ML20154L992

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Provides Draft Exam Matls for Plant Senior Reactor Upgrade Exam,Scheduled for 980601
ML20154L992
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 02/27/1998
From: Chitwood G
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To: Bundy H
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML20154L930 List:
References
NUDOCS 9810200134
Download: ML20154L992 (84)


Text

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) S' te 2/27/98,1997 Mr. Howard Bundy, ChiefExaminer U. S.NuclearRegulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-8064 To: Mr. Howard Bundy

Subject:

South Texas Pmject Initial License Examination Scheduled for June 1,1998 This letter is accompanying the Draft Examination Materials for the South Texas Project Senior Reactor Upgrade Examination scheduled for June 01,1998.

Two copies of all the examination materials are provided. One copy is for the public document room and the other copy is for your review purposes. The review copy also includes the necessary reference materials to facilitate your exam review.

Additionally the updated examination outline materials necessary to respond to previous outline comments are included.

None of these materials are to go to the public records until after the examination has been completed.

Please call me at (512)972-7241 or at gschitwood@stpegs.com ifyou have any questions.

Sincerely,

. J Greg S. Chitwood -

Exammation Lead South Texas Project Nuclear Training Department 8

9810200134 981009 F PDR ADOCK 05000498 v PDR ,

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w NRC EXAM SCHEDULE - SCUTH TEXAS UPGRADE EXAMS, 6/1/98 DAY / EVENTS TIME CANDIDATES EVALUATORS VALIDA N TIMES MONDAY 6/1 Briefing N/A N/A N/A N/A Badging Plant Tour r-TUESDAY 6/2 0700 - 1000 Mike Schaefer lHoward Bundy JPM 1 - 55 min ***

. Kelly Teague Evaluator 2 JPM 2 - 50 min ***

Simulator JPMs (2) JPM A1 - 15 min Admin JPMs (3) 1000 - 1300 Pete Lara Howard Bundy JPM A2 - 15 min Lu DeLaGarza Evaluator 2 JPM A3 - 10 min 1400 - 1700 David Klaus Howard Bundy a -

mn g Bill Morris Evaluator 2 Y/EDNESDAY 6/3 0700 - 1000 Mike Schaefer (Unit 1) Howard Bundy JPM 4* - 40 min ***

Kelly Teague (Unit 2) Evaluator 2 JPM 3* - 45 min ***

In-Plant JPMs (3) JPM 5* - 45 min ***

Admin JPMs (2) 1000 - 1300 Pete Lara (Unit 1) Howard Bundy JPM A4 - 10 min Lu DeLaGarza (Unit 2) Evaluator 2 JPM AS - 10 min 1400 - 1700 David Klaus (Unit 1) Howard Bundy Total - 2hr 30 min

[ Bill Morris (Unit 2) Evaluator 2 THURSDAY 6/4 0700 - 1230 Mike Schaefer Howard Bundy Scen 1 - 1hr 50 min **

. Kelly Teague Evaluator 2 Scen 2 - 1hr 50 min **

Dynamic Scenarios Scen 3 - 1hr 50 min **

Exit Meeting 91800 Pete Lara Howard Bundy Total - Shr 30 min 1230 - 1800 Lu DeLaGarza Evaluator 2 David Klaus Howard Bundy Bill Morris Evaluator 2 Notes:

In-plant JPMs to be performed in the order listed. To avoid overlap while performing In-plant JPMs one candidate will perform JPMs in Unit one and the other in Unit 2.

    • Each simulator time includes 15 minutes turnover time, 10 minutes machine setup time, and approximately 10 minutes conservatism. l
      • Each system related JPM time includes 30 minutes for associated questions rev. O l
s. . . . . .

South Texas Upgrade Exam 6/1/98 Outline Comments and Resolutions l l

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JMi-p5-98 H0N 10iSl' ^ ^ DRS Hall R00H ' FAH078608212 P. 02- ~ ^ ^

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1 CHIEF EXAMINER OUTI.INE COMMENTS - SOUTH TEXAS 6/1/98 WRIITEN t =

How does KA 000076AK3.05 relate to 10CFR55.43(b)(6)?

4 How do KAs C00055EK3.02, OOOOS6AK3.02, and 000009EK3.21 relate to 10CFR55.43('a)(2)? They appear to involve EOPs, not Technical Specifications.

ADMINISTRATIVE topic OUTLINE Replace JPM A4 tbr the following reasons: 1) The SRO can not authorize the release; therefore this JPM does not have a high enough importance rating.

2) Because it was used on the last exam, it would not be unexpected for the applicants to prepare for this task.

WALKTHROUGH OUTLINE Which one of the Subcategory B.1 tasks involves an engineered safety feature? At I least one of these tasks must relate to an ESF and should be so designated on the l outline.

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  • For JPM 4, Question "a," avoid Technical Specifications questions which do not test system knowledge.
  • As described, it appears that JPM 5 applies to Safety Function 1. This would result in JPMs 4 and 5 applying to the same safety function. Each task must apply to a ut.lque safety function. Question "a" is not appropriate for a systems task. For Question "b" avoid Technical Specifications questions which do not test system knowledge.

SCENARIOS GENERAL Complete Forms ES-301-5 and ES-301-6 for applicants only in SRO position. An -

examiner will not be assigned to specific applicants in the RO/ BOP positions.

However, where there are actions for the RO/ BOP, they should be covered in detail on Form ES-D-2 to assist in performing a top level evaluation.

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  • We recommend validation of timing for specific malfunctions to assist in estimating an overall time line for each scenario.
  • It will be necessary to develop a backup scenario. .

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South Texas Project Outline Changes and Comment j Resolutions Summary l

, l l Written i i e K/A 00076AK3.0510CFR55.43(b) designator changed from (6) to (2).

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l e The 10CFR55.43 designators for K/A 000055EK3.02,000056AK3.02, and i 000009EK3.21 changed from (2) to (5).

l e Changed K/A W/E12 EL2_2 changed to EK3.1. Also added a 10CFR55.43(b) i designator of(6) for EK3.1. 1 l

Administrative Topic Outline 1

. JPM A4 - In accordance with procedure PSP 07-WL-0005, Liquid Waste Batch Tank Release step 5.2.53 the Shift Supervisor does approve liquid radwaste releases. This is also a task performed by the Senior Reactor Operator in accordance with our current task list. It was planned to revise the JPM to incorporate errors of a different nature than those on the last exam however, based on the second comment the JPM l was removed from the outline. This JPM was replaced with a new JPM titled l l ~ Determine Unit Vent Radiation Monitor Operability Requirements".

Walkthroueh Outline

! e JPM 3 " Place a Class 1E 125 VDC Battery Charger in Service" and JPM 4 " Restore l

l Power to an Accumulator Isolation Valve" apply to ESF Systems. While not required j as a type code in accordance with fonn ES-301-2 an ESF type code has been added to i l the Walkthrough Test Outline. JPM 3 and JPM 4 identified as ESF System related on the outline.

I e JPM 4 was replaced, thus new question K/As were required. The replacement K/As

! do not involve Technical Specifications.

  • To ensure Safety Functions are not repeated JPM 4 was replaced with a JPM titled l- " Restore Power to Accumulator Isolation Valves" which is an ECCS System and
applies to Safety Function II. Feedback was received after the outline was initially approved indicating that there is no overlap allowed from previous examinations in .

the area of operating JPMs. Based on this feedback, JPM 5 replaced with a new JPM titled " Add Chemicals to the Reactor Coolant System. This JPM falls under safety function I as did the previous JPM. JPM S question "a" and "b" K/As revised to reflect system related K/As.

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.. - . . . _ - . - . . - - . . . - .- .. . -... - - .- . - ._ .- ~ .. - - ._ .-

Scenarios e Form ES-301-6 revised to reflect event numbers only for those scenarios in which the candidate is in the SRO position. A revision of form ES-301-5 was not required. The information on form ES-301-5 is applicable as submitted since the event numbers still i apply when considering the candidate only in the SRO position. When submitted as part of the draft examination materials the ES-D-2 forms will reflect the actions for all control room positions.

. A table describing the timing for specific malfunctions has been added to the simulator scenario documents based on operator reponse times recorded during scenario validations.

  • A backup scenario has been developed as requested.

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l Changes made based on utility identified items identified while developing examination materials.

Written Examination Outlin_g ES-401-3 Revised Tier 1/ Group 1 K2 and K3 category totals to reflect actual totals.

! Changed Tier 2/ Group 1,004 Chemical and Volume Control System j second entry K/A from "K/O oper implications of O2 control and CVCS" l

to "K/O effects of CVCS malfunctions on RCPs". Also changed from category K5 to K3 and updated respective column totals for columns K3 and K5 and updated the cover page.

Changed Tier 1/ Group 1,003 Dropped Control Rod K/A from A201 to i

A105. Updated the totals for this column on this page and on the cover page.

l Made the following corrections to the 10 CFR 55.43 designations:

Tier 1/ Group 1 Added reference (5) to 00024 Changed reference (6) to reference (5) on 00040 Added reference (5) to 00062 Added reference (5) to 00068 Tier 1/ Group 2 l

l Added reference (5) to 00061 l  !

l Tier 2/ Group 1 Added reference (5) to 001 K5.04 Added reference (4) to 068 Generic Tier 2/ Group 2 Added reference (5) to 033 l Added reference (7) to 034 i

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e Written Examination Outline (continued)

ES-401-5  ;

K/A# 2.1.33 topic verbiage revised to correct grammatical error. l Made the following corrections to the 10 CFR 55.43 designations:

Conduct of Ops - deleted 10 CFR 55.43 designation on 2.1.13 Radiation Control - deleted 10CFR 55.43 designation on 2.3.9 Emergency Procedures and E-Plan - added 10 CFR 55.43 reference (5) to 2.4.18 and reference (1) to 2.4.26 The followine materials to suonort the resolutions described above are attached:

e Form ES-401-3, Revision 1 (all pages) e Form ES-401-5, Revision 1

  • Backup Scenario Outline, Revision 0

. Pages 17 and 37 of procedure OPSP07-WL-0005, Liquid Waste Tank Batch Effluent Release l

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Revision 1 ES-401 PWR SRO Examination Outline Form ES-401-3 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: 6/1/98 Exam Level: SRO K/A Category Points Tier Group Point K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G Total

1. 1 3 2 10 hhh hh hjk 4 4 hg{ h 1 24 normal 2 1 3 3 hh ki$ Uh 2 6 @ hh 1 16 Plant Evolutions 3 1 0 2 hh-hk hk 0 0 h k 0 3 Totals 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 4 2 1 1 1 19 2.

2 1 0 1 4 2 1 1 3 0 3 1 17 Plant Systems 3 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 Tier 5 1 3 5 6 2 5 6 1 4 2 40 Totals

3. Generic Knowledge and Cat 1 Cat 2 Cat 3 Cat 4 Abilities 17 5 4 3 5 Note: 0 Attempt to distribute topics among all K/A categories; select at least one topic from every K/A category within each tier.

8 Actual point totals must match those specified in the table.

6 Select topics from many systems; avoid selecting more than two or three K/A topics from a given system unless they relate to plant-specific priorities.

l 0 Systems / evolutions within each group are identified on the i

associated outline.

