ML20199C674

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Insp Rept 70-1257/86-03 on 860512-16.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Organization & Controls,Training & Retraining,Criticality Safety,Operations Review,Maint & Surveillance Testing & Radiation Protection
ML20199C674
Person / Time
Site: Framatome ANP Richland
Issue date: 06/13/1986
From: Brock B, Skov D, Thomas R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20199C646 List:
References
70-1257-86-03, 70-1257-86-3, NUDOCS 8606180222
Download: ML20199C674 (16)


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. s U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REdIONV Report No. -,. 70-1257/86-03 Docket No. ' 70-1257.

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License No.

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Safeguards Group: I'

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Licensee: , I Exxon Nuclear Company S ' 2101' Horn, Rapids Road

.. _ Richland,! Washington 99352 Facility Name: "Richland Facility Inspgetion ati Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted: May 12-16, 1986 Inspectors: SM r B. L. Brock, Fuel Facilities Inspector Date Signed

%A1>- M 6Ih-f f(p D. D. Skov, Radiation Specialist Date signed Approved by: 3 d h&M D. Thomas,7 Chief d f'

&Af Yate digned Nuclear Materials Safety % ction Summa ry:

Inspection on May 12-16, 1986 (Report No. 70-1257/86-03)

Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced inspection was conducted of management organization and controls, training and retraining, criticality safety, operations review, maintenance and surveillance testing, radiation protection, transportation / radioactive waste management, environmental protection and deactivation / decontamination activities.

During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 88005, 88010, 88015, 88020,.

88025, 83822, 86740/88035, 88045 and 83890 were covered.

Results: No violations were identified in the nine areas inspected.

8606180222 860613 PDH ADOCK 07001257 C PDR

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DETAILS

.l. Persons Contacted

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  • R. G. Frain, Manager, Operations-Richland -
  • R. A. Schneider, Staff Specialists, Safeguards ..

E *T. C. Probasco, Supervisor, Radiological and Industrial; Safety ,

  • L. D. Gerrald, Criticality Safety Specialistl ,
  • J.JE.,Pieper, Specialist, Health Physics '
  • R. -H. Purcell, Manager, ' Safety and Security- .
  • E..L. Foster, Radiological Safety Assistant' ~
  • M. K.=. Valentine, Manager, Plant,0perations.

W. E. Stavig, Senior Operations Analyst.-

) B. R.-Black, Manager,-Quality Control Engineering

'D.

! Adkisson, General Supervisor, Production Inspection D. W.'Vaughn,' Process Control Lead Audit Technician G.~Kasco, Engineering Assistant, Maintenance-Engineering.

C. Christensen, Instrument Repetitive Maintenance Engineer N. S. Wing,l Manager, Analytical Chemistry Laboratory E. R. Marx, Supervis'or,' Inspection Engineering G. V. Mulligan, Supervisor, Shipping  ;

S. R. Lockhaven, Specialist, Industrial Hygiene ,

NJ T. 0'Rourke, Engineering Assistant

'~ M. /J. Hill, General Supervisor, Chemical Operations J. Payne,' Control Room Operator, Line 2

J. R. Nance, Engineering Technician R. A. Nunamaker, Lead Materials Controller G. York, Health Phys _ics Technician

'* Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2 .' Management Organization and Controls Section 9 of. license SNM-1227 incorporated Part I and the Appendixes to

-Part I of the licensee's application as' license conditions.

!. 'A. . Organizational Structure l

Section 2.4 of-the license application.. requires certain l

organizational divisions of responsibility to provide.a check and.

b'alance system in the important areas of plant safety.

(1) . The inspe'ctor reviewed the Senior Operation Analyst's monthly l production criticality safety audits. Items identified during i '

the audits were expeditiously' corrected. The operator's shift reports (Shift Fissile and Criticality Violation reports) have l

proven helpful in identifying potential safety problems.

L However, the Senior Operations Analyst should resume l' identifying the specific shift report findings rather than j' ,

merely reporting the number of findings. 'This will be reviewed in a-subsequent inspection (86-03-01).

