IR 05000029/1989009

Insp Rept 50-029/89-09 on 890522-0625.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Daytime & Backshifts of Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety,Security,Plant Operations,Maint & Surveillance,Engineering Support & LERs

ML20247M922
Person / Time
Site:	Yankee Rowe
Issue date:	07/25/1989
From:	Blough A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247M901	List: IR 05000029/1989009 ML20247M897
References
50-029-89-09, 50-29-89-9, NUDOCS 8908020251
Download: ML20247M922 (12)

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?! U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,, REGION ~I Report No: 50-29/89-09

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Docket No

-50-29

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Licensee No: DPR-3

' Licen*;ee: . Yankee' Atomic Electric Company e 580 Main Street'

t Bolton, Massachusetts 01740-1398 Cis:11ity Name: Yankee N0 clear Power Station Inspection at: Rowe, !< massachusetts Inspection Conducted: May 22 - June 25,.1989-JInspectors: John Macdonald, Senior Resident Inspector Michael T. Mark ey, Resident Inspector

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Ap,, roved . By : ' .

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A. Randy Bloughp C,iief, Reactor Projects Section 3A Date

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Inspection Summary: . Inspection on May 22 - June 25,1989 (Report No. 50-29/89-09)

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Areas Inspected: Routine inspec* ion on daytime and backshifts by two resident inspectors of: actions An prey w 5 inspection findings; operational safety; securit',, plant operati-ws; mainter,ance and surveillance; engineering support;

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radiological controls; licensee event reports; licensee response to NRC initi-atives; and, periodic report Results: General Conclusions on Adequacy, Strength or Weakness in the Licensee's Program The licensee response to.the increased main coolant system (MCS) leakage event of June 6,1989 (Section 6.1) was a noteworthy strength. Plant staff demonstrated a conservative safety perspective. Continuing manage-ment oversight was provided and strong interdepartmental communications were evident. The conception of the enhanted maintenance support program is a positive response to an NRC identified weakness (Section 7.1).

Security staff responded to the peaceful citizens group demonstration on June 1,1989 in a professional manner (Section 5.2). Violations-No violations'were identifie . Unresolved Items No unresolved items were identifie <

8908020251 890727

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TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Persons Contacted..................................................... I Summary of Facility Activities....................................... 1 Stat >;s of P revi ou s Fi ndi ng s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3.1 (Closed) Violation 89-06-01: Two Examples of Failure to Properly Implement Approved Procedures. ............................... 2 Operational Safety (IP 71707)........................................ 2 4.1 Plant Operations Review.......................................... 2 4.2 Safety System Review............................................ 3 4.3 Inoperable Equipment............................................ 3 4.4 Review of Temporary Change Requests and Mechanical Bypasses..... 4 4.5 Review of Switching and Tagging Operations...................... 4 4.6 Ope ra ti ona l Sa f e :y Fi ndi ng s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.7 Reactor Engineering........................... ................. 4 Security (IP 71707).................................................. 4

~.1 3 Observations of Physical Securi ty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5.2 Peaceful Citizens Group Demonstration........................... 5 P l a n t Op e ra t i o n s ( I P 7170 7 ) . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6.1 Plant Shutdown to Repair MCS Leakage Path........ .............. 5 Maintenance / Surveillance (IP 61726,62703)........................... 6 7.1 Maintenance Program Su r rt..................................... 6 7.2 Mi spositioned Safety InP tion Acculator Valve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8 Radi ologi cal Control s (IP 71707) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8.1 Observation of Radiological Protection and Controls............. 7 Licensee Event Reporti ng ( LER) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.1 LER 50-29/89-08, Missed Surveillance - TS 4.6.1.1.b............. 8 1 Licensee Self-Assessment Capability and Quality Assurance Program Implementation (IP 35502,40500)................................... 8 11. Review of Periccic and Special Reports (IP 90713). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 12. Management Meetings (IP 30703, 40500)........................... .... 10 The NRC Inspection Manual inspection procedure (IP) or temporary instruction (TI) or the Region I temporary instruction (RI TI) that was used as inspection guidance is listed for each applicable report section.

