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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20211H7921999-08-13013 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 126 to License DPR-54 ML20198G8271997-08-22022 August 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 125 to License DPR-54 ML20045B9051993-06-16016 June 1993 Safety Evaluation Re Order Approving Decommissioning Plan & Authorizing Decommissioning of Rsngs,Unit 1,SMUD.Concludes That Reasonable Assurance That Health & Safety of Public Will Not Be Endangered by Decommissioning Option,Provided ML20029B6721991-02-22022 February 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed Rev to Emergency Plan & Granting Exemption from 10CFR50-54(q) Requirements ML20059G9621990-09-10010 September 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 115 to License DPR-54 ML19325F0311989-10-26026 October 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 114 to License DPR-54 ML19325D0901989-10-0404 October 1989 Safety Evaluation Re Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.2.1, Equipment Classification Program for All Safety- Related Components ML19325C9601989-09-29029 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 113 to License DPR-54 ML20247B3611989-07-17017 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 112 to License DPR-54 ML20245E1161989-06-20020 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 111 to License DPR-54 ML20245A1991989-06-0909 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 110 to License DPR-54 ML20248B6321989-06-0505 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 108 to License DPR-54 ML20248B9361989-06-0505 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 107 to License DPR-54 ML20248B9621989-06-0505 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 109 to License DPR-54 ML20247P1761989-05-30030 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2 Re on-line Testing of Reactor Trip Sys ML20247K7261989-05-23023 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 105 to License DPR-54 ML20247M9231989-05-23023 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 106 to License DPR-54 ML20247K6871989-05-16016 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 104 to License DPR-54 ML20246F4671989-05-0404 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Re Inservice Testing Program & Requests for Relief Re ASME Class 1,2 & 3 Pumps & Valves.Program Acceptable ML20245F9041989-04-18018 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 103 to License DPR-54 ML20248E9371989-03-29029 March 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 102 to License DPR-54 ML20155D3131988-09-28028 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 100 to License DPR-54 ML20151L5511988-07-14014 July 1988 Redistributed Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 99 to License DPR-54 ML20151A2771988-07-13013 July 1988 SER Supporting Util Actions to Prevent Failure of Ammonia Tanks Which May Result in Incapacitation of Control Room & Technical Support Ctr Personnel ML20195C9311988-06-0808 June 1988 SER Accepting Util Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 2) Re Vendor Interface Programs (Reactor Trip Sys) ML20195C5571988-06-0808 June 1988 SER Supporting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 1) Re Equipment Classification (Reactor Trip Sys Components) ML20150F2851988-03-28028 March 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Resolution of Tdi Diesel Engine Vibration Problems at Facility ML20148J8611988-03-17017 March 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 98 to License DPR-54 ML20153B2911988-03-15015 March 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 97 to License DPR-54 ML20149L6961988-02-12012 February 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 95 to License DPR-54 ML20055E3041988-02-12012 February 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 871223 & 880111 Proposed Changes to Tech Specs,Including Reducing Lower Limits of Detection for Liquid Radioactive Effluents ML20149L2761988-02-0909 February 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 94 to License DPR-54 ML20148C7321988-01-0505 January 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 93 to License DPR-54 ML20237B4141987-12-0707 December 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 92 to License DPR-54 ML20236X1771987-12-0303 December 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 91 to License DPR-54 ML20236X1111987-11-13013 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 90 to License DPR-54 ML20236Q2461987-11-10010 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util & Related Submittals Re Design Mods to Emergency Electrical Distribution Sys (Ref Tdi Diesel Generators) ML20236J2671987-11-0303 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 89 to License DPR-54 ML20245C7051987-10-27027 October 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 87 to License DPR-54 ML20245C7831987-10-27027 October 