ML20126D229
| ML20126D229 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 04/11/1980 |
| From: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004220407 | |
| Download: ML20126D229 (190) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:.. l l pa arouq s. U NIT E D STATES N UCLE AR REG UL ATORY COMMISSION in the matter of: SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT O RANCHO SECO DOCKET NO. 50-312 l l l Place: Sacramento, California Date: Friday, April 11, 1980 Pages: 1794 to 1984 l i INTERNATIONAL VERBATIM REPORTERS, INC. 499 SOUTH CAPITOL STREET. S. W. SUITE 107 l O- WASHINGTON D. C. 20002 202 484-3550 8 0 0 4 2 2(Mto7
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i ll J 11 :2mD EXIEDIT . For. i.d.entification In Evidence 9 I i P. No. 3 1802 1.3 Ma. 4 1812
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1 1797 , O t . E. E E E E E E I E E S 1; u . I MRS. DOEEDS: Er. Viebh, please raise your right l
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e I. hand. i .", l Khereupon, S .. CLIFFORD 11. ITEBB (3 l wao called as a vitaess, being first duly sworn, was I ., I / i . avanined and tactified ns f6110ws: 2 MRS. BOFERS: N o'<l , bcfore we get started, CEC e Exhibit 5 wat Ibthlbit 1 of tir. Webb i a testino:ay, :.s that 10 t correct? 1 11R . ULLISON: That's corre.ct, ) 12 i MRS. DONERS: And in his narrative testimony, t 3 13 t of courac he refers to this Exhibit 1. i \ 14 l
\ MR. ELLICON- Por tle raccrdr I would also point l .g -
l ' cut that txhibit a in Mr. ibbb's tectinony has buen i
.c j iden'cified in this pro m eding no CEC 24, and FYhibit 4
, t I .. . l , in Mr. Echb'is testimony has been identified and c6.titted i: 1;; h s
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' in this proceeding: au CUC 23. /
p' MRS. ECTORS : Itra. you ready? i 'm' l 1 MR. ELLh.SOUh Yoe, ma'am. I
' U D1RE.CT EKM11 NATION i "
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e l BY ML ELLISON: d_ Mr. Uebb, c'.o you neve before you a doctwnut ? O 24 cntitled 'The Prepared Direct h eimony of Clifford Pf., Webb, ( -.
" 'Cononrai.ug Design Sennitivities of the Eabcock S.Filcax l ,
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l 179a 1 Nuc1 car Nuclear Steam Gupplios"? , 2 j A .Yes, I do. 3 Do you also have beforp you attached to that docu-
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'I ment a document entitled " Statement of Affiliatioris and S Onnlificationo, Mr. Clifford M. Webb"?
0 A Yes, I do. 7 Q Point out for the record that Statement of Affilia-i 0 tiona and Qualifications / that was originally profiled Jith i 9 this testimony is not the onc referrod to he:.e, but one
- 10 cJaat was distributed to the Board and all parties in th'e l
4 l 11 ' previonn ecscion hcro. 12 Mr. Fiebb, varo those docwcants prepared by you ' your direction? 13 or at i j j M A Yes, they are, j 15 O And are the fccto stated tharein true aad correct i i 16 to the bavr of year knowledge? ;
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d- 17 A Yas, they are. Ao ,
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, fa Q Do you hava any additionn or correctiona to.rpi4o ,t ! . .. Wbi '!! i 19 in thesa docmsants? I j i .i l : 20 A In my testinony that haa ba9n prefilad, therecero > l - ! 21 acce aditerial coricctions which % can go through at tLf.s.t, , u , .l l 22 I ti rac . ,' ] O. l l . , 23 To bcgin, with, on ps;o 1,1 in regarda to my
, F 24 employmmt by th California Enorgy Coniosion as a - >;-
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.25 i projcet 9unager, I recently.been reassigned and ait ncWL '
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1 i f 1799 j i < 1 divinicn chief of the Eagincoring nrd Environcontal Diviuior l l 2 for tne California Energy Cc mienion. l I 3 1 On page 2, cocond paragraph, after ,the first
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4 paragraph starting on that page, in the cixth line where i 5 challengun hac been nicapelled. Also on paga 5, second 6 paragraph which begins, "I em catscerned," tha second to the f 7 lact. lina, which raads, "Sensitivition, not just thosc which neck to offect " chould b2 struck. It should read, 3 1 ' 1 I D
*aee! to centrol the conscquencas of thco cencitivi. tic % "
I i 10 Page d, the leading paragraph next to the last 1 1 1 1e uentence, the word "de.scription," has been rir.cpellad.. ] j 12 On page B, the ancond paragraph starting in I 13 Rommt numerulo Soction II, the next to the lant sentence > l 1.; on the next to the laat lina, which reada from the 3:3 proceding line, "The acnsitivitiec," the worb "preuented," j ;g j nhnuld bo inserted, such that it reads, " presented to the i j p! ACRS on January 8, 1900." f Could you do that ngain, pleaso? l ;3 DR . COM. : THE ??I'i:I!E3S: The recond paragraph abarting g i
! with Roman numOral II, the accond to the Inst sentenes 70
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! s, j of that paragraph., c3an sitivitie ri" goun ovor f. rom the ; i u I preceSing line, and after that word should bo inserted the' t 9 73 word "precented." And one laat correction to note i:s pape 13c sacond 2; g ' 23 , l line from.the bottom of that page, the word "largely" hac {, : 1
p I i e l'1' 4 . t 1800 l 1 boon mienpolled. It nhould read, "an a matter of," the i 1, i word icrgely."
- 2 F 3 DR. Cols
- Mr. Webb -- ;
J . A THE WITNESS: That concludes my editorial cor-1 3 rections. ,
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'3 DR. COLE: Mr. Webb,Jon page 9, at the top, th'c 7 cocond word "imbob:3m$nt," you mean inbrittlement'"/
i ! 6 THE WITNESS: Yes, imbrittlementi thank you. l 9 MR. T'ILLISON: Mrs. Bowere, for tha racord, because. q -. . . . j 10 thero'P bean sono confecibn with respect to what has been l 11 included in the transcripts, I would like to stats that i G 12 I provided to the reporter 15 copies of the preparad direct 1_ i l, - ) 13 testiw;ny and a otatement of af filiation and qualifications, 4 l 14 but not the attached exhibitd. The reason for this la l. l m that. two of thoce enhibito are already identified and te admitted into ovidence in this proceeding separately, and i l ;; the other two ar$ not to be admitted as evidence. So, 1 ! l m in order to cvoid confucion, I thought it would be best j ig to provide. the reporter with only the documents-that f 1 20 you move admisnion. So, with that I,would move admicsion- -- g j of the document of preparca direct test 1 mony of Mr. Webb l 5 ne t4 c:11 na his statelt. ant of que.lificationa. u 4 g I would move that be included in .the transcript. j r l g j MR. LE IS: No objection. ; I MnL EbiERS 'Will the documents that you "
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of: )
)
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY ) DISTRICT ) Docket No. 50-312 (SP)
)
(Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating ) Station) )
)
)
Prepared Direct Testimony of Clifford M. Webb (' Concerning Design Sensitivities of the
\v} Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Steam Supply System February 11, 1980 Sponsored by the California Energy Commission O
s Prepared Direct Testimony of Clifford M. Webb Concerning Design Sensitivities of the Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Steam Supply System
}
My name is Clifford M. Webb. I am employed by the California Energy Commission ( " CE C " ) as a Project Manager in the Office of Projects Administration. My resume has previously been submitted in response to discovery requests. I have been active in the design and safety analysis of nuclear power plants since 1974. I have worked as a supervising mechanical systems engineer on a Babcock and Wilcox series 205 nuclear power plant and I was a principal engineer on a study to optimize the emergency core cooling system for the General Atomic Company's High Temperature Gas Reactor. Introduction This testimony primarily addresses three issues: Additional Board Question No. 3,b! CEC Issue 1-1, ! and CEC Issue 1-12.S! - l
- 1. It appears from a Board Notification issued by R. H. Vollmer i on December 5, 1979, that the basic design of the Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) may so closely couple primary system behavior to -)
secondary system disturbances that gross disturbance of the primary system is inevitable for feedwater transients. Further, it seems there are situations in which an operator may not be able to tell exactly what is wrong or what response is appropriate (e.g., over-cooling vis-a-vis a small-break LOCA).
- a. What changes in the system and procedures have been made to ameliorate this situation?
- b. What are the implications for safety or operating {
Rancho Seco before any uncertainties are resolved? 1
- 2. Despite the modifications and actions of subparagraphs (a) through (e) of section IV of the Commission's Order, will reliance upon the High Pressure Injection System to mitigate pressure and volume control sensitivities in the Rancho Seco primary system result in increased challenges to safety systems beyond the original design f~T J and licensing basis of the facility?
- 3. Despite or because of the modifications and actions of _
subparagraphs (a) through (3) of section IV of the Commission's Order ; of May 7, will Rancho Seco experience an increase in reactor trips ' resulting from feedwater transients that will increase challenges , to safety s stems beyond the original design and licensing basis of. . the facilit ?
n< In addition, it will relate to the following Board Questions: CEC 1-2, CEC 1-10, Hursh and Castro No. 21, and Hursh and Castro No. 24. The TMI-2 accident and subsequent analyses by NRC and other groups have revealed that Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) nuclear steam supply systems (NSSS) are unusually sensitive to disruptions in the feedwater system. In particular, the design of the once-through-steam generator (OTSG) makes the B&W NSSS highly vulnerable to undercooling and overcooling events. The undercooling event challegnes the pressure relief and se.fety valves (which have been the subject of post-TMI " fixes ") . The overcooling event can result in auto-matic activation of the high pressure injection (HPI) system. During an overcooling event which activates the HPI system, reactor operators cannot easily determine whether the event is a feedwater transient or whether a small break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) may also be involved. Accordingly, operators are required to treat the event as a small break LOCA until a definitive determination to the contrary can be made. The operator must therefore trip the reactor coolant pumps (RCP), which results in a loss of forced ~ circulr. tion cooling to the core and reliance on natural circulation cooling. The foregoing situation is of particular concern because B&W l NSSS's have historically been more prone to feedwater transients i l i than other PWRs. Moreover, the complex feedwater control system has a number of failure modes which result in overfeed and under-feed events. This raises several concerns regarding the performance limitations of the B&W NSSS which is employed at Rancho Seco. These are as follows: l l 2.
~ _
- 1. The high pressure injection system (HPI) is often being
() used to mitigate insufficient control of primary system pressure and temperature fluctuation caused by OTSG sensitivities. This use of HPI, part of the emergency core cooling system, should not be favored. Such non-emergency use of HPI means that it no longer serves to alert operators to the presence of a LOCA or other serious low probability event. This situation, which contributed to the accident at TMI, has not been remedied at Rancho Seco.
- 2. Small break analyses performed since TMI have shown that HPI may not be capable of maintaining sufficient core cooling inventory when certain size breaks occur in the primary system and the reactor coolant pumps continue operating. Since operators cannot easily discern whether a LOCA is present, let alone its size, they must now trip the RCP's whenever the HPI set point is reached
() because of the possible HPI underdesign.b! Obviously, the absence of the RCP's means there is significantly less defense-in-depth.
- 3. When the RCP's are tripped, the core must be cooled by natural circulation. To date, natural circulation has never been used for core cooling at Rancho Seco, nor, to my knowledge, has -
it been successfully relied upon at any B&W facility following the occurrence of severe transient conditions.
- 4. Natural circulation cooling is unreliable once significant voiding occurs in the primary system. A severe overcooling event, such as may result from excess feedwater flow, may empty the pres-surizer and cause steam bubbles to form in the hot leg. In addition, a serious overcooling event may result in flashing because of the rapid pressure loss experienced under these conditions.
O
- 4. I&E Bull. No. 79-05C, dated July 26, 1979. _
3.
e The foregoing performance limitations inhibit the ability of the Rancho Seco system to cope with the design sensitivity of B&W h NSSS. The actions instituted since TMI at Rancho Seco do not eliminate or significantly reduce these sensitivities. Ra ther , the post-TMI actions are designed to mitigate the consequences of these sensitivities, not eliminate them. In addition, the short-term actions such as the lower high pressure reactor trip set point, the anticipatory secondary side reactor trips, and improved reliability of the auxiliary feedwater system were designed primarily to compensate for the overheating transient event. However, in mitigating overheating events, these measures may have increased the frequency and severity of overcooling events. The focus of this
- testimony will be on the need to eliminate the design sensitivities of the Rancho Seco NSSS in order to ensure that the defense-in-depth concept is maintained. Thus, this testimony will deal with h the following
--The design sensitivities of the B&W NSSS;
--The consequences of these sensitivities, including the increased reliance on natural circulation to -
ensure adequate core cooling;
--The post-TMI-2 actions taken by SMUD, particularly that the design sensitivities of the Rancho Seco NSSS to overcooling events have not been eliminated or significantly reduced; and
--The need to reduce or eliminate the sensitivites of B&W j systems.
l l l 4. l
Discussion () The defense-in-depth concept utilized in nuclear plant licensing demands that all reasonable steps be taken to ensure nuclear power reactor safety. The TMI accident has shown that, at least in part because of inherent design sensitivities, unsafe conditions can result in B&W plants when feedwater transients occur. , Although post-TMI requirements have alleviated some failure modes 1 ( and new operating instructions have been adopted for use during transients, the sensitivity of B&W plants to feedwater transients has not been fixed. This sensitivity is of particular concern because B&W facility's experience more feedwater transients than , other PWR systems (three per year versus two per year) .b! Moreover, the post-TMI actions will apparently increase reactor trips at B&W facilities.5/ Therefore, overcooling events are an increasing () possibility. I am concerned that the basic design sensitivities of the B&W NSSS have not been adequately addressed in the aftermath of TMI. The defense-in-depth concept demands that efforts must eventually focus on steps which eradicate or reduce B&W systems' unique - sensitivities, not just those which seek to offset control the consequences of those sensitivities. I. The Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Steam System is More Sensitive to Feedwater Transients Than Other PWR Systems. The B&W NSSS utilized at Rancho Seco uses a unique OTSG. Unlike other PWR's which use a U-tube steam generator, the B&W OTSG utilizes vertical, straight tubes. The primary coolant enters (} 5. 6. NUREG-0560, p.ld, Ch. 3. See NRC Memorandum entitled, " Primary System Perturbations Induced by Once Through Steam Generator", attached as Exhibit 1. - 5
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the top of the OTSG at slightly above 600 *F, flows down inside the l steam generator tubes, and exits the bottom at about 550*F. The secondary coolant (feedwater) flows in the opposite direction outside 1 the tubes, absorbing heat from the primary coolant. The secondary coolant enters at approximately 400*F and turns to steam about ; 1 half-way up the OTSG. As it travels the remaining length of steam l 1 generator, this steam absorbs more heat and becomes "superheated". The superheated steam is then fed to a turbine for power production. A detailed discription of the OTSG is contained in the Rancho Seco FSAR, Section 4.2.2.2. While this steam generator design has certain operational advantages in that it provides a degree of steam superheat, it has certain distinct disadvantages under transient conditions. First, the B&W steam generator contains a smaller volume of feed-water than the U-tube designs. It therefore becomes filled more quickly than other designs and, when feedwater flow is lost, it boils dry more quickly. Upon a complete loss of feedwater flow, the B&W OTSG will boil dry in approximately one minute.2/ This is relatively rapid by comparison to U-tube steam generators, which - would maintain at least some cooling capacity for about 15 minutes.8/ Thus, because of the small feedwater capacity of the OTSG, small differences in feedwater flow result in large fluctuations in the OTSG liquid level. This particularly concerns me because the complex B&W control feedwater system has a number of failure modes i 7. At full power, the OTSG can boil dry in less than 30 ! seconds. See NUREG-0560, Table 1, pp. 2-7.
- 8. The Palisades Combustion Engineering plant can remove &
stored and decay heat with no makeup for approximately 16 minutes W after a reactor trip. See NUREG-0560, pg. 6-3. 6.
1 l m; which result in overfeed and underfeed. With respect to the B&W () system, the NRC staff has stated:
"The system will often oscillate from underfeed to overfeed conditions, causing a reactor trip and sometimes a high pressure injection initiation".
Exh. 1, pg. 4. The sensitivity of OTSG liquid level to feedwater flow is compounded by yet another concern: the system heat transfer is determined by the liquid level in the OTSG. As I mentioned previously, the feedwater turns to steam as it flows up through the OTSG. The liquid in feedwater side of the OTSG absorbs much more heat than the steam. This is because the heat transfer coefficient depends on whether there is liquid or steam present on the shell sides of the heat transfer tubes. Therefore, if the OTSG liquid level drops, the heat transfer in the OTSG drops n (_) with it, and, if it drops too far, the primary system can be undercooled. Conversely, if the liquid level rises in OTSG, the amount of heat transferred from the primary system to the secondary system can increase greatly. If the liquid level in the OTSG becomes excessive, the primary system can become over- - cooled.O! See Exhibits 1 and 2, attached. Thus, when compared to other PWRs, the B&W NSSS design is doubly sensitive. Small changes in feedwater flow cause relatively large changes in OTSG liquid level; and small changes in OTSG l liquid level cause relatively large changes in the rate of heac 1
- 9. The sensitivity of the Rancho Seco system was emphasized by a Rancho Seco operator. Mr. Morisawa stated: "Feedwater does, l you know, it is a big deal. But you can drop pressure like crazy l by just adding a little bit of cold water." Morisawa Deposition, O
s pg. 15. 1 7.
l transfer from the primary system. These sensitivities closely tie the primary system temperature and pressure to events in the secondary system, especially feedwater transients. This increases the likelihood of both undercooling and overcooling.1S! l II. Ramifications of B&W Design Sensitivities The ramifications of B&W design sensitivities are well docu-l mented and need not be discussed at length herein. I have enclosed an Exhibit 1 an NRC Staff Memorandum, " Primary System Perturbations Induced by once Through Steam Generator", which describes my major concerns. I have also enclosed, as Exhibit 2, excerpts from l recent NRC sponsored analysis of the consequences of the sensitivi-
- ties to the ACRS on January 8, 1980. However, there are several l
l problems which I wish to emphasize. First, the frequent use of the HPI system, especially without a LOCA, cannot be favored. Use of emergency core cooling systems O in situations where a LOCA has not occurred deprives operators of LOCA indication. It may also condition operators to routinely manipulate these systems. The TMI-2 accident was largely the result of such operator manipulation of HPI. New procedures and training since TMI have sharpened operator awareness of the danger of turning off HPI too soon following transients. However, tLis may now lead to other undesirable conditions. For instance, continued operation of HPI without a LOCA may exacerbate other conditions by filling the primary system completely and raising primary system pressure to relief and/or safety valve limits. By maintaining a high reactor vessel pressure, violation of technical specifications (meant to protect the reactor O i 10. The NRC presentation to the ACRS on January 8, 1980 - l summarized these sensitivities. See Exhibit 3, attached. 8.
from embittlement caused by low temperatures and high pressures) () may occur. This is of particular concern at Rancho Seco, which has atypical reactor vessel weldments that are more sensitive to such conditions.11/ In addition, prolonged use of HPI may result in extensive overboarding of coolant that may eventually exceed the capacity of the relief tanks that receive excess HPI flow. Furthermore, in a severe overfeed situation such as those discussed in Exhibits 1 and 2, the sensitivity of the OTSG may cause pressure in the primary system to fall below 1600 psi, thereby initiating HPI . This would require operators to trip the RCP's.bS! I have several concerns related to this procedure. First, reactors are designed and licensed to use the RCP's as the primary means of providing core cooling. A reactor operating procedure which eliminates use of the RCPs for a certain class of events cannot be favored since it means one of the defense-in-depth mechanisms to ensure core cooling has been lost.
- 11. The routine use of HPI may have an additional danger.
At the depositions of SMUD operators, it was revealed that operators may routinely start HPI prior to reaching 1600 psi. Comstock Dep. ~
- 56. This could be a problem if a small break LOCA is present. The start of HPI will delay reaching the 1600 psi set point and delay tripping the RCPs. If RCPs thus continue to run longer than other-wise would have been the case, more liquid may be lost through the break than HPI can make up and the eventual RCP trip at 1600 psi may come too late to avoid a partial core uncovering. I am unable to analyze the dangers of this scenario but suggest that analysis should be made to ensure that SMUD's procedures are consistent with the purposes of I&B Bull. 79-05C.
- 12. Current procedures at Rancho Seco and other PWRs demand that operators manually trip the RCPs whenever a pressure loss reaches the safety features set point (1600 psi). I&E Bull. 79-05C.
When the pumps are tripped, the primary coolant must circulate naturally, without mechanical force. Because of the sensitivities induced by the OTSG, the Rancho Seco system can reach 1600 psi more quickly and more of ten that other systems and, indeed, under O circumstances where no LOCA has occurred. 9.
--r, m
Second, these procedures force reliance on natural circulation cooling. Natural circulation cooling demands operator judgments h requiring a high degree of understanding of the analytical bases of the associated procedures. Rancho Seco has never used natural circulation cooling and, to my knowledge, natural circulation has never been demonstrated in any B&W plant following a severe overcooling event. Nevertheless, natural circulation will he relied upon at Rancho Seco whenever the HPI setpoint is reached. To rely so heavily on a less effective cooling method, especially one requiring a high degree of operator competence, for relatively frequent events does not seem wise. Whenever new and additional operating procedures are required, the potential for operator errors or unexpected situations is increased. Natural circulation conditions do not easily forgive operator errors. Since an undisputed lesson of TMI is that operating errors do occur, the design sensitivities which increase the opportunity and consequences of such errors should be eliminated. Third, the increased reliance on natural circulation in B&W plants is of particular concern because the B&W plant sensitivi- - ties that lead to tripping the RCPs may also lead to flashing (voiding) in the primary system. Natural circulation is not reliable under these conditions.13/ As noted earlier, primary pressure can fall quickly during overcooling events. This causes the primary coolant to shrink substantially, lowering the level in the pressurizer below its measurement range and, for severe occurrences, emptying the pressurizer completely.11/
- 13. Both the Licensee and the NRC Staff have admitted that this is true. See Licensee's Answer to CEC Request for Admission No. 36; NRC Staff's Answer to CEC Request for Admission No. 35. .
- 14. See Exhibit 2.
10.
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s The emptying of the pressurizer is extremely undesirable () since it may form voids or bubbles in other reactor locations (such as the high point of the steam generator hot leg) . This could possibly occur even if the primary system had not reached saturation conditions. Operators may not be alerted to the instabilities caused by such voiding, since they have been instructed that HPI may be secured when 50'F subcooling is verified. If coolant empties from the pressurizer, creating a bubble in the hot leg, natural circulation may be undependable. Furthermore, when the pressurizer empties, operators lose knowledge of primary coolant inventory and the ability to recognize further degredation due to abnormal conditions. In addition, recent analysis suggests that the pressure decline from overcooling can be so rapid as to cause flashing () in the hot leg, again making natural circulation cooling unreliable.bE!
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If natural circulation cannot be achieved af ter stabilization of primary system conditions, core pressure will rise until the relief or safety valves are lifted to prevent overpressurization. This will, of course, discharge heat from the primary system. - However, during this time both forced and natural circulation will be unavailable. Operating without either of these core cooling methods violates the defense-in-depth philosophy. To me, this seems
- 15. See Transcript of ACRS meeting on January 8, 1980, pg.
43. O 11.
e clearly unwise, particularly since such overcooling events are in my mind anticipated events.16/- III. The Post TMI-Fixes The dangers described in the preceding section all relate at least in part, to the B&W reactor systems ' design sensitivi-ties. Since TMI, efforts have been made to control the consequences of some of the sensitivities in an effort to provide reasonable assurances of safety (e.g., the set point for the PORV has been increased, the high pressure reactor trip has been reduced, and an anticipatory secondary side hardwire reactor trip has been installed) . But, as described above, anticipated events can lead to considerably less defense-in-depth than seems wise, notwithstanding these measures. None of the post-TMI fixes which have been installed so llh far--and certainly none of the fixes required by the NRC's May 7 Order--addressed measures to reduce or eliminate the basic design sensitivities of B&W reactor systems. This is surprising since B&W design sensitivities were identified in April, 1979, and are mentioned in the May 7 Order itself. The NRC staff has recognized the need for correcting B&W design. Thus, the staff has stated:
- 16. Recent NRC I&E inspections review of even normal operational B&W plant transients have indicated void formation in the hotter regions of the reactor vessel. According to the NRC staff "there are a number of potential concerns that could arise" if this is bna e . See Exhibit 4, attached, at p. 1.
O 12.
It is felt that good design practice and O maintenance of the defense-in-depth concept, requires a stable well-behaved system. To a large part, meticulous operator attention and prompt manual rction is used on [B&W] plants to compensate for system sensitivity, rather than any inherent design features.
. . . The staff believes that modifications should be considered to reduce the plant sensitivity to these events and thereby improve the defense-in-depth which will enhance the safety of the plant. Ex. 1, pp. 3 and 7.
I believe that the May 7 Order cannot be viewed as adequate j since that Order not only failed to implement any changes to reduce the Rancho Seco design sensitivities, it also failed even i to require that such sensitivities be studied. At a minimum, that Order should have established a strict schedule for study of design modifications to reduce or eliminate the design sensitivities, with (} a requirement that either the NRC or a licensing board operating at NRC's direction, decide which design changes, if any, should - subsequently be implemented. I do not call for massive design modifications which would require expenditures of millions of dollars in return for only marginal safety benefits. I do _ believe, however, that identification of possible design changes is essential so that a rational decision can be made as to whether changes should be required. IV. Conclusion It is a matter lagely of common sense, not technical argument, that the design sensitivities of B&W NSSS's should be eliminated. O
- 13. _
i
With respect to new facilities and those under construction, the (( ) NRC is apparently studying measures to remove the sensitivities 11! and taking steps to ensure that design options remain available.18/ - With respect to operating B&W facilities, elimination of design sensitivities is a more complex matter, if only because of the economic factors which are involved. But, nevertheless , I strongly feel that the sensitivities need to be addressed since they increase both the frequency and severity of challenges to reactor safety. These sensitivities weaken the defense-in-depth concept, the cornerstone of nuclear plant licensing. I have no easy solutions to this problem. Indeed, I believe the NRC, the Licensee, and Babcock and Wilcox may not fully under-stand all the variables that affect the B&W NSSSbE!. But I believe strongly that these sensitivities cannot be tolerated in () the long term, and I urge the Board to make an explicit finding
~
to that effect. At the very least, the Board should direct the Licensee to begin analyzing measures to remove the sensitivities, I rather than continuing to cope with them.
- 17. See Exhibit 1.
- 18. E.g., NRC Letter to TVA, dated October 25, 1979 re Bellefonte Nuclear Plant.
- 19. Some measures to remove the sensitivities have been suggested. See Transcript of ACRS meeting on January 8, 1980, !
pgs. 49-50.
~
14.
I o UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board O In the matter of: )
)
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY ) Docket No. 50-312(SP) DISTRICT )
) 1 (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating ) l Station) )
)
AFFIDAVIT OF CLIFFORD M. WEBH Clifford M. Webb, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says as follows: I have prepared and am familiar with the attached document entitled " Prepared Direct Testimony of Clifford M. Webb". The opinions set forth therein are my own and, to the best of knowledge, the facts set forth therein are true - and correct. d D-Dated: February 11, 1980 < N
~
CLIFFORTM. WEBB Sworn and subscribed before me this lith day of February, 1980. ) Nttu WU thtwtd QtaryPublic
;w-%+e+e v 2 M/-
4
) Ol'l f CI AL. SF, Al.
- j d*,;"t MARY McDEARMID l l 4
, bo 52 Noreay a;cuC.CAttFORNIA ;
~ Princ6cai ctrice in sAcnauta ro c.u,:y r ,
{,3 y
, , p coma.issen En,res r.b ra.19eo ;
y g 1 l
s STATEMENT OF AFFILIATIONS O AND QUALIFICATIONS l l Mr. Clifford M. Webb I l AFFILIATION: i California Energy Commission EDUCATION: Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering - University < of California, Berkeley - June, 1967. l l SPECIAL COURSES: Graduate courses in Advanced Heat Transfer - University of Houston, Houston, Texas - 1967 to 1968. Graduate courses in Atmospheric Science and Remote Sensing - Colorado State University, Ft. Collins, Colorado - 1970 to 1971 NUS Corporation courses in Nuclear Power consisting of the : () three part series being Nuclear Physics and Reactor Design, Reactor Control and Power Conversion, and Reactor Safety ~ and Licensing - Censumers Power Company, Jackson, Michigan - , 1974 to 1975. ! EMPLOYMENT HISTORY : ! 1977 to Present - Energy Analysis and Power Plant Siting, California Energy Commission, Sacramento, California. -- 1974 to 1977 - Nuclear Power Plant Design, Gilbert / Commonwealth j Associates, Jackson, Michigan. ; 1969 to 1974 - Thermophysics Engineer, Martin Marietta Corp., Denver. Colorado. 1967 to 1969 - Thermal Systems Engineer, General Electric Company, Houston Texas. 9 O f i '!
1 s. QUALIFICATIONS: Before joining the California Energy Commission, Mr. Webb has spent the majority of his professional career performing heat transfer and thermodynamic analysis and designing thermal systems. While at General Electric Company from 1967 through 1969, Mr. Webb worked with the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center and was responsible for the environmental simulation and thermal predictions for all spaceflight missions requiring extravehicular activities including Apollo 9 and the first lunar landing missions. While at Martin Marietta from 1969 through 1974, Mr. Webb was a lead engineer res-ponsible for the thermal control design of the electronic and guidance components for the Skylab spacecraft which included one of the largest and most complex thermal modelling, predication and thermal verification test programs ever conducted in the space program. Following his role in the Skylab program, Mr. Webb was assigned to perform atmospheric thermodynamic response predictions for the Viking Mars Lander spacecraft and was subsequently a principal engineer for the design of atmospheric entry and descent probes for Venus and other atmospheric entry probe missions. Mr. Webb was honored in 1973 by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics for his innovative thermal design for atmospheric entry probes and was published in Volume 35 of Progress in Aero-nautics and Astronautics by the MIT Press. Mr. Webb joined the consulting engineering firm of Commonwealth Associates in 1974, and was assigned as the principal staff engineer responsible for the integration, safety analysis, and balance of plant design for nuclear system cooling requirements for a proposed - 1300 MN High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor power plant. Although General Atomic withdrew their HTGR nuclear steam supply system from the commercial market, Mr. Webb was contracted as a special con-sultant by General Atomic to redesign and optimize the Emergency Core Cooling System for the HTGR. Mr. Webb's work in this area resulted in improvements in HTGR design, although the HTGR has re- ~ mained withdrawn from the commercial market. Following Mr. Webb's involvement with the HTGR, Mr. Webb was assigned as a senior engineer and subsequently promoted as the , mechanical system's supervising engineer for a two-unit Babcock and Wilcox Series 205 nuclear power plant project for the Ohio Edison Company known as Erie Nuclear Units 1 and 2. Mr. Webb was responsible for the system design, procurement, and safety analysis of all mechanical equipment within the scope of supply of the Ohio Edison Company. This included such systems as the auxiliary feed-water system, decay heat removal, nuclear service water, fuel pool cooling, ultimate heat sink design, containment air coolers, con-l tainment spray, and all power conversion system design. Mr. Webb was responsible for the analysis and preparation of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report for the Erie Nuclear Project and as a result of this involvement gained knowledge of other B&W plants, including O
- - :.:2 ::. - . - - --
;_-~---' - -- - --- - ---
i i O site inspections of Davis-Besse Unit 1 and Midland Units 1 and 2 during various phases of their construction. Mr. Wubb has also inspected Rancho Seco on two occasions during recent months. Mr. Webb joined the California Energy Commission in 1977 and was responsible for regulatory engineering review of new power plant siting applications before joining the Office of Projects -l Administration where he is currently Deputy Chief of Projects Administration. Mr. Webb is a Registered Professional Engineer in Colorado and l Michigan. 1 s t P o
l- ) i I I I l ! 1602 . 1 l MR. EIJ.,ISON: Mr. Webb is available for cross-i 2 -
- examination. ,
3 CROSS-EXNigNTsTION 4 " tiR..BAXTER: Mrs. ' Bowers, I'd like the reportar i to mark for identification as SMUD Exhibit No. 3, a one-I , l l ... (' page documont which han juct boon dic.tributed and it'N'
~
captioned,." Appendix Statement of Affiliations and"Quab.C ~ < r t fications of parspective witnesa, Mr. Clifford M. Webb " l .?cchibit Moz 3 w&e ' _e ~ ;
, (SMUD : .._: ..K:.
