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Insp Repts 50-313/98-07 & 50-368/98-07 on 980802-0912.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support
	ML20153H246
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	09/25/1998
From:	; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20153H237	List: ML20153H232; ML20153H246;
References
	50-313-98-07, 50-313-98-7, 50-368-98-07, 50-368-98-7, NUDOCS 9809300363
	Download: ML20153H246 (15)
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ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket Nos.: 50-313;50-368

License Nos.: DPR-51; NPF-6

Report No.: 50-313/98-07;50-368/98-07-

Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: Arkansas Nuclesr One, Units 1 and 2

Location: 1448 S. R. 333

Russellville, Arkansas 72801

Dates: August 2 through September 12,1998

Inspectors: K. Kennedy, Senior Resident inspector

S. Burton, Resident inspector

K. Weaver, Resident Inspector ,

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Approved By: Charles S. Marschall, Chief

Project Branch C '

Division of Reactor Projects

ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information ;

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2

NRC Inspection Report 50-313/98-07; 50-368/98-07

This routine announced inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering,

maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection. l

! Operations

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Good housekeeping practices and component material condition was noted in the Unit 1

Train A reactor building spray pump room. The system valve lineup was in accordance l

with the procedure. Components in the field were properly identified and labeled as

denoted on Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&lD) M-236 and in !

Procedure 1104.005 (Section O2.1). l

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Unit 2 Train A emergency diesel generator (EDG) was aligned and maintained in

accordance with station procedures. No material deficiencies were noted that had the

potential to impact system operation (Section O2.2).

Maintenance

Units 1 and 2 maintenance activities were performed professionally by qualified workers

knowledgeable of their assigned tasks and diagnostic equipment. Technicians

demonstrated good as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) practices during the

activities observed (Section M1.1).

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Units 1 and 2 surveillance activities were performed in accordance with approved j

procedures by knowledgeable personnel who demonstrated good communication, !

self-checking, and peer-checking skills. Good system engineering involvement was

observed during surveillance activities (Section M1.2).

Knowledgeable, qualified technicians performed 4160 volt circuit breaker maintenance

on Unit 2 using approved procedures (Section M1.3).

Unit 2 Technical Specifications were entered when a technician interrupted power to

reactor vessel level monitoring system (RVLMS) Channel 1 by utilizing an uncontrolled

power strip located inside the system cabinet which also powered system comoonents.

The licensee missed an opportunity to prevent the loss of RVLMS Channel 1 power

when they initiated system specific corrective actions for a similar event that occurred in

1996 (Section M1.4).

' Enaineerina

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Chemistry technicians demonstrated a good questioning attitude when they identified

water discharging from the shared Units 1 and 2 emergency cooling pond spillway when

the water level was below the top of the dam. The licensee promptly investigated the

condition and found it to be normal for the water level (Section E1.1).

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- Plant Support

- Two deficient air sampling charcoal cartridge holders were left in service when Units 1

and 2 radiation protection technicians failed to review radiation work permits to identify

[ deficient inservice lodine sample holders. A review of the operating and radiological

' conditions relevant to the inservice sample holder indicated that an unmonitored release

to the work space had not occurred (Section R1.2).

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Report Details

Symmary of Plant Status

Unit 1

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Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On August 8,1998, for approximately

3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months , and on September 11 for approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months , power was reduced to 85 percent for

monthly turbine valve testing. On August 15, power was reduced to 95 percent for

approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to support circulating water bay cleaning at the intake structure. The unit

was operating at 100 percent power at the end of the inspection period.

Unit 2

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Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On August 8, power was reduced to

l 95 percent for approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months to support quarterly turbine valve testing. The unit was

y operating at 100 percent power at the end of the inspection period.

