ML20127B833
| ML20127B833 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 01/05/1993 |
| From: | NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127B831 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9301130149 | |
| Download: ML20127B833 (20) | |
Text
_ - _ _
NSD921231 Attachment 1 Page 1 of 9 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES FOR REMOVAL OF BUS 1A and IB LOW VOLTAGE AUXILIARY RELAYS Re11 icd _Im1c1 S3 70 SS 71 _
References:
- 1) CNS Technical Specification Amendment 43, dated April ll,1978, "Undervoltage protection and Relays"
- 2) CNS Technical Specification Amendment 124, dated August 3,1988,
" Revised Setpoints for Undervoltage Relays"
- 3) CNS Technical Specification Amendment 144, dated July 17, 1991,
" Revise loss of Voltage Relay Settings" 1RIRODE110d The Nebraska public Power District (District) requests that the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO's) and Surveillance Requirements for Residual Heat Removal (RilR) and Core Spray (CS) relays 27X31A/lB be removed from the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) lechnical Specifications. The RilR & CS 27X3 1A/lB are '
auxiliary relays in the first level (loss of voltage) undervoltage protection scheme for buses lA and 10. The relays are presently listed in Tables 3.2.0 and 4.2.0 on the above pages in the CNS Technical Specifications. The RHR & CS 27X3 1A/lB relays were originally included in the licensing of CNS with their function being to detect when power is available to Buses lA and IB from the Startup Station Service Transformer (SSST) and to bypass the sequential loading timers for the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pumps during a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). Emergency buses if and IG normally receive power from the Normal Station Service Transformer (NSST) or the SSST via buses lA and IB respectively, with backup power directly provided by either the Emergency Station Service Transformer (ESST) or the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). As a result of past modifications and commitments by the District along with modifications scheduled to take place during the spring 1993 refuel;ng outage the need for the RilR & CS 27X31A/lB relays to monitor bus lA and IB voltage will no longer exist.
9301130149 930105 0 PDR ADOCK 0500 P
llh . _ ___---- . . _ _
NSD921231 Attachment 1 Page 2 of 9 R1100SS10H During the upcoming spring 1993 refueling outage the Nebraska Public Power District (District) will replace the existing Emergency Station Service Transformer with a new Emergency Transformer. Included as part of the installation of the new Emergency Transformer will be overvoltage protective relays in the control logic for the 4160 volt switchgear breakers from the new Emergency Transformer to the 4160 F and G buses (Breakers IFS and 1GS). This transformer replacement will require the use of 52a contacts from breakers IFS and 1GS in the new Overvoltage Relay Protection Scheme. Thus, by modifying the __
existing RHR and CS power monitoring logic, relays RHR & CS 27X3 1A/lB, and breakers IFS / LGS and EGl/EG2 52a contacts are no longer required. As such, the District requests the removal of the two relays from the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) Technical Specifications.
The existing alignment and safety function of the relays is discussed below. The original GE design of the RHR and CS relay logics started the RHR and CS pumps dif ferently depending on the power source (Figure 1 attached). If the SSST source was available, the RHR and CS pumps were block started onto the SSST. If the SSST was not available, but the ESST or the EDG was available, the RHR and CS pumps were sequentially started onto either of these power sources. The RHR & CS 27X3 1A/lB relays were originally included in the licensing of CNS with their function being to energize RHR relays RHR-REL-K2A/B and Core Spray relays CS-REL-K2A/B when 5 a first level undervoltage (Reference 3) condition did not exist (no loss of voltage) on Buses lA and IB with the tie breakers closed, thus powering buses IF and IG from the SSST (Figure 1 attached). Energizing relays RHR-REl-K2A/B and CS-REL-K2A/B would bypass the scquential loading timers and result in a block start of the RHR and CS pumps when powered from the SSST. During the Safety System functional Inspection (SSFI) of CNS conducted in 1987, the District committed to removing the block start capability and initiate sequential loading of the ECCS pumps on the SSST to improve voltage control on the critical buses. This essentially changed the GE relay logic to initiate sequential loading of the RHR and CS pumps on the availability of the SSST, the ESST or the EDG by reconfiguring the RHR-REL-K2A/B and CS-REL-K2A/B relays from bypassing the sequential loading timers to energizing the timers (Figure 2 attached). In this configuration, the RHR & CS 27X31A/lB relays initiated sequential loading when buses if and 1G were powered from buses 1A and IB via the SSST. In 1989, the Second Level Undervoltage
NSD921231 Attachment 1 j
Page 3 of 9 System (Reference 1) was modified to extend second level undervoltage protection to the Emergency Transformer (Reference 2). The existing Bus if and 1G first level undervoltage system and the modified second level undervoltage system essentially provide continuous monitoring of all offsite power sources and aligns a power source with adequate voltage, thereby ensuring adequate voltage is available at Buses If and 1G prior to sequential loading of the ECCS pump motors from offsite sources. (4160 Buses lf and 1G normally receive power from the SSST via buses l A and lu, with backup power directly provided by either the ESST or the EDG). If both the SSST and ESST have inadequate voltage, then the first or second level undervoltage system transfers buses if and IG to the EDG's by inhibiting the close signal and inserting a trip signal to the offsite power supply breakers.
lhe actual available power source to Buses IF and IG is not important since the undervoltage protection schemes ensure buses lf and IG can adequately power the RHR and CS pumps during sequential loading of the ECCS pump motors. Therefore, ,
the need for the RHR & CS 27X31A/lB relays to monitor bus lA and IB voltage will no longer exist. The bus If and 1G first level and second level undervoltage relay systems provide a continuous monitor of the offsite power sources feeding buses if and 1G, and ensure adequate voltage at Buses lf and IG will be available prior to beginning sequential loading of the ECCS pump motors onto either the SSST, ESST, or EDG, whichever power source is available. (See Reference 1).