~
1< j ruirked for identification.) 1 lI DK MR. H?3TER: 3 ~., i Q Mr. Webb, can you further identify this as a state , ' 44
' ment of your qua[ific$tions 19hich was attached to CEC's a
j 14 imawrs to the first cat of MRC Staff interrogatoriec l l IU dated Deconber 5, 19797 i
# h A res, I believe that'n correct.
/
0 Uoll, tho stater $ ant of affiliations and qualifi- 5 J ,
; M cahic ta tohich hec been received thist morning 10 trritten f
W j in the third person. Did you prepare that atttement
' (
M1 p ersonr.d.ly? I 4 W. # A Yea, I did. E f Q Why dif you decido to' file the more a::haustive 9 53 statement of qua ific$tiona md affiliatione as part of 3 24 your.testimany today rather than SMUD Exhibit No. 37 75 A I think at the tima we prepared ..
- _ _____t -
. . - . . - - - - - . . - - . -- - --- ..- .- - - - -- - -- - - - -~ - ---
1 i l 1803 , 1
- l i
i recponses to interrc,gatory, I think, as we all know, we're j j l i under deadlines, too, to Tacot -- I did not have time, what 3 I felt it wculd be a prepared statsment of qualifications in :ho 4 i t. type of detail . hat I thought would be of intorest to i 'S , my tectimony today. 6 . . MRS. BOWERS: Well, Mr. Baxter, I know I men-: ) 7 .. . j tiened either at the prehearing conference February 6th , i S ) or when we were,beginning that the statement here, "My 9 .) j resume has been previously submitted in respont.e to ' l to ' discovery requestos," that we wanted a separato qualifica-11 / , tion thing to come in at the time of the testimony. ) 12 XP.. ImXTER: Yos, I was just asking why it was j 15 - . . n different one, in _ . . . i{ BY MR.. BT.XTER: j 1S _. _ g O Now, in the 3HUD E:dlibit No. 3, with recpect to.
- 16 - .-
your emolciyment at General 31cctric from 1967 to l'369, it'
)
! 17 .
, states, " Engineering computer simulation," whereat on Shs n' .
atatement of affiliations received this morning, it says, , 10
" Thermal syster.a angineer,
~
can you explain that change i 2.0 . for ac? R A Yae, I'd ha glad to.
?2.
I. t Uhen I prenm4 the very trief, VME is obviouc'ly u -
,a very brief, statement that wem .ctbnittod with Raaponses to Interrogatories, I felt the title was a little nare in EU .
[ keeping with the duties I also had, but my Official titler j-.-
i l l l
- 1 l
', 1804 j
! i of my position whilo at General Elcetric was, quote, l i 2L l
" Thermal Systcco Engineer." ,
l 5! . . . ifan this your first position 'after re.coiving O A ,
~
your bachelog'sidegree7 r 1 h A Yes, that's correct b .. . 4 Q Now, you atate on pagc 2 of the Statement of ,
.y .. -- .
Qualifications that while at Genorni Electric you vore , I b responsible for environtrental simulation and theridal. pre-9 1 dictions for all space flight miccions requiring cxtra j 10 vehicair activities.- Did you porconally develop the computer simulation prodrano used to perform these thermo-dynanic analyses of upace niscion's? ; ] a 2 13 Yes, we did. A i .4 O You personally daveloped? , 3 13 A I porEenally was an integral party to develop that with two otl r individuals. i D MRG. BOliERS : Excuso Ice, Mr. Baxter, for interrupt - j b U ing. I realine $hcn wo modo the co:mrant about qualifica-i in ~ tiono, it cotkid not have been at the prehearing. We had l t
~o not yet received the file testimony, so it must have.been j the beginning cf our last'negment.
3
' '# L7 MR. BIGTnn:
.Huat was your official title whilo _ you were
'~,
O ) I- .. .
'".. otoploy M dat Ganeral Electric? l
\
I was, quote, "a Ul A I holio m I juct otated that,
l \ a l i I, 1005 l
;j therani systems engineer."
- l 2 f- Q And what was the group or section thrt you were
\ l 3 assigned there? a A We were a small noction of --- when I joined the _ r 3 group, there wore tuo other individuals who directly l l e supported the crew systens division of the MASA Manned 8 i Space Flight Center. 4 1 7l . 4, Q And who wac the head of that section? d l 9 WereycI2 the head of the cecbion? gg l A U0. It was a Dr. Ajayan, l O Did ha revict; your work in thene thorrani pre - I
). ,
32 dictionu? , i I ' A Tes he did. 1..0 p, , O Eny thed wotild you consider that you wre rocponsi- ; I' - ble for the prediationu rather than hira? 2 15 . j A Ee did not write the computer codes, and the' i a wc l' ' 4
. g f pov:connul at NAS? witn wncm I interacted played also a i n .
- primary role into Nore or lecc ianntifying thosa g
areas of the spneu flight missionc for which therraal i responce comuter coden were not available. for which , c.0 : l g predictions did not exist, and it was necessary that this u, .,. stall group waa dire h.;d to develop those, both tbcse codes ; 1 and thom predictione. I could c:cpandl 'on that,. ' if you'd ; L.. ., like to get a little better idea of what had heppaned. - 24 r , , , O Fino r thank you. , e.h.
= - ..... - -.,,m., , _ . . . , , _ _ . , _ . . _ _ , , _ , , , , . , _ _
. _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ . _ . . . . _ . . ~ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
i 1800 LO 1 0 You otste that at Martin-!hriotta, you were I _ l : a lead engineer, is that an assignm'nt e deceription or an l 3 occupation title? j 4 A Well, it certainly is in my mind. It was not ! an occupational title, that was the duties to ubich I 1 5 I ~ i 6 was annigned, and ccMainly I think that' n' a'-- 7 would be a- fairly co: anon description of my duties. . ) g Q Let mc list five enginooring positions at Martin-9 Marietta, and ack you to identify what your technical i j g job c;rade was. 4 j jj Grade 41, associate engincor; grade 43, engineer; , { O g grade 45, senior $ngidecr; grade 47,groupenginc. wry grade j 1g 49, so ior group engineer. - 1 MR. ULLIGOU: ! g Pardon me, Mr. Baxter, would you ) clarify whethor i$ltoso $re ~ what's 'the timeframa for those i 15 3 ca es are. A m d ose present timedrames or categories 16 i 4 that ware in exiEtenco at the. time Mr. Webb vca vaployed ! 17 there? e i BY HR. DIGTER:
- 10
! Q Uare thono c$tegories that vere in existance at l c.O ! the tirac you were craployed et Martin-flarietta? a 2, .,. .. j A They do,-I balieve, were. 'I do reenlh those, e i 1 Q And do ycn recall which grade you - ro? 23 A I b311ev2 my grade was that of an engineer. Q That was grade 437
" .- 1
[ A I holinvo that would bo crude 43. j_
q i i . f i
? 4, ,.
F l ! 1807 , ! ' I Uere you assigned to the thornophyaics section Q 2 of Hartin-Ma.rist.ta? 3 A Yes, I wan. 2 4
Would you any there was roughly 100 engineers i I Q i I j r.
c i s i empicyed in that eaction? J
-{
h At one tim -- it was a very largo section. I _. I ray it wac probably less than 100, but probably
/
could l i f e o grc uter than 60,. i 9 R ni C.cm u.nectios:1 manu;or thero?' l K' ; A Yna, i. Luc mes. i 11 1 0 And below hin, uere there unit henda? i 9 12 i is Tes, ti e ro o :r l
' .? i' A Etat b thc. nm of the unit to v/aich ycu were \
l'
+; ac;0 f.gnad , iiithin the section?
15 I don't ::ecni, but I can -~ originally I waa i f , i Ei , assigad to a proJec: which in a natri:. crgani: ration daos I f 0 nch .coccrd directly chrough -- what you're tllv6ing to l I
- - uotle be thermophycian nanagement. I tras on the Sky Lab I
i . _ if integration cants:Act, reportef. to Sky Lab Integration i M panagement, bania.C 7 vorked independent of therrophysics. ]l i 11 nanancnant direcs. ion. 4 l 1
,0 000 h) allo Telr covo Match Unit cound fe.miliar? '
)
9 z? i A-Yac , d e do c a , N a 1
?. ( i 0- Within the unita, were thera group engineers?.
n .es, t. hare sure. ) 29 l. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ = =_ - . _ - - . - . _ . - . - . _ - - l
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ . __ . . . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ . . . . _ _ . . _ . - . _ . . _ . _ . . _ . I i ' Y 1806 i l - I O Were you a unit houd or a group engincor? 1 1 2 A No, I was not. 3 Q You centinued in this sentence r. we've.been din- l I j ' cussing to state.that you're responsible for. the. i i P thentocontrol design of the niectrodic and guide.nce , l b coraponents for the Sky Lab Spac$ Craft which $icluded one , i , 7-i of tlie largest and cost coroleZ' thorrnomodelling predicf tion and thorrtoverification test programa ever conducted in i 9 y, the space progrma. Arc. 'You familiar u,ith the Martid j K .tntorndictTherrnlAnalyderSystemorM.ITASprogram? l 1 t
.,p e
11 A Yes, I cir., i' . l j , f * . .g ; .i 11 0 The bhis progrart initirilly. developed by the - - , . ~ . . m
- 13
! National teronnutics .2nd Space Adninistration c.nd then ' y4*,, : s (,. . I M teodified by Martin-Marietta? ' , 4 l' ,) s h No, it una noh. V. , 19 j
- i5 0 It's your testimony it was developed and initiated ,
l , . . . ! , , , at Martin-Miriot;ta? . l I i 16p A Wo, it was davelopod by Chrysler Corporation. i i __ . .,
, 4 inj i
Q So, you didn't personally develop .that pr0 grain? f
~
4 - ~ .. 20 ' A No. I, . . . si l Q Would it be fair to say you rt b ace.of the program u,, <
;'B ih yCUr lid?llyticUl Work and preps.rct2 ' inputs 'for ih7 l
o abt A Tho answer to that quection sould So yes, but I 3;[ Wouldliketoexh$ndobit? 3-y Tha Martin thermal cnc1va r :c mtea is a basic-
, 1609 4
I e compu:or code to which you writo c cor.puter program. The 2 computer code is more of a mastar control logic lanyuage
-, o program which then basically only colves the finite i
- diffe
- mntial equationc of the basic transient hont trencfer S equations.
l_ l G The engincero who work on the progruts, not caly J _ .- . 7 develcp and nodal then, which is input, which is then solved with didferential equationci but by and large, write 1 ) 1 E the computer code itself which runs the boundary conditions ! IC of the model. l 1i O The thermal verification program in mantioned in l' U the nuntencu, in this conducted by HMA in Hounton uith the l l IP aucistance Martin-Marietta personnl? l l 14 A It uns conducted at the Space Gimulatlon Environ-l l 15 ' mentr1 Chamber in Jcuston by Huntsville personnel on the ! 10 MSA Huntavilla Spacacraft Center, and Martin-Marietta i 17 porsolum.l.
- n. O Wero you the only person from Martin-Marietta If involved in tha .cca program? i 4
2c A No, I w a *1 not. !
-21 Q Ware ycN the most senior porcon' involved? ,
;!? ; A No, I una not. l
;c 0 Further on in the paragraph, you stata that you i
2 <.; were a principal $ngincor for the deniga of atmosphuric - l 29- ontry and deecont proben for Venus and other atsoaphoric ! !
1810
'1 entry missions. And using tho word "denign"'there, we're 2- spoaking of an analytical rather than a physical declgn, i
1 l l 3 is that true. In other words, the establishment of parameteri i
<1 touhichotherodenigr$thephysic:tlequipment? 3 3 A. No, it'a both.
1 0 0 no yon'ush the term " principal engineer" to mean l 7 that you were th$ only engincor worki'ng on this analysis? ~ ~ a A At time, that la true, yes. '
)
1 . 1 9 O In the next paragrcph, you state, .that, "At l v.; commonwenlthAnso$iat$s,youworotheprincipalstaff g) engineer roupontAlble for the integration and safety analysis O 12 and balanca of plant design for nuclear s'caam," excuse me r g.3 " nuclear system cooling requiremonts for proposed HTGR y Powor Plant." iha there a project ctaff at Convaonwealth i g for this effort? i I g A Tbo.Corconucalth organizction ',.nu broken both i I g into projects which included your normal staff engineering o, m support, pita a acparate ctaff cuction which reported - I g direct 3y to the manager of what would be the mechanical l 3 power production, $1vicion of Connonwenith Acsociates.- i g I worked i e the stcf f section, not in the project 22 scotion. g- 0- How many people were - how many engincarn were l y. involved in thib r$taff section? : l
-A K'e ll , -4 ~
.6.. . 1 l
l 1811 I
.O Hou Intny engineers, roughly, would you say were j 4
i l 2 on the project staff? ..
- I
) 3 A 100. > l i ' t i 4 Q Was principal staff engineer your title er is - l
- 5 that again, your description of thz function or responsi- '
I ! 6 bilities of the role you were performing?
+
l 7 A It's noro in line with lay functional responsibili-3 ties and role. 3 9 Q Did that title, in fact, exdst in the Commonwealth 10 organir,ation, principal staff ouginecr? I 11 A No, i S 12 Q Uns yo E wo$5 en the staff reviewed by others 13 in CorJacnwealth? A
~
14 Yoc, I bulieve that'u 'cor'rcct. 15 Q So, in what ensa ;ters you colely and responsible l 1 4 l 16 for the integrati$n e aEfoty analysis, and balance of plant 17 danign for the nuclear system coolinej requirements? l l to A I was thc - I had one other engineer who trorked 19 mler rn in the project section. Other than thatr I wars to renpoa.sible for that analysis,
- p. _
21 Q And tlie integration and the balance of Tle.nt designt ! I 22 A In reU ir0d to that co6 ling system? Yea, i i .. 23 0- Policwing the dex. ice of-NTGR, were you, Nx. Webb, .
,y '
did you, I :caan, execute a contrach yourself with Gensrul s l 25 Atopic to redesign and optimico the TGR emargency core _ _ _ _ . _ _ d -
i 1/ 12 O
; cooliity cyctetn? Or was this contre.ct actually betwo w p, Gsnaral Atomic and Comaonwealth?
~
3 A I certainly played a major role in devaloping that a contract, IEt the contract was betwoon Gcneral Atonic;'and g Connonwoalth. 6 0 Ucll, at Camonwaalth, uere you the only perron
.I.
who concinued to work on the HIGil/ECCS? ( r ( g 0 Nas the asuna project raanager for UTGR in cht.rgo , g of ycur .:'ork? , i , A Ho, ha was not. - ,} l U - O ).y 0 I tuy be beini.1 repetitive, did you pcraonally
<j i
anecute a contrr.ch with hnoral Atomic t;s a upcial con-c, ,, aultant? 19 A No, it no erecated between (cm.onvenith Associates
,G an0. Gen eral Atorcico.
i ,
! SE, DAXTER: Frs. Ecuarc, I 'rould like the i . . _ . . . . . -
I reporter to nmrk for idantification as SMUD Exhibit Mci. ' 4 ~ l m ,
\
,e b, j a two-page af fidavit ry Joseph f. McCarthy, bearing the.
i
, , i
! caption of this procondi.ng..
- !O l .
bi (SMUD E hibit No. 4 was riarked
?! !
for ide itifibation. ) n 1 73Y MR. BA>:TEI.t < 23 l / I 0 &, Wabb, if you .would, plc. ace, review thi.s l ... ,
^
! af fin tvit, and then T'S like you to 15entify for :n ami ' 25 , i
, - I
i e i ! l i I ! 1813 [ l i I statements which are untrue and the banis for yorr statement, - ! t 2 A Will yor. give me a moment to rand it? i 3 0 Sure. > I l. i
. . . . . J j
4 A Would yo.u repeat 1];our questior\? . i i i 5 0 Would you identify any statements by Mr. McCarthy i I
\
j 6 which are natrue and the reacons for your conclusion. i j 7 A Uell, I think yon'ro apt to define these state-
' I thin % Mr. ficCarthy and I might l 6 ranto as haing untrue.
I O hcVe a difference of opinion on two points in his sworn j i. ! 10 affida.vit. Firstr in nunber four. S l 11 :Pirst of all, I'd like to define to you Mr. in "cCarthy'c position c.t Cormonwealth Associates. He was la what would be kno'en ce part of tle project tenu which I N ' br.c a project intniager. Now, I'm talking about specifically . 3 l In the contract C xsonwealth Acacciatee had to provide the a ! m balan x 02 plant design of Eric Nuclosr Plantu.1 and 2, i i i 1; which is a project uhich doca grow up to be 100's and q .. 4 ta 100*n oO people, i f
- .19 I vas ~ uhan I worked in the staff, I supported 4
l 30 the project but r.ct as a project team. The. project c.t that time vas mayM about 30 or 60 pec'ple,- including all dinci-
-q i
- i. a plines. Muclear, a3mf=ical, IMd ' structural Inyouts and l
. r3 machantcal~.
a , M The ETGR itself is a very nignificant balance lof .
; {
, e3 I_ _ plant problem with what is called an_ - - _ _ - _ _ _ i
I f a L t 1 1 1814 " 1 1 coro auxiliary ccoling water nyctem, and basically that is { a closed loop ccoling cyaten which is -- has a heat nink a ( i of dry air-cooled heat exchangern, rainly becauco high j , i A ' temperaturos and high temperature gac-cooled reactors, ' i, ( n' thero'o not a need for a low-temperature heat sink because j 1 i c" J the high temperature 7, the air-cooled heat exchangers pro- , i
~.
s ) vide an efficient means to reject the heat. The balance f
- l 8
i of plant design, the coat and cis:e4 of these heat exchangerc: ) j 3 was becoming a very expansivo item which could stcrt t r'~ canning great concern to the Ohio Edison Company, na well . j l II j ' na the original econo:aic evaltttien of the ccupeti.tivencao I2 of ETGR. Eccance of that, when I first canc'to work l O for Cocaonwealth Ascociaten, I was in the staff section U' and acnigned to lock into this problem. IS Tim &. prob]cm specifically included looking at K theintegrctionchBTGR Dalance of plant design for tho' l i W nucicar cooling water syntem for which this -cignificant 1 - ,1 , 1 l R problem c:<iated. To perform the safety enalysis in tha ! i W balanr:e of plant dcaign pitw it inhorontly had to deliver j i U tha cooling ruitiranntG for the HTGN-and, obviously, the , M baltinee of plant deuign.- M- ' 22 ,' 31 my ataff role I was the only engineer doi.ng 23' tharrac3ynnnic tma.lysic. for Conaonuealth Msocinton in that , i i l 20 regard, and in that regard I was.responsiblo for the z 25 . int.egration, sadety analyclo, and balance of plant decisn. l
I l l 1
.1815' '
, for the nuclear cooling system requircicents. '
i 2 I Now, Mr. McCarthy's role as a project tecn in l i l i a broad conse may not agree I was,-quoto, "responsiblei" - l i i since he felt Commonwealth Ausociates, quoto, "may ) l 5 ' havebeenranponsible,"since5workedforCommonwealth 6 Ascociates. 7 0 7 don't think ha states that in the affidavit, ! 8 dons he? Doce he consider only Connuonwealth Associates
~c ~
rosponsible? i 10 t A Well, I think he anyc I was not responsible, 11 Cartainly, I uas Seaponcible for those specific activitiet. 9 12 Dut certainly in a contractural se.nso:there was others who j 13 were respannible. Should I not have performed my job d offnetivelye I don't think they would hrae 15 left only to me as being held accountable for, quote, ; 16 "porformnce of work," ih vocid have been Comonwealth
'17 Associatca.
18 t Certainly, he Vas part of the management that uns I 19 responaible for by work, but vaa ho responsible or did he 'i 10 review nuy of the specifics of ray work? I He only did that' ! l 21 in a general senso. I j P2 By'and large. I uorked directly with General 23 Ato:nics personnel in developing this. At that time I had a, 24 quoto, " project engineer" who originally had thic, quote, ! 25 - "rcopane.ible assignment" through which he was unable ,t
i
'l' I 1616 t
to properly analyze and find the real problems.for tho 2 HTGR. 3 Now, che other thing that I think will help you to
,1 . . . .
understand a little bit the apparent disagrecuent here. - 5 ' the staff section to which I tras originally assigned 6 when 2 van with Connonvenlth Associctes was essentially 7 dichanded about a year after I worked there. The manager 8 of the utaff noction took over the tota.1 management of all-D the mechanical engineering power production group for Con;sonwealth Acsaciates. 11 I was then physically movad from the location L y~, . of the utaff group into the project scetion. It was at 13 thatt time the ct:;onct, direct consultant contract, with , 14 General Atomics to further -- even though the HTGR had been U canceled by Ohio Edison Company with further put under N contract witt GnnrJ.al htomicc to continue, bacically, the 17 cama work. I had already initiated in rogards to che k nuclear cooling ayatcm or the core au:tiliary water system to with General ntonien, although I was then physically located; "n , on the project, my recponsibilitica were to negotiate and' cLecuto that contract. My title was project engineer. Mr. l McCtrthy was the contract c.nginecr. IIj; official title - '
"3 '
wac the project manar;er, i U I was ronpunaible to report to hila the progrecs E cf ny vork, the problcr.c I was having, and getting proper
i 1917 l l I auppert from other diodiplines then CoLmonwoelth Associaten. 2 He reviewed my interim reports to General 1 2 3 Atomics Corporating, esked.ma basically the basic questions i .,
'+
t that General A';omics vould ank me about nry work, although r' from the standpoint of being recponsibic for producing.the i 6 c
, work productc as project engineer, that wan my responsibilityL 1
~
7 Q So you and Mr. McCarthy disagree on the word i 6 " responsible"? I$ thEt one way to summarize at least part
')
i 9 of it? 1 l l l 10 A I think bhat's correct, it's a definition of the 11! word responu1b.t.c., 9 12l l O According to your ctaterant on page 2 that Mr. l 13 j ifobb wm contracted as a cpecial consultant, ths.t isn't j I l 14 [ true, is ib*l I
-)
] 15 { n T think it's unusac1 for a large architectural' , i, I ) J 16 l engineeria; firm to execute a very sreall contract, i i ! 17 i banically sontracting u:y ar.rvices to un outside, in thic .I g Ef , caso, reac?or vender. That certainly was the reason
&i the contraub was ene.cuted batween Commenvealth Associates i
1 ,.' i 20 l nndGenorClAtomibs. ~kt wasn'b aimply because un had, ni quota, "gmaric expertice" in thic ar,ea which a number.o.f. l
}i E people coabl do the work. . It was very'spocifically -
l' G I" li because of my 1:nc.iledge and my background having done
- 24 l vary coupler cyateme of heat transfer analysis and having V
) 25j i alrendy recormnded cpecific changes to the- UTGR design. ex--m. e,,w..._..=- r.,--.m.__ _.~.,m._,.,_r:._.. -....._m.,,m...-. - , _ . . . . , _ _ _ _ . . . . - . , . . _ _ . _ _ ..._.,_ - . . ..._ m . .
l'
,m j 1818 V)
To botter accsmaclahe and colve this problem of the heat. l l i g rink. I think juct to give you an idea of how vast a
, problem it waa, tha building being designed to house tho l
air blast hont exchangers was getting to be almont as lega y - ac the ccatainiaant structure. MR3. DO~E!!S: Ar large cc what? 7 -
,j THE WITIESS: The co~ntainmcat structure.
o i j . _ _
! BY MR. LASTER: -
9! . . . .
!o Q On the first page of your statement, you indicato '
- ~~
I
- hat from 1974 to 1977 you were engaged in nuclear
(\ \1 (,,) -
. poisar plant design at Gilbert Coazou an.lth. Gilbert Comnon-1.?
. .' . .l 13 waalth is what ia ecmmonly referrod to in tha industry na i <
t
- 11 an architect engineering firm or an AE, ic that correct? '
15 A That'a correct. j 0 AC an T'.E Gilbcrt Ccmonwealth is not responcible 16 for the design oIE a plant'n nuc3 car cheem cupply system, r/ 10 i t'l 13 - A 110 , it' u not. 10 i a s, Q Eo, fo:: purpocos of ralov w:c, thia proceeding, l for oxcxp1(, th. air .r.copa of cupply would be roughly equi.va-
! lent 'to utat B0chtal rind on the Rancho Seco projcot, is that ,,m
( v) , l truG? t, $ A Ucll, thers'n cartainly come opbicas which - - - 23 , like Babcoch & Wilco c offera the cwner in this caso, and ,
; at various t .r.es they do to.ho on additional ragoM3 bili th"
! l i i t t t ! j' 3 1819 d Ij but usually they're contract additives. 1
^ So, to return of my question, would it be roughly O .
3 equivalent to the architect engineer role Bachtel had i 4 on the Radcho Seco? I . 5 A Yes. I thought I had answerca yac. 6 Q So, your design work at Ceramonwcalth would not i 7 hrJe involved anklyses or SBLOM accidents, in that correct? i UI A No, they would not. D Q On the hirst page of your testimony, you state s 30 that you worked $$ a nupervising mechanical systems engineer ; i l Il on a Babcock & Wilcox series 205 nuclear poweb plant. Is j l? that t'ac Eric Nuclear Power Plant work to which you ref'er a 13 on the bottom of ps.ge 2 of this statem?.nt of affiliations? l Yoa, that'c correct. 14 g A
+
,i ! ] 15 Q Did ptrenork on the Eric Plant include the design 1
,i -
i 16 ' of the main feedunter sfatom? 1 i
- ~17 A Yes, it did.
~ '
la 0 Is the mnin feaduater system within the scopo ,' i l
- 19 of cupply of Co
- m bm-realth?
! 20 A Fes, it 10. l ... j
- 21 .Q You state further on in this paragraph that you i .~. __
L
;2 were raoponsible for the -nystem dcaign procurencnt and 9 -23
'mfety analysis of all nachanicali equipmnu within the
- e. r 24 mope of:anpply of Ohio Edison Company.- What is atfety 25 annlyr,is as ycu use the terrt.hore and on the first page of
l l O' . 1820 1 : your testimony where you say.you've been. active in designing i 3 and-eafety analy:Jis of nuclear power plants? 3 A Well, there's certain specific secti'ons of ; i.'
-- ~
the. safety analysis report which are prepared by the
'5 architect engineer, and the reason fer that is there are
, certain' systems which are in the scope of supply of the 7
architect b$1gincor which are safety-related systems. 8 Those would be the nuclear component cooling water system 9 which providen the cooling water to, say, the residual 10 heat removal aystem interface as well as the fuel core 11 coolors, containment air coolera, et cetera. Items such ! ne containuent air coolers would'bo procured by the U - within the acopes of the supply ~~ as voll as the heat - i I N orchangetta, primary heat exchangers, between the nuclear ' 0 coollire water syctema and the residual heat removal f M system. design and location of decay heat pumps. That - 17 was a good crataple. Those would be procured by the architect h I* engia aer. - The aulixary feedwater system) I think, is the l 1 0 perhot e2: ample. ,
,. ~
'0 Further down thel paragraph you state that, "These )'
Q l
?
s #.mluded such systems as," and you list e number of then, i
22 ~ l p . aid you don't-1ist the main feedwater system. t V 2.1 3 gali, % think I'm;just recalling, but.I think
" ' :I liated the pow $r of convarsion nyctems? Those would' t
25 include the whole secondary stem powar train, cenacessrs, -
--; . ~ .
l l 18 2 J.- i I' circulating water nystem, and turbinus, feedwater heaters, l l 2 condenante pumpc, heat pumps. 3 In the first sentence of this paragraph you 0 4 I 4 state that you were subsequently pro.utes - - i S A Whora aro ycu reading rou? t i 6 In the first sentenc3 of this paragraph. Q
? A Which page?
6 O Page 2 Sf your statement of qu?lifications. D Thelautparngrahn. WbweretalkingabouttheErieproject.
;0 A Okay, thank you, il Q You stnte that you were prcmoted as the mechanical l
9 iP systema supervisi$g engineer. Again, is thin an occupa-13 tienal title or job pocition to which you ware promoted M in the s.unce one thinks of a promotion or was it a 6; functional de.ucript on aga).n? 16} A It'a just both, t a j
;7{ Again, it'a a matriy. organization. In the l
j te orgru:.i::ution, I wEs a senior raachanical onginocr. However, i i
- n{ I also had a title no being nentber of a project, and'I had j
i i i 1 20 a project titic. My official project titic wne lee:hanict.1 j a j ayatemn auper'rssabg- engineer., j 22 Q Wan there a Mr. Ray Townson involved-in the Erie
-22 . project whi3c you vorksd there?
Yea 7 ' there was, 24 A o
=
I- 25 . O' . What waa-his title? N l .
%-s.~t.o*' _ _ _ , _ , __,
I i ! r r 1 1822 l- A &chanical supervicing engineer. I 2 l 0 What vsra the differences between nechanical ! 9
~
l cystens supervi'oing onginecr and a Inochanical supe 1Nising i a enginecr? ] 4 ' 5 A The work required in the mechanica.l. area is i l 6 y quite broad. It$cquirocnotonlyallrochanical. systems, , ] 7 a, but also requirco design of all the piping of the plant, ' s as well as the layout of that piping which includes in , ; 9' i - 2 j safety-relat t ayatoms, the scismic restraints for. that ' i i 10 t ' ' f j piping, Becauca of the now requirements of the - section 3,f II we had envicionad a coction of'as many an 25 cngineers'just to design and analyze the pipa rostraintc. Because of U this, this cection was brokon into two major arons. j .
'" There was my counterpart, below me Townsend, was l 0- eccentially accha$ical piping supervicing engineer, and I
! l E l there was my section which included all mechanivel systems.
- 17 It mic -- tho organi:ation was comewhdt unique in the sense M that Ray's expertise wac nore in the area of plant layout 0 of piping syste:1w, and my expertino was more to the l
.20
~+ ccoa of the cafety-rclated Vork.
21 My ph:cvious position, you huvo to understand,'I- ' M was already at Ray'a level when the cyaten folded, sinco i
?.3 the staff norged in with the project phople. In that pocition,' l 24 I alraady had responsibility for all procuromant, cpecifica- .l 25 tien procuremont, of all major components for the project. l
- .. _..-.-----._- - ..-.-.-...-~-_ - ..~~--..U
i
?
i- . 1823 6 I I r tape 2 , l m'ts . B O N E F '1 :
. Lot ne rake a brief statenent.
1 2 The reporter infornn uc j ust prior to the break ! .l ! I l that sha rea137.c6 that the cocond tape boing recorded ; i z I thic moi:ning was a bad tapa cnd shn unc not getting the : { , e 1 tect:.imony and the questions on tha hearing. So, what we'd like for you to do in play hho last - let ma check 1 with the party. We have a nituation here thct's very unusual. l 5 "c. .; t Now,, :that va vould suggont and wa'il cak for your comment, l I w 1 la thnt thn last part, very - oh, five minutes of tcro mat.cr one ha played,. .to that everyone will know at what l polat he recordin:J, the proceeding was dropped, and then .i N I ) that will giva you a cennco to know tho.t the ne::t 15 minutes i 1 ' i j
" or uo war: not recorded.,
1 Now, Mr. Toaxter, sdien you hear -- i
" }i cell, firah ~
think you should hear tht.t part of the first i I j E tago, and than wa ro' tid like your opinion as to . a i ) U ! whethn.youcanreconctructandreenactthepartthatfollowsb., g t ec l , l MR. PE RTS: Tf I cca. I think I'll havo to try and do the bcat .: can Th[reicn'tachoice. Fivo ninutes
'T 1a edequate for ma if it's adequate for Mr. Ecbb.
"-)
- Mns. DORCM: Well, lot me check first.
.>s Mr.2115 son,anyproblemwiththis?
s h 4 .a b1 del hNI bC g - I think it'S th$ Only 1,
'Y Cho$CD YO h WU + - .
2f> s . DS J' TERSI Mr. IaOViS? w____-- x _ _ .-. --_ .---------~u------- :- - ----
i i i I. 1824 9 MR. LEWIS: No, fine. 3 i 2 Dihereupon, the . previous five minutes of testimony i 3 wore replayed.] 4 MRS. SCWERS: Mr, Dn::ter. i l
; 5 MR. ELIhSOH[ Mr. Baxter, I would suggast it j > . _
6 would be the test thing for TIr. %bb to give his cotmuantu-l .,
/
on Mr. McCarthy's sworn statemint firct and that will put t ! it nearer to whero t; hey belong and then you can continuo g l . with the reuninder of the excJ.lination. g MR. DAXTER: Fine.
,l i
Mr.Uabf$,whydon'tyouproccodtodothat. l THE WIbiTESS: Yes. ! 12 i In regards to Mr. McCarthy's sworn statoment.
