ML20206B810

Affidavit of Sc Sholly Re Restart of Facility.Facility Should Not Be Restarted Until Offsite Emergency Response Plans Upgraded & Evaluated to Adequately Protect Public Health & Safety

ML20206B810
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	10/14/1987
From:	Sholly S MHB TECHNICAL ASSOCIATES
To:
Shared Package
ML20206B722	List: ML20206B717 ML20206B727 ML20206B741 ML20206B760 ML20206B770 ML20206B780 ML20206B784 ML20206B792 ML20206B810 ML20206B825 ML20206B838 ML20206B847 ML20206B859 ML20206B915 ML20206B960 ML20206B970 ML20206C001 ML20206C010 ML20206C025 ML20206C041
References
FOIA-88-198 NUDOCS 8811160025
Download: ML20206B810 (30)

Text

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION EF10AE THE COMMISSION '

i in the matter of Docket No. 50 293 h

BOSTON EDISON COMPANY i lt .

(Pagrim Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) b AFFlG AVIT OF S i1NEN C<$ HOLLY Steven C. Sholty, being on oath, deposes and says as fonows:

1.

I am an Associate Censultant with MHB Technical Associates,1 Avenue, Suite K, San Jose, Ca!ifemia,95125. A statement have cf m qualifications 17 e*t ,ched hereto ard marked Attachment A.

more than six years experience in the review, analysis, interp application cf probabilistic risk ast,essment to the anaysis o related to commercial nuclear power plants, including issues r I have served as a member of the peer radiological emergency planning. Ai5h review group for the NRC publication NUREG 1050 (1984) (Pr Assessment (PAA1 Aeference Dm.fment. September 1984), and recenty served as a member cf the Qcntainment Patorman OtiectNe Werkthco, the Panel on ACR? EffectNeness I NNe (1985),

Accident Policy Imtlementation blernst Events Workshon {1987).

previcusty testrfied as an expert witness en probabdis emergency planning matters in NRC proceedings on th 2, Indian Point Units 2 and 3, and Shoreham Unit t nucl i h Un4ted the Pubf4 inquiry regarding the proposed Sizewel! B nuclear plan Kngdom., in addition, I have co authored two major revie g li g S 001025 VOHNSONDD-190 PDR pb9 e ..

and risk sstimate issues published in NRC reports NUREG4956 and NUREG-1150. I have also performed reviews of various technical aspects of the

' Shoreham, Umerick, Indian Po nt, Sizewell, 7 inn, Seabrook, Millstone 3, and Oconee 3 probabilistic risk assessments and the Vermont Yankee Containment Safety Study.

2. MHB Technical Associates ('MHB') has been requested by the Nuclear Safety Division, Department of the Attorney General, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to evaluate the increase in risk resutting from a startup program for retum to power from the current refuelir,g and modi 5 cations outage for the Pilgrim Nuciear Power Station, Unit 1 (PNPS 1).

3. In its current con 5guration (refueled) and considering the duration of the currer.t shutdown, Pilgrim currentry poses very little risk to the public health and safety. This is due to the multiplic.ty of systems theoretically available to inject water into the ret,ctor vessel and due to the low decay heat level present in the fuel. In the eve,1t cf a ccre heatup transient with the plant 61 its current configuration, considerable time would elapse between initiation of coolant loss and the onset of fuel dainage, t;me curing which measures cculd be takt., to initicM coctant makeup and/or other recovery and mitigative actions.

Mcreovtr, in Secry a longer time period is available within which to implement offstte protecdve actions due to the slower accident progression tme compared with acedents at higher pcwer levels.

4 Boston Edison Company (BECO), the Icensee for PJgnm, currentry envisions restart pcwer ascension program with a minimal nurnber of hold points. In brief, BECO proposes to esttute holds en ree, tart (pending approval from NRC in accord with Confirmatery Action Letter No. 8610), recevery fre . actor mode switch testing prior to conduct;ng a test for shutdown from outside the contrcJ room, and prior to mcvement of the scram set point above 95% power.

(Ste. Boston Ed son Ccmpany, Pilgnm Nucitar Pcwer Station Rest 3rt Plan, pages IV 29 to IV 31.] The details of the power ascension program in Attachment 13 of the Pilgnm Nuc!ev Pcwer StatiQn Pestcrt Plat} have nct yet been provided.