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p DETAILS Persont Contacted Yankee Nuclear Power Station N. St. Laurent, Plant Superintendent T. Henderson, Assistant. Plant Superintendent R; Mellor, Technical Director Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC)

B. Drawbridge, Vice President of Operations A. Shepard, Director of QA G Mcdonald.. Group Manager, Quality Services Group

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J. Thayer, Projects Manager J. Haseltine, Project Director V. Hinkle, Asst. Project Manager J; DeVincentis, Vice President NRC M. Fairtile, Project Manager D. Haverkamp, DRP, Section Chief J. Macdonald, Senior Resident Inspector M. Markley, Resident Inspector The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees during the inspec-tion, including members of the operations, radiation protection, chemis-try, instrument and control, maintenance, reactor engineering, security, training, technical services and general office staff . Summary of Facility Activities At the start of the inspection period Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Yankee, YNPS or.the plant) was returning to full power following a reduc-tion to 50% power to facilitate condenser tube cleaning. Full power was attained on June 23, 1989. Full power operations continued until June 6, 1989, when an emergercy load reduction was preformed as a result of an increased MCS leakage rate. The source of the leak was promptly isolated and power operations were resumed on June 7,1989. The plant was returned to full power on June 8,1989 and remained at 100% power through the end of the inspection perio A Region I specialist inspection of the licensee radiation protection pro-gram was conducted May 23 - 26, 1989 (50-029/89-07).

A Region I specialist inspection of the licensee fire protection program was conducted May 30 - June 1, 1989 (50-029/89-08).

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Region I operator license examiners initiated administration of SRO re-qualification examinations to 12 candidates on June 19, 1989. The results will be documented in inspection report 50-029/89-0 On June 22, 1989, the resident staff, accompanied by the cognizant DRP Section Chief, conducted various interviews with supervisory personnel at the Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) corporate offices in Bolton, M . Status of Previous Inspection Findings 3.1 (Closed) Violation 50-29/89-06-01, Two Examples of Failure to Follow Approved Procedure A notice of violation was issued in inspection report 50-29/89-06 which involved two previous and separate examples of licensee failure to properly implement approved procedure Both examples involved the improper restoration of systems during surveillance testing. In 1988, technicians miswired a module it the control room fire protec-tion panel which rendered the control room emergency air cleaning system functionally inoperable. On April 6, 1989, technicians omitted a restorative procedural step during non-return valve (NRV)

logic testing which resulted in the inadvertent closure of the N NRV and required a manual reactor scram to be initiate Because the licensee previously implemented appropriate corrective actions to prevent occurrence of similar events, as reported in in-spection report 50-29/89-06 and the associated LERS, no licensee written response to the violation was required. Final inspector re-view determined the corrective actions previously identified had been properly implemented. This item is close . Operational Safety 4.1 Plant Operations Review The inspector observed plant operations during regular and backshift tours of the following areas:

Control Room Safe Shutdown System Building Primary Auxiliary Building Fence Line (Protected Area)

Diesel Generator Rooms Intake Structure Vital Switchgear Room Turbine Building Cable Tray House Spent Fuel Pit (SFP) Building Control room instruments were observed for correlation between chan-nels, proper functioning, and conformance with technical specifica-tions. Alarm conditions in effect and alarms received in the control room were reviewed and discussed with the operators. Operator aware-ness and response to these conditions were reviewed. Operators were found cognizant of board and plant conditions. Control room and