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'(2). The inspector reviewed the minutes of the monthly meetings of the license,e's Safety Committee. The committee met as required; however, thereLwere no items requiring formation of an' incident review committee.

No violations were identified.

6 3 .' Training and Retraining Section 3.10 of the license requires a training and retraining program

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for operators which covers rad 5ation protection, criticality safety, industrial safety, fire protection, and emergency procedures.

The training of one new operator rehired during the fourth quarter of 1985 was reviewed. Classroom trainingLlasting-two hours was provided in such subjects as radiation protection, criticality safety, emergency procedures, and respiratory protection. This is supplemented by additional instruction in safe working procedures by the shop supervisor. -

Records were also examined showing the completion of annual = retraining provided to a number of or.her radiation workers during October, 1985. A large number of workers have attended monthly and quarterly training sessions held at various times since November, 1985 by the various shop supervisors.

No violations were identified. ~

4. - Criticality Safety Section 3.2 of the license application requires assurance of criticality safety through both ' administrative and technical practices.

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Section 3.2.1.1 of the license app ication requires criticality. safety analysis of all applicable processes in accordance with Section 2.3.20 of the license application and all determinations of Nuclear Criticality' Safety be reviewed and approved by a second: party reviewer in accordance

' with the requirements.

The licensee' completed two criticality safety analyses since the last inspection. The analyses were reviewed and approved by the second party reviewer. One analysis addressed planned operations in the Advanced Fuel Fabrication Facility. The other analysis evaluated Line 2 equipment for processing up to 5.0 weight percent enriched uranium ~. The previous evaluation of Line 2 was for up- to 4.5 weight percent enriched' uranium.

The licensee's modification of the lagoon inspection frequency for the winter months was also reviewed and approved by the second-party reviewer.

. No violations were identified.

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. Operations Review

- Section 2.1 of'the license application requires the licensee to conduct business in a manner so 7as to assure that the licensee facilities are safe from radiation and other nuclear hazards, and the operations will

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inot be ldetrimental to the environs and to assure that personnel radiation exposures, both in plant and offsite, are maintained as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA).

A. Conduct of Operations (1)' The expanded Liquid Uranium Recovery System (LURS) was in operation. The area had been upgraded by expanding the paved area, adding,a small storage building, fencing the area and paving an onsite access road to the area.

(2) The Gadolinium Scrap Recovery Process (GSRP) was operating during the inspection. The odor of the organic solvents used was particularly noticeable in the GSRP laboratory. The inspector discussed this concern with the licensee's industrial safety. engineer. The licensee had previously sampled and analyzed.the laboratory atmosphere and found it acceptable.

Additionally, samples had been provided to an independent laboratory which also found the organic vapor concentrations acceptable.

(3) . The licensee's Dry Conversion Process area was visited. The inspector verified that-a lock had been installed on the bypass valve at the point where uranium in the HF sidestream is smeasured. The installation of this control over the bypass valve closes item 85-12-03.

(4) While touring the powder blending room, the inspectors observed that planned improvements to the ventilation at the blender had not yet been implemented. Item 85-06-01 will therefore remain open. No ciinge'was noted with regard to pallet handling in the powder room, therefore, item 84-10-02 will also remain open.

(5) The inspector observed the modifications the licensee had made in the inline strainer and manually operated valve in the Miscellaneous Uranium Recovery System (MURS). The modifications improved the control of inline liquids during changeout of.the strainer. This closes item 85-12-02.

t (6) The licensee was conducting UF 6 cylinder recertification tests-

i. under the observation of the certified pressure vessel

!- inspector. The tests underway included pressure testing newly installed valves and measuring cylinder wall thicknesses. The first few valves tested failed and heavier tinning was therefore requested. The more heavily tinned valves passed the 100 psig air leak test. The NRC inspector observed the calibration check of.the ultrasonic thickness gauge used to measure the wall thickness of UF cylinders. The cylinder wall thickness measurements observed6were acceptable. ANSI N14.1 specifies a cylinder-wall thickness lower limit of 5/16 inch for 30B UF cylinders.