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5. My current understanding of the BECO pc,ver ascension program !s that the program would result in a relative?y rapid ascension from the current shutdown condition to full power operation. In so doing, the risk to the public health and safety posed by cperations at the Pilgrim plant will be increased markedly.

6. The Commission has concluded generally that the risks from 5% powe.

operation are negSgible. (Seg, for example, SECY 84155,12 Ap,*il 1964, and attachments, and letter dated 15 June 1984 from Nuruio J. Partadino to Hon.

' Edward J. Markey, and attachments.) The evaluations upon ' ' the Commissica has drawn thesu conclusions, however, were for plants .4 m

• Lttle operating histo / and no spent fuel pool inventory. Clearty, '

different in this regard, with a substantial long half !de fi ssioti oroduct irivents.y present in both the refueled reactor core and the spent fuel pool. Morerver, these evaluat: ens did not consider me unique risks posed by accid .ints resulting from extematy initiated events (spec:fca!!y, '.n this case, seisnic events). In my epinion, the presence cf more than 1100 spent fuel asser,1blies, prior operation of two-thirds of the ccre at equrvatent full power for most of an operating cycle, and the matter of extemal events render the circumstances at Ptigrim suff.cientry c.fferent from those previousry evaluated for 5% power operation that the previous eva!uations understate, perhaps significantry, the risk posed by cperaten of Pilgrim at 5% of full povier. This concfusion is further supported by the Lkelihood thtt the primary containment wil not be inerted untJ operation above 5% power is ccvnmnnced, in my opinion, wtuatty any severe accident at 5% p;wer w,th the containment de irwrted ws!! result in earty centainment fa3ure (due to hydrogen bum or hydrogen detonat;on '.9 the pnmary containment, and/cr other causes).

7. As power levelincreases, nsk to the public increases. This is due to severaj factors,includhg a marked increase in volatle fission product inventory and a ma+ed increase in decay beat level, which results in accident progresson times ahich are maa:h shcder than at low power levels. This reduces the amount of t.mo avai!ab'e for implementatjen of recovery and/or mitigaton

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4 actions and reduces the amount of time available to implement offsite protective measures.

8. A full scope probabilistic risk assessment for the Pilgrim plant has been in j progress for ,several years. It is my understanding that this study is nearly completed. It is my expectation that this study will identify seismic initiating events as a significant contributor to core melt frequency (i.e., contributing 10%

or more to core melt frequency from all causes). This expectation is based on my familiarity with seismic risk assessments performed on similar designs and performed on other plants in the general region of Pilgrim (e.g., Shoreham,

> Seabrook Units 1 and 2, Millstone Unit 3, and Umerick Units 1 and 2).

Seismically-initiated accident sequences are accompanied by potentially severe impacts on offsite emergency response even wnen there are fully-approved and operational emergency plans. In the case of Pilgrim, the current status of emergency planning is such that there is not adequate assurance that protective actions can and will be taken in the event of an accident. Given the more severe conditions of a seismically initiated accident scenario, this conclusion is all the more apficable.

9. A study of risk at 25% power for the Shoreham nuclear plant, which possesses a nuclear steam supply system which h; grossly similar to Pilgrim, indicates that the core melt frequency for operations at up to 25% of full power may not differ dramatically from the core melt frequency at full power. The 25% power PRA estimates a core melt frequency (,f 2.8 x 10 5 per reactor year. (SS L E.T.

Burns, S. Mays, and T. Mairs, Er@abilistic Risk Assessment of the Shoreham Uuclear Pcwer Station.' initial Power Oceration Limited to 25% of Full Power.

Delian Corporation, prepared for Long Island Ughting Company, April 1987, page 412.) The full power PRA unalyses for Shoreham estimated a core melt frequency of about 6.5 x 10-5 per reactor year. [SSL Science Applications, Inc., Final Recort: Probabilis'ic Risk Assessment. Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. prepared for Lorsg Island Ughting Company,24 June 1983, page 4; and V. Joksimovich, et al., Maior Common Cause initiatina Events Studv:

Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. NUS Corporation, NUS Report No. NUS-4617, prepared for Long Island Ughting Company, February 1985, page 18]

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This represents less than a ft.ctor of three difference in the likelihood of a core melt accident at 25% power versus full power. Although this assessment is for Shereham and not for Pilgrim, it suggests that the likelihood of an accident is not markedly different for 25% power versus 100% power.