8 The shaded areas are not applicable to the category / tier.

23 of 39 NUREG-1021 Interim Rev. 8, January 1997 i

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Revision 1 ES-401 PWR SRO Esandnetton Outline Form ES401-3 Emergency and Atmormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Croup 1 E/ APE 81 feame f Safety Function 10CFR K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G K/A Topicts) Imp. Pts 55.43 (bt 000001 C,... . Red Withdreweli1 A22 K/O opee Img4cetions of continuous rod withd.2wal and Dette Fhrs 36 ,

000003 Dropped Control Red f I A05 Monitor the fonowing as they appey to dropped conteel red: Rm power - Turbine power 4.1 000005Inoperstde$tuch Control Rod fI 82) A04 K/0 reason for Tech Spee llentes for inoperebae rods 4.1 000005 Inoperable /Stuct Controllied f I A06 E!O reason for actions contained b EOP for hoperable'stuch conteel red 42 000011Large Break tOCA 1In E12 K/O reason for actions contained in EOP for emergency LCCA (terne break) 46 000011Laege Broek LOCA f ni (5) Ett Operate /monitee the long teem cooang of the core fosowing a Isege breat LOCA 4.2 WY04 LOCA Outside Coat '  : 1In E1 K!O he _. . - - . .s between LOCA outside containment and .

s, functions of 3.9 contret end safety systems 1 etion, signees heerlocts. aure/ features W T02 St Terminatina f IN E2 K/0 oper Impecations of normal, abnormal and emeeg procedures associated w/St termination 3.9 000015/17RCP Matfunctions 7 tv A10 Determine / interpret when to secure RCPs on loss of coo 9ng or seat hjection 3.7 E3 Operate /monitet for desked results during natural cire wkh steam veld in vessel 3.7 BWT09: CE/A13:W T09&tE10) Natural Ckc.1 N 000024Erneegency Beretion f I (H A02 K/O the reasons for actions contained in EOP for emergency beration 44 000026Less of Component Coenne Water i VIN A03 K/0 oper bnp5cetions of guidance eetione contained la EOP for loss of CCW 4.2 000029 Anticipated Transient wfo Screm iI L12 K/0 the reasons foe actione contained in EOP for ATWS 4.7 000040 (BW.T05: CEM05: WT121 Steam the ISD E1 K/O the seasons for facility operating characteristics includseg reactivity changes and 3.9 Rupture - Encessive Hoet TrensTor --s iIV operating Emmettoees es oppted to Uncontro5ed Depeoesuriertion se S/O.

CE/A11: WTOB RCS OvercooEng - PTS f IV E2 K/0 the reasons for normal. etmormal and emers _s associated with PTS 40 0000511oss of Condenser Vacuum f IV A02 r Determine 4nterpret conditions esquiring reactor eurbine trip on toss of condeneer wecuum 4.1 000055 Station Stockout f VI (5) E02 K/O the reasons for actione contained in EOP for lose of offsite end ensive power 4.6 0000ti7 toes of Vital AC Elec. Inst. Bus F VI Aos Operatewonitor man control when auto controlle lost after loss of vivas AC beteumont bus 3.5 009062 tese of Nuclear Ogrvlee Water f IV (5) A02 Deeseminer1nterpret the cause of possilde CCW tess 36 000067 Plant Fke On-sne 1(X A01 K/0 oper implication of fire elassificortion es appmed to plent fire on site 3.9 000067Plent Fke On-site f tX ATS Deteemineinterpret vital eqisip and control systems to be maintained /oper during a fire 4.0 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evoc. 7 Vtti (5) X 2.4.40: K/O SRO's responsibalties in emergency pion * :etion 4.0 000074 (W T06&E07) Oned. Core Cooling i TV E04 K r0 Int _. _ ' e between HHSt pumps and i to core cooling 4.1 000076High Reactor Coolent Activity 1IX (2) A05 E!O the esecons for corrective actione et e result of high Resion p educt activity in RCS 36 K/A Category Totals: 3 2 10 4 4 1 Group Point Total: 24 (2A) (2El (5Al (2A) (4A)

(1E) (SE) 12Et

_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ . . . _ . _ . _-.______r_ _ _ - . _ . . _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . ____ _ _ _ _ _

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PWR SRO E Ouenas -

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_ and Atmosenes plant Evehfilone - Yler 1/ Gross 2 E/ APE F f 80msne i Sology Puneeen 10CFR K1 K2 K3. A1 A2 'O KIA Tapestol hup. Pee

, 55.43 00000710W/E024E10: MJE02) Reacter Tety - 15) E02 DeseW the proper scalone to be taken N the h satsey funcelone have noe 4.8

'} SeehAmeelen - Itseovery i f taken 30ses

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000000 Peensuriner Veser Ssees Aseedent 7 W _

P2R tavat hadcotore es they ensly to e PZIt wager space N 3J 000009 Susee Oseek LOCA f M (5) E21 K/O the seasons for the h eeneshood he EOP for eeue hoseh LOCA/Isoli 4.5

- Depsees. f N E2 'U WWlEOS: WAE03 LOCA e- ad- K/O.e.per kupeeselene of.sess.ened, ohnennel, procedesee ^wiOCA 4.1 W!E11 Lees of - . , h Rocke. f N E1 K/O huesneesteens hoeween Laos of ennese emetent socire esse essop, festettene of conesel and 3.9 seauty synemens, humuu. sW, buseseeche, and outeaquenest fasesses 000022 Lees of Itsecese Coahnt RAshaus f B A02 & "

shesubes piens prehtones as ther essly es teos of someter emetent euehene 3.7 000025 Lees of RHel Sysenne i N A09 e__ LMOS sense swetches enuneeer, mesh press and Row h 3.1 000032 Lees of Source Itange Nt i Vu A04 Deeenednedhitempset emelefactory . l ' sesege ovestep me k appens to less 3.5 et senses senso nascesor -

000030 Steene Gesnermeer Tubs lhoense f M E15 7 . the press at wtdeh to meninesin RCS dustes S/G C/D femmeshes e SGTR 4.4 000054 (CEMOS) Lees of tanks Feedweser i N A04 r -

-proper eser of AFW pesuse and vesses foAnwhen a teos of RNw 4.3 SW/E04: WJE05 Inadegseen Heat Trenefer - Loss of E2 ' E!O i . _. . hetween Lees of seeendary heat sink and pehmery esehnt, einess coetent. 4.2 j SecondaryWShh iIV decer heet senessed eyesents, and IIee proper eger of IItese sysannes 000050 Lees of DC Power i VI Act K10 the seasons ter use of DC eeneret power by OfGo se k eggene to a teos of DC power 3.7 000000 Accideneet h Redwesee ReL f IX A02 IUO of - between Aun Wide veneAmeen myseese and gaseous redwesee 3.1 setense 000001ARRA Svetesu Alanno f Vu (5) A02 Kf0 the reasons for geldesses cesseekend he eterme sessamme for AfMS ersessa 38 W!E16 lee n e Itsameten f IX E3 Opereenlanentier deelred seesdte during ohnennetrasserg eleuselens for high 3.3 '

vedeselon 000085 Less of - Air i Vul X 2.1.23: Performe specific sysessa and ineagresed plant precedenes dushes ad esodos of plant 4.0 emesselen r

KIA Category Pohet Teemas: 1 3 3 2 6 1 Group Pebst Total: 16 (1El Ital (2A) IIA) I4Al (2E) (1E) t1El (2E) t

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Revision 1 ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-5 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: 6/1/98 Exam Level. SRO Category K/A # ggCFg Topic Imp. Pts (b) 2.1.10 (1) K/O condit:.ons/ limitations in the 3.9 facility 1: cense Conduct of 2.1.11 (2) K/O <1 hour T.S. action statements 3.8 Operations 2.1.13 K/O facility rea. for controlling 2.9 vital / controlled access 2.1.29 K/O how to conduct / verify valve 3.3 lineues 2.1.33 (2) Ability to recognize entry level 4.0 conditions to T.S.

Total 5 2.2.7 (3) K/0 rocess for conducting 3.2 testp/' exceriment not described in FSAR 2.2.13 K/O tacaina and clearance orocedures 3.8 bS.Nt!$$ 2.2,22 (2) K/O LCOs and safety limits 4.1 2.2.31 (7) K/O SRO fuel handling responsibilities 3.8

_ Total 4 2.3.1 (4) K/O 10CFR20 and facility radiation 3.0 control recuirements 2.3.2 (4) K/O facility ALARA program 2.9 Control 2.3.9 K/O process for performing a 3.4 containment ource Total 3 2.4.18 (5) K/O specific bases for EOPs 3.6 2.4.21 (5) K/O parameters / logics used to assess 4.3 the status of safety functions Emergency Procedures 2.4.26 (1) 3.3 and Plan K/O fire facility brigadeprotection regingincluding and fire fight eauipment usaae 2.4.40 (5) K/O SRO's resoonsibility in emergency clan implementation 4.0 2.4.44 (5) K/O emeraency plan protective action 4.0 recommendations Total 5 Tier 3 Target Point Total (SRO) 17 l- -

_. . . . . . _ _ . . - _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ . . . ~ . . ._ _.. ._ _ . _. _.. . _ _ _

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 l

l Facility: South Texas Project Date of Examination: 06/01/98

! Examination Level: SRO Operating Test Number: 1 l Administrative Describe method of evaluation:

l Topic / Subject ONE Administrative JPM Description l

A.1 Conduct of K/A: 2.1.3[3.4]K/O Shift turnover practices >

Operations JPM TITLE: Review Control Room Logs (JPM A1)

Conduct of K/A: 2.1.33[4.0] Ability to recognize indications for system Operations operating parameters .which are entry level conditions for L

Tech Specs.

JPM TITLE: Review Esv Power Availibility Surveillance Results (JPM A2)

A.2 Equipment K/A: 2.2.13[3.8]K/O tagging and clearance procedures Control JPM TITLE: Review a Faulted Tagout (JPM A3) l~ A.3 Radiation K/A: 2.3.11[3.2] Ability to Control Radiation Releases Control JPM TITLE: Determine Unit Vent Radiation Monitor Operability Requirements (JPM A4)

A.4 Emergency K/A: 2.4.44[4.0]K/O E-Plan protective action Plan recommendations JPM TITLE: Determine Emergency Action levels (JPM A5) l Rev 1 t

i i

i NUREG-1021 1 of 26 Interim Rev. 8. January 1997 1

l'*

l m-3ul manviaual walt-urougn Test vuume vorm m-3ul-z ,

Facility: South Texas Project Date of Examination: 06/01/98 l l Exam level: SRO(U) Operating Test No.: 1 l t-System / JPM Title / Type Safety Planned Follow-up Questions:

Codes

  • Function K/A/G -Importance - Description  !

l  !

IV

1. Residual Heat Removal. a. APE 025AA101 [3.7] Ability to  ;

Shift RHR Trains. monitor heatup rates during loss of i (S)(M)(A)(L) RHR.

! b. 004000A413 [2.9] Ability to monitor  ;

! VCT level control.

l l' 2. PZR Relief Tank. V a. 026000K408 [4.3] Knowledge of Feed and Bleed the Pressurizer interlocks which provide auto swapover l Relief Tank. for recirc phase.

(S)(D)

b. 028000A201 [3.6] Ability to monitor l changes in parameters including H2 Recombiner power setting. )
3. Electrical,125 VDC VI a. 062000K405 [3.2] Knowledge of AC l Class IE. distribution system interlocks which Place a Class IE 125 VDC provide for paralleling of AC sources.

8

b. 063000K302 [3.7] Knowledge of N) E effects of a loss of DC on components using DC power. l
4. Emergency Core Cooling II a. 006000K409 [4.2] Knowledge of i

System ECCS interlocks which provide for Restore Power to Accumulator valve positioning on SI signal.

l

Isolation Valves.
b. 006000A113 [3.7] Ability to predict MXA)M and monitor changes m accumulator 4 parameters to prevent exceeding limits.
5. Chemical Volume Control I a. 004000A208 [3.7] Ability to predict System. impacts of loss of heat tracing.

Add Chemicals to the RCS.

b. 004000A407 [3.7] Ability to monitor (P)(N)(R) boration.
  • Type Codes: (D)1 rect from bank. (M)odified from bank, (N)ew. (A)lternate path. (C)ontrol room, (S)1mulator. (L)ow-Power. (P)lant. (R)CA (E)SF Rev I NUREG-1021 1 of 26 Interim Rev. 8. January 1997 l

l

1 I

ES-301 Competencies Checklist _

Form ES-301-6 l South Texas Project Exam 6/01/98 i

l Applicant Applicant Applicant l

  1. U1/U4 #U2/US #U3/U6 l SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U  !

Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Understand and Interpret 2 2 2 Annunciators and Alarms l

Diagnose Events 4 2 3 i and Conditions .