The existing RHR and CS relay logics utilize 52a contacts from breakers IFS / LGS -
and EGl/EG2 in the RHR and CS pump start logic. The RHR and CS relay logic will be modified to perform the same safety function without the breaker IFS and IGS interlocks. The existing 52a contacts from breakers EGl and EG2 (emergency diesel generator breakers) will also be removed without changing the safety function.
The removal of the IFS, IGS, EG1, and EG2 S2a contacts will simplify the RHR and CS pump start circuitry while providing the same safety function. With these contacts removed, the power monitoring looic of the RHR and CS logic continues to provide a sequential start of the RHR and CS pump motors when adequate voltage is available on Buses IF and 1G (Figure 3 attached). The modification will simplify the RHR and CS relay logic, by removing a component in the logic scheme, and will not change the desired performance of the RHR, the CS or the EE systems.
In summary, when the RHR & CS 27X31A/lB relays were originally included in the licensing of CNS, their function was to initiate a block start signal of the ECCS
NSD921231 Attachment 1 Page 4 of 9 pumps onto the SSST when voltage was available on buses lA and 18 and the tie breakers between buses lA and if and IB and IG were closed during a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). However, as a result of commitments made in response to the SSfl at CNS, the District removed the block start loading of the SSST and incorporated Sequential Loading of the ECCS pumps from this power source.
With the existing bus if and 1G first level undervoltage systems, and the modified second level undervoltage system the need for the RliR & CS 27X31A/lB relays to monitor bus lA and IB voltage no longer exist. The bus IF and IG first level undervoltage relay system (Reference 3) will ensure an immediate transfer of power sources on loss of voltage to buses If and 1G when powered from the SSST or ESST and initiate the sequential loading timer. The second level undervoltage relay system logic (References 1 & 2) will ensure buses IF and IG are powered either from offsite sources with adequate voltage or the EDG's. Additionally, the first and the second level undervoltage relays are currently controlled by the CNS Technical Specifications with attendant setpoints and surveillance frequencies, to ensure they are operable.
Therefore, the District requests that the CNS Technical Specifications be revised to remove relays RHR & CS 27X31A/lB from the protective instrumentation tables 3.2.B and 4.2.8 located on pages 53, 55, 70, and 71 respectively.
DESCRIPTION Of CHANGES The District requests that the CNS Technical Specifications be revised as described below:
o On Page $3, Table 3.2.B (Page 1), completely remove " Aux Bus low Voltage Relay 27X3 - 1A & IB".
o On Page 55~, Table 3.2.B (Page 3), completely remove " Bus lA low Voltage Aux. Relay 27 X 3/lA", and completely remove " Bus IB Low Voltage Aux Relay 27 X 3/1B". <
L o On Page 70, Table 4.~2.B (Page 1), completely remove " Aux. Bus low ,
i Voltage Relay 27X3 - 1A & IB".
P i o On Page 71, Table 4.2.0 (Page 2), completely remove " Low Voltage i
Relays 27 X 3/lA", and completely remove " Low Voltage Relays 77 X 3/lB".
1 i
l
. . - . , ~ . .. --. ....... _ ------ - - , .-.- -.....-..,..-. .-
NSD921231 Attachment 1 Page 5 of 9 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS DETERMINATION 10 CFR 50.91(a)(1), requires that licensee requests for operating license amendments be accompanied by an evaluation of significant hazards posed by the issuance of the amendment. This evaluation is to be performed with respect to the criteria given in 10CFR50.92(c). The following analysis meets these requirements.
Evaluation __gf_this Amendment with Resocct to 10 CFR 50.92 The enclosed Technical Spcification change is judged to involve no significant hazards based on the following:
- 1. Does the proposed license amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Evaluation The proposed li.,nse amendment will remove the Auxiliary low Voltage Relays 27X3 1A/18 in both the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Core Spray (CS) systems. These relays are used to provide a start permissive signal to the RHR and CS pump motors if voltage is available at buses IA and IB respectively and the tie breakers between IA and IF are closed or the tie breakers between IB and IG are closed. During accident conditions emergency.