- 13 l I'd just like to out=arine my previous comments and alco an additional comaent, which may not be on the record.-
15 , l 1 think va did discuse upccifically in item number 1( l l f our of the sworn statenent regarding the word responsi-17 i l bility," certainly, by my acfinition of responsibility ta l the work van either parformed directly under my supervision - or by mycolf. In a classical conse, Mr. McCarthy as the project deniegn engineer-also had recponsibility,"but his i responsibility was moro of a mana:)!cmont naturo.and not a mechanical naturo. 23 ^ In add tion, in regarda to' item No. 5, you are i 2: , correct -- it's on the record' that tha contkact was crecuted 25 l between General _ Atomica _ cJid__ Con'uncnueo.lth Associates Howevor.,
- . - . . _ . - . . . . - . - . - _ . - . - . - . ~ - - . . . . - . - _ . - . . - - _ . = . - - - - - . _ ~ _ __
o j , i 1 i l 1825 ! i , l 1 at that time, the E11TGR project had been postponed or 1 ,i j ;.: indicationc of bnteg cancelled by the Ohio Edison Cortpany, l l and General Atomien had a desire for na to continue with 4 1 ! f my work that I ht.d been doing on the inniatence from Ohio j i l ' l S Mdicon Colupany, and it said the contract uns negotiated i, c, and in the propocal for that contract, I uns idc;ntified , , l j 7 aa th<e project engineer. And that u:Is 1)y off.'icial title 1 9 vith regards t.o th*it contreet , and the work was performad )
!, directly under ny supervision or by myself.
., ,1 IN NP. , BAXTER:
l n: y lj
;; rl O Excusa rio, Mr. Wobb, you stated, "It's en,the recor,d F" . z '. , that tha contract was with Com!cnwenith Arir:ociates." It'n
- I o.o tho :n ;;t: as s. result of the ep.tostioning here, it's 1 i.s :
4 i. . j ! not in your statuwnt, isn't that true? l l 1- i , i ; i j ! A I don t believe in ny'ntatement I precisely lc a 1 l y ; indicated u. o the contract unc - to whom the pcrtica i l i
!, to centraOb and the no.1cyr vare paid. '
s i l l i O You sny Mr. Webb was contrneted in the d W ! l - i
;C:1.stnucnt - i 19 ,
l 1 [t EL LOVERS : Yes, but there was a quection which il 40 '
~
i . f you recponhd to. ?M stated the contract was beteean did~ ,t 3 , i - i conpany, between the tuo companies. ], ]
- , i
! l < i 1
>m
}
s MR. EA%T H: Ycs, hhen ho stated just neu that
- s. s w,.
it in on the.rocord, I canted to make 3.t clear that that's .
, i, 2 4 j
a, , . why it'a on tho record. l- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . -. _ . ~ . . . _ . . , _ ~ . . . _ _ ..
p
- l i
i i i
. 1826 .
I
- l THE WITNESS': Yes, I just Iraant that we had clari-l :
E ! fiod that previously. I believe that's clarified now. i u
- Mr. McCarthy statec it wan perfor:med.under his i
'l direction. Well, he as the project manager, but as 1 1
l 5 project engineer, the work was performed under my direction, l I 6 nna perhaps therc's sopa r.iaunderutanding in terms of j 1 i j 7 respoucibility, theia again. And, also, it indicates d i 1 l 8 a staff of two engineers. Thero was another major portiori , 0[ of the pontract which had the structural engineering, and a j N there une a lead structural engineering' assigned more ~or 11 less to me, ar$d with Mr. McCarthy., Eut there were other !
?2 engincers.
j 13 LY MR D.uTSR: I H Q To report to you or to Mr. McCurthy? < j l Iti A Ho and I worked e ro or insa an equals directing . I i I 16 the project, although I ran thn project engineer. I devoted 1 l 17 full tino to this project, ha did not. Au far as all' l i , I , 18 i, technical matters were conearnad, he and I interrelated on I F l d j 4i . technical nattera when we felt we needed additional resourcas , l i 20 ' ' or wished to expand specific points of the contract and l
\
l , 21 had contractural matters of* tho -- actually meeting the ) P2. utctamanh of work 161ich van part of the contract sith r 9 23 g i' General Atomics.
- 24; ise, of course,. consulted Mr. McCarthy. He was I
w f. proj ect manager, and, of courec, he una responcible to l l I._._,._.--__._______....._,__,,._-_....--___,,-.-,._.,_-....._.__ i
' i
d l
- l I
i i i 1827 . l . j 1 deliver the products guarant ced by the contraat. i
- 2 O So wh3n Mr. McCarthy ataten in the affidavit that ;
i i 3 there unre two engineers, could it be he tras referri.ng to l : 1 l l 4 you and thin ciril person that you decerib2d as being ' } . I j 'i l rongl.ly your equal? 1
)
- 6 A Tes, I think that in Mr. McCarthy's - what Mr.
7 f McCarthy intended to say here. Heutver, tharc tms between O l appronitutoly four to six other profensi.onal people, ' I I t 9- j engindaru and draf tsman who worked specifically under Iny 10 h direct.icn alone which was 80 percent of this contract., P I 11 O Go that at various timas during the courco of O n I i i the ':crk und.cr this contrnct bhers wae ne many no savan ; I ' i O4 a or air.nt r.urnonnel at Co m anwcalth ecoloyed cn tho project? l 4 M A Tcs, for perioda of weeks, that's true. ! H ' 1; C. Dafore m went bc.ck. to Mr. IdcCarthy' c effidavit, (
- 1 c, l I var asking you acaut the. cor.paricon between your title 3, ll r.d. job (iecariptiour on the Erie Iinc2. car Power Project jg j 1.ctWecn you 2.nd Mr. Ray Townsond. Unun't your job classi-iti
- n. .
}y fication during this period at Cormonve tith, lead enginecr?
i a; h no,
)
i
- z. ,,
O or 1citd wchnv.ical engincor? i i n c,. ; a Un ,. it was not. My lob clascification was senior O w ,
')f rechanical engineera 22 j 0 In cuperviring engincar a job classification at 1 p
\ n
- c. Cor,aonucalth?
sh. . , . (t .
___- - - - - . . ~ - . . - . . - . _ - - . - , - - . ~ - . _ . _ . - - . - . - - . . . - - i i i i l 1828 i I j 1 A Not to my knowledge, no. l l l 2 0 If you were responsiblo for the cyuten design ! I ! : procurement and cafety analysis of all the unchanical , a equipnent .uithin the scopo of Ohio Edison Company, what , I r was Mr. Townsend, as supervising mechanical en'gineer , , , i 6 responaible for? i j 7 A Well, of cource, I guess, in a classical sence , i l 1 _. i j e was :ny boss, and he was - I was responsible to him for I i i i ; g the performanca of my functions. Ilowever, he did not directly m supervice the work as I've stated in my statement of quali-l g) fications. The work was perforned under my direct ; g cupervicion an opposed to a person in the more genorgl p-. scnce responsibic to unke cure the work was being performed 3 l l j y [ in accordance with the nnster Schadule of the project in i 1 L i .g[ identifying specific problems and meeting the master
- 't g ochaanAe or the prc$cct, and resources, of course.
, .j Q i?nw nnny enginecro, approximately, would yoe. say l.
7 I rcpozied to Mr. Townsend on the project? 4 L l g. A The ,only problen I hava in directly ancuering 4 l
. . e
{ g that, in what point in tima'you may be referring to. Just I
--y ,
expand a littl.e further if I might, the project consisted
~~
I s i of about 60 people,, These 60 people did the prolininary ! l .. _ . . engineering and all dicciplinaries, including.the total a 1 l e' ,
, nanegenwnt of the project. Until you get to a point in L the project whoro you start specifying equipment and designinii c
_..,.,,,_m - . , . . _ _ _ . . . _ - . _ _ _ . . - - - m. _ . . . . _ _ _. ...,_..--.-.._.._.,_.-_________________.___e
> 1829 1 piping systems,. an wall cc the layout of the plant gets I i 2 somauhat fi:ted in time. , At that time r the numbers of people that worked I i .- l on a project of this magnitude accelerates quite dramatically , i t.
~
l nnd I would nay' it goec from 64 people to 350 people over G a period of four or five years. , Q An6 did all those profesuicnalc work imder your - 7' direction? c~ !!' A At the tirm the ataff caction folded in the project, , section, we hcd b4rienlly the 60 coro people, the 20 i l II - :f would actimabe between 20 and 25 - what I'm going l i n" I to ccil mochtnical r,ystens engineers that vent in ny 1~1 cection contietod of parhttps half the total - thoro was
" probably a like number who - including draftomen now -
v' vho reported to tha piping, engineer. He'had maybe six
" c.
1 engin$ern an6 10 draftaman., I' O Co the rd woro udbstant).a1 nw@er of enginaars R p} __ l l d c>ther than thonn with whom you worked raho reported to Mr. i se l
; Townsend? l i 1 T. l
{ A Viall, did you nay cubetantial? t -- i J. , t G Yea, i
.. i 22 A 17 0 , tha c ' s not trms . The cubatnatial nunhor of j i
E3 engineers vore in my section. I would say between 3, 4, 5 j 2a crnd G total othern who were not in ny direct cupervicion i 25 would have been the cthers who were under Mr. Townsend's
1 l r W-1830 (' I managensent responcibilities. 2 O l As cupervising enginscr e ho then had a caction 1 2 ~~ l of 30 engineers of which you had direct responsibility 4 for 24? 0 A 7t the tino I wac promotad into this position I j
for the org;bilzation of the project was devel.oped, Mr.
4 i 7 Townaend..kna alno at that time pronioted into his positlenc j . 6 He had a raorgtmization within the company and we had just ] 4 i C switched, if you will, from the HTGR nuclear steam cupply l 10 cyctom to Dabcock & Wilcox nuclear abeam nupply system. I 11 It was in this inherim tima just for clarification when { 1 V . , 1 ?- this HTGR work van stopped by Ohio Edican and the Babcock t 13 r Wilcox work started that I did tho, what I'll refer to 14 as r;acial consulting Sro$k to Cencral Atomics. 1 l 15 0 You procaca to aa'l four lineo up from the 1cct - 1 10 in the lact parag$aph on page 2 of your statement of i 17 gealification, and I quote, "Mr. Uchb wac recponsible for l ' E l.he analysis and prepartion of the preliminary safety l h analysia report for the Erie Ituclear l?roject," unquoto. 20 '1his document which I have a copy of in my office is --- can$iata of 12 volumen, each of which is l M approximatcly thna inchos thigh. Is it your testimony C ; i' I 23 i that ycu were responsible fer the analysis and preparation - Ei of the entire report? D A Certainly act. The entire report for clarification _ 1 _ _____ _ ~--_ _ __ _ _ _ . ~ . - - . - . _ _ . -
h , i i l L - 1831
.v i
1 l; I une referring to here'those arean for which I was i l 2 recponsible which werd by and large the mechanical systema,
- 3 and thoco cafety-related systems, a
J i 4 The preliminary cafety analysis report or the i I d 5 safetyanalysisreporthoenn'tincludea description of
~
the power convorcion steam sections to the plant which l 7 are not cafety-related, but nonetheleau are dencribed a T . na uoll aa other safety-related systema. Thoae would be l 9 primarily chaptern 9 an6 10 of thone reports. I i 10 O How are ur. to underntand that you were only f i I . _ l 11 referring to those limited chapters in the preliminary i
- 12 ucEeny analysin report?
13 A X do not kncrJ. I u u, h Does the Erie Preli:rinary Gafety Analyaic Report t 0 6 .1::o v.ck; considerabic referenca to the Babcock & Wilcox l i , 16 J Standard Sc.fety 7malysis neport, the 205 sorica plcnts? ! . I c a voc, they do. u; ! O and that would not be within the scope of anpply ( ( __ i Uz ! of Gilbart Ce:r:nonwealth, ic that correct? I f i 20 A Whenyo$refertoneopeofsupply,Ihavea f 21 problen because a5viously there's corte.in components and i n systerm within thy scope of cupply of Ohio Edison Company G 23 which interact and ramt provide necessary functional p- 1 requiremnta for those within the ' scope of supply of I l t
.x. h 7 Dabcock 6 MilccK.
- - -_______--.m..<,,--,,_m___m,.,
,,y_,, ,
. _ . _ . _ _ _ = . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
I l l 1 , h i l
$ l J 1822
\ :1 I O Lat me restate the question. l ' . l 8 Gilbertcomonwealthisnotrespojisibleror f l 8 ' preparation of any of the B&W Safoty Analysic Report' I ) '
. i l 4 which is referenced, is that correct?
l J l $ A That's true. i i ! C Q At thic point, I would like marked for identifica l I l 7 tion ao SMUD Exhi5>it No. 5, excuse nie, a' two-page affidavit , f 1 6 by Willian E. Koscler boaring,the caption of this pro- ] D coeda.ng and also as SMUD Exhibit No. 6, a letter dated d 10 turch 31, 1900, to me from D. H. !Tolson of Gilbert Conunon-i
!!! wealth. d.
! '.7 2 ; (SHUD Exhibit Hoa. -5 and 6 - J r
- \
l ~13
' were : narked for idnetification. ) .
1
- l' BY MR. B CTER
o .. 15 ], O Mr. Wabb, as we did with Mr. McCarthy's affidavit a 16 I'd like you to take a moment road SMUD Erhibits 5 and 6i r 1 j r, ! ident-ify any ctatenanta whidh (3.ro untrue and explain your i .{ l 1s 1 tactimony, plenac. e A MR. ELLIGON: That' a my cuc. n. 1: 20 I For the record, we have an' objection to SMUD 1 l a; Exhibit No. 6. It rofarc to a letter of March 27, 1980, I y2 which has not been provided to the parties either'in di.ncovery or at this tine. Our objection is haced on p3 j ya 0 the fact that SMUD D:hibit 6'is a response to, apparent'ly' ! 3; a ru;ponco to, -- for inforn,ation. And we believe in order:
i
'f 1033
~
l (: 1 to undershand the response, it's necessary to understand I l I 7., the question. l ) 3 KF; . BAXT3R: SMUD Exhibit 6 is not going to be '1 ) 4 effered into evidence. It is simply going to be used to
- i
! 5 -- for the question I just asked of Mr. Webb, and certainly :
. (
h.
- 6 if any of the. information included in this letter 10 untrue i
~
7 or nisicading, I think Mr. Webb has a]1 the opportunity 3 he needn to mche that corzection. l r, MRC. BGWZRU: Mr Elliron, 6cca that change your 7 i i m. position? 3g MR. ULLISO ?: No, na'an, it dcec not. I - h l Pd I. I would simply point out that witn respect to a 1, , . . i g g L the ather docur.ent in this procacding that parties have i gl i been uned in their crean-enamination, dacumunts portinent tO thCCC ..I*.il/T!: has b4'Gn F.1Vai.lable all the parties either - 1,.0 in U :.oc or in tbc ordinary courst of business. This y ic .
- 1 is a cormtut unique rituation in that there is no way
. 11 h ue WOLid have E.ccess to the letter referred to in GMUD
.i b.l' b ,
k i Whibit Ea. 6. , 291 1 i 6,- l llPS . BOWEPS: Deau the ataff have a position in , t l 1 this n'atter? 21
, ME. LEWIS: Mrs. Ec u rs, we'have no objection w
O 23 to' itr admit;sion,'but we think it wculd bo' - - l j MR. EAETER: It bras not been offered, nothing ' O, , j t
. t has h0cn offered,. excuse tr.e. , Mr. Lewis, 'i 25l1 l' t 1
- -,-~-,..,...~..-,....---~.-.---,-a ,~ --s --
a- -. e,.-
i i l i i i , 1834 l 1 24R. LEh7IS: You're not going to offer it? l 2 gg, nn5<gn: go, l 4 3 MR. LEWIS: I atill think that the letter from 4 Mr. Daxtorchouldbe dentified as ucll l'f the response 4 s 5 is going to bo identified in the record, I think the lottor ! t , G to thic gentletann should!, be identifiwd in the record, and 1 l \ 7 I think for the canah of completences of the record, that ' F 4 1 4 ,
' l 0 should be 0.one subcequently 4 . .-
1 * ] 9 MRS. EOWERS: Well, the Board recognines this l ._ _ 4 j 10 m!stter'o very censitive area of inquiry, and we agree with
. i 11 the Staff that the letter of March 27, 1980, from Mr.
i 12 Baxter to Mr. 7?cicon should cono into the docket file, 1 13 com.? into the record in the untne sort of a way that SMUD, , 1 l l 14 Uxhibit G is. It's juct c3mply to give a rocre complete F 1 l r ! 15 explc.untion of GMUD Exhibit G narked for identification ' j 1 1 15 as h hibit 6. I ) 17 f4r. Bater, does your office have the resoureds - I i te that thsy can do Yi telefax or uhatever it is to the SNUD l l 1g office hora so that lctter night be in our handa promptlv? . , 1 j i 20 Ha. HAXTER: Even batter than that, Mrs. Bowers, i i 2) in anticipation of yowc ruling, I di.g it out of the tranh I i
- 22 of the car and had copies mLde.
i i z3 [ Laughter.] .. l _ 2.$ MR. IULXTER: Chall uo have a renconable pauce ' g) -: [ --. . - . . ..--.-----_-------------a- - - . - - - - ~ -- - '
l_ - - - l i i i j l
- . 1835 i i I for people to read?
.e i still'jn '
2 j [Pauce in the proceedings.]' i l tape 3 3 BY MR. bLXTEb: 4 Mr. Uebb, in paragraph 3 of Mr. Kessler's O I > ! 5 affidavit, he states that, "On the Erie l'iuclear Powar
- i 6 plant, he ut=n project manager, he was responsible for the 1 '
- 7 engiueoring design licensing and project ruanagement of 9
I Ol . the Erie 19uclear Forject, with approximately 278 engineers, 9' including yournelf, vorhing under his direction. " 10 Ic that true? j ! I! A I'd like to expand before I answer, , J, i f Mr. Kocular uc.s not oroject manngor of the Erie 1 a I2.}![ i 1 13 d Nuclear Project for its entirety. At the tioca - I do not j i < 1 14 L r call praciaaly waan nu becaire proju;t menager of that ' l l sectica. 15 g! He was ' the project reanager r t Consunmrn Pmeer 1 ., i , 1
! lbl 5 Compr.ay for Midland' United ' r.nd 2, wich tare SMT uni.ts, l ~
17h o Ifter t we had negotiated a cone.ract or had.a - - 1 l 16 letter of intent and were nugctiating thy contract with q {
' l '
i 19 Babcock & Wilcox a.t that tipe, the corporation approached l t l 20 0 Nr. Kessler for this porition. - - d ~ ! F 21 ' Ouring the interim, when tha project HTGR work had 2 bean stoppad' kr.d bcifore .the B&W war)i had ctarted, again, 23 m were a corpc. of' approxituately 60 people. During the l ta coursa of tima; the project started up , ~ Mr. 'Kessler came onboard,. dad I' cuspec? p.5 ,e 270, in my estination, is.'a.g_ )
--------------.X' - -
i
i 1836 l g larger ntrrher which probably more indicates the project-O 2 at a later tine rather than when Mr. Kesslor came, i j i 3 O Excuse me, if you'd refer lto paragraph 1, he 4 ctates that he began his employment in 1975. Was he hired
, a.
ac the project manager 'in that year, o:6 did he have another G PU "
,, A It'c my recallection that he came directly to '
/
! Couuumors Power, and I do not believe in 19 ~~ I thought it i 6 l . i vac later than 1975. I believe it'was in the timef::ame of I 9 I g 1976, but he may have already been hired by Con.monwealth , i Acacciates in, it's not to my knowledgc. It's l 11 ! not to my knouledge that he uns functioning as project ; i 12 mtnager of the Eric Nuclear project at that time in 1975 <
.. u,
! O What's the bacic for your recollection, was that 14 ..
. ,;d t
j it was 1976 ather than 1975? 15 i i > A My recollection in thid: Mr. Kessler had no q t 50,
- 17 involvement whatsoever with HTGR worb and it was the . -
cummer of '75 that3.1e cancelled the work on HTGR, and ue* 16 did not really get tmderway with Babcock & Wilecx work
, until early 1976.
;w i Q Okay,'I interrupted ycur cEpansion of the annueF j ,
u a , o -. , l to paragraph 3.
. 22 A So, I took tw comments, and the first comment is
-23 9 ,g4 270 ongineers at the tina we wont into the Babc.ock a Wilcox work.,- it was rcoro like - 64 people, of which - I'm- talking !
,' ,45 j
<?
_ - - ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _--____. _ _ .
l :
- u i 1837 about all disciplinas, mechanical area, probably wc're e
2 talking a docon people, including Mr. Townsend and myself. 3 Q How about subsequent to when you first mtde the
- 4 nwitch to the'B&W project. At any tima during the course 3 of your employment through 1977 could the ntaff have been 6' that large? ,
l A I would say in my estimation and recollection, 7 g maybo 150 to 200 would be a batter number, but there's no j g way I could be correct. 0 In that pocition, Mr. Kessler was responsible for 10 g the engineering daniga, licensing, and project manegement, i g correct? A Would you repeat that question again? 1 Q In thib position, ta project manager, whcn he assumed it whether it was 1975 or 1976, he was responsible w for the engiaeering design, licenairg, and project manage-l e-mant for the Erie Naclear Pownr Plant, is that correct? - l 17 ,
! A Yae, ha uns the Dingle individual, if you will,
,B i
captain of the chEp, and en auch, he was totally accouitable h, for all work performed on the contract to Ohio. Edison Company. Duclear F' mtr i and 2. 1 El f l 0- Mr. IN ular, in paragraph 4 of hin . 22 1 - 3 affidavit and Mr. Nelson in hic letter to me, both ctate CJ~ l l that your title wr e lend anginaar and not supervising engineer , Are thcy correct? j- 25 i l l r
, _ - . , - - , .- - . - . - . . - , . . _ - . _ , , - . _ , _ - _ . ~ , , . - ~ _ . . - - , - , - , , . . _ _--.,____,-..-,.-~mw.m.-,,.-
- .----.-. - --.. - .-. - - .~ . . - - .- - - .._ --- - - -.. - - - - - - . -
4 l 1838 l
; t A No, they?re not correct in.the absolute sense.
J 2 The project organization, I think I tried to i 3 explain this a littic carlier now. I'll try to be a ) 4. little clearer -- was comewhat unique because of the 4 1 5 organisation that took place uithin Commonwealth Associates 6 at about the time the HTGR folded,'and the Babcock & Wilcox i j y plant declgn began, i
- g Previous to that, Mr., Townsend, who held the p title n3 mechanical supervising engineer, he and I were 1
g more er less equals, no on the project side and myself )
' 1 on thf str.ff side'. Mr. Tcunnend was more responsible for i
't l l
l l g2 the pLping designa r the layaut of components. I was more inte che individual'specifice.tions and procurement, and l u, so.ai of the licensing calculations required on certain ayatems.' 'l
,q At the time the project, the reorganization toch
,. ~. .
., \
_, p .'.1 x the crgani ;atio:m'i chart win.ch ahowed r.,y position ! it i ! ra orting to r. Tom nnd had L-he titic mechanical systems j l_l
! sJgervising engineer.
,8 1
3 } 1 ~ Now, the confusion com s because Commonwealth
- 19 1 i tu an architect engineer of come 3,000 engineers or 3,000 l p
- oficscianci people,. in many large projects has i 2,1 1
i ' stat they Govaloped as a standar:1 organization project. , 'ITo standard organizatione I he:lievo, has your major i 13 i F (icciplines, nachanical, cicatrjcal, IGC, atructural, what-M , j . :are.you r with a supervising mechanical engineer. p r. n l.
-..- - ....-,,-. ---.;r - .- - .,., -- ~ - - -.-.. - --.- -. -- -
. _ _ _ . . . ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - - . - . . _ ._ _ _ .__ _ _ _ . _ __
i I
- i
{ ! i . i 4 ' 1839 i l Of courno, it starts with Mr.1(esaler who is the 1 l ! pr ject manager, than you como down the line to Mr. t 2 McCarthy, who ic the project engineer, then you have the major disciplines supervising engineera. I
- Now, in each of those you have lead engineers, 1
l 5 j And insofar as the standard project organization goes, those a 6 I <' are the functional titles. 7
!!aw, Eric Nuclear Project did not have this same
- b j standard organisation., The organization' had been expanded i 9 j in tna mechnuical area, and epecifically becauce of the
! now 7sSME code 3 require::ients with pooter (phonetic) strengths
!1 l which v,are coming into effect at thct tima, and it van
.o enviaioned that a trcmendonc nmount of computer work to i s. the Sani.gn piping strength in the piping syatem. Secause of l
;/ l1l that, i. bey felt thnt it w u it van toa much responsibility
-r }1, for sbat had been a claenicnic macht.nical, supervising
. M
[ cag.i ntu.:ri ng uni , , anci, therbfore, that unit was split into n i two metican. That was also nri known titia to Ohio Edicon , rh l l Compfuy I was responsible for what I recall as monthly j h3J 0 prment:1tir.*n:., to tha client in regard 3 to the cctivity l in 'achani. cal rnatems. Of course, at thozo I nuie the
.?. [
}
pretentations, Dut, of course,. Mr, Towcon was prosent, and. A._% on arcasion Mr. Kcucler and Mr. McCarthy. l 3? MRS, BOUERSt You said that that was vou: " s ome.-
&ap .
thinf title t D Onic Edison,
?.5
g _ - _ _ _ _ _ _,. _ .._ _._____.__.____._______ _ ______ _ _ _ _ . I ,I ) l 1840 i a 1 . I THE WITNESS; That was also my known title, as a 3 i g mechanicalsyntemssuhervisingengineer.
~
t l , MRS. BOWERS: Known. ; i a . . l [ g DY MR. BAXTER: I O So, when Mr. Nelson states in paragraph 4 of g. g his letter, "you functioned as lead :techanical.' engineer : on the Eric Nuclear Project and reported to a cupervising. a 7 machanical engineer," he is in error because he simply , g doran't understand well enough the nuances of the nuclear , project -- I Dean the E;rio staff as it was established
- 10 i
within the largo Commonwealth organization? ! A I think by and largo that's correct. O Why would Mr. Kessler suffer from that anme i j infirmity if he was project manager? j 14 i A I believe that he ia relying for -- as well as l i 15 . 1 l Mr. Malcon -- on his recollection of the classical I 15 l J project organization. Also, since I left Commonwealth l 17 l . Associates, they may well have gone back to doing that ! 18 l position as a load engineer rather than a nochanical super-i 29 viaing engineer because of the tine.I was given that titia i 2.0 position, it was dus.to reorganizagtion as ucll as my 21 ongoing functional responcibility, perhaps when they -- 22 efter I paraonally had lef t decided not to hold that title r 23' l I don ' t know. l lA O Well, Mr. Koneler anid in partgraph 4, doco ho 25 ' t . _ _ . . . , . - - _ . . . _ . , - . _ , . . . , . _ , . . - , , _ . , . _ _ . . , _ _ , , . , , , , , , , . - - _ _ , - , . _ . _ . . _ , _ , - _ .m..s. - - , . . _
1 1 1841 ! ! i j 3 not, "Your title during this period of employment and when . 2 you resigned your position van lead engineer, isn't that { , 3 what ho' states? MF, ET&XCOL, At this point, I have to objract ( 4
~
5 to this line of'qucstioning. ME Webb has been grest:ioned i ! 6 ort naively n what he meant when ha described his quali-l 7 fications. In thi'a regard, he's been questionined 1 g extensively as to what his understanding of the organiza-s tionthathewaEvorkingforis. I had no objection to l
- that line of quantioning, however, the line of questioning l 10 11 nstowhatthoceindividuaismeantintheirdocuments z
provided this reorning. I must object to that. There's no l vay Mr. Webb can speculate as to what they meant, and j 13 . j vhat wac in their minda at the time they wrote these 1* 1 doctuments . i 15 I Mn. BTC'IER:
/ I.didn't nok him to interpret 1G i
i their maaning. 1 anked him whethcr or not Mr. Kessler didn't i i (7 nakt specific' reference to the fact that to the best of l SS 1 hic knowledge at least that was your title, quote, "during
?? i i
j thic period of eaployment at Commonuaalth? 20 f i MR. E!4ISON: I believe, Mr. Buxter, you are j 2i ... t taking questiont uith respect to whct was the basie of 22 their anderstanding, j 23 jl { l MR. BAKTER: I'"a asking uhat the affidavit states. l 24 1 -
- 1 1
l NdL DGliERS: Mr. Banter, is this being 25 7 ..
! . repetitive? .You know, the witnces.has gone into a long 1.
1 1 3 1 t b, u, ..: 4 t l e:cplanation of tim 1 >q e::g; war ching and rechanical - i i 2: , . , i n u.n. cry].cor'.7 era ,s nee r tl u, no.. . E n c c .a.u c ].n:t nc., nnat peo le t
.t uith the different orgc_ainationo, Corc'conucalth Acccciates vs. ..
t ch.to Edjuon, fhat cort of china. We think there has been f a
~
1 vary crtensiva c::ar:.inntion, md co if you could - ; i l l 0 J
/n. DA%TER: Thr.re'c ce.sn c;;cenaive testimony i i I 3
7 bea niac m . i abh hh bec a ' denaribing. I have not objected j i O to zhat, the actual work ha dig, and I aIn more going at .j 9 his dex ci.ption in :he ctatement of titles auU what he van l 10 agtigg, 7 31, just ab ntt finichad. I, thinking back on the ! il craraj nation v:a've nari with respecc to tha preparation j t U ced c."lalificE. tion: of other wittleccan, I don't think I've 1 13 : chuurul ray ti a. ' ht re thic morning and I ' mould like to cirply i 3 1 + lo i finiEh by -- vit: < f ollct:an cunc hien .;o Mr. h bb's last A I
\ s 4 .
Ml . piecc of ten';;; my triich speculabad that Coi";nonwealth citiht l
! . j Nf have che agca fin a.. .c j ah de s t: rip uian -'- *
-l i l '! ' ;1TW ., EDW R$: 'Ahy don't '/cu pro:Jecd? I i i,. PIT.EbS: I do h.ca 1uovdudge --
l, 63 i 3 19. . T" C:I E i. : l l
. t (
I . i
! } !
. t t
90 nh bh 1tly - do Il .V O 2'.itOUlOOgG '030.5
.. ., . 4 5
{ lh L e ia 6 t I - l due .a c c , _ta m :, w :h a feo e :q af.iliatec at l . ,
.I
( .3 CQ'O ' Y.
. S I)! , 3 (j d. A DO f '*
- I thinh *" * ~4'O I^e 2111 hutty up l ,
ai p ; ~;4 " on Sr.,. - m tha title r e ce*: ainlv the work I di3 I
.m.
om- 3 ,- . - < . y.
,u,m c 2 . m. 4
. .. m. . .. , g s..g.
m ,t 1 (., e -.- Avu 3. . pg u v u,. t o .a.t
. . . . x.
4..J 2.w.;
,. .q >. . .c. t.
w - m. .s p. te. l l.
o 1843 of affiliations. 7nat was the titic that was -- that I 1 was known as when I was there. But even organizationally, as far as I know, whether he was called a lead engineer ) ' o or a nochanical syntoms engineer, -- - O He una speaking of you? : 5 . i A No, of who would have taken my place after I ! 6 resigned from Condonwealth -- was responsible for all the 7 mechanical systemn work under an individual's direct super-8 t vision, and it uan not Mr. Townsend. 9 0 Do you agree, however, that both Mr. Nelsen and 10 Mr. Kessler are describing your responsibilities and job 11 titles during the period of your employment? Ic it not 17. clear from these docatments that they are not talking about the present, that they are indeed talking about the time 14 which you were employed in that organi::ation? 13 ' A There'u a real problem here because lead mechanical 16 cugineer and cupervining engineer, to ray knowledge, are not 17 job titlea. IS Q Address yourr6Lf to the timeframo. I'm asking io - . . . you are they not referring and discussing the tiraeframe .
?D during which you woro employed at Gilbert Colmnonwealth?
2l Isn' t that clour? 22 - It Kell, they're certainly reporting to the classical 23 y oitions, project or otl'orwise, that are utilind by ( 24 the Connonwealth Associatos. 25 Q Are they roforring to the timeframo of your
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ~ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
t i i i I 4 1844 I i i s {' ] ' cmploymnt, Mr. ' hbb, that is :uy question. 'f
?
4 I i 2 A I can't say - - i 3 / MR. ALLIS0W. Mr. Darter, E object to that quantion. a , If you wich, you can road thin into the record c.nd let O the documanta apuJ: for themaalvec e s but after what these I O individ:talu Ara rcCerring to, once again, I have to object. 7 Mr . Eh didn' t prepara thot e doctuatuts -- 0 i MR. BT0;TER: 1 I Mr. Febb can read. I think it says 9 in paragraph 4, "Your title during thic period of employment.
- 3 NI 1 Docen't that imply -
II i S.4iB WITXLSS: Mo, it unyu Icy PM ition not title. 12 MAG. EOUI:P.S : We have an objection. 13 Mr. Dcntar, do you want to ror. pond to that? Was 14 reading paragraph 4 your rocponro to the objection? I 1 IS ' i MF. MTIIP : The witeeen is not being responcive ' l ) N to my quasbious. 1 i I'm cletrly asking - he's made the ' 17 stater.cnt thet Mr. Eccclcr and Mr. Malson may have been E referring to a poriad in timo aftar he loft the employment g 19 : of Gilburb Ccsroun ac:3h, i I am aching hira as concone wh'o 20 ,I 0 can :end English to tel] r.:o whether or not it isn't clear 4
- 1 !( that the' time horlod that is being referred to is
,, i u nynonc IO ur.
i 1 1 with the tire period of his employment there,.and , EI he'c coupandi:1g by telling cr. about the jat .aeecription ano 24 tha various reaponnibilitica. I'm askigg him whether or not
- 25 timeframco tre.not synonomous. I,think.it's a readily i I n i j !
