ML20128L556
| ML20128L556 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1993 |
| From: | NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128L550 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9302190291 | |
| Download: ML20128L556 (3) | |
Text
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COOPER NUCLEAR STATION TABLE 4.2.D MINIMLH TEST AND CALIBRATION FREQUENCIES FOR RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEMS Instrument Instrument System I.D. No.
Functional Test Frec.
Calibration Fren.
Check Instrument Channels Steam Jet Air Ejector Off-Cas System RMP-RM-150 A & B (12)
(12)
(12)
Reactor Building Isolation and RMP-RM-452 A, B, C 6 D (12)
(12)
-(12)
. Standby Cas Treatment Initiation Liquid Radwaste Discharge Isolation RMP-R!i-1 (11)
(11)
(11)
Main Control' Room Ventilation RMV-RM-1 Once/ Month (1)
Once/3 Months Once/ Day Isolation Mechanical Vacuum Pump Isolation RMP-RM-251 A
.B, C, & D See Table 4.2.A l
Loric Systems SJAE Off-Cas Isolation Once/18 Months Standby Cas Treatment Initiation Once/18 Months imm4 -
@$ Reactor Building Isolation Once/18 Months
-su e
>C Liquid Radwaste Disch. Isolation Once/6 Months co O r4
. Q4, Main Control Room Vent. Isolation Once/6 Months Oh Mechanical Vacuu:n Pump Isolation Once/ Operating Cycle
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P NOTES FOR TABLES 4.2.A THROUCll 4.2.F 1.
Initially once every month until exposure (M as defined on Figure 4.1.1) is 2.0 X 10 ; thereafter, according to Figure 4.1.1 (after NRC approval).
The l
compilation of instrument failure rate data may include data obtained frota_ other j
boiling water reactors for which the same design instrument operates in-an I
environment similar to that-of CNS.
l 2.
Functional tests shall be performed before each startup with a required frequency not t
to exceed once per week, t
3.
This instrumentation is excepted from the functional test definition. The functional test will consist of applying simulated inputs.
Local alarm lights representing-upscale and downscale trips will be verified but no rod block will be produced at this time.
The inoperative trip will be initiated to produce a rod block (SRM and IRM inoperative also bypassed with the niodo switch in RUN).
The functions that cannot be verified to produce a rod block directly will be verified _during the.
operating cycle.
4.
Simulated automatic actuation shall be performed once each operating; cycle.1 Where-possible, all logic system functional tests will be performed using the test jacks.
5, Reactor low water level and high drywell pressure are not included on Table 4.2.A' since they are tested.on Table 4.1.2.
6.
The logic system functional testa shall include an actuation of time delay relays andi timers necessary for proper functioning of the trip systems.
7.
These units are tested as'part of the Core Spray System tests.-
i 8
The flow bias comparator will be tested by putting one flow unit in " Test" (producing-a rod block) and adjusting the test input to obtain comparator rod block, _The flow bias upscale vill be verified by observing a local upscale-trip. light during-operation and verifying that it will produce a rod block during the operating cycle.
9.
Performed during operating cycle. Portions of the logic is checked more frequently.
during functional tests of the functions that produce a rod block.
- 10. The detector will be inserted during each operating-cycle and the proper amount of travel into the core verified.
111. Surveillance requirements for this system are defined in Table 4.21. A.1.
- 12. Surveillance requirements for this system are defined in Table 4.21.A.2.
-13. - This instrumentation is exempted from' the instrument channel test definition. -The-instrument channel functional test will consist of injecting a simulated-electrical i
signal into the measurement channels to test the alarm and trip functions.
- 14. Calibration shall be performed using a standard current source. The current source provides instrument channel alignment.
Calibration using a radiation source shall be made each refueling outage.
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3.2 MSES:
(Cont'd) and the guidelines of 10CFR100 will not be exceeded, For large breaks up to the cotoplete circumferential break of a 28 inch recirculation line and with the trip setting given above, CSCS initiation and primary systern isolation are initiated in time to roeet the above criteria.
Reference Paragraph VI.5.3.1 USAR.
The high drywell pressure instrumentation is a diverse signal for malfunctions to the water level instrumentation and in addition to initiating CSCS, it causes isolation i
of Croup 2 and 6 isolation valves.
For the breaks discussed above. this instrumentation will generally initiate C3CS operation before the low-low. low water level instrumentation; thus the results given above are applicable here also.
The water level instrumentation initiates protection for the full - spectruin of
~
loss of coolant accidents and causes isolation of all isolation valves except Groups 4 and 5.
Venturis are provided in the main steam lines as a sneans of measuring steam flow and also limiting the loss of rnans inventory from the vessel during a steam line break 4
accident.
The primary function of the instrumentation is to detect a break in the inain steam line. For the worst-case of accident, inain steam line break outside the drywell, a trip setting of 150% of rated steam flow in conjunction with the flow limiters and tnain stearn line valve closure, Jimits the inass inventory loss such that fuel is not uncovered, fuel clad temperatures peak at approxirnately 1000'F and release of radioactivity to the environs is below 10CFR100 6uidelines.
Reference Section XIV.6.5 USAR.
l Temperature monitoring instrumentation is provided in the snain steam tunnel and along-the steam line in the turbine building to detect leaks in these areas.
Trips are provided on-this instrumentation and when exceeded, cause closure of _ isolation valves. See Spec. 3.7 for Valve Group. The setting is 200*F for the main steam leak detection systein. For large breaks, the high stearn flow instrumentation is a backup to the temp. instrumentation.
High radiation inonitors in the main steam tunnel have been provided to detect gross m
fuel failure as in the control rod drop accident. These snonitors alert control room operators to potential fuel degradation by means of an alarto set at s 1.5 times the normal background, and initiate a Group 7 iwolation at s3 times the normal _
background.
Pressure instrumentation is provided to close the main steam isolation valves in RUN Mode when the main steam line pressure drops below Specification 2.1. A.6.
The
- Reactor Pressure Vessel thermal transient due to an inadvertent opening of the-turbine bypass valves when not in the RUN Mode is less' severe than the_ loss of
+
feedwater analyzed in Section XIV.5 of the USAR, therefore. closure of the Main Stearn
. Isolation valves for thermal transient protection when not in RUN-mode. is not-required.
The Reactor Vater Cleanup System high flow and temperature instrumentation are.
arranged simitar to that for the HPCI. The trip settings are such that core 'uncovery is prevented and fission product release is within limits.
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