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s (7)' The inspector visited the Neutron Absorber Facility (NAF) in

, 'the Specialty Fuels'(SF), Building. No poor health physics practices were. observed.

('8) -Room 173 of the SF-Building was also visited. The Oakridge Associated Universities (ORAU) had recently performed an independent overcheck of this and associated rooms for NRC.

See Section 10 for details.

-(9) The licensee's former Centrifuge Test Facility (CTF) was visited to view its current status. Work with nonradioactive.

materials was'in process.

B. Licensee's Procedures a'nd Practices

, (1) The inspe'ctor previously cited the licensee for an inconsistency between licensee procedures P43,078, Rev.10, and.

P66,371', Rev.-2. The first procedure called for,UF6 cylinder valve' testing at'100 psig which is consistent with the ANSI N14.'1 Standard and the second called for replacement valve testing at 70-90 psig. The licensee has cubsequently revised the second procedure to require testing at the higher pressure.

This revision adequately correct's;the identified violation.

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(2) This violation, issued d'uring the previous inspection, addressed the licensee's failure to follow his procedure

'P66,366, Rev. 18, which requires the use of protective valve covers. 'The licensee decided to remove this requirement from

'the procedure. The NRC Region V office asked the licensee to make an appropriate safety evaluation giving due consideration

, to the protection of the valve.from physical damage during handling of the.UFg cylinders. The. Region V office also requested a copy of the revised procedure. The inspector suggested the licensee also delineate in his letter to. Region V

, the items.that were identified in their meetings as justification for the discontinuance of the use of UF6 cylinder protective valve covers. :The licensee agreed to identify the basis fo'r their-decision. One troublesome item the licensee i~ mentioned was the fact that the small plates welded to the l

protected end of'the UF cylinder, and to which the protective.

6 l valve ' covers'are anchored with bolts, have occasionally been j ' broken off. The inspector indicated that the broken off " dog-L; ears" are indicative of the vulnerability of the valves in spite of the " protective" extension of the UF cylinder wall 6

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beyond the end of the cylinder valve. The licensee indicated

=that protective valve cover use has no technical standard providing guidance. This item is therefore identified as an i

' unresolved item pending the completion of the review of the licensee's basis for the decision to no longer use the j protective valve covers during onsite UF cylinder 6

movements.

i j (3) Thelinspector reviewed the licensee's response to the third l ,

violation where his practices failed to follow his procedures.

l In'one case, the licensee neither crated and stored hose reels 1

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through the winter nor did,he lock the piping ~ cabinet as required by pro'cedure P43,078, Rev. O. During this inspection the inspector checked the, piping cabinet.when it was unattended

-and found it locked as required, 'Further, the= licensee had placed.the hose reel storage on the preventative maintenance

-program completing the correction of the third violation.

No violations were identified.

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6. Radiation Protection Pursua'nt to 10 CFR Part 20, the licensee is required to provide protection against radiation hazards associated with-licensee activities.

A. Urine Bioassay Results The results of urinalysis for the third quarter of 1985 and first quarter of_1986 were reviewed. The maximum reportable result for both quarters was 20.48 ug U/1,_which is'below the action level of 25 ug U/1 requiring airesample and second urinalysis. Records were also examined which.shows an initial urinalysis was. completed.as required upon employment of a new radiation- worker during October, 1985.

A total of 46 positive urine samples were reported out of approximately 860 samples submitted for the two calendar quarters -

combined. The number of positive urine samples increased .

' dramatically during the period between June and November, 1985.when compared.to, previous periods. Along with this-trend,.the licensee had also noted that many of the positive readings were associated:

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with employees having minimal or no exposure to special-nuclear material. This prompted'the licensee to request that its contractor-reevaluate sixteen samples previously reported as positive., The contractor subsequently reported an error in the previous analysis

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resulting in a decrease in uranium -content for fifteen samples and the reporting of nine of the sample:results to below the minimum .

l detection limit of 10 micrograms per' liter. As a result,xthe .