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' I shift manning were compared with Technical Specification require-ment Posting and control of radiation, contaminated and high radi-ation areas were inspected. The use of and compliance with Radiation Work Perr..-its (RWPs) and use of required personnel monitoring devices were checked. Plant housekeeping controls were observed including control of flammable and other hazardous materials. During plant tours, logs and records were reviewed to ensure compliance with sta-tion procedures, to determine if entries were correctly made, and to verify correct communication of equipment status. These records in-cluded various operating logs, turnover sheets, tagout and temporary change request logs, and event deportability evaluation request Operators and shift supervisors were alert, attentive and responded appropriately to annunciators and plant condition Documentation of shift activities was good. Inspector review of operating logs and turnover sheets indicated good characterization of operating history. Off normal conditions, surveillance completed, and equipment performance were appropriately documente .2 Safety System Review The emergency diesel generators, EDG fuel oil, containment isolation and high and low pressure safety injection systems were reviewed to verify proper alignment and operational status in the standby mod The review included verification that: (1) accessible major flow path valves were correctly positioned; (ii) power supplies were energized; (iii) lubrication and component cooling was proper; and (iv) com-ponents were operable based on a visual inspection of equipment for leakage and general conditions. No violations or safety concerns were identifie .3 Inoperable Equipment Actions taken by plant personnel durinn periods when equipment was inoperable were reviewed to verify: Technical Specification limits were met; alternate surveillance testing was completed satisfactory-ily; and equipment return to service upon completion of repairs was proper. This review was completed for the following items:

Inclusive Dates Item June 1 - Present Main Steam line area radiation monitor No. I was declared inoperable due to cable dnd hardware problems (MR 89-1200).

May 24 Vapor container pressure indication (VC-PI-244) was declared inoperable due to a loss of pressure indication (TCR-89-190).

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l 4.4 Review of Temporary Change Requests and Mechanical Bypasses Temporary Change Requests (TCRs), which include lifted leads and jum-pers and mechanical bypasses, were reviewed to verify that controls established by AP 0018, " Temporary Change Control," were met, no con-flicts with the technical specifications were created, the requests were properly approved prior to installation, and a safety evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 was prepared if require Implemen-tation of the requests was reviewed on a sampling basis. The follow-ing requests were reviewed:

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TCR 89-190: Implemented and restored on May 24, 1989 to support maintenance on vapor container pressure indication (VC-PI-244).

4.5 Review of Switching & Tagoing Operations The switching and tagging log was reviewed and tagging activities were inspected to verify plant equipment was controlled in accordance with the requirements of AP 0017, " Switching and Tagging of Plant Equipment." No unacceptable conditions were identifie .6 Operational Safety Findings Licensee administrative control of off-normal system configurations by the use of TCR and switching and tagging procedures as reviewed above, was in compliance with procedural instructions and was con-sistent with plant safet Licensee efforts to minimize active tem-porary change requests and mechanical bypasses are noteworthy 4.7 Reactor Engineering Inspector review of reactor engineering suppsrt for plant operations indicated good licensee performance. Reactivity and data trending, incore flux mapping, and calorimetric determinations were observed to be performed in accordance with Technical Specifications, station procedures and good engineering practices. Personnel were profes-sional and responsive in addressing inspector questions and concern . Security 5.1 Observations of Physical Security Selected tspects of plant physical security were reviewed during regular and backshift hours to verify that controls were in accord-ance with the security plan and approved procedures. This review included the following security measures: guard staffing, vital and protected area barrier integrity, maintenance of isolation zones, and implementation of access controls including authorization, badging, escorting, and searches. No inadequacies were identifie _ - _ _ - - _ . -

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5.2 Peaceful Citizens Group Demonstration On June 1,. the licensee.became aware of the intent of a' citizen group to conduct a non-violent ~ demonstration at or near Yankee Rowe on June The licensee deployed-additional security personnel as a pr4cau-tionary measure to increase owner controlled and protected area ;ur-veillanc On June 2, at approximately 11:30 a.m., 20 demonstrators crossed owner controlled property and entered a protected area isolation zone and sat peacefully against the protected area fence. A previously positioned state law enforcement agency (SLEA) official advised the demonstrators that they were in violation of trespassing laws and that they would be' arrested if they failed to voluntarily exit the are All but.six of the demonstrators exited the area. The six indivi-duals who remained seated in the isolation zone were then informed that they were under arrest and placed into a van for transport to a loca.1 state police barrack The licensee response to this event was noteworthy. The security staff performed in a professional manner and were observed to have displayed restraint and respect in dealing with the demonstrator The appropriate security notification was made to the NRC Operations