Understand Plant 3 3 3 l and System Response Comply With and 1 1 1 Use Procedures (1)

Operate Control l Boards (2)

L Communicate and 5 3 4 l Interact With the Crew Demonstrate Supervisory 4 5 4 Ability (3)

Comply With and 2 2 2 Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an R0.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.  :

l. (3) Only applicable to SR0s.

l .

Rev 1 l 1istructions: l Circle the applicant's license type and enter the event numbers that. test the competencyforfachse ario in the set.

t Author: Mx gj'

/ '7 ff i i Chief Examiner: v i '

NUREG-1021 1 of 26 Interim Rev. 8 January 1997

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 i

Faellity: South Texas Project Scenario No.: Backup Scenario Op-Test No.: N/A Objectives: Provide a backup scenario to be used as necessary to evaluate performance in the event competency areas or event types are not adequately addressed during the performance of scheduled scenario sessions. The crew's ability to diagnose RCS leakage rates and take appropriate actions based on the leakrate will be evaluated. The crew's ability to monitor the operation of plant systems and take necessary corrective actions will be evaluated during a failure of an ECW pump to start and during a failure of Source Range Nls to energize.

Initial Conditions: 100% power, 8,000 MWD /M1U Turnover: The Unit is at 100% power. Upon takmg the shift the crew is to start Ccatrifugal Charging Pump IB and Secure Centrifugal Charging Pump IB and secure Centrifugal Charging Pump 1 A to allow Engineering to take vibration rnessurements on Centrifugal Charging Pump 1B.

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Typc* Description 1 N/A N Shift Operating Centrifugal Charging Pumps 2 2 18-1 I Pressurizer Level Control fails high when CVCS parameters have a stabilized after CCP swap. ,

l 3 4-1-2 C CCW Pump IB trips after the crew has addressed Tech Specs for the l level control failure.

4 2-4-1 M Small Break LOCA on the Rx Vessel Head Vent. Escalating to 210 ,

gpm over a 7 minute period after CCW param?ters have stabilized. '

5 4 9-3 C Train C ECW Pump hils to start on Safety injection signal.

1-35-2 C Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrument Channel 36 is undercompensated. i 1

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor. All event types apply only to the SRO l position.  ;

Rev 0

. 1 OPSP07-WL-0005 Rev. 7 Page 17 of 45 Liquid Waste Tank Batch Effluent Release

  • 5.2.48 Divide the Monitor Background recorded in Step 5.2.46 by the Conversion Factor recorded in Step 5.2.47. Record the result in cpm on Release Data Sheet.

CAUTION RM-11 keyboard response is slow. ENSURE correct values are entered. (SPR-0310) 5.2.49 IF at any time all RM-11 printers are inoperable, write the appropriate " changed to" values in the remarks section of Release Data Sheet vice attaching printouts to the package.

5.2.50 Change the channel items, as necessary, to the values specified in Step 5.2.39 and the background value calculated in 5.2.48 using Addendum 2 for guidance as necessary. Alert and High Alarm Setpoints (items 9 and 10) are set to the same values in each channel. Obtain a printout of the channel-items and verify caly the desired setpoint values were changed. Label the printout " changed to" and include it with the package. Record initials and datdtime on Release Data Sheet. (SPR 92-0310) 5.2.51 Independently verify setpoints, conversion factor, and background values are correct. Independent Verification may be perfonned by reviewing the attached printout of the " changed to" ChannelItems or Alarm Histories. Record initial and datdtime on Release Data Sheet . (SPR 92-0191) 5.2.52 The CTS SHALL review and sign the Prerelease Permit. ENSURE Chemistry Division Manager permission is obtained prior to release of WMT/rDS Tank to the OC system if the CW system is NOT operating (in the affected unit).

Record the datdtime and initials on the Release Data Sheet.

5.2.53 Route the Package to the Shift Supervisor for approval of discharge and that RT-8038 status verified operable, orif RT-8038 verified inoperable that Steps 5.2.41.1 through 5.2.41.3 have been completed. The Shift Supervisor (upon approval) SHALL record the datdtime and initials on the Release Data Sheet.

5.2.54 Route the Release Package to Operations.

5.3 Operations SHALL perform the following.

5.3.1 After receiving the release package, verify CW or OC flow meets or exceeds the flow rate recorded in Step 5.2.21 and record datdtime and initials on Release Data Sheet.

m ,

l l OPSP07-WL-0005 Rev. 7 Page 37 of 45 Liquid Waste Tank Batch Efiluent Release w  !

Form 2 Release Data Sheet Page 2 of s DATA PACKAGE PAGE ~ of~

PERMITNUMBER TANK 5.2.39 Prerelease Permit Setpoint ~

(1/2WL138 Item 9 & 10) MSI uCi/ml

)

(1/2WL238 Item 9 & 10) MS2 uCi/sec l

' Effective Gain-EMS Calculated I

(Conversion Factor) j (1/2WL138 Item 11) uCi/ml/ cpm i Exp. Monitor Response EMR uCi/ml

/  !

Chem. Initials Date Mme j 5.2.40.1 5.2.40.2 Souwe check satisfactory /

Chem. Initials Date Mme 5.2.44 Setpoints changed /" changed to" printout attached or" changed to" valaes" annotated in remarks I section of Data sheet. Chem. Date Mme 5.2.45 Independently verified by /

Chem. Initials Date Mme 1

5.2.46 Monitor background (MB) uCi/ml 5.2.47 Scaling Conversion Factor _ uCi/ml/ cpm (Item 11)(CF) 5.2.48 Background in cpm cpm (Item 13)(MB/CF) 5.2.50 Setpoints changed /" changed to" printout attached or" changed to  !

values" annotated in remarks /

section of Data sheet. Chem. Date Mme 5.2.51 Independently verified by /

Chem. Initials Date Mme

'5.2.52 Chemistry Technician Supervisnr /

CTS Initials Date Mme 5.2.53 Shift Supervisor approval for discharge

and that RT8038 status verified operable, or if RT8038 verified inoperable that Steps 5.2.41.1 i through 5.2.41.3 have been /

l completed. SS Initials Date / Time l

l l

t

, a ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 l South Texas Proiect 6/01/98 Exam .  !

l OPERATING TEST NO.: 1 l

l Applicant Evolution Minimum Scenario Number Type Type Number  !

1 2 3 4 ]

l Reacti'vity 1 l l-Normal 1 R0 Instrument 2 l Component 2 Major 1 Reactivity 1 Normal 0 As R0 Instrument 1 j Component 1 1

Ma.ior 1 SRO-I Reactivity 0 .

r Normal 1 As SRO Instrument 1 Component 1 Major 1 I' Reactivity 0 l

Normal 1 1 1 1 SRO-U Instrument 1 2 2.5 2 Component 1 3.! .6 3.6 3.4.6 Major 1 4 4 5 Rev 0 Instructions: (1) Enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each evolution type.

(2) Reactivity manipulations t be i 11f ant as defined in Appendix D.

L Author: h/lkh A. Mtf /tht/# l Chief Examiner: h[

i-NUREG-1021 1 of 26 Interim Rev. 8. January 1997 l-l

r l,,-

t ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 South Texas Project Exam 6/01/98 l Applicant Applicant Applicant l #U1/U4 #U2/US #U3/U6 i SRO-U SRO-U- SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 -4 1 2 3 4 f Understand and Interpret. 2 2 2 Annunciators and Alarms

! Diagnose Events 4 2 3 and Conditions Understand Plant 3 3 3.

and System Response Comply With and 1 -1 -1 Use Procedures (1)

Operate Control Boards (2)

, Communicate and 5 3 4 l Interact With the Crew Demonstrate Supervisory 4 5 4 Ability (3)'

Comply With and 2 2 2 Use Tech. Specs. (3).

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an R0.

(2) Optional for ~an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SR0s.

Rev 1 Instructions:

Circle the applicant's license type and enter the event numbers that test the competencyforfachse ario in the set.

Author:

N

/ll.dw ~

// /

f[

l . Chief Examiner: -

NUREG-l'021 1 of 26 Interim Rev. 8. January 1997 L

- _ . - ..- .- ._ - . _ - - . _ _ . . . . _ . . . - . . . _ _ . . . - - = . - - . . . - - - . . - .

OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 1 PAGE 10F 15 '

t .

INITIAL LICENSE EXAM OPERATING TEST 1 i

SCENARIO 1 i

l l JUNE 1,1998 Revision 0 i

l l

l l

l

OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO I PAGE 2 OF 15 i SCENARIO OUTLINE l Facility: South Texas Project Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 1 l Session 1 Examiners: El evaluating Mike Schaefer Operators: SRO-Mike Schaefer RO-Kelly Teague BOP-Pete Lara Session 2 Examiners: E2 evaluating Lu DeLaGarza Oxrators: SRO-Lu DeLaGarza RO-David Klaus l BOP-Bill Morris Objectives: Evaluate the Unit Supervisor's decision making ability during escalating steam generator tube i leakage. He crew's ability to protect plant personnel and the public during a release of radioactive materials due to a ruptured and faulted steam generator will also be evaluated. Familiarity with the EOPs including the User's Guide will also be evaluated due to the procedural transition demands during a ruptured i and faulted steam generator. His scenario is designed to evaluate the crew's ability to respond to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture with a containment bypass due to the safety leaking by since this event is the top ranking core damage sequence in accordance with the site specific Probabilistic Risk Assessment.

Initial Conditions: 25% power, 8,000 MWD /MTU Turnover: ne Unit is at 25% power, POP 03-ZG-0005 step 7.11.8, starting up shortly after an unplanned trip. maintaining power until chemistry levels are acceptable for power increase. Start CCW Pump 1 A and j secure CCW Pump IB to allow vibration checks to be performed. Essential Cooling Water Pump IB should remain in service. Bank 1 Steam Dump Valve PV 7493 has been manually isolated due to excessive seat leakage.

l Event Malf. No. Event Event Description l No. & Type * &

l (Value) Timing 1 N/A N Shift Operating CCW Pumps.

, 2 1 38-2 I Power Range NI-42 fails low after CCW Pump 1 A secured or after l

(True) 11 minutes.

3 8-23-2 C Condensate Pump #12 trips after l&C contacted to trip bistables

[ (True) based on NI failure or after 13 minutes.

4 5-3-2 M Steam Generator B tube leakage escaladng value to Safety injection (0 to .35) required leak rate after the Steam Generator Feed Pump Seal Water l 7 min ramp DP alarms clear or after 8 minutes. Design Basis Accident leakage l then (.9) rate immediately after the reactor is tripped.

5 5-4-2 C Safety on ruptured SG B leakage after the Rx is tripped.

(.05) 6 Rose C Charging line OCIV fails to close upon receipt of a Safety injection BMP001 signal. The scenario is terminated after the crew has commenced

'25 the RCS cooldown in E030.

0) 1

{ (N)ormal, (R)cactivity, (1)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor. All event types apply only to the SRO position.

l l

l l

OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 1 PAGE 3 OF 15 SCENARIO MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION SIMULATOR BOOTH NOTES:

SIMULATOR SETUP

1. Reset to IC #4 and go to run.
2. Trigger Lesson Plan #11 under Lesson Plan Group NRC2
3. Hang a caution tag on Bank 1 Steam Dump Valve PV-7493 and slightly rotate the indicating lights so that the lights deenergize to identifying that it has been manually isolated due to excessive seat leakage.
4. Ensure breaker flags reflect current breaker alignment on CP-10 and CP-3.

EXPECTED BOOTH OPERATIONS

1. Autograph file "/cae/agraph/ data /jody/critscenl.agb.2" should load with lesson plan.

At the conclusion of the scenario print out the critical parameter trends from the autograph file.

2. Locally close CV-MOV-25 when dispatched to close locally by deleting the valve opening malfunction "BM-XCV-0025".

EXPECTED BOOTH COMMUNICATIONS

1. When Reactor Engineering contacted, report that flux maps can be performed.
2. When asked to check Condensate Pump #12, report that no apparent signs of damage at the pump, however there is an overcurrent flag at the pump.
2. Seven minutes after the reactor is tripped, report to the Control Room that steam is i issuing from the B Train IVC cubicle.