', number of positive urine Lsamples fell. to within the normal range.

expected by comparison with previous sampling periods. No. . l C

significant exposures were noted'from the urinalysis data. .

.B. Lung Count Results a >

Lung count measurement results since September 19, 1985 were L reviewed by the inspector. One measu'.ement of 0.29 nCi of,U-235 was L due at least in part to body l surface contamination present. 'A -

recount one week later yielded a corrected ~ reportable internal ,

burden of 0.14 nCi. .No significar.t exposures were!noted from thel l.'J lung count data.

u C. Whole Body Exposure l

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Externa 1' radiation exposure records for the fourth quarter, 1985 and

[' first quarter, 1986 were examined. The highest cumulative radiation

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6 exposures noted'for 1985 were 0.98 rem whole body and 1~.42 rem skin to one individual, most of which was received during work associated with the removal and disposal'of the plutonium glovebox from the SF ,

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, A review was made of.the annual personnel' radiation exposure data

- submitted.by thellicensee for 1985 in accordance with 10.CFR'20.407.

None of the reported doses due to on-site activities exceeded the licensee's guideline -of 1.0 rem per quarter or;10 CFR, Part 20

' limits .

D. Airborne Contamination ,

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Weekly airborne contamination level survey reports were reviewed at' random"for the period up to September, 1985. All average ~ quarterly' air concentration levels reported.were below the ENC guideline of '

1.0 E-11 uCi/ml. . The licensee has recently-increased to fourteen 4

the number of individual work stations at which air concentration measurements are tracked for co'ntinuous evaluation on a weekly, monthly, quarterly and yearly frequency. At the end of the first quarter of 1986, the overall average air concentration was reported as 4.5 E-12 uCi/ml. Air concentration levels of most work areas have.either decreased or remained steady during the first 1986 quarterly period when compared with-the 1985 overall average.

- However, some work stations have shown an increased level of air concentration, such as the Scrap Recovery Area, increasing from 2.1 E-12 to 8.5 E-12 uCi/ml. .This significant increase has been

attributed to increased production.in that part of the process. The licensee also tracks-the highest individual work station air concentration on a weekly basis. The last weekly monitoring period reviewed (March 24-30, 1986) disclosed maximum airborne levels of up to 4.8 E-11-uCi/ml at one of the work stations.

t E. Surface Contamination-

, The licensee conducts a routine survey-program for the detection of surface contamination resulting from operations in plant areas where 3:

- radioactive materials are stored or processed. These routine facility surveys are conducted at a frequency ranging from daily to

l. monthly. In addition, special contamination surveys are made when necessary or upon indication of the presence of uncontained l radioactive material in certain areas.

l Records of surface contamination surveys were selected at random for review back to the. third quarter of 1985. Three of these records indicated the presence of smearable contamination exceeding the 10,000

( . dpa limit without adequate follow-up surveys. For example,; visible and smearable contamination levels at five different locations of between

12,000 and 40,000 dpa U/100 sq. cm. were recorded from the radiation

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survey conducted January 29, 1986. However, no follow-up survey was performed within the same or- following eight-hour shift, and the five areascidentified as contaminated were not checked again to verify decontamination until the routine survey made on February 6, 1986.

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^ a-The inspector was informed of the 'following commitments from the

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, licensee to prevent recu'rrence: (a) Preparation of ~a job checklist

.to be' completed daily by alliworkshift HPT's which will' identify the

, ' need ,for' any resurvey and review by the following : shift .HPT; (b) -

Training of health physics personnel in the use of the checklist procedure during June or July'1986; (c) The Radiological Safety Assistant will. audit all survey records at least monthly,to' ensure

. proper 1 closeout of all actions which require repeat' radiation surveys and will report the findings in writing to the Supervisor,.