' Center in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71 (b) criteria. The inspectors had no further question . Plant Operations 6.1 Plant Shutdown to Repair MCS Leakage Path On June 6, at 8:45' a.m. with the plant at 100% power, operators noted a high valve stem leakoff system temperature of 210 degrees Fahren-heit. The valve sten leakoff system collects leakage from many valves located within the vapor containment (VC) and directs the leakage out of the VC to the primary drain collecting tank (PDCT).

High leakoff system temperature could be indicative of MCS leakage into the system. Following receipt.of the high temperature condi-tion, the operators calculated the MCS-leak rate to be 2.3 gp Since the leakage was attributable to the stem leakoff system it was considered identified leakage. Technical Specification 3.4.5. permits continued operations with an identifiable MCS leakage of up to 4.0 gpm. At 10:25 a.m., a VC entry was conducted in an attempt to locate the degraded valve (valve or valves). However, due to the nearly uniform heating of the common leakoff system header, as well as limited VC accessibility at power, personnel were unable to locate the affected valve. For the next several hours, operators isolated and backseated various leakoff system valves individually without identifying the valve. At 2:32 p.m., the PDCT high temperature alarm

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annunciated at 142 degrees Fahrenheit. The PDCT was isolated and the stem leakoff system was redirected to the low pressure surge tank via relief valve, SV-223, set at 300 ps The plant onsite review committee (PORC), which had convened earlier in response to this event, determined a sufficient period of time had elapsed to attempt to locate the degraded valve and recommended reac-tor power be reduced. Therefore, at 4:15 p.m., control room opera-tors performed a rapid load reduction, the turbine generator was secured at 6:53 p.m. and the reactor was stabilized in mode 2 (start up). At approximately 11:00 p.m. maintenance personnel identified a minor packing leak on charging system letdown isolation valve CH-MOV-525. The valve had previously been evaluated for leakage but was believed to be backseated as a result of full open light indicatio However, due to the open limit switch setting, the valve disk was slightly off its backseat allowing MCS flow up the stem, past de-graded packing and into the stem leakoff system. The operators placed the valve into hand operation and manually backseated the valve which isolated the leakage path. An operator aid label was attached to the main control board valve switch to indicate the off-normal valve condition. On June 7 at 2:30 a.m. following completion of VC close-out and start-up prerequisites, reactor power was in-creased. The plant entered Mode 1 at 7:14 a.m. when the turbine generator was phased to the grid. However, plant power was main-tained at less than 50% to facilitate main condenser tube leak in-spections. Following completion of the condenser inspections, the unit was returned to 100% at 10:10 p.m. on June The licensee response to this event was prompt and well coordinate The inspectors noted continuing assessment and oversight of plant activities during the event was provided by the PORC quorum. The licensee exhibited a conservative safety perspective in the expedi-tious reactor shutdown. The inspectors had no fur *.her question . Maintenance / Surveillance

7.1 Maintenance Program Support d

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During the inspection period, the licensee initiated a new mainten-ance support progra In this program, Yankee Nuclear Services Divi-sion will perform week-long system reviews, in each engineering dis-cipline, for each plant system. The initial program is being de- 1 veloped through evaluation of the safe shutdown syste Engineered !

safety features will be the first systems reviewed.