- - ~ _. ..

OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 1

~

PAGE 4 OF 15 1 SCENARIO MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION i l

SCENARIO TIME

SUMMARY

)

EVENT VALIDATION TIME FINAL TIME l

l Shift Operating CCW Pumps. I1 min 11 min l

Power Range NI-42 Fails law. 10 min (+3) 13 min Condensate Pump #12 Trips. 6 min (+2) 8 min Steam Generator B tube leakage escalating value to 48 min 47 min Safety injection required leak rate. Design Basis Accident leakage rate immediately after the reactor is tripped. The safety on ruptured Steam Generator B leakage and the charging line OCIV fails to close included in this event time.

TOTAL TIME 1 hr 19 min Notes: VALIDATION TIME reflects the actual event run time based on a " minimally adequate crew".

The numbers in parenthesis indicate a time cushion that is added to the validation time, where appropriate, to determine the FINAL TIME. This time cushion is added to ensure the crew has an opportunity to reach the desired point in the event. Malfunctions will be placed in pending and triggered at the times listed in the FINAL TIME column or at the discretion of the lead examiner.

CRITICAL PARAMETERS:

The following parameters may be of value in evaluating crew performance and should be placed in an Autograph file for recall when the scenario is completed:

Pressurizer I2 vel, LT455 Core Exit Thermocouple temperature AFW flow Train B SG B Narrow Range Ixvel Wide Range RCS Pressure Reactor Power OPERATOR ACTIONS TABLE NOTES:

I. Critical Tasks are indicated by "C" in the position column and indicated in bold type.

2. Actions required throughout the event are indicated as "(continuous)" in the position column.

i

3. Procedural entry points are indicated by shaded cells.

l I

OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 1 PAGE 5 0F 15 OPERATOR ACTIONS Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Shift Operating CCW Pumps. The primary operator will stan CCW pump 1A and secure IB.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notss SRO Directs the RO to start CCW pump 1A and secure IB per POP 02-CC-0001, Component Cooling Water operating procedure.

SRO Maintains cognizance of CCW pump evolution (continuous) while maintaining big picture of plant status.

RO Ensures that the CCW system is prepared for CCW pump start.

-Ensure CCW train A has been filled and vented Ensure CCW rad monitor aligned to only one CCW train

- Ensure CCW Pump 1A Supplementary Cooler is in auto

- Ensure ECW pump 1 A is running

- Ensuie all three CCW/ECW mode selector switches are in OFF

- Dispatches an operator to locally verify CCW pump 1 A ready for start RO Announces the stan of CCW Pump 1A ovdr the plant paging system.

RO Starts CCW Pump 1 A.

RO Ensures the CCW train A header isolation valves automatically open.

RO Verifies CCW parameters aEer pump start.

-Check header pressure > 80 psig

-Check flow between 7,500 and 15,000 gpm RO Ensures that the CCW system is aligned to support CCW pump stop.

- RHR equipment cooling not required

- Ensure CCW rad monitor aligned to operating CCW train

- Ensure all three CCW/ECW mode selector switches are in OFF

- Ensures flow and cooling requirements will be met when pump is secured l

l ..

OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 1 PAGE 6 OF 15 RO Secures CCW Pump 1B.

RO Verifies CCW parameters after pump stop.

-Check header pressure >80 psig

-Check flow between 7,500 and 15,000 gpm RO Places running CCW pumps mode selector switch in OFF or RUN and asks SRO if a non-running pump should be placed in STANDBY.

US Directs the positioning of the non-running CCW pump's mode selector switch.

RO Positions the non-running CCW pump's mode selector switch based on SRO direction.

RO Secure CCW Pump IB Supplementary Cooler

-I

! OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 1 I PAGE 7 OF 15 i OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont')

l

! Op-Test No.: 1- Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 i-Event

Description:

. Power Range NI-42 Fails Imw.

i

(

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes i RO Acknowledges and reports annunciator -

! 5M03-E2,- PR HI VOLT FAIL and references j anmmciator response procedure POP 09-AN-

[ 05M3.

RO/ BOP Accurately reports which power range channel 2 has failed.

} RO Ensures immediate action of POP 04-NI-0001, l Nuclear Instrument Malfunction are completed

[ by verifying the following:

i -Control rods are in manual 3 - Iow Power Feed Reg Valves not in i service l- SRO Enters procedure OPOPO4-NI 0001, and ensures i j' the immediate ' actions of POPO4-NI-0001;. )'

i Nuclear Instrument Malfunction have been l completed.

l SRO Directs the actions of POPO4-NI-0001, Nuclear 4 (continuous) Instrument Malfunction Addendum 3.

j RO/ BOP Maintains average coolant temperature at j (continuous) reference temperature 1*F using manual j control rod motion.

RO Ensures BOP is aware of responsibility to

] monitor the plant while RO and SRO bypassing

channel at CP011.

SRO/RO PERFORMS ACTIONS OF OPOPO4-NI-0001 C TO BYPASS THE FAILED CHANNEL ALL- Continue with the actions of POPO4-NI-0001, Nuclear Instrument Malfunction Addendum 3.

- Verify permissives in the proper state

- Select an operable power range channel on NI recorder

- Contact Rx Engineering to perform flux maps SRO Initiate Tech Spec 3.3.1 Table 3.3-1 Action 2.a required actions by ensuring I&C contacted to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

I

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 1 i EAGE 8 0F 15 i l OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont') $

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3

Event

Description:

Condensate Pump #12 Trips. )

i j j- Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes )

BOP. Acknowledges and announces annunciator q 9M01-A1, COND PMP TRIP.

] BOP Reports that condensate pump #12 has tripped.

s 1 i BOP Pulls out and reviews steps.in OPOP09-AN-'

09M1, Annunciator Lampbox 9M01 Response j Instructions, i BOP Recommends that an alternate condensate pump j be started.

1 SRO Determines that an additional condensate pump

] is required based on current plant conditions

and directs the BOP to start an alternate

] condensate pump. l

! RO/ BOP Dependent on plant conditions may make a l j plant announcement based on condensate pump {

j start.

. BOP Starts an alternate condensate pump and opens the respective condensate pump discharge j valve.

j BOP Monitors the condensate system to ensure )

[ (continuous) parameters return to normal.

- Condensate pump recire valve closes

! - Deaerator and hotwell levels return to j normal values t - Condensate flow returns to formal -l

- Low Pressure Heater Drip Pumps I SRO/ BOP Ensures a Plant Operator is dispatched to determine the cause of the condensate pump trip.

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  • l PAGE 9 OF 15 OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont')

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 '

Event

Description:

Steam Generator B tube leakage escalating value to Safety Injection required leak _

rate. Design Basis Accident leakage rate immediately after the reactor is tripped.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior . Notes RO/ BOP Acknowledges and announces radiation There is an approximately 2 monitoring alarms and begins an investigation minute delayfrom malfunction into possible tube leak. trigger until radiation monitor alarm comes in.

SRO Enters POP 04-RA-0001 based on radiation monitoring alarms.

SRO- Begins investigation of SG tube leakage by directing RO/ BOP to monitor RCS leakage and identify the affected SG.

RO/ BOP Identifies the affected SG.

SRO Dimets/ ensures operator actions.of OPOPO4-(continuous) RC-0004, Steam Generator Tube leakage.-

SRO/ BOP ENSURES BLOWDOWN IS ISOLATED C FROM SG B RO Control and monitor CVCS charging and letdown to maintain VCT level greater than 15% and pressurizer level greater than 17%

SRO Ensures that BOP /RO monitor and report status of pressurizer level, VCT level and SG B feed flow steam flow mismatch.

! SRO Direct performance of POP 03-ZG-0006, Plant l

Shutdown From 100% to Hot Standby, at i greater than or equal to .5%/ min concurrently with tube leak procedure.

SRO Ensures Chem Analysis, HP, and Chem Operations notified to carry out procedural j actions.

l ALL Makes a plant announcement concerning tube leakage on SG B.

OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO' 1 PAGE 10 OF 15 '

ALL MANUALLY INITIATES SI WHEN 'a C DIRECTED OR PRIOR TO PRESSURIZER LEVEL DECREASING TO < 17%.

SRO Ensures that the crew enters OPOP05-EO '

E000,' Reactor Trip or Safety Igjection. j RO/ BOP Completes immediate actions of EOOD, Reactor Trip /SI.

SRO Directs / ensures the immediate actions of EOOO,_

Reactor Trip /SI have been completed.

ALL Ensures RCPs are tripped if RCS pressure drops to less than 1495 psig.

SRO/ BOP ENSURES THAT AFW FLOW REMAINS C ISOLATED TO B SG WHILE SG LEVEL (continuous) > 14% NR.

SRO/ BOP May initiate a Main Steam Line Isolation j dependent on the value and trend of SG pressures approaching 735 psig.

ALL~ Completes the actions of E000 up to the EO20, see event #6 for Charging Faulted SG Isolation transition point. OCIVfailure.

ALL Monitors Critical Safety Functions upon exiting  ;

(continuous) EOOO. I SRO Transitions to EO20, Faulted SG Isolation and. .see event #5 for actions on directs RO/ BOP actions. failed open SG safety.

SRO- Transitions to EO30, SGTR based on SG -

Actions continuedfrom event i radiation abnormal. #5.

l BOP- Identifies Ruptured SG as SG B.

SRO DIRECTS / ENSURES THE FLOW FROM  !

C SG B IS ISOLATED. 1

--Adjusts SG PORV setpoint to 1260 -

l 1265

- Verifies blowdown isolated

- Closes SG MSIVs

BOP When directed in E030, adjusts SG B PORV setpoint to 1260 to 1265 psig and places the  :

, PORV in auto.

RO When directed restores instrument air to containment.

OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 1 PAGE 11 OF 15 SRO Verifies ruptured SG pressure is >426 psig and continues with EO30.

BOP Blocks the LOW STEAMLINE PRESSURE SI when RCS < 1985 psig.

ALL INITIATES RCS COOLDOWN TO _

C TEMPERATURE CORRESPONDING TO RUPTURED SG PRESSURE.

SRO/ BOP Initiate a cooldown at maximum rate.

- Target core exit temp determined by table corresponding to ruptured SG pressure.

- Steaming rate should be maximum available while avoiding a main steam isolation.

- If steam dumps used to perform cooldown, an unaffected SG PORV should be fully opened to substitute for the inoperable steam dump.

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 1 PAGE 12 0F 15 OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont')

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Safety leakage on ruptured Steam Generator 1B after the reactor is tripped.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes BOP Detennines SG B is faulted based on the following:

- SG B pressure decreasing

- ERFDADs indication of Safety open SRO Transitions to E020, Faulted SG Isolation, and directs RO/ BOP actions.

ALL Monitors the status of Critical Safety Functions when the crew transitions to OPOP05-EO-EO20.

SRO/ BOP Ensures that the AFW flow to SG B is isolated.

BOP /RO When directed, resets SI, SG LO-LO level AFW actuation, SG blowdown and sample isolation.

SRO Notifies Chemical Analysis to sample all SGs Operator actions continue at for activity, event #4.

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 1 l PAGE 13 OF 15 l OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont')

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

Charging line OCIV fails to close upon receipt of a Safety Injection signal. _

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes RO Report that the charging OCIV did not close upon receipt of a Containment Isolation signal based on " Fail to Actuate" light.

SRO/RO Directs the RO to attempt to close the charging OCIV using the control room handswitch.

SRO/RO Ensures a plant operator is dispatched to manually close the charging OCIV.

SRO Continues with the actions of EOOO. Continued under event #4

OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 1 PAGE 14 0F 15 l CRrflCAL TASK

SUMMARY

l j POSITION EXPECTED RESPONSE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA SAT /

UNSAT l

SRO/RO PERFORMS ACTIONS OF OPOPO4-NI- ACTIONS AT CP011 LISTED l C 0001 TO BYPASS THE FAILED IN ADDENDUM 3 OF POPO4-CHANNEL NI-0001 TO BYPASS NI CHANNEL 41 ARE l COMPLETED.

l SRO/ BOP ENSURES BLOWDOWN IS ISOLATED ENSURES BLOWDOWN IS C FROM SG B ISOLATED FROM SG B PRIOR TO EXITING EO30.