Radiological and-Industrial Safety.

The need for improvement in conducting follow-up contaminatioh:

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surveysLis identified as an open item (86-03-02). This open. item will be reviewed during the next inspection.

F. Instrument Calibration Randomly selected records of air sampling and contamination monitoring' instrumentation were checked by the inspector.to determine that calibration occurred at.the required semi-annual frequency. .All records and instruments examined indicated that

' calibrations were being performed within the required time period.

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G. Radiological Safety Audits-At

.The inspector examined records of eight separate audits that were conducted during the period between October-1,;1985 and April 24, 1986. Discrepancies which are identified i'n the audits are categorized as either an " audit finding" or~ as an " observation" which is reported in writing to the Plant Managers. Responses to the audit' reports were completed in a timely fashion and generally addressed the~various discrepancies identified.

During'the last audit (ENC Report,86-4), surface contamination was

. reporteds on a number.of occasions as a; result of transferring liquid wash solutions to drums improperly _ stored in the Line 2 airlock of the UO2 Building. The drums are to be relocated to a Contaminated Controlled Area while equipment modifications' scheduled to be completed by the endiof' July', 1986 are made to re-route the piping.

This item will be reviewed during theinext inspection .(86-03-03). '

Audit Report 85-11 identified visible contamination on boat rollers '

outside of the NAF press containment.. There.was'no documented

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follow-up action taken-by Corporate Licensing regarding this issue and.there have been no' process line modifications scheduled to-date.

This subject, open item 86-03-04, will be reviewed during the next NRC inspection.

Audit Report 86-1 describes smearable contamination in excess of 10,000 dpm on the floor between the pellet stackers of presses number 2 and 3 in the UO 2 Building. This contamination was~further described as a repetitive problem due to the absence of containment

_ of the pellet conveyer tape between the two press enclosures. This

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4 is, identified as open item 86-03-05 and will be reviewed during the '

next inspection.

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Discussions were held.with licensee representatives regarding the need for additional emphasis'on conducting thorough follow-up

' : actions on " observational" discrepancies which are identified 1 through internal audits. All discrepancies should be identified in subsequent internal audits and additional corrective actions described in writing until the matter is resolved to the satisfaction of the Corporate Licensing auditor. This open item will be re-examined during the next NRC inspection (86-03-06).

No violations were identified.

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7. Transportation / Radioactive Waste Management 10 CFR Part 61 requires that all radioactive waste prepared for disposal is classified in accordance with para ~ graph 61.55 and meets the waste characteristics requirements in paragraph 61.56. The licensee's program for packaging and transportation of radioactive-waste must also be conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20.311 and 10 CFR Part 71.

The licensee's quality control'(QC) proce'dures'for shipments of low level radioactive waste was reviewed. LTo help ensure compliance with DOT

. requirements, the Quality Control Engineering group performs quarterly

' audits of waste packaging practices as required-by the Quality Control Procedure'XN-NF-P69008. The QC audits. include waste containers in temporary ' storage prior to their removal! from the uranium oxide plant.

Check-off forms used in previous: audits were reviewed and appeared to be comprehensive.in coverage. Based on the corrective actions taken by.the

.licen'see to improve the QC shipment inspection procedures',. inspection

. . item 85-06-02 is closed.

No violations.were' identified.
8. Emergency - Prep'a redness Section3.9Efthelicenseapplicationaddressesthelicensee'sEmergency Plan (XN-NF-32) which includes a listing 'of procedures that have _been prepared to' implement the plan.

The status of three corrective actions that were identified by the

_ licensee as necessary for the improvement of emergency response capabilit,ies were. reviewed by the inspector. Two of the corrective s

~ actions had been completed. In one, new radiation survey and personnel '

. monitoring instruments-had been placed in the Central Guard Station of the Emergency Command Post. The equipment is used solely for emergency response purposes, and all were in current' calibration.