Ji e
).I . - _ _ - = - . _ , - . _ _ ,- . _ _ . - . , _ _ . _ . _ , - , - .
l ?
. 1845 l 9_ et n.
i 3-1 SCG 1 undcratandable question and should be answered fron, reading 2 thoco doctmnte. What is the basic for the objection?. 3 I ME. Ei2ISOM: The basic for the objection is i i 4 very nimply thic. If you want to read this document into ! 5 tho record - 4 ) 6 MR. BATFBR: I vant tol,nsk.gucations and I would ( ) 7
- like to have an uncucr.1 '
8 MR. ELLISOU: i L If you wisN Mr. Webb to interpret
- 9 1
uhat was meant by the words on this page. He was not the : 1 10 author for the words on this paga and he has not seen them 11 , i , until this morning and I object on the grounds that there is
- 12 )
i no foundation for a.sking Mr. Wabb that kind of a question. j 13 MR. ICLXTER:
- How many t2.mes nave wa.tnessea in 14 thic proceeding been precanted with docttments that they may 15 ;
not have scen before and asked to read them? I do not think g ) that that is so anusual for the hiatory in this hearing. a 4 37 Can you understand the words in the affidavit, 1 i
$3 Mr. Uebb ? i l
w MRS. ISOWERS : Just a minute, we have an objection. 20 pending herek Mr. Lcuis e doen your Staf'f have a position on the pending of'the objection? 21 22 , MR. LEWIS: s Well, I think that as long'as he is not
- g 1
baing osked to interpm,t the doctatent, but to simply confirm
%4s s
.,4 ](, what the document does state.
9.. I , And I think that he'should , anUNOr thD. QuCStion.- l
'I
1846 4 . 1 13.RS. DOElW : Well, the objection is ovorrulod. 2 We think it la appropriate for Kr. Webb to be asked to read i' e 3 from the document and also that he vould have an opportunity L 4 to fully explain his position on those mattern. [ i i, 5 DY MR. BAXTER: 1. l 0 Q Hr. Webbi in Paragraph 4 of Mr. Kessler's affidavit I i y does he not ntate that during your period of employmen.t , i O at Gilberb Connnonwealth and when you resigned your pocition-I l 9 with the fina, your title was Load Engincer? f ! 10 A No, ho dona not say that. l l g1 O Would you correct my statement? 12 A Ile refers to my pocition. O f3 0 Does not he say tit 1.i? l 14 Paragraph 4 of Mr. Koscler'c affidavit, maybe we ! IS ime not loching at the name thing. 16 A I cortainly hopo no. 9y Eculd you liko for me to road what it is on my i 18 paragraph 47 gg Q Certainly. , 20 A Mr. Hebb's title during thic period of employment 23 at Gilbert Commonwealth and when he resigned this position 22 with the firn una Lota Engineer. I ctand corected, I was . 23 looking at the words, his pocition was Lead Engineer, and I 24 had. missed tho' word title. To my knowledge, that is not an 25 official title of job' clacsification at Gilberti Comonwealth.
}
i !
1847 t Q And so Mr. Nelson who in manager of Employee
- i
- 2 Relationships, you would tectify is in error when he list 3 that an a job title that you held at Gilbart Commonwealth.
4 A Again, Mr. Nelson, and thin is what caused tha
]
j 5 problett. I am trying to explain this as best as I-can. 1 [ 6 He sayn that I functioned as a Lead Engineer - Lead Mechanic 21 7 Engineer. Well, a Lead Mechanical Engineer can mean i S differant things to diffe. rent people, I think all that I G rn trying to tentify here to todc.y, was that organizationally ; i t i 10 and to the people to whom I work and was not known, my l 'l l title us en the project, regardleau of - it may he within l i ;2 the det .nitions of your Land Machanical Engineer or Iead i 13 Engi:acci , but the title van Mochani. cal Syste au Supervising j u Engincet and I had, func ionally, responsibility for all the l 1 j 15 work frcn the Mechenical Sysrems Engineering. I ! 16 0 Oksy. On. Page 3 of your utatem.nt of affiliations 4
- j7 you at..he that you inspected Rancho Seco on two occassions i
! 18 during recent nontha. What equipment did you inspect in l l gg the sctpe of :upplier design at Babcoch n Wilcon and describe 1 l 20 pleast. , how that inapoction han a hearing on the testimony L < 21 YO2 II160? 22 A U# I' ND*~'fdyst tirm, I tcut'ad the faciliby was 23 . Ulth Ec mn of Mr. Man Andoraon and he .gave myself and
. 3; Ufo othar inJ.viduals a rather curcor.y tcuard the planten.tha:.
3 Jncluding tan contr:21 room. It was cor prime function on.tha" l i i .. .
_ _ - - -. - --. - -- - - - - . ~ . - . - . - - - - . . - - - . . J848 1 l q 1 vlait to look at the control room. An well, we walkad aroung i.' D 2 the plant. We at least showed the general area.of the l 3 auxiliary feedwater'nyctem pump location, identified tho { 4 condencate tankn, the borad (?) water chorage tank. Generall y 5 described where the major, components were located at the i 6 plant. On a nocond occaccion, uas in a response to a request
- 7 to our involvenent in theco proceedingn, and Mr. Ron a Rodriguez chowed uc e.round the plant. Again,.our price i
9 interact was the control room. On that visit we were led 10 into the gates, if you will, that phycical barrier that kept jg yard perconnel out of the area of the auxiliary fecduater 12 pumpa. We personally went into tho ar:en of auxiliary
\ fecdwater pumps and their drives.
g3 Uc looked at the pipe f4 arrangements for t'ao condensate stcrage tank and I alao gg inspected some of the piping and vaiving in that area -- 16 0 I am sorry to interrupt you, hub it la going tc 97 be acre officient th.',s way. My question uas which equipment
.g did you inapect that ras within the scopo and cupply and g design of Dabcock & Wilcox. And while you cro identifying 20 all these piecco, that you would answer my question along g with that.
22 A I gueso bated upon ny knowledge that the scope of t 23 mpply f Babcock & !!ilcox being the ntclear ateam cupply (w k system and itc interval components being a reactor coolant 24 25 pu ps, ste m gene M ore, prosaurizer, we vore not allowed to f l
4-1 1849
.f:
i enter the containrient . building and inapoct those components. 2 Q In the period since 1977 your statement of 3 affiliations on the first page indicates, Energy Analysis i 4 and Power Plant Siting for the California Energy Conenission. 5 Is energy analycic and siting - power plant siting an 1 I 6 offico of the Conrission or la that just a description of ! 7 work you have bonn doing? 3 A It is both. It is not a specific division or 9 office; it is I guess, a somewhat functional title used here. 10 l 0 On Page 1 of your testimony, you atate hhat you l 3j ; have been active in the 6ccign of cafety analysis of nuclear i i 12 l Plants since 1974. Deen your energy analysis' function ! l g et the Cclifornia Energy Ccmmicsjon include the design and ' i h aufaty analyais of neclear power plants? ; i g A I did work on Sun Desert application contention i y
,v which was a two-unit nucicer power plant proposed here, ;
I within the state. l g g Q Tcu did not do any design work on Sun Desert Project, Uhile yon vero at the Energy Cornission, did you? t ,w, 23 A In reapoct to one major issue in that caso, we did I g get involvad in with United Engineers in regards to wet / dry
.G' 2 nyatens So in that cense, I did get into come design work l f l
cnd tectittony was presented at the Sun Decert protroodings rOgardbnQ Io WGt[ dry COUpoDent Sy$teQD. 4 Q WQS that a - 25b t o
q ,, .. v.
; 1850 1 A Sponsored by thii Energy Comission.
Z Q Wau' that evaluation of designo done by other's or i I 3 were you actually designing something? 4 A We actually contracted with United Engineers to l 5 actually do analysis in design in coct estination. I. 1 S 0 Vihat nuclear power plants in California havo . , l ' you perforned a enfety analysis on and what systems of those S . ! I plante? i i 9 .(i A You would have to define that. I guess you mean
.i '
! 100 perfona a nafety analysis.
- N y '}i Q 1 believe you defined it earlier today in your
.)
y testimony. I asked you a question what -- do you define' a ) i g anfoty analynia to be -- I will lot you use your own i ! definition; p- I ! j A I think hho problem that I have in directly ; g d,t i I 6 - gg { answering than ic whether dafety analycis work, opecifically !
. was t.onn by neself or under my dircchion or whether it was .
l l l g[ revicu of the work et others not having the direct knowledge l I
- p!1 of Thrt; the day-to-day evolution of that work. Which l ggNn defin' tion would you liko no no reaaond to and answer your
,1 ,
l i l 5q. f question.with,1c unknown on my part. :
- ]i
', Either. Either safety analyces under your directio n
. .y i~
Q ! I
, e I
g o.- mfaty analysen which you perforiaca directly. v.,3 h. qq A I have since hacn -- encept for my involvement on
} dicort - would you rakat.the quistion, please? I thinh '2 25 ; ;
l 1 1 { l e ,
- 1
, 1 I l l [ 1851
- ti P .4 F )
i il I lost the question hare.M. N 2 Q On t' hat nuclear power planta here in California 3 have you perferned a safety analysis and on what systems l l 4 of those plants? i 5 A I eculd aay that I have not performed direct 4 6 safety analycic on any power planto in California with regardt 7 to their design. I
,G Q , Including Rancho Seco?
9l A With regarda to their design, that la true. 10 So your testir.ony, then, would it be fai.r to say that I ) 11 it does not present the resulte of any ne.fety analynis of i i
!?, nnneho Seco5 n denign that you have perconally performed?
13 A Again. I en really caught up on rsymatics here. I 1/, j Did I do safety analycis which that analysin design.the ; 1 l n; plant or havu I revicud and analyized those analyses for.
- i 10 which the plant was designed to forater. The answer is no i l 37
; and the 1cter is, yes. i i 4 gg Q So ycur testiraony, would it be fair to say, that 39 j it reflecta your revicM, assessnent, or analysis of safety I
e
;fl analynoc done by others,, namely the Licencee, Babcock & {
- r i ,
24*1 ! Wilcox, andithe NRC Staff? ! 2.2 A Yes, :" think that is carrect. 23 l 0 And from that reviet or study,. you have' drawn
-.O- y ycur. parsonal and profeccional judgmento 'of the eennitivities gq l of the D&W nuclear aboam cupply systern; is that ccrrect?
1' 1853 1 MRS. BOWER 3: Well, California Energy Cornis:sion 2 nck thc.t it come in. Dc ycu want to respond to that? 3 MR. ELLI. SON: Mrc. Howc.rs, wo ask to Eco a copy. 4 of it. Uc would net object to its being raarkad for q t 2 51 identification, bab ue do not particularlv. care whether it ic S or r.o t. l s T ML EHS : I 97a not noving in any way, I was b i l'iO [ J'TT'e h C.V it 115 h M A 10 % .
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bYh b $[ o ~e e 1hb hk n tie).c'n e i g 4.a w LO . XLillybbCal bGD'1D , 'fbiS 10 21 qu23 tion DDZGd Ondd 6 04 the l A I Energy Commission'a issuer in the proceeding. v ' ______,m.--_--.-.~-,,._--e
y a 1854 l i l Tho response states that the Energy Corratission 9 1 l l l l 2 cannot answer the interrogatory pending further discovery 3 and that it indicatos that a supplement will be provided at 4 a latter date. Han cuch a supplem:nt bocn provided to your r, knowledge?' 6 A Not to my knowledge. j Q May we assume then, at least, that you IJave not l c i identified any operator action required by the interrogatory? i I 9 A Yes, that would be true. l jo MR. ELLSION: Mrs. Exters, I believe that that i l jj last question wac out31do the neopo of Mr. Webb'u direct ! And, in addition, point for the record that with 3 m testi:r.ony. lO 4 13 respect to this interrogatory and a number of otherc proposed y by the Licenaco, that e.caentially, they were asking for a
; c, bcsis of a contention and as ycu know, the ponture of 16 California Els.rgy Co:aniscion in this procooding is an inter-l ected sta.tc. It is not one of raising contenbienc as much as g ,
I g innues, and one of the reasonn why at the time thic responsn , gg wan nado, the Commission - the Enorgy Ccmmission had not 20 taken a poation on this insuc, pursuant to the NEC rules of. l l g , practico. 5 i y MR BA%1'ER: I believe that the witness answered g thd quostion. I wan -~ the interrogatory coems to me to simp 3y 9 . , . u. d ask for factual information and I wanted to make :;ure that the re
, was not any - developed since this Line.
c.b.
1855 1 MR. ELLISON. Well,'I would just add that with O 2 respect to California Enorgy Commiocion's position on these 3 .iccues, thoso arc Category 3 Issues and we are presenting 4 Meccarc Minor arid Byranhowl (?) on thoce iscues. Go, that e s tontimony speaka for itcelf. 6 MR. BAXTER: May we proceed? 7 MRS. DOWERS: TYos. l 8 DY MR. BAXTER: i l 9 0 Your tostimony, Mr. Hobb, is entitled in part, I l to well I uill read the whole title. Prepared Direct Testimony y of Clfford M. Webt concerning Design Sensitivity of the 12 Babcock & Wilcox Unclear Steam Supply System. Would you 13 define for us hcw you aro using the work "consitivity" in g your Eastiraony? 1S A The word "sensit!.vity" in my toctinony, I.think, gg has two facets concernsd vi th that. The foremost in my l 's aind is from the -- whri J. cra going to refer to is the g phynical or thermol hydraulic sensitivity of tlie one-suit (?) q i g etcan generator. In that, as a "rolatively small inventory" g conpared with th'a U-2 doaigns used in other pressurized 21 w ter renctors. And, cecondary, that the stcan generator i i l. u., design han in its perfornanca has a length of heat transfer I f g area which ic used to heat steum to the nuper-heated stato g rather than heat transfer froma- liquid to a liquid zono, y a Daccute of thht, IcVel flucuations within that once-through
1 1856 1 staam generator design lead to rapid changen in the heat 2 l transfer capabilities between the secondary aide and the 3 printary side and this leads to a rather quick pervations on 4 the primary cyater parameters due to f lucuationc and upsets l 5 in the secondary ayctem. Of course, when one things of the i I l 0 sensitivity, what ought this chould refer to is the physical l l 7 concitivitloc. What one must also concider is the driving f3 functions, the driving forces, or those systema that actually 9 change the parmaeters on the secondary side, which also i I j 10 . contribute to the consitivitier and becauce of the inherrent i 11 . quick responnen which may be required by the feedwater l l 12 l cynten and there oc2ponents which alao innintain the steam l 9 13 prnacure on the accondary cide, neither of these which could 14 Ii rapidly change the inventory and water level in the oteam l p i cene:w. tor, thercfore it has a duel sannitivity. Nct only l 1 43 can <hengac in the feeduator cystem rapidly chnnge the l u feed rate to the one cult {?) stean generator, but because ja! the lovel is flucuating the heat trannfor coupling, but the i i 19 1 prinary nystax. in alco affected and this is Uhat I mean by 4 i po ! .
"connitivity".
l ai i Q In a nuclear atoam supply system senultive when l thorn in any recponca in the prim my system to upset the ! 22 l 1 l 23 necendary nytem?
~y A I think now we are talking about relative p~q nanuitivity and I think, that what ia forefrost in my mind is j
~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . - . . _ . _ . _ 1857 , i l j 1 the uensitivities of a time response significanco such that ' O 2 the operatora, theacelvos, and or renponaca of open. tors in 3 cufficient in a . timely cence to cope with what Inm going to. l ! 4 call cbnormal conditione. 5 . O Hr. Ylchb', encuac me. I do not like tointerrupt l 6 witneauen, Ent we will do a lot bottor if you would, pinase . 7 first anaver ny question and then I will give you all the i 8 opportunity or span you uculd like to., The question is a l ! t 9 nuclear steam cupply nystem consitive when thoro in any 1 10 responso in the primary cyctem to an upcet in the secondary l
\
11 system or does it require como particular magnitude of I 12 responce .tn your m3,nd before you use the word "censitive"? 33 A I have a problem in directing to anmar that ,
- l j g question 'because the definition of consitivity and I was !
gg brying to expand to at least, indicate to you what I would { j g have meant by the vords "sehsitivity" before I answered tlutt., ; 1 l 37 1 My an wer would be no. All pressurize water reactors do' je not sco the came consitivity to the cocondary sido upsets oil i j 39 the priamry system. l , pg Q But there is a responciveno'ac in all precourized g watar reactorn in the priteary cyntem, to upsets in the 23 . accondary cystem. ! 23 A Eventually, but gancrally, the upsets in the , g ceconda.ry cycteau can be corrected by other operating plant 23 oroto"S c"6 if in tho courS3 th"t th* "PSot "YSte" in tho~ : r
. 1 1858 I cecondary is corrected, the primary system would see very
! 2 little response. l 3 0 inton you apeak, however, in your testimony then of 4 eliminating, censitivity, you are not trying toiimply that 5 it is possiblo to divorce the responcivonens of - altogether i I G the ronponciveness of the primary system to the secondary 7 System? 1 i 8 A No. It is not possible to totally divorce, but I i j a o think no are talking about one of - looking at the wholc i w picture or to uce a word that P.abcock & Wilcox used when they i l 11 testified, is '.ntergration of all these factors. l ! 12 Q Turn to 3our page 2 of your tantinony, if you j g will picano. The first full paragraph on that pago p; beginning with the cecond sentence, and that centence rtarto g with the "Undercooling efent- challenges the pressure relief { i l g and safety valves. 1 { . l v7 DR. COLIk That is the third sentence. MR. BAY.TER: Oh, I am sorry. Yes that is the one l 13 i j g I menn, the third sentence. 4 1.0 DY HR. BAXTER: 4 i
- g Q I uould like for you to go through that paragraph n and indicate to me which of any of those statements are not 33 trua of all pressurized unter reactors.
pj A Do you want ino to go sentence by centence starting I 25 with the undorcooling event? l I
1859 1 Q Right. 9 - 2 A The first sentence'would be true, of course, of 3 all pressuticed water reactors, but not to loose cite of 4 this importanco with Babcock G Wilcox. Again, we are talking; l 5 about the responsivonona and the time in which the inter-l l 6 cooling event would lead to requirements for challonges to ] i l 7 precoure relief and safety valvoc. O In other words, how quick does one' system 0 generator boil dry compared to U-2 atcam generator which to has greator water inventory. Ji The next santonco, perhaps I should read these, l 1 l 12 will that help the record?
- 13 0 . Finn.
i y A The ovcrcooling event can result in automatic 15 activation with the high prcosure injection system. I 19 Q I a that truc of all FWR's? pj A Yes. That in true of all PUR'c, but, again, to
- m expand, thoro are differences, phycical differencca which, l- 39 I think are very inportant and go to the eccential points 20 in my testimony.
gi Again, if one lockc at the heat trancfor aurfcco 22 area which conos into play on a one-cuit (?) ctcan generator 3 compared to n U-2 steam gonorator where the tuben are y completely covered during normal operation and overcooling cvont which is alco an over feed event, would have dramatically 25 .
i 1860
-1 different results with the Babcock & Wilcox decsgn, rather 2 than the U-2 standard design, rather than the other ,
3 pressuriced water reactors. 4 Readinginto the next centence, during that over-
- 5 cooling event, which activates the HPI, reactor'operators 1
6 .cannot easily deternine whether the event is a feed-I 7 watcr transient or whether a small break loss of coolant l l 6 accident LOCA also be involved. Thic is true of all PWR's. l 9 But, again, I think we are talking about the significance l j
- to of thic statement is the arrivalry or the times that the i
i
;; l cther PWR's would coo the HPI system activate, compared witn 12 a relatively high occurrence with Babcock & Wilcox, which i
33 concerns ne that the sennitivit.ien may create trore challengen , l g; more reactor trips, whero the operator will not be able g to distinguish between an overecoling event and one in which 3 m a creall break anybe procent. I 3 .,, Accordingly, operators required to treat the
,t u event as a small break LOCA until a definitive determination i i
g of t:ho contrary can be made, g My aucwer, again, would be yes with one caveat. g That, operator training regarding -- with regards to p experiencing the small break versue the responsiveness of a the Labecck s Wilco:t reactor, the recovery would be i- different in different PWR's and as a result of tim.t, the } ?A 4 i cporators rny.bave a' little moro different range of knowledge - e
~~-,,_,,,,_r,-~~ ' ~ . , < - _ _ _ - - - - , - _ - . , - - - .., - . - - - , . . . . ---.
l I 1861 i t "e 'with other PNR' a than they Uould with the Babcock & Wiloon. 2 Again, the Babcock & Wilcox hac responcivonoss which is much 3 greator than other FWR'c and thorfore the significanco I 4 of an early definihive determination on whether 'n LOCA is
- S procent or not, may be different.
l . . l 6 Q What would be the vignificance of not boing able i 7 coxly on in a Babcock & Wilcox Plant to be able to determine E 8 vinether there is a small break LOCA? Is the operator's l action going to be any different when ho aces the Oymptoms?. 9{ 10 A First of all, if ho could not dotormino whether ' I; i a anall break was prenont, IthinkbeforeTMI,atkeast i sa uhat van the ma: lor contributor in my mind to the '1WI accident l . - l 13 was that the operator had thdir mind set having ceen. thic l
; y responsivenecc which wan assunod that no LOCA's were taken l place and'indcod the stuck valve una a LOCA and his actions j 15 ,
< t 16f ware inapp opriate which lod to the core damage. l Since TiiI, he nov has the nind act to accume the 37 ; I u LOCA. Baccuce of that - jy 1 Q Is it mind set or inntrcotions he has in operating 29 procedureu? 21 A Nell, I think, operating procedurea moct definitely 22 since Teil, but Ecfore then I think there was indeciveness 23 non during proceduren as'to what his co'mprehension was. 1 Tow
~
2 t,' ho has operating procedures which ho must assume a IOCA in 1 25 taking, place. Until he had indications to the contrary.- That
\
c
1862 1 recently happened at Crystal River. l Because of that, he may I , 2 get himself into a position : tat he doesnot know, and must' i 1 3 keep the IIPI punps on and running. Which will run the systen l 4 l
- solid overboard to the PO1W valve visible and also the S
safety valves and this can 1 cad into the overboarding of I a 6 cooling, into systems which are not really designed to 7 accomtaodate these, although they may not be a direct impact 8l in themselves to public heal +.h and safety or the precursor t j si of conditions that, in my mind, are totally indosirable and i ic l; if they are -inticipated, they should be climited, . j jj Q Tou cro deacribits asituation where an operator 12 loct' hic instrum2ntation; is not that correct?
;3 A Certain portions of his non-cuclear instrumentation ..
l 14 0 If he Gees these synptccts of a LOCA, cf a drop in l 15 pressura, is not he poing to be abic to tcol rather soon
;g from his reactor coolant cyctem temperature dropping and the s
l i g i l high level cream generator that he has in an overcooling i j g l event an opposed to a small break LOCH. l { 1 i j9 l A First of Ell, is he had his instrumentation I , 1 i e i ' 20 1 available from the nteam generacor, is the first hypothetical - l i 21 O It in a hypothei:ical that he han tha instrumentatio n
- L i
22 available? l i 23 A No. I am try!.ng to put some balai2ce.on if he would y, Encu that he had an overcooling event, uhat wo were just i
,, te1xins ememe ehae he ven1d have 1eee his ineernmentetten, :
l I
-- . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ ____._.__L
I I 1863 l l 1 Q Let us assume that ho has it. O 2 A He has a loss ~~ .
)
3 0 No. Let us assumo that ho has his instrumentation. ! 4 A So he han a somewhat of an ideal event where i 5 there are no abnormal occurronces. 6 0 Idaal or norraal,103. Webb? I l 7 A I am corry. Could please repeat the question? i j 8 0 We are .ccuning that the operator has all of hic 1 l 9 instrumentations, He cean the symptoms of a small break l 10 IMCAr that is a drop in the reactor coolant pressure. If -- l l ) and ha takes the operator action that is dictated by hic s p. guidelines which io to initiate high-proccure injection and l 13 reatore inventon. If in time, in a chort timo, is he not 4 y going to be able to tell frou reactor coolant system i g temperature and secondary side portervation (?) cuch as l g high steam generator level, that he has got an overcooling I gj event, if indcod he has one inntead of a snall break LOCA? 10 A No, he cannot and let to orpand on why. 39 , ,,In the first part of the hypothesis you said that ' 20 h2 would be. inctructed to initiate an HPI and no it would , 21 have been a manual initiation to PHI versue and ESFAS l 3 initint' ion of HPI, I think that that is a very important 23 point. Aasu'ning that either car 2y on to componsato for e. g losc in lovel in his precouri::cr, he manually initiated 'a g- HPI or if you lot.it ride /cutanu if you waited for ESFAS.
-,w, , rm m. rw e, _ . - - - , - - , . . - - -
, 1864 e 1 In any caso, if EGFAS occurred, he then in itself would not E know that he had a LOCA or if it .was the responciveness of t ! 3 the system or sono other upset. Jassuming that he finds i s I his guidelines an I understand them, and he leaven the HPI
- 5 running the preccurizer level on certain. conditions remain 6 mpty, analycio has been performed and dependent cn what ,
1 l
! 7 the secondary side upset is, he may got Blean (?) the j i
C pri'aary uystem and in my mind the 'm1Ging is very important i
)
l 0 in terms of the ret:rovery because it may actually mask -- ; to it dees tuo things. It can mack the nyuptoms of a small 1; break in that the recovery -- it nay appear that the l i I i 12 pri:aary r.ystem inventory is recovering by its -- the noning 1;, indication, by the way is at pressurizer level -- i , In Q How did we get the voiding? l ;s A It depends on the degree to which the upset in the , 4 10 windaary sysbom which deriving the responsiveness is led 4 l g to an overcooling event. . I in,l 0 Uhat analyson a.ce you awara of that chowed the . j l g; void 6ng in formed during an overcooling event? , 20 A I think the tout dramatic -- there are two, but I i 21 think the noat dramatic which did not include any sor t of ; pg a steam line breaks van that which in contained on Exhibit 2 u m, of my tactimony uhich was presented by Dr. Hovak with 1 l nro khaven Lots to_th j
.$ 2,, hens on aanuary 8, 1980.. That analysin 33 contaised occurred which chewed aistnificant voiding occurring. .
I
1665 t 1 not only in the reactor but in the hot lag afea of the stcma O 2 generator piping and it 1;hoved voiding even in excess of thos a 3 which was teatified to by Mr. Norian, the 60 cubic foot 4 number, which natural circulation would be uncertain. Those 5 c1irvon chow voiding in crceus thoce amounts. 6 Q That is the Brookhaven analycia rhich Mr. Novak 7 testified to this weak assumed incredible events and improper i i l 0 application of codos?. l l 9 MEU. ELLISON: Objection. Mr. Banter, 2 do not 10 believe that Mr. - I do not recall him referring to those . 11 an incredible and I would objcat to your characterization 12 of his testimony. , 13 MR. DAITP.R: I withdrau the queation. . i l 14 DY MR. DAXTER: 15 0 Let us go to the lact centence. The operator l > g must therefore trip the reactor coolant pumpo which resultu gy in a loss of poor. circulation cooling to the coro and I gg reliance on natural circulation cooling. Is that true of jg all PUR'c? go I, I just found the centonce; give me a moment to read g it. Yea, that is true. n O- In the next centonce you state that the foregoing w s situation in of pecticular concern becauco IMW and SSS's i
.jg had been nore historically been more prone to feedwater 3 transienta than other PWR'a. Over on_Pago 5 of your testimony I'
l 4 1856 1 Footnote S in referencing a similar statement and the 2 reference is to UUREG OSGO in that the data that you rely 4 j 3 upon for that statencnt? - 4 A Well, I think that that is some of the data, but
- 5 thera is certa. Inly more data since then --
1 j 6 l 7 O When you wrote your testimony, you filed - ! i 1 ] 8 MR. ELIISON: Mr. Baxter, would you let the witness 9 to complete his answer. , l i I 10 MR. 2M'ER: I am clarifying my question for hin, j l l 11 MRS. DOWERS: The witneso had not completed his J l ) i j pa an:3wer. Uc 20 not want tuo neople am akinc at once. ) O g BY MR. I;A:DSR: l r y A Juct so that overything in under control, would j iS j you, plance, repeat your quenbion? ; 4 l gl 0 I cm trying to deter rino vinother the ctatement l ;j on Papa 2, the bacia for that, ans this was filed on ; jg Febra.nry 11, was EUREG 0560, that is the dc.te that relied j 39 upon in making that ntatem?nt. , i 20 A In part, there certainly specific anta which was l g compiled by the Euclear Regulatory Comission and more widely distributed in the first report in the genaric l gp
., 2 assentme.nt of Babcock & Wilcox recatora, which is 05G0. But, !
y there har, been, bc#cre that, thera was a concern by the 25 Nuclear Regulatory Containsion, Wacto in their April' 25 as ___ _.______._ __..____..__ ____._ _ _.__.__ _.. __ _..___ ___.__.,_ _,._.. _, a
1867 ) . t I well as in other caces and since then, there is even more' 2 data which addrecee:.1 this problem. Thore'was data presented , t ! 3 in -- at the came January 8 meeting, the ACRS meeting, there 4 was data in UUREG - Draft NDPEG 0667, and an well in the { 5 testimony of Novak and Rubin. What L fool is important, 6 becauco there has been numerous numbers and statictics sited 6 7 is that DGW reaci: ora, and I have to use the word appear I 8 becauac I am certainly -- I have not compiled the data 1 J n mysel. S havo mora feedwater transic.tts leading to react'or 10 tripa, three to two over other PWR's. And that is what is ,
- ;; imporbant an6. that is what concerns me. It in the feedwater i
i 12 translents that load to reactor trips. 1
\
O fine, Do you know whether the definition of j t
- p; factm':.or transients in NUREG 0550 was linited to feedwater l 1
4 i yy , trancitnt lecding to reactor trip? , i a i 16 A I believe' that that is a true statomont becasuo i l pj ; the pro':Irn with 0560 was that their data base relica upon i 1 m' reportaM e occurrences. i
- yg O It is a true statement that it van not limited t
to feeOnI.or transients loading to feedwater trip, ib that l _m .r i i 99 wilat yot. Jaant Mr. Nebb? . i (R. ELLISOli: ter, Baxter, do you have a copy of that l l g t i
.a, e documen: that you could show to the witncac7 i O t*- $ e .. . e84
- 4 88 elf .
1 , b l l l
-ww-e
! L i ! l - { 1868 l i l 1 BY MR. DATTER: i l 2 A I have a copy of 0560. l l 3 MR. ELLICON: Would you please give Him a moment ; l l
- 4 to review that?
5 MR. WEED: I think let the record sho)r , 1 6 THAT THE Goction of thic report which deals with th6s 1 l 7 problem was Chapter 3 and it is entitled Seroid (?) Survey E of feedwater related incidences and I will road the fjxst 9 two sentences. l i 10 A review tras made of reportable occurrences , l 11 ' involving fecdtater realfunctions at each operating B&W , 1 I i 12. 1' plants, Jin inchanco is reported in licensing of that reports
;;3 I.ER s only if it violatec plant technical ppecificationa.
j ,; If tant is the do not result in cacceding a technical ] ! g g, apacification limit, are not considered to be reportable.