10. Further, a limited scope PRA of Shoreham at 5% power was prepared for LILCO. This study, which did not include external events, concluded that the core melt frequency for 5% power operation was about 4.9 x 10 4 per reactor- ,

year. (See, Delian Corporation and Science Applications, Inc., Frobab///st/c l'

Risk Assessment. Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. Low Power Ooeration Uo ~

to 5% of Fv// Power prepared for Long Island Ughting Company, draft, May 1984, page 78.] This indicates that core melt frequency at 5% power is g significantly reduced from 25% power or full power, by a factor of roughly 20, but not nearly as significantly reduced as previously predicted by the NRC staff, which predicted a reduction factor of 1,000 or more.1/ Moreover, the 5%

power reduction factor of 20 is an underestimate since the 5% power estimates do not include external events, i

11. The 5%, 25%, and 100% power PRA studies for Shcreham indicate, in my opinion, that the core power level for Pilgrim will have at best a moderate ,n impact on the likelihood of an accident. Considering the uncertainties involved, e

the likelihood of an accident may be nearly indistinguishable at the various power levels indicated above. Moreover, the Shoreham results are lower than the core melt frequency estimates for many other plants. A Brookhaven National Laboratory review of the Shoreham PRA for internal events only 4 per reactor year. An average value L estimated a core melt frequency of 1 x 10 4

for full scope PRAs completed to date is of the order of 3 x 10 per reactor- e year. 11 1/ The NRC staff, in SEC%e4-156, predicted core melt frequency reduction factors for various classes of BWR accidents ranging from 1,000 to "00,000. (SA2, SECY-84156, Enclosure 1, ' Staff Review Process for S Percent Power Operation *,

y page 2.) Thus, in the aggregate, the NPC staff would have expected a core melt frequency reduction of at least 1,000, compared with the Shcreham value of 20.

The results for Shoreham indicate a reduction factor approximat$y 50 times less than the NRC staff expected based on engineering judgment.

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12. These results are especially significant for a plant with a containment design similar to Pilgrim. Pilgrim employs a steel Mark I pressure suppression containment. Such containments have been estimated in a variety of studies sponsored by.lDCOR, NRC, and utilities to have an early containtnent failure probability - given a severe accident - in a range from 10 90%. This means that there is a significant chance that, given a severe accident, the accident will be accompanied by a large early release of radioactivity to the environment.

13. The Pilgrim plant, like all Mark I containment design plants, also employs a '

seenndary containment, usually referred to as a reactor building. This structure is not designed to with. stand the high internal pressures which would accompany a severe accident, and is unlikely to survive in a leak tight condition following primary containment fai!ure. High pressure in the secondary containment due to a severe accident would be produced by a combination of blowdown due to primary containment failure, primary containment teakage, primary containment venting, and burning of combustible gases, indeed, Mark I plants are designed with both internal and external

• blow out panels' which are dnig.2ed to relieve pressure. In the case of Pilgrim, there are blow out panels at the refueling deck elevation which relieve pressure direc+Jy to the environment. Ir my opinion, there is little basis for assuming that releases from the primary containment will be significantly mitigated by the presence of the secondary containment.

~ 13. ' Based on the above considerations, it is my opinion that Pilgrim Unit i should u not be restarted until the offsite emerge,'cy response, plans are upgraded and evaluated to adequately protect the public health and safety. Further, it is my recommendation that BECO be required to promptly submit the Pilgrim probabnistic risk assessment study to the NRC for public review and evaluation prier to restart. The review of such a study should indicate whether there E'

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.rcmain significant op:rctional risks which must be amelioriated in order to provide adequate protection to the public health d safety, f .

1 Steven C. Sholly~ /

Associate Consultant /

gNERAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT i y

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cou,,,,o,2 I A )SS- _19fZ, before me, Nm., t 2.m, . .

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.amw s-Executrve off<es 800 Bo/ston Street

', Boston. Massachusetts 02 H9 October 26, 1961 .

Ralph G. Bird semor Vice Presder't - Nuclear Mr. Peter Agnes, Jr.

Commonwealth of Massachusetts Assistant Secretary of Public Safety One Ashburton Place - Room 2133 ~

Boston, MA 02102

Dear Mr. Agnes:

As you and I recently discussed, periodic submittal of the information developed in response to the issues identified in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) .'.ugust 4, 1987, "Self-Initiated Review and Interim Finding for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station" (SIR) should facilitate FEMA's review of the resolution of those issues. Accordingly, we are forwarding a copy of a report entitled "Pilgrim EPZ Public Beach Population Analysis,"

dated October 14, 1987, which addresses subissues C.1 and C.2, as identified in the "Boston Edison Company Action Plan and Schedule for Providing Assistance in Addressing FEMA Issues," dated September 17, 1987 (Boston Edison Action Plan). We are also enclosing for your consideration a draft letter of transmittal to FEMA and a suggested distribution list.