1. Operations

1 01 Conduct of Operations

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l 01.1 General Comments (7170Z}

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The inspectors observed various aspects of plant operations, including compliance with

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Technical Specifications, conformance with plant procedures and the Safety Analysis

Report, and shift manning. Inspectors also observed the effectiveness of

communications, management oversight, proper system configuration and configuration

control, housekeeping, and operator performance during routine plant operations and

surveillances.

The conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious. Evolutions were

, generally well controlled, deliberate, and performed according to procedures. Shift

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turnover briefs were cornprehensive. Housekeeping was generally good and

discrepancies were promptly corrected. Safety systems were found to be properly j

aligned. Specific cvents and noteworthy observations are detailed below. 1

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02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

O2.1 Unit 1 - Enaineered Safety Feature Walkdown of Train A Reactor Buildino Sorav System

a. insoection Scoce (71707) ;

The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown of the accessible portion of the Unit 1

Train A reactor building spray system.

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b. Observations and Findinas

The inspectors reviewed Procedure 1104.005, Revision 37, " Reactor Building Spray

System Operation," and P&lD M-236, Sheet 1, Revision 85," Reactor Building Spray and

Core Flooding Systems." The inspectors verified that the Procedure 1104.005 valve

lineup matched P&lD M-236 for the Train A reactor building spray system. The

inspectors walked down the Train A reactor building spray system using

Procedure 1104.005 and P&lD M-236. The inspectors founct components in the field

were properly labeled, identified, and accurately denoted on P&lD M-236 and that the

valve lineup was in accordance with Procedure 1104.005 and P&lD M-236. The

inspectors also verified locked valves required by Procedure 1104.005 and found no

deficiencies.

The inspectors found that good housekeeping practices were being maintained in the

reactor building spray pump room. No equipment conditions that might degrade system

performance were identified during the walkdown.

c. Conclusions

Good housekeeping practices and component material condition was noted in the Unit 1

Train A reactor building spray pump room. The system valve lineup was in accordance

with the procedure. Components in the field were properly identified and labeled as

denoted on P&lD M-236 and in Procedure 1104.005.

02.2 Unit 2 - Enaineered Safety Feature Walkdown of EDG

a. Insocction Scoce (71707)

The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown of accessible portions of the Unit 2

EDGs. Walkdowns included a review of valve and electricallineups for the EDGs and'

supporting equipment.

b. Observations and Findinas

The inspectors reviewed Procedure 2104.036, Revision 42, " Emergency Diesel

Generator Operation;" Unit 2 Safety Analysis Report, Section 8.0; Technical

Specifications; Regulatory Guide 1.108; and Piping Drawing M-2217, Revision 52,

" Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System."

The inspectors found that the accessible system mechanical and electrical components

were aligned in accordance with procedures. Component labeling was verified and no .

discrepancies were noted. Housekeeping practices and component material condition !

was satisfactory.

c. Conclusions 1

Unit 2 Train A EDG was aligned and maintained in accordance with station procedures. a

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No material deficiencies were noted that had the potential to impact system operation.

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08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700,92901)

O8.1 (Closed) Inspection Followup Items (IFI) 50-313/9701-01. " Administrative Control of

Containment Penetration Vent and Drain Line Valves"

The inspectors initiated this IFl during the closure of Violation 50-313/9407-01 to provide

further review of the licensee administrative controls for vents and drains that penetrate j

the reactor building. The inspectors reviewed Procedure 1015.034, Revision 4, i

" Containment Penetration Administrative Control," and Procedure 1015.041, Revision 6,

" Unit 1 Containment Penetration Administrative Control," and concluded that the

licensee had implemented permanent administrative controls for vent and drain line

valves on piping that penetrate the reactor building.

