Text

Proposed TS Re Primary Containment Isolation Valve Tables
	ML20056G597
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Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	08/31/1993
From:	; NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
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	NUDOCS 9309030308
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s Attachment 1 to s~ . - NSD930993 Page 1 of 6 COOPER NUCLEAR STATION TECllNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PROPOSED CHANGE NO. 140 Primary Containment Isolation Valve Tables Revised Pares 47 52b (delete) 3 50 83 51 84 52 169 52a (delete) i 1.0. Introduction. ,

The Nebraska Public Power District (District) requests that the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) Technical Specifications be revised to add requirements for primary containment isolation of the drywell air sampling system and clarify the requirements for instruments that initiate primary containment isolation signals. This submittal fulfills the commitmentU to submit a proposed -

Technical Specifications change to add the air sampling system isolation by August 1993.

To provide sufficient time for licensed operator training and the revision of station procedures, the District requests that the amendment implementing these proposed changes become effective thirty days after its issuance. l 2.0. Basis for Chance.

2.1. During the 1993 CNS refueling outage, a replacement radiation monitor was l installed for the drywell air sampling system to improve its reliability. The i replacement monitor, which is currently operating in parallel with the original monitor, is undergoing final acceptance testing prior to being placed into service. The monitor for this system is required to be operable during reactor power operation by Technical Specification 3.6.C and Table 3.2.E. The original I monitor continues to satisfy these requirements. The monitor provides local and remote indication of drywell particulate, iodine, and gaseous radioactivity, alarms in the control room on high radioactivity, but does not 3 initiate any engineered safeguards or provide any control signals for other equipment. The replacement radiation monitor, although the most suitable model for this application, has a pressure rating which is lower than the containment design pressure. Because the monitor is located outside the drywell but !

communicates with the primary containment atmosphere through its sample and l return lines, and the replacement monitor is rated at a pressure lower than the design basis pressure for the containment, two automatic containment isolation valves were installed on each line to the monitor. These valves are air.

operated and fail closed on loss of air pressure or loss of power to the solenoid pilot valves. A maximum valve closing time of 15 seconds was established consistent with reliable valve operation and the need to isolate the line in the event of an accident.

U G. R. Horn to J. L. Hilhoan, NSD930690, June 7,1993, Status of Issues Related to Unit Startup.

9309030308 930831 PDR ADOCK 05000298 P PDR l

. Attachment 1 to NSD930993 Page 2 of 6 Group 2 was selected as the appropriate primary containment isolation signal to isolate the air sampling system. Group 2 isolates on a reactor low water ;

level of 24.5 inches (Level 3) or a high drywell pressure of $2 psig. This containment isolation signal also isolates the shutdown cooling mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system, the drywell floor and equipment drain sump discharge lines, and the Traversing In-core Probe (TIP) system, and also ]

initiates a Group 6 containment isolation signal. j l

As a result of this station modification, CNS Technical Specifications needs i to be revised to add the four new containment isolation valves to the list of p primary containment isolation valves on Table 3.7.1 and to add the drywell air l sampling system to the list of systems isolated by the Group 2 signal in the ;

notes to Table 3.2.A.

2.2. A review of Table 3.2.A, Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation ,

Instrumentation, found that the action required when component operability is not assured did not always either isolate the systems associated with that containment isolation signal or place the plant in a condition where !

operability of that instrumentation was not required. In some cases, following !

one of the current assigned actions would result in isolation of systems that ,

are not associated with the inoperable instrumentation.

For example, the current actions associated with inoperable reactor low water '

level instrumentation, which initiates Group 2 and 3 isolations and also j results in a Group 6 isolation, are actions A and B. While action A will result in placing the plant in a cold shutdown condition, where primary ,

containment integrity and hence operability of this inatrumentation is not ;

required, action B results in isolation of the Main Steam Isolation Valves !

(MSIVs) and placing the plant in a hot shutdown condition. Closing the MSIVs I will not isolate the systems associated with the Group 2, 3, or 6 isolation signals.

To correct this, new actions are assigned to several of the instruments of Table 3.2.A. Following the proposed actions would result in either the isolation of affected systems or, if isolation of the affectad systems would !

be inconsistent with continued safe power operation, placing the plant in a >

cold shutdown condition. !

2.3. The Table 3.2. A action statements A, C, D, and E in note 2 are also being ;

revi. sed to be more compatible with the action statements of Table 3.3.2-1 of i the Fermi-2 Standard Technical Specifications.Il Action statement A is being i j revised to correspond with Fermi-2 action statement 20, action statement D is l being revised to add a time limit from Fermi-2 action statement 25, and action j statements C and E are being combined into a new action statement C that :

! corresponds with Fermi-2 action statement 23. This will result in action l statements with completion times for this table thet are consistent with '

current NRC requirements. ;

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l 2' NUREG-1089, Fermi-2 Technical Specifications, March 1985.

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In the revised action statements C and D, the District proposes to use the term

" isolate" instead of directing the closing of valves that is used in the Fermi-2 statements. Use of the term " isolate" is consistent with the requirements for inoperable primary containment isolation valves in specification 3.7.D and i the CNS Technical Specifications definition of primary containment integrity. l i

2.4. Certain administrative changes are also being made to improve the readability j of these specifications. These include the clarification of specification 3.2. A and its Bases and of some Table 3.2. A notes. These changes do not change ,

the intent of these sections. Defined terms are also being capitalized, a ,

practice consistent with Standard Technical Specifications.