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 88 to License DPR-54 ML20236G8791987-10-23023 October 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 86 to License DPR-54 ML20236D1361987-10-23023 October 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 870826 Request to Use Repair & Replacement Program Contained in ASME Section XI 1983 Edition Including Addenda Through Summer 1983 ML20238D4151987-09-0303 September 1987 Evaluation of Engineering Rept ERPT-E0220 Re Reactor Regulation of Util Approach to Compliance W/Reg Guide 1.75 for New Diesel Generator Installation at Plant.Licensee Approach to Demonstrating Compliance Acceptable ML20238B1771987-08-27027 August 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 85 to License DPR-54 ML20236E3731987-07-24024 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Existing & Proposed Mods to Meteorological Program & W/Planned Improvements,Facility Will Satisfy Min Meteorological Emergency Preparedness Requirements of 10CFR50.47 & 10CFR50,Apps E & F ML20205T3021987-03-31031 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 84 to License DPR-54 ML20205R7871987-03-26026 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Concluding Util 831104 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2, Reactor Trip Sys Reliability On-Line Testing Permits on-line Functional Testing of Sys,Including Diverse Trip Features of Reactor Trip Breakers ML20205C3951987-03-13013 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against PTS Events (10CFR50.61).Util 860123 Submittal Re Matl Properties & Fast Neutron Fluence of Reactor Vessel Acceptable ML20206B6561987-03-13013 March 1987 Corrected SER Re Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against PTS Events (10CFR50.61).Util 860123 Submittal Re Matl Properties & Fast Neutron Fluence of Reactor Vessel Acceptable ML20205J0971987-03-11011 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Sys Selected for Facility Sys Review & Test Program.Sys Constitutes Adequate Scope for Sys Review & Test Program 1999-08-13
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20211H7921999-08-13013 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 126 to License DPR-54 ML20195D1901999-05-0606 May 1999 Annual Rept ML20195H8571998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Smud. with ML20155D4801998-10-27027 October 1998 Amend 3 to Rancho Seco DSAR, Representing Updated Licensing Basis for Operation of Permanently Shutdown & Defueled Rancho Seco Nuclear Facility During Permanently Defueled Mode ML20248C4301998-05-0606 May 1998 Annual Rept, Covering Period 970507-980506 ML20249A7831997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Smud Annual Rept ML20198G8271997-08-22022 August 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 125 to License DPR-54 ML20217D3271997-07-30030 July 1997 Update of 1995 Decommissioning Evaluation for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station ML20140A6371997-05-0606 May 1997 Annual Rept, Covering Period 960507-970506 ML20140G4481997-05-0101 May 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Component of Dsrv & Dsr Enterprise Standby Diesel Generator Sys.Recommends That Springs Be Inspected on Periodic Basis,Such as During Refueling Outages ML20137W8151997-03-20020 March 1997 Amend 1 to Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Rept ML20141J2711996-12-31031 December 1996 Smud 1996 Annual Rept ML20138L1231996-11-13013 November 1996 Smud Rancho Seco Incremental Decommissioning Action Plan, Rev 0,961113 ML20129E7151996-10-14014 October 1996 Defueled SAR for Rancho Seco ML20029D3561994-03-31031 March 1994 Update of 1991 Decommissioning Cost for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station ML20059H6821994-01-17017 January 1994 Revised Rancho Seco Quality Manual ML20058K3841993-12-0909 December 1993 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Component of Dsrv & Dsr Enterprise Standby DG Sys,Regarding Potential Problem W/ Subcover Assembled Atop Power Head ML20056E5171993-08-31031 August 1993 Technical Review Rept, Tardy Licensee Actions ML20045B9051993-06-16016 June 1993 Safety Evaluation Re Order Approving Decommissioning Plan & Authorizing Decommissioning of Rsngs,Unit 1,SMUD.Concludes That Reasonable Assurance That Health & Safety of Public Will Not Be Endangered by Decommissioning Option,Provided ML20059K1981993-05-0606 May 1993 Annual Rept, Covering Period from 920501- 930506,consisting of Shutdown Statistics,Narrative Summary of Shutdown Experience & Tabulations of Facility Changes, Tests & Experiments,Per 10CFR50.59(b) ML20034F7031993-02-25025 February 1993 Amend 1 to Enterprise Rept 162 Re Defect on Starting Air Distributor Housing Assembly,As Followup to 930115 Final Rept.Addl Listed Part Numbers Discovered Which Are Higher Level Assemblies of Housing ML20128C9641993-02-0202 February 1993 Informs Commission of Status of Open Issues & Progress of Specified Facilities Toward Decommissioning ML20127H2301993-01-15015 January 1993 