ML20154L965

Forwards Exam Outline for Plant Initial Exam Scheduled for 980601.Exam Matls Support Exam of Six SRO Upgrade Candidates

ML20154L965
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	12/17/1997
From:	Chitwood G HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:	Bundy H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML20154L930	List: ML20154L926 ML20154L965 ML20154L992 ML20154M001
References
NUDOCS 9810200126
Download: ML20154L965 (24)

Text

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December 17,1997 Mr. Howard Bundy, Chief Examiner j

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

]

611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 l

Arlington, TX 76011-8064 i

i Dear Mr. Bundy j

i

Subject:

South Texas Project Initial License Exammation Scheduled for June 1,1998 l

)

This letter is accompanying the Examination Outline for the South Texas Project Initial l

Examination scheduled for June 01,1998. Examination materials to support the examination of six SRO Upgrade candidates.

1 Also included is additional information not actually required but provided to aid in your review of the examination materials. These additional materials include a simulator and job performance l

measure overview as well as a scenario overview to provide additional information beyond that

.l contained in the associated outlines. A cross-reference of 10CFR55.45 items to operating examination materials as well as a probabilistic risk assessment item to examination materials is also provided to aid in your review.

None of these materials are to go to the public records until after the examination has been completed.

3

<t

. Please call me at (512)972-7241 if you have any questions.

I Sincerely, g,,

)

Greg

. Chitwood.

j Examination Lead

[

South Texas Project Nuclear Training Department i

'k qMCigg,,3 9810200126"981009 h 'r)7\\

[U PDR ADOCK 05000498 a..

V PDR y

~

g Proposed Schedule

]

Indoctrination (2 hrs) 2 Simulator and 3 Admin JPMs Day 1 3 In-Plant and 2 Admin JPMs

_ Day 2 Scenario Session #1 (UI, U2, U3)

Day 3

~ Scenario Session #2 (U4, US, U6)

]

TExit t

L ltaneously to expedite Notes:

i Simulator JPMs selected can be performed on the simulator s mu the exam process.

h fi t day due to the time Simulator scenarios are suggested for day 3 to avoid alengt y rsplan h

anticipated for up front items on the first day suc as d session two.

same three scenarios will be used for session one an

3 I

Proposed Schedule Day 1 Indoctrination (2 hrs) 2 Simulator and 3 Admin JPMs Day 2 3 In-Plant and 2 Admin JPMs Day 3 Scenario Session #1 (Ul, U2, U3)

Scenario Session #2 (U4, U5, U6)

Exit

' Notes:

1 Simulator JPMs selected can be performed on the simulator simultaneously to expedite j

the exam process.

i Simulator scenarios are suggested for day 3 to avoid a lengthy first day due to the time anticipated for up front items on the first day such as plant familiarization tours etc. The same three scenarios will be used for session one and session two.

I i

4 l

i

_. _ ~ - - - - -. -... -

. -. ~

e Revision 0 1

ES-401 PWR SRO Examination Outline Farm ES-401-3 l

)

f i

4 Facility:

South Texas Project Date of Exam: 6/1/98 Exam Level: SRO j

K/A Category Points i

Tier Group Point l

K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G

Total gmhy Egys 3

5 pg gy 1

24 ym, y:.

euNpg wc F

1.

1 3

3 9

Emergency &

$rh h's; 1

16 ud he[ [K

$~

e aw 2

6 2

1 3

3 Abnormal Plant 3

1 0

2 M fN D 0

0 NY DN 0

3 I

Evolutions

[hfM hhk 2

43 i

h.dk[M[h 5

11 Tier 5

6 14 k fML WM W i

Totals NU we m1 w$

j av i

1 2

1 1

1 4

1 4

2 1

1 1

19 2.

2 1

0 1

4 2

1 1

3 0

3 1

17 Plant Systems 3

2 0

1 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

0 4

Tier 5

1 3

5 6

2 5

6 1

4 2

40 l

l Totals i

3.

Generic Knowledge and Cat 1 Cat 2 Cat 3 Cat 4 Abilities 17 l

5 4

3 5

i l

Note: 0 Attempt to distribute topics among all K/A categories; select at least one topic from every K/A category within each tier.