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As described, the system review methodology will include evaluating vendor technical manuals, design changes, maintenance and surveil-lance procedures, and the plant maintenance program. Findings and

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conclusions will be provided in the form of recommended change Documentation is to bc included in the equipment history program and plant life extension (PLEX) data bas The licensee has demonstrated good initiative in providing additional onsite engineering support. This area was previously identified in NRC inspections as a program weaknes Implementation of the program and resolution of the findings will continue to be monitored by the resident inspector .2 Mispositioned Safety Irdection Accumulator Valve On June 14, the licensee identified a mispositioned valve (SI-V-741)

in the safety injection accumulator nitrogen system during a walkdown with the NRC inspector. Specifically, the valve was found unlocked and open contrary to the operating procedure. The licensee performed an event deportability evaluation report per procedure AP-0008 and concluded it was not reportable. However, nonconformance report NCR 89-009 was issued for resolution. The licensee determined system operability not to have been affected because SI-V-741 is in series with SI-V-45 which was locked closed. The licensee review determined that conflicting procedural guidance existed such that the conclusion of-some procedures left the valve open while others directed the valve to be left closed and locke Inspector review of the licensee assessment, system drawings, and pracedures as well as observation of the valve lineup verified the licensee findings to be as described. In response ta the self-assessment and recent NRC findings, the licensee detailed plans to upgrade operations department procedures. Immediate procedural dis-crepancies were adequately resolved in a timely manne . Radiological Controls 8.1 Observation of Radiological Protection and Controls l

Radiological controls were revieweJ on a routine basis relative to industry radiological standards, administration and radiological con-trol procedures, and regulatory requirements. Selected work evolu-tions were observed to determine the adequacy of program implemen--

tation commensurate with the radiological hazards and importance to safety. Independent surveys were performed by the inspector to verify the adequacy of radiological controls and instructions to worker Inspector review noted radiation work permits (RWPs) and radiological surveys to provide adequate worker guidance. Most RWPs were for general plant activitie Radiological posting and labeling were consistent with administrative and regulatory requirement c--____- _ - _ _ _ _

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1 Licensee Event Reporting (LER)

The inspector reviewed the below listed licensee event report (LER) to determine that with respect to the general aspects of the events: (1) the report was submitted in a timely manner; (2) description of the events was accurate; (3) root cause analysis was performed; (4) safety implications were considered; and (5) corrective actions implemented or planned were sufficient to preclude recurrence of a similar even .1 LER 50-29/89-09, Missed Surveillance - TS 4.6.1. This LER describes the May 21, 1989 event in which the licensee failed to perform the once per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> containment air mass calcula-tion surveillance, as required by TS 4.6.1. The calculation is normally performed daily at 3:00 a.m. by the shift technical adviser (STA). However, on the morning of May 21, the STA was monitoring condenser tube cleaning activities and failed to perform the calcu-lation. Later on May 21, at 1:15 p.m. the day shift STA identified the missed surveillance and performed the calculation satisfactoril The immediate root cause of this event was the failure of the STA to perform the TS surveillanc Further, this surveillance was not in-cluded on the operations department surveillance schedule procedure, which requires shift supervisor review prior to shift turnove The licensee corrective actions included stressing TS surveillance compliance to all STAS and revising the surveillance schedule proce-dure to include the VC air mass calculation, such that status of the surveillance will be reviewed by the shift supervisor during shift turnove The LER adequately addressed the reporting criteria above. The lic-ensee promptly identified the missed surveillance, satisfactorily completed the calculation and took appropriate actions to preclude recurrence of a similar event. The inspectors had no further ques-tions regarding this even . Licensee Self-Assessment Capability and Quality Assurance Program Implementation The resident inspector and regional specialist staffs continually evaluate the ability of the licensee to perform self-assessments which contribute to the identification, correction and prevention of safety-significant operational and technical issue These evaluations include frequent NRC inspector observation or review of the licensee handling of internal and external licensee event reports, communications between staff personnel and management, both onsite and offsite, the oversight functions of the onsight and offsite review committees and their appointed subcommittees, and the performance of the quality assurance program audit, quality con-trol and operational surveillance function _ _ _ - _ - _ _