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defeat in Component of Dsrv & Dsr Enterprise Standby DG Sys.Starting Air Distributor Housing Assemblies Installed as Replacement Parts at Listed Sites ML20036C0601992-12-31031 December 1992 1992 Annual Rept for Smud ML20126B0421992-12-17017 December 1992 Final Part 21 Rept Re Potential Problem W/Steel Cylinder Heads.Initially Reported on 921125.Caused by Inadequate Cast Wall Thickness at 3/4-inch-10 Bolt Hole.Stud at Location Indicated on Encl Sketch Should Be Removed ML20125C7161992-12-0707 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Possibility for Malfunction of Declutching Mechanisms in SMB/SB-000 & SMB/SB/SBD-00 Actuators. Malfunction Only Occurs During Seismic Event.Balanced Levers May Be Purchased from Vendor.List of Affected Utils Encl ML13316A1381992-11-25025 November 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Problem W/Cylinder Heads Cast Prior to 840801 in Dsrv & Dsr Enterprise Standby Diesel Generator Sys.Caused by Inadequate Casting Wall Thickness at Tapped Hole.Oil Analysis Should Be Performed Monthly ML20127P5861992-11-23023 November 1992 Followup to 921005 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in SB/SBD-1 Housing Cover Screws.Procedure Re Replacement of SBD-1 Spring Cover Bolts Encl.All Fasteners Should Be Loosened & Removed.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20126E6771992-08-0303 August 1992 Rev 7 to Rancho Seco Quality Manual ML13316A0841992-01-15015 January 1992 Part 21 Rept 159 Re Potential Defect in Power Cylinder Liner in Diesel Engine of DSR-48 & DSRV-16-4 Standby Diesel Generator Sys.Investigation Continuing & Expected to Be Complete on 920301 ML20029A7511991-02-28028 February 1991 Suppl to Special Rept 90-13:on 901224,25,29 & 910113,listed Meteorological Instrumentation Inoperable for More than 7 Days.Work Request Initiated & Instrumentation Channels Declared Operable on 910116 ML20029B6721991-02-22022 February 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed Rev to Emergency Plan & Granting Exemption from 10CFR50-54(q) Requirements NL-90-451, Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1990 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station1990-10-31031 October 1990 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1990 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station ML17348B5061990-10-0909 October 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Zener Diode VR2 on Power Supply Board 9 1682 00 106 Possibly Being Installed Backwards ML20059G9621990-09-10010 September 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 115 to License DPR-54 NL-90-443, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1990 for Rancho Seco1990-08-31031 August 1990 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1990 for Rancho Seco ML20217A5711990-08-28028 August 1990 Final Engineering Rept,Assessment of Spent Fuel Pool Liner Leakage NL-90-439, Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1990 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station1990-07-31031 July 1990 Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1990 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station 05000312/LER-1990-002, :on 900614,Step 6.9.3.1 of Liquid Waste Discharge Permit Checked R-15017A as Inoperable & Two Independent Samples Not Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Caution Will Be Added to Step 6.9.21990-07-20020 July 1990
- on 900614,Step 6.9.3.1 of Liquid Waste Discharge Permit Checked R-15017A as Inoperable & Two Independent Samples Not Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Caution Will Be Added to Step 6.9.2
ML20055F8591990-07-16016 July 1990 Special Rept 90-11:on 900613,06,25,18,21 & 28,fire Barriers Breached More than 7 Days & Not Made Operable in 14 Days. Corrective Actions:Operability of Fire Detectors Verified on One Side of Breached Barriers NL-90-423, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1990 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station1990-06-30030 June 1990 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1990 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station NL-90-355, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1990 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Plant1990-05-31031 May 1990 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1990 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Plant ML20055C6291990-05-21021 May 1990 Special Rept 90-08:on 900419,fire Pump Batteries Inoperable When Surveillance Procedure SP.206 Not Performed by Due Date.Caused by Test Frequency Incorrectly Changed from Weekly to Monthly.Surveillance Schedule Revised ML20055C6301990-05-21021 May 1990 Special Rept 90-09:on 900424,25,30,31 & 0502,fire Barriers Inoperable for More than 7 Days,Per Tech Spec 3.14.6.2 Requirement.Hourly Fire Watches Established & Penetrations & Doors Returned to Operable Status ML20058B6521990-05-0404 May 1990 Rev 0 to ERPT-M0216, Property Loss Study for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station