In the other completed action the licensee had reemphasized the need for prompt

, employee response"to criticality alarms with additional attention given to the employee whose response to a recent accidental criticality alarm was unsatisfactory; ' Additionally, the need for a prompt response to a criticality alarm was addressed in the' licensee's internal news sheet ~

which is distributed to'all employees. These actionr, close two parts of l r -

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9 item 85-12-01. The part remaining open involves installation of a

_ criticality howler silencer switch.

No violations were identified.

9. - Environmental Protection Section 3.5 of the license application addresses the licensee's Environmental Surveillance Program wherein gaseous effluents, liquid effluents and lagoon systems are monitored. ? Additionally, the licensee collects vegetation, soil and air samples'at strategic locations for analysis of pertinent chemicals and uranium.

A. The licensee arranged for the measurement of sludge samples at an independent contract laboratory. The measurement results are consistent with the heterogeneity attributed to.this type sample.

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Repeat analysis did not improve the scatter of the results.' The licensee's. fluorimetric procedure includes measurement of both a spiked and .an unspiked fraction of the. sampleI to correct for the effect of quenching. The scatter of the results is attributed to the heterogeneity of this type" sample (sewage, treatment plant residue). This closes _ item 85-10-04.

B. The results from the measurement of seven NRC' samples by the Radiological and Environmental Sciences Laboratory (RESL) were less

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than NRC release limits. The results are listed in. Table I.

C. The inspector reviewed the licensee's 1985 ALARA Committee Report,

-and the effluent monitoring report for the. period July 1 to December 31, 1985 which was submitted to the NRC as required by 10 CFR 70.59. The licensee reported that liquid radioactive effluent-discharges to the sanitary sewerage system did not exceed 0.08 curie during 1985. All ' discharges of uranium to the. sewer system come from Chemical Waste Storage. Lagoon SA. There was no reported leakage 'of- radioactive material from the storage lagoons 'to groundwater as determined from test well and "between liner" monitoring data. Gaseous effluents released to unrestricted' areas L .during.1985 totaled less than 15 microcuries for uranium and below

. 0.02 microcuries of plutonium.

No violations were identified.

l 10. Deactivation / Decontamination Activities

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j ' The licensee has. completed closeout surveys in areas of the Specialty Fuels (SF) Building which were associated with the fabrication of mixed (uranium and' plutonium) oxide reactor fuel elements. The results of these surveys were presented in a final report which was transmitted by -

l h letter dated November-25, 1985 to the NRC's Division of Fuel Cycle and h . Material Safety, and the Region V office. Based upon the reported absence-of detectable plutonium or' uranium contamination above release limits, the NRC was requested to perform a confirmatory survey in order to allow for release:of the facility,from plutonium limits.

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At the request of the NRC, a confirmatory' radiological' survey.of the -

mixed oxide facility was performed by Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU), 0ak Ridge, Tennessee during' February 6-12, 1986. .The~results of the survey are-described in the final report: " Confirmatory Survey of the Specialty Fuels Building, Exxon Nuclear. Company, Richland, Washington",

't - April 1986. Except for certain limited areas and items,.the total.and removable contamination levels measured were all within NRC release limits after final-decontamination by the licensee.

Paint samples removed by,0RAU from two Room-173 floor. locations were found to contain plutonium above'the 300 dpm/100 sq..cm.: release limit.

The results of. subsequent decontamination efforts and resurveys of the floor areas were reported in two separate follow-up survey reports from Exxon to NRC. Region V dated March 19, 1986 and April 18, 1986. The areas checked were determined to be free of plutonium, and the residual uranium contamination present was reported to be within NRC release limits for fixed and removable contamination.

L , During this inspection,' the NRC} inspectors ~ conducted'a final radiological survey overcheck of certain selected floor areas in the SF Building Room 173 which had been identified by the ORAU confirmatory survey as requiring additional decontamination effort. No contamination was detected.except for one sm'all area near the former location of the pellet" press. However, the measured levels were below the guideline release limits.of'300 dpm/100 square centimeters total contamination and.20 dpm/100 square centimeter removable contamination for plutonium-239 alpha. The results of ?the ' contamination' surveys are shown-in . Table II.