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The resident inspectors frequently attend Plant Operations Review Commit-tee (PORC) meetings. The cornittee is an experienced, multi-faceted body composed in accordance with TS requirements. The committee normally con-venes weekly, and as plant conditions dictate, Committee dialogue is per-ceptive and professional. Open and constructive discussion by all atten-dees is encouraged and comt.. hic direction is well maintained by the chair-man. The committee typically displays a conservative safety perspective and utilizes license and design bases documents in support of conclusion The committee frequently charters subcommittees to provide specialized oversight of specific issues. The development and implementation of the revised emergency operating procedures was an example of positive subcom-mittee oversight. A review of LER root cause and corrective action de-terminations reveals no programmatic or repetitive weaknesses in a given area. This indicated that the licensee has been generally successful in assessing deficiencies and. implementing effective corrective actions to prevent recurrence. The quality of the meeting minutes, which were pre-viously determined to be deficient, continues to improve. Issues are properly documented and PORC follow items are individually identified and appropriately dispositioned in ensuing meeting The Yankee independent offsite review committee is titled the nuclear safety and audit review ccomittee (NSARC). The inspectors interviewed the NSARC chairman, reviewed the committee composition and reviewed the meet-ing minutes from the November 30, 1988 and May 26, 1989 semi-annual meet-ings. The TS 6.5.2.2 and 6.5.2.3 requirements for committee co;nposition and qualification, respectively, were me Review of the meeting minutes indicated the committee discharged its duties in accordance with the re-quirements of TS 6.5.2.8. The committee displayed a conservative safety approach toward potential plant aging related problems. A subcommittee was commissioned to review the previous five years of data on plant trips and load reductions to independently determine the failure mechanisms and evaluate plant aging impact on these events. The quality and development of the meeting minute topics was consistent with the safety significance of the issue Based on a review of the PORC and NSARC activities, the inspectors con-cluded the licensee was providing appropriate management oversight to en-courage the identification and ensure the resolution of potential safety issue The quality assurance department (QAD) has responsibility for all QA/QC activitie Performance based audits and surveillance of plant activi-ties were performed by the quality services group (QSG) of QAD. The QSG was organized in 1987 to provide enhanced technical expertise to the audit process. This initiative has enabled the QAD audit and surveillance pro-gram to move from a compliance oriented group to a proactive organization more capable of identifying and preventing potential conditions adverse to safety. The QSG resources were properly allocated to ensure all major

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.V 10 L functional: areas.were. addressed. The QSG audit and surveillance inspec- tions provided in-depth reviews which-effectively developed deficiency and-Observation detail. The reports assessed and trended present performance-and addressed the implementation of corrective actions to previous issue TheLplant staff appeared responsive to QSD-findings and. generally met-established commitment dates for resolution.-

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Resident inspector review'of operational data, NRC inspection reports, licensee. event reports and QAD/QSG audit reports indicate the~ licensee continues to be a strong performer capable of identifying and effectively correcting deficiencies. No indications of programmatic breakdowns or declining performance trends were identified.' The inspectors had no fur--

ther question . Review of periodic and Special Reports i Upon . receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special reports sub-mitted pursuant to Technical Specification This review verified, as applicable: (1) that the reported information was valid and' included the NRC-required data; (2) that . test results r.nd supporting information ~were consistent with design predictions and performance specifice. tion; and (3) that planned corrective actions were adequate for resolution of the-problem. The inspector also ascertained whether any reported information should be classified as an abnormal occurrence. .The.following reports were reviewed:

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Yankee NSARC Meeting Minutes from Meeting No. 88-8-R, November 30, 1988

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Yankee NSARC Meeting Minutes from Meeting No. 89-3-R, May 26, 1989

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Result for the Combined Utility Assessment of' Yankee Atomic Electric-Company, September 23, 198 . Management Meetings At periodic intervals during this inspection, meetings were held with senior plant management to discuss the findings. A summary of findings-for the report period was also discussed at the conclusion of the inspec-tion and prior to report issuanc No proprietary information was iden-tified as being included in the report.

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