08.2 (Closed) Violation 50-368/9509-01. " Lack of Temporary Modification for Connectina )

Shutdown Coolina Heat Exchanoer Service Water Drains" l

The licensee had cross-connected the service water side of the shutdown cooling heat

exchangers through the service water drain valves using a configuration that did not

conform with approved drawings, without considering the system a temporary

modification. The inspectors verified the immediate and long-term corrective actions ,

described in the licensee's letter dated February 6,1996, and found them to be )

adequate and complete. )

11. Maintenance

M1 Conduct of Maintenance j

M1.1 General Comments ,

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a. inspection Scope (62707)

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The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance activities:

Unit 1 - Job Order (JO) 00960109," Perform Diagnostic Testing of Emergency

Feed Water Pump to Steam Generator B Discharge Isolation Valve CV-2620,"

performed on September 1.

Unit 1 - JO 00981234, " Inspect, Clean, Lubricate, Megger Motor, Check for

Leakage of Valve, and Lubricate Valve Stem for Valve CV-2620," performed on

September 1.

Unit 2 - JO 00972810, Procedure 1412.001, Revision 9, " Preventative

Maintenance or Limitorque SB/SMB Motor Operators," performed on

September 1.

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l b. Observations and Findinas

The activities that the inspectors observed were conducted professionally and

! thoroughly. Work was performed according to procedures. The workers were

knowledgeable of their assigned tasks and diagnostic equipment. The inspectors noted

i that the workers properly stopped work when problems were encountered with the

i diagnostic equipment. On one occasion, technicians promptly identified a faulty

equipment cable and replaced the cable prior to proceeding with the work. The

inspectors observed maintenance supervisory involvement during these activities.

Maintenance personnel involved demonstrated good ALARA practices and radiation ;

worker knowledge.

c. Conclusions

Units 1 and 2 maintenance activities were performed professionally by qualified workers '

knowledgeable of their assigned tasks and diagnostic equipment. Technicians

demonstrated good ALARA practices during the activities observed.

M1.2 General Comments on Surveillance Activities

a. Inspection Scope (61726)

The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities:

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. Unit 1 - Procedure 1304.128, Revision 12, "RPS-D/CRD Breaker Trip Test,"

performed on August 4.

. Unit 1 - Procedure 1304. 208, Revision 3," Unit 1 EFIC Channel D Monthly Test,

SG Pressure Greater Than 750 PSIG," performed on August 4.

. Unit 1 - Procedure 1607.017, Revision 5, " Sampling the Borated Water Storage

Tank," performed on August 26.

. Unit 1 - Procedure 1605.005, Revision 5," Determination of Boron," performed on

August 26.

. Unit 1 - Procedure 1104.036, Revision 42, " Emergency Diesel Generator

Operations," Supplement 2,"DG2 Monthly Test," performed on August 31.

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. Unit 2 - Procedure 2104.036, Revision 42, "Emerger,cy Diesel Generator

Operations," Supplement 2A, "2DG2 Monthly Test (Slow Start)," performed on

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b. Observations and Findinas

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The inspectors found that surveillance activities were performed in accordance with

l approved procedures by knowledgeable personnel using calibrated test equipment.

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Licensee personnel demonstrated good communications, self-checking, and

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peer-checking techniques. System engineering personnel observed system

performance during the surveillance testing and demonstrated good attention to detail

when monitoring for abnormal conditions. During interviews with the system engineers I

involved in the observed surveillances, the inspectors found them knowledgeable of

deficiencies associated with their assigned system and that they had verified that the i

deficiencies would not impact system operability. The equipment performed as required !

and data met the required acceptance criteria.

c. Conclusions

Units 1 and 2 surveillance activities were performed in accordance with approved

procedures by knowledgeable personnel who demonstrated good communication,

self-checking, and peer-checking skills. Good system engineering involvement was

observed during surveillance activities.

M1.3 Unit 2 - 4160 Volt Breaker Maintenance

a. Inspection Scoce (62707)

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On August 26,1998, the inspectors observed 4160 volt breaker maintenance performed

on Breaker 2A310, the " Vital Busses 2A3 and 2A4, cross tie breaker" for Unit 2.

Maintenance was performed in accordance with Procedure 1416.040, Revision 2, !