4 Actual point totals must match those specified in the table.

]

l 0

Select topics from many systems; avoid selecting more than two or three K/A topics from a given system unless they relate to plant-specific priorities.

0 Systems / evolutions within each group are identified on the l

j associated outline.

9 The shaded areas are not applicable to the category / tier.

23 of 39 NUREG-1021 Interim Rev. 8, January 1997 i

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Revision 0 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

Form ES-401-5 ES-401 Facility:

South Texas Project Date of Exam:

6/1/98 Exam Level:

SRO Topic Imp.

Pts Category K/A #

ggCFR (b) 3.9 2.1.10 (1)

K/O conditions / limitations in the facility license 3.8 conduct of 2.1.11 (2)

K/O <1 hour T.S. action statements Operations 2.1.13 (5)

K/O facility rea. for controlling 2.9 vital / controlled access 3.3 2.1.29 K/O how to conduct / verify valve lineups 4.0 2.1.33 (2)

Ability to entry conditions to T.S.

5 Total 3.2 rocess for conducting K/O p/ experiment not described in FSAR 2.2.7 (3) test 3.8 K/O taccino and clearance procedures 2.2.13 4.1 con rol 2.2.22 (2)

K/O LCOs and safety limits Equ pment 3.8 K/O SRO fuel handling responsibilities 2.2.31 (7) 4 Total 3.0 K/O 10CFR20 and facility radiation 2.3.1 (4) control reauirements 2.9 2.3.2 (4)

K/O facility ALARA program 3.4 2.3.9 (4)

K/O process for performing a Control containment purae 3

Total 3.6 2.4.18 K/O specific bases for EOPs 4.3 2.4.21 (5)

K/O parameters / logics used,to assess the status of safety functions 3.3 Emergency K/O facility protection reg, including Procedures 2.4.26 fire brigade and fire fighting and Plan eauipment usaae 4.0 2.4.40 (5)

K/0 SRO's responsibility in emergency plan implementation 4.0 K/O emergengy plan protective action 2.4.44 (5) recommendations 5

Total 17 Tier 3 Target Point Total (SRO)

l Appendix D Scenario Oethne Form ES-D-1 l

l l

Facility: South Texas Project Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 1 Session 1 Examiners: El evaluating UI Onerators: SRO-U1 RO-U2 BOP-U3 Session 2 Examiners: E2 evaluating U4 Operaton: SRO-U4 RO-U5 BOP-U6 Objectives: Evaluate the Unit Supervisor's decision making abihty during escalating steam generator tube leakage. The crew's ability to protect plant personnel and the public during a release of radioactive materials due to a ruptured and faulted steam generator will also be evaluated. Familiarity with the EOPs including the User's Guide will also be evaluated due to the procedural transition demands during a mptured and faulted steam generator as well as the unavailability of a bank 1 steam dump. This scenario is designed to evaluate the crew's ability to respond to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture with a containment bypass due to the safety leaking by since this event is the top ranking core damage sequence in accordance with the site specific Probabilistic Risk Assessment.

Initial Conditions: 25% power,8,I40 MWD /MTU Turnover: The Unit is at 25% power, maintaining power until chemistry levels are acceptable for power increase. Start CCW Pump IB and secure CCW Pump 1 A to allow inspection of the inboard pump bearing.

Bank 1 Steam Dump Valve PV-7493 has been manually isolated due to excessive seat leakage.

Event Malf. No.

Event Event No.

Type

• Description 1

N/A N

Shift Operating CCW Pumps.

2 1-38-2 1

Power Range NI-42 Fails Low.

3 8-23-2 C

Condensate Pump #12 Trips.

4 5-3-2 M

Steam Generator IB tube leakage escalating value to Safety Injection required leak rate. Design Basis Accident leakage rate immediately after the reactor is tripped.

5 5-5-2 C

Safety on ruptured Steam Generator IB leakage after the reactor is tripped.

6 Panel C

Charging line OCIV fails to close upon receipt of a Safety Injection Graphics signal.

Overide l

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor. All event types apply only to the SRO l

position.

