IR 05000220/1992005
ML18038A502 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Nine Mile Point |
Issue date: | 03/12/1992 |
From: | SYLVIA B R NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
References | |
NMP1L-0649, NMP1L-649, NUDOCS 9203190321 | |
Download: ML18038A502 (16) | |
Text
ACCELERATEDDISTRIBUTIONDEMONSTRATIONSYSTEMREGULATORyINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)DOCKET05000220500041NOTES:ACCESSIONNBR:9203190321DOC.DATE:92/03/12NOTARIZED:NOFACIL:50-220NineMilePointNuclearStation,Unit1,NiagaraPowe50-410NineMilePointNuclearStation,Unit2,NiagaraMohaAUTH.NAM"AUTHORAFFILIATIONSYLVIA,B.R.NiagaraMohawkPowerCorp.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)"
SUBJECT: ProvidesresponsetoNRCviolationsnotedinInspRepts50-220/92-05&50-410/92-05.Correctiveactions:accountabilitymeetingheldw/personneldirectlyinvolvedtoprovideinsightintoreasonsforevent.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-InspRept/NoticeofViolationResponseRECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPDl-1PDBRINKMANiDINTERNAL:ACRSAEOD/DEIIBDEDRONRRMORISSEAUiDNRR/DLPQ/LPEB10NRR/DREP/PEPB9HNRR/PMAS/ILRB12OEDEREXTERNAL:EG&G/BRYCEgJ.H.NSICCOPIESLTTRENCL11112211111111111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEBRINKMAN,D.AEODAEOD/DSP/TPABNRRHARBUCKgC.NRR/DLPQ/LHFBPTNRR/DOEA/OEABNRR/DST/DIR8E2NUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS1RGN1FILE01NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111'111111111111110NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMP1-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR25ENCL25
,~I NIAGARAMOHAWKPOWERCORPORATION/NINEMILEPOINT,P.O.BOX63.LYCOMING,NY13093/TELEPHONE(315)349-2882B.RalphSylviaExecutiveVicePresidentNuclearMarch12,1992NMP1L0649UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskWashington,DC20555NineMilePointUnit1DocketNo.50-220DPR-NineMilePoint.Unit2DocketNo.50-410NPF-Gentlemen:
SUBJECT: RESPONSETONOTICESOFVIOLATION-NRCCOMBINEDINSPECTIONREPORTNOS.50-220/92-05AND50-410/92-05AttachedisNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation'sresponsetotheNoticesofViolationcontainedinthesubjectInspectionReportdatedFebruary11,1992,(Attachments1and2).WeshareyourconcernsaddressedintheInspectionReport,andfeelthatourcorrectiveactionshaveappropriatelyaddressedtherootcauseandrecurrenceoftheseviolations.Ifyouhaveanyquestionsconcerningthismatter,pleasecontactme.Verytrulyyours,/Yr~/jj"L.c.(~r)j:a+C~B.RalphSylviaExecutiveVicePresident-NuclearBRS/RM/NS/lmcATTACHMENTSxc:Mr.T.T.Martin,RegionalAdministrator,RegionIMr.W.L.Schmidt,SeniorResidentInspectorMr.R.A.Capra,Director,NRRMr.D.S.Brinkman,SeniorProjectManager,NRRMr.J.E.Menning,ProjectManager,NRRMr.L.Nicholson,Chief,ReactorProjects,Section1BRecordsManagement92031'70321920312PDRADOCK05000220PDR
ATTACM4ENT1(Page1of3)NIAGARAMOHAWKPOWERCORPORATIONNINEMILEPOINTUNIT1DOCKETNO.50-220DPR-63RESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATIONASCONTAIjMEDININSPECTIONREPORT50-220/92-05VIOLATION5222-0510CFR50.36(a)statesinpartthateachlicenseauthorizingoperationofaproductionorutilizationfacilitywillincludeTechnicalSpecifications.PlantTechnicalSpecification6.12statesinpartthatforHighRadiationAreas,theareabeconspicuouslypostedandentrancebecontrolledbyrequiringissuanceofaRadiationWorkPermit.Anyindividualorgroupofindividualspermittedtoentertheareashallbeprovidedwithoraccompaniedby:aradiationmonitoringdevicewhichcontinuouslyindicatesradiationdoserates,or;aradiationmonitoringdevicewhichcontinuouslyintegratestheradiationdoserateintheareaandalarmswhenapresetintegrateddoseisreceived,or;anindividualqualifiedinradiationprotection,,witharadiationdoseratemonitoringdevice.Contrarytotheabove,onDecember16,1991,threemembersofthelicensee'sOperationsDepartmententeredtheSouthCondenserMoistureSeparatorRoomonthe277'levationoftheTurbineBuilding,apostedHighRadiationArea,withoutbeingonaRadiationWorkPermit,andwithoutadoseratemeter,analarmingdosimeter,oraccompaniedbyaRadiationProtectio'ntechnicianwithameter.