in Long Term Defueled Mode ML20042E6921990-03-30030 March 1990 Special Rept 90-06:on 900301,06 & 14,listed Fire Barrier Penetrations That Failed Surveillance Test Not Restored to Operable Status within 7 Days as Required by Tech Spec 3.14.6.2.Operability of Fire Detectors Verified ML20042E6931990-03-30030 March 1990 Special Rept 90-07:on 900228,high Temp Detector Circuit for Zone 53 Not Restored to Operable Status within 14 Days When Circuit Failed Surveillance Test SP.345 & Would Not Alarm. Fire Watch Established.Detector Found Operable on 900316 ML20033G6031990-03-30030 March 1990 Rev 1 to Defueling Training Programs for NRC License Candidates ML20033G6011990-03-30030 March 1990 Rev 1 to Defueled Requalification Training Program for NRC Licensed Operators NL-90-054, Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1990 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station1990-02-28028 February 1990 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1990 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station 1999-08-13
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACT 0P REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.105 TO FACILITY CFERATING LICENSE DPR-54 RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-312
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letters datea October 7,1988, November 18, 1988, and March 27, 1989, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) requested en amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) appended to Facility Operating License No. DPR-54 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station. The proposed amendment would change the TS by revising (1) TS 3.4 to clarify the operational ;
mode applicability of that specification and the definition of Auxiliary Feedwater(AFW) train,and(2)TS4.8tochangethesurveillance requirements and frequency of verifying the AFW System flow path, modify a surveillance requirement to reflect the installation of an alternate flow path for AFW pump testing and remove the requirement for conducting system testing following cold shutdowns longer than 30 days, excluding refueling shutdowns. Specifically there are five proposed changes, as follows:
- a. Modify TS 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 to clarify the reactor operating conditions in which these respective TS apply.
- b. Modify TS 3.4.1.E and 3.4.2.F to clarify the definition of " auxiliary feedwater trains."
- c. Change the references to "SFW" (Startup Feedwater) in TS 3.4.1.G and 3.4.2.I to reflect that the startup valves are part of the Main Feedwater (MFW) System,
- d. Modify TS 4.8.1 to reflect alternate flow paths available for AFW pump testing and lower the reactor coolant system average temperature above which the AFW system is to be tested. ,
- c. Modify TS 4.8.3 to allow only AFW flow path valves not locked or sealed to be verified monthly to ensure that the valves are in the proper position and add TS 4.8.4 to require that those AFW valves manipulated for surveillance testing or maintenance be verified upon completion of the surveillance or maintenance to ensure the valves are in the proper position. (Existing TS 4.8.4 is renumbered to ;
TS4.8.5) l
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2.0 . EVALUATION The hRC staff-has evaluated the proposed changes and has concluded that.
they are acceptable. The staff's evaluation is provided below.
- a. Applicable Reactor Operating Conditions for TS 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 Currently, TS 3.4.1 does not have an upper boundary on the operational modes in which the Specification applies and TS 3.4.2 is applicable L when the reactor is " critical." The licensee. proposes to clarify the reactor operating conditions in which the respective specifications apply by the following: (1) In TS 3.4.1, expand the term "above 280*F" to "above 280*F thru HOT SHUTDOWN": and (2) In TS 3.4.2, re-place the term " remain critical" with "in the STARTUP through POWER OPERATION mode." Thus, the applicable operating conditions are clearly defined. The NRC staff finds this change to be acceptable.
- b. Definition of Auxiliary "Feedwater Trains" Currently TS 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 use the term "Both auxiliary feedwater trains" and the licensee proposes to clarify this term by indicating the specific. valves in specific flow paths thus clarifying the equipment required to constitute an operable train. The NRC staff finds this change to be acceptable.
- c. "SFW"(StartupFeedwater)
Currently, TS 3.4.1.G and 3.4.2.I reference "SFW" (Startup Feedwater).
The reference implies an independent Startup Feedwater System when it actua11y' refers to the startup valves of the Main Feedwater (MFW)
System. The licensee proposes to eliminate this confusion by changing "SFW" to "(including MFW startup valves)". Thus the affected systems and components in TS 3.4.1.G and 3.4.2.1 are clearly identified. The NRC staff finds this change to be acceptable.