;g Vihat relevent informatica ic cvellabic on unrepo::tod g7 instanceu of cignificen::e study it hns been included with yg regards to feewater trencient in general, a recent review gg of the Staif of f 2cdwatar transicnte and PiiR plEnts fro.n gj) n pcried of A rch,. 197ti through March, 1979 shows the i
pg following. Ard in that they conclude - I l 27, M3, LE.0ER: Mra. 2 overs,.tha witness is not g' bcing rongensive to my quastion, 9 3,; i L BT MR. TEXTER: 3 ,- m> Q The queation I ae.%ed, is do you know whether the _ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ _ . , _ . . . . _ _ . . . . . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ - - -J
T l IEG9 l l l t definition of fooduator transient, not jn::t the - not the l 2 rc uits of the numtor, I ara :iust trying to gettyyour l 3 understanding of the reference that you sited. Is the ! 4 definition of fooductor transient in ni3EG 0560, uhich you I S uco, limited to feedwater trancients which cause feedwater l 6 trip. 7 A It wac uy understanding that it was. J O Q I going to -~ I cannot find the reference in 0 0560. 1 am going to ahow the witness the testimony of 10 Mr. Rubin and Mr. Novak, regarding the ceceptability
;j of foodwator transienta referenced in NUPIG OSSO as 12 tertiaony on FOD Contantion 3A.
i Q fnPE sS j3 N you already have that,Hr. Uebb? i 1 lcg g h do, I cia not , i Q If you 1:cfGr to Page 3, Mr. Rubin and Mr. Novak l 15 ? testified atout four lince into the cecend fuul paragraph 16 l of tha amucr that tha oventu ::cvicued and the s' c udy ucre 77 l simply, the cacc:: vere forc2d plant chutdoun resulted from 33 l gg a feed ratcr cyctcu ualfMnction. That would include more 1 l ,, l cvents that juct the rou: tor tripc; icn't that corrcct? to , , A lio , I, at least, in ray om nind a forecca plant I l 'y chttdoun vould Icad to a reactor trip, therefore tho data i CU Y C
- l 23 Q You do not think thrt they rare ::c:lerring to 24 instanceo uhcre the plant had to be chutdoun for repair w,,
I
I s i 1870 l i i 1 even though it was not a recator trip? ! 2 A Well, frcea what I just read in Chapter; 3, they i 3 certainly had datn before the plant chutdowns, but just from 4 what I rend in Chapter 3, it indicates to me that they 5 included additional data base which uccid include feedwater , G transient, which lead to reactor trips, which may have not l I 1 7 bann for: d plant chutac: ,s. Go, I thinh, that there is an l 3 area where I do not complete underntnnd based upon the 1 9 statement on Page 3 and the teds:nnt in Chapter 3 of l 10 NUmG 0560 whether indeed there are one in the same. l 11 Q On Page 3, in Paragraph 1, you stnto - I i 12 . MR. ELLICON: Mr. Enxter,. whose tosuimony are you i I 13 referring to? 4 'l i p; ML BMfER: Oh, I am acrry. I ara back to I j p3 Mr, Nebb'; tent.inony. l l l 15 MY ML ELL'TER: i g Q Gn Pago 3 of your teabir.ony, first paragraph, n g start 1ng in the fifth line, you any that non-c:nergency use
;g of high prescure injaction, rcans that it no lungar cerves l 1 '
73 to alent oparators to th' precence of a ICCA or other carioue
, m
~
low pretability cyc nts. h'ould decurihn how oparetors I 77, are alerted in the control room when there is a cafety l l
,,3 t
featura accuation tignal? g A Uell, assuming they have enunciated - they havo l i l 15 nn enunciator uhich with the -- the automatic initiation of l i
, . . . _ - , - _ . , . _ , , . , . . . - - , , _ _ _ _ , _ _ , - . ~ . . _ - . _ . , - . - - - - - . - - . .__.- _ . ___.- ---._ ---_._ _ _ _ ,.,. -,- . -.
' 0 [' 1871 2 i l 1 NSFIC , would indicato so. ' 2 j O In Paragraph 3, you atake that 5: hon the re' actor 3 coolant pumps are tripped, the core must be cooled by 4 natural circulction. Aren't high precouro injection used j 5 in reflex boiling alternativec? d 6 A Yec. that would be true. ' I did not mean to . 7 excludo others, but certainly in my mind natural circulation ) 0 isthenextmodothatwouldbeutilibd. There are others , D that could be utilized based upon the abnormality of the I 10 upset condition which would be facd and bleed as well, that 11 bac been testified to. i 12 O In the no:rb sentonce ycu ctated that l O 13 mtu:^al circulation hac nc'rer baan used for core coolina - n , g at Ihncho Ecco nec to your knowledge has it baan sucacaufully ii i 15 relied upon at azar DeiJ facility followimJ the cccurrence of [ g :.cVe :e L:an , .wnt ec;aitions. How are ycu corin. tug covere l 37 trencient for that unntenent? l P l fcu thoco thc.t would lead to anosccurrence of reaching-9 thr 4turat. ion conditionc of tea eraturo and pressure in the 73 priu g cyctem. P r i n a r i l y , 1 a:tt (oncarned with those that ( m l in . nv. ragion of the crimary cvstc;. Uhat
- could occur.
p Q So the f act ca the tactire_q of m::. Karrasch and 1 i
,,s v . l Mr. Jenoa, identified coveral unplann<.d losacc of offaite y v er, lon.; of conolche electrical powtr at BrM planto, y~ a .
.itore natural circulation waa cucceccitlly achievod. You do H
ff d n
a, 1872 1
,4 U
,6 I not consider tho'sa to be sover transient conditions?
2 A -I cannot answer that becauae I cannot recall the I i 3 scvarity of those transients that relied on natural circu-l l ! 4 lation and what the approach -- the amount of cubcooling t 5 that would have b0en maintained in the hot regions of the core l ) 6 as well as the lowest hydrodynamic point being the high point I
- 7 of that candy cana l 1
8 Q Uhat cbout the reliance upon natural circulation
- 9 at Three Mile Island Unit 2 nince April, 27, 1979. Is that'not i
1 to a succecaful reliance upon natural circulation upon B&W j l 1i facility following a acvere transient condition? f i i ! 12 A Well t that is followed by several days. I>think ! j 13 j that the the .!csson learn 3d frce THI was that when they went ; i 5 a ; I into the natural circulation, it was not achieved. u h:t So they , g had neither forced circulation or natural circulation. They ! 33 say there for a period of houru until 9, 'LO hours into the
$7 accids.t before they finally recavad the reactor coolant j
gg l t pumps and were able to then cat some sort of a cooling mode i
- y be.ck to the reactor cora other than this-what I will call .
no . Pool welling (?). I think that that is a very in1portant
- 21 p intOcn chroc Hile Island Unit Two event wac.that the operato:
7 m u- was - had crocoted natural circulation to. occur and did not,
)
23 0 Tha operators did not understand the condition ! 24 i the plant, at all, did they on the retrospect? ,
?
3 A Did not understand the conditions of the pb at or i j
'PTF'TF'9 N$47E=TWW *M t Fi *"W "C C N'-W98' O N t? "-'t **79- F Twrsw .'f8=9*-e ur- *-W"W"N4- 'F**"YENW8N#8F-'N-r+" * ' " " ' ^ * * " - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
I 1873
'N 1 did not underatumd what procedurea should have been availabic (G
2 to then to take correctivo action. 3 0 The cPeratorc did not realize that they had a 4 LOCA, did they? 5 A Yoc, they did at that point. They closed tho , 6 PORY valvo, if my recollection ic correct, about two houra 7 into the accident. 8' O Wan the core damaged by that tino? O h Yen, it uan. 10 0 So, uc are talking about the failure to achieve 11 natural circulation in a severo trancient condition when the 12 coro has been damaged? i 3,3 A Yec. 13 0 Do you undernband that natural circulation has gg baen succaesfully arrived upon at Three tiile Island Unit gg , 2, however, sinco roughly a month after the accidient? p A Yes. I think thn impcrtant to noto about Three Mile g ! Island rac that uhat they did for other reasons when they gr could non achieve forced 3r natural circulation, they tried i g to get on a 'jow pronourc cosidual c zon rural synten. To do p;l this, theyooponed a PORV, but allowed the synten to blou l l i 7; l - uun for a period of ceveral houra. Although there were
,. 3 trying to get on low pressure injection, what thia ovidently y did Mac to allow nomebody voiding in the uysten to reduce to g
the point uhoro they could got the reacto1* coolant pumps back
..-.=aht.
1874 1 on on. After nuotain operation of reactor coolant pump, 2 mako up and let down, they ucro abic to get entaugh of the 3 voiding and noncondencables out of the system such that, 4 eventually they were able to shut off the reactor coolant 5 pumps an.i get natural circulation into play. 6 We should undarstand, here, too, that there la 7 more p' ant analysis approaching more of a cold chutdown 8 statc. rather than a hot shutdown state. 9 , O If natural circulation has been deomonsticated at
'10 other Babecch & Wilcox planto, a nimiliar design to y net.cho Seco, in there any rer. son why it choald not work 8
f p~ ( t. Rancho Seco?
@ g A ro rearau why it 6mu:td not.
l l 14 0 Tu'ning to Page 4 of your tactimony, en the top . g l iim , could you pleaur def'ina for ma the word "inhi. bit" g as .'en umd it there? ; I j .7 A That in ono -- I juch tant to enend my pravioun
- s ,
) I g annuar. and not to be repetitivo, but I .1.taname you t sked g' i me that qucation with considering uhat I will call Jdeal j l
( a . g, conditionc.. Th'iro - when there are ideal conditione, i
..t hava no reas:>n to believe that natural circulation woald not be affectivo at ?'.ancho Saco., I think my tectinany in.
n
,,,, cla.nr,. but I just wanted to cype.nd on that to ny.3aat answer.
.w 4
g C Mh:tt are ideal conditione? A . ons, ga n, nhere certainly the amour.t of 29
- ...-,-.\ ,. - . - . . . . - . - . . - . - . . - . - - - - _. . - . - . . - - _ - _ _--- . - ..
l 1875 ( 1 cubccoling, that would be maintained before the reactor 2 coolant pumps be trippad, vould not load to voiding the 3 cycton. 4 O Thank you, isould you proceed now. 5 A I am corry. Could you give me the quection, again? . G Q What is.your definition of the word " inhibit" 7 used by you on the top of Pago--line of Pago 4. 8 A Thank you. 9 0 I am looking, if it will help, as nimple as 10 the difference betueen totally provant or reduced - 11 I!R. ELLISON: 11r. Daxter, let the uitness 12 formulato his own ancucr. 13 I!E. BAXTElt: I am just trying to be helpful. He g.g ic tLhon como time nad I thought hd was trying to think of 15 what Woboter would Jay. g Bi' MR. Bl.XT13R: A I?o . I r.c junt trying to review the four major 97 73 iteraa that I hava on Page 3 to my own mind, answer that yg q112 3 bi.on . 20 0 I rea.'.ly am not looking for a uhole explanation 21 of that centenga, but mately that verd. 22 A WU11' just eo that it is not lost, parformance l
,g
. limitationo tr., no means, both tha sensitivity which allowa O 24 natural - rapid perdination (?) of reactor coolant system y plua the neods to use high presourc injection for systems ,
w> i
i p
, i 187f ,
!. I 1 whero LOCA's may not be precent, tripping the reactor l 2 coulant pumps when conditions in LOCA may not be present, i .f } 3 plus the masking of a LOCA of a reactor coolant pumps may not i 4 he tripped and all these in my mind hamper or at least j 1, 5 chal*.engo demand. How is this. Demand the operator to 6 follow varying oncoming procedures, such that the plant 7 can properly respond and spe wirh the design sensitivities. { G So the uord " inhibit" monna that it inhibits the operator i 9 e.ction. For him to comprehend and respond. l l 10 0 Do you une the word inhibit in the cenae of I 11 provent the cyatem from coping with the design and nake it 12 more difficult? O 13 A Well, I think it ic hoth in ny mind. If it makes 14 more difficult it is just e.s serious an preventing, because 4 j g ultimately it could be a precursor of conditiona that would u3 provent the Rtocho Seco syctem to cope with initiating 1
- 37 tho thing that we are all concernsd with here which is the 73 design sanuitivity. So what happens, what conditions that 39 can happan with the design centlitivity, how they muy ultic.
no mately lead to challenges to other cystems and loss of i 21 defense and depth which we are conce.rned. 22 0 Well, if you aro using the word inhibit to include 23 the concapt ta provant, how w2a the plant then operating-p4 Sor 5 years without the cbility of the system to yope 25 with the desirin sonaitivity of tha.Br:H nuclear.cteam supply
.systum?
%..___...__ _ _ _ _ . _ __ _ _ _ _ .. _ ___. .- _._._._u._.__
1877 ! { 1 'A We are talking about a statistical game here. 2 O no, I really am not. 3 A Ho, we arc. We are talking about the number 4 of years of reactor operation which has been around relativel f
$ short, 38 years. I t gets right back to the testimony of 6 again, Novah and Rubin that the number of thene events th'at 7 land to the very undcrcirabic concequences, not - with the.
e exception of Threo Mile Icland Tuo have directly exposed 9 pitblic health and cafety to direct consequences uhich had 10 all the precurocra of single failuro advanco vinich could 11 havo. And I think the sizo of the uord couI.d have lead even 12 to core moltdownc. And no are getting an area of very low g3 probebility events, but what we cannot dc6ide up hear, at ta least this is foremost in ny mind, is that you have cortain 15 c m ronces of upcats which have given undernirable i6 conuequences and there is the low probability event ifnich g7 will requiro procedures and renponcca to be taken under 33 undcrcirable circumstances. And that indeed in the reason j 39 for - why uc designed, why wa r,pont co mtch money and time 20 to put cafety cystema in thosn plants. 'It is not to 33 withatando the challenges of filrly ideal events, it is i 22 abno. anal event; certainly for t:n onen that we are aware ! 23 we sould not lose the defense at:d depth. s.) 7,3 Q to, is it your tectinoay that the plant is now
,, g tr.tble to cope with the BGW reactc?
s
l I 1878
, . i i
.% l" 1 A I do not knou. j j 2 Q If you vould turn to the bottom of l i
3 Pago 8. You are testifying with scspect to a scenario { 4 of continued operation of HPI vithout the LOCA. You go on \ , 5 to ctate at the bottom of the page that my maintaining the l t l 0 entire reactor vossol pressura, violation of technical ! 4 l l 7 specificationn maycoccur. Isn't it true with high pressure-1 l 3 and low temperature over an er. tended period of time, the 9 operator is going to recognize the need to throttic back-to high precsure injection? f l n A Net in all cases,if I may expand again. Crystal _ I > l i i e j p-n River shoved et 16ast a practu:nor of this in that at the' ond of Lbe 20 nicutes before they throttled back high prensure l l g injection, they aircady had smbcooling of 175 degrees. That ! i l 15 itec1f i;3 a 34nific ut a m nt of cubcooling at the high t y pret;ure. What wi here to rcmemer it that un injection, c l . p- or at h st in my ming, the injection of high pressure fluid ! i . i a.
., which is lou tcmperature in itsel.f hac sensible heat transfer i
i ! gg which cooln that core off and ansta.ining -- suntain injection , l j i 20 f cold unter at those rates vill not cool the core, in the y u feed and blood modo. And if allond to go for a long j extended period of tima, I am thinking of a time period of t
'22 l' j
l 2'il lees tMn an hour, perhaps, you couldireach those technical-
,. specifications. The other concern, of course, which in
- i. *4 l
pr valent,-1s rapid cool off. Maybe not the privalent, but it 25
IU17 1 1 1 1 i I cortdinly concerna the integrity of the thern:ol stresses in 2 the reactor vennel. So that in another concern would be a l l 3 rapid cool down nncontrolled, in exccos of the 50 dcyrecs 4 an hour which is a lot. 1 5 0 Co he might continuo punp operation for as much aa i , 6 an hour bocanne, an in Cryatal nivor event, he has lost l j 7 instrumentation. l 3 A Ho calmot cc.nprehend due to, again, abnormal 1 9 conditions which thera is alnoch infinito variety of abnormal 1 l to eenditiona that contribute by non-cafety conditions related it cyctems, station blackoute. And, in itsolf, if it is not i 12 l know if the IOch'a are presant er not and to protect the 1 l i gl public health and nnfoby, he rust continue operation high ' I . p precoure injcetion. It may not bo desirable, but that } 1 13 certainly are the preceduros in effect at the Babcock & l 13 Wilcon plants, g O Have you dona any analysin to determine how long 3 HPI sould hava to run cDntiunously before it would have to -- l 1 3 beDua the technical spacifications would be violated? A only ny cursory fool for the trend of this cort of 23 l 3 ! 1 occux nm e , I .mo donc a heat balanco on the system to Encu, 3l to continue the HDI injection with the lona of haat cinh,
.~ . :) even in ccncert (?) uith a ccrtain loss of heat cink that if ->i I tho 'gh prest:ure injecbien Unintains a hfich precsure in tho 1
2: cort _ . hcw long -- whab tha oikot of that s;ould he. I think :
- . . . -- . - - . - .... _ _ _ . ~ - - . . ..-- . - - - . . - - . . . - . . - . - . . - _ .
l1 454,
'-Q g'
~
1880
. .d' x t 1
l I em indicating this as a concern. 2 O In the next sentence you state that this is a i i 3 particular concern of nancho Seco which has ctypical 1 i 4 reacter vacac1 weldnonts that are more censitive to condition , 5 What is the basis to your statement with respect to those l-i l 6' weldmentc? 1 7 A Wall, it certainly was an interrogatory response l G that establislied thoce atypical valduento may exist at l' j 9 Rancho Seco. It was on that basis that I nado that statoment .,
; i l
! to O An interrogatory response ffom Licensee? 31l A Yen. 12 Q Did that interrogatory answer to your nemory 4 13 se, ate that the vonculu weldments made nancho Seco mere l 1 i j y [I sencitive to such conditions? 4 15 A fell, I d not know if they used the word l
.; g concitiver but they enrtainly recognized the problen, that I-7;. f utypicai weldnentf nay exist at Rancho Seco and that thero is i
! ;g ' defini aly a cancorn with the rilduchility trancition
;g trxpontture privnlent of the weldmenta. Eut becauce of thir i 20 they .zad elterc3 e.a I understand, certain technical speci-g ficarlone c.nd bluy hacp close trnck of the exposure of the i
22 p:!!nb to conditionc of conern which is high preccure. of ta aperature . 23
,y ,3 p>
Q; Enva ycu conducted any invectigation with recpoet 1
- w the c::ictence of atypical reactor vensel voldme-tc at-za t
_ _ .~.~. , _ .i L _ . - ~ . . - . - .
l 1 G 81 I, l 1 Rancho Seco other than your rovict; of that intorrogatory 2 responce? 3 A No. I did cend the interrogatory response onto 4 Dr. Homer Eboor at SAC State who hac had como interact 5 in this problam and reque.;ted a revicu of hic understanding. G of the correctiveneca of the reaponco and although I hava 7 not had any perconal bonversations uhich Dr. Ebcer, from Bt Sacram nto Stato, I certainly have --- I nacune having not I s heard from him that the recponse was an neceptable responce.
'0 The rouponne did, at lonot in ny mind, van a aatisfactory 11 l ancuor in concern ac far a3 SMUD'c knowledge of the problem 1 n and the steps they had taken to accomodate operations i
1 13l i uhich would not lead to thoce canditions for which we t/ould
; e. ,
be cancerned. ., p3 HR. $ HON: Excuse me a noment, Mr. Baxter. I p3 vould like to have Mr. Ucbh clear up one. little thing of 77 :i dets.il.. ion charactorito those ucidmentt as atypical, but i g; that ia a Tery general to::m. Can you.tell us in any simple, i . I j g chort;. uny in what way thace were utvpi-:al? Uhat wac wrong? i l 1 7;3 .1 I cou.u:; ly could. I waa just go.ing to suggent y that the interroga? ary ranponco I thought war - let ne read l l
,,y it fo:: a ninuta and I Ujll nnyho verbatim quoto the.6, becauce' 1 I
3 l i think it it a good description. y , MP. IZLICON: ?"r. Uabb, conid you identify the s a intorroGatory recronse? I 1 . 1
t t ;
'1802 i 1 ;
1 MR. WEBB: It is Liconsce's answer, Set No. 1, 2 to Californie Esrergy Conaaission's second set of interroga-r t 3 tories to the Lacranento Municipal Utility District, dated ! l ! 4 January 17, 1980. > 5 MR. ELLISCH: And that in CEC's Exhibit No. ~ 6 MR. WEBB: 10. - And I am read.ing it from.Paga 4. 7 BY MR. BAxTER: ; i A There is a clight possibility that 'I E . ANSWER: e p uc1d material, cont ned in higher and atypical concentration . t l 10 of cyljcona (?) and lower than atypical concentrations of [ r ! }t nickel may havn been use.d in a vertical. senm belt - line I wold in a Rancho 5cco reactor vocecl. When this possibioity - 12 'O
;3 was diocovored, :nra restrictive normal heat-up and cool !
, f l
- g. doun ldmit:; we7:e imposed to preserved the 60-year life of the !
picnt the limits ucre incwcporated in the Rancho Seco !
- m. ,
g tenhntec] _ ' 'i c a ".io n , j 37 O Doca that answe.r scy that Rancho Seco has etypical l l 33 renator vessel veldrents or tLat there is a. alight possibil-t i i 39 ity that they do'i i gg A Ec9 ncither did I Uny that it did, I said that it j 21 may-i'
'c2 O You you did.
3 A Ho.- leniti tho.t it m'ay. .
- 9. y, O Mr, U :bb,, I refer you to lina 2 of Paga 9 of ,
g your tectJmony. Nhere. in the word 'May"? w .--,,.__ _.._-._._l..-_,.. >
{' 1883 1 A Hell, I stand corrected. (A) s _- I snid that the 2 conditions of high proscurc.end low temperaturo may occur, 3 but cortainly that was not rg intention to inninuate that 4 there in an absolute certainty that the ecid material 5 exist, however,'it acums to me that uhnn I wrote my 6 tectimony, it was a conceded point, that we are ascuming 7 that they existed. Certainly, thoro is to knowledge of 8 ovidence that I have scen which would indicEta that we g positively know that there is no -- that the a, typical welds 10 ucre not used. So let me put it that way. l 1 11 O MR. BAXTER: Mrn. Dosers, I would like the reporter 12 [ Lo mark for identification)as EMUp_Exhib_i_t No. 8, a letter
~
13 from Lecter tubenetcin, from the HRC Staff to 14 Jrnon II. Taylor of Eabcock & Uilcox dated December 12, 1979. 15 httached to which in a document entitled safety evaluction g atypical uald material by the engineering branch of 4 gj operating reactors, g BY HR. BAKTER: G 1D In the laut caragraph of the 1ctter to Er. Taylor, 20 ti.c IUtC states, the technical specificatienc, that is ny 33 anduratanding and you correct rn if yours is different, that n uc are talking chant revised technical apacifications that u were imposed as a recult of thin invaatigation, ( ,y a hrdon me, there are you reading? g 0 F go 1 of the letter, the last paragraph, the
------.__.m.---
-~-..~~~.-...____...w --w.a ,, . . ~ - , - . . , ,
r I t
! 1984 !
1I contence bcginning approximately on the sixth line. 2! The technical specifications for Rancho Seco
,i 3 have operating units based on the atypical material that are 4[ more censitive than they would he if based on the criteria 5 -
that developed from this review. i 0 MR. ELLISON: Mr. Baxter, my copy says "more l 7 rostrictivo" rather than more sensitive. l 6 MR. DAXTER: Oh, I am sorry. That is correct. p, BY IIR. PJ2TER: E I 10 Q I c that your understanding when you wrote the i t 11 testic.ony or had you not ceen the evaluation made by the 12 i Staff? O 13{ A Well, I certainly -- I bacically understand i 14 l i what the analynia was done and I hope my point in not lost 15 i that teceuac of their further investigation asumiing that i i g! there war. atypical koldtng mterial that they could relax i i l 97l so:r.r: of their temperatw:e pressure relationships in regard 1 l gj to this nilductility transition concern. Eowever, at teact jgl I am mot aware of, for inctcnce, how many degrees an f 20f additional cubcooling would be allowed at the safety valve i g i limit which wa are nou concerned z.nd convorucly how rouch time I l 22{ that ray ellow the plant to operate s according to the full , i l 23 EPI flow, with one of thcoc - c03 normal black statien condit:.ons, ' 24; O- Have you invr.atigated that metter? i
~a A - I have not investigated'that matter'further, no.
I _.1-. _....__-.--___.-.i.-__.-._._______..
t [ 1885 : I 1- Q Then how do you know that the plant is more 2 sensitive to cuch conditions that you state in your 3 testimony? i 4 A Well, I think that that la still true that -- ' t S O Based on the operating limit and the technical. O specifications that are inposed now and diccusced in that I h lettor to Mr. Taylor? . O A I hope, that, again, that ue are not ljung up on 9 synatics, but, perhapa, I think we are. That whether 10 Rancho Seco una of concern because of the atypical weldacnt 11 problera, uhich in one aspect of that but are we also concerned by Rancho Seco becauce of thic responsivencas whihh cart get 12 O g3 un nto these conditions -- ! 14 0 Wall, right now, I am talking about this particular' 15 sentence -- gg 11 Woll, lot no finish, if I may. 37 Q Cortainly,
~
gg IIR. ELLSIOlh Mr. Webb, before you go futhher, ID would you like a couple -- you have not had time to really 20 revicu this letter Jn ihc entirety, and you were asked to g a cuontion rather quickly on it If you wich I would suggest 22 that you take the time and read the entire thing. . 23 }IR. WEBB: Well', the thing that I wan rest ccncorned ) y about in reading the lettor was trhother there cro curvos l~ j 3 tinich relax the proscure temperaturo relationshipc and I' (
,i
( l s l l
I 1886 , i 1 cannot testify tcday to know what those relaxations would be , 2 and if, indcad, they would be enough such that Rancho Seco l 3 would be considered atypical interms.on this reactor vessel' l l l 4 i Weldmonts with other PNR's or other normally specified
=
l 55 fabricated BEW reactor vossels. I 6 What I was trying to finiah in my previous- ; 7 roeponco, is that Babccch G Wilcox is unigno in its feed and B biced mode W 2 h the high praccure HpI pumps that can pump ! s this ayatem up to the anfety valve limita and if St"xontinued 10 to operate dranatically cooling, the reqctor inventory and i 11 Crystal P.iver in a matter of 20 minutos at a 175 degrees l ! ?, subcooling at that linit, if you are acking me if I can 13 tantify cpacifically to how many degroes of subcooling i y could be provided and during what time frams it would- be 15 c::ceeded with come hypothetical event such no what we are 3e; now discuccing, I havo not parfcared those analysis. . j g , O I believe the hypothetical event that wo gp 1 are discussing is that which in in your testiumcly, but we wil: ! gg move on. e p.0 MR. SHCm Mr. Ent:ter, I would again like to 21 clarify comething in my mind frcm both your Exhibit A and the n things M.r. Nebb has bocn anying. How that the nature of n stypical contantion ~ condition or potentially' condition > G g ff has boca revealed, I note that.it is a change in trace mat-F 3 erials, particulcrly . cylicon (?) and nickel, I think, in'the u .____.-,~..._._F - - ~ - - _ _
3 4
-! 1887 i l ! 4 iU/? !
i t 1 voldment, and that chango although it dcha cr me.y oponly ! ' P, ' effect nilductility transition temperature is of the sort . 1 l 3 that would not effect it until conciderable fact neutron-L 4 ofrradiation had occurrod; in that correct? l l 5 MR. WEBB: Well, sir. I amcertainly not going to , i l put myself out as a metallurgist or u,atever and reviewing ; G I i 7 this, I kind of had therrcycrea imprescion, I have not read l a ! 1 l i i a in detail, but perhaps I should but that the neutron 3 exposure to the weldmants, had indeed increased or at least' i 10 changed the nilductility temperature in incroaced with tina, i ! 11 Ws, this at least Ln ray cursory reading leada me to 1 I j pg balicyc that the pressure t4cmperature rectrictions can ba 1 i w raarca. : I I
- y ER. SEO
- 7: The 3ast centenco on the firrt page f 1
g i of the letter to Mr. Taylor rendas at these plants Uc have j g found tilat atypical naterial is not currently limiting due i ! .; .7 to the low amount of the rr.diation demage which auggests to g ne that at locat in the NPC's opinion, this atypical nature i l g has not had a chance to h.tvo any affect, does it not suggcat 1 l ,.n. e the arJ2c thing to you? , I g MR. WEBB: Yes, it does. p, . [ MR. SiiON: Mc11, that is all that I wanted
, to establich. Thanh you. 1 ara corry, Mr. Baxter. '
2.3 O. g LY MR. BAXTER:
'A- I might add ths.t J.o comewhc.t my responce was based P.5
__ __.- .__l._-.____-.____._.__.__._______u _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . _ _ _ . . - _ _ _ . . - _ _ .
l 1 1889 h 1, upon cdditional information in the interrogatory which 2 quoten thic Auguct, 1979 letter. This in the cana --- I do 1 3 not know if it in the same letder. 4 Q The letter is dated Deccetbar 19. l l d 5 A Well, it han toduo with the B&W report. " Evaluation 6 of atypical wald.nent, R&i71556, August 1979" maybe that is l i 7 what la attached. I 8 HR. LEWIS: The attachment in the 1iRC evaluation. i 9 A Uhich further states in response to interrogatory, i ! 10 Mr. Ghon, 6 concluded that the hont up/cooldoun limitations l 11 could bo relaxed". I r 19 IJR, SHON: Thank you., I ! 13 LY MR. BAXTER* , i l On Page 10 of your tcctimony, Mr'. Webb, the second
- i 14 0 i
l 15 sentence, states that natural: circulation cooling demando l l l jG operator jud.;monto requiring a high degree of understanding
- l l 17 of the analytical basce of the nacociated procedures.
i ! 18 I could like you to acetune that there is a loss l l 10 of all main <aeduc. tar in the reactor trip and a cubsequent a tripping of the reactor coolant plunps. Would describo cach 21 nation the operator muct take to achieve natural circulation n and for each action describe each judgment that in demanded 23 cad hon it requirca a high level of understanding of tha
@ 24 cnalytical bases for the proccdure.
3 A I certainly would beglad to do that but I might j
'l na--..,----, ,,-,.----------r-.-
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - - _ _ . ~ - - _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ . i i i
- r g 1890 i %
I offor what my concern is berc. i 2 O Would you answer my question, please? l 3 A I certainly will. We have h.a a - ropaat the 4 question, please. 5 Q Loss of all main feedwater, reactor trip and I 6 tripping of the reactor coolant pumpc. Identify the 7 operator actions needed to get natural circulation and for B each one describe the judgment that la called for and how j 9 a high degrco of understanding of the analytical bases for l 10 the procedure in needed. 11 A Well, the first part of that is actions required l to achieve natural circulation, am I correct? 12 4, 13 Q nn. l I4 A And what was the cocond one? 15 Q The jndgment that in called for in conneection with ! 16 tbnc action., I, l 17 A Was there anothc.r part ot the question? fB O Yes, a third -- no , thero in a third. I iD l A Knat was that list of action? i ! T.0 0 How that judgment requirac a high leval of r.ndar-l l n1 , abanding.of the analytical banca for the proceduro. l 22 A Diay. In rayrd's to the first part, what actions 23 would they. require. Certainly, I had no knowledge, at:least, 24 of whether this woulti be -- wait, I have to hypotheticate here 25 for a iainute, nt renowledge of'whether this,vould be an ideal
l [ 1891 1 event - 2 ;O- Well, I defined the ovent for you. l-
- 3 A Well,'you just said 100c of feedwater leading to i
4 an ESFAS accuation with EAD cooling pump trip. I 5 0 No. I did not rmy anything about ESFAS accuation.
~ :.
l 6 A Well, ascuate RAD coolod pumps would only be tripped.' 7 Lousoof offnite power? 8 0 No. We have had a loss of main feedwatcyj, a D reactor trip and the reactor coolant pumpc have been tripe.ed.. 10 A That was my point. j . lTP 6 seg 11 0 WEll, lot us say locs of offsite power. l l 12 A Well, certainly if that was the only thing that 9 13 happened and wo did not have, what I am going to call as
)
t g a malfunction with the ICS, cither a failure with the ICS 15 that they are ntill (Lparating with or thoce conditions which 10 uoult lead to what I angoing to call under feed, or overfeed. 77 Let us just aasuno only foedwater is loct, the level of the l j gg steen gancrator drope without additional au::iliary feedwater 19 until it gots to the auxiliary feeduaterppoint. With a y renctor coolont pumps trip, an I understand it, automatically 3 control it to the 50 percent 1cval in the one-suit (?) y ganarutor by the zuxiliary feedwater cycte:a. All those given, you caked me a question earlier, vanld I think natural 23 y circulation would occur, and my answer at this point would g be g:cs;' natural circulation vould occur. Go ahead Mr.Baxter. 4 _______u__ - - -
l l ! 1892 1 Q Refer to the three things that you wroto down.