Buses If and IG normally receive power from the SSST via buses lA and IB, with backup power directly provided by either the ESST or the EDG. Removal of these relays will not affect the RHR and CS system logic that requires adequate bus voltage be available prior to initiating-the start sequence of the ECCS pumps. The existing plant configuration of the Bus IF and 1G first and second level undervoltage relay logic ichemes (References 1, 2, & 3) ensures that adequate voltage is available from either offsite power sources (SSST and ESST) or the' onsite power source (EDG); therefore, adequate-voltage at Bus IF and 1G would be an acceptable condition to allow sequential loading. Identifying the actual power source.(SSST, ESST, EDG) supplying power to buses IF and IG is no- longer important since all available : power sources can adequately power the RHR and CS pumps during sequential loading.
==
1
.b, - w .c e wew.e_... m , .-..,........m_....., ,. , , , , . . , . , , _ . , , , , , m,...m.,,..,. yy_,,_ym_.,.rmm,*- 9'm--v--m' &mmww -*we v w m *' n-'-'---==r--w-nr w w
NSD921231 Attachment 1 Page 6 of 9 The safety function of the RHR and CS relay logic is to sense an accident condition, start the ECCS pumps, and open the injection valves at a preset pressure. The safety function of the RHR & CS 27X31A/lB relays is to monitor voltage on buses l A and 18, and tie breaker status for IFS / LGS, and if adequate voltage is available and the tie breakers are closed to initiate a permissive signal to start the sequential loading timers for the ECCS pumps during a LOCA. The ECCS pumps are loaded on buses if and 1G which are powered from buses lA and IB via the SSST. However, this safety function is also provided by the first and second level undervoltage relay schemes, _
which ensure buses If and 1G are always powered from a source with adequate voltage. The safety function of the bus if and 1G first level undervoltage relay is to provide an immediate loadshed of the ECCS loads and a transfer to an available power source af ter detecting a loss of voltage. The second level undervoltage relay system ensures that an offsite power source or the onsite power source with adequate voltage is available to buses IF and 1G to start and run the ECCS loads. The proposed removal of the RHR & CS 27X3 1A/lB relays and RHR and CS relay logic modifications will not change the operation, duration, or timing of the sequential loading logic for the ECCS loads. Therefore, the safety function of the RHR and CS relay logic is not affected by the removal of RHR & CS 27X31A and IB relays.
The RHR and CS Emergency Core Cooling Systems will still perform their -
intended safety function as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) for the loss of Coolant Accident with the approval of this proposed change. By maintaining the safety function of these ECCS systems CNS will continue to meet the criteria prescribed in the 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K analysis assuring that the CNT ECCS are capable of meeting their design bases and licensing requirements. The probabilities of a LOCT or other design basis accident will not be increased with approval of this proposed change because, the performance characteristics of the RHR and CS systems are not affected by this change, only a change in the logic scheme for initiating ECCS sequential loading is taking place. This is accomplished by using the bus lf and 1G first level undervoltage relay system instead of the first level RHR & CS 27X3 1A/lB relays to monitor the emergency buses IF and 1G for voltage when powered by the SSST to initiate sequential loading of the ECCS pump motors. Furthermore, the first and second level
l' NSD921231 Attachment 1 Page 7 of 9 undervoltage relays are currently controlled by the CNS Technical Specifications with attendant setpoints and surveillance frequencies, to j ensure the components are operable. ,
lhe removal of the RilR & CS 27X31A/1B relays will simplify the RHR and CS pump start circuitry while providing the same safety function. The modified RilR and CS relay logic, will not change the desired performance or safety function of the RHR or CS systems. Therefore, based on the above discussions, the changes proposed in this amendment request do not represent a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility for a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Lv319All1U1 4
This proposed change removes auxiliary relays RHR & CS 27X31A/lB which i
, monitor voltage on buses lA and IB, and tie breaker status for lfS/ LGS, and if adequate voltage is available and the tie breakers are closed would initiate a permissive signal to start the sequential loading timers for the ECCS pumps during a LOCA. The function of auxiliary relays RHR & CS 27X3 1A/lB is unnecessary since the safety function is performed by the existing first and second level undervoltage relay logics, which ensures that Buses if and 1G are powered from either offsite power source (SSST or ESST) with adequate voltage, or the onsite power source (EDG). The bus if and IG first level undervoltage relay system provides an immediate loadshed of the ECCS loads and a transfer to an available power source after detecting a loss of ;
voltage with a subsequent initiation signal to the sequential loading timer.
The second level undervoltage relay system ensures an offsite or onsite-power source with adequate voltage is available to buses If and 1G to start and run the ECCS loads. The monitoring of Bus IA and IB by these relays will not be required since the first and second level undervoltage logic '
monitors voltage at Bus IF and IG which directly powers the ECCS loads from one of the three available power sources (SSST, ESST, or EDG). Bus IF and IG normally receive power from Bus lA and 18 respectively, therefore, monitoring Bus If and IG to initiate any ECCS sequential loading _would be
--....-_.,~-...<_..~.,-.~-...m...,.a ..d.....m,-.-,__,. ._,.mm,~m-,,,.m.E.
NSD921231 Attachment 1 Page 8 of 9 acceptable. Identifying the actual power source (SSST, E3ST, EDG) to Buses 1
If and IG is no longer important since all power sources can adequately power the RHR and CS pumps during sequential loading. Therefore, the utilization of bus If and 1G voltage as a permissive signal to begin sequential loading of the ECCS pump motors does not-create the possibility for a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously :
evaluated. ,
l
- 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety?
Evaluatton This proposed change to the Technical Specifications removes relays RHR &
CS 27X31A/lB, that monitor available voltage on Buses IA/18 and tie breaker status for IFS / LGS. These relays are used to provide a start permissive signal to the RHR and CS pump motors if adequate voltage is available at buses IA/lB respectively, and the 1FS/ LGS tie breakers are closed. The ,
adequacy of voltage at buses IA and 18 provides an indirect indication of voltage at buses If and IG, because buses if and 1G normally receive power from the SSST via buses IA and IB, respectively. The function that these relays performed will now be accomplished by the bus IF and IG first and second level undervoltage relay logic. The bus IF and IG first level undervoltage relay system provides an immediate loadshed of the ECCS loads and a transfer to an available power source with a subsequent initiation signal to the sequential loading timer after detecting a loss of voltage.
The second level undervoltage relay system (References 1 & 2) ensures an offsite power source with adequate voltage is available to buses IF and 1G to start and run the ECCS loads. Monitoring both Bus IA/lB and IF/lG is not i needed or necessary, because buses IF and 1G normally receive power from the SSST via buses lA and 18, with backup power directly provided by either the ESST or the EDG. By monitorins Bus IF and 1G for adequate voltage to initiate sequential loading of the ECCS pump motors, the safety function of ,
the RHR and CS logic systems is maintained. The RHR and CS Emergency Core Cooling Systems will still perform their intended safety function as ;
l -described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) for the loss of Coolant _ Accident with the approval of this proposed change. By maintaining i . m, L, .-. . _ _ , _ . , _ , , . . . . . . . . . - . _ . -__,,_,.-._,__,,..._,._.,,._,_.,__,__...-._____..___.-_._o _ . _ . . _ . . , . _ .
l NSD921231 Attachment 1 Page 9 of 9 i
the safety function of these ECCS systems CNS will continue to meet the criteria prescribed in the 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K analysis assuring that CNS ECCS are capable of meeting their design bases and licensing requirements. Therefore, the removal of the RHR & CS 27X31A/lB relays for i
RHR and CS pump start circuitry will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
LOKLVSION The District has evaluated the proposed changes described above against the criteria of 10CFR50.92(c) in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.91(a)(1).
This evaluation has determined that Proposed Change No.116 to the CNS Technical Specification will not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the possibility for a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) create a significant reduction in the margin of safety. Therefore, the District requests NRC approval of this proposed Technical Specification Change Number 116.
ham
ry%C$
, >g Xi$ f _
H T
t 1
w T
- r. S L
1 A C S I
M s (} GS G O S eY 1 LM vAL L O I
R O uE A eR E A RF R
T J
S I I
K U GT C
O L
B
)
p,I I ]
(( I F
iR G ROT A S
0
(
A _ DK 2 EC I
- K _ . FO
_ UL G
PB
! l g8
_ N Y M I
e1 )
8 _ oA S
Y : _ tY AA i
A 2
_ rL L
E NE E D R ) _ u A
B cE EV C
(
A _ ST I
O 5 1 _ S L K -
- _ P N : M EMT H _ U WC N 1 E
- _ P DSSE i i I l l l I E I L S SGR O OP C L
CL eJ (} D N
A R
) H eJ G
i (}
R
) (
2 r )
R G i B E /
2
(
A O x 4 F G 7 K -
2 L
= )
=
A C
iI l I1 ! L I P
l )
G Y D _ ) (
1 T E ) .
NZ i L S F B
EQ G 1
( G HR 1 / A N I
1 WE4 X 3
K R
D F 7 O D 2 T ES )G = : YG NI O
L (f 2 :- u CSJ: I II l I l lII l R
e )
B E
T W
( O A ) P 1 B
(
/ A
- 3 2 x K 7
_ 2 DS :
ER : .
NZE \
ECK _
HPAD WEE _
NRE D EBS O l iI [ 1 l L E
Sfh ) BEL C OA $ go9 L H {
CST U! hN -
Bw l ,' !; ! j.i = 3 l 4 ;ii j ! 4 ;ii :
- !. i& tfr ii;iI};f !! j Ii l ![tY! ; '!!,j :: l!l !
