ML20133L974

Forwards Descriptions of Objectives & Scope of 1985 Emergency Preparedness Exercise,In Response to NRC 840209 Request

ML20133L974
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	05/02/1985
From:	William Jones OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
LIC-85-176, NUDOCS 8510240398
Download: ML20133L974 (4)

Text

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tmnam c. Jone, Omaha Public Power District We Ptew1ent 1623 Harney Omaha. Nebraska 68102 402/536 4000 gggg g g ~h May 2, 1985 ' I LIC-85-176

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._ @ i Mr. R. D. Martin, Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011  ;

Reference:

Docket No. 50-285

Dear Mr. Martin:

Fort Calhoun Station 1985 Emergency Preparedness Exercise The Commission requested Omaha Public Power District, by February 9, 1984 correspondence, to provide the description of the scope of the annual emergency exercise and the objectives to be fulfilled by this exercise approximately 75 days prior to the exercise. Accordingly, the subject information is provided in Enclosures 1 and 2 for the upcoming Fort Calhoun Station's 1985 emergency exercise. Copies of this information are also being provided to the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Director, Division of Emergency Prepared-ness and Engineering Response.

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G50502 5 ' ( w' PD W. C. ones Vicefl resident cc: Mr. Patrick J. Breheny Regional Director Federal Emergency Management Agency Region VII Old Federal Office Building, Room 300 911 Walnut Street Kansas City, Missouri 64106 Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement ~

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 '

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Enclosure 1 1985 EERGENCY EXERCISE OBJECTIVES

1. Ensure the activation of the OPPD emergency organization including the Operations Support Center (OSC), Technical Support Center (TSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) to test the capability of the Initial Response Organization and Emergency Recovery Organization.

2. Ensure that notification to state, local, and regulatory agencies and offsite support groups are performed to test the communication networks and the effectiveness of interface between these agencies.

3. Test the emergency response capabilities of OPPD, state authorities, local support agencies, and appropriate federal agencies.

4. Test the public notification system and require protective actions to be taken for the plume exposure and ingestion pathways. They may include evacuation (simulated or actual) of offsite areas.

5. Exercise the capability to provide periodic pubite infomation releases.

6. Test the emergency response capabilities of designated offsite emergency medical facilities and ambulance services.

7. Test the adequacy and content of the Radiological Emergency Respone Plan (RERP).

8. Test the adequacy and content of the Emergency Plan Implementing Proce-dures (EPIP's).

9. Test the emergency equipment and its use.

10. Test the abilities of operating personnel and emergency response person-nel to properly classify emergencies.

11. Test the protective actions for onsite personnel.

12. Test the capabilities of of fsite monitor teams to locate monitor points, measure airborne concentrations, and report results.

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f' dy /f Enclosure 2 1985 EMERGENCY EXERCISE SCENARIO DESCRIPTION The 1985 annual emergency exercise at the Fort Calhoun Station will commence with the reactor in operation at a nominal full power. High pressure safety injection pump SI-2B is out-of-service for maintenance. Parts have been re-ceived, and it is estimated that the pump will be returned to service by the end of the day. Inspection of fuel discharged from the previous cycle is in progress at the spent fuel pool. The charcoal filter, VA-66 is in service.

A " Notification of Unusual Event" will be declared due to the failure of a safety valve on a chlorine cylinder stored on the loading dock. The chlorine gas is smelled by personnel in the cafeteria which is located above the load-ing dock. All necessary notifications and actions will be taken in accord-ance with the Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP's).

Approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after the declaration of a " Notification of Unusual Event" and while conducting discharged fuel inspections in the auxiliary building using the "CE super-stand," the spent fuel handling machine (FH-12) operator encounters a hoist overload condition when attenpting to renove a fuel assent >ly from the inspection stand. The hoist elevation indicator shows that approximately three feet of upward movement occurred prior to reaching the overload interlock. The CE operator of the inspection stand observes that the switch for clamping the fuel assembly into the inspection stand is still in the " secure" position. The assembly is unclamped and the FH-12 op-erator lowers the assembly back into the stand. Upon returning the assembly to the stand for examination of potential damage, local alams are received from both the portable air radiation monitor and the Victoreen VAMP (FH-12 radiation monitor). All personnel evacuate the area. Upon receipt of a high level alarm from the stack radiation monitor RM-062 in the control roon, an

" Alert" is declared. Approximately 30 minutes af ter the Alert has been de-clared, the fuel inspection team returns to the spent fuel pool area wearing self-contained breathing apparatus. Upon examination of the fuel assembly, severe damage to the third and fourth spacer grids is observed. Fuel inspec-tion is teminated following video-taping of the damage.

Approximately one hour af ter declaration of the " Alert" status, a low level alam on safety injection tank SI-6D is received in the control room. Oper-ations personnel decide to fill SI-60 using a high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump via loop injection valve HCV-320, rather than transferring water from one safety injection tank to another. During the process of filling the tank, reactor coolant system (RCS) loop isolation check valve SI-212 fails open with pieces of the valve making their way up the piping and blocking open check valve SI-198 and valve HCV-320. The safety injection line is pressurized to 2100 psia from the RCS loop injection point back to the HPSI pumps. Pressurization of the line results in a mpture downstream of HCV-304 in the safety in,jection pump roon (Roam 21). The RCS leak rate is detemined to be less than the charging pump capacity. An operator is dispatched to the safety injection pump roam to look for the leaks. The operator is burned by leaking steam and is contaminated. He is taken to the UNO Hedical Center for treatment. Control room personnel attempt to close HPSI header isolation valve HCV-306, however, the valve is damaged and remains in the open post-tion. HPSI pump SI-2B, -2C discharge, cross-connect valve HCV-304 and loop

$g0g,,ma injection valve HCV-321 are successfully closed, and HPSI flow out the break (from SI-2A and SI-2C) is prevented. The break size increases and the charg-ing ptsap capacity is exceeded. A " Site Area Emergency" is declared approxi-mately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after declaration of an " Alert" due to a loss of coolant acci-dent in which the RCS leak rate exceeds the charging pump capacity. An oper-ator and maintenance personnel are dispatched to containment to attempt to close HCV-320.

Approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> af ter the declaration of a " Site Area Emergency," fail-ure of the two, in-service HPSI pumps (SI-2A and SI-2C) occurs due to the steam and flooding from the rupture in Room 21. A " General Emergency" is declared due to a small break LOCA with failure of the ECCS to perfonn which may lead to core degradation or melt.

Approximately 1 to 1-1/2 hours after declaration of a " General Emergency,"

the Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS) indicates that uncovery of the core is occurring. The high-range stack monitor, RM-063, indicates an increasing level in the radioactive release fram the auxiliary building.

Approximately 1/2 hour later, after continued attempts to close HCV-320, the valve closes and the LOCA is tenninated. A very slow refill of the core begi ns.

Radiological monitoring teams will be dispatched, both onsite and offsite, concurrent with the main scenario starting with initial indications of a re-lease. Teams will track the plume of released activity and verify dose / con-centration projections. The plume will be in Sectors Q and R and later shift to Sectors A and B. This will ensure that both the Iowa and Nebraska re-sponse organizations are able to demonstrate their ability to perform the remaining items of their 5 year objectives.

The accident scenario will be moved forward in time to allow radiation levels to decrease belw emergency action level guidelines for the " General Emer-gency" classification which will allow de-escalation to a " Site Area Emer-ge ncy. " The emergency exercise will then be tenninated.