"Magna-Blast Circuit Breaker Maintenance," and JO 00979698.

b. Observations and Findinas

The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedure, interviewed technicians, and

monitored the maintenance activity. Technicians were knowledgeable of the design and

operation of the breaker. When the work area was left unattended, technicians secured

the breaker and equipment carts to ensure immobility during a seismic event. Proper

controls of cleaning fluids and combustibles were otaserved. Procedural compliance,

place keeping, and required signatures on the data sheet were accomplished as the

tasks and steps were performed,

c. Conclusions

Knowledgeable, qualified technicians performed 4160 volt circuit breaker maintenance

on Unit 2 using approved procedures.

M1.4 Unit 2 - Loss of Power to the RVLMS

a. Inspection Scoce (62707)

The inspectors reviewed conditions relating to a loss of power to Unit 2 RVLMS

Channel 1 that rendered the channel inoperable on August 31,1998.

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b. Observations and Findinas

On August 31, while performing routine cleaning and inspection of the RVLMS cabinet

performed under JO 00979045, " Vibration and Loose Parts Monitoring Panel,

Cabinets 2C19 and 2C3888-1/2 Clean and Inspect / a technician plugged a vacuum

cleaner into a power strip mounted in the cabinet. The power strip was designed to

provide electricity to the RVLMS control power supply modules and not intended to

supply externalloads. The load, resulting from the operation of the vacuum cleaner,

was sufficient to cause the power supply protective fuse to blow. This resulted in a loss

of control power to RVLMS Channel 1 and entry into Technical Specification 3.3.3.6.

There are two channels of RVLMS. Each channelis powered from separate

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safety-related busses. The RVLMS system is utilized as an indication of reactor vessel

water level during postaccident conditions and provides no automatic functions. During

the loss of Channel 1 RVLMS, Channel 2 was available for indication in the unlikely

event of an accident. Additionally, the loss of one channel of RVLMS has no impact on

routine power operations.

The inspectors reviewed Condition Report 2-1998-0340 for this event, related Condition l

Reports 2-1997-0132 and C-1996-0227, interviewed the licensee, and observed the

configuration in the affected cabinet. The power strip located within the cabinet did not

have any protective covers or warning labels that would prevent a technician from

plugging a nonsafety-related component into the supply. The work instructions did not

contain cautions to preclude the event from occurring. The licensee indicated that the 1

technician was not aware that the strip was intended only for use as a system power

supply. The inspectors interviewed the maintenance supervisors who estimated that as

many as 30 cabinets contained various receptacles and that a similar configuration to I

the RVLMS power strip existed in a minimum of five locations.

The inspectors determined that Condition Reports 2-1997-0132 and C-1996-0227

identified similar occurrences. Specifically, C 1996-0227, dated September 11,1996,

identified a loss of the safety parameter display system power when a worker plugged a

heat gun into an electrical outlet supplied from the same source as the system. The

inspectors concluded that the licensee missed an opportunity to prevent the loss of

RVLMS when they did not recognize that the condition associated with Condition

Report C-1996-0227 was more extensive and potentially affected other systems.

Although these problems had no safety significance, they represent weak corrective

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Unit 2 Technical Specifications were entered when a technician interrupted power to

RVLMS Channel 1 by using an uncontrolled power strip located inside the system

cabinet that also powered system components. The licensee missed an opportunity to

prevent the loss of RVLMS Channel 1 power when they initiated system specific

corrective actions for a similar event that occurred in 1996. The problems had no safety

significance, but they represent isolated examples of weak corrective action.

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M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues

M8.1 (Closed ) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-313/96-010. "inadeauate Procedyre Revision

Resulted in Not Havina Tested the Reactor Protection System Hiah Temperature Trio

Function as Reauired by TSs"

The inspectors verified the immediate and long-term corrective actions described in the

licensee's letter dated December 19,1996, and found them to be adequate and

complete. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified, and corrected violation is being treated

as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

M8.2 (Closed) LER 50-368/96-005-01. " Surveillance Testina of Plant Protection System and

Postaccident Monitorina instrumentation"

The inspectors verified the immediate and long-term corrective actions described in the

licensee's letter dated January 30,1997, and found them to be adequate and complete.

This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a

noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

lil. Enaineerina

E1 Conduct of Engineering

E1.1 Units 1 and 2 - Ooerability of Emeraency ( '

-,aPond

a. Inspection Scone (37551)

The licensee identified a possible deficiency associated with the emergency cooling

pond which serves as the ultimate heat sink for Units 1 and 2. The inspectors observed

the condition and reviewed the operability and system design with engineering

personnel.

b. Observations and Findinas

On August 24,1998, while making preparations for chemical treatment of the

emergency cooling pond, the licensee lowered level to the top of the overflow spillway to

prevent chemicals from entering Lake Dardannell. Chemistry technicians noticed that a

small amount (less than 2 gpm) of water continued to seep from the seams in the

concrete erosion barriers that overlay the spillway. The technicians properly questioned

this and submitted Condition Report CR-C-98-0212 which documented their concern.

The inspectors observed the condition and reviewed the licensee's operability ,

assessment of the water seeping from the emergency cooling pond concrete erosion l

blocks. The construction of the spillway consists of clay underlayer, a permeable i

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overlay that minimizes erosion of the clay and allows water to penetrate, solidifying the

clay layer, concrete erosion blocks on top of the overlayment, and finally a plastic j

tarpaulin type covering over the concrete that provides additional erosion protection

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when water flows over the cor crete. The inspectors reviewed the configuration of the

spillway, the lake level, and the location and amount of water seepage and concluded

that the licensee's operability determination accurately reflected the condition. Although

the level of water in the pond was slightly below the top of the concrete, the licensee

concluded that, because the pond level was above the bottom of the concrete blocks, a

tortuous flow path between the blocks existed that allowed water to migrate through the

joints between the blocks and over the spillway.

c. Conclusions

Chemistry technicians demonstrated a good questioning attitude when they identified

water discharging from the shared Units 1 and 2 emergency cooling pond spillway when

the water level was below the top of the dam. The licensee promptly investigated the

condition and found it to be normal for the water level.

IV. Plant Support

R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls

R1.1. General Comments (71750)

During routine tours of the pi.snt and observations of plant activities, the inspectors

found that access doors to locked high radiation areas were properly locked, areas were

properly posted, and personnel demonstrated proper radiological work practices.

R1.2 Units 1 and 2 - Radiation Monitorina at Reactor Coolant Samole Sink

a. Insoection Scope (71707)

On August 26,1998, the inspectors observed chemistry technician radiological practices

while establishing valve lineup in preparation for performance of Procedure 1607,

Revision 13, " Reactor. Coolant Sampling System."

b. Observations and Findinas

The inspectors observed radiological practice conducted per Radiation Work

Permit 98-008 when technicians were aligning the reactor coolant sampling systern in

preparation for performing of Procedure 1607.001. Technicians demonstrated good

contamination control practices. The sample sink was configured with an exhaust hood

that is maintained under negative pressure to preclude radioactive gasses and particles

from entering the work space. Air samplers were prestaged at the sample sink in !

accordance with Radiation Work Permit 98-008 to provide monitoring for lodine and

particulate during sample activities.

The inspectors noted that air sampling charcoal cartridge holders were configured such

that air could bypass the charcoal cartridge due to a missing gasket in the sample head.

This condition would lessen the efficiency of the sample cartridge, possibly yielding

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inaccurate samples. The licensee took actions at that time to remove deficient

cartridges from service. The inspectors questioned the chemistry technicians about the

deficiency identified during the week before. Technicians were aware of the problem

and indicated that they had been informed that health physics had removed all of the

deficient holders. The inspectors asked the technicians to check the holders located at

the Units 1 and 2 sample sinks and noted that both were missing gaskets and o-rings.