1 ALL MANUALLY INITIATES SI WHEN AN AUTOMATIC SI SIGNAL l C DIRECTED OR PRIOR TO IS NOT RECEIVED.

l PRESSURIZER LEVEL DECREASING TO < 17E SRO/ BOP ENSURES THAT AFW FLOW ENSURE AFW FLOW IS C REMAINS ISOLATED TO B SG WHILE ISOLATED TO SG B PRJOR SG LEVEL >14% NR. TO EXITING EO30.

SRO DIRECTS / ENSURES THE FLOW FROM ENSURES FLOW FROM SG B l

C SG B IS ISOLATED. IS ISOLATED PRIOR TO l EXITING EO30 BY PERFORMING THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

- ADJUSTS SG PORY

, SETPOINT TO 1260 -

l 1265 l - VERIFIES l l BLOWDOWN h ISOLATED ON SG B l

- CLOSES SG B MSIV ALL INITIATES RCS COOLDOWN TO INITIATES COOLDOWN OF C TEMPERATURE CORRESPONDING THE RCS AT MAXIMUM TO RUPTURED SG PRESSURE. RATE WHEN DIRECTED IN l EO30.

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I o l OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 1 PAGE 15 0F 15 TURNOVER INFORMATION l

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' l 25% Power, 8,000 MWD /MTU l i

Plant Startup in progress after an unplanned trip three days ago. Startup procedure POP 03-ZG-0005 Step 7.11.8 in progress. Maintaining the current power level until chemistry levels are acceptable for continued power increase.

Bank 1 Steam Dump Valve PV-7493 has been manually isolated due to excessive seat leakage.

Component Cooling Water Pump 1B is to be started and Component Cooling Water Pump 1A is to be l l secured. This will allow performance Technicians to perform vibration checks on Component Cooling Water Pump 1B later in the shift. Places Excess Letdown in service.

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O OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 2 PAGE 1 OF 15 l

l INITIAL LICENSE EXAM OPERATING TEST 1 SCENARIO 2 l

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 2 PAGE 2 OF 15 SCENARIO OUTLINE Facility: South Texas Project Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 1 Session I Examiners: E2 evaluating Kelly Teague Operators: SRO-Kelly Teague RO-Pete Lara BOP-Mike Schaefer Session 2 Examiners: El evaluating David Klaus Operators: SRO-David Klaus RO-Bill Morris BOP-Lu DeLaGarza Objectives: The Unit Supervisor's ability to protect plant personnel and the public is evaluated during a failure of the Containment Ventilation Isolation signal to isolate the Containment Supplemental Purge in progress. The ability to diagnose events is evaluated during a loss of a 4.16 KV ESF Bus which results in a loss of letdown. Familiarity with procedural immediate actions and the ability to take timely actions to mitigate events is evaluated during a Teold instrument failure which will result in an unexpected rod insertion.

Initial Conditions: 100% Power,8,000 MWD /MTU Turnover: Secure Closed Loop Auxiliary Cooling Water Pump #12 due to high vibration. Supplemental Containment Purge is in progress.

Event Malf. No. Event Event Description No. & Type

  • a (Value) Timing I N/A N Shift operating Closed Loop Auxiliary Cooling Water ru...gs.

2 2-25-2 I Reactor Coolant System temperature instrument Loop i Tcold fails (1.0) high after Closed Loop Cooling Water Pump #11 is secured or after 10 min.

3 10-11-3 C Loss of 4.16 KV ESF Bus ElC due to overcurrent lockout after the (T) crew has addressed Tech Specs for the Tcold failme or after 12 min.

4 2-1-1 M Large Break LOCA Reactor Coolant System Loop 1 A after the crew (1.0) places excess letdown in service or after 15 min.

5 Rose I Failure of Containment Ventilation Isolation dampers MOV-003 and Schercatics FV-9776 to close.

6 4 16-2 C Containment Spray Pump IB Trips after checked in E000. 'Ihe (T) scenario is terminated when the crew completes actions in ES13.

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' (N)ormal, (R)cactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor. All event types apply only to the SRO position.

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 2 i PAGE 3 OF 15 l SCENARIO MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION SIMULATOR BOOTH NOTES:

l SIMULATOR SETUP

1. Reset to IC #1 and go to run.
2. Trigger Lesson Plan #12 under Lesson Plan Group NRC2.
3. Ensure control rods are in auto.  ;

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4. Place Supplemental Purge in service.
EXPECTED BOOTH OPERATIONS
1. When directed to take actions to close the Supplemental Purge Damper FV-9776 or 1 MOV-003, delete the open override to allow damper to shut. FV-9776 is the OCIV l and can be closed locally at the valve. MOV-003 is the ICIV and can be closed by manipulating the breaker at the MCC if requested. This should be allowed to happen  ;

shortly after requested to ensure containment pressure is not allowed to decrease any '

more than necessary. This will help to ensure the crew transitions to FRZ1 later in the scenario.

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2. Autograph file "/cae/agraph/ data /jody/critscen2.agb.2" should load with lesson plan.

At the conclusion of the scenario print out the critical parameter trends from the autograph file.

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3. If asked to cross-connect AFW to feed SG IC due to loss of associated AFW Pump, use AFW System remotes.

i 4. If asked to close the VCT Outlet Valve CV-112C, use CVCS System remotes to close.

EXPECTED BOOTH COMMUNICATIONS

1. If asked the discharge pressure of the operating Closed Loop ACW Pump, report 100 Psig.
2. If asked to check Instrument air compressor status, report that Instrument Air l compressor #12 is running.

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3. If asked if any battery banks have any jumpered cells, report none jumpered.

., 4. If asked to investigate the breaker for CTMT Spray Pump IB, report that an overcurrent flag dropped.

4 OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 2 PAGE 4 OF 15 SCENARIO MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION SCENARIO TIME

SUMMARY

EVENT VALIDATION TIME FINAL TIME _

Shift operating Closed toop Auxiliary Cooling Water 9 min 9 min Pumps, Reactor Coolant System tempe.3ture instrument Loop 1 8 min (+3) 11 min Tcold fails high.

less of 4.16 KV ESF Bus E1C due to overcurrent 14 min 14 min lockout.

Large Break LOCA Reactor Coolant System loop 1 A. 40 min 40 min Failure of Containment Ventilation Isolation dampers MOV-003 and FV-9776 to close as well as CTMT Spray Pump 1B Trip included in event time.

TOTAL TIME 1 hr 14 min Notes: VALIDATION TIME reflects the actual event run time based on a " minimally adequate crew".

The numbers in parenthesis indicate a time cushion that is added to the validation time, where appropriate, to determine the FINAL TIME. This time cushion is added to ensure the crew has an opportunity to reach the desired point in the event. Malfunctions will be placed in pending and triggered at the times listed in the FINAL TIME column or at the discretion of the lead examiner.

CRITICAL PARAMETERS:

The following parameters may be of value in evaluating crew performance and should be placed in an Autognph file for recall when the scenario is completed:

RWST Level Pressurizer Level, PT-456 Wide Range RCS Pressure Reactor Power OPERATOR ACTIONS TABLE NOTES:

1. Critical Tasks are indicated by "C" in the position column are, indicated in bold type.

l 2. Actions required throughout the event are indicated as "(continuous)" in the position column.

3. Procedural entry points are indicated by shaded cells.

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 2 PAGE 5 OF 15 l OPERATOR ACTIONS I Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Shift operating Closed Loop Auxiliary Cooling Water Pumps.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes SRO Directs start of standby Closed Loop ACW  ;

pump and securing of #12 Closed loop ACW.

pump per POP 02 -AC-0001.

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BOP Starts a standby Closed loop ACW pump.

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BOP Secures #12 Closed Imop ACW pump after Closed Loop ACW pressure begins to increase.

BOP Places a Closed Loop ACW pump in standby.

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i OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO- 2 l PAGE 6 OF 15 OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont') l l

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 '

Event

Description:

Reastor Coolant Syster: emperature instrument Loop 1 Tcold fails high. _

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! i Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes  :

RO Responds to annunciators: l

- AUCT TAVG HI  :

p - TREF /AUCT TAVG DEV l

- DT/AUCT DT DEV

- TAVG/AUCT TAVG DEV I

- PRZR LEVEL DEV LO l, l RO Ensums rod control in manual.

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SRO Directs the actions of 0POPO4-RP-0004, Failum (continuous) of RCS Loop RTD Protection Channel;  ;

RO Identifies the failed channel as 410B and I informs the SRO.

RO/ BOP Controls charging flow as necessary to maintain the programmed pmssurizer level value i 5%. .

RO Ensures Tave maintained within 1.5 degnes of.  !

Tref. -

RO Defeats the failed RTD channel.  ;

1 SRO Refers to Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 to determine applicability and the action i required.  ;

f SRO Notifies I&C to trip usociated bistables within l one hour.

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 2 PAGE 7 OF 15 OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont')

. s. . ,o Op-Test No.: - 1 Scene A kv.? 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Loss of 4.16 KV ESF Bus E1C due to overcurrent lockout.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes RO/ BOP Reports that E1C has an overcurrent lockout and cannot be reenergized.

SRO- ENSURES STANDBY DIESEL C GENERATOR 13 IS REMOVED FROM SERVICE.

SRO Ensures an operator is dispatched to investigate the loss of E1C.

RO Taports that CCP 1A has tripped and letdown hns isolated.

SRO Ensures the following actions taken based on CCP 1A trip per POP 09-AN-04M8:

- FCV-0205 is closed

- CCP IB placed in service SRO Enters either POPO4-AE-0001, IAss of any The SRO may enter POPO4-13.8 or 4.16 KV Bus or POP 04-CV-0004, less AE-0001, Loss of any 13.8 or of Normal Letdown and direct operator actions. 4.16 KVBus or POPO4-CV-0004, Loss ofNormal Letdown and direct operator actions since entry conditions l i

for both are met The operator actions t slow are  !

listed as described in the applicable procedure to make l it easier tofollow however, i the crew may perform actions described in both procedures simultaneously. l l

SRO Enters POPO4-AE-0001, loss of Any 13.8 KV  !

or 4.16 KV ESF Bus and din:ct operator i actions.-

. RO Ensures Standby DG #13 is secured since 4.16 i KV ESF Bus E1C is not energized.'

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 2 L PAGE 8 OF 15 l l.

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(- RO/ BOP Places equipment on 4.16 KV ESF Bus E1C in - l l Pull to Iack.

BOP Places SG C PORV in manual.

RO Ensures no RCS dilution in progress from the -

l following sources:  !

l -Boron Thermal Regeneration System l l -Reactor Makeup System

, -Ietdown Demineralizers t

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! SRO/ BOP Verifies offsite power is available to 13.8 KV  ;

! Switchgear i L . BOP Verifies that an instrument air compressor is I mnning and that cooling is available, j SRO Detennine that reenergization of 4.16 KV ESF - l l Bus E1C should not be attempted due to a bus  ;

t fault based on an overcurrent lockout condition.  !

l SRO. Directs the RO to place Excess letdown in l service per POP 02-CV-0004 based on loss of normal letdown.

RO Monitors the increase in pressurizer level while leidown is not available and reduces seal  !

l injection flow rate to minimum to minimize I pressurizer level rise.

l RO Places Excess letdown in service. Monitors ,

e the following parameters to ensure limits are  !

not exceeded during system startup:

l - Heat exchanger temperature

- Heat exchanger pressum  ;

SRO Enters POPO44V.0004, Ioss of Normal letdown and ^ direct ' operator actions.'

l SRO/RO Verifies letdown alignment.

SRO Ensures maintenance is contacted to investigate

the loss of E1C.

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! SRO Directs the RO to place Excess Ietdown in service per POP 02-CV-0004 based on loss of normal letdown.  ;

RO Monitors the increase in pressurizer level while l letdown is not available and reduces seal injection flow rate to minimum to minimize

, pressurizer level rise.