In subissue C.1, FEMA requested, "(1) an updated geographical description of the beaches (within the Pilgrim EPZ) and their capacity." (Page 26 of SIR)

The Boston Edison Action Plan (Page 14) stated that preliminary estimates of the expected maximum number of people on the public beaches within the EPZ had been developed and were being verified. It also stated that updated geographical descriptions of the beaches were being developed. The results of those efforts in response to FEMA': request are contained in the enclo ud report.

In subissue C.2. FEMA requested, "(2) a detailed analysis of the beach population, including the number of permanent and temporary residents and the number of day visitors, together with their geographical dispersion."

(Page 26 of SIR) The Action Plan (Page 15) stated that the geographical dispersion of the population of each of the public beaches was being developed.

It also indicated that a breakdown between permanent and temporary resi. ants and day visitors did not need to be developed since the current planning process is based on the conservative assumptioi that sufficient sheltering capacity *will be identified for the entire beach population. Thus, the enclosed report provides the information requested by FEMA as to geographical dispersion of the population on the public beaches within the EPZ. .

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. u Mr. Deter Agnes, Jr.

Assistant Secretary of Public Safety

/ October 26, 1987

Page Two Please do not hesitate to contact either myself or Ron Varley at (617) '

747-8544 if you have any questions.

c% u R. G."Bird .'

t Enclosure cc Mr. John Lovering '

Deputy Director MCDA

. 400 Worcester Road Framingham, MA 01701 Mr. Jeffrey B. Hausner MCDA

, 400 Worcester Road Framingham, MA 01701 Mr. Steven A. Varga, Director Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 w/o draft letter attachment i

Mr. R.H. Wessman, Project Manager i Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  :

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  ;

7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20814  !

Wessman - NRC w/o draft ,*.etter attachment j U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 - 631 Park Avenue l King of Prussia, PA 19406 w/. draft letter attachment l Senior NRC Resident Inspector

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Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Rocky Hill Road .

Plymouth, MA 02360 w/o draf t letter attachmerit i

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A PILGRIM EPZ PUBLIC BEACH POPULATION ANALYSIS KLD Associates, Inc.

October 14, 1987 The purpose of this report is to respond to certain issues raised in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) August 4,1987 "Self-Initiated Review and Interin Finding for the Pilgria Nuclear Power Station (SIR)." In particular, the report addresses SIR subissues C.1 and C.2 as identified in the "Boston Edison Company Action Plan and Schedule for Providing Assistance in Addressing FEMA Issues" dated September 17, 1987 (Boston Edison Action Plan).

Subissue C.1 stated:

FEMA and the RAC ... must receive the following additional information: (1) an updated geographical description of the beaches and their capacity.

Attachments A-G are relevant portions of United States Geological Survey quad sheets (modified as described under Subissue C.2 below) which identify each of the major public beaches in the EPZ as follows:

Attachment A - Brant Rock Beach and Green Harbor Beach Attachment 8 - Ouxbury Beach Attachment C 'Saquish Neck f

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. Attachment 0 - Grays Beach

< Attachment E - Plymouth Beach Attachment F - Priscilla Beach and White Horse Beach  ;

Attachment G - Manomet Beach In addition, estimates of the expected maxiWum number of people on each of these beaches are contained on Attachments A-G and summarized below:

location Estimated Canacity Brant Rock 1,211 Green Harbor Beach 2,609 Ouxbury Beach 4.583 Saquish Neck 654 Grays Beach 103 Plymouth Beach 1,960 Priscilla Beach 430 t White Horse Beach 2,387 Manomet Beach __.655 14.592 k

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" These estimates were developed by counting the number of persons visible on I

aerial photographs of the beaches and adjacent off-beach areas (LL., paths, hemes, parking areas) taken between about IPM and 3PM on Sunday, Ju'/ 5 1987. At least two independent counts were made for each beach aho the highest count selected in each case. The photographs cover virtually all of the area of the major public beaches and eacP. of the areas of high beach population density. .