Y . l During a visual inspection of Room 173, it was noted that a door bumper:

plate was still attached to the North entrance door.- The metal plate, n installed after mixed oxide production started, was removed and surveys of both the bumper plate and the door surface covered by' the plate revealed no significant contamination present. ,

Eight square filter holder frames, each'with side dimensions of 27'

inches, were mounted in the return air ventilation ducts of the. Room 173

> floor. These frames had been identified in the ORAU. report as having been removed from,the SF facility by the licensee after_the frames were identified as contaminated. Licensee. representatives stated that they

< intended.to use. the frames only. temporarily for purposes of room air balance before future remodeling of-Room 173. . Of the. six filter frames -

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surveyed, one frame holder (Number 5) had total and ' removable

, contamination above NRC release' limits for plutonium-239-alpha (though not identified -as plutonium) and a second frame holder (Number 1) was' marginally acceptable. The remaining filter holders' measured were found to be either free of any significant contamination or were contaminated at levels below the release limits for total'and removable plutonium and-uranium-238 contamination. After the contamination was identified'during this on-site survey, the Radiological and. Industrial Safety Supervisor informed the NRC inspector of the licensee's decision toidispose of the six filter holders. ,During a walk-through inspection of the Waste Packaging Area in the Uranium 0xide Building,-the inspectors observed' filter holders to be in transit'for disposaluns radioactive waste. s

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11 The-inspectors examined the second floor space of the Room 157 vault in the Specialty Fuels Building which is used for the storage.of 55 gallon

' drums containing uranium and plutonium waste. . -The waste material was generated from fuel processing operations, and from decontamination

. efforts following the shutdown of the mixed oxide production line. Each of the thirty-four waste drums . stored has a log sheet identifying its contents. The licensee currently plans to_ store the plutonium waste indefinitely since arrangements for its disposal at a low level waste burial site have been unsuccessful. An acceptable alternative to this plan is needed. No surface contamination was detectable on the bottoms of the several drums surveyed. - >"

Based upon the confirmatory radiological surveys conducted by ORAU and that conducted by the NRC during this inspection, and on the basis of action taken by the licensee-to remove the contaminated filter holders, it is concluded that any contamination present in the' Room 173 mixed-oxide facility is within NRC guidelines'for release from the criteria for plutonium.

No violations were identified.

11. Exit Meeting The results of the inspection were discussed with the licensee's staff identified in Section 1. The topics included:

The areas inspected; No violations were identified; The closure of five open items:

85-06-02 QC audits of UO Building waste packaging; 2

85-10-04 Review quenching in the licensee's fluo ~rimetric l analysis; -

85-12-01 (a) Acquisition of additional survey instruments for the emergency command post; (b) Emergency response training reemphasis;

i. (c) (See continuing open items for part remaini 4 l open);

85-12-02 MURS inline filter and valve relocation and

, modification;

  • 85-12-03 Dry conversion photometric analyzer by-pass valve f lock installation; i -

Continuing open itemst

  • 84-10-02 Pallet contamination control improvement;

12 85-02-05 Status.of the licensee's actions on the recommendations of his task force on Criticality Safety; 85-06-01 Ventilation control improvement around the drum tumbler; 85-10-03 Review the effect of the limit of error on the licensee's effluent measurements; 85-12-01 (c) Key operated howler silencer switch installation; 85-12-04 Disposal plans for about 34 drums of TRU waste; 86-02-01 Status of the licensee's actions on the recommendations of the UF6 Study Group (implementation of an additional pressure based vaporization emergency cutoff switch and implementation of automatic placement of thermocouples on UF 6 cylinders placed in heating

' chests);

  • '86-02-02 Review the procedure developed by the licensee for action to be taken on identification of an overfilled UF cylinder; 6

86-02-03 Review the results of the licensee's reevaluation of the emergency scrubber capacity;

,New open items:

  • 86-03-01 Review the documentation of the findings in the Senior Operations Analyst's monthly production criticality safety audits';

, 86-03-02 Review improvement in the: conducting of~ follow-up contamination' surveys; .