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l RO Places Excess letdown in service. Monitors i the following parameters to ensure limits are not exceeded during system startup:

l' - Heat exchanger temperature

- Heat exchanger pressure J

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 2 PAGE 10 OF 15 OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont')

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Eeent

Description:

Large Break LOCA Reactor Coolant System Loop 1A.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes ALL Recognizes that an automatic reactor trip and SI have occurred RO/ BOP Completes immediate actions of EOOO, Reactor Trip /SI.

SRO Directs / ensures immediate actions of EOOO, Reactor Trip /SI are completed.

ALL TRIPS RCPs AFTER CONTAINMENT  ;

C SPRAY IS ACTUATED.

(continuous)

BOP MAINTAINS TOTAL AFW FLOW 2:576 (continuous) GPM WHEN NR LEVEL IN ALL SGs IS LESS THAN 14% (34% ADVERSE CONTAINMENT).

ALL Monitor CTMT pressure and shift to adverse (continuous) containment values when containment pressure exceeds 5 psig.

RO Reports failure of CVI on Train A based on Actionsfor afailure of CVI l ESF Status Monitoring indications. components are described under event #5.

RO Identifies that Containment Spray Pump IB Actionsfor a Containment tripped. Spray Pump 1A trip are described under event #6.

ALL Complete actions of E000 up to the transition to E010.

ALL Monitors Critical Safety Functions upon exiting (continuous) EOOO.

SRO Transitions to FRP1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thennal Shock Condition due to RCS temperature decrease.

._ . _ . . _ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ . _ _ . . _ . _ _ . . . ~ . _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ .

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SRO/RO Exits FRP1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition at the first step based l

l. on LHSI flow greater than 500 gpm.

'SRO Transitions to FRZ1,- Response to Containment _

High Pressure and directs operator actions.  ;

RO Places containment hydrogen monitoring system  :

in service. I SRO Transitions to E010, Loss of Reactor or l Secondary Coolant and directs operator actions.

SRO Conducts a crew briefing to cover the following areas upon exiting FRZ1.

- Previous events i

- Plant status i

- Future plans ,

RO When directed, resets SI, ESF Load Sequencers, Phase A and B. l BOP When directed, resets SG LO-LO level AFW  !

actuations, SG blowdown and sample isolation.  !

SRO Directs Chemical Analysis to sample all SGs for activity.

RO When directed, restores instrument air to containment.

SRO Transitions to ES13, when RWST level'-

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(continuous) decreases to'less than 75,000 'gallons.-

SRO Directs RO to align injection flowpaths for cold leg recirculation and transfer to cold leg recirculation.

I SRO/RO ALIGNS INJECTION FLOWPATHS FOR '

i C COLD LEG RECIRCULATION AND TRANSFERS TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, WHEN DIRECTED.

l RO When directed, establishes charging flow. '

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OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont') I I

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Ev:nt

Description:

Failure of Containment Ventilation Isolation Signal Train A. 1 1

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes RO Reports failure of CVI to close HC-MOV-003 and HC-FV-9776 based on ESF Status l Monitoring indications and control board i i position indicating lights. l l SRO/RO ENSURES THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS C ARE TAKEN:

- STOPS SUPPLEMENTARY PURGE SUPPLY AND EXHAUST FANS  ;

- ATTEMPTS TO CLOSE PURGE DAMPERS

- DISPATCHES AN OPERATOR TO

, CLOSE ISOLATION DAMPER (S) l LOCALLY l SRO Continues with the actions of EOOO. Continued under event #4 l

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 2 PAGE 13 OF 15 OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont')

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

Containment Spray Pump 1B Trips after checked in E000 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes RO Identifies that Containment Spray Pump 1B tripped.

SRO Directs / ensures the RO attempts to manually start Containment Spray Pump 1B OR places handswitch in PTL per OPOP09.

RO Attempts to manually start Containment Spray Pump 1B or place handswitch in PTL if directed.

SRO Ensures an operator is dispatched to investigate the cause of Containment Spray Pump IB trip.

SRO. Ensures maintenance is contacted to investigate Continued under event #4 cause of Containment Spray Pump 1B trip.

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 2 PAGE 14 OF 15 CRITICAL TASK

SUMMARY

POSITION EXPECTED RESPONSE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA SAT /

, UNSAT j SRO ENSURES STANDBY DIESEL SECURE STANDBY DIESEL C GENERATOR 13 IS REMOVED FROM GENERATOR #13 PRIOR TO SERVICE. STANDBY DIESEL -

3~

GENERATOR TRIPPING OR PRIOR TO EXITING EO90.

ALL TRIPS RCPs AFTER CONTAINMENT RCPs ARE TRIPPED PRIOR C SPRAY IS ACTUATED. TO EXITING E000.

BOP MAINTAINS TOTAL AFW FLOW 2576 AFW FLOW IS j C GPM WHEN NR LEVEL IN ALL SGs IS MAINTAINED 2576 GPM LESS THAN I4% (34% ADVERSE UNTIL AT LEAST ONE SG i CONTAINMENT). NARROW RANGE LEVEL IS i > 14% NORMAL OR 34%

i ADVERSE CONTAINMENT.

SRO/RO ALIGNS INJECTION FLOWPATHS ENSURES RWST l C FOR COLD LEG RECIRCULATION ISOLATIONS ARE i AND TRANSFERS TO COLD LEG MANUALLY CLOSED FOR RECIRCULATION, WHEN DIRECTED. SI TRAINS A AND B PRIOR TO 28,000 GALLONS IN THE RWST.

SRO/RO ENSURES THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS ENSURES THE FOLLOWING C ARE TAKEN: ACTIONS ARE TAKEN

- STOPS SUPPLEMENTARY PRIOR TO EXITING EOOO:

PURGE SUPPLY AND EXHAUST - STOPS FANS SUPPLEMENTARY

- ATTEMPTS TO CLOSE PURGE PURGE SUPPLY AND DAMPERS EXHAUST FANS

- DISPATCHES AN OPERATOR - DISPATCHES AN TO CLOSE ISOLATION OPERATOR TO DAMPER (S) LOCALLY CLOSE ISOLATION DAMPER (S) LOCALLY NOTE: Acceptance Criteria MUST be evaluated as Satisfactory (S) or Unsatisfactory (U).

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 2 PAGE 15 0F 15 f

( TURNOVER INFORMATION 100% Power,8,000 MWD /MTU  ;

All equipment is operable l'  !

l Supplemental Containment Purge is in progress to reduce radiation levels in preparation for a plarned

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l Secure Closed 140p Auxiliary Cooling Water Pump #12 due to high vibration. The pump can be left in l automatic if desired after shutdown. l l

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 3 PAGE 1 OF 15 INITIAL LICENSE EXAM OPERATING TEST 1 SCENARIO 3 JUNE 1,1998 i Revision 0 l

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 3 PAGE 2 OF 15 SCENARIO OUTLINE Facility: South Texas Project Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 1 Session I Examiners: El evaluating Pete Lara Oxrators: SRO-Pete Lara RO-Mike Schaefer BOP-Kelly Teague Session 2 Examiners: E2 evaluating Bill Morris Operators: SRO-Bill Morris RO-Lu DeLaGarza BOP-David Klaus Objectives: Evaluate the crew's ability to diagnose plant events as well as protect plant personnel and the public during a radioactive leak in the Auxiliary Building. Evaluate the Unit Supervisor's ability to direct appropriate actions to control the plant and minimize transients during a loss of vacuum with power above the turbine trip / reactor trip setpoint. Evaluate the crew's ability to diagnose events and take required actions during a slowly increasing steam break inside the reactor containment building. Evaluate the crew's ability to initiate contingency actions as directed in the EOPs based on a failure of an MSIV to close.

Initial Conditions: 75% Power,8,000 MWD /MTU, fuel pre-conditioning limits have been met, power increase in progress.

Turnover: A power increase is in progress Per POP 03-ZG-0005 step 7.23.6, fuel pre-conditioning limits have been met. The 85 gpm letdown orifice is to be placed in service and the 120 gpm letdown orifice is to be secured to allow flow verification for the 85 gpm orifice.

Event Malf. No. Event Event Description No. & Type

  • a (Value) Timing i N/A N Swap letdown orifices.

2 2-19-3 I Pr:ssurizer pressure instrument Irr-457 fails low after letdown

(.01) parameters stabilize or after 8 min.

3 3-12-1 C 20 gpta letdown line leak outside containment after the crew has

(.5) addressed Tech Specs based on the Irr-457 failure or after 15 min.

4 7-2-1 C Slowly escalating condenser air inleakage after actions taken to (0 to .5) isolate the letdown line leak or after 12 min.

7 min ramp 5 5-2-3 M Slowly increasing fault on SG IC inside the Reactor Containment (0 to .5) Building after the reactor and/or turbine is tripped.

7 min ramp 6 5-7-3 C Main Steam isolation Valve IC fails to close until local actions taken to close. The scenario is terminated after the actions of EO20 have been completed (N)onnal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor. All event types apply only to the SRO position.

~ OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 3 PAGE 3 OF 15 SCENARIO MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION SIMULATOR BOOTH NOTES:

SIMULATOR SETUP

1. Restore to IC#2 storepoint and go to run.
2. Trigger Lesson Plan #13 under lesson Plan Group NRC2.

EXPECTED BOOTH OPERATIONS

1. Delete the MSIV Fails Open malfunction when asked to locally close MSIV C.
2. Autograph file "/cae/agraph/ data /jody/critscen3.agb.1" should load with lesson plan.

At the conclusion of the scenario print out the critical parameter trends from the autograph file.

EXPECTED BOOUs ( )NMUNICATIONS

1. Wlae dux! to investigate lowering condenser vacuum report all parameters as normal with the exception of the sound of inrushing air near the exhaust hood for Low Pressure Turbine #12.

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 3 PAGE 4 0F 15 SCENARIO MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION SCENARIO TIME

SUMMARY

EVENT VALIDATION TIME FINAL TIME __

Scap letdown orifices. 8 min 8 min Pressurizer pressure instrument Irl'-455 fails low. 12 min (+3) 15 min 20 gpm letdown line leak outside containment. 9 min (+3) 12 min Slowly escalating condenser air inleakage. 7 min 7 min Slowly increasing fault on SG IC inside the Reactor 33 min 33 min Containment Building. Main Steam Isolation Valve IC fails to close ';t.i' local actions taken to close.

TOTAL TIME 1 hr 15 min Notes: VALIDATION TIME reflects the actual event run time based on a " minimally adequate crew".

The numbers in parenthesis indicate a time cushion that is added to the validation time, where appropriate, to determine the FINAL TIME. This time cushion is added to ensure the crew has an opportunity to reach the desired point in the event. Malfunctions will be placed in pending and triggered at the times listed in the FINAL TIME column or at the discretion of the lead examiner.

CRITICAL PARAMETERS:

The following parameters may be of value in evaluating crew performance and should be placed in an Autograph file for recall when the scenario is completed:

SG C AFW flow SG A Pressure Pressurizer Level, PT-466 Pressurizer Pressure, PT-456 CTMT Wide Range Pressure Reactor Power OPERATOR ACTIONS TABLE NOTES:

1. Critical Tasks are indicated by "C" in the position colunm and indicated in bold type.
2. Actions required throughout the event are indicated as "(continuous)" in the position column.
3. Procedural entry points are indicated by shaded cells.

OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 3 PAGE 5 0F 15 OPERATOR ACTIONS Op-Test No.: 1- Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Swap letdown orifices from the 120 gpm orifice to the 85 gpm orifice.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes SRO Directs the RO to swap letdown orifices .in.-

accostlance with POP 02<V-0004,' CVCS -

Operations.-

SRO Maintains cogmzance of orifice swap while (continuous) maintaining the big picture of plant status.

RO Enters OPOP02-CV-0004. Ensums CVCS Demins bypassed - if not, bypasses demins.