-) On July 5 it was clear and sunny and the temperature was approximately 85 degrees with low humidity. Since July 5 was part of a three-day holiday weekend during which Massachusetts beaches likely reach capacity and the weather conditions were highly conducive to maxica beach usage, these numbers are considered to represent reasonable estimates of the maximum number of ,

persons expected on these beaches at any one time. Although those numbers could, of course, be exceeded on a given dty, the excess would be expected to be small and not significant for emergency planning purposes.

Subissue C.2 statas:

1 (2) a detailed analysis of the beach population, including the number of -

permanent and temporary residents and the number of day visitors, together with their geographical dispersion.

t Attachments A-G contain histograms which identify the distributton of observed persons on each of the beaches on July 5, 1987. The histograms identify the percentage of the total population that is located in approximately equivalent j segments of each beach. For example. Attachment A depicts Green Harbor Beach j and the percentage of the total population of 2,609 persons which is located j I

! in each of 23 segments.

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, Page 4 Analysis of the population distributions shows that p'eople tend att to travel f

far from their parked vehicles. For example, on Duxbury Beach (Attachment B),

approximately 60 percent of the beach population is concentrated along the 3/4 mile segment of beach from the entrance to the Ouxbury Beach parking field to

' the area just south of the Powder Point Bridge. This area encompasses the two major beach parking areas. The remaining 40 percent of the beach-goers are distributed over the refeining beach south of the Powder Point Bridge. These .

people have access to off-road vehicles. A total of 521 off-road vehicles were counted along this stretch of beach. This represents an average vehicle occupancy of 3.51 persons per off-road vehicle (0.4 X 4.583/521). Aerial photos of Saquish Neck (Attachment C) indicate that access to the area is achieved principally by automobile via the road from Ouxbury Beach, or by boat, and that persons in the area have access to a vehicle, a boat, and/or one of approximately 200 residences.

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Similar conclusions may be drawn for Plymouth Beach (Attachment E).

Approximately 28 percent of persons at the beach are located along that section of beach abutting the parking facilities. The remaining 72 percent of the beach-goers are distributed along the remaining portions of Plymouth Beach in proximity to the 565 off-road vehicles counted. The average occupancy for Plymouth Beach off-road vehicles is 2.49 persons per vehicle (0.72 X 1,960/565). ,

Beach-goers at the other major public facilities (Brant Rock, Green Harbor, Gray's Beach, Priscilla Beach, Whitehorse Beach, and Manomet Beach) all have read'y access to adjoining roads where vehicles are parked.

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COMMISSION BRIEFING ON THE STATUS OF PILGRIM NUCLEAR STATION JUNE 9, 1988

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.. PRESENTATION OUTLINE BACKGROUND RESTART CRITERIA STAFF RESTART ACTIVITIES FUTURE STAFF ACTIVITIES SLIOE 1

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s BACKGROUNO

.. SHUTDOWN APRIL 12, 1986 CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER 86-10 i MANAGEMENT MEETINGS ON RESTART ISSUES

• TECHNICAL / EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS

• MANAGEMENT CONCERNS

j. *SALP FINDINGS EMERGENCY PREPARE 0 NESS I

SAFETY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM

! 2.206 PETITIONS /PUBLIC CONCERNS

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, ... p RESTART CRITERIA STABLE AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT AND STAFF

,. AT PILGRIM RESOLUTION OF MAJOR TECHNICAL ISSUES DEMONSTRATED IMPROVEMENT IN SALP PROBLEM AREAS MAINTENANCE PROGRAM AND WORK BACKLOG ISSUES A00RESSED NRC SATISFIED THAT CERTAIN EMERGENCY PLAN IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE 4

SLICE 3

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STAFF RESTART ACTIVITIES RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL INSPECTION AND LICENSING ACTIVITIES PUBLIC MEETINGS / STATE INVOLVEMENT SENIOR MANAGEMENT REVIEWS SLICE 4 I

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BACKUP SLIDE RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL COORDINATE ALL RESTART A f!VITIES INSPECTIONS AND LICENSING RESTART PLAN REVIEW POWER ASCENSION PROGRAM REVIEW ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE

-MANAGEMENT

-STAFF

-ORGANIZATION PROVICE BASIS FOR RESTART RECOMMENDATION SLICE 5

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BACKUP SLIDE i

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l INSPECTION AND LICENSING ACTIVITIES  :

THREE RESIDENT INSPECTORS i l

INSPECTIONS - SPECIALISTS AND TEAM

. LICENSING ACTIVITIES - AMENOMENTS/ EXEMPTIONS OTHER ACTIVITIES AND REVIEWS I

• RESTART PLAN / POWER ASCENSION PROGRAM  !