86-03-03 , Review the relocation of the UF6 cylinder rinse

' accumulation drum;

'86-03-04 Review the licensee's progress on the-further research the Plant Operations Manager suggested for resolution of the boat roller contamination at the NAF press; 86-03-05 Review the follow-up action taken by Corporate Licensing on the control of contamination on the floor between the pellet stackers of press number 2 and press number 3; 86-03-06 Review improvements in Corporate Licensing's records tracking discrepancies until they are adequately resolved.

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< 13 Specialty Fuels Building NRC overcheck of the licensee's cleanup of floor contamination identified by ORAU.

Survey and swipe sampling of filter frames temporarily returned to the SF Building.

The results of'the preliminary look at the former Centrifuge Test

- Facility for confirmatory survey planning.

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TABLE I RESL Analysis of NRC Environment Samples Taken On or Near-the Exxon Nuclear Company Site (pCi/g (dry) 1; Sigma)-

Sample No.*** 238 p,239,240 Gross Alpha Gross Beta Pu Cs-137 NRC-1 412 31 1 6. 0.005 1 0.003 0.108 t 0.009 0.48 1 0.19 0.232 1-0.009 NRC-2 6 1 2~ 20 i 5 0.0013 2 0.0013 .0.031.1 0.003 0.45 0.15 0.110- .0.004.

NRC-3 3i2 22 1 5 0.0005 1 0.0011- 0.028 i 0.003 0.93 1 0.22 0.107 i 0.004 NRC-4 2i2 23 1 5 N.D.** 0.0039 i 0.0017 0.69 i 0.18 0.0186 1 0.0016 NRC-5 10 1 3 26 1 5 N.D. N.D. 3.39 1 1.14 0.026 1 0.012 NRC-6' 913 24 5 N.D. N.D. 1.08 1 1.12 N.D. .

NRC-7 6 2 26 1 5 N.D. 0.0009 1 0.0012 3.41 i 1.15 ~ 0.029 1 0.014

  • Calculated from the reported gamma spectra' ,

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. **Not detected

      • Sampling locations:

NRC-l'265 ft.'SSW of the Specialty Fuels Building

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NRC-2 270 ft. SSW of the Specialty Fuels Building' NRC-3 600 ft. NE of the Specialty Fuels Building "NRC-4 630 ft..NE of the Specialty Fuels Building NRC-5 35 ft..NE of the Specialty Fuels Building NRC-6 ~ 25 ft.. NE of the Specialty Fuels Building NRC-7 105 ft. NE of the Specialty Fuels Building

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1 TABLE II Surface Contamination Results Room 173, SF Building Total Contamination Removable Contamination Item / Location- Alpha'dpm/100 cm2 *. Alpha dpm/100 cm2 **

Floor near' east door- Undetectable Not measured Floor former pellet press area 33 1 s

North door uncovered by metal bumper plate Undetectable 3 Door bumper plate outside Jsurface Undetectable 1

' Floor filter holder frame:

l Number 1, Location 1. >

57 20 Number 1, Location 2 127 12-Number 2 63 1 Number 3 Undetectable Not measured Number 4,. Location 1 31

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Number 4, Location'2 31 Number 5, Location 1 317 9 4

Number 5, Location 2 174 21 Number 5, Location 3 476 20 Number 6 Undetectable Not measured

  • Based on LRL Alpha Count Rate Meter surveys using efficiency of 42%

obtained from counting of Pu-239 source.

    • Based on smear survey using a measured efficiency of 30% obtained from counting of Pu-239 source with the NRC Region V Tennelec Model LB-5100 Automatic Low Background Alpha / Beta Counting System.
      • Result of single smear from Locations 1 and 2 of filter frame No. 4.

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