RO Takes manual control of PCV-0135, letdown Pressure Control Valve, and adjusts pressum as necessary. Monitors for low pressure, which could result in flashing, and high pressure, which could result in a letdown relief actuation.

RO Places selected orifice in operation and removes orifice to be secured from service.

RO Adjusts letdown pmssure to between 350-380 PSIG and place PCV-0135, Ietdown Pmssure Control Valve, in AUTO.

RO Adjusts Charging Flow on PCV-0135 as needed ta match charging and letdown flows.

RO Places demins back in service if necessary. (as directed by SRO) l: . . .. . . . . . . ..

OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 3 PAGE 6 OF 15 OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont')

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Pressurizer pressure instrument PT-457 fails low.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes RO Acknowledges and Reports annunciators on Control board CP004 are indicative of a pressurizer pressure instrument failure.

RO Reports that pressurizer pressure channel PT-0457 has failed low.

SRO Directs / ensures the actions of OPOPO4-RP--

(continuous) 0001, IAss of Automatic Pressurizer Pressure Control, are taken.

RO Places Pressurizer Master Pressure Controller RC-PK-0655A in MANUAL SRO/RO REMOVES THE FAILED PRESSURE C CHANNEL FROM SERVICE BY PLACING THE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL SELECTOR SWITCH TO THE P455/456 POSITION.

RO Returns Pressurizer Master Controller to AUTO and verifies proper operation:

- Pressurizer Pressure maintaining between 2220 and 2250 psig.

- Pressurizer PORVS closed.

- Auxiliary spray valve closed.

- Normal spray valve closed.

- Variable Pressurizer Heaters deenergized.

- Backup heaters cycling AS REQUIRED between 2210 and 2220 psig.

SRO Initiates actions per Technical Specification 3.3.1 Table 3.3-3 Action le. (Associated bistables must be tripped within I hour.)

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 3 i PAGE 7 0F 15

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SRO Notifies I&C maintenance to trip appropriate  :

channel 1 bistables per Addendum 1 of l

OPOPO4-RP-0001. 1 SRO/RO Verifies permissives in correct state for current l i

plant conditions.

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 3 PAGE 8 OF 15 OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont')

Op-Test No.: 1 Sanario No.: 3 Event- No.: 3 Event

Description:

20 gpm letdown line leak outside containment.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes RO/ BOP Acknowledges and reports radiation monitoring alarm in MAB.

SRO Enters POPO4-RA-0001 based on radiation monitoring alarm.

RO/ BOP Report indications of excessive RCS leakage based on the following indications:

-Decreasing RCS pressure

-Decreasing pressurizer level

-Charging and letdown flow imbalance

-MAB radiation monitors in alarm SRO Enters POPO4-RC-0003, Excessive RCS -

(continuous) leakage and dimets operator actions.

RO Control charging and letdown to maintain (continuous) pressurizer level > 17% and VCT level greater than 15%.

ALL Follow the procedure diagnostic order to determine the leakage is from the MAB.

-SG tube leakage

-I2akage to the RCDT

-Ieakage through Incore Instrumentation

-leakage to Containment

-Izakage to the PRT

-I2akage to CCW

-I2akage ta the MAB SRO/RO Determine leakage is from the MAB based on:

-MAB radiation abnormal -

-12tdown flow and pressure changes SRO Transition to Addendum 6 and directs actions to identify and isolate the leakage.

SRO/RO DIRECTS / ENSURES RCS LEAKAGE C ISOLATED BY REMOVING NORMAL LETDOWN FROM SERVICE.

SRO Directs the RO to place excess letdown in service per POP 02-CV-0004 to control RCS inventory based on loss of normal letdown.

OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 3 PAGE 9 0F 15 t

RO Monitors the increase in pressurizer level while

! letdown is not available and reduces seal l injection flow rate to minimum value to i

minimize RCS level rise.

RO Initiates actions to place Excess Letdown in l service. Monitors the following parameters to ensure limits are not exceeded during system startup:

-Heat exchanger temperature

-Heat exchanger pressurc m - . - - .

OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 3 PAGE 10 0F 15 OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont')

Op-Test No.:  ! Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Event Descriptioc: Slowly escalating condenser air inleakage. _

Time Pocition Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes BOP Reports lowering condenser vacuum based on the following indications:

-Lowering vtcuum

-lowering turbine load

, -Condenser vtcuum low alarm BOP Reviews and takes the actions of POP 09-AN-07M3 Annunciator Response Procedure if the Main Condenser Vacuum Low alarm is received.

SRO Enters POPO4-CR-0001, Loss of Condenser:

(continuous) Vacuum and directs operator actions.

BOP Monitors condenser vacuum and verifies (continuous) required automatic actions:

-Rx/ Turbine trip @ 22"Hg SRO Coordinates a reduction in turbine load to increase the value of condenser vacuum. The following information should be discussed:

-Turbine ramp rate

-Method of power decrease (i.e. rods and/or boration)

-Value at which a manual reactor and/or turbine trip will be performed SRO Directs efforts to determine and eliminate the reason for lowering vacuum.

SRO Directs a manual reactor trip prior to receiving an automatic trip based on lowering condenser vacuum.

SRO Transitions to POP 05-EO-EOOD, Reactor Trip -

procedure and ensures the immediate actions of POP 05-EO-EOOO are performed. .

RO/ BOP Perform the immediate actions of E000.

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 3 PAGE 110F 15 OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont')

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Slowly increasing fault on SG IC inside the Reactor Containment Building.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes RO/ BOP Recommends a manual safety injection signal based on the following:

-Increasing Containment pressure

-Decreasing RCS pressure l SRO Directs PO/SO to manually initiate SI and/or i

ensures that SI actuates when required.

RO/ BOP Manually initiates SI when directed by the SRO.

l SRO Directs the actions of E000 up until the E020, (continuous) Faulted SG Isolation transition point.

RO/ BOP Completes immediate actions of EOOO and (continuous) continue with EOOO supplementary actions.

SRO/ BOP DIRECTS / ENSURES ISOLATION OF See event #6 l C FAULTED SG C BY PERFORMING THE FOLLOWING

-ISOLATING SG C FROM THE MAIN STEAM HEADER

- ISOLATING AFW FLOW TO SG C SRO/ BOP DIRECTS / ENSURES RCPs ARE TRIPPED l C FOLLOWING THE PHASE B ISOLATION SIGNAL.

SRO/ BOP MAINTAINS TOTAL AFW FLOW h576 C GPM WHILE NR LEVEL IN ALL INTACT SGs IS LESS THAN 14% (34% ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) i l SRO Transitions to E020, Faulted SG Isolation.

ALL Monitors Critic:tl Safety Functions upon exiting l (continuous) EOOO.

! SRO Conducts a crew briefing upon exiting E000 to l cover the following areas:

l -Previous events

-Plant status

-Future plans l

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. , OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 3 i PAGE 12 OF 15 l

SRO Ensures the crew enters FRZ1,- Response to (continuous) Containment High Pmssure if containment  ;

, pressure is above setpoint after exiting EOOO.

l SRO Transitions to EO10, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

This event would be classified as an Unusual l Event based on an RCS cooldown due to an I uncontrolled secondary depressurization. l l

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, OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 3 PAGE 13 OF 15 ;

l OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont')

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page of Ev:nt

Description:

Main Steam Isolation Valve IC fails to close until local actions taken to close.

l Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes BOP Reports that the Main Steam isolation Valve C will not close using the control room handswitch.

l SRO/ BOP Directs / Ensures an operator is dispatched to The operator actionsfor the i manually close Main Steam isolation Valve C. remainder of the scenario recommence under event #5.

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, OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 3 PAGE 14 OF 15 CRITICAL TASK

SUMMARY

POSITION EXPECTED RESPONSE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA SAT /

UNSAT SRO/RO REMOVES THE FAILED PRESSURE THE RX DOES NOT TRIP C CHANNEL FROM SERVICE BY BASED ON A PT-457 PLACING THE PRESSURIZER FAILURE.

PRESSURE CONTROL SELECTOR SWITCH TO THE P455/456 POSITION.

SRO/RO DIRECTS / ENSURES RCS LEAKAGE RCS LEAKAGE IS C ISOLATED BY REMOVING NORMAL ISOLATED PRIOR TO LETDOWN FROM SERVICE. REQUIRING A SAFETY INJECTION BASED ON PRESSURIZER LEVEL.

SRO/ BOP DIRECTS / ENSURES ISOLATION OF SG C IS ISOLATED AND/OR C FAULTED SG C BY PERFORMING OPERATOR DISPATCHED THE FOLLOWING: TO PERFORM LOCAL

- ISOLATING SG C FROM THE ACTIONS TO ISOLATE MAIN STEAM HEADER PRIOR TO EXITING EO20.

-ISOLATING AFW FLOW TO SG C SRO/ BOP DIRECTS / ENSURES RCPs ARE RCPS ARE TRIPPED PRIOR C TRIPPED FOLLOWING THE PHASE B TO EXITING EO90 IF A l ISOLATION SIGNAL. PHASE B ISOLATION HAS OCCURRED. i SRO/ BOP MAINTAINS TOTAL AIM FLOW 2576 MAINTAINS TOTAL AFW l C GPM WHILE NR LEVEL IN ALL FLOW 2576 GPM WHILE NR INTACT SGs IS LESS THAN I4% (34% LEVEL IN ALL INTACT SGs ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) IS LESS THAN I4% (34%

ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) l NOTE: Acceptance Criteria MUST be evaluated as Satisfactory (S) or Unsatisfactory (U). )

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OP-TEST 1 SCENARIO 3 PAGE 15 0F 15 TURNOVER INFORMATION 75% Power, 8,000 MWD /MTU.

A power increase is in progress per POP 03-ZG-0005 step 7.23.6, fuel pre-conditioning limits have been met.

The 85 gpm letdown orifice is to be placed in service and the 120 gpm letdown orifice is to be secured to allow flow verification for the 85 gpm orifice prior to continuing with power increase.

All equipment is operable.

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. BACKUP SCENARIO PAGE 1 OF 14 i

INITIAL LICENSE EXAM BACKUP SCENARIO l

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i BACKUP SCENARIO PAGE 2 OF 14 SCENARIO OUTLINE t

i Facility: South Texas Project Scenario No.: Backup Scenario Op-Test No.: N/A '

Objectives: Provide a backup scenario to be used as necessary to evaluate performance in the event competency areas or event types are not adequately addressed during the performance of scheduled scenario sessions. The crew's ability to diagnose RCS leakage rates and take appropriate actions based on the leakrate will be evaluated. The ability to meenitor the operation of plant systems and take necessary corrective actions will be evaluated during r. failure of an ECW pump to start and during a failure of source range Nis to energize.

Initial Conditions: 100% power, 8,000 MWD /MTU Turnover: The Unit is at 100% power. Upon taking the shift the crew is to Start Centrifugal Charging Pump IB and secure Centrifugal Charging Pump 1 A to allow to allow Engineering to take vibration measurements on Centrifugal Charging Pump IB.

j Event Malf. No. Event Event Description No. & Type

  • a l (Value) Timing 1 N/A N Shift Operating Centrifugal Charging Pumps.

2 2-18-1 1 Pressurizer level Control fails high when CVCS parameters have (1.0) stabilized after CCP swap or after 8 min.

l 3 4-1-2 C CCW Pump IB trips after the crew has addressed Tech Specs for j (T) the level control failure or after 9 minutes.

l 4 2-4-1 M Small Break LOCA on the Rx Vessel Head Vent. Escalating to 210 (0 to .45) gpm over a 7 minute period after CCW parameters have stabilized ramp over or after 10 minutes, j 7 min ,

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l 5 4-9-3 C Train C ECW Pump fails to start on Safety injection signal, m j 6 1-35-2 C iate Ran I pTComPensatge Nuclear lastrument Channel 36 is (T) l (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, - (C)omponent, (M)ajor. All event types apply only to the S (O j position.

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BACKUP SCENARIO PAGE 3 OF 14 SCENARIO MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION SIMULATOR BOOTH NOTES:

SIMULATOR SETUP

1. Restore to IC #1 storepoint and go to run.
2. Trigger lesson Plan #14 under lesson Plan Group NRC2.
3. . Ensure control rods are in auto.