=$E:m~
>N:i.E - T U
O H
T T I T R
A WS e Y T C}
S A
L S CS I
Ec Dr P Y 2 GO M s VM UE LO Eo V PR E R i t Tc R GF N
I T Fil ;I U
F EX SK I
)
e
( _ _
4 2
DC O x _ -
EI L
- _ F B
- G U
_ f 4
iY P
D M
)
B _ AM S I
( OE r
4
_ LR K _ LY Y
A :
Au TI L N E E
R _
ED -
> U -
L 3
x
_ S 1
- _ P N
Eg
_ M HgT _ U WgN _ _ P DgSE i l ! II I L ~
E E I [ S S R C OgP L
Cg e> C) D N
A R
) H e> c i C)
R
) (
)
2 G
r i B R
/
2
(
A O L(E1 x 4 K
F 2G 7 3E 2 L
- : A C
I I I ! 1 g I l l
)
P c Y D
E l_ ) (
1
)
T NZ L S r 0 EG i
c t
( G HR 1 / A N t(s WEN 1
x 3 R 2r 7 K O D E 31 2 TI E )G : N S -
vOM O (F - :
L CSU i I i I i i ! I l l l L R B ) E B W i
f O A ) P 1 B
(
/ A 3 2 x K 7
2 DS -
ER NIE - '
EGV HRA D WEE NRE _
D EBS C j I 1 i; ;lII E)EL S
OA (B !TC L
g" 5" CSUITH h g[~
U BW
I CLOSED WHEN GCE WHW
- BUS F(C) ENERGZED ES T l 1 i
l L7 , e e i
I c
- ) ) )
g J l
I l
[
l 1 g L _ :: LOCA RELAY I I l , l _ _ T:ME DLLAY F -- CLO5:NO l l I
$ I 1 o g. L :: 27X1/1F(1G) L:: 27X2/1F(1G) : K3A(B) 2: K4A(B) ya l
.0g i I
S I
___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _J l
K3A(B) K4A(B) L- SEQUENTIAL LOAD:NG PUMP STARI TIME DELAY RELAY RELAY
- l.
1I < r (
) ) )
. Y $$
POWER MONITORING 78 oy 5U TYPICAL FOR RHR AND CS PUMPS 5~
- i. .
l . FIGURE 3 SIMPLIFIED PROPOSED LOGIC WITH 27X3/1A(18) RELAYS REMOVED
E
. i I.
I
- t i
i' ,
l l'
' f
- 3. .
I COOPER 23UCLEAR STAT *CN l
.ABLE 3.2.3 (PAGE 1) -
I e
l CIRCUITRY REQUIREMENTS CORE SPRAY SYS m i I
- Minimum Number of Action Required When i Instrument . Cperable Sc
- tponent; Component Operability
- j. Instrument I.D. No. Setti-.e Limit Per Trio Svstem Is Not Assured (11 k i j ,
Reactor Low Water NBI-LIS-72 A, B, C, 2-la5.5 of Indicated 2 A ;
Level &D Level'
?
Reactor Lou Pressure NBI-PS-52 A2 & C2, s450 psig 2 A ,
NBI-PIS-52 3 & D [
(Switch 92) [
t
- Drywell High Pressure. PC-PS-101, A, B, 52 psig 2 A [
- j. C&D s i
' Core Spray' Pump CS-PS-44, A & B 2 A '\ '{t L w Disch. Pressure CS-PS-37, A & B 100 s P s 165 psig l: " t' %*kg/
r-l' Core Spray Pump CS-TDR-K16 9sTsll' seconds 1 B ,(Y Time Delay A&B N
= .
t Low Voltage Relay 27X1 - lF & 1G Loss of Voltage 1. 3 i
. Emerg. Bus 27X2 - 1F & 1G. r l
~ _
,. .~. - r - - -- N ;
Aux. Bus Low 27X3 - lA & IB Loss of Voltage 1 3 [
Voltage Relay _
m _ _ ~
- Pump Discharge Line CM-PS-73, A & B 210 psig (3) D i ii Low Pressure i E
e :
+
a !
w t
+ N n f N r a -r
'i! ,l (I:!l.t tI[L!'j![!!iIf !! (!i i t y
nt ei hl )
Wi1 b(
d a erd r ee i pr uO q
u s
et s A A A A B B D R nA e
nnt ooo i pN t m cos ACI s
t f n oe roe nm ept bmoyms )
uCS 3 N 2 2 2 2 1 1 (
eo ml i ubr M mat .
i r E ner T i pe S MOP Y
S d Y e g t
A t a i N R i c s O) P a r i p e I 1 S i d s g T L n 5 d a AEE I 6 n t TGR e 1 o l SAO n f c o PC i o g s e V R( t i s g A S t 5 s g P f i E
L B_T e p i 1 o s N S 5l s s 1 .
p C 2.E 4 e 0 p s s U M 1 v 5 0 T s 0 N3E - e 4 2 0 s o 1 R 2L 5 $ 1 9 L 2 REI ELU PBQ OAE OTR .
C C ,
Y 2 R t ,
CD ,
T I n B B BB B .
U e . ,D && GG C mo )
A
&& 11 &
R uN A& 2B2 I r A # AA .
&& A '
t 2 2 ,
6 2 5 h' C FF ',
sD 7 1 , , 1 n - 5 - c 0 47 K II 3 I I S - S t 1 43 - 7 I SI i - - - R - - -
- S P PP T I2 1 II ( - - - &- XX -
B BB C SS S 77 M N NN P CC CA 22 C -
e e r r uD e u s n r s s& y i t e s e a L .
n t e rC pe p- l
_ e a r P mr m e a m W P uu u R g u h g
P s P re e ar
_ r w w s yy gs t o o i ye hu s L l H ar aa au cs n -
rP rl tB ss I r r l p pe l i e o o l S . SD o . D r e
p P-tl t h V g ce c w ec ee r
av a y r s rm w_e mw uo Iem ee e r oi oi RL R D CD CT E PL
$w.