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementIV).I.THEREASONSFORTHEILATIONNiagaraMohawkadmitstotheviolationasstated.OperationspersonnelarecoveredbyanextendedRadiationWorkPermit(RWP)iftheymeetthequalifyingconditionsforsuchpermit.However,oneoftheprerequisitestotheapplicationofanextendedRWP,obtainingaradiationmonitoringdevice,wasnotmet.TheStationShiftSupervisor(SSS)failedtoobtainaradiationmonitoringdeviceorRadiationProtection(RP)supportpriortoentranceintoaHighRadiationArea.TherootcauseforthiseventispersonnelerrorduetoOperationspersonnelnotfollowingstationprocedures,whicharebasedupontheabovecitedTechnicalSpecification.Specifically,GenerationAdministrativeProcedureGAP-RPP-08,"ControlofTransient,High,andLockedHighRadiationAreas,"Section3.2,wasnotfollowed.Operationspersonneldidnothavemonitoringcapabilitysuchasaradiationmonitoringdevice,analarmingdosimeter,orapersonqualifiedinRPprocedurespossessingaradiationdoseratemonitoringdevicebeforeenteringthelockedHighRadiationArea.Also,betteravailabilityofportableradiationmonitoringequipmentassignedtoOperationsinthecontrolroomthroughappropriatecontrolswouldhaveallowedtheproperentryintothelockedHighRadiationArea.TheSSSattemptedunsuccessfullytogetaportableradiationmonitoringdevicebeforeenteringtheHighRadiationAre ATTACHMENT1(Page2of3)NIAGARAMOHAWKPOWERCORPORATIONNINEMILEPOINTUNIT1DOCKETNO.50-220DPR-63'ESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATIONASCONTAINEDININSPECTIONREPORT50-220/92-05I2.CRRETESTEPTAKENANDTHEULTSACHIEEDRadiologicalOccurrenceReports(ROR)forenteringthelockedHighRadiationAreawithoutaradiationmonitoringdevice(ROR¹1-91-00-57)andbreakinginthe"break-to-enter"keybox(ROR¹1-91-00-56)weregeneratedonDecember16,1991.Immediatec'orrectiveactionstakenforROR¹1-91-00-57wereforRadiationProtectiontosurveytheSouthCondenserMoistureSeparatorRoomarea,documentdosimetryreadingsfromOperationspersonnel,andverifythatdosesreceivedwerewithinReg'ulatorylimits,NiagaraMohawkguidelines,andpostedvaluesatthegates.Eachpersonwhoenteredthearearecordedanexposureof10mremonanextendedRWPlog.Thefollow-upradiationsurveyidentifiedageneralarearadiationexposurerate,inthetravelpathOperationstook,oflessthanorequalto450mr/hr.ImmediatecorrectiveactionstakenforROR¹1-91-00-56weretocontactSecurityI&CtoreplacethekeyboxglassandhaveRadiationProtectionauditandaccountforthekeysinthe"break-to-enter"keybox.Anaccountabilitymeetingwasheldwithpersonneldirectlyinvolvedtoprovideinsightintothereasonsforthisevent.TheSSSwascoachedbyOperationsmanagementregardingcompliancewithapplicableproceduresandimpactonTechnicalSpecifications.Also,toprovideimmediateaccesstoaradiationmonitoringdeviceforOperationsinthecontrolroom,aradiationmonitoringdevicestationhasbeenprovidedinthatlocation.TheAssistantSSShassinglepointaccountabilityforreturnandissueofradiationmonitoringdevicesaspartofshiftturnover.Additionally,aradiationmonitoringdevicehasbeenlocatedatoptheemergencykeyboxintheSSSofficefortheexclusiveuseoftheSSSordesigneeduringemergencyentryintoHighRadiationAreas.Theseactionshavealleviatedtheradiationmonitoringdeviceavailabilityproblemthatcontributedtotheviolation.3.CORRETIVESTEPSTOBETAKENTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSALessonsLearnedTransmittalhasbeengeneratedfortheUnit1eventandhasbeendistributedtoNuclearDivisionseniormanagementpersonnel,Unit1and2OperationsandUnit1and2RadiationProtection.ThiswillallowOperationsandotherbranchdepartmentstounderstandthesignificanceofthisviolation.OperationswillalsopresentshifttrainingtoOperationscrewstoemphasizethiseventandtheLessonsLearned,includingtheoverridingrequirementtocomplywithTechnicalSpecificationrequirementsandstationprocedures.Theshifttrainingwillalsoincludeinstructionsthatifradiationmonitoringdevicesbecomeunavailable,RadiationProtectionwillbenotifiedandnoentrymadeintoaHighRadiationAreauntilapplicableproceduresandrequirementshavebeenfulfilled.RadiationProtectionpersonnelwillbeinvolvedwiththisshifttrainin ATTACHMENT1(Page3of3)NIAGARAMOHAWKPOWERCORPORATIONNINEMILEPOINTUNIT1DOCKETNO.50-220DPR-63RESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATIONASCONTAINEDININSPECTIONREPORT50-220/92-05RRETESTEPSTBETAKENTOAIDFURTHERILATI(cont.)TheRadiologicalOccurrenceReportprocesswillbereplacedbytheDeviation/EventReport(DER)processtoallowforahigherlevelandmoreimmediatemanagementreview.TheDERprocedureisbeingrevisedtoprovideaprocesswhichwillallowdisseminationofevents,suchastheUnit2HighRadiationAreaentry,betweenbothunitsinamoretimelymanner.ThisprocedurerevisionwillbecompletedbyMarch31,1992,withtrainingtobecompletedbyApril30,1992.4.DATEHELLMPLIANCEWASAHIEVEDFullcompliancewasachievedonDecember16,1991,whendosesreceivedbyOperationsweredeterminedandfoundtobewithinregulatorylimitsaftersurveyswereperformedbyRadiationProtectio ATTACHMENT2.(Page1of3)NIAGARAMOHAWKPOWERCORPORATIONNINEMILEPOINTUNIT2DOCKETNO.50-410.NPF-69RESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATIONASCONTAINEDININSPECTIONREPORT50-410/92-05VIOLATIO51-0510,CFR50.36(a)statesinpartthateachlicenseauthorizingoperationofaproductionorutilizationfacilitywillincludeTechnicalSpecifications.PlantTechnicalSpecification6.12statesinpartthatforHighRadiationAreas,theareabeconspicuouslypostedandentrancebecontrolledby.requiringissuanceofaRadiation'orkPermit.Anyindividualorgroupofindividualspermittedtoentertheareashallbeprovidedwithoraccompaniedby:aradiationmonitoringdevicewhichcontinuouslyindicatesradiationdoserates,or;aradiationmonitoringdevicewhichcontinuouslyintegratestheradiationdoserateintheareaandalarmswhenapresetintegrateddoseisreceived,or;anindividualqualifiedinradiationprotection,witharadiationdoseratemonitoringdevice.Contrarytotheabove,onOctober23,1991,fivemembersofthelicensee'sOperationsDepartment.enteredtheNortheastandNorthwestCondenserAreaonthe277'levationoftheTurbineBuilding,apostedHighRadiationArea,withoutbeingonaRadiationWorkPermit,andwithoutadoseratemeter,analarmingdosimeter,oraccompaniedbyaradiation"protectiontechnicianwithameter.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementIV).1.THEREASONSFORTHEVIOLATIONFiveOperationspersonnelenteredtheNortheastandNorthwestCondenserareaonthe277'levationoftheTurbineBuildingonOctober23,1991,inresponsetoalossofcondenservacuumcondition.ThisareaisalockedHighRadiationAreaandentryiscontrolledbyprocedureS-RAP-RPP-0801,"HighRadiationAreaMonitoringandControl"(formerlyS-RPIP-3.8).TheOperationspersonnelwhoenteredtheareaarequalifiedasselfmonitors,andassuchwereauthorizedtoenterunderanExtendedRadiationWorkPermit(RWP)asprovidedforinAdministrativeProcedureAP-