EXPECTED BOOTH OPERATIONS

1. Autograph file "/cae/agraph/ data /jody/critbackup.agb.2" should load with -

lesson plan. At the conclusion of the scenario print out the critical parameter trends from the autograph file.

EXPECTED BOOTH COMMUNICATIONS

1. When dispatched to check out the breaker for CCW Pump IB report that an overcurrent flag has dropped.

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BACKUP SCENARIO i PAGE 4 OF 14 SCENARIO MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION ,

f SCENARIO TIME

SUMMARY

EVENT VALIDATION TIME FINAL TLME l l

Shift Operating Centrifugal Charging Pumps. 6 min (+2) 8 min l Pressurizer level Control fails high. 7 min (+2) 9 min CCW Pump IB trips. 7 min (+3) '40 min Small Break LOCA on the Rx Vessel Head Vent. 38 min 38 min l Escalating to 210 gpm over a 7 minute period. Train C l ECW Pump failing to start and IR channel 36 slao l included in the event time. l TOTAL TIME 1 hr,5 min i

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Notes: VAIJDATION TIME reflects the actual event run time based on a " minimally adequate crew".

l The numbers in parenthesis indicate a time cushion that is added to the validation time, where appropriate, to determine the FINAL TIME. This time cushion is added to ensure the crew has an opportunity to reach the desired point in the event. Malfunctions will be placed in pending and triggered at the times listed in the FINAL TIME column or at the discretion of the 1:ad examiner.

CRITICAL PARAMETERS:

The following parameters may be of value in evaluating crew performance and should be placed in an c Autograph file for recall when the scenario is completed:

Pressurizer level, LT-466 RCS Wide Range Pressure CTMT Pressure RCS Subcooling Reactor Power OPERATOR ACTIONS TABLE NOTES:

1. Critical Tasks are indicated by "C" in the position column and indicated in bold type.

l l 2.' Actions required throughout the event are indicated as "(continuous)" in the position column.  !

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BACKUP SCENARIO PAGE 5 OF 14 OPERATOR ACTIONS i Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: Backup Event No.: 1 l

Event

Description:

Shift Operating Centrifugal Charging Pumps. _

L Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes i

SRO Directs. the RO to Start Centrifugal Charging .

, Pump._1B and Secure Centrifugal Charging; Pump .1A per POP 02-CV-0004, Chemical and

. Volume Control System.

RO Ensures CVCS System is prepared for Centrifugal Charging Pump 1B start.

-Ensures discharge valve open

-Charging flow control valve in manual

-CCP Aux lube oil pump available RO/ BOP Announces intention to start CCP IB over the plant page and dispatches operator to check locally.

l RO Starts CCP IB and monitors the following:

-Charging flow

-RCP Seal injection flows RO Performs valve alignments and shuts down CCP 1A.

RO Places charging flow control valve in auto and monitors the following while adjusting seal injection flow control valve as necessary:

-Charging flow

-RCP Seal injection flows

-Pressurizer level RO Ensure cooling fan starts for CCP IB and secures cooling fan for CCP 1A RO Reports to the SRO that CCPs have been shifted.

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BACKUP SCENARIO PAGE 6 OF 14 OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont')

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: Backup Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Level Control fails high. l Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes RO Reports that pressurizer level is not responding as expected and reviews annunciator response l procedure for alarms.

SRO Enters POPO4-RP-0002, loss of Automatic-(continuous) Pressurizer Level Control and directs operator-  !

actions.

RO Places FCV-0205 in manual to control pressurizer level. )

RO Determines that a pressurizer level and RCS temperature channel have not failed.

RO Verifies that RCS temperature and pressurizer level are normal.

SRO/RO Direct / Ensure pressurizer level is maintained in (continuous) at the appropriate level for the present power level by maintaining FCV-0205 in manual.

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OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont')

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: Backup Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

CCW Pump IB trips. _

Thne Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes RO Silences CCW Pump 1B trip as an unexpected alarm and reports a trip of CCW Pump 1B.

RO Ensures the actions of POP 09-AN-02M3, .

(continuous) Annun:it, tor Lampbox 2M03 Response..

Instruction are' performed.

SRO Maintains cognizance of CCW Pump trip event (continuous) while maintaining big picture of plant status.

RO- Verifies CCW header pressure is >76 psig and that the standby CCW pump is running.

RO Places the CCW Pump 1B handswitch in Pull To lack.

RO Secures CCW. Pump 1B per POP 02-CC-0001, l Component Cooling Water and ensures at least.

one available ECW/CCW train mode salec' tor:

switch is placed in standby.

SRO Ensures the actions of Tech Spec 3.7.3 are

! reviewed.

SRO Ensures maintenance is contacted to investigate the cause of the CCW Pump IB trip.

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4 BACKUP SCENARIO PAGE 8 OF 14 OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont')

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: Backup Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Small Break LOCA on the Rx Vessel Head Vent. Escalating to 210 gpm over a 7 minute period.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes RO/ BOP Acknowledges and reports a radiation monitoring alarm in containment.

SRO Enters POP 04-RA-0001 to address radiation monitoring alarm.

1 RO/ BOP Determine that RCS a loss of reactor coolant is occurring based on the following:

, -Pressurizer and VCT level change

-Charging and letdown flow mismatch ,

-Containment radiation monitoring trend I

-Containment pressure increase

-Containment sump level increase

.SRO Enters POPO4-RC-0003, Excessive RCS Ixakage and directs operator actions.

RO Controls charging and letdown to maintain pressurizer level > 17% and VCT level greater than 15%.

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ALL Follow the procedure diagnostic order to i determine the leakage is to the containment.

-SG tube leakage

-Izakage to the RCDT

-leakage through Incore Instrumentation

-Ieakage to Containment l SRO/RO Determines leakage is from the containment based on:

-CTMT radiation increasing

-CTMT sump level and flow abnormal

-CTMT pressure increasing SRO Transitions to Addendum 3 of POP 04-RC-0003 RCS Excessive Leakage and directs operator actions.

RO Attempts to determine RCS Leakage rate by comparing letdown and charging flow rates and reports estimated RCS leakage rates to the SRO. l

BACKUP SCENARIO PAGE 9 OF 14 RO Determines that RCS leakage is greater than the capacity of the Reactor Makeup System and reports this to the SRO. '

SRO ENSURES A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP C AND SAFETY INJECTION BASED ON _

RCS LEAKAGE RATE GREATER THAN THE CAPACITY OF THE REACTOR MAKEUP SYSTEM.

  • RO/ BOP Performs the immediate actions of EOOO, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

SRO Enters E000, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and directs operator actions.-

BOP MAINTAINS AFW FLOW ;> 576 GPM .

C WHEN NR LEVEL IN ALL SGs IS LESS THAN 14% OR 34% IF ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS EXIST.

RO Reports that train C safety injection equipment Operator actions related to failed to automatically actuate. thefailure of C train safety injection equipment to actuate are listed under event #5 RO Reports that Intermediate Range NI channels 35 Operator actions related to and 36 are not trending together after the trip. the undercompensation of NI 36 are listed under event #6.

RO/ BOP Completes the supplementary actions of EOOO, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

SRO Transitions to POP 05-EO-EO10, Loss of (continuous) Reactor or Secondary Coolant and directs operator actions.

ALL Monitors Critical Safety Functions upon exiting (continuous) EOOO.

SRO Conducts a crew briefing upon exiting E000 to cover the following areas:

-Previous events

-Plant status

-Future plans

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t BACKUP SCENARIO PAGE 10 OF 14 RO/ BOP When directed, performs the following steps in -

E010. ,

-Resets SI, ESF Imad Sequencers, Phase A, and Phase B  ;

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-Directs Chemical Aralysis to sample SGs for activity  ;

! -Restores instmment air to containment

-Places hydrogen analyzers in service i

-Establishes charging flow l ALL Determine that SI flow should be terminated L based on the following parameters within limits:  !

-Subcooling

-Secondary heat sink j

-RCS pressure  ;

l -Pressurizer level j l SRO Transitions to POP 05-EO-ES11, SI Termination '

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l SRO/RO Verifies that ESF actuation signals have been i reset and instmment air has been restored to the RCB RO Places Spent Fuel Pool Cooling in service.

l RO- Stops Iow Head and High Head Safety l Injection pumps and places in automatic. i Monitors the following parameters:

l -RCS subcooling

-Pressurizer level L

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BACKUP SCENARIO PAGE 11 OF 14 l OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont')

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: Backup Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Train C ECW Pump fails to start on Safety Injection signal.

l Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes RO Reports that ECW Pump IC failed to automatically actuate on Safety Injection signal.

RO/SRO ENSURES A MANUAL START OF ECW C PUMP IC OR SECURES STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR #13.

RO After ECW Pump IC is started ensures that the Operator actions continue discharge valve opens and flow is supplied to under event #4.

i Standby Diesel #13.

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. 1 BACKUP SCENARIO PAGE 12 OF 14 OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont')

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: Backup Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

Intermediate Range Nuclear Instmment Channel 36 is undercompensated.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notes RO Reports that Intermediate Range NI channels 35 and 36 are not trending together after the trip.

RO Determines that Source Range NIs did not energize based on NI 36 not decreasing as expected after the reactor trip.

SRO/RO ENSURES THE SOURCE RANGE Operator actions continue C MANUAL BLOCK SWITCHES ARE under event #4.

ACTUATED TO ENERGIZE THE SOURCE RANGE NIs.

BACKUP SCENARIO PAGE 13 OF 14 CRITICAL TASK

SUMMARY

POSITION EXPECTED RESPONSE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA SAT /

UNSAT l SRO ENSURES A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP ENSURES A MANUAL C AND SAFETY INJECTION BASED ON REACTOR TRIP AND SAFETY RCS LEAKAGE RATE GREATER INJECTION IS PERFORMED THAN THE CAPACITY OF THE PRIOR TO AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR MAKEUP SYSTEM. REACTOR TRIP SIGNAL BOP MAINTAINS AFW FLOW 1576 GPM AFW FLOW IS MAINTAINED C WHEN NR LEVEL IN ALL SGs IS LESS 1576 UNTIL AT LEAST ONE THAN 14% OR 34% IF ADVERSE SG NARROW RANGE LEVEL CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS EXIST. IS GREATER THAN 14% OR 34% IF ADVERSE l CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS EXIST.

SRO/RO ENSURES A MANUAL START OF ECW MANUALLY START ECW C PUMP IC OR SECURES STANDBY PUMP IC OR SECURE DIESEL GENERATOR #13. STANDBY DIESEL l GENERATOR 13 PRIOR TO STANDBY DIESEL

! GENERATOR TRIPPING OR EXITING EOOO.

SRO/RO ENSURES THE SOURCE RANGE ENERGIZE THE SOURCE l C MANUAL BLOCK SWITCHES ARE RANGE NIs WITHIN 15 ACTUATED TO ENERGIZE THE MINUTES OF REACHING P-10 SOURCE RANGE NIs. SETPOINT.

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NOTE: Acceptance Criteria MUST be evaluated as Satisfactory (S) or Unsatisfactory (U).

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BACKUP SCENARIO PAGE 14 OF 14 TURNOVER INFORMATION 100% power,8,000 MWD /MTU. '

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' The Unit is at 100% power. Upon taking the shift the crew is to Start Centrifugal Charging Pump 1B and secure Centrifugal Charging Pump 1A to allow to allow Engineering to take vibration measurements on Centrifugal Charging Pump 1B.

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CHIEF EXAMINER SCENARIO COMMENTS - SOUTH TEXAS 6/1/98 EXAM Leaend: D - Difficulty on 1 to 5 scaie,5 being the most difficult OPERATING TEST 1 -

SCENARIO 1 D - 3 No comments.

SCENARIO 2 D - 3 Under CRITICAL PARAMETERS, also monitor Tave. Resolution: Incorporated. <

SCENARIO 3 D - 3 No comments.

BACKUP SCENARIO D - 2 No comments.

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