3.0. Detailed Description of Proposed Changes.

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3.1. The District proposes several changes to page 47. Specification 3.2.A is revised to clearly state that the instrumentation that initiates primary j containment isolation must be operable whenever primary containment integrity is required. Minor grammatical changes are made to specification 3.2.B. All defined terms on this page are capitalized, i 3.2. The District proposes several changes to Table 3.2.A, Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Instrumentation, page 50.

3.2.1. Several changes are being made to the column of Action Required When Component Operability is Not Assured. The referenced action statement for the Main Steam Line High Radiation instrument line item t is changed from E to C to correspond with changes to note 2 of the table. Action statement B is replaced by C as an option for the {

Reactor Low Water Level and High Drywell Pressure instrument line i items since action B will not result in either a condition where !

operability of these instruments is not required or the isolation of !'

the affected systems. Action statement A is being added as an option for the Main Steam Line Leak Detection, Main Steam Line High Flow, and Main Steam Line Low Pressure instrument line item as it will result in a condition where operability of these instruments is not required, i

3.2.2. The line item for Reactor Vater Cleanup System High Space Temperature. j is moved from page 51 to page 50. This reduces the length of this I table to one page. l l

3.2.3. As an administrative change, the format of the instrument identification numbers is made consistent and- defined terms are capitalized.

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Attachment 1 to NSD930993 l Page 4 of 6 i

3.3. The District proposes several changes for the Notes for Table 3.2.A. which are moved to pages 51 and 52 from pages 52, 52a, and 52b.

3.3.1. In Note 2, action statement A is revised as follows to conform to ;

i Fermi-2 Standard Technical Specifications action statement 20'of ,

i Table 3.3.2-1. -

"Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN

within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ."

3.3.2. In Note 2, action statements C and E to isolate the Reactor Water Cleanup system and Reactor Water Sample Valves are combined into the following action statement C, which is based upon Fermi-2 Standard ,

Technical Specifications action statement 23 of Table 3.3.2 ]

" Isolate the affected system within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and declare the affected system inoperable."

i 3.3.3. In Note 2, action statement D to isolate the Shutdown Cooling mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system is modified to add a time i limit similar to action statement 25 of the Fermi-2 Standard Technical Specifications:

" Isolate the Shutdown Cooling mode of RHR within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ."

3.3.4. In Notes 5 and 7, " mode switch" is replaced with " Reactor' Mode Selector Switch." Also in Note 7, the word " valve" is added after

" turbine stop" as a clarification.

3.3.5. In Note 8, the Drywell Air Sampling System is added to the list of systems isolated by the Group 2 isolation signals. Automatic containment isolation valves for the air s.ampling system were added during the 1993 refueling outage.

a 3.3.6. All defined terms in the notes were capitalized.

3.4. The District proposes changes be made to Bases 3.2.A for the Primary Containment Isolation Functions on pages 83 and 84.

3.4.1. Statements made in two paragraphs that the grouping of valves for containment isolation can be found in specification 3.7 are deleted.

The listing of valve groups for the various containment isolation signals is found in Note 8 of Table 3.2. A. This appears to have been i an administrative error in the Bases from the original issuance of the CNS Technical Specifications.

3.4.2. A paragraph is added at the end of the Bases referencing specification 3.7.D for the requirements for inoperable primary containment isolation valves. .

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Attachment 1 to NSD930993 ;

Page 5 of 6 3.4.3. Several editorial changes such as correcting the format for USAR references, making the capitalization of component names consistent, ;

changing " primary system isolation" to " primary containment isolation," spelling out an abbreviation for " temperature," and -

clarifying some paragraph wording are made on pages 83 and 84. All i defined terms on these pages are also capitalized. {

3.5. On page 169, the District proposes to add to Table 3.7.1, Primary Containment 1 solation Valves, the four isolation valves added during the 1993 refueling -

outage for the Drywell Air Sampling System sample and return lines. These ;

normally open air operated valves close on a Group 2 signal with a specified maximum closing time of 15 seconds. .

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4.0. Sirnificant Hazards Determination.

10 CFR 50.91(a)(1) requires that licensee requests for operating license l amendments be accompanied by an evaluation of significant hazards posed by the issuance of the amendment. This evaluation is performed with respect to the ,

criteria given in 10 CFR 50.92(c). .

This proposed change to the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) Technical i

Specifications adds requirements for the primary containment isolation of the ;

4 drywell air sampling system and clarifies the requirements for instrumentation that initiate primary containment isolation signals. ,

4.1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The addition of the drywell air sampling system isolation to the tables listing primary containment isolation valves and clarification of the requirements for instrumentation that initiates primary containment isolation will ensure primary containment integrity requirements are maintained for this system. Revisions to the action ;

statements for the instrumentation that initiate primary containment isolation l signals will ensure, when these instruments become inoperable, that the affected systems are isolated or the plant is placed in a condition where ,

operability of the instrumentation is not required. By ensuring primary l containment isolation during accidents as previously evaluated, these changes will not result in an increase in the probability or consequences of a l previously evaluated accident.