3.3.2,"RadiationWorkPermit."OnememberoftheteamenteringthisareawascarryingaradiationmonitoringdeviceasrequiredbyTechnicalSpecificationsandRadiationProtectionprocedures.ThecondenserbayentrywasmonitoredviaaremotecameramonitorbyaRadiationProtectionSupervisorinthearea.Theoperatorcarryingtheradiationmonitoringdevicebecameinvolvedinrespondingtothelossofvacuumandfailedtodevotetheproperattentiontoperformingradiationsurveys.TheRadiationProtectionSupervisordeterminedthatanadequateradiationsurveywasnotperformedbytheoperatorcarryingtheradiationmonitoringdevice,nordidheinformtheotheroperators"ofradiationlevels.Thereasonfortheinadequatesurveyhasbeendeterminedtobeapersonnelerrorduetoafailuretofollowprocedures.UponexitingtheHighRadiationArea,personnelcompletedtherequiredlogentriesfortheExtendedRW ATTACHMENT2(Page2of3)NIAGARAMOHAWKPOWERCORPORATION'INEMILEPOINTUNIT2DOCKETNO.50-410NPF-69RESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATIONASCONTAINEDININSPECTIONREPORT50-410/92-052.RRETETEPSTAKEDTHERESLTAHIEEDTheimmediatecorrectiveactionsweretohaveRadiationProtectionpersonnelverifyradiationlevelsintheareaandverifythatdosesreceivedwerewithinRegulatorylimits,NiagaraMohawkguidelinesandvaluespostedatthegates.Allpersonnelenteringthearearecordedanexposureoflessthanorequalto5mremonanextendedRWPlog.ThePlantManager,OperationsManager,andRadiationProtectionManager,wereallnotifiedoftheevent.ARadiologicalOccurrenceReport'(ROR)waswrittentotrackanddocumenttheeventandanycorrectiveactionsgenerated.Anaccountabilitymeetingwasheldwithallpersonneldirectlyinvolved,toprovideinsightintothe~~~~reasonsfortheevent.ParticipantsdiscussedtheproceduralrequirementsforandtheimportanceofpersonnelradiationmonitoringinHighRadiationAreas.Inaddition,theydiscussedtheneedforOperationsandRadiationProtectiontoworkasateamtopromotesaferplantoperations.Further,thecontrolofkeysthatallowentryintolockedHighRadiationAreas(XHKeys)hasbeenshiftedfromtheStationShiftSupervisor(SSS)totheRadiation,Protectionoffice.ThiswillfacilitateOperationspersonnelcoordinationwithRadiation-Protectiontechniciansduringresponsetoplanttransients.AnemergencyXHKeyhasbeenstagedintheSSSofficealongwithanemergencyuseonlyradiationmonitoringdevice.ThesemaybeusedifaconditionweretodevelopwhereimmediateaccesstoaHighRadiationAreaisrequired.3.CORRETIVESTEPSTOBETAKENTOAVOIDTHERVIOLATINSTheOperationsManagerwilldiscusswithOperationspersonneltheRadiationProtectionrequirementsforoperatorstoenteraHighRadiationArea,stressingthatduringanemergency,thepreferredresponseistoinvolveRadiationProtectionpersonnelifavailable.Hewillalsostressthatwhenutilizingtheself-monitoringtechnique,personnelwilldetermineradiationlevelsinallaccessedareas,andensureallotherpersonrielintheareaaremadeawareoftheseradiationlevels.OperationsTrainingwillbeintegratingRadiationProtectioninterfacesintoappropriatetrainingandevaluatedsimulatorscenarios.Thiswillpromoteteamworkthatallowsoperatorstofocuson~~~~~~respondingtoplanttransientsandRadiationProtectiontechnicianstosupplytheappropriateradiologicalmonitoring.Thisinterface,onceinternalized,willbeapracticedemergencyresponseandanevaluatedportionofthesimulatorscenari ETTAHMBNT2(Page3of3)NIAGARAMOHAWKPOWERCORPORATIONNINEMILEPOINTUNIT2DOCKETNO.50-410NPF-69RESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATIONASCONTAINEDININSPECTIONREPORT50-410/92-05.4.DATEWHEFULLCOMPLIANCEASACHIEVEDFullcompliancewasachievedonOctober23,1991,whendosesreceivedbyOperationswere"determinedtobewithinRegulatorylimitsaftersurveysperformedbyRadiationProtection.