Rev 0

Form ES-D-1 Scenario Outline Appendix D Facility: South Texas Project Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: I l

Session 1 Examiners: E2 evaluating U2 Operators: SRO-U2 RO-U3 BOP-UI i

Session 2 Examiners: El evaluating US Operators: SRO-U5 RO-U6 BOP-U4 Objectives: The Unit Supervisor's ability to protect plant personnel and the public is evaluated during a fai of the Contaimnent Ventilation Isolation signal to isolate the Containment Supplemental Purge in progress. The ability to diagnose events is evaluated during a loss of a 4.16 KV ESF Bus which results in a loss ofletdowm.

Familiarity with proceduralimmediate actions and the ability to take timely actions to mitigate events is evaluated during a Teold instrument failure which will result in an unexpected rod insertion.

Initial Conditions: 100% Power,8,000 MWD /MTU Turnover: Secure Closed Leop Auxiliary Cooling Water Pump #11 due to high vibration. Supplemental Purge is in progress.

I Event Malf. No.

Event Event No.

Type

• Description 1

N/A N

Shift operating Closed Loop Auxiliary Cooling Water Pumps.

2 2-25-2 I

Reactor Coolant System temperature instrument Loop 1 Tcold fails high.

3 10-11-3 C

Loss of 4.16 KV ESF Bus EIC due to overcurrent lockout.

4 2-1-1 M

Large Break LOCA Reactor Coolant System Loop 1 A.

5 Rose I

Failure of Containment Ventilation Isolation Signal Train A.

Schematics 6

4-16-2 C

Containment Spray Pump IB Trips after checked in EOOO 7

8

• (N)onnal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor. All event types apply only to the SRO position.

Rev0

...__._._e E

1 1

l l

l Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: South Texas Project Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 1 Session 1 Examiners: El evaluating U3 Operators: SRO-U3 RO-U1 BOP-U2 Session 2 Examiners: E2 evaluating U6 Operators: SRO-U6 RO-U4 BOP-US l

Objectives: Evaluate the crew's ability to diagnose plant events as well as protect plant personnel and the l

public during a radioactive leak in the Auxiliary Building. Evalente the Unit Supervisor's ability to direct j

appropriate actions to control the plant and minimize transients during a loss of vacuum with power slightly above the turbine trip / reactor trip setpoint. Evaluate the crew's ability to diagnose events and take required actions during a slowly increasing steam break inside the reactor containment building. Evaluate the crew's ability to initiate contingency actions as directed in the EOPs based on a failure of an MSIV to close.

Initial Conditions: 55% Power,8,000 MWD /MTU, fuel pre-conditioning limits have been met, power increase in progress.

Turnover: The 85 gpm letdown orifice is to be placed in service and the 120 gpm letdown orifice is to be secured to allow flow verification for the 85 gpm orifice. Power increase in progress, fuel pre-conditioning limits have been met.

Event Malf. No.

Event Event i

No.

Typc*

Description 1

N/A N

Swap letdown orifices.

l l

2 2-19-1 I

Pressurizer pressure instrument PT-455 fails low.

3 3 12-1 C

20 gpm letdown line leak outside containment..

l 4

7-2-1 C

Slowly escalating condenser air inleak. age.

5 5-2-3 M

Slow increasing fault on S/G IC inside the Reactor Containment Building.

6 5-7-3 C

Main Steam isolation Valve IC fails to close until local actions taken to close.

l 7

8 l

f

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (1)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor. All event types apply only to the SRO l

position.

Rev 0 4

Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 ES-301 South Texas Project 6/01/98 Exam OPERATING TEST NO.

1 Applicant Evolution Minimum Scenario Number Type Type Number 1

2 3

4 Reacti'vity 1

Normal 1

Instrument 2

R0 Component 2

Major 1

Reactivity 1

Normal 0

Instrument 1

As RO Component,

1 Ma.ior 1

SRO-I Reactivity 0

Normal 1

Instrument 1

As SR0 Component 1

Major 1

Reactivity 0

Normal 1

1 1

1 SRO-U Instrument 1

2 2,5 2

Component 1

3.5,6 3,6 3,4,6 Major 1

4 4

5 Rev 0 Instructions: (1) Enter the operating test number and Forn ES-D.1 event numbers for each evolution type.

(2) Reactivity manipulations t be 1 if ant as d fined in Appendix 0.