• BECO SELF-ASSESSMENT [

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• SEP ASSESSMENT

• CURRENT SALP (2/1/87-5/15/88) f L

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BACKUP SLIOE PUBLIC MEETINGS NUMEROUS MEETINGS WITH STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS SENATOR KENNEDY HEARING - JANUARY 7, 1988 TWO LOCAL MEETINGS ON RESTART PLAN MANAGEMENT MEETINGS WITH UTILITY SLICE 7

FUTURE STAFF ACTIVITIES PLANNED BECO SELF ASSESSMENT / POWER ASCENSION PROGRAM REVIEW INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT TEAM INSPECTION (IATI) 2.206 PETITIONS /PUBLIC MEETINGS SALP ASSESSMENT RESTART ASSESSMENT REPORT ACRS/ COMMISSION MEETINGS POWER ASCENSION PROGRAM MONITORING DECREASE PERIOD FOR NEXT SALP SLIOE 5

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Received 5/24/88 from R. Wessman for Conference o Call 1:30 5/25 with Dr. Murley Re: Pilgrim Pre-Brief, a

Mary Jo 5/24 INTRODUCTORY REMARK 5 - DR. MURLEY

-This briefing is a status briefing - we have a great deal to accomplish before we can return to you with our reconsnendations regarding restart of Piigrim

. -Sill Russell and I will sumarize background, restart criteria, completed and future staff ar.tions on Pilgrim

-Facility shutdown in April 19M due in hardware nrnhleen missues at P11 0 ria enenlav and inwniva more then enrrective actinne tekon to resolve technical matters and management deficiencies identified by the staff

-0ECo initiated a Safety Enhancement Program during shutdown

-Not required for restart decisinn

-Actions to frprove Mark I containn:ent response to severe accidents

-Direct Torus Vent

-Relationship of Ptigrim to Mark I generic improvements

- C. L. . 1, n . . p..y y. e r. . .J..c a s u ns. . .. . . . l ..J e l. s. . liv Ldvie n

-FEMA Review of August 1987 - 6 major areas

-Efforts by Comonwealth, BEco and local governments to resolve deficiencias

-Exemption to schedular requirerwnt for Full Exercise Limited demonstration of plan fne:

senools ano cay care centers 9pecial needs and transportation dependent population

-Restart can be authorized with son

• EP issues tot fully resolved Public concern regarding the Pilgrim restart remains intense Public meetings,c'edia attention, frequent correspondence

-Petitions for 2.206 Decisions, litigation Congressional interest

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Remarks (Con't)

-NRC activities and commitment to dealing with Pilgrim has been extensive

-Resources committed

-Depth and scope of reviews

-Level of management attention, Commission attentich

-Staff has much to accomplish before recommending a restart decision

-Unique restart panel approach

-Opportunity for pLblic input to the process

-Continued r.anagement involvement Pust assure ourselves that Pilgrim can be operated safely before considering restart i

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4 COMMISSION BRIEFING ON THE STATUS OF PILGRIM NUCLEAR STATION JUNE 9, 1988

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.; PRESENTATION OUTLINE BACKGROUND RESTART CRITER!A STAFF RESTART ACTIVITIES FUTilRE STAFF ACTIVITIES i

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l BACKGROUND SHUTDOWN APRIL 12, 1986 1 CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER 86-10 MANAGEMENT MEETINGS ON RESTART ISSUES

• TECHNICAL /E0VIPPENT PROBLEMS i

• MANAG

'SALPgMENTCgNCERNS INDING l EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SAFETY ENHANCEFENT PROGRAM 2,206 PETITIONS /PUBLIC CONCERNS  !

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1 SLIDE 2

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PESTART CRITERIA -l

, h,fMt/ STABl{A g g CTIVE MANAGEMENT AND STAFF

. IJ d M RESOLUTION OF MAJOR TECHNICAL ISSUES

{[( DEMONSTRATED IMPR0vEMENT IN SALP PROBLEM AREAS MAINTENANCE PROGRAM AND WORK BACKLOG ISSUES ADDPESSED NPC SATISFIED THAT CERTAIN EMERGENCY PLAN IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE i

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