Upon noting the problem, plant staff promptly replaced the defective sample holders.

The inspectors discussed the condition with the health physics department. Health

physics indicated that they had failed to cross-reference radiological work permits to

prestaged sample holders and had only removed deficient sample holders located at the

controlled access and in spares. Subsequently, health physics reviewed radiation work

permits and other potential locations fcr sample holders and found that the two holders

in the chemistry lab were the only oversights.

The licensee determined that no negative fuel performance trends or positive iodine

samples had occurred subsequent to both units' refueling outage. They noted that the

installed ventilation maintained the sample sink at a negative pressure and that iodine

sample cartridge bypass flow was minimal. Based upon this information, the licensee

concluded that no unmonitored releases to the work space at the reactor coolant system

sample station had occurred. The failure to priorly identify these two sample holders as

defective did not result in an unmonitored release and did not constitute a safety issue.

c. Conclusions

Two deficient air sampling charcoal cartridge holders were left in service when Units 1

and 2 radiation protection technicians failed to review radiation work permits to identify

deficient inservice iodine sample holders. A review of the operating and radiological

conditions relevant to the inservice sample holder indicated that an unmonitored release

to the work space had not occurred.

S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities

S1.1 Conduct of Security (71750)

During this period, the inspectors observed personnel and package access, personnel

searches, and applications of temporary lighting in areas where >quipment,

components, and truck trailers were stored. The inspectors' review of security

measures and operations periodically throughout the inspection period indicated that

they were properly implemented.

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V. Manaaement Meetinas

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at

the conclusion of the inspection on September 15,1998. The licensee acknowledged

the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the

inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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( ATTACHMENT

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! PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

l Licensee

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l B. Allen, Unit 2 Maintenance Manager

l C. Anderson, General Plant Manager

l G. Ashley, Licensing Supervisor

B. Bamant, Unit 2 Plant Manager.

B. Beard, Unit 2 Electrical Superintendent

bR. Carter, Maintenance Superintendent !

M. Chisum, Unit 2 System Engineering Manager l

M. Cooper, Licensing Specialist

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P. Harris, Unit 1 Operations

B. Haylock, Unit 1 Electrical Maintenance

D. James, Acting Director, Nuclear Safety l

! J. Kowalewski, Unit 1 System Engineering Manager i

R. Lane, Design Engineering Director

~ J. Vandergrift, Nuclear Safety Director

R. Walters, Unit 1 Assistant Operations Manager

H. Williams, Plant Security Superintendent

C. Zimmerman, Unit 1 Plant Manager i

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l INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

iP 61726: ' Surveillance Observations

IP 62707: Maintenance Observations

IP 71707: Plant Operations

IP 71750: Plant Support Activities

i IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports

IP 92901: Followup - Operations

IP 92903: Followup - Engineering

IP 93702: Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors

ITEMS CLOSED

50-368/9509-01 VIO Lack of Temporary Modification for Connecting Shutdown

Cooling Heat Exchanger Service Water Drains

(Section 08.2)

50-313/96-005-01 LER Surveillance Testing of Plant Protection System and

Postaccident Monitoring instrumentation (Section M8.2)

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50-368/96-010 LER Inadequate Procedure Revision Resulted in Not Having i

Tested the Reactor Protection System High Temperature !

Trip Function as Required by Technical Specifications !

(Section M8.1) l

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50-313/9701-01 IFl Administrative Control of Containment Penetration Vent 1

and Drain Line Valves (Section. 08.1) l

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ALARA as low as is reasonably achievable

EDG emergency diesel generator

IFl inspection followup item

JO job order

LER licensee e /ent report

P&lD piping and instrumentation diagram

RVLMS reactor vessel level monitoring system

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ML20153H246

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