Author: h/lAL A-

/2.[ tid 7

[

Chief Examiner:

NUREG-1021 1 of 26 Interim Rev. 8. January 1997

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 South Texas Project Exam 6/01/98 Applicant Applicant Applicant

1. U1/U4

1. U2/US

1. U3/U6 SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U i

i Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1

2 3

4 1

2 3

4 1

2 3

4 l

Understand and Interpret 2

2 2

2 1

2 Annunciators and Alarms j

Diagnose Events 4

3 2

2 5

5 2

3 and Conditions Understand Plant 3

3 4

3 4

3 3

3 i

and System Response Comply With and 1

1 1

4 1

1

)

Use Procedures (1) l Operate Control 1

4 3

2 Boards (2)

Communicate and 5

3 4

3 4

5 2

4 Interact With the Crew Demonstrate Supervisory 4

5 4

Ability (3)

Comply With and 2

2 2

Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1)

Includes Technical Specification compliance for an R0.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SR0s.

Rev 0 Instructions:

Circle the applicant's license type and enter the event numbers that test the competency for,each scenario in the set.

l

./

/2/22[f;7 Author:

,n,r u

Chief Examiner: v NUREG-1021 1 of 26 Interim Rev. 8. January 1997

Form ES-301-1 Administrative Topics Outline ES-301 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Examination: 06/01/98 Examination Level: SRO Operating Test Number:

I Administrative Describe method of evaluation:

Topic / Subject

1. ONE Administrative JPM Description K/A: 2.1.3[3.4]K/O Shift turnover practices A.1 Conduct of Operations TITLE: Review Control Room Logs (A1)

Conduct of K/A: 2.1.33[4.0] Ability to recognize indications for system Operations operating parameters which are entry level conditions for Tech Specs.

TITLE: Review ESF Power Availibility Surveillance Results (A2)

K/A: 2.2.13[3.8]K/O tagging and clearance procedures A.2 Equipment Control TITLE: Review a Faulted Tagout (A3) i A.3 Radiation K/A: 2.3.10[3.2] Ability to control radiation releases Control TITLE: Review and Approve a Liquid Rad Release (A4)

A.4 Emergency K/A:2.4.44 [4.0] K/O E-Plan protective action Plan recommendations TITLE: Determine Emergency Action Levels (A5) l Rev 0 l

l l

NUREG-1021 1 of 26 Interim Rev. 8. January 1997

15-301 Individual Walk-lhrougt1 lest Outime l'o11n 16-301-2 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Examination: 06/01/98 Exam Level: SRO(U)

Operating Test No.: 1 System / JPM Title / Type Safety Planned Follow-up Questions:

Codes

• Function K/A/G - Importance - Description

1. Residual Heat Removal.

IV

a. APE 025AA101 [3.7] Ability to Shift RHR Trains.

monitor heatup rates during loss of (S)(M)(A)(L)

RHR.

b. 004000A413 [2.9] Ability to monitor VCT level control.

2. PZR Relief Tank.

V

a. 026000K408 [4.3] Knowledge of Feed and Bleed the Pressurizer interlocks which provide auto swapover Relief Tank.

for recirc phase.

(S)(D)

b. 028000A201 [3.6] Ability to monitor changes in parameters including H2 Recombiner power setting.

3. Electrical,125 VDC VI

a. EPE 055EA105 [3.6] Ability to Class 1E.

monitor battery when approaching fully Place a Class 1E 125 VDC discharged.

Batte Charger in Service.

b. 063000K302 [3.7] Knowledge of effects of a loss of DC on components using DC power

4. Rod Control.

I

a. GEN 2.1.12[4.0] Ability to apply Startup the Rod Control Tech Specs to a given system Y

b. 001000K409 [4.0] Knowledge of p

)

interlocks which provide for recovery of a dropped rod.

5. Boric Acid.

II

a. GEN 2.3.1[3.0] Knowledge of Locally Align Alternate 10CFR20 and facility radiological Buration Flowpath, control requirements.

}I )( )

b. GEN 2.1.12[4.0] Ability to apply Tech Specs to a given system.

l

• Type Codes: (D)irect from bank. (H)odified from bank. (N)ew. (A)lternate path. (C)ontrol room.

(S)1mulator. (L)ow-Power. (P)lant. (R)CA Rev 0 NUREG-1021 1 of 26 Interim Rev. 8. January 1997 l

l t

i

Scenario Overviews

)

Overviews of each scenario are described below to provide additional information beyond that provided in the outline to help answer questions concerning scenario details i'

Scenario #1 The crew will Shill Operating CCW Pumps per shill turnover direction. NI-42 fails and as soon as the correct Tech Specs are addressed Condensate Pump #12 trips. When the crew has the standby Condensate Pump in service a slowly escalating S/G Tube Leak occurs. The crew will take actions in the Off-Normal procedure and end up tripping the reactor based on procedure direction due to the inability to maintain VCT level. Once the reactor is tripped the S/G Tube Leakage escalates to DBA value and a Safety on the same S/G begins to leak. The crew will need to address the failure of the charging OCIV to shut (can be shut by local rnanual operation). During the cooldown in E030 the crew will need to take actions to per the EOP User's Guide to compensate for the out of service steam dump valve during the RCS cooldown in E030. The scenario will be terminated once the crew has the faulted / ruptured S/G isolated and has commenced the RCS cooldown in E030.

Procedural Flowpath Normal Operating Procedure POP 02-CC-0001 used to shift CCW Pumps j

Offnormal Procedure POP 04-NI-0001 used to address NI failure Annunciator Response Procedure POP 09 used to address Condensate Pump Trip Offnormal Procedure POP 04-RC-0004 used to address S/G Tube Leakage Reactor Trips and the following EOPs should be entered - EOOO, E020, E030 l

ES-301-4 Attributes Breakdown e Total Malfunctions Events 2,3,4,5,6

• Malfunctions After EOP Entry Safety fails open and charging OCIV fails l

. Major Transients Faulted / Ruptured S/G t

. EOPs entered requiring substantive actions EO20, EO30

• EOP Contingencies Requiring Substantive Actions ;

i f-

1 Seenario #2 The crew will shift Closed Loop Auxiliary Cooling Water Pumps per shin turnover direction. Once the Closed Loop Auxiliary Cooling Water Pumps have been shined an RCS Tcold RTD will fail high resulting in rod insertion due to rods being in automatic at 100% power. Aner the crew has addressed Tech Specs for the Thot failure a loss of 4.16 KV ESF Bus E1C will result in a loss ofletdown. This will require the crew to make preparations to place excess letdown in service to control RCS mventory. Aner the SRO l

directs actions to place excess letdown in service a Large Break LOCA will occur. Aner the LOCA the crew will need to address a failure of the Containment Ventilation Signal which is significant since the containment purge valves were open prior to the event and will not receive a close signal. Aner the crew checks the Contamment Spray Pumps running in EOOO Containment Spray Pump 1B will trip. The crew should make a brief l

l transition to FRP1 and exit at the first step based on LHSI pump flow. The crew should then enter FRZ1 based on increasing containment pressure due to only one of three Containment Spray Pumps available. The scenario will be tenninated shortly after the crew transitions to E010.

Procedural Flowpath i

Normal Operating Procedure POP 02-AC-0001 used to shin Closed Loop ACW Pumps.

Offnormal Procedure POP 04-RP-0004 used to address RTD failure Annunciator Response Procedure POP 09 and Offnonnal Procedure POP 04-CV-0004 used to address the charging pump trip and loss ofletdown.

The following EOPs should be entered - EOOO, FRP1, FRZl, E010 ES-301-4 Attributes Breakdown

. Total Malfunctions Events 2,3,4,5, and 6 e Malfunctions Aner EOP Entry CVI fails & CTMT Spray Pump Trip e Major Transients Large Break LOCA e EOPs entered requiring substantive actions E010 e EOP Contingencies Requiring Substantive Actions FRZ1 l

Scenario #3 The crew will be directed to swap letdown orifices prior to continuing with the power increase. Once letdown orifices have been swapped a pressurizer pressure instrument will fail. This pressurizer pressure instrument failure was placed in the scenario based on a similar event occurring recently to one of the operating units. After the crew has addressed Tech Specs for the pressurizer pressure instrument failure a small letdown line leak will occur on the piping in the MAD. Once the crew has taken actions to isolate the letdown leakage a condenser air inleakage event will initiate. The rate of condenser air inleakage will gradually increase. This slowly increasing rate of condenser air inleakage will result in the crew taking actions to reduce power to both decrease the rate of vacuum loss and avoid a reactor trip if the turbine is tripped below 50% power. The loss of letdown flow gains significance at this point due to the limitations placed on boration capabilities due to nonnal charging being isolated while normal letdown is unavailable.