> l The operator action. '
i 3 A Certainly, given thab we do not have any other i 4 upseta, which would lead tho operator to assume that natural i 1 5 circulation or suspect that a natural circulation would be l 6 ccourring or not, in any case he vould monitor hic hot leg
- '/ and cold leg temperatures to narhar one to identify' a 1
1 8 Dc:lta T or at leact a temperature drop across the steam D generator which would givo me roma indication that a flow 10 was teJting place. You uould have to have knowledge that 1I nhould thin Dolta T be too high, it uould he an indication ( 12 that no flov or low flow or no natural. circulation was l l
- l. 13 taking place and atradvocction (?) was oddurring. To de 1
14l this he would hava to have some sort of knowledge of I 15l thornoldynamics and f.luid flow and be able to hace upon o 10 [ his very currio7.y indicatora, which aro juct basically i gj this temperature imd preacu::o in the primary system to not i 13 l only, nttmber one, that he did not have a LOCH then
,i 10 ! occurring. hoically, hin actions requiro you Uould have to i
20 nonitor hin 3nstrTauntatione to sac if any further prompt t 21 ; action by the operabor would be required. Corteinly, if l-22 given a chandard e mnt, none of his actiona would, so he 1 k 23 ' uould b o primarily monitoring his instsunentation and he l 24 l waald, and I am going to uce the word " comprehending # the 25 statie off the primary reqctor coolant. l-I I
I $ 1893 1 tsoe. in this'reagrd, a great deal of judgment might i 2' be called for on his ability to. comprehend, and thin, indeed, 3 is what I "his demands his operator's judgnonts". What_I 4 just aluded to is hind of an inci;oresting point. About the 5 crount of stradification (?) acroca the steam generator. 6 and 1: hen Rancho Soco in about torrectart from the May 7 orrior 7 I cannot recall eractly where it in documented, but ono 3 reason that it did not r d tart wao that upon the audit 9 examinatione given the dporators, they failed to respond
~
10 properly when given the hypothetical conditions whether
;; natural circulations were occurring or not and this had to 12 do with the high Delta T between the cold leg and the hot leg O 13 t/nich would indicato atradification. So the operator 14 steld that would verify that natural circulation was occurringj 15 Dmune of this the riRC Staff required general physics g corporation and the Licencee agreed, to further training j.7 Eo the operatora before the plant would raatart. This la gg what my concerns are and in addition -
19 0 Did the Stuff ultimately conclude that the jo operator'c -- , 27 MR. ELLICOli! Mr. Banter, would you please allow tho witnosa to finich hic ancwcr, a MR. Sn ten: The witnacs gives 10--ninute answera 23 24 that cro not responoiva to the cuection, g MR. ELLISON: Mr.-Daxtar, you have asked a question
I 1994~ < l 4 i / 1 that at least require a 10-minute answer. i I ( i
- 2 MRS. BOWERS
- We woul'd like for the Witness to i
3 answer. I 4 Mn. BAZTER: He la talking about audit examinations - l I am answering, specifically, just ! 5 MR. WEB 3: i 6 for clarity. 7 BY MR. BAXTER: l e A The cenond pcrt of your question what judgments e are failed for for his actions? j 10 Q Dub tho action that you identified was monitoring, I 11 A 2bnitoring tuo thinga. No. I to identify proper i 12 tempr.raturia in the hot leg and the cold leg, whichv7.21d l i i 13 indicate ta hin that c nctural circulation flow was occurring , j g ico. 2, it would be for him to identify hhat subccoling. l g exiateil In the primary system. Until the recent addition 1 l of rubcoaling matero, inich I do not know, cannot mdLfunction l g 4 g cannst conse periods - arcan wirhin the core which would ]. jg hnvu c;rtain errors asscciated with them, but certainly,
- Jg I would hope, that the operator ic not using his total l gg judgrunt anpco to - bO.ced upon a ningle in61 cater !
i 21 Ent, containly he now has a snbecoling noter, but in addition i to taat, he 7;hould be and be z.ble to take pressure in 22 23 torfrerature kcadinga from the prixm y cyctem and know from f.O 24 tharaedynts. mien charte, whethe he chould be subcooled or not n - . or t2 ether he is in naturated conditI,cnn. This requires a g l 1
= . - . - . . _ . . . . . - . - - . . .-.-....-..._.__.~,_..._,-...--.j
E l' > 1895
! M.
I cortain level of eduation, understanding, with regards to 2 tharr.odynamica and fluid flow. It demnds operator judg-- 3 g menta based upon a high degree of undcratanding of an 4 analytical bason of this phsnor.ena. And I might add that 5 this phenccaenn or at lenot this reliance in natural circulati on
~
G row being a stand operating proceduro if you will since , 7 B&W plants in ny opinion vill have upcets leading to reactor 8 chrips with ESG3S cocuation and rcactor coolant pumps being 4 9 tripped off require the operctor in.hin judgments to know jo that ho doos not hava a LOCA, but that he has not had even 11 vercus tir.e, ete.3 condition in thoro thct leads him to believ i n that ho is voiding, and that he has perhaps has minned s a voiding that even though he comes back a subcoolant he g , utill ecold have a omil breah and I am additionally con- % 33 corne.d beunuce of whit I am tware of Mr. Wilson will t0Ehif Y lat0T in thane proceedings han unrveyed Bruce Wilson 1G[ - p; who is an NRC oportting licencing branch c: aminer.is cluded i p, l to have testified befera an 24RS Cosaittco on these came
;9l facters and ha concluded, juct from rp understandiny 20l randing here, that ':hn Injority of NR opere. tora did not 5
g have a g ;od enong". understanding c f thenodynaalca and h g invcribly uculd thaa the tcaperc.tcrav into tha supar heat t t,. o, e regica t/ con a;kcd icout cartain ocnditions. So there have a ( y .} h 4 been e :tivitico by T.he IGC to e.xmine operntore on thone
.,h ftets and there have baen acco indientiens that the analytical
$l u 9
- d. ',
i 1 l , 1896 9 1 bancs of their undcratandings need to be iriproved. - I l
.2 ' ,0 Prior to the rectart of the Rancho Seco on l
j 3 JtTLY 5, of .1979 had the Staff' cudit concluded that the 4 operators had an adcuqato understanding of natural ] i ~ ! 5 circulation phononana? 1 1 1 6 A I cannot stato that the.y did or did not. Certainly, , i i-
..- '7 t. hey aup.ied the plant to rectart, I acatme -that they were .
i l 8 convinced that proper training had been given to the operatoro s to corrcot their dcficiencica, whether that 1c adequate, I l
. to do not know.
l I ! 11 Q Have you read the Staff'ncevaluation of i j - 12 June 27, 1979 Milch lead to the restart and which is in . 1 ) l g evidenco in this proceeding? J l l j y A At - cometime ago, I did rend that. l l jij O On Page 11, five lines down, you state that since g oparntrac ara in;ttructed that HPI naybe secured in 50 degrees ; gy of subcooling ic varified, they racy not be alerted to i instabilitica caused by voiding. Are not the operatora 33 g also instructed by their p m ccduros to reactivate HPI if l I l l 3 they loose the 50 degreen cubcooling range? 21 A I am sorry, I en on Page 11 and I could not find I
'c;here you 'aro reading from. Would you please -- j g
l ( g{ MRS BOWZRS: Wall, ha read the last. half first j i l m,
, nna the first hcif lant. But it in the contence that sta.rta ,
,,5 off . tith operators on the fifth line.
1 i l
I r i 1897 j I b ( s . 1 1- IR. WELS: Operatore may be - re ; f not be alerted; } i P. 10 th6t correct? ' i ! 3 MR. 3AXIER: Yon, ' i I i 4 BY NR, 73.hXTER: i i j' 5 A And your question in? ! i g 6 0 Are not the operators instructed by their ' 7 procedures to rgmtivate ITI if they11oose the 50 degree 6 Lubcooling margin? 9 A You, that is true, idlich if thay secure HPI and natural cdranlation van not taken pince that they tould i 1 10 ? I be totally monitoring this infort.Etion and would have the ! 7t
. t y, g prop e:: analytical undaratanding by chuchinc preocure and iG g
1 subecolim. y tegen.ture wculd reactivato IWX in thic condition ( b . ]
'y Q v?ht: analytical - ,, ;
a 1 1 a A Tha procedurea c:;ist, but it still requires the a , i I f j g., ;. operator to rmite: cortain instrumentetien and cgain my : l 8 24* coner.cn in the abnormal event which could have mc.ny other .. c g i thinrya occurring. It could be even offaite fire or offsite
.}
j ;9} pattor, cinco thz they could, perharc, omlock vo.tding which I go nay hava accurrou or even e mall brod which night have 1 i i g ; becm en .ked by voiding. So asntme ~~- ascuning that they i t b 4.
- s. ,u l
follow proccf.uro in.na timel.v. fashion, and there is nothing > w
-, I
)
to distrach them from thota proceduran and tlwy do hava , h 3, - cccurate instrp2cntatica, ycu, they uauld rect.: art a high g prorwure injection of samabhing - of cabcooling if it was 6 i
.l .w- .--,n.--...-n_-,.n <+~--+_,L...-~..-.-------i.,,,-,.--.----. - - - - - -
l i 1 y l 1898 4
.a i ! lost.
- e l 2 0 Which they can tell from juct reading just pressure I '
3 and temperature and now juct the subcooling noters; is that i
- 4 correct? >
l j 5 A I f thnt instrumentation is accurate, yes. , l ! l G Q Page 12 -- i
*/ MR. SHON: It:cuce me, again, Mr. Baxter. Ecforo
/ .;
8 wo leave this one point, I -- reading the centence that you 4 j 9 juct read or just had Mr. Webb coment on in conjunction with ] 10 the sentonce before it, the sentenco cecms to suggest that ! 1 1 j 11 oven if naturated conditions existed in the core and this l i j
- 17. cubcooling read thattthere was a margin of subcooling, or l
{ 13 the oteam ttpa shoued that there was a margin of subcooligg, ) g yea could still have voinding, and that seemd to be what i - 15 your concern wac, I did not understand that from your ~ g antwora to Pr. Baxter, in that what you were talking about?
'I ey MR. WrDB: Well, cetually I had concluded that '
l J g he had cecured HPI and I had not achieved because of what I i 39 am testifying to for thoco reasons, natural circulation had 20 not h un achiercd, if you will, for a HPI that was cecured 1 J j 21 natural circulation wan lost that he has procedures which l i 22 ctill havo to restart high proccuro injection if natural circulation is not occurring and that he would use the 50 23 24 dc.grees nubcooling as that parameter. . In other uords, there i 1 l .y ic a natural circulation that is loct and a HPI that una [ , l a 4 b* wn. ,,rv - - , , w a m --w n -r ee --.1 , - . , , . . . . . , - . , , -. - - . - - - - - - ~ , _ , .
I l 1899 1 secured, and if thero was a small braak, the ayctem would 2 blow down towards saturation. 3 MR. SHON: But your sentonce taken together 4 zecm to imply that there could be a condition in which he l s would not know that a saturation was occurring. Is 50 degree l c subcool.ing still look an if it la there ? 7 MR. WEBB: Exactly. What I am concerned about or > l 3 convinced where a natural circulation will not occur and he O secarea EPI. Now here we havo no heat sink and he have no 10 high pressure injection on which toroly upon feed and bleed. 11 MR. SHON: Can this actually occur? sg MR. Wl:DB: I cannot say for certainty and agiin la becanise I am not cueing specific analyais in these areas. 14 And as we saw thet when even the panel was here, they just gg ! eluded to additional staff analysis on these severe conditions g uhere voiding could occur,, whero the pracsurizer is empty 37 for instanca. To know that there is not the case where
;g natural circulation would not fail and I think the whole 10 point here 10 if natural circulatiun fails, what does thic l
20 mean? It neans tht li?I must be restarted. Does that help, fir. Shon? 21 ) l g ER. SHON: I am utill not clottr on the matter l 23 ecapse it ues my improaction that the other uitnesnes g had virtually cosured us that if you rad subecoling, pro-t g vided that you have a precsurizer like thia. i
t l 1900 t i alIR. WEBB: G 1 Well, we certainly cAid that and I ! i 2 hnvc not scen the analycic and I-must say that I am not ' 3' convinced until I see tho analysis that I would agree with ' I 4 them. l 5 MR. SHON: Thank you. Sorry, again, Mr. Bdxter. 6 Plence go on. ' I . ! 7 BY MR. PJa'I'3R: ' t 8 ( Q Page 12 of footnote 16. - i t i 9 h Page again, Mr. Baxter? 10 0 12. In footnote 16 to which you alte, what was ' gg attached to your testimony ard which is now CEO D:hibit 23, ) i ' i 12 you ntate tha 103 inspcotions of oven normal operational O 13 DEW tranciente, he"o '
- cated void formation in the j g hotter regionc of the reactor vessel. In that the conclusion
) I 15 eted in CEC's Dthibit 237 That these are indicated or do l - g; they Asay they - it is a uatter of concern and there a l 77 number of in6icationn that suggent void formation may be taken l gg piace. 3 A I think that the way you characteriro thin 23 Exhibit 4 in correct. a u, O Havo you donc any further invent.igation of this l l ,7 cer. carn cincs reviewing CEC's D:hibit 170.- 237 1 g A Mull, I undcrStand that. SWJD Exhibits 1 and 2,
,g which teaa shown to us yocterday, I reviewed that 'as a curAwry 25 mnnner and,although it concludco, want to use the proper
- - . , _ . . _ ,-......-n .._-m-_ ___
. . . , , . . . . . _ __.--,-,.4 ,m e ww -
1901 1 uorda, but it concludes that the voiding was ntit occurring. 2 I think that there is still soms abnormal transient conditions . 3 There are como concerns on my behalf ifnich are thoca stated 4 on the bottom of enclosure one, that if voiding the curves 5 there are cortain characterista of voiding and it is that with 6 which I am concerned. Perhaps, how you would define a norma 7 responae or at least for these transients that they specifical ly 8 identified and have been analyzed whether voiding has occurred 9 or not, the NRC has recently had a n awareness that in the 10 hot regions the thermol acets the hydraulic low point in 31 the system, which is where Voiding would occur first because 12 of the lowest point of saturation temperaturo that voiding u indeed in a distinct ponsibility with only minor upsets if p not naar normal in the concern are valid. I do not think that I g the coneerno have boon elimisied, that in what I am saying
;g even though no looked at some specific transients and did 77 find cignificant or through the analysis the voiding did not I
g occur in thosa trancients or certain other transients where, l gg I think, there is substanhial evidence that voiding will 20 occur-33 C Unte I am just ta11 ting alcut your testimony and ; Z:, in footnote 16, you are talking about normal cperational 3 , trannienta, cren't you?
;g A Yes. that is what the concern wra in the January 23 9, NRC 1stter, even what vould be normal, being defined ar. a 4
----ww.
I i I 1902 , i l ! 1 ' five ' day pick where there was not a significant undcrcooling or l l 2 overfeed or underfeed of the steam generator. There was not- ! 3 a failure of steam generator pressure regulation that th'ey I 1 4 though voida might even occur then, which says that maybe in 3 3 an old trancient the operators wercegotting invalid data, 6- the prescurizer levela are not accurate. That dogasing even - l 7 in the proccuriter, this could'be affecting the instrumentatia l '4
.s ab. Thore are tuo specific things tNat related this 9 E:dlibit 4 in my mind to acond it to my tactimony. The first
- yo that voiding can occur quito easily cin B&W systems if not undar norhal trancients and number 2,.that'the concerns will f 7;
) state conditionn for which the D&W cystem has more v:.scept- ' 12 f O 33 ibility. I Q But you considered it when the NRC Staff has a con-j g l g corn chout a problem that meanc that there is one necoccarily. l g A No. J g Q l have no further questions. 1 l MRS. BO7SR3: Uhat about the Staff?
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MR. WESB: May I just, if I nay? ). ,,"' \; i i 1
=0 MRS. BOWEFS; Go ahead.
I .ta. MEDS: Earlier I was asked to read the g a j g. affidavit of Willian Kessler and to corront on that and I was j 1 nevur allowed to finiah my respance. Maybe this would be an
., -.g i
f' g npptoprinto time to go bach to that. 1 1 i g MR. LATTER: Noncally, re -dircot would be an i l 1 ) i .
1903 1 appropriate time, but -- 2 MRS. BOWERS: Why don't you go ahead. 3 BY MR. DAXTHR: 4 A Now, I think we got caught up in the terminology l 5 of whether management used "the lead engineer titlo" to 6 dealgnato my position vorcus what on the Erio Muclear Project 7 my position had been entitled. S Eut further with Mr. Kessler's tentinuny, he 9 oludes to the addition to the fact that I was core lead 10 ongineer, although he does not discount the fact that on a il project ny title may have been project -- mechanical re synteits supervialng engineer. He said that I did not work g on fuc1 pool cooling and containment air cooling systems
;.4 except with the interface of those systems with those in 15 whichhhe did sork.
g The personnel in my group ce.ctainly did have a very strong interhee in that uc providsf. a temporature
)f g pro-nile for the tuuperature water system, which directly j 79 impacted the d.csigns of both the fuel cooling and the response; 3 to fuel cooling and the containmant air-cooling systems.
g The temperature or cooling capacity of the I 7 contnirnent air cooling nyaten was calculated by people in my g section and of course, that in a very important nurther since 1 y . it directly relates to the size of the containment structure. 3 i so, I ude, it is an over statemen or it eluden the fact j l j-
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that I would not he.vo had or I did not perfrom safety 2 cniculationn.only in syntems or I would not have had comouhat i 3 of a dotniled knowledge of these systems. i In addition, if ! 4 my nemory serven ma corMect, the containment air coolers 1
- l i 5 specifications were going to be written by my group. '
g ,. G Q You any that it cludes that you did not perform
.r 7 any calculations on th6sc systems. Your testimony is that' j 0 you were rosponsible for it.
1 l a 9 A My tectimony staten that I was responsible for the 10 ccoling, provided for thono cystems.
]
] 11.- Q Does the nystem design procurement and cafety 12 , analysis. 13 A That io correct. The fuol pool coolers and the. l j 14 containacnt air coolora, I was responsible for. Now, what s 15 Mr. Kescler is eluding to is who was responcible for "the 16 containment cooling calculations" and who was responsible for < jy the cooling of the cool -- fuel rods anddthe fuel pool, that i la was another group. 10 0 I!cy can you tell that that is what Mr. Ecualer d 20 $c talking abnut?
! 21 A I acatune that wlmn he cays that he did not work, J
21 that that. in what waa noat foremost in his mind, e f L 23 . And again, I think, on the verylast line when he y caya ilt, hbb van only responsible for the 10:00 -- for the 1 { 25 anlect, machanical systema on which he vor%ed. Certainly, I I I
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- l. 1905 i
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- l 1' can think of -- I cannot of a mechanical cyctem.s fo: which 2 I van not responsible except for perhaps some very isolated 3 areas of nuclear R:0 we4rc., et cotera which were considered l
l 1 nuclear systems. l 5 MRS. BOWERS: Ic the Staff ready to proceed? I U MR. LIMIS : Mr. Black will cond9ct the cross j 7 examinution. I i U 1G. ELLT.3OUt Mrs. Bowers, if I laay, it la l j 9 2:30, parhaps this r.rould be a good tirne to take our 10 afternaen break? i
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i ' i 1906 ! 4 I MRS. DOW2ES: Are you ready,>Hr. Black?
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MR. SLACK: Yo s, I am. ,billiccolburn ) !, 3 CROSS EXMiINATION b j, 4 BY MR. BIACK: 5 t w .. i Mr. Hebb, you :1.ndicate in your testimony that the Q 6 i BW nuclear steam supply nycteca la unusually sencitive to ~ 7- disruptiona in feedwater flow, feedwater systems. What is the I O basic for your overall conclusion on that? a On what have-you l D relied? l 1
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10 ' A Well, I think, certainly, the majority of my pro-11 feasional career hac been associated with predicting thermal I 12 l energy responsen, thermal system haat trancfor cystem, if you ! I G 13 will, containing fluida of this type. u l 14 And, bacically, the once-through steem generator g design is just th:tt. You have e colid reactor coolant fluid h , la j on one aide which it passing heat t$rrpugh a tube through a I 4 1 4 e[ heat transfer co-efficient, through another heat transfer 1 16 I co-efficient, to another fluid; a,nd that fluid is both solid s m{2iquidphnacandgaseousphase.
- j. 20 J And it is my knowledge, having done thoaa kinds of a, calcult'.ionc, that I have a feel, at least, for how rapid i
i
.n y bhangec in those parstetera can effect and contribute to the 1
p3 } respencivencnn of the primary . rystaa, y,r Q Uhen you did those calculations, did you do them 0
;,;; y apecifically ' for the DWi system?.
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i- 1907. i -
- .2 1 A Fo, I have not done thone calculations specifically
- 2 for B&W system. All I've done, shnilar eniculatione on other 3 thermal syatems.
d O What other thermal systema trould thouc be? 5 L Well, cortainly, a good example would be going back 1 i G to acma~of my earlier apncocraft days where you have cooling j 7 water systems that una a space radiater, if you will, for the l l 3 heat sinkf or building; a fluid system. I have modeled those ; s . l 4 -l 5 system 9, predicted conduction he t transfer to these fluid , 2 1 ]- 10 systems and thtm done what are c111cd truisient analysis, j t I i j
- 11 which arc tine-bearing enalysin of inposed boundary conditions
- J'.; r which uffect a tharmal state; cud dono the heat flow calcula-
i . 12 tions to deternino temptsrature profile. i 1 Another exaxple might be atmospheric calculations i 14 ] g-uhure you h:we certain atmanpheric boundary conditions, if . I g yoc w.11, the te perature and presabre, which in a gaa, which g ims certaan filn co-officient into in foot they heat up cool f gg do me of OLhcr russea within those fluids. i ! )g O Have rou donc any two-phe.ae fluid flow calculations? ! i: ! t
- ;g ,
A What do you mean by two--phaue? [ a t j i
- y 0 Oh, in the context of uhat uo are talking about here, .
) > 1 I would accueu that *rould be liquid stear. l ] i l g h Ithink what you do, you (noblize) - the system. And, . i g generally, when you Osobline) the syctem, you have to have some t i g knowledyn; which is through profecsional experience, as to what [ l. j- .
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1908 ' { I sort of a fine model you ~nced to depasste, if you will, the 2 { steam and the liqui'd states; or you asamne in this little ; 3 i model, which hae a physical signific..ance to the actual inodel, ' , the actual thing you are modeling, c'o it'a homogencou:i; in l l
'i l
which ch e, you havo~ void fraction and I would assume that, .l 1 f) . based on that void fraction, if you are doing heat transfer
-a calculations, you wolld try to use an anaumption that puts I 6
J an aren involved--if you could up it through a huge, say. , l N ! O It could be a homogenous flow boundary condition, j 10 . e it could be an actual fion calculation, where you assume tha.t, ; l U like, boiling in taking place, you have a tube which is a hot l , u m temperature, ycu have a fluid which comes in contact with ! O that, or you can have an actudi steam watorf ace wiiere you are ! N connecting acrocs the steam film that's built up. You assume M it's alwest like a small insulator, if you will, one more I6 bitrrier that's modeled and calculated. j U Well, when inryour professional carner did you - 1 IO b.7co:te with the sensitivitien that we arc discuacing here with 19 tha liEW cyatem? I ' N A Where in my professional career, o'r what is it in M M'/ profecsional carrer that concerno me? F2 O Mhen in your professional career did you become ! ?3 , concernec with these BEW censitivities? ! f I i l M A I cartsinly have workcQ on the 30W plan, have been 25 cware of the manner in ubich the once-three steam generator
i i l P l 1909 { 7 :
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. operates; and, printarily, the fact that it uses a finite '
'A 2
lenith to convert feedvator into steam and then usos an ! i 3 additional finite length to convert that uteam.., for , i 4/ ... in the cecondary balance of ... ; i
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5 In that respect I have been aware oL' the design 6 in the thermo-dynamic principles of design.
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! O I tche ,it then you were aware of the design when l l 6 you vorked on the Erie Nuclear Project? 9 7 That's correct, i 10 0 At that time, did you voice any of those concerns i 11 to your ruparvicing engineers, superviving management? 12 A Ho, at that time, I vas not aware of the pctcutial 1
]? to be precursors to accidents of this sensitivity in primary 16 syctcra; tha t being--I thinh Mr. Baxter asked me the same i 1
g ; querbion. Those calculationn were done by tha B&W Company, g Q IJell, ther uhen did you beccre aware of the, as you g aay, t-he cafety implications of the design?
;g A Sher bly nf cor Three Mile Is1End, the California 19 State Ene: gy Connicsion, director of our chairman, thu next 2r day, over che uccke:16, se.t up an infonuational center at the n; Energy Commir.sion ' to interf ace with tht Huclear Regulatory l 33 Comnie lon in thair instan t response, in an effort to consoli-73 !' dui.e all c7nocLns of the Californit, government, both Govern-7,j or's Office, cur Office of Dhargency Serv. ices, to pass on to a, _s them informtion coming- cut of TMI, and how this information
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1910 } 5 I [ had leplications for ua in Californin. l d 4 At that tima, I was assigned to this information , ) l 3' conter and subsequently wao ocnt back to Washington as a i . 4 representative of the State of California to the staff brief-t 5 ing to the NRC Ceraissiongra. April 4th reems to stick in ! l l C gay mind. (
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l 7 At that time I started boccming intimately involved G in looking at ite Three Mile Island data, the significhnec l i 9 of that dc.ta, and more or less acting in that capacity since i. 10 that time. I i e a r 1 l 11 Q So, really, your concerns about the IMW system have ' l 12 certainly evolved frca TAI and, certainly, your concerns about l l 13 the syszem havc beca-~-well, your learning process about those i i 14 concerns han cortninly evolved cinca TMI, and also has inter- . I a 15 acted with those which the URC and alco the Nuclear inductry 15 is doing Nculd that be a fair statcr. tent? I i l . 1 i ;7 A Ithink tbat's a f air statuaent. I will... I have 1 l 1 l l 3 to ntate that, with regards: to the initial shutdoun of Rancho l ! ) ! is Seco, Imorerit ;in specific items. But I also, at that time, 20 had cencerna in unanswered questions in my mind as to the l l 21 adequacy ' of that shutdoun, the adequacy of the order. And you I a.cc correct in that my concerna have evolved as one aska 22 l 23 . quest. ions, and the.n those certain quections in one's mind are i 1 . ! 3 - ancacred, you tendte develop a moond not of questionn, one's a nernpoetive is certainly continually evolving in accessing--
1911 1 i q l and things that the NRC has done, of courso, in regards to l 2 'I analyzing Threc Mile Island, ca well as othern. O What particular dccuments have you reviewed? Let's 1 I A l l say, in particular,, ubet NRC documenta have you reviewed in ' i 5 , the course of thie evolution of concern? 1 6 A W... well, it was previonaly... well, the Deputy Execut'.ve Director of the California Energy Co'muission, D l Franh Hahn, is the state 1.iason officer for the Nuclear Regu - , i
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"g 1 Intory CoEuiscion, and, ns auch, receivan all Nuclear Regulatory )
10 Octmaiscion correspondence that at least goes through the I j 1I , Walnut Creek office. 1 ! I2
! So I hcve had that informatien continually i availabic )
U to me. i We also have, early en, cbtained most all transcripts i l "' roleted to TMI in the conths of April from NRC meetings, i I t D ) In discovra'f I was, tsked to produce lay documents and 16 produce crece 200 docennntu, latters, mamen, reports, directly ,t , -. l
'; rMatr-d to TM1 and Ernche seco.
1 IU Q 1%vo eau reviewed NUREG- 0M;7 7 i W ! A Yw , I have tt l ea s t. , 1 have read che repart and l ! i ! EU had some preliminary thoughts and obsc:vations based on read-I 21 ing that raport, although I thin my re'tiew is utill limited.
"n Q Does NUREC Of 67 ch:mge ycur testimony in any respect?
e'- 3 ' l A Ho, I can't... Without taking a few minutes, if you'd l 1 - 24 like,, I could cortainly go through lay notes quite quickly, but. . 15 raaybe I should do that. t
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E 1 A I In c gcneral sonce, nc, it aid not change any 4 a n rr.7 e r t to my testic.ony. Al l O a Hzvc you relied on any other docue nts, let's cay,
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4 thst have not f1 cut 6 through the hando of the parties in the i 6 course of this proceeding? t 7 r A Wo.l.1, I think acrething... yea, .I have. I have had j 6 ceveral ari.icles in Nuc Ueck, for inctance, that have -- and 9 i J in the newn nedia - tM.t pick up to certain specific things, , s to eithar stattaente of others, or opinions of othora, or concernt l 's tint are voiced by people in the induutr.v. R l _ I thini a good cal-c in point la that I became aware 13 ci and cbtr.im s a Jeucry 8, 19E 0 ImC-ACn3 transcript. I-14 'ccan that tr an ner.i p t. t It was tir firct, if you will, analyais IS parf orr.d' by Broon e/r n Laba for the Hi1C, uhich indend0 id ; m el: f _oed tbc t vaiding in substa- tial anounts van taking place t L L n .ncc h ai.n cpacific regionc of rcactor vecsel during everfeed i 6 l N. !ng <_ vent i hich h9d not bc A i prodiebed by Licenceo's annlyuic; {i m ll II w 6 0 .- ast nec to ?ht &nt iv.ilca ted by Grockhsven. I f, h
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' ' .fi This of cort'e a ttenuatz.c P.y concerne in thane i
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l'll get ba.ch to the 2rcekhaven Study in v. rment,
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I)1. I t lot's say? I l t i 2 ' i i n I think in regardc to that I have primarily relied l 3 ; j upon the analycic of the ones you've stated. I don't mean ! 4 . to interrupt, I just used the word "attenunte" in one of my j 5 , previcus answers, and that was ap impropd use of that word.
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o . l 1 I think the proper word was "emphaaized" my concerns. 7
- I ' m sorry .,
,f , I gl, 0 Well, .;1et's get back to the Brookhaven Report. I i ' oi
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1 . believe that that report has been discucced during the course l of this proceeding. Ycu just menticned previously that the , l 'l l existence of that report and the conclucions reached . i
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therein did something to attenuate your concerna. And I was ! just venderin<! whether hearing the witneeces from the NRC l i " 4 14 . 1 j i Staf f, and alro I believe BCd1 discussed that report, whether l= 4 p. l. their discusLion of that report may have done something to N l' i alleviate your concerns more tha.n attenuate your concerna. 17 > A "Itt tenun t e " , in my mind, means to " lessen". I .; i W didn't really... I misused the word. I meant it emphasised I 4 . i 1 j l D or heightened my concern nty ccacerna. n
'E t In that respect, one ching that specifically atill 21 docu concern me, having heard the testimony of the panel, I.
" [;
~ i Mr. Norian 's otatarients, cne of the laauca of concern in these t
22' proceedings is the ability of natural circulation to take 9 N place with void t and ho-( much voiding will actually stop after i 25 circula tion. 1 l' 1
l ' 1914 I , 9 He stated that tha accanulation of Go cubic feet E o in a ca.ndy canc veuld be m:f ficient t'o.'. . or at least tfotild 3 get you to the point uhore natural circulation may not be 4 I rollable.
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And certainly in IMhibit 2, uhich I took frcra the i G ACRS originel Brookhaven analyclo-there may havo 15cen dono 7 dose since then---page 4, of thoac failures was his actually l 8 ) Figurc 4-47 caca 3. And it shova voiding voltue in cubic ! 9 I. candy cano and cubic foot as a function of time. But it i to appearn to be a period of time of 40-50 seconds there appeara 1 11 to be in cxcess of 60 cubic feet. j 12 So I don' t know what the flow raton and whether this ; 13 asemnca that we have coast down react coolant pumps or natural M circulation. . . best he had aufficient to sweep thene volumes 2 , 15 cuftof the candy cane. ) ) 16 Now certainly it wac clear in my mind frem Mr. l 1 ! 17 Worian'9 tertimony thet he u:eant that, given this analysis of 1 l {- 18 thoce cacca and the anal'fsio. t.e -hey 've done-which Ihave not 30 ueen-atncluded that it wan .ftfficient to handle these voidings ; n 1 20 and natural circulation would occur. I 4 21 But I'ra otill not c'onvinced , if you will, since I a he used the number 60 cubic feet, and I have an analysis that 13 chcha no voiding in. excess of GO cubic feet. 24 So I kind of got a my frcn the question but, no, I
- 25 can't nay that ry concerns have been alleviated, i
i i t
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I \ l I i 1915 i i 1 O But you are familiar with NRC Staff testimony that, G , 1.0 2 basically, .if has indicated that limited voide vill be swept { 3 through hha lopc and quenched and that natural circulation l 4 uill not be inhibited, by tho analysin that have been done by i I S Brookhaven, B&W nnd the NRC7 6 A Well, I didn't hear \that Brookhaven had done an l l j
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annlysis. I heard that it was an inhouse NRC analysis with 1 i G, yeer inhouse modela. I respect the results of thone models. 1 E Bu t, in my mind, there in still a great deal of uncertainty. 10 And I didn't get the imprescion fran the testimony l 71 of the panel that r.his waa a cloned point; wo are going to 12 continue to do f urther analysis and refinements may still be l 13 approp: into. 1 . u i Certainly, I think the point that was well-made by " ? 14 4 i j g s
] the panel in that tho tripping of the reactor cooling pumps, 4
1 i 30 g which '.a necessary .or a certain range of small breaks-and if it 1 ' ty la not tripped to at leact-could lead, or does lead, to the 73 , conditions whera the pumpa critically have insufficient l gg I inventory + -thut's not an ideal colution. I i-
,i I don't think the analysis that's bean performed y u0uld be cuf ficient to say that nov it is an ideal solution.
j i 2p Q So I guean I'm still trying to ge'c the flavor of your I- !