4.2. The proposed changes will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The addition . of the drywell air sampling system isolation to the tables listing primary containment isolation valves and clarification of the requirements for instrumentation that 2

initiates primary containment isolation will ensure primary containment ,

integrity requirements are maintained for this system. Revisions to the action J statements for the instrumentation that initiate primary containment isolation ;

signals will ensure, if the instrumentation becomes inoperable, that the affected systems are isolated or the plant is placed in a condition where ;

operability of the instrumentation is not required. These changes will ensure J the primary containment functions during accidents as previously evaluated and will not result in an accident of a new or different type.

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Attachment 1 to

, . NSD930993 Page 6 of 6 4.3. The proposed chaciges will D21 create a significant reduction in the margin of !

safety. The addition of the drywell air sampling system isolation to the ,

tables listing primary containment isolation valves and clarification of the requirements for instrumentation that initiates primary containment isolation will ensure primary containment integrity requirements are maintained for this i system. Revisions ,t o the action statements for the instrumentation that .

1 initiate primary containment isolation signals will ensure, if the instrumentation becomes inoperable, that the affected systems are isolated or !

the plant is placed in a condition where operability of the instrumentation is not required. These changes will ensure the primary containment functions ;

during accidents as previously evaluated and will not reduce the margin of !

safety. j S.0. Conclusion.

The District has evaluated the proposed changes described above against the criteria of 10 CFR 50.92(c) in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR ,

50.91(a)(1). This evaluation has determined that Proposed Change Number 120 {

to Technical Specifications will not (1) involve a significant increase in the -

probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the ;

possibility for a new or different kind of accident from any accident [

previously evaluated, or (3) create a significant reduction in the margin of {'

safety. Therefore, the District requests NRC approval of Proposed Change Number 120. :

Point of contact: Michael A. Dean r (402)-825-5663 l t

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! MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES ,

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT l

3.2 Protective Instrumentation 4.2 Protective Instrumentation Applicability: Applicability:

Applies to the plant instrumenta- Applies to the surveillance requ'irement tion which initiates and controls a of the instrumentation that initiates otectivefunctioj. and cont rotective functiorg.

O_bj ec tive : Objective:

Toassurethe[ operability /ofpro- [ To specify the type and frequency of

tective instrumentation.' surveillance to be applied to protec-tive instrumentation.

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[ Specifications: CnPs i N specifications: ;

% l A. Primary Containment Isolation Functions A. I Primary Containment Isolation Functions '

c p i- ny : n t n1:.a t in t q;ri t y 1.- .- Instrumentation shall be functionally i l . ,hc, The tlimiting conditions forf tested and calibrated as indicated in

/ operation] for the instrumentation that Table 4.2.A.

initiates primary containment isola-l tion are given in Table 3.2. A.This System logic shall be functionally l Inshme n fa fio,13/ul/ 6e 6PERABAE- tested as indicated in Table 4.2.A.

whenteer PRit\1ARY CctJrAIA!/'1FMr INTEc.g ry ;s reyarre t.

B. Core and Containment Cooling Systems B. Core and Containment Cooling Systems Initiation and Control Initiation & Control

[ limiting conditions for operation} Instrumentation shall be functionally I for the instrumentation that initiates tested, calibrated and checked as in- i or controls the core and containment dicated in Table 4.2.B.

cooling systems are given in Table _ /hjQ 3.2.B. This instrumentation - +^f v oysten logic shall be functionally tested 8(operab'13 ub+/the systemM it as indicated in Table 4.2.B.

initiates or controls w.4: reg'u ) A i_7 d

to be [ operable)as specified in Section 4

3.5. / -

C. Control Rod Block Actuation C. Control Fod Block Actuation f

l The[limitintconditionsforoperationh Instrumentation shall be functionally for the instrumentation that initiates tested, calibrated and checked as indi-l control rod blocks are given in Tabic cated in Table 4.2.C.

3.2.C.

System logic sball be functionally l tested as indicated in Table 4.2.C. .

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6/24/82

i COOPER Nin, LEAR STATION TABLE 3.2.A (':ge 1) "g-PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR VESSEL ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION .w ,

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Minimum Number Action Required [

of (Operable' When Component Instrument Components Per (Operability)is

Instrument I.D. No. Settinn Limit Trip.Systen (1) Not Assured (2)

Main Steam Line High Radiation PJIP-RM- 25 A,B,C,&D s 3 Times Full Power 2 /C l Reactor Low Water Level NBI-LIS-10 A,B,C,&D #1 2+4.5 in. Indicated Level 2(4) A or/I C Reactor Low Low Low Water NBI-LIS-57 A & B #1 2-145.5 in. Indicated Level 2 A or B Level NBI-LIS-58 A & B #1 Main Steam Line Leak MS-TS-121[A,B,C,6D s 200*F 2(6) 7B Detection 122, 123, 124, 143, 144, a 145, 146, 147, 148, 149,

? 150 h or-

Main Steam Line High MS-dPIS-116 A,B C,&D s 150% of F;tted Steam 2(3) B Flow 117, 118, 119 Flow j Main Steam Line Low MS-PS-1344 ,B,C;&D A 2 825 psig 2(5) B, Pressure High Drywell Pressure- PC-PS-124 ,B,C,&D A s 2 psig 2(4) A orff C High Reactor Pressure RR-PS-128 A & B s 75 psig i D Main Condenser Low MS PS-103 A.B'C,6D

, 2 7" HP (7) 2 A or B Vacuum Reactor Water Cleanup RWClf-dPIS-170 A & B s 200% of System Flow . 1 C System High Flow ,

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COOPER NUCLEAR STATION , I TABLE 3.2.A (Page 2) '

PRIMARY CONTAIhMENT AND REACTOR VESSEL ISOLATION INSTRLHENTATION ,

L Minimum Number Action Required k' hen Instrument of Operable Components Coepenent Operability Instrtment T.D. No. --

Setting Limit Per Trip Svstem (1) is Not Assured (2) )

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.JCU Systen Hi Space RWCU-TS-150, A-D, 151 12000F 2(6) C Temo. 152, 153, 154, 155, 156 I 157, 158, 159 RWCU-TS-81 A D,E.F, Sl'6M O d -RWCO-TS-81 C,D,G.H e

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NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2.A Whenever Primary Containment integrity)is required there shall be twoherabhor tripped trip systemsy<for each function. ~r -

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2. If the minin:um number of [ operable [ instrument channelsj per [ trip sysQ requirement cannot be met by a (trip sy s t errj, tnat _Itrip syst em) shall be tripped. If the requirements cannot be met by(both@p C systems),(the C

appropriate action listed below-shall be taken.

A. Initiate an orderly shutdown and have the reactor in a cold shutdown condition in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . _ _ ,

D. Initiate an orderly load reduction and have the Main Steam Isolation Valves shut within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

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C. [ Isolate the Reactor Water Cleanup System. SfC on nu { d.'f D.

g Isolate the Shutdown Cooling mode of the RHR System.

J E. Isolatt- t h= T:ra cter at er c mple-Vahes,--

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3. Two required for each steam line. -

4. These signals also start the Sta 3 Treatment System and initiate Secondary Containment isolation.

5. Not required in the kef uel), [ shutdown l, andktartup/ hot standby) modes (interlocked with the m + - i 5:h ) . ,r- g qd

6. Requires one channel from each physical location for each tri svsteml hd"I"

\/n h/ c; % ll ca p s Low vacuum isolation is bypassed when the turbine stop is not tull open, manual bypass switches are in bypass and wb w14+h- i s not in RUN.

8. The instruments on this table produce primary containment and system isolations. The following listing groups the system signals and the system isolated.

Group 1 Isolation Signals:

1. Reactor Low Low Low Water Level (2-145.5 in.) ,

2. Main Steam Line Low Pressure (2825 psig in the RUN mode)

3. Main Steam Line Leak Detection (5200oF) ,

4. Condense - Low Vacuum (27* Hg vacuum) l S. Main Steam Line High Flow ($150% of rated flow) !

Isolations:

P

l. MSIV0s

2. Main Steam Line Drains

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1 INSERT FOR PAGE 51 ACTION STATEMENTS:

i A. Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the. ;

next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . l C. Isolate the affected system within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and declare the affected system inoperable.

D. Isolate the Shutdown Cooling mode of RHR within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

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110TES FOR TABLE 3.2. A (cont' d.) JgDR Pec J Sl

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Group 2 Isolation Signals:

l. Reactor Iow Water Level (24.5 inches) !

2. High Dry Well Pressure ($ 2 psig) '.

Isolations: ;

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1. RHR Shutdown Cooling inode of the RllR System. l

2. Drywell floor and equipment drain sump discharge lines. I I

3. TIP ball valves ,

4 Group 6 isolation relays '

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Group 3 Isolation Signals: ,

1. Reactor Low Water Level (24.5 inches) !

2. Reactor Water Cleanup System liigh Flow (6200% of system flow)

3. Reactor Unter Cleanup System liigh Area Ternperature (s 200*F) !

Isolations: ;

1. Reactor Water Cleanup System ,

Group 4

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Isolation Signals:

Provided by instruments on Tabic 3.2.B (llPCI) {

Isolations: 5 Isolates the HPCI steam line !

Group 5 J Isolation Signals:

Provided by instruments on Table 3.2.B (RCIC) !

Isolations: ;

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Isolates the RCIC steam line.

Group 6 i I

Isolation Signals: l l

1. Group 2 1 solation Signal ;

2. Reactor Building H&V Exhaust Plenum liigh Radiation ({ l00 mr/hr) l rWM DVt i t\Yc, krom

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Isolations i

1. Secondary Containment Isolation *

2. Start Standby' Gas Treatment System i G ro'* , l

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Isolation Signals:

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1. Reactor Low Low Low Water Level (3-145.5 in) l-l

2. Main Steam Line High Radiation (<3 times full power background) ,

Isolations:

1. Reactor Water Sample Valves i

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L Con co n m e n In addition to eactorhrotection'instrumentationwhichinitiatesareactorscram, j protective instrumentation has been provided which initiates action to mitigat.c the ,

consequences of accidents which are beyond the operator's ability to control, or .