The rate of condenser air inleakage will increase to a value requiring a turbine trip regardless of whether or not power is decreased to less tha will not close from the control room but can be closed locally. The crew may or may not l

enter FRZ1 dependent on the length of time spent in E000 which may allow Containment pressure to decrease to less than the procedural entry value. The scenario will be terminated once the crew has completed the actions of E020.

Procedural Flowpath Normal Operating Procedure POP 02-CV-0004 used swap letdown orifices Offnormal Procedure POP 04-RP-0001 used to address PZR pressure failure Offnormal Procedure POP 04-RC-0003 used to address letdown line leak Offnormal Procedure POP 04-CR-0001 used to address condenser air inleakage The following EOPs should be entered - EOOO, E020, possibly FRZ1 ES-301-4 Attributes Breakdown

. Total Malfunctions Events 2,3,4,5, and 6

. Malfunctions After EOP Entry MSIV fails to close e Major Transients Faulted S/G e EOPs entered requiring substantive actions E020

. EOP Contingencies Requiring Substantive Actions - 0 f

l

JPM OVERVIEW The following information beyond the detail provided for in the test outline form to help answer questions concerning operating JPM details.

The two JPMs designated for simulator setting should be able to be performed at the same time on the simulator. The basic fonnat of the JPM questions has been determined.

A.s currently planned 70% of the JPM questions.will be of the open reference type. The open reference questions have been planned to ensure the candidates will be required to utilize a variety of different reference types. A sampling of the types of open reference documents to be used includes graphs, piping diagrams, electrical diagrams, tech specs, plant curve books, and operating procedures.

Probabilistic Risk Assessment Input The South Texas Project Probabilistic Risk Assessment was reviewed and used as input to determine the content of the examination. A table describing the " Top 15 Core Damage Sequences" included as part of the Project Probabilistic Risk Assessment was reviewed to help identify dominant accident sequences and used as input to the examination. Also a table called " Risk Importance for Operator Actions was rcviewed to identify important operator actions that help drive events to low risk. Two other tables relating to system importance and reliability were reviewed to ensure the systems which were targeted as important to core damage mitigation and those vulnerable to unreliability were addressed on the examination. The latter two tables are titled " Risk Achievement Worth" and " System Importance" The cross-reference below shows items from these tables that were targeted for one of the reasons listed above and cross-references the area of the examination that relates to the items. The cross-reference below is not an attempt to show allitems from these tables and all areas where these items are addressed but is provided to provide examples of how the PRA was addressed in the examination.

PRA Item Description Related Examination Items Simulator scenario includes a DBA Tube Rupture coincident with a S/G Tube Rupture with Containment Bypass. (Top ranking core damage leaking S/G Safety valve on the ruptured S/G. Additionally the written examination contains questions under K/A 038EA2.15 and sequence) 035 A4.06 that relate to this event.

During a S/G Tube Rupture with JPM NRC-1 includes starting an RHR pump and responding to a Containment Bypass the operators are not loss of the same RHR pump.

able to place RHR in service. (Top ranking core damage sequence)

Loss of a vital 125 VDC Bus (Second JPM NRC-3 includes placing a 125 VDC Battery Charger in service.

ranking core damage sequence)

Additionally the written examination contains questions under K/As 055EK3.02,058AK3.01, and 063K2.01 that relate to this event.

Operator actions during an electric power Simulator scenario #2 has the respond to a loss of a 4.16 KV ESF recovery (Top ranking operator action in bus. Also JPM NRC-3 includes placing a 125 VDC Battery Charger the " Risk Imponant Operator Actions" in service. Additionally the written examination contains questions under K/As 055EK3.02,057AA1.06, and 056AK3.02.

table)

Operator initiates RHR is one of the top JPM NRC-1 includes starting an RHR pump and responding to a ranking operator actions in the " Risk loss of the same RHR pump.