.e..a ;
concern relative to natural circulation, Are yaa merely 14 stating at thia time that there han not been sufficient i I 4 25 analysis by cither the industry or by the NRC, or by URC I -- , i j i i
, _ , _ - - - + - . . - . - - . . . . . - . . - - . - - _ . - _ - -. - s.
j 7 1916 l y l consulte.nte, evith regard to thia. problm? Or, is it that you. l 3 . i 2- . . . l l ,, have nottdono sufficic.ut roccarch'~cr analysis by yourself to j i . 3 1 i M indicate whether thin la a nignificant proble:n at this i h . 4 time? i, 5 l A I think tho' answer is yes to both parts of .you'r a
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queations ,I'm not convinced qmfficient analysis has been donet. , s, 7 . 1 and t it io my understanding thSt testimony of the panel was 8 that testing, 4,7.ogt testing, (won't be done 12) for certain 0 1 1 bronks, I guess. J 10 } l Q Could you givo any recencendations other than Icf t 1 4 , testing as to what could be donc to alleviate this concern? 12 l h Well, certainly, the draft 0567 has two specific ' O U recomendationa in it which will at least study the problem. l 1 M ' Any tirae... well, one. specific recommendation just states ! N that pressurizar levcl indications eball not be lost, or the 1 li-N[ presenriner shall not empty for anticipated transients; and h.c that high presourc injection shall not be required for anticipa'- c l r M ' cd transients. . dhd . That gocog I think,,to the earence of at least my O pocition in my tect:!rony; whether I have specific raodifications d which I am proposing today covon problems, I do not. I think U f those probltaa take-vill require-careful evaluation. ii U ) What doas concern me though is that in the interim ' E4[ the plant is op0 rating. He don't kncW of the risk potential generated by now theco known senr;itivities why tae plant 1 75{a n li
. i 4. Ij i u' 1917 q ; 12 1 i operates, i 2 There is still, et least in my mind, the demancic 3 placed upon operat. ore whopreviously had -not been required to 4 , at 1 cast accept none of these responsibilition of detection si - l and judgment, and cc:aorehension azid rescenco.. ' 6
- 0. In your teetinony you indicate that ' natural circula-7 tion has not been succesafully relied upon at.any E&W D facility following the occurrence of a nevere transient 3 condition.
10 I know you defined ".Tevere transient condition" l !! for Mr. Ecx.ter. Could you give ne that definition again? 1 j 12 n $ 'V T4; Pardon nw Mr. Black. I think that , in j G regard:7 to the definition of " severe transient", y concern in i M the deg: en of voiding that can occur. And it gets back, I ) 1 B think, to our previoua cucationa and answera concerning the ' .i l 16 Brocknavaa annlye,in and tlic positionof the panel. U . It hac not been demonstrated., at leant to ny knowlede?, i ] in {[ that 'ca hwc had an overcooling r.rvent uhich leads to, let's l hI )4 9 say, roiding in the area of 60 cubic feet, which, to me, la 1D substantial; where then we know ne.tural circulation has taken 21 place. l j 22 And I guccb the only paramator I can think of that 1 i l 23 would be important in looking at trannients that have occurred 2d where natural circulation has been us d is looking at and ni. knowledge of the time (plot) subcooling. l 1 J l j 1
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l 1918 i t l 13 I And I believo, in regardc.to Crystal River, which ! !9 i 2 mcy, at leact in my mind, one of the raost severe for which , 3 natural circulation w.s relied upon, had cubcooling down to , t .1. 4 cight degrees and at:ill ranintained cubcooling. } ! 5 O So under your definition of " severe transient i ! 6 condition", Crystal River was not claniified as a severe ' ! 7 : tranreicat condition? 6 {l A In regards to dependence upon natural circulation, ; l 5' the le.ek of natural circulation occurring, that the operator. . . , 10 if natural circulation has not occurred, of course, the ! ) 11 operator hac to take other appropriate action; he has to have I' f 12 knowlengo that.it is not occurring. ; 13 Or, if he cuspects it is not occurring, and it may l 4 1/. 1 be occurring, he takas again actican that might not be 1 i- 15 appropriata. It's both siden of the coin. 16 unt, yec, in that regard, Cryctal River was not a 17 severe enough transient to deruonstrate . . . on natural l 18 circulation for severe overcoolanto. It was a stuck valve. I I
.ls It nc a I,0CO, more undar-cooling hn over-cooling, in my 20 mind.
l l
- n f Q lire you nware of any scvere transient ecndition that
,rt would meet your definition of severe transient other than Tiil?
l 33 . L No, I'm not. d g: O Is it your cent < Nation tha t wa would have to have a g; Dr.c70re trandient condition bafore We could demODStrate natural o. k 4
t i i 1919 ! ! 14 1 circoh tion? 2- j A Of coursenot. And, of course, I think it gets bach ; 3 u to again what we were talking about before, which is the
,, t 4 chance that nome low probnLility events will occur where we i
b, j_ don't have substantial knowledge, that tripping HPI pumps la G an ide.al solutica. 7 MR. COLE: I'm norry, could you...? J O
- l THE WITNESS: Where tripping reactor coolant pumps i.
j S io e.n acceptable solution, becauce I think that's what we are 10 talking about - tripping reactor cooling pumpa either in a I? g prnon of .~ sone ann'.1 brocho, for which we are going to rely a i D1 upon natural ciren1 1 tion-nt least, a certain level of breaks-- l 13 and if ve don 't have breifcz, the f act tha t we still mayi j i i 14h- have ch:.; reoponcivenesa thic to the zenci+;.i.vities, which will [ I 'l i l IE D 10:adi to cufficient voiding c.nd we don't get natural circulation', l 4 I is H r which iu anticipated and yet very undesirable. l gh B'I HR. BIACE:
- 3 w'
?
i O On pnge 2 of ycur testimony, you indicate that l 6 it i o. arder-coeling events challenge the pron:niro relief and safety ? 7 20 i valves, which have been the subject of ' post-GliI fixes. 1 11 What in the bs.cis for the statement that inrieed i 22 ] undercooling .cen d "11~ challenge thece . valves?
,y j A Well, m're talking abcut direct locs of heat sink. '
I 2,7 Are with the direct lons of heat sink,.you will have pressure , 75 temperature buildup from cecny heat, which will directly -
- rsetee M w . . . -
t ,- w e e - w* v , w ww w t sow vveam e*- *e we *-e--w=-+-=-ve-w-+*-----"- -w-=---=- =- r-e- -
1920 E I t' challonge the valvda,, 15 2 Q And what are the pont-TMI fixen that you are' alluding
~
3 to there? 7 4 A Well, reliability in the auxiliary feedkater system i j 5 I and the various specific modeo that have been investig'a ted l-l' l 6 where that system could be defeated: alinement of block [ , i l 7 valves, which happened at THI, of course; manual operation , l B of.... overridorof;.anEnhal operations auxiliary fechwater
- l P h syntam; procedures in operator training with regards to 4 .t j 10 reliablo delivery of auxiliary feedwater--so that that under- 1 I
j la fand uculd be avoldod. 4 I 12~ , O Khat about the PORV actuation pressure setpoint? t!l A Those alco. The inversion of the PORV interaqtor > it setpoint uoald help the over-henting event. But, on the , c contrary, if you had the overcooling, which is what I think TS .n
- i. y 16 into tny tactisony following, is that you lose that heat if
]1 i
1 i n,.l. 4 you have an over-[p $ which in en over-cooling event, that i 3 13 .i it will happon quicker and facter becauce you don't have the I i l N L; delcy and full power reactor accends, which the anticipatory
,f
'I 20 i trip or the inversica actually def ect. 1
'l
- M h So it helpu in terms of if you lone heat sink you i
i E2 ' j have loas hett to take cut er to be accounted for by primary ,
)
rysten ronpenne. But if you have.too much heat sink, it 25 } i B yy, i ha'a actually subtracted some heat tenas; so you get quicker 25 rer.ponsa on the cool-ddm-uniona, 'of course, the cooldown-1 d l 1 11 _-...._.~.-..!i.. . _ - _ . . _ , _ . . , . . . - . . - . _ . . . _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . - . - _ _ . _ _ _ _ . - . . . _ , - _ - - . - . . -
1 16 challenges the operators with the ESPAS and HPI. , 2 Let uc go back to the undercooling event. It's a O 3 change in the setpoints, pcat-TMI fixes. Do you think that 4 thero will be valve challengen as a renult of those post-TMI 5 fixes and the loss of main feedwater turbine trip? 6 A I think that the main objective of the fix was to 7 avoid chlllengen to PORV. And I think that those fixes as 8 supported by transients since TMI have satisfied that 9 objective. 10 But thic goea to -- I don't know if it's Board 11 Question 1-12 or the CEC Icane 1-12 -- where we are concerned 12 no'.: uith the nwnber of trips. I believe the panel testified 13 and substantiated that since TMI, because of (subversion), 14 now we are going to cee greater numbers of reactor trips. 15 also within that testimony it appears that, although 16 the nu:abora of trips per year will not challenge the basic p deeign of the plant, it's the reactor trips themselven which ta create events which will challenge the safety systems require 19 the operatora to take actione c.nd increace, from a probablistic 20 a tandpoint, the chance of further1: failures or abnormalities 21 to the trips. 22 It'c the trips that you are concerned with, the fact 23 that they occur, not tha b they may be thermally overstress L 24 the reactor venael, the four-year life. 25 Q Okay, but I guese you'd made the statement that the i
l 1922 ' i trips the=celves don't have any safety implications. Would 1 l 97 ') that be a fair statealant? . l l 3 A No, I totally dicagree. I thinkthat, frcm a l l % probablistic standpoint, thsy do here safety considerations t s l s acaociated with then. The more trips the more likelihood ) i ! 6 you can have failures nacociated with those trips,. failures l ' 7 in nyctems requircG to reopend to shut doun the reactor. l l Eat a trip itr,c1f is not a violation of any cafety . e O , 1 i , l 9 requircr:ent, is that correct? j
!O E Only in the philosophical sence that you want to ]'
i
$3 ,
minimize the ntmtber. 5 ! i i ! g; O I'm talking about point zero, a reactor trip in and . et itcelf is not a nafety concern? g , 1 t g. 8 A All ayates.u required to respond and function l l J g properly, no, in and of itself it does not have a design limit j l p- fand, . fore, ie not an unsafe event. i O Let'e go <;ver to an ovarcoaling event. I believe in-1/ 3 4
.a l your tectimony you used the tena "2cvere overcooling event",
g Hou do you define a suvere overcooling event? i , y A Mell, certainly foremont in my mind, I thinb it i g rny not be nevere, but anythine[Ehat requires ESTFAST actua-- h tion with no Joss of cooling occbrring ia severe.
~
3
., : O. Mhat is that likely to be caused by?
,, 3 4 ,,,
A I think ths.t we have testimony that shown that,
,.,y nunber oae r it'n claanified. Mc11; an 0667 wac clacaified; r..> )
p _ _ . ~ . . , . _ _ ._.J. ! _ _ a._ __ __ _ _._ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ __ ____. _ L_ _ . )
1 i 197.3 i i
- t I
i' 18 1 a normal reactor trip would ccene down within the neighborhood ; 4 of 1700 pni, which is within a hundred pai EPI actuation, and 3
- this is concidarc0 normal based upon a certain select < h a
range of parametric responsaa. t
- S
, If any of those exceed those limita, even'some r I 6 momentary malfunctions of again the integrated control system )
- i 7
i and the components it controls or that feed into it, it's not 8 going to take much to exasperato that auch that you reach the l l 9 .' j !!PI c etpoint linit. ! to i 0 1:ow when does en overcooling event become a safety
- l 11 a concern?
i 12 I l h In ny uind, as coon as the ESTFAST actuation, it's 1 l 3 '1 - l a saieby conccrn. I s 3 id ' l G And hou long will the overcooling event... what will l ; ito durction be? 1 , 16 i l A Hell it' a un?tnown what the. . . the upset Jcould ! r p' be quito minor auch that you just do reach the 'high-pressure ! o i cotpoint; you may na t, In my mind, if ycu do not empty the I a I. preerurn er ex! adcycate subccoling ic maintained, you will I I O l get a recovery which will not require operator action and 21 would not, if you udll, . leave the opere tor blind for a substas-
'd
'~
tial pericd of tira , which I , deem.grer.ter than five or 10 0
~3 minutcc.
O But if the. nvent is sufficient to reach naturation
'x~
conditions and' voiding should occur, I-think there la a'grea't ! I i 1 e s _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . , ______.._.._.,,.__...,__,_.________m_..
I i 1M4 L
=
e 9 chance... it is very undesirahlo in my mind that you could 2' i j have racponaivenaac and sensitivity in any nucloar plant'which I
.4 1
I 1 s' would create those conditions. i~
'/i f$ And, really, the basis for that position in that, s.)
i < I as a minimum, B&W reactora should have at least the level of i 1 c [ . perfomence given to us by other preasurined water reactors. I _ A And I think in that regard I have acce cense of additional l ! G'
- h concern that they do not, s b g .I j Q You are making the statement that B&W reactors do i to I j i not have the lovel of performance that other PWRs hava? i I
c I l y A in regards to an overfeod. Specifically, I am talk-1 l ing about overfeed or en overcooling event that would cause i l i ' 9 '. ,'
,)
i responsiveness to the 116 generator; you're going to get it every t.ime in BfiW. It is not necessarily true with other M i y pracw.rized water reactore in general. 7 I M 1] Q Uhat do yon mean by "perfonnance"? l.,
}+
j A 3
" Performance" being that you will have an overcooling.
7.
.. i l '" h it's the coupling and rerponsivenece of tha primary system i
U, p*, k partncters, prencurc and tempan ture, cuch that they will have D ? rapid shrinkage becauce of the large amount of the trancfor. l
", s
- t. hat all of a sudden occurs in cteam generator,this does not I?
U h occur in the U-2 d'et.ign. .; I E y) The U-2 decign is aluaya full of water. Therefore, 9- > 55 j you have a constant amount of heat transfer surface area. You
.i f
d } imedictaly bring into play an . overfeeding event, additional D hect trancfer area in a 116 generator. O
l 1925 i-
- j ;
f Aad because of this, 'and this cloco coupling, you 1 2 , ! will haue an ESFAST actuation which-is generally only thought 1 l 3. l 1 of to occur with a saall break. t 4 ! O Okay, so "performanpe to yon meano ESFAS actuation, l 5 is that correcti That's how you measure performance? Bs.W G
- has a worse performance record than CE or Westinghouse because
, y}
it has more ESDS actuations during any period of thue? G A I need to state two things, then I'll anuwcr that a 9
! que sition. In regards to overcooling, I think the annuer is 1
4 inl l yen. That' a not to say tha.t thoce ETao would not have .had il overcooling eventa., I'm not specifically knowledgeable of tha . ;c pri:cary ryctea reupence of thone, but those have been reinted - G More to stean demp stmor.pherc7'1" beam dump valver, sticking 2 wl
' 14 open, titrbine hypn.ac valvas malfimationing--things that
~; _
j regula to the eteam ..rensure ind. the steem generator.
.g If yet bicu down the stena generator, you have an i er
~'
] ov e reocd.ing event, aa nell. En t, on the other side of the
" 3 ccin, .m f ar ca the overfeed conditione, thay are very id '
I draatic, at least in r:y mir.d, in the E?M design, n,, So I'm not saying thah all prescurized water l reactora in generely an f ar as precoure regulation in the i n ,, ' "~
! necondary side is concerned, you can 't have failures in both.
! j "n'! l But, additionally, ycu have this Issponsiveness created just ) . t, - j - l by the f.ecdwater to the steam generator. 2~=. ~ O Savo.you ceen any data or etudies that would indicate 1 I. - _ - -
.,I
_ . _ _ _ _ . ~ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __--._ ____ _ _ _ __. l I '
- 6- -g7 wx .h) [
i 4aw[}jp t.a 1926 , ! 7'9 ; I P 21 I ; that in.N has more of a problem with 'this than the other PHRa? 2 A Yes, I think the ACES analysis, which is Ex.hibit 2, l i
?
3 in n very specific exra.ple cf en overfced event, and a 0 revere overcooling event. , 5 1 Q Did that indicate that BcW has c history of events more than the other PWRu? 7 A That specific nnalycle, no; but in that came presentae :
- D tien., rm it'.
1 Eubir: and Mr. Thatcher discussed yesterday, they i 4 y
; included a table of recent events; specifically, they identifie l 10 fthocewithregardatooverfeedorovercooling.
i1 i ) O Didn't Mr. Eubin and Mr. Novak's testimony mcacure I i l i 12 i a specific timeframo, mainly, I believo it was April 1978 to
- O bpril 1979 with rcupact to operating history?
4 l l 14 L i I think itwas post-TMI; since TRI. (Perusing i 15 g documents) . April to Novenber 1979, which would have been a t p l 16 crosa 'section of. cvents sincc then, or since Three Mile i 17 Island. i I l ta ML COLE: 3xcuse me, Mr. Webb., I l You caid "ACRS? j fD THE WITU353: I'm carry, I may have meant. . . i it's < 20 ' Exhibit 3., but it's Crom the came Jennary 2, 1950... 21 BY MR. BLACE: 22 'O I td.e ' it, Hr. Webb, yea are looking at the
- r. January 3,1980 ECRS stcraittal? _,
j 1 24 A Tec. 1 25 Q .The table precented thoro? ' l
-l.-__-.___.
l l
)
i
- 1927 i
l A Yef:. s 1 O The table h.au indicated 35W epercting experience 3 j Apr'il-Nucmber 19'/9, is that correct? I ' 4 4 A It's also labeled CC Exhibit 24. 1 i r J Q Right, CEC Exhibi t 24. Now that exactly does this , l 6't table Indicate insofar ao idio IMW operatir.g experience with I l! i
- 7 regard to overcooling event?
< t l J O a 1?o11, there's two things in n.y mind. It dhows tho : j; I
,i l'
'l i i interplay of the ICS, which can creata trancients. . . ;' KI . contribute to frilttren in transients in the IMW plants, as well l I r , l !! ', an it iioes indice.to resulting overfeedc. And there are a
- d. !
l '. d nulb O.U Cf yC000. I
!i y r think, getting back to the basis for your first j i 4 ;
I; ,
', question, the overfe I hr.9 a specific significance in regard l ,
l 11 ,I to B W plantn, and it doen not with othm preocurined water l a ' t , di i ! 12 *i reac tor e . ! II
\
17 O 1 helicyc you icentionad pra.vict sly to a question of ! I aj f mine tht:: vour inCica tion of perfe.rcumce %c ESFAG actuation, ) i i i IL l is t w . correat? i
- C [
. lt den.
l 21 1 n O lihat, cn C.dC lb:hibit 24 indice.tos that ESFhS i o 72 j actuatier happened with regard ha thiu trtb3c? , 4 2? ;l Ji IMuld yea repcat that question, plea 3c?
?.4 l 0 Uoll, losing at CEC Exhibit 24, B&W Operating
;l a
25 :.) !A:ps.rience what is on this table that would indicate that : l } t h
. . . . . . .~ _ ..). ._ . _._ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . - _ . _ . . - _ _ . . . - _ . . - _ . . _ .
l l q 1928
.3 I D6W' c perfor:annce, i.e. USFAS actuation, suffers from the 2
other P!TP.o? 3 L h's not indicatied cn thin table, and I can't
'I recall cpecifically on :r.y :neacry if any of theco have the i
U ECFAS tatuation. I think the point here is more the over-i 6 fccil being a potential probles sit the BMI plantc. i Certainly, I h the overfeeds can--nci; whether this opacific set is as aof l 8 a result of the ESPits actuatio:a or not, I am not certain. l tape 7concludo- , tapa 8beginD ! be con't to i
- 11 l
12 13 - B { 14 ' i is i 10 I l l 17 10 - f ! 70 21 E ! y 22 [ i 23- ; 2a 6 25 l
e - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - '----- --- --- - - - - - - 2 1929 u j i , i I l ta MR, WEBB: I would like to, if I may, before we
- -11-00 2 l leave this, on page 2 of that r4 cme exhibit, the third bulletin, 1 ~
Ilincolburn b . l I am going to just quoc.c 2. t . - i i 4 l PU.hX 24 ; It says: A nunber of feedicater over-feed evente
';c \
' have cccurred which have cauced rapid primary systtrn depressuri-
. 6 i nations, sorr.e reculting in the lean of pre nurizer level and ! _ t l safety in$cotion initiation,
'p 7% ULACH: Fren where are you reading? '
! l
' 1 l
9'! M . Unn : I an reading on page 2,. the flip side of l 10 ' i . page 1, which was proccding viewgraph. l
- y. ,
MA. DU .CH : But, there again, .t.t:cm what you have just y" r ead ,, that does cet give.' mty indication of }3!W'n parfoncance U reintine to other PW3' n perf ormance, doca it'i , I l f M d ., U!rMi. : I think, getting back to the original I l I qi i <p t: tion, donc not have a nignificant irportance to other 1 1~c. p:ractu;irc.d reacters, toce.use you don't hnvo this sensitivity s . i s .. , and thia react:nniinnens to primary; and, therefore, you do not i W' ', h av e., tiu. .t 07.1d der.:rcrmurin itier. Iceding. to lona of pressurizer 4 El level Walcatlen ad mdaty injection. t [
'o!) And tha t , indeed, la the basic conern, at least, thn:
i i 1 1 cm tentU.ying to totiay in regards to once-through stimu genuat.Tc rMoir;L E3 %. BLACi;, Can thocc things huppen in other FWR ; 3 tenctor.2 i r [ M MR. UEED: Es faut cctuation Without a small breuk
- t
'i
I:' 1930 , 25 PC90 fidx
- .._ ! can happen one ether general way with pressurized water I
) 2 reactora, and three ways with the B&W plan. The K9FAS, or l , ) . 3 high'precsure injpction actuations of other pressurized water a reactora have bean a recult of loca of ateam, pressured ?
, 'e.23-d 1
3 regulation on the seccindary aide. \ 1 1 ! 6 If you lose steam pressure regulation, you uill blow ; y down the secondary side, uhich in en over-cooling . dent. This 4 8 can happen in BW plantc; thi.c can happen in other pressurized .' D, motor reactor plants; either due to talfunctions in the ICSJ f' 10 or thos components interrelated to ICS, if you got a,.. ady, a g nain feed pump, which would-after E feactor trip-would i - ! g continua to feed the otcan generator because of its small g lino, yea are going to have a rapid rise in the level of the g steam gem /kator. g i i a m , n t nly i the volutaa ricing quickly-15 , [^ e
/
g ithat's .the fjirst ... Danction, tha heat transfer. . cow.ing into a , ] j 17 play is inpreased beyond that which 10 even nonnally e
? available during poser pro 5uction.
la 1, g In both of thone you vill see a rapid response in 1 l g deprescarization primary primary cyaten. This would not occur l I uith the other types of stelm generators. f ,3 MR. BLACK: ' The other stcara generatorc, do they not have a control cychen similar to the Uf:M ICS? 9 c4 l Md. WEDD: l'think that's correct, MR. ELECE: Usva those other contro3 systeme experienced I 2n-il
.o t_ t - _ _ _ _._ . _ . - _ _ _ . _ . - - -
i 1931 l
~ failure mcdeo?
j MR. WEDB: I nost certainly am. , < ->. l I CON'T CROSS EXAMINNfIGN ! { 1 l 4 ! BY MR. $BLtrn: 0 ! 0 And what is the result of that failure mode? Would it lead to an overfeed or an underfeed cituation? a I f A I think that's the whole point, that when they i 2 0 l occur in other plante, you do not have the responoivoness of 9 ii the prinary system and therefore not the concern, 10 f 0 Are you ntating that a failure node in another Ii control cystem would not lead to an overfoed or undorfeed . ! l o
'" i j vituation? l 1
M ! AIt'a not that ycu ucn't get the overfetid or underfeed
- I
- j. Mi situation, it's the response to the priTary system thht we are i
I j IS worried about. had it's the close coup 1.ing of the B&W plant ! l M that creates tlu t, which does not create that in other l ] 17 pressurized water reactora. 1 l IS g And if you don' t have the quick responsiveness of - l-19 g thn priuny aysten, perhaps ue are not as concerned. . . I 20 war. going to ' amtion the third , and I don' t +)want to .bolabor t. , 21 [ my renpenso. 22 But I t.heuiJ h t you acked ,aod question. It has'to i 23 [ do witch the introduction of auxiliary feedsater. Again, wo ' O 24 have. r;cen, beenure of the aparger . arrangement, thnt if the l 25 l stemt generator e perticularly.in a condition where you have !QS I a a
1932 27
,p 1 had acma underfced h. tha cubiliary feed cyatc= ccmea on,
..' b 2 that beenuse again the heat transfer, tho sparger arrangement, 3 the cold anniliary fecdutter, we have seen uhcre that in 5 itself can cause a rapid cooldown, which would get e_n ESPAS 5 actuai-ion, which Idon ' t bel: eve occura uith your U-2 designs 0 in generators. 7 0 When you say " don't believe", what is the basis for 8, that? 9 A Hall, I von' t acy with certainty that I have 10 intinute knowledge of all tranal.ent events that occurred at Il all PiJ reactors to say that that haa not occurred. Cl 1 O Bave you ctudic6 the other control cystems in r ! C , other PWRs to ntaka e point blank atatcment that, cay, n M! failure of tbo ICS, or failura of the other cont rol cystems, l U l coulti not lend to > rancorbatt:d condition of overfeed--underfeed, 12 'i lot'c Eay?
;/ j A Yea, in a cpucifif: conse, that in why I'm conching
- a !! Ay retark, hccause I haven '> done tlw.t. Bu t, in a general 4
!3 cense, I certainly belicyc that that's not true.
i 9i I O Do you know how luni EDFAS actuations have cccurred t
- i ! in D5W plants in recent yctrs, let'd say? Unve you looked at i
- u. any data that would indicate that?
n sj f F A Certainly, I havo looked through the data, t.nu the ( l oost rou.r:c of that data in NUP2G-0560, and I think 667. I to , i recall specifically the data in 0567 indicatos that, due to f i
1933 l I IMI or ICS or NNI failurcs or mal' functions, of which there 28 2 . hu.vc been 29, there have boon fou.c which have caused ESFAS , 3 1 actuation. I l i 4 I i There alco are events, of course, with stuck j 5 valves, which is a kind of different problem. If the pore 6
. valve cticho, you have a an.all break phenonenon.
7(- I'm trying to keep this clear. We are talking f
'l j
- , phenonenonn taking place without small breaks that look like -
l 1 i' amall breaks. But, of crnrno, if the pore valven stick, they 9 1 l , IOl bicw doun the eyatsm and certainly depressurize it to ESFAS i i l -l , i U as tiell. i: , [ E. There have been ccourrences of those, pressuriced l l ._.
- v , water reactors.
M Q When you say you'll look at data on ES?Its actuation, l i l 15l what doce that data indicate to you? 16 ) 1 ..
- h. Well, it indicaten to me that they do occur.
j W Q And have you looked at data for other FNRs? i l l H Or, ESPAS actions?
#9 .1 I think I'a ::elying, I guess, upon my, in a general l
20 i senne, of my cursory review, if you will, of the information 3 21 the.t cctaen forth in th.? nuclanr industry, i l
- 22 Of ecurce, NUREG-0560, I beldeve, made a co
- nparison n
i l 23 with othcr :plantn. In that sence, I am aware of what that i
?A { 4 data in.- >
l 25 0 would it be a fair characterization of your testimony
.-.._,m... . . ~ _ . , . . . - ...-._-_.-,--.L.,..-.--E-- - - -- _-- . .- 7---- -o------
i l i
; 1934 1 4 i I
29 ' 1 l that with regard to overcooling events that you are relying I l ' o i nibro on the cloae coupling characterictica of the primary to j 3 the secondary uide than really anything elce? ! r. l 4 I me:tn, you are not really relying on data that telle 5 ) you that there have been more overcooling events in BW G reactors? But you are mainly relying on that close coupling? 7 A Yea, I think that'n a good characterization, that O it's not co much maybe the statistical occurrence that t j 9 concerned me ao rauch no that the design inherently presents ! 10 the problem. l 11 O You indicated in your testinouy that when an over-12 cooling event occurs, the operators now are required to treat 1 l
@ 13 the event als a eraall break LOCA until a definitive determina-l 1 ! 14 tion can he endo; and, therefore, required to trip the 15 reactor coolant pumpr.,
16 Do you disagree with that procedure? j 17 A How do you mean--dicagree? J l
;8 G Well, given tne stato of events, the state of what I
j 19 we have been dincus: sing on this proceeding, would you--and i 20 ; based upon the analycic that had been performed, testimony i 2t that hau been prensntati in this proceeding--vould you disagree 22 with that procedure to trip - the reactor collant pumps? i 2:: A Yes, I would... . wall, you acked no to disagroc with I 3; the procedure. The procedure nay be actind but, indeed, it i n !! does trip the conctor coolant pumps. I;ut the rationale.for
- l. .
- _ _,_._._.a n 8_._ _.-.______-_..-_._. _ -.- - ---
1 k 1935 I l I
)
1 the prec25ura, although in itself now in requirad, I t 6s0 2 l j dias. gree wLth the f act that the des.i.gn has led to that l 3 requirement 4 Q Ja that nainly becauce you think that the reactor ; l 5 coolant punpc tre the main cooling system in the reactor? : d A 'the lacs of forced cooling, I think, can place 7 grantor deands on the cperator and other plant systems to ! 3 act, which are nomally not i'unctioning. l , l ] 9 l Anytina you go froat one system whicipis designed to
\ . ?
i a - l- 10 j do a certain job to anothe cyate:n, you require certain things 1; to co m into play and respond. You dor.and performance from , , ;a other cyctem m Thet is where .the failurca occur. They occur i G <a , i tinen yeu dc.nnnd a nyatem to respend and it doesn' t. So that's 33 my ficct cc.ncern
, t
, s, z,. i, f ut m ov erhinU concern is that we nou have identifi ed I p
- w I a certain Ianga a rnall breaks for which caergency core
;7 ccolinn crate.m is not designed to accomodate.
4-
- j. g Bad we had this 1:nsdedge uhan we- designed the of emergency care ccoling syrte, I% cure they would have been 20 necc'ut edntcl. So now na ara str.ck, 12'you will, with a l 7; j design which cannot acocmnodate all'rangeo of small b.ceaks 1
l 2.? and w must take un-actica. And ' that ac tion is to trip the ., e.-
.1, i .-
reactor #ccolant >nspm - l pc !f the rN etor cool.h11t'pumpa are not tripped for some i g l reason we will. have a 1cas of inventory sufficient to creato l
..i_,._._--_'~L.-s ~ .-.--_--._-...i------.---------------------
t 1 i 1936 '
+
4 { . ! 4 -1 l 0 ,, l , j coro dansge. And that in ny concera. : 2 J. .
- . It is not'so much perhaps the pumps are tripped.
l I 3 I havo that concern because it placca deanands 'on other l 4 ' j cyst <ns and porconnel. But it's just basic. design philosophy , 5 . that, if thoco pumps are not litripped and can'.t ride through the entiro event, you are going to have a reoccurrence of 7 < , TMI. ! 6 j 0 Are you aware or do you knew whether the safety 1 3 unalycic that has been done for. Rancho Seco in the PSAR has... j uhether that safety analycio han been done assuming reactor ! d i coolant pumpa operating or tripped? i p~ I A Which cafety analysis? 13 0 Donc in the PSAR, I believe, Chapter 15.
;4'
^
A I cocume that another low probability event which ' l uct be considered indeed in the defense indepth end the i a 46 '
^
! probability of evu. La ther concern us. I think in the long l U term in t% loss c f cutcide power will have loca of reactor l l i 93 l cDolant pWupS. i How whether Elm probability of small breal;n may come 1
?'
into play there, or t. hat you u::uld have en overcooling event i e !! I aufficicnt to create voids when the reactor coolant pumps are i r, l trippod, you are talking ~cbout .( two dif ferent thinga. ! i 23 l i Now I'm not knowledgesble thr.t the final safety l 4i !
~cedaron in the cymptoma that have been analyzed are l l i 15 canulntent that we huvo abeoluta knowledge that no mall break l l
i T6 is precent; then it would be no problem. i i '! ;l 0 tricula you agree with the ntatcaent that limited i j ) la j', void,ing vill not inpede natural circulation? I i U; A I belfbve that's true. D 20 p' Q II voiding dcas cccur such that natural circulation l
?! ic ing cded or cc.nnot be established or maintained, are you I I
- 27. I aware of ether procedurce whereby the core can be cooled?