- d. Alternate Flow Paths for AFW Pump Testing Currently, TS 4.8.1 directs that AFW pump verification be performed by operating the pumps "on recirculation to the condenser." An alternate flow path is being installed that provides for recirculation to the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) for AFW pump testing. The licensee proposes to delete the words "to the condenser," which would allow the flexibility to test the AFW pumps via a flow path from the CST to the condenser hot well, recirculation of water to the CST, or other alternate flow paths. The acceptance criteria for acceptable pump performance and operability are not changed or modified and remain specified in TS 4.8.1. Thus, the operability requirements for the AFW pumps are not affected. The NRC staff finds this to be acceptable. Also, in TS 4.8.1, the licensee proposes to change the RCS temperature at or above which the AFW pumps are tested from 305'F
3 ,
to 280'F. This change'is proposed to be consistent with AFW System operability requirements stated in TS 3.4.1. Lowering the RCS ,
temperature limit is a conservative, more restrictive change and D therefore the NRC staff finds it to be acceptable.
- e. Verification of AFW System Flow Path Currently, TS 4.8.3 requires all AFW valves, including those that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, to be inspected following all surveillance performed pursuant to Specifications 4.8.1, 4.8.2, and 4.8.4. The licensee proposes to change TS 4.8.3 and. add 4.8.5) a new the to require TS 4.8.4 (the existing)TS following: (1 monthly,4.8.4 verify would be renumbered to all auxiliary feedwater system valves that are not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position are in the proper position, when the average Reactor Coolant System temperature is greater than or equal to 280 F, and (2) verify that all AFW valves manipulated in the performance of maintenance or surveillance performed pursuant to Specifications 4.8.1, 4.8.2, and 4.8.5 are in the proper position.
The NRC performed an evaluation of AFW Systems for various operating plants (NUREG-0611 and NUREG-0635) and made short-term and long-term generic recommendation. In response to the short-term recommendations, the licensee committed to inspect all AFW System valves, including those that are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, to verify the proper position. The long-term recommendation to resolve the concern that generated the above short-term recommendation is_to provide redundant parallel flow paths (piping-and valves) to prevent AFW system inoperability due to an inadvertent closed manual valve that could interrupt all AFW system flow. The itcensee has redundant parallel AFW system flow paths, which satisfy this recommendation and resolves the concern.
NUREG-0103, " Standard Technical Specification for Babcock and Wilcox
- 1. Pressurized Water Reactors," Section 4.7.1.2 (Surveillance Requirements for the Auxiliary Feedwater System) states that each AFW System be demonstrated operable at least every 31 days by: " Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) in the flow path that is
- not locked, sealed, of otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position."
The proposed changes to TS 4.8 provide for monthly inspection, when the average RCS temperature is greater than or equal to 280*F, of all flow path valves in the AFW System which are capable of being moved without unlocking or unsecuring. This will ensure proper valve positioning in the AFW System flow path. The proposed changes also provide for post-maintenance and post-testing verification of the proper positioning of all valves that were manipulated during maintenance and testing. This ensures a return to the proper' position of those AFW valves placed in an off-normal configuration, k - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
r_ . __ .__
9 The proposed changes to TS 4.8 ensure periodic verification of the position of AFW System flow path valves which are capable of having their position changed (valves not secured, locked, or sealed).
Administrative controls are presently in place at Rancho Seco to ensure the proper positioning of the remaining AFW System valves.
The positioning and control of locked valves is directed by administrative procedures. The position of all locked valves is verified prior to plant startup after leaving cold shutdown. The correct position of all system valves is verified prior to startup of the respective system. An administrative procedure controls the documentation of the status of equipment and systems. System Lineup Alteration checklists and System Lineup Restoration checklists are used for all system lineups that vary from the position required by the applicable procedure. Technical Specification requirements and in-place administrative controls ensure that all AFW System valves are in their proper position. This ensures the capability of the AFW System to perform its intended function.
Based on the above, the NRC staff finds this acceptable.
3.0 CONTACT WITH STATE OFFICIAL l The NRC staff has advised the Chief of the Radiological Health Branch, State Department of Health Services, State of California, of the proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration. No comments'were received.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
This amendment involves changes in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Comission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding.
Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusionsetforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9). Pursuantto10CFR51.22(b),
no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
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5.0 CONCLUSION
Wehaveconcluded,basedontheconsiderationsdiscussedabove,that(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) public such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the anendment will not be inimical to comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor: S. Reynolds Dated: May 23,1989
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