- I e !' j4 ! ; l; ! ! jl,; ;lli!lIIli!! e; i .
COOPER NUCLEAR STATION TABLE 3.2.B (Page 3)
RESIEUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM (LPCI MODE) CIRCUITRY REQUIRE'4ESTS Minimum Number of Action Required @ en Operable Components Component Opetability Instrument is Wt A s v>tred I.D. h. Se ttitu- Limi t Per Trin Svstem (1)
Instrueent 1 A RER-dP15-125 A & B 22500 gpm R11R Pump Low Flow 1 A FJ!R-TDR-KAS, lA51B 4.255Ts5.75 min.
Time Delays A
PJIR Pump Start RHR-TDR-K75A & E70B 4.5sTs5.5 Sec. 1 A
1 RHR-TDR-K75B & K70A s.5 sec.
Time Delay B
RHR Heat Exchanger RHR-TDR-K93, A & B 1.S$T52.2 min. 1 Bypass T.D.
(3) E RHR-LMS-8 Valve Not closed EllR Crosstle Valve I )
!
- Position I e.
v B Loss of Voltage i Bus IF Low Volt. 27 X 1/1F 1 B Loss of Voltage j
Aux. Relays 27 X 2/lF 1 5 Loss of Voltage Bus 1G Jow Volt. 27 X 1/1G 27 X 2/1G Loss of Voltage Atix . Relays D
CM-PS-266 25 psig (3)
Pump Distr:arge Line 215 psig (3) D CM-PS-270 2 B 27/1F-2, 27/1FA-2 3880V 152V Emergency Buses 7.5 second 1.8 sec. 2 B Undervoltage Relays 27/1G-2, 27/1GB-2 B time delay 1 (degraded voltage) 27/1F-1, 27/1FA-1, 2300V 15%
Emergency Buses Loss of Voltage Relays 27/IG-1, 27/1GB-1, 0.0 sTs 5.0 sec. B T - Time Delay 1 27/ET-1, 27/ET-2 Emergency Buses Under- 27X7/1F, 2 7X7/1G, B Voltage Relays Timers 5 second 1.5 sec. 1
COOPER !!UCLEAR STATION TABLE 4.2.B (Page 1)
CORE SPEXi SYSTEM TEST & CALIBRATION FREQUENCIES .
Instrument Calibration Freo. O wck Item I.D. No. Functional Test Freo.
Item Instrum-nt Once/3 Months once/D..y NBI-LIS-72, A,B,C, 6D Once/ Month (1)
- 1. Reactor Low Water Level NBI-PS-52, A1,A2,C1, & C2 Once/ Month (1) Once/3 Months None
- 2. Reactor Low Pressure NBI-PIS-52, B 6 D Once/3 Months None PC-PS-101, A,B,C. &D Once/ Month (I) ';o ne
- 3. Drywe11 11' gh Pressure Once/3 Months Core Spray Pump Disch. CS-PS-44, A&B once/ Month (1) 4 Once/3 Months None CS - PS - 3 7, A & B Once/ Month (1)
Press. Once/Oper. <ene Core Spray Pump Time Delay CS-TDR - K16, A & B Once/ Month (1)
S. Cycle (4)
Once/Oper. Cycle N.A. None
- 6. Emergency Bus low Volt Relay 27X1 - IF & 1G None 27X2 - IF & IG Once/Oper. Cycle N' c) once/3 Months None l Pump Disch. Line Low Press. CM-PS-73, A & B Once/3 Months 7.
Lonic (4) (6)
N.A. N.A.
Logic Power Monitor once/6 Months
- 1. N.A. N.A.
Core Spray Initiation once/6 Months
- 2. Once/6 Months N.A. N A.
- 3. Pump & Valve (Signal Override)
Control y
- !!I{ i[l[t> fi
- [}If1;{[j[j! .
j ;tfit ,! !I ,i
- tt IilI , ti t .
n s s.
e yy r r mk aa h h uc r he DD
/ /
2 1
2 1
ts C eeeee e eeeeeee eee/ e
/
e e _
n ncc nn onnoo n
o nnnnnnn ooooo oo nnn ooon c c n
n o
I NooNN N NNNNNNN NNNO O N a eeee e ll ll r cc cc s s s F ss s ss s ss syyyy sh h h hhhhh h hhhCCCC ht t t n t t t t t t t t t t n n n o nnnnn n nnn . . . . no o o i ooooo o ooorrrr oM M M t MMMMM M MMM ee pppp ee M a 8 8 8 .
r 33333 3 333 OOOO 3 1 1 1 b ///// / // / / // // / /
i eeeee e eeee e ee . ee e e '
l ccccc c cccccccA. cc c c a nnnnn n nnnnnnn nn n n C OOOOO O OOOOOOON OO O o e
e r
F t
s ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
S e 11 111 1 1111111177 s E T ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ((( ( ( h' I t C l hhhhh h hhhhhhhh nh h h N a t t t t t t t t t t t t t t ot t t E
U o n nnnnn ooooo n
o nnnnnnnn oooooooo Mn o
n o
n o
Q i MMMMM M MMMMMMMM 3M M M E t ///// / //////// // / /
N R c eeeee e eeee eeee ee e e F n ccccc c cccc cccc cc c c O)
I 2 u nnnnn n nnnnnnnn nn OO n n T N F OOOOO O OOOOOOOO O O A e O T gI T , ,
S PaA 1 2 12 R( R # - - -
B 2 G GT A I D C 1 l E E B.L L A D
&1 & DD 7
/ //
77 C
U 2.C &
C D
&& 3 GG02 ll7 22 .
N4 & C ,B 1 & BB1 BB //2 ,
11 RE EL TS ,B& C,C,& & & & & 21 - 2 S - - G PB .B B2 C D C. B,B,A A1 A A A .XXPA AT1 OA E ,A A,& B. - F FE/
OT T . ,A ,& lBA AA 77Ml l/7 C o A ,3AA ,5 , , ,
22C/ /7X M N ,
20553 7 727 E ,27 2 , 0517479 , , , 2 2 ,2 T .
17 8259 20 - KKKK8FF6 S D 0 S25 - 1 11S - - - - - 116 2 ,1 ,
Y 1ST1 - S1 - - I RRRRS//22 1 F S I - I I - SI - SSPDDDDM21 - B Bl SLLSPFS PPdTTTTL SFGFG/
R m P - - P - - P - - - - - - - - xXPll11 7 E e - I I I I - RRRRRRRR - ////X R t CEBRBBC EHHHHHHH77 RRRRRRRR22C22222 M77777 I PNNRNNP D. . D. n e e l T To i wg g e t oa a v n . . yeyst Lt) t e e ssh asasi l e l lL m s scl ol as . o gf o e n eet el epo r r i D C D yP '
svao v r
evd reuee; i srt a PP w B eel s e uLorr t S e ee e rd os d s ruu n e-g mvmrvssP nVo n srhss o wili el yy U L U eeS ss C r- oT aTgaaae d rt ee aal V nVll nses - s P al rr .
hhFt t a eeied ese W ePP s cc rnrh eRRLsasyss hgwsww s s e
sswaoaci ii otit x uruaur bgBlB e n i oeoo r DDLS tSETeeggh .
e e m m o HLVLL P c s a a c yD yR yi e i ppppept st t sc( c cT t t l rrrr l mmmmjmaolli n nen .
I a l oooo l uuuunuerooD eseges t et t t t e yP P P P I P H C V V gygagy n wcccc yaaaa wa prart ra e yrRRtUU t RRRR wwmel el el m reeee r PH H DSRRF F OU HHHHooumemome u
r DRRRR RRRRLLPERE.VER t
s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ;
n 1'. 2345678 12345 6 7 8 9 0 . 9 0 I 11111 1 111 1L2
,Z* :
i , , ' l\ ;i)' f j' ,ijj[j![j1;j;[!! i:
- COOPER NUCLEAR STATION ,
TAP' E 3.2.B (Page 3)
RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL S3?EM (LPCI MODE) CIRCUITRY REQUIREMENTS Minimu=i Nusber of A . . u Required L' hen Instrument Operable Components Corpor ent Operability Instrument I.D. No. Settine Limit Per Trip System (1) Is Not Assured RHR Pump Low Flow RER-dPIS-125 A & B m z500 gpo, 1 A Time Delays RHR-TDR-K45, lA&lB 4.25sTs5.75 min. 1 A ,
RhR Pump Start RHR-TDR-K75A 6 K703 4.5$T55.5 Sec. 1 A ,.
Time Delay RHR-TDR-K75B & K70A s.5 sec. 1 A y /)
V 0 R11R Heat Exchanger. RHR-TDR-K93, A 6 B 1.85T62.2 min. 1 B Bypass T.D. ,
RilR Crosstie Valve EHR-U!S-8 Valve Not closed (3) E Y
- ~ -_.-
Bus 1A Low Volt. 27 X 3/1A Loss of Voltage 1 B Aux. Relay-Bus IB Loc Volt.
,, Aux. Relay _
27 X 3/1B Loss of Voltat 1
B
)
Bus IF Loi Volt. 27 X 1/lF Loss of Voltage 1 B Aur Relays 27 X 2/1F Loss.of Voltage 1 B Bus 1G Low Volt. 27 X 1/lc Loss of Voltage 1 B Aux. Relays 27 X 2/1G 1ess of Voltage Pump Dic harge Line CM-PS-266 25 psig (3) D CM-PS-270 215 psig (3) D Emergency Buses 27/lF-2. 27/1FA-2 '3880V iS2V 2 8 Undervoltage Relays 27/1G-2, 27/1GB-2 7.5 second i.8.sec. 2 B (degraded voltage) time delay 1 B Emergency Buses Loss 27/1F-1, 27/lFA-1, 2300V iSI c, f Voltage Relays 27/1C-1,.27/lCB-1, 0.0 STs 5.0 sec.
27/ET-1, 27/ET-2 T ~ Time Delay E Eg 1 E Emergency Buses Under- 27X7/lF, 27X7/1G, 5 second y Voltage Relays Timers .5 sec. 1 B er -
.-d
TNB B Pa e 1 j .
CORE SPRAY SYSTEM TEST & CALIBRATION FREQUENCIES Instrument Item Item I.D. No. Functional Test Freq. Calibration Freq. Check i
Instrument s I'
- l. Reactor Low Water Level NBI-LIS-72, A,B,C, & D Once/ Month (1) Once/3 Months once,jDay :
i 2. Reactor Low Pressure NBI-PS-52, Al,A2,C1, & C2 Once/ Month (1) Once/2 Months Ndne NBI-PIS-52, B & D I
- 3. Drywel.' High Pressure PC-PS-101, A,B,C, & D Once/ Month (1) Once/3 Months Ndne Core Spray Pump Disch. CS-PS-44, A & B once/ Month (1) Once/3 Months None
! 4. . ,
Press. CS-PS-37, A & B Once/ Month (1) Once/3 Months None{ ;
- 5. Core S' ray Pump Time Delay CS-TDR - Ki 6, A & B once/ Month (1) Once/Oper. None' l l Cycle (4) t i
- 6. Emergency Bus Low V.dt Relay 27X1 - IF & 1G Once/Oper. Cycle N.A. None }
27X2 - IF & IG once/Oper. Cycle N.A. None t[
. Bus _ Low Voltage Relay _ 2713_ W _IB Once/Oper.Cyclei %. _
[
Once/3 Months once/3 Months None
,- . Pump Disch. Line Low Press. CM-PS-73, A & B
/ ,
j 8
1.ogic (4) (6) i r' i
Once/6 Months N.A. N, A. !
- 1. Logic Power Monitor
- 2. Core Spray Initiation Once/6 Months N.A. N .?A.l 1 3. Pump & Valve (Signal override) Once/6 Months N.A. NjA. j Control l
$oMPtsTEL y -
SENOVE f
i o i R !
4
':: t
~
COOPER NUCLEAR STATION
TABLE 4.2.B (Page 2) ,
RHR SYSTEM TEST & CALIBRATION FREQUENCIES Instrument Item Item 1.D. No. Functional Test Frea. Calibration Frea. Check Ins t rume nt a t i on
- 1. PC-PS-101, A, B, C & D Once/ Month (1) Once/3 Months None Drywell liigh Pressure
- 2. Reactor low L'ater Level NBI-LIS-72, A, B, C & D #1 Once/ Month (1) Once/3 Months once/ Day
- 3. Reactor Vessel Shroud Level NBI-LITS-73, A & B #1 Once/ Month (1) Once/3 Months Once/ Day
- 4. Reactor Low Pressure RR-PS-128 A & B Once/ Month (1) Once/3 Months None
- 5. Reactor low Pressure NBI-PS-52 Al,A2.C1, & C2 Once/ Month (1) Once/3 Months None NBI-PIS-52 B & D
- 6. Drywell Press.-Containment PC-PS-119, A,B,C & D Once/ Month (1) Once/3 Months None Spray
- 7. RilR Pump Discharge Press. R11R-PS-120, A,B,C & D Once/ Month (1) Once/3 Months None
. 8. RllR Pump Discharge Press. R11R-PS-105, A,B,C & D Once/ Month (1) Once/3 Months None 1 9. PilR Pump Low Flow Switch Rlla-dP15-125 A & B Once/ Month (1) Once 3 Months None
- 10. RiiR Pump Start Time Delay RilR-TDR-K70, A & B Once/ Month (1) Once/Oper. Cycle None
- 11. RilR Injection Valve Close T.D. R]IR-TDR-K45 LA & IB Once/ Month (1) Once/Oper. Cycle None
- 12. RilR Pump Start. Time Delay .RHR-TDR-K75, A & B Once/ Month (1) Once/Oper. Cycle None
- 13. R!IR Heat Exchanger Bypass T.D. RHR-TDR-K93, A & B Once/ Month (1) Once/Oper. Cycle None .
14._ Ri!R Cron Tie Valve S-8 Once/ Month (1) N.A.
- 15. Low Voltage Relays Position27gX 3/lA
^
- N - -
None } ,
6 Low Vo h Relay g _ _ ___ _ 21 X 3 /1R . J._ _
_ . _ -Jgne -
None 1
/ J4 Low Voltage Relays 27 x 2/1F, 27 X 2/1G (7) !
(7) None
/f, J3. Low Voltage Relays 27 X 1/1F, 27 X 1/lG CM-PS-266, CM-PS-270 None
/7 JM. Pump Dis h. Line Press. Low Once/3 Months Once/3 Months j g J4. Emergency buses Undervoltage 27/1F-2, 27/lFA-2, 27/1G-2, once/ Month once/18 Months CoceA2 hrs.
Relays (Degraded Voltage) 27/1GB-2
/67 74. Emergency Buses Loss of 27/1F-1, 27/lFA-1, 27/1G-1, once/ Month once/18 Months Cece/12 hrs.
Voltage Relays .27/1CB-1, 27/ET-1, 27/ET-2 once/18 Months None J7g7d. Emergency Buses Undervoltage 27X7/1F, 27X7/lG Once/ Month Relays Timers fo C. f))h 0fbb E d/myd f7g4et/E
. - - _ .