J terminates operator errors before they result in e n ri nm consequences. This set of specificationi provides thell_imiting conditions M operation)for the primary -cystd L T

isolation function, initiation of the core cooling systems, control rod block and Standby Gas Treatment System. The obj ectives of the specifications are (1) to assure l the eff ectivenes.c of the protective instrumentation when required . ver Sring veried, when portions of Tif systems are cut af -- s mic e - f e r r ai n t en anee", and (2) to prescribe the trip settings required to assure adequate performance. When necessary,] r one/channeVmay be made inoperable for brief intervals to conduct requiredMnctiona5)

LestWEd s aliidations[ ]@SYU M E M U

f. mognMd I J 1 Some of the settings on the instrumentation that initiate or control core and containment cooling have tolerances explicitly stated where the high and low values are both critical and may have a substantiat effect on safety. The seQoints of other ins t rume nt.a tion , where only the high or low end of the setting has a direct bearing on safety, are chosen #5 - level = [ rom the normal operating range to prevent inadvertent actuation of the safety system involved and exposure tc abnormal}_

situations W th w M;c h.d rvmej n A. Primarv Containment I sol ation Functions Gi3D Actuationofprimarycontainme]nt valves is initiated by protective instrumentation shown in Table 3.2.A which senses the conditions for which isolation is required, i Such instrumentation must be a dip.le whenever Rimary containment integrity) is required. CPERI\[$t.E - > -

c_cnhnnrvw.n( Cs 3s The instrumentation which initiates primary system isolation is connected in a dual bus arrangement. j W

The low water level instrumentation, set to trip at 168.5 inches (+4. 5 inches) above the top of the active fuel, closes all isolation ul es except those in Groups 1, 4, 5, and 7. %-tens -+f. (valvel gr oup ng and- Required closing times are given in Specification 3.7. For valves which isolate at this level this trip setting is adequate to prevent core uncovery in the case of a break in the largest line assuming a 60 second valve closing time. Required closing times are less than this.

2) The low low low reactor water level instrumentation is set to trip when the water

( level is*19 inches (-145.5 inches) above the top of the active fuel. This trip closes Groups 1 and 7 Isolation valves (Reference 1), activates the remainder of the CSCS subsystems, and starts the e:cergency diesel generators. These trip level settings were chosen to be high enough to prevent spurious actuation but low enough to initiate CSCS operation and primary yct = isolation so that post accident cooling can be accomplished, s g.

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and t.h e guidelines of 10CFR100 will not be exceeded. For large breaks up to the [

complete circumferential break of a 28-inch recirculation line and with the - trip i se tting given above , CSCS initiation and primary system isolation are initiated in ~

time to meet the above criteria. Reference h :g _ph VI q$. 3 M, USAR]

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The high drywell pressure instrumentation is a diverse signal for malfunctions to the 1

water level instrumentation and in addition to initiating CSCS, it causes isolation ,

of Group 2 and 6 isolation valves. For the breaks discussed above, this i

instrumentation will genetally initiate CSCS operation before the low-low-low water ;

level instrumentation; thus the results given above are applicable here also. The !

water level instrumentation initiates protection for the full spectrum of loss-of-coolant accidents and causes isolation of all isolation valves except Groups 4 and S. t Venturis are provided in tl. main steam lines as a means of measuring steam flow and also limiting the loss of mass inventory from the vessel during a steam.line break accident. The primary function of the instrumentation is to detect a break in the

)#'h'mainstcamline. For the worst case of accident, main steam line break outside the

- d rywell , a trip setting of l50% of rated steam fl ow in conjunction with the flow t

f l

, 4' limiters and main steam line valve closure, limits the mass inventory loss such that

' fuel i t. not uncovered, fuel clad temperatures peak at approximately 1000*F and [

release of radioactivity to t.he environs is below 10CFR100 guidelines. Reference !

7 Section XIV .5 USAPl.

Temperature n.onitoring instrumentation is provided in the main steam tunnel and along :

the steam line in the turbine building to detect leaks in these areas. Trips are !

provided on this instrumentation and when exceeded, cause closure of isolationhMd 3

/ ;

valves. m Sp c . 2 . ' fo r V . hc G v-e.*p,- The setting /i s#200*F for the main steam leak j detection system. For large breaks, the high steam flow instrumentation is a backup b to the % instrumentation.

i

' I

' C hpe.ndu ct High radiation monitors in the main steam tunnel have been provided to detect gross fuel f ailure as in the control rod drop accident. These monitors alert control room !

operators to potential fuel degradation by means of an alarm set at 51.5 times the i normal background, and initiate a Group 7 isolation at s3 times the normal ,

background.

Pressure inst.rumentation is provided to close the hain hteam fsolation alves in RUN Mode when the main steam line pressure drops below Specification 2.1.A.6. The Reactor Pressure Vessel thermal transient due to an inadvertent opening of the !

turbine bypass valves when not in the RUN Mode is less severe than the loss of ;

icedwater analyzed in Section XIVgd> of the USAR, theref ore, closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves for thermal transient protection when not in RUN mode is not 4

required.

I The teactor Water Cleanup System high flow and temperature instrumentation are r i

arranged similar to that for the llPCI. The trip settings are such that core uncovery I is prevented and fission product release is within limits.

l OC pO rt m e nd's her- inoprad pimrgCodOAMEnY l 1%tI d on v'A h e S a r(L 1rg g ,G,e d ;cm 3.3.D.