I
'3
. L' You, 1 % aware of other proceduren but I think it 8 was testified yectorday that if no totion was taken, the synten i
25 I would go into a feed and biced modo. L r, U 1
--,--..._.-...._P
i 1939 i t 4 1 What I'n concerned about is that proceduros inay 2 allow a curtain lattitude for the operatorc to do certain
- 3 ,
things baned upon their determinations of whether natural 4 circulation is occurring or is not occurring, and whether 5 that really represents the came as it may be. C Procedures may allow him to open PORV valves, open , 7 J the pore valve if he believes natural circulation is not ' a cccurring. There are other actions he may take in those O circumstancan. But, given that the procedures require no 10 operator action, we will go into the feed and bleed mode. j 11 i I'm not aware- getting back to your question of 12 ' what'n in the FSAR--I think it was determined that FSAR did M
, not cenalder feed and blead mode as a form of cooling. Or it 14 was nct concidered in the original licensing procealings and 15 in the PSLR at Rancho Seco.
1G Q And do you have evidence or any knowledge that would
'7l ;
indicate that the feed and blesd node is not sufficient to 16 assure adequate core cooling? 4 .. 10 ' h No, I don't. I I 2^~ O On page 4 of your tectimony you indicate that the o
'"i post-TMI .fixen for actions cre not designed to elilainate the consequences of Rancho Seco'n inherent sensitivities. Are E
ycn1 cdvocating that Rancho Seco should beinhut down and not 24 allowed to opcrata until these sennitivities are elininsted? , 8 A Well, I think you have really gone to the essence of
! l 1940 the quention. I'm surely not advocating at thic point-that 5 Rancho Seco in uncafe or that it should be shut down. But I i 3 l must any that, front the perspective that I'm testifying hero 4 l l today, I have acco very real concerns and have not, until n 3 0667 c me out, not seen a positioning by the Nuclear Regulatory 6 Comminelon to seriously address those. j I 7' O Are you advocating that the censitivity should be 0 eliminated? - i , j 3 A I believe that they should be eliminated. However, 10 I'm not going to sit he.re today and any that all types of M cvaluationu-analynio have indicated that there are not i j 12 (brain uaven) that the uanaitivities can be resolved without I i O p being totally climinated.
- 3 14 Eut I think th::t in a priority sense that should be a
- c 4 4 top priority, to clininnto those sensitivitie.s--becauso-if you 4
q I 4: O can't do that, or if it's highly undesirable to do that, then t1 g you are buying yourself. . . et rentially, you are conceding f n$ il yourself a certain cmount of inherent rick, I think, in D&W I l
- 15
} plants. l
- j. 1 I
20 !. Fald they will place dematdo on either additional l n [: cystats or additional feataures not rcquired of other )
} -
L pronmarized water reactors. .And, of cource, while there would n[ , be certain advantagc3 to thosa, there could be dicedvantages. l 2.: So it's not a simple yes or no. ; 25 Q Are you a6vocatinci in the long run that these
*. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . . - - . _ __.-.._.___.-..._,____..__c._ , - - . _ ,
r N' '
] 1941 36 I '
inheront donign acnaitivities be totally eliminated frcm the
~
2 B&W systera? - i 3 A Frcm my perspective today, the ancwor to that is yes. 4 O And what ucnid you roccanend at this point to either S study that or to eliminate there at this time, or in the lontq 6 term? 7 A Well, I'd even like .to coe in the short term that... i 8 I am very intorosted in following what ocnes out of the , ci
~
i freccamendatione in 0667; r..f,and Iwould like to see that as a high l to i priority. And, certainly, I want to iterate that I don't have I 11 l quote,'the solution bero before me today" which I could atate ; 1 4 12 1 uncategorically that thic could be incorporates ncar and, if I h l e.no wnen incorporated, would alleviate all of our concerns. Q j M l
, It's a very ccmplex problemtit weighs on many -
t 35 l differr.nt issues and aspects of what han happened since TMI. t 16 And there are over a hundred rocc.nunnndc<tionn at VARGA adopted
- 7' t
since TMI nucicar reactors, as well as Rancho Seco.
}
11, Thosa have certainly had an effect. I think that i le i one approach was to look at the risk reduction potential. I ! v,
~~'
think that those nee 3 to be weighud out. But my position ; 1 I i today is tlat the foramont problan is the design senritivity
'3p~ i in the BH1 design.
2?' That needs to be aerio:cly considered. . . i 24 0 When you say " risk reduction should be weighed out", 25 what do you maan by that? l :l J
1942 j i 37 Ancil, certainly, tro all knce.c that there in a certain~ 2 level of risk, and we hope it is as Icw att possiblo; it can't 3 L be negli.gible. If other pressurized water reactors are 4 operating at a certain level of rich, and thoce posed by 5 Rcncho Seco are highor, I think that it's minimun they need to 6
, be cyaated.
7 , 1;ow if there are a nuraber of ways to get to that, o ' some miny be economically more prudent in certain risk reduction' 4
~
j than others. And that'n what I wc.s alluding to in my response.
! m
) Q Why do you make the statemat that all PWRc nhould ha:Ie
<1
! 11 l l an equa? riuk? } 12 1 h I guean I'll abk the namo quoction: Why not? I l i 'efi3 tp certainlyr no & atate official, rosponcible to the people of tho
)
~ i l l ] 14 li l State of California, do not focl that a certain sector' bf that i I i "* I
- population shculd be expeced t o a higher riak frc
- a a design that 1
I 6 d inhurently pocco a higher riah. ; l O If tho jfERC de bertainec that all the riska. . . the i ( w /drinha frcru e.ll PiRay *thother e it be Westinghouac, CE or BEW,are f { d
'3 'e i.
a de cred acceptable, should the NIC go further and equalize thace "o' rd ekc--even in tho' firat instance when they are deen'ed - ..{ accept.nbly low to bc acenptable? 1
., i
! "j- h I hate to ecs you to r3 pact that question, but... i E 4 " ! Q l 'm sure you ' r e awar e of what t motion and the l " i role in the regulatory responsibility of the NEC is. And I i < 1 m. j l
" g) perhapo I am going to testify a little hit as a preface to ray i t(;
i f .- i -
e , J 3 i I l l l I, 1943 l 1 < question. 38 4 2 l But, assuming that the NRC finds that D&W reactors 3 indeed do have a level of rich, but we find that level of rink 1 1
~4 j to be minimal and therefore acceptable undar our criteria, do
(
"r.
). you feel that the NRC should go beyond that and equate that l 6 ( albeit lov rink with all other PWR yendors is their rick I 7
, level ic even louer?
6 l A Enving hoard that I would think that the Nuclear i O l- Regulatory Comiccion--if I ucre in your role-I would have a 1 t l 3 ". '} l
, - very dif ficult time trying to ~~ I don't want to say " sell' --
! 11
! but hwe. a very difficult time in rationalizing that to myself.
l
.' 4,' i Of coursa, rinha ahould he es low ac possible. We
.<.w
& O hava set certain ettndards. _ This defence indepth concept is M n 5 4
g one which anny of us have $hent lots of resources, mg # fcaro j
'S
;.Jt '
- of study in twing to achieve. ' '
4 10 What we arn f aced with here in, I think.,n. .u., s specific " plan viiich itn prime purpose is to deliver electrical {v Q
'~ l power 1
i fu i and t. hat electrical ; cover nada to be delivered econcibically l W ! i,n a reliable f ueMon, 8 !
- 20 Dut, on the other side of that coin, if that plant i i i
I d l poseo greater rishu, then it chould--baced upon technology that. L t U [ is a)rendy nya.ilable--we should highly conaidar rectifying, ! l j dl elininsting those ricka dcwn to the level which the people I i 1
< :1 think norrally would 'have crpacted to have eccepted..
2S , 0 Then when you nay that are you testifying on behalf
- . , _ , _ , _ _ . - , . . . _ _ . _ . - .__.u,.___--_.____._____.--_ -
1944 1 I of the California Energy Conraissionero, or is that your own
- 2' i perconal testimony?
i
~
A Wo, I think I sa testifying more as a state official, 4 that I' feel this is the most responsible role. - I 5 0 Do you agree.with the state:nent that risk 'chould be 6 an low an reasonably achievable? ;i! 7 P. I most certainly do. U Q Sothere'sacostjfactorweighed... involved in D that? 10 A Certainly. 11 0 Do you agree with the statenont that the rink of 12 nuclos.r generation ahould be equally an low as that from O 13 other for:ric of generation? l 14 A There's n lot of uncertainty, and it can be. . . I a j 15 : think the bulk of what I wac trying to comment on~-you can i n le ,l - carry thin to the abstract--all I was trying to allude to is ! I i 17 I th c. t w 4 may ] carn and have learned through experience and
!R .
naturntion in the nuclear industry batter trays to achieve. . . i f D! and reduce rir;k. I Ni But now we are faced with n specific generating type 1: (; 25 t-that, in my mind, b:'canno of these cenoitivitica, has higher i a rii . And the censitivitier: should be renolved, if not i t i a1 i eliininated, 0 DOOS thf3 inh 0IQnt dCCign...
~
2.0 WG21d you Day that th3 h ah,BEWfacilityhaaahigherrickinvolvedintheproductionof l _ _ _ . -
1945 I O electricity than other PWR vendors? 9 2 h Based upon a lack of resolution, even in the NRC's 3
. own mind, about these ocnnitivitien, that there is in my 4
mixtd a higher risk existing today. 5 O Does that higher risk have a cost tradeoff? 6 A It most certainly does. I think this gets back to 7
. your initial quertion: Should the plant be shut down? And 8 because of 'that, one needs to keep into account the degree of 9 what that rish ie. And, although, in the short term, I'm I C' certainly not the person who is here to decide thoce factors--I 11 think that's the whole purpoce for thece hearings--but that in 12 the abort term, relative increases in risk may be acceptable.
- G And that, of cource, is the role of the Nuclear 14 Regulatory Commission, I think, to make those decisions now.
15 Sut, in the long term, it's definitely not in my mind accsptablia. 16 0 on page 13 of ycur testimony you have indicated that 17 the hncho seco design censitivities have failed to be even 10 s tudied. Is theit statement, in your mind, still tran? 19 A Yes, it is still true. I am very encouraged by 20 1(UREG-0667, but I don't believe that even 0667 acknowledges the p 21 f act tha t the types of studica that I'm alluding to have been 22 done. 23 Q So you would say that 0667 is deficient insofar na 24 its reccenendations for study of the inherent design sansitivities 25 of the B&W plant? , l l L .a - e- -
o 1946 0 O A Wo, I. caid quite to the contrary, I am very
- 2 $
encouraged that - this is my first evidence, -at leact -- 3 . . . tha t I have seen that the HRC is adopting a position that the
.4 sensitivity needs to be directly studied and clininated. -
I 5 That's my charactorization of what the recomendations of l C 066'/ arc. \ ' 7 liR. BLACK: I havo no further questions. ] G MRS BOWERS: Mr. Ellinon. J 9 i s , fir . 11LLICON : Mrs. Urners, lihc Mr. Louis, I would ;
' lI' s
10 prefer to uithhold my redirect until after questioning of the / Board, in esse that I might have quections based on the , 12 ."' Scard's quections. l i3 ' HRS. BOWERS: I think we should take a 10-minute 14 ' break. You know, when you have eno perscn testifying, you 1 "' i don 't get to share. 1E end tape 8 (Whqreupon, at 3:46 p.m. , a receas was taken.) 1 tape 9,bc DR., COLE: Jurat a few questions, Mr. Webb. ) ' 18' CEOSS EEAMINATION DY TIIE DOARD i 10 DY DR. COJ3: 1 10
.; O On pa:;je 2 of your contimony, en line 4,of a acntence
) f
~
that. begins on 1.ine 4, you referred to analyses by NRC and l '2' L other groups. To what are you ref erring there, sir? Which n I.DUh ha 24
- A I'm corry, Dr. Cole, I just did locate my page 2 of 25
,. the tactimony.- Could you plear.s indiente that again?
l
t t l l I ' j 1947 l 1 i t l 0 Page 2 of your tectimony, linc 4, ycu refor to 1 2 -
- analysen by imC and "other groups". To whe.t are you referring?
- l 3
, .n Yec, prinarily, the Draeney Ceraishion Report, i 1
" l
- i believe, also nay be his conclusiono I I' I S l 0 Any others? l 1 6 I j l A Ho, none I can think of immediately.
1 ( 7 . O On that name page in the bottcca paragraph, in the 9 middle of tha.t pa agraph, you refe.r to the complex feedwater 0 control cyattm. Is tina feedvater control cystem more compli-10 cated than the fardwater ao:Itrol cyctea used at other nuclear poscr plante? A In a senze. Maybc not feeduater control htt, a ' n 4' h cortainly, Sto ICS, in my aird, is nore complex nud more 4 ! i i I uophinticated. .t think, indeed, the BEM design, becauce of l D.' j
; the once.-through nteam genorntor and the close coupling, has 4~- ,
l attenpted to develop and inatall a systert which in mora
,I O'
,i c ompc.ex , in that sense.
j g 1 10 i i G hll right, nr,, tbe ICS system van originally l L i '
- 9 designed cnd used on cold cystem%
h Is that correct, cir*/ j i
"q L I l'elieve that wp .83bccck and Wilcox's tentimony 1
2! in thr.t regard? I
# ! ML f:. HON: Excuno me a moment, Dr. Cole, I would'like - k '
j h to ask one guention with regard to the anwer you just gave. l l F You are f,wiliar with the principle feed i forward 23 i control?
- l. _
I ' , + l t 1948 1 THE WITR:3S Yes. 2 1 MR. GHON: Do you k.now whether that la tised in the 3 other reactors also, or cimply in this one? I 4 I THE TOITHESS: The low (following) veraus food ', 5[ forward, ycu nean? Is that it? I , i 6 MR. Shout
- Yea, well, feed forward...
, 7 THE 01TNESS: Noll, cortainly in the boiling water j 8 ,
. reactor, I believe it's different. There ic a generic k j 9'
{ difference betweca boiling water reactors and pressurized 1 4 10 i water reactors in terma of that.. . i I r 21 1U1. SUON: I nean other PsTRc.
- j. h, TIM WITNESS:
1:? n I certainly couldn't answer it, no. l i 13 Pl i CY DR- COIJS : h 1 u j! O i no yca know if the integre.te.d control system that's i pi 15 L uced ou fo cnil fuel ple.nto is as complicated, or leac y; complica ted, than the adaptation uced on the Babcock and y l Wilco) cystem? g A I certainly feel tial the acpoet of the integrated ig ; t. control syst(m which we are diccuncing now, .ic the riothod in-f
- 0 l. ehich it dor _a a cc:aputer integration of matching the heat out t
3 { of the steam generator versua a concing .cf the heat into the i }, r, j -atema cenarator. p
- . . ; In the.t aunne r $ think it'a unique to a pressurized 1
6 oe l water reactor versus. a foc5il fuel plant. 1 1 y Sut en far 'ad lperhaps the Incthod in which. It senda l 1 - - - - - " --- - ~~ ~ '~~~~ ~~-~~~~ ~ ~ '~~~
t 1949 signals out to control ccatponenta and interrelates probably, I 2 at least, in my opinien, would be the basic generic type of , 1 j denign. O Do you know if they have had any problems trith the ; , ICS cystem on fossil fuel plants? E' , A I would; be surpriced, I think, genericly control 1 7 problems, particularly when you start getting into the E relatively very large plants which have economy of scale, c
/
3 , that the control problem becomes tougher. l w "7 ' l C' Dut you have ne knculedge of whether they had more l i i II or lets of a prehlem than nuclec; power plants, using the k syster... T A I specifically 'cculdn 't say the t, no. M 0 on page 3 of your tontinony, iten 1, the first
)
F-
! centeucc< "the high prosauro injection system is of ten being a
H
~> " h uead to mitigate insufficient. control of primary system
- 7 preocure nr.d tempere.ture fluctuation caused by GTSG sensitivi-IG tics."
(0 _ I believe you answered a-question by Mr. Black i
%' concerning the number of inct ancas in which high powered I
2i !!injectionvacured. Do I recall correctly that you answered
!m 21 - !.fcur tc that? Four incts:nces?
9 23 ti
'l J
a A NC, I'm actunlly referrin:; to manual cctuation, high M pressure injection system, as well ae autantic actuation, 1 25 which would be your ESPIS signal. It is my kncwledge that J
I i i 1 i i 0 I i 1950 l I high proscuro injection is normally uced by the operator i 2 '
- manually as soon na they scnce they are having a rapid cool 3
1 down in the system, to head it off at the pass, so to speak. . i .i 4 l As far se I know, in tha last instance einere 1 5 , could either review what's been done at Rancho Seco, it was , u still conaidared acceptable to ucs HPI after a reactor trip' , 7 to offnc.t the overcooling. 4 s g 0 I believe, in an affidavit with an operator, you ' D indicated that might have been a responso. . . an operator 10' might have done that. i A Procisely. I believe that one, if not more, of the i 12 operators, indicated that they had those options and would use g ", - l ! HPI almost iminediately. , , O Is that a reportable incident, the use of the high j d power high p : essure injection uysten? l { _ l A Ho, it i'a not. 1 { */ j Q Do you knm , or have knowledge of any instances i $ , , i l when it his been used and hac not bech reported to the p' ! {' Huclear negulatory Corticcion? ' I ' ao
' }
l A Well, this ic nuhjective on}s,my part but, yes, I i think, if we assure the normal tranaignti takes place, and d-. i I 4 ( j "n .l 8 i g the operatora, as a natter of. course,euse the high pressure I .; v
"; i
-; injection cyecm, as coon as they aanse the pressurizer icvel I
! decrensing rapidly, that those events normally uculd not have
*~
l bean ESFAS actuation and therefore the une of HPI in thoco
.. . _ ,. _ - _ _ h _ - . .. - .-. .. - _ . _ _ _ ..._ _ -_. - - -
I, 1951 9 , t. ( I circtuantances would not be reported. l l' 2 O ifell, when you recponded to the question of how
\
s i many timec it was used, I thought you nald four. 1 4 A The timen that ESPAS ia actually ruiuiredr HPI I S operatj ort uithout a cmall 1.)rcak. 6 q Q Oka.y , that'n the automatic initiation of the system. ! 7 i A l'es, that's cofrect. And it's peasible that, in an 3 l overfeed, you could, even thottgh ycu Utarted an IIPI pung
~! carly, that. the abnormal upset in the cecondary still could la L
t drive you down to an E3FAS; then they vould be required to
- trip reactor coolant pampu.
1; i l
! O Do ycn have any estimate of the nuirber of timen that l i
j the high proccure injection system might have been uur.d as ycu ) have deccribed it to mitigate insufficient control? ! 1 13 )i A 1 think that'c a good quection. The toutmony or i 16 ! s i anclycin we had on the number of t5mes the high pressure i ) g " f* l ll :_njectio: r.ozzles had been anbjectud to co]d water from ) la , high p::escure uno, Ibelieve, was 21, reince Eencho Seco has i n J l 4
] been operating.
) f)
~t .
1.nd an ice know c Dancho Seco had a substantial
}
l u i
~j outage to I guess a tu'bine blade failure. So 31 out of...
2", ! aince '1975 minus alucct a year': outage vould be a rounb . i -,
" i i estima te. i 1 l 1
, ,I 1 j Q Further on in that name paragraph, you say: "Thig !
1
.t 1
',S I u . _ _ _ _ _
situation which centrdhuted to the accident at TMI. . . I'm
. b. -
)
) i 1 i I i i i 1
> 1952 4 I
reading the last sentence of that paragraph. . . " has' not been 2 remedied at Rancho Seco." 3 j Could you provide us with some guidance as to how i 4 ) that might be remedicd? 5
- A Well, I think what I'm alluding here to is the 6
sensitivity, which requires high precaura injection use. 'And, i 7 certainly, if you follow my logic--it might be elightly 3j j convoluted--but the operntor had a (mine) not at TMI. He s
~9 l expected to neo the deprecsurization would normally start off i f u, j
l i HPI. And as soon aa he naw a recovery in his pressure level, , I
' i l [ he would Ihrottle back HPI.
Artd he had operational reaconc tco because, if I understand, the (bore on) being injected and certain
^
reactivity considerations to get the plant back on line, that
,a !
) "j he wouldn 5t like to use the system too long,
. ,h l !
But the uituation that I am really referring to here I i
...s j
i hinthatthasensitivitiescontributeacertain (mind) set at 0 i WG but thcae sensitivities have not been ramediad--not no much
" h!! at th- mind sat parhapa, but bothar inctructions to oport. tors,
.,s o i y or least, the awarenenn of operatora is different nou than it ii
",' ;fI w as be f erc T.II.
4 \
- p. - . 0l i But. what I'm referring to here is the sensitivity.
! k l 0 0 And I be. icva in rcoponst to a question, also by l d 1 l ;y Mr. Black, yo2 indi:eted you had no specific runedios but that ! 75 f;l tha nyntea chould be looked at core closely. i_-.._,-.-_-.
~ .a.-- _ . - . . _ . _ . - , . . _ . .
In that your
I 1953 1 l answer 7 o A Yea, my ancwor van that it'4ganintegraldesign I I. 3f problem. In other vords, you have to integrate not only the 4i fact that you have the sensitivity bu the.censitivity that i ' l ! I 5) requires the IIPI. In other words, pressurizar doesn't have l ] 6l ! surficient pressure control in thnae rapid transients. l 7 So, you know, there's two aides to the coin. Maybe a l i SI the sensitivitien can be eliminated with better pressure i 1 j 9 control en well, and other uayo, too, I think, in ny mind, i 10 detect 12cther you havo IOCAs or non-LOCAc--other than waiting l ! 11 for a recovery in the ayntaa. I feel that the recovery in the syntem could be D'f l 13 cmsked bued upon sente other very abnormal thing, particularly s M the voiding utill concerno rae. ) l 13 As we know, a significant amount of voiding in the. . . l' f63 of conrce, we had a precoure ... relief valve that failed to y j 17 L open, unich af fected at leuct the apparent inventory level of 10 the pressuriner. ! D So I utill can nec come of 'here t recoverien having 1 # i i M, .again a very lou probability, probnb1' . But, none'.heleac,
- 1 l 21 a prebebility that the operator eculdibe misinforraad for a
, ) I 6 22 chort perdod of time, sufficnet that it could be a precursor,
~
C And Itan No. 2 on page 3, in the sentenco that-endn a h- I h1 with your . iootnote 4, - you refer to "high proscure injection gd under desirjn". Under design in.what respect, cir? Tc what L
.__________A ._--.-__.-_-___.-.____-.___.-___..x__
..._ _ _ _~ .._ _ _ _ __. _ _ . _ ... _ . _ _ _.._ _ ._ __ ___. . _ . . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _
l l e s , l . 1954 t 1 j are you referring? j 7. Is Well, specifically, it's the emergency core cooling
+
I analysis that'e taken pluco since TMI, which choirs that if the 4 ptw.ps continuo operating and you have a homogenous mixture, 5 uhich would be discharging through the break, IIPI doea...not'
- 6
- have sufficient capacity to make up for that masa loss and that
', 7 l the break 10 still in a cisc uhich will not depressurize down 1 0 l i to the other components of the emergency core cooling--which is i g i the core flood tank inventory, which getc you at least down } . 10 , 4 t.o the low precuure injection. l
, So the tripping reactor coolant pturpc was a solution !
l 12 I ! to che fact that UPI doesn't have enough capacity to make up l < n" l the mass loss in that break. i ! j 14
- Q All right, sir, under design in that respect, with 1
1S , respect to the certain site in break that was within the
- envolope...
17 A Exactly. With the honogenuous ficW, exactly. O Thank you,. Item Ho, 3', wherein you stato that, ' 19~ j "Hatural circulation has never been used for core cooling at , i
?i)' e
- 5 Ranche Seco nor,"to your k vledge,"has been successfully-j 91 ,,
relici upon. Following the occurrence of severe transient n
~"
cenditions." O ~n Uas I correct in my understanding that the only.one i of A *
~' -
l ; we'have had so for im TMI-2, based upon your: definition of i .. 23 fl " severe transient conditions"?_ - . - _ _ - - .
.. - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ . _ _ . - -_ . . . . - - _ _ . , . ~ _ . _ _ - -
)
a 1955 j 1 h i r A Well, certainly, that's true ind that was maybe P. f very far left,.:Lf you will, in terms 0f severity. I'm nore 3 concerned with a cevere transient condition without a core 4 valve steck open, for insuance, but nemore eavore than Crystal 5 L River; wimre you will get into a regine whero (anif t) and 6 voiding will occur. l 7 ! O Do,you know if natural circulation ues achieved at il 8 i Crystal Rive.9 "a l ! A It wac,.. froa my understanding, it certainly was. h
!O
{
] I think in thq parameter against which to judge its relative l
ranking L.n terms of Goverity is perhapc the nubcooling, which . 1 1 l 17 { I unders tend, r.t co:no point in time, approe.ched eight degreen,
- or had o miniamn value of eight degreca of subccoling.
la ' l Uhere that value or what parameters, specific ! I ! d). location.;of neacurs tnts that's based upon, I don't know. t r, l! There still might have been voiding where you have very hot icettln, parhaps a rsector head, there atill could have been i 1 is i l - eene voh'ing. ; I ! I pl ! I
, ifall, my concern there was the strength of your !
2.0 j '! j statemnt tlu.t natural circulation han never been used for i 21 {
! core cocling.
And we have at least two incidents where it hau . 22 i been used for core cooling. It is now being used at TMI-2,is : i 23 ' l it not? Was uscd?
- 24 -
l ! A Well, yac, but it wasn ' t of fectivo at 'TNI-2 until i , .,.~ , I 73 L__OW Q4DI .Y_ _YoM _,Y.Iere no 1Cn7Er- in U tI7'lD Ni OU D NW3i hi OUL-VOIL--- -----' -
l : i ! l i i I
)"l '
195G ' ! _- 1 l had etablized the pitn. There were no substantial condensibles i 7. l . or voiding. You had essentially a refill of the pridary 1 ! 2 , l, 1 aystem. i 4 i i At that point, it wan more or lona a baseline use , S ; of natural circulation. And I think Crystal River falls in , , 1 ! 6 that same category. The cystem remained basically solid. And i 7 I think there in no contontion on my part as long as a systeia , j ' 8 remains basically solid that there is any problem associated ; O l with these transients, or with using natural circulation. ! 10 l
- That'n a proven mode for a solid prir
- .ary ayctem. .
O I undoratand your position on that. On page 6, the
- firnt full paragraph--the paragraph that begins on that page--
i 13 ( i about two-thirds of the way down, just in front of your 1 '1 j 14 , foot 2ute 7, you... well, the centence states, "Upon a i 18 i ccaplete lecs of feedseter flow the MW cnce-through steam i 16 ; i generator will boil dry in approxinately one minute "
"2
" i 1 Would you utate your e.ctnnapticus under those 1F" i
I jo cteditions, sir? Thic is not an anticipatory trip, right? i 49 p A No, it'c based upon no anticipatory trip. And as n l well it ir based upon the pre TMI cetpoints. And tha oro , n, i
; minute I believo hae also been interchangstb3y used with a i Y 7". '
tuinute and a half, at well. p" i So I thinkr rather'than establich an absolute valua, l , MhIthinktheninuteorninuteandahtlf19... U l 0 All right, sir, than.k ycu. On page 9, footnote 11, e
i l l 1957 , O ' j- 1 c.m I correct thnt this is the basic for your statement that ! \ ! E
, I operators may routinely use the high pressure injoction !
3 l system for mitigating insufficient control? 4 , A Yea, I nay that through the depositions of the e 5 three licensed SMUD operators. That is the basir of that G underetanding. 7 Q And your recorr.mendation thera is that analysis 8 3 Tho'110 ba made to ensure that GMUD's procedure are. consistent l I 9 with the purpoca of IGE Eulletin<J 95 05C? " 10 A Yes, and the concern is alto, I think, covered in 3; W.1 REG-0565, which ic the ct:all break enalysin itself. And in ! 12 that report, they identify brouk tiiec which would not deprescu-Ii n ' rize Dhe oystem hnless that you would have ESFIG i p i actuation, unless icacth3ng-one of two things happen in 20 ' i ' g minutes, i i ;3 You are working with a very, very small break that , ;y by and inrge matchc3 ito strun loss, if yoa will, to the decay ] 4 ] heai- term. And you coald juet basically hang up. And what i { ;p ; needn to happen is au:< ilia.ry fcedvator systect necca to come on i , j-I l pr.hj at leM t 20 minutos to provido cooling,to further depressurir.e
- o
- - u . 4 it down to HPI catp0!nt.
i I n Now my concern in that ycu get a trip and you see
.g jthisinitiilresponce. And, again, I am thinkirg oi lov l i 0
j y probability events: design basis, carthquakes, and worse,
.a j Lsanothing _--. that would perhaps giva you a LOCA, ' where you havg had
?.5
7.___.____._._..____.___..._.____.___.___.__ s l 1950 I l
'an inntrunont lina or a valve that is partially stuck open, j 9 or uhatever; and. one for which the operator in his own mind I
3 would have started the high pressure injection systen. And now 4
- thin vac a hypothetical.
I O Eut, cuppose the break was pretty the high pressure 6 flow pluo tho decay hont term--we have a lons of heat sink. l l 7 And it hanga up. l We don't over get to ESPAS, And wa allcnr O the pitmps to continuo to operato. D ] , And if the mano loan certainly would still be greater 4 M I, than the UPI f1cu, or uo would havo reprencurized the system, [ 11 I okay ?, but we don' t. 0 Ho just hcng in there--you still have 3 M more mass locc to the bronk that's being utMde up by HPI, i f j ? And you continue to operate your react:or coolant pumps.- i 4 d
! M: 1 In my mind--I have resolved it in my mind that that's l ;
b ' j S ? ntall not a concern. I hope the URC perhap3, or if further l I! it tratimony doesn't alleviate that in your mind, then porbppo
- 17
- : lie is a pint that chould requira some cupplener,tary
! B, investigatitn. l I i l
\.
l IP O Under the prenant grotmd ;rulna, wouMn' t they , s ! trip the coactor puup? .I i "D[!l ' l '..",[ A No, if: they ratart EPT carly, they nesier get to ala i F :SFAS anc they do not have to trip rocctor coolant pump. In R ither wordn, the depressurization nocdn to con:'.nw down 30 i
%i fou can got below the cetpoint of 1600 pounde.,
?S 0 okay, but getting back to the previcun question, if
l l l l 9
- ) 1959' 1 .
wo look at SMUD pracodures and if they are consistent with the 2 i purposen of Bulletin 79-05C, and the nmall break analysis,
! 3 j,
wouldn't, or shouldn't, that particular problem be addressed? 4 {j A Yes, I certainly think so. But the question ist l n
~
j Do the procedurce allow tin operators to manually early 1 0 initiate the EPI? If they don't... an analysis, it' n, clear J J j in my nind, they assimo no sarly initiation of HPI. Analysic J G [ assume that for all those (apeertn) broeka, ESFAS was hit und I Dl . that'e when H?I cane on, , f u I 6 to b0 1 l Took no credit-naybe right so-- no credit for I I early HPI. But I wonder now in the real conso if the Yi l cperavorn ura initiating early HP1, unlear they have nau 1 o , u D Ll } instractions for procedures that preclude tha t. 3.nd that van i
- i. . I s v not included in the analysis of OS65.
D1 l t O All right, thank you. Page 10,, the second paragraph, i [ ' l {j the firut sentence-the end of the firnt centence-you rcfor i p i :
.I to: relatively f rerpent events. D.nd, again, are yen referring p" I -
to high prosauro injoctica and both autu.natic and manual? ID [ And when you talk about "rel2tively frequent", whnt cort of , e
""n fregatoney are you talking about, cir? ,
I !' A We're probably etill talking ebent a Irw nunber in . ll l l my "relatively frcquent" ar cc2apared to other prescurized-l
^^3
) water reactore. This really gets into como of the questiona a i 2i'" ' i j from Mr. Blaci that you can have'the overcooling event, or ; 1
-y initid,tiCU _ Of a3X1113ry ..fCOdWater, .WhiCh Will .driVG. _ _ . - -the
- - System .
- . - .- _ _ .- -..- - .-.-....--.-.....- -. ----- -.- - _ -.--- -._~ i-l l l i 1960 O ,' - ! down to MPld point. And you must trip thepoint pumps then, j
., , -~
c - I think that just reintively comparing D&W with 3 theotherreactors,pressurizedwaterrfactors,thiswill
- happen more in the Babcock Wilcox planr.
j
'6 That's the bacia of the "rc
- tive frequent" bit,
) G in my ctatement. . 7
- Q on page 11, the first sentonces you describe an i undonirabla situation. That wil-1 be correct 4il by the inatalla-9 tion of the vants uhich are pretantly being planned. In that 10
! correct? U A Well, certainly, I fcel that when the vente are 1 I1 installed, there ic going to have to be gain actae very l i C rostrictive procedurcs on their use, which, again, would l t T* g* .
- i. require a high degree of ccaprohansion by the oporator when j $ , thona chould na nacd.
l t l M Uhether, if he loeco natural circulation. . . well, - R firstly, it's just bad from on icpiarator's standpoint becmine l ' 1 E}j he can't feel too comfortable trit.h hic prosauri:: era empty. U 10 i So he's going to be in a atate of somewