ML20203F133

Proposed Tech Specs Removing Cycle Reload Specific Parameters

ML20203F133
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	07/16/1986
From:	Maine Yankee
To:
Shared Package
ML20203F129	List: ML20203F125 ML20203F133
References
NUDOCS 8607300112
Download: ML20203F133 (14)

Text

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+ . MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANV ATTACHMENT B i TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Table of Contents 1

(Continued)

PAEft l 4.0 Surveillance Requirements 4.0-1 l 4.1 Instrumentation and Control 4.1-1 4.2 Equipment and Sampling Tests 4.2-1

4.3 Reactor Coolant System Leak Tests 4.3-1

4.4 Containment Testing 4.4-1 4.5 Emergency Power System Periodic Testing 4.5-1

. 4.6 Periodic Testing 4.6-1 1 4.7 Inservice Inspection and Testing of Safety 4.7-1

Class Components 4.8 Operational Environmental Monitoring 4.8-1 i 4.9 Shock Suppressor (Snubber) Surveillance 4.9-1 4.10 Steam Generator Tube Surveillance 4.10-1 4.11 Ventilation Filter System Surveillance Testing 4.11-1 1

5.0 Administrative Controls 5.1-1 j 5.1 Responsibility 5.1-1 5.2 Organization 5.2-1 5.3 Facility Staff Qualifications 5.3-1 5.4 Training 5.4-1 5.5 Review and Audit 5.5-1

! 5.6 Reportable Occurrence Action 5.6-1 1 5.7 Safety Limit Violation Report 5.7-1 5.8 Procedures 5.8-1 5.9 Reporting Requirements 5.9-1 5.10 Record Retention 5.10-1  :

!. 5.11 Radiation Protection Program 5.11-1

5.12 High Radiation Area 5.12-1 5.13 Peaking Factor Limit Report 5.13-1 ]

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7419HP+

i

• . M AINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY 1.3 REACTOR Apolicability Applies to the reactor vessel, vessel core and internals, as well as the Reactor Coolant System and components, including associated Emergency Core Cooling Systems.

Obiectives To define those design criteria essential in providing for safe system operation which are not covered in Sections 2 and 3.

Soecification A. Reactor Core The reactor core shall contain 217 fuel assemblies with each assembly containing 176 rods. Each fuel rod clad with Zircaloy-4 shall have a nominal active fuel length of 136.7 inches. The fuel shall have a maximum nominal enrichment of 4.10 weight percent U-235. ]

The core excess reactivity shall be controlled by a combination of boric acid chemical shim, Control Element Assemblies (CEAs) and mechanically fixed non-fuel rods when required. The non-fuel rods may be fixed alumina-boron carbide, solid metal or open tubes.

There are a total of eighty-one (81) full-length, full-strength CEAs provided. Forty (40) of these are paired to form twenty (20) dual CEAs.

Seventy-seven (77) CEAs, including all dual CEAs, are trippable. Four (4) of the CEAs are nontrippable.

i l

1.3-1 7419HP+

. . MAINE VANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPAP4Y 2.2 SAFETY LIMITS - REACTOR CORE Acolicability Applies to the limiting combinations of reactor power, and Reactor Coolant System flow, temperature, and pressure during operation.

Obiective To maintain the integrity of the fuel cladding and prevent the release of significant amounts of fission products to the reactor coolant.

Soecifications A. The reactor and the Reactor Protection System shall be operated such that the Specified Acceptable Fuel Design Limit (SAFDL) on the departure from nucleate boiling heat flux ratio (DNBR):

DNBR - 1.20 using the YAEC-1 DNB heat flux correlation is not exceeded during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences.

B. The reactor and the Reactor Protection System shall be operated such that the SAFDLs for prevention of fuel centerline melting are not exceeded during normal operation and antic'. pated operational occurrences. ]

]

Basis To maintain the integrity of the fuel cladding, thus preventing fission product release to the Primary System, it is necessary to prevent overheating of the cladding. This is accomplished by operating within the nucleate boiling regime of heat transfer, and with a peak linear heat rate that will not cause fuel centerline melting in any fuel rod. First, by operating within the nucleate boiling regime of heat transfer, the heat transfer coefficient is large enough so that the maximum clad surface temperature is only slightly greater than the coolant saturation temperature. The upper boundary of the nucleate boiling regime is termed " Departure from Nucleate Boiling" (DNB). At this point, there is a sharp reduction of the heat transfer coefficient, which would result in higher cladding temperature and the possibility of cladding failure.

2.2-1

. MalNE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY 3.10 CEA GROUP. POWER DISTRIBUTION. MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT LIMITS AND COOLANT CONDITIONS Acolicability:

Applies to insertion of CEA groups and peak linear heat rate during operation.

Objective:

To ensure (1) core subtriticality after a reactor trip, (2) limited potential reactivity insertions from a hypothetical CEA ejection, and (3) an acceptable core power distribution, moderator temperature coefficient, core inlet temperature, and reactor coolant system pressure during power operation.

Soecification:

A. CEA Operational Limits

1. When the reactor is critical, except for physics tests and CEA exercises, the shutdown CEAs (Groups A, B and C) shall be fully withdrawn and the regulating CEAs (Groups 1 through 5) shall be no further inserted than the limits shown in Figure A.3 of the Peaking ]

Factor Limit Report per Specification 5.13 for 3 loop operation. ]

CEA Group 5 consists of two subgroups designated Subgroup 5A and 5B.

2. A CEA is considered fully withdrawn if the CEA is withdrawn to 4 steps or less from its upper electrical limit.

3. Except during physics testing, a CEA misalignment is considered to be any one of the following:

A CEA in Group A, B, C,1, 2, 3, or 4 that is out of position from the remainder of the group by more than 10 steps.

- A CEA in Subgroup 5A or 5B that is out of position from the remainder of the subgroup by more than 10 steps.

The indicated subgroup positions of Subgroup 5A and 58 differ by more than 15 steps.

If a CEA misalignment is not corrected within 15 minutes, operation with a CEA misalignment is permitted for a period of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> provided:

a. Thermal power is reduced by at least 10% of rated power within one-half hour by at least 20% of rated power within one hour of identification of the misalignment. The CEA insertion limits specified for the initial thermal power must be maintained.

l

b. Hithin two hours after realignment, the peak linear heat rate will l be shown to be within the limits specified in 3.10.C.1 and the total radial peaking factor will be shown to be within the limits specified in 3.10.C.3 using the latest unrodded radial peaking factor.

I 3.10-1

i

. . MAINE VONKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY Exposed Fuel: 14.0 kH/ft for X greater than 0.50 -

p I

. L i

16.0 kH/ft for X less than or equal to 0.50 L -

where X is fraction of core height and CAB is cycle average burnup. b L ,- ,

Should any ofithese limits be exceeded, immediate action will be taken to restore the linear heat rate to within the appropriate limits specified above.

2. The total radial peal l.ing factor, defined as

,, Ff - Fl (1 + Tq ) ,

. shall be evaluated atlea'st once a nonth during power operation above 50% of rated full power.. g 2.1F$isthelatestavailableunroddedradialpeakdetermined from the incore monitoring system for a condition where all CEAs are at or above the 100% power insertion limit. Tq is given by the followi g expression:

T g-2[(Pa-Pc)2+ /Pb-Pd)2

/ (Pa+Pb + "Pc+Pd)2 where Pi is the relative quadrant power determined from the incore system for quadrant 1, when the incore system is operable. If the incore system is not operable, the Pi are. the signals from excore detector' channels 1.

If the measured value of Fj exceeds the value given in Figure ]

2.2 'A.1 of the Peaking Factor. Limit Report por Specification 5.13, ]

perform one of the following within 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s:

)

1. Reduce symmetric offset LC0 (Figures 3.10-9 and 3.10-10) -

and trip band (Figure 2.1-2), thermal margin / low pressurz trip limit (Figures.2.1-1 a and b and Technical Specification 2.1), and excore LOCA monitoring limits

-(Fig 0res 3.10-2 and 3.10-3) by a factor greater than or equal to-

[F{ 6es,sured] / [Fk Figure A.1' of- the Peaking Factor ]

Limit Report] ]

. DE:

2. Reduce 1:h'ermal power at a rate of at least l'uhour tg bring sthe combination of thermal power and % increase in Fit to

'within the limits of Figure A.2 in the Peaking Factor Limit ]

. Report, while maintaining CEAs at or above the 100% pcwer

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]

insertion limit. If incores are not operable and Fig. 3.10-2 is in use, then also reduce excore LOCA monitoring limits (Figure 3.10-2) by a factor greater.than or' equal to:

. [Fdmeasured?/[FjFigureA.1ofthePeakingFactor ]

Limit Reportl , ]

, OR:

3. Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN.

3.10-3 ,

. . MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPONY Basis:

The CEA insertion limit shown in Figure A.3 of the Peaking Factor Limit ]

Report per Specification 5.13 assures that the individual CEA worths used ]

for the CEA ejection analyses are not exceeded. The CEA insertions used for the CEA withdrawal accident are also not exceeded by this insertion limit. In addition, the limit ensures that the reactor can be brought to a safe hot shutdown condition even with the highest worth CEA not inserted. This restriction provides more shutdown margin than is required at BOL, since the moderator temperature coefficient is more negative at EOL. For this regulating group insertion limit, the peak linear heat rate will be well within the design values.

The limit applies also to two loop operation, in which case the power coordinate is rescaled to 1001, of the rated two loop power. This ensures that the CEA induced peaking will not lead to worse thermal conditions than for 3 loop operation since the flow to power ratio is greater for two loop operation. This CEA insertion limit may be revised on the basis of physics calculations and physics data obtained during plant startup and subsequent operation.

For a full length CEA, with misalignment up to 10 steps from the remainder of the group, the peaking factors will be well within design limits. The power level and CEA restrictions imposed for operation with a misaligned CEA assure that the assumptions used in the generation of the RPS setpoints are not violated. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> time limit restriction is short with respect to the probability of an independent incident occurring. The requirement that no more than one inoperable CEA is allowed and that the shutdown margin is maintained ensures that the reactor can be brought to a safe shutdown condition at any time.

Shutdown margin is assured within the required CEA drop time by operating in accordance with 3.10.A-1 and measuring CEA core height vs. time and CEA worths after initial loading and each refueling. The maximum CEA drop time specified is consistent with values used in the safety analysis.

Should a CEA drop time be in excess of 3.10.B.3, then the core height on that CEA at 2.5 seconds would be conservatively determined. Reactivity worth of the CEA from the above core height to the bottom of the core would then be determined. Appropriato action would then be taken, if necessary, during power operation to compensate for 1.5 times the above measured reactivity in order to maintain adequate shutdown margin.

Incore detector alarms are set based on the latest power distributions obtained from incore detector analyses. These techniques reflect actual radial and axial power distribution which exist in the core. Should the system become unavailable, continued operation is permitted under either the more conservative excore symmetric offset LC0 envelope or at a power level consistent with maintaining an appropriate margin to the peak linear heat rate assumed in the LOCA. Both these functions ensure that operation is within the limiting peak linear heat rates assumed as initial conditions for the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). Further, since rod position information is not available to this excore system, this function assumes the most limiting radial power distributions permitted at each power level.

3.10-6

• . M AIRE YANKEE AVOMIC POWER COMPANY The split excore detectors monitor the axial component of the power i distribution. The signal generated from the excore detectors is provided l as input to both the Symmetric Offset and Thermal Margin / Low Pressure Trip l Systems. Limiting Safety System Settings (LSSS) are, therefore, generated i as a function of the excore detector response. '

The radial component of the power distribution is monitored as a Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) by Technical Specification 3.10.C.3. The intent of the specification is to monitor the radial component of the power distribution and to ensure that assumptions are made in the generation of Reactor Protective System (RPS) LSSS remain valid. The LC0 on the radial power distribution is specified in Figure A.1 of the Peaking Factor Limit ]

Report per Specification 5.13 in the form of a steady-state unrodded total ]

radial peak (Fd) and provides indication that the core power distribution is behaving as predicted. Figure A.1 of the Peaking Factor Limit Report ]

includes 10% for calculational uncertainties. The measured steady-state value of Ff, augmented by 8% for measurement uncertainty, is compared to this limit on a monthly basis. Should the measured steady-state unrodded total radial peak including uncertainties exceed the limit of Figure A.1 ]

of the Peaking factor Limit Report at any time in the cycle, specific ]

action is to be taken to assure that the LSSS remain valid. The specific action includes a) the reduction of RPS LSSS and LC0 by the ratio of [F[ (measured)/ Fk (Figure A.1 of the Peaking Factor Limit Report)] ]

to directly compensate for the higher radial peaks, or b) the imposition of additional restrictions on power and CEA position (Figure A.2 of the ]

Peaking Factor Limit Report) to assure that the assumptions made in ]

establishing the RPS LSSS and LC0 remain valid. Figure A.2 of the ]