~

.n- 3/2/n i

l

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION ,

TABLE 3.7.1 (Page 2) .

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES ,

Number of Power Maximum Action on Operated Valves Operating Normal Initiating.

Valve & Steam Inboard Outboard Time (Sec) (1) Position (2) Sicnal (3)

Primary Containment Purge & Vent 2 15 C SC l PC 246AV, PC-231MV Primary Containment & N2 Supply 2 15 C SC PC-238AV, PC-232MV Suppression Chamber Purge & Vent 1 40 C SC(4)-

PC-230MV Bypass (PC-305MV)

Primary Containment Purge & Vent 1 40 C SC(4)

, PC-231MV Bypass (PC-306MV) m

? Dilution Supply PC-1303MV, PC-1304MV 2 15 C SC PC-1305MV, PC-1306MV 2 15 C SC Dilution Supply PC-1301MV, PC-1302MV 2 15 0 CC PC-1311MV, PC 1312MV 2 15 0 CC !

Suppression Chamber Purge and Vent Exhaust 1 15 C SC PC-1308MV Primary Containment Purge and Vent Exhaust 1 15 C SC PC-1310MV Degt.N [Mr buf b ^'] b 'S O Gc Rmv- ic AV, amv-ltAV 2 I5 "

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I APPENDIX B REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES

.I i

e 1

9 l

r 2

l l

I

l i

i LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION ' SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENT l 3 . 2.. Protective Instrumentation 4.2 Protective Instrumentation ,

i Applicabi1ity: Applicability:

Applies to the plant instrumentation Applies to the , surveillance .!

which initiates and controls a requirement of the instrumentation l PROTECTIVE FUNCTION. that. initiates and controls a- i PROTECTIVE FUNCTION.

Obiective: Obiective:

l To assure the OPERABILITY of To specify the type and frequency of protective instrumentation. surveillance to be applied to ,

protective instrumentation.

Specifications: Specifications:

A. Primary Containment Isolation A. Primary Containment Isolation Functions Functions ,

i The LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR Instrumentation shall be OPERATION for the instrumentation functionally tested and - calibrated j~

that initiates primary containment as indicated in Table 4.2.A.

isolation are given in Table 3.2.A.

This instrumentation shall be system logic shall be functionally.

OPERABLE whenever PRIMARY tested as indicated in Table 4.2.A.

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required. ,

t B. Core and Containment Cooline Systems B. Core and Containment Cooline Systems !

Initiation and Control Initiation & Control j The LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR Instrumentation shall be OPERATION for the instrumentation functionally tested, calibrated and-that initiates or controls the core checked as indicated in Table 4.2.B. :

and containment cooling systems are i given in Table 3.2.B. This System logic shall be functionally l instrumentation shall be OPERABLE tested as indicated in Table 4.2.B. -l whenever the system it initiates or l' controls is required to be OPERABLE

== specified in Section 3.5. j C. Control Rod Block Actuation C. Control Rod Block Actuation

'I i

The LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR Instrumentation shall be l OPERATION for the instrumentation functionally tested, calibrated and I that initiates control rod blocks checked as indicated in Tab 1e 4.2.C. j 1

are given in Table 3.2.C. .

System logic shall be functionally tested as indicated in Table 4.2.C.

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION .,*

TABLE 3.2.A

l PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR VESSEL ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION Minimum Number Action Required of OPERABLE When Component Instrument Components Per OPERABILITY.is I.D. No. Settine Limit Ttir System (1) Not Assured (2)

Instrument s 3 Times Full Power 2 C Main Steam Line High RMP-Flt-251 A,B,C,&D Radiation 2(4) !

Reactor Low Water Level NBI-LIS-101 A,B,C,6D #1 2+4.5 in. Indicated Level A or C Reactor Low Low Low Water NBI-LIS-57 A & B #1 2-145.5 in. Indicated Level 2 A or B Level NBI-LIS-58 A & B #1 Main Steam Line Leak MS-TS-121 A,B,C,&D s 200*F 2(6) A of B l Detection 122, 123, 124, 143, 144, a 145, 146, 147, 148, 149,

? 150 ,

Main Steam Line High MS-dPIS-ll6 A,B,C,6D s 150% of Rated Steam 2(3) A or B l Flow 117, 118, 119 Flow Main Steam Line Low MS-PS-134 A,B,C,&D 2 825 psig 2(5) A or B l Pressure High Drywell Pressure PC-PS-12 A,B,C,6D s 2 psig 2(4) A or C l RR-PS-128.A & B s 75 psig 1 D High Reactor Pressure Main C.indenser Low MS-PS-103 A,B,C,&D 2 7" Hg (7) .2 A or B l Vacuum-Reactor Water Cleanup RWCU-dPIS-170 A & B s 200% of System Flow 1 C System High Flow Reactor Water-Cleanup. RWCU-TS-150 A,B,C,&D s 200'F 2(6) C.

System High Space 152, 153,.154, 155, '

Temperature 156,'157, 158, 159 RWCU-TS-81 A, B,C, D, E, F, G, & H

_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ , . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . ~ _ - _ _ _ _ _-___1. . _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ - _ - . _ _ _ .

,~. .

NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2.A l

1. Whenever PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required there shall be tripped TRIP SYSTEMS for each function. twoOPERABLEorl

2. If the minimum number of OPERABLE INSTRUMENT CHANNELS per TRIP SYSTEM requirement ,

cannot be met by a TRIP SYSTEM, that TRIP SYSTEM shall be tripped. If the requirements cannot be met by both TRIP SYSTEMS, the appropriate action listed below shall be taken. ;

A. Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . .

B. Initiata an orderly load reduction and have the Main Steam Isolation Valves j shut within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . ;

C. Isolate the affected system within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and declare the affected system inoperable. ;

D. Isolate the Shutdown Cooling mode of RHR within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . ,

l

3. Two required for each steam line. ,

4 These signals also start the Standby Gas Treatment System and initiate Secondary i Containment isolation. l 4

5. Not required in the REFUEL, SHUTDOWN, and STARTUP/ HOT STANDBY modes (interlocked with !

the Reactor Mode Selector Switch).

6. Requires one channel from each physical location for each TRIP SYSTEM. l

7. Low vacuum isolation is bypassed when the turbine stop valve is not full open, manual bypass switches are in bypass and Reactor Mode Selector Switch is not in RUN, l

8. The instruments on this table produce primary containment and system isolations. The !

following listing groups the system signals and the system isolated. l Group 1 Isolation Signals: !

l. Reactor Low Low Low Water Level (2-145.5 in.) :

2. Main Steam Line Low Pressure (2825 psig in the RUN mode)

3. Main Steam Line Leak Detection ($200*F)

4 Condenser Low Vacuum (27" Hg vacuum) ,

5. Main Steam Line High Flow (5150% of rated flow) !

, Isolations:

1. MSIVs _I i

2. Main Steam Line Drains i

Groun ?

Isolation Signals:

1. Reactor Low Water Level (24.5 inches) l

, 2. High Dry Well Pressure (s 2 psig) '

! Isolations--

i 1. RHR Shutdown Cooling mode of the RHR System. l

2. Drywell floor and equipment drain sump discharge lines. !

3. TIP ball valves .

4. Group 6 isolation relays !

5. Drywell Air Sampling System l l 1

~

J Y 4 NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2.A (cont'd.)

Grouri 3 ,

i i

Isolation Signals:

1. Reactor Low Water Level (24.5 inches) i 2. Reactor Water Cleanup System High Flow (6200% of system flow)

3. Reactor Water Cleanup System liigh Area Temperature ($ 200* F)

, Isolations:

1. Reactor Water Cleanup System Group 4 d

Isolation Signals

Provided by instruments on Table 3.2.B (HPCI)

Isolations:

? Isolates the HPCI steam line l

j Group 5 i

a i Isolation Signals:

i i Provided by inst.ruments on Table 3.2.B (RCIC) j 1

Isol ations :

I

{ Isolates the RCIC steam line, i

! Group 6 Isolation Signals:

1 j 1. Group 2 Isolation Signal i 2. Reactor Building H&V Exhaust Plenum High Radiation ((100 mr/hr)-

4- Isolations:

i i

1. Secondary Containment Isolation

2. Start Standby Gas Treatment System Group 7 a

I Isolation Signals: I

! 1. Reactor Low Low Low Water Level (2-145.5 in) '

l 2. Main Steam Line High Radiation (s3 times full power background) i Isolations:

1

1. Reactor Vater Sample Valves !

{

4

- . . - - -. . . . - . , - . - . .-- - . . - - .,....;,~

,% j 3.2 BASES s

In addition to Reactor Protection System instrumentation which initiates a reactor l ;

scram, protective instrumentation has been provided which initiates action to mitigate the consequences of accidents which are beyond the operator's ability to ;

control, or terminates operator errors before they result in serious consequences. l' This set of specifications provides the LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION for the primary containment isolation function, initiation of the core cooling systems, control rod block and Standby Gas Treatment System. The objectives of the 2 specifications are (1) to assure the effectiveness of the protective instrumentation

'l when required and provide the actions required when portions of these systems are ;

inoperable, and (2) to prescribe the trip settings required to assure adequate l performance. When necessary, one INSTRUMENT CHANNEL may be made inoperable for brief j intervals to conduct required INSTRUMENT FUNCTIONAL TESTS and INSTRUMENT l CALIBRATIONS. ]

Some of the settings on the instrumentation that initiate or control core and l containment cooling have tolerances explicitly stated where the high and low values i are both critical and may have a substantial effect on safety. The setpoints of l :

other instrumentation, where only the high or low end of the setting has a direct I bearing on safety. are chosen with sufficient margin from the normal operating range l l to prevent inadvertent actuation of the safety system involved and exposure to j abnormal situations. 1 I

A. Primary Containment 1 solation Functions J

Actuation of primary containment isolation valves is initiated by protective l j instrumentation shown in Table 3.2. A which senses the conditions for which isolation l is required. Such instrumentation must be OPERABLE whenever PRIMARY CONTAINMENT j INTEGRITY is required. !

t The instrumentation which initiates primary containment isolation is connected in a l l dual bus arrangement.