Important Operator Actions" table The AFW System rates very highly in All simulator scenarios will require the operator to take some sort of system importance to prevent core actions that involve operation of AFW equipment. These actions will damage and also in potential unreliability, include throttling flow and securing equipment to minimize cooldown. Additionally the written examination contains questions under K/A 054A2.04 and 061 A2.08

Operating Exam 10CFR55.45 Item Cross-Reference The following cross-reference lists the 10CFR55.45 Operating Tests (a) Content section substep to the portion of the operating exam that as a minimum satisfies this substep.

(1) Walk through JPM 4, Startup the Rod Control System (2) Scenario #3, Plant power increase in progress (U3 & Ul)

Scenario #2, Rod Withdrawal while at power (U2 & U3) 3 (3) Walk through JPM #1, RHR Pump Trips (4) JPM 4 Question 1, Question concerning Axial Flux out of normal band.

(5) All scenarios involve challenges to controlling the plant.

(6) All scenarios contain normal, abnonnal, and emergency operating situations.

(7) Walkthrough JPM #1, Shifting RHR pumps.

(8) Admin JPM #A4, Review and Approve a Liquid Radiation Release. Walkthrough JPM #5 involves operation of the Boric Acid System. Additionally all scenarios contain sorne sort of challenge to mitigating radioactive releases.

(9) Walkthrough JPM #5, results in an RCA entry. Also JPM #5 Question #2 discusses requirements if a radiation monitor is out of service.

(10) Walkthorugh JPM #5, results in an RCA entry. Also JPM #5 Question #1 discusses facility rad control requirements.

(11) Admin JPM #A5, requires declaration of Emergency Action levels.

(12) Admin JPM #A1, requires a log review which is ajob position requirement.

(13) All scenarios require functioning within the control team.

a

.. ~.

. - ~. ~ _ ~ - ~

~.. ~.. ~. - - - ~. ~. - ~.

.~.--

lasued 12/30/97 CHIEF EXAMINER OUTLINE COMMENTS - SOUTH TEXAS 6/1/98 WRITTEN

~ How does KA 000076AK3.05 relate to 10CFR55.43(b)(6)? Resolution: Changed t

reference to 'sOCFR55.43(b)(2).

How do KAs 000055EK3.02,000056AK3.02, and 000009EK3.21 relate to 10CFR55.43(b)(2)? They appear to involve EOPs, not Technical Specifications.

Resolution: Changed references to 10CFR55.43(5).

ADMINISTRATIVE TOPIC OUTLINE Reptr.ce JPM A4 for the following reasons: 1) The SRO can not authorize the I

release; therefore this JPM does not have a high enough importance rating.

2) Because it was used on the last exam, it would not be unexpected for the applicants to prepare for this task. Resolution: 1) The SRO does approve this release. 2) JPM was replaced because of second comment.

WALKTHROUGH OUTLINE P

. Which one of the Subcategory B.1 tasks involves an engineered safety feature? At

+-

least one of these tasks must relate to an ESF and should be so designated on the outline. Resolution: Designated JPM 3 as ESF. Also, new JPM 4 was designated l

ESF.

For JPM 4, Question "a," avoid Technical Specifications questions which do not test system knowledge. Resolution: JPM 4 was replaced and new questions no involving Technical Specifications were prepared.

As described, it appears that JPM 5 applies to Safety Function 1. This would result in JPMs 4 and 5 applying to the same safety function. Each task must apply to a unique safety function. Question "a" is not appropriate for a systems task. For Question "b" avoid Technical Specifications questions which do not test system knowledge. Resolution: JPM 4 was replaced with one applying to Safety Function

11. JPM 5 was replaced because of similarity to a JPM on the last exam and i

appropriate questions were developed.

l SCENARIOS GENERAL i

Complete Forms ES-301-5 and ES-301-6 for applicants only in SRO position. An examiner will not be assigned to specific applicants in the RO/ BOP positions.

However, where there are actions for the RO/ BOP, they should be covered in detail on Form ES-D-2 to assist in performing a top level evaluation. Resolution: Forms were revised appropriately.

P

9 e

lasued 12/30/97 We recommend validation of timing for spec'ific malfunctions to assist in estimating

+

an overall time line for each scenario. Resolution: Appropriate validation times for specific malfunctions were included with scenario documents.

lt will be necessary to develop a backup scenario. Resolution: Developed a backup scenario.

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