Peaking Factor Limit Report in conjunction with the restricted CEA ]

insertion allows for an increase in the steadyestate unredded total radial peak above the limits of Figure A.1 of the Peaking Factor Limit ]

Report without a modification of the RPS LSSS. In order to assure that the LOCA linear heat generation rate limits would not be exceeded when operating as allowed by 3.10.C.2.2.2 with the associated alternate, more restrictive LCO on excore symmetric offset, Figure 3.10-2 is modified by the ratio above. The allowed increase in radial peak is derived from the difference between the radial peaks assumed in the RPS setpoints for rodded conditions at reduced power and the radial peaks reflected in the CEA insertion limit at 100% power. This assures that the radial peaking factors vs. power assumed in the RPS LSSS remain valid.

The power distribution in the core can be determined in two ways. The normal method is through analysis of the fixed and movable neutron detector signals with the on-line computer. The alternative is to determine the radial and axial peaking factors by hand. The radial peaking factor can be determined from the core exit thermocouples, the fixed incore detectors or in the movable incore detector traces. The axial peaking factor can be determined from the fixed incore detectors, the movable incore detector traces or the excore detectors. The requirement that the core power distribution be shown to be within the design limits after every refueling not only ensures that the reactor can be operated safely but will also provide reasonable verification that the core was properly loaded. The requirement for operability of incore instrumentation in the instance of an excore detector channel being out of service ensures that an unobserved quadrant power tilt will not occur.

3.10-7

• . MQlNE VANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY The moderator temperature coefficient, coolant pressure, flow rate, and temperature specified are ca sistent with the values assumed in the safety analysis. The safety analysis assumes ranges in cold leg ternperature corresponding to the allowable coolant conditions given in Figure 3.10-6.

The actual values assumed in the safety analysis include an uncertainty on temperature measurements of 40F conservatively applied to the allowable values. The exception permits testing to determine decay heat removal capabilities of the Primary System while on natural circulation, prior to operation at higher power.

Operation with the turbine in IMPIN mode could result in a core power increase during a CEA drop transient above the initial pre-drop power level due to automatic opening of the throttle valves combined with moderator reactivity effects. Thus, additional initial overpower margin is required to preclude violation of the SAFDLs. The modified symmetric offset LCO band provides this additional margin.

3.10-8

• . M AINE YONKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY 5.13 PEAKING FACTOR LIMIT REPORT ]

The following figures: ]

Allowable Unrodded Radial Peak versus Cycle Average Burnup ]

(Figure A.1) ]

Allowable Power Level versus Increase in Total Radial Peak ]

(Figure A.2) ]

Power Dependent Insertion Limit (PDIL) for CEAs (Figure A.3) ]

Shall be submitted to USNRC at least 60 days prior to the date the ]

figures become effective. This information may be submitted as ]

Appendix A of the Core Performance Analysis Report (CPAR) ]

In the event that this information is submitted at some other time ]

during core life, it will be submitted 60 days prior to the date ]

the limit would become effective unless otherwise exempted. ]

5.13-1

. . MolNF VONKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPAP$V APPENDIX A PEAKING FACTOR LIMIT REPORT 7419HP+

• . MolME YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPONV A.1 ALL0HABLE UNRODDED RADIAL PEAK VERSUS CYCLE AVERAGE BURNUP Theallowabletotalunroddedradialpeak(Fk)versuscycleaverage burnup for Cycle 9 is given in Figure A.1 for the purpose of comparison to measured values as described in Maine Yankee Technical Specification 3.10. This assures that peaking will not exceed the values used in the safety analysis.

A.2 ALLOHABLE P0HER LEVEL VERSUS INCREASE IN TOTAL RADIAL PEAK The allowable power level versus increase in Ff while the CEAs are maintained at or above the 1001. power insertion limit for Cycle 9 is given in Figure A.2. Technical Specification 3.10 also provides the details for its use.

A.3 POWER DEPENDENT INSERTION LIMIT FOR CEAs The CEA group insertion limits for Cycle 9 are given in Figure A.3. The Power Dependent Insertion Limit (PDIL) for CEAs provides for sufficient available scram reactivity at all power levels and times in cycle life.

For details of its use, see Technical Specification 3.10.

7419HP+

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NOTI: 1. This cutve includes 102 calculational unce :sinty

2. Tf=(x1.03 '

3. Measured I should be aug=ented by measurement unc'ertaintv (8 )

before co arison to this curve

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