The low water level instrumentation, set to trip at 2 168.5 inches (44.5 inches) l ,

above the top of the active f uel, closes all isolation valves except those in Groups i 1, 4 5, and 7. Required valve closing times are given in Specification 3.7. For l valves which isolate at this level t.hi s trip setting is adequate to prevent core uncove ry in the case oi a break in the largest line assuming a 60 second valve closing time. Required closing times are less than this.

The low low low reactor water level instrumentation is set to trip when the water level is 2 19 inches (-145.5 inches) above the top of the active fuel. This trip l closes Groups 1 and 7 Isolation Valves (Reference 1), activates the remainder of the CSCS subsystems, and starts the emergency diesel generators. These trip level settings were chosen to be high enough to prevent spurious actuation but low enough to initiate CSCS operation and primary containment isolation so that. post accident l cooling can be accomplished, and the guidelines of 10CFR100 will not be exceeded.

For large breaks up to the complete circumferential break of a 28-inch recirculation l line and with the trip setting given above, CSCS initiation and primary system i isolation are initiated in time to meet the above criteria. Reference USAR Section VI-5.3.

_ - -. ~ . _ - - . -. -. -- .- -

.o l

, ' .a . .

3.2.A PASES: (Cont'd)

The high drywell pressure instrumentation is a diverse signal for malfunctipns to the water level instrumentation and in addition to initiating CSCS, it causes isolation of Group 2 and 6 isolation valves. For the breaks discussed above , this I instrumentation will generally initiate CSCS operation before the . low-low-low .l water level instrumentation; thus the results given above are applicable here l also. The water level instrumentation initiates protection for the full spectrum ^

of loss-of-coolant accidents and causes isolation of all isolation valves except Groups 4 and 5. !

Venturis are provided in the main steam lines as a means of measuring steam flow [

and also limiting the loss of mass inventory from the vessel during a steam line '

break accident. The primary function of the instrumentation is to detect a break j in the main steam line. For the worst case of accident, main steam line break outside the drywell, a trip setting limit of s 150% of rated steam flow in l .

conjunction with the flow limiters and main steam line valve closure, limits the !

mass inventory loss such that fuel is not uncovered, fuel clad temperatures peak :

at approximately 1000*F and release of radioactivity to the environs is below l 10CFR100 guidelines. Reference USAR Section XIV-6.5. !

Temperature monitoring instrumentation is_provided in the main steam tunnel and i along the steam line in the turbine building to detect leaks in these areas. ,

Trips are provided on this instrumentation and when exceeded, cause closure of I isolation valves . The setting limit is s 200*F for the main steam leak detect. ion l l system. For large breaks, the high steam flow instrumentation is a backup to the !

temperature instrumentation. l ,

High radiation monitors in the main steam tunnel have been provided to detect l gross fuel failure as in the control rod drop accident. These monitors alert !

, control room operators to potential fuel degradation by means of an alarm set at ;

s 1.5 times the normal background, and initiate a Group 7 isolation at 6 3 times i the normal background. ;

i Pressure instrumentation is provided to close the Main Steam Isolation Valves in l ;

RUN Mode when the main steam line pressure drops below Specification 2.1. A.6. The Reactor Pressure Vessel thermal transient due to an inadvertent opening of the !

l turbine bypass valves when not in the RUN Mode is less severe than the loss of feedwater analyzed in Section XIV-5 of the USAR, therefore, closure of the Main -i Steam Isolation Valves for thermal transient protection when not in RUN mode is j

, not required.

The Reactor Water Cleanup System high flow and temperature instrumentation are '

l arranged similar to that for the HPCI. The trip settings are such that core .I uncovery is prevented and fission product release is within limits.

)

Requirement s for inoperable primary containment isolation valves are in I Specificat ion 3. 7.D.

.sc. ;

I

4 CCOPER NUCLEAR STATION ,

TABLE 3.7.1 (Page 2) : g PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISO 1ATION VALVES , ,

Number of Power Maximum Action On .

Operated Valves Operating Normal Initiating Valve & Steam Inboard outboard Tire (Sec) (1) Position (2) Sinnal (3) 15 C SC Primary Containment Purge & Vent 2 PC-246AV. PC-231MV 15 C SC Primary Containment & N, Supply '

2 PC-238AV, PC-232MV Suppression Cha:rber Purge & Vent 1 40 C SC(4)

PC - 2 3(;MV Bypas s (PC-305MV)

, Primary Containment Purge & Vent 1 40 C SC(4)

%2 PC-231MV Bypass (PC-306MV)

I Dilution Supply PC-1303MV, PC-1304MV 2 15 C SC 2- 15 C SC PC-1305MV. PC-1306MV Dilution Supply PC-1301MV, PC-1302MV 2 15 0 GC PC-1311MV. PC-1312MV 2 15 0 GC 15 C SC Suppression Chamber Purge and Vent Exhaust 1 PC-130SMV 15 C SC Primary Containment Purge and Vent Exhaust 1 PC-1310MV Dryvell Air Sampling System RMV-10AV, RMV-llAV 2 15 O CC RMV-12AV, RMV-13AV 2 15 0 CC

_._ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ ________m______.__._____.m_______m" - -

-er -.w-- , , , . . w-- 4 g .._--w- _ - .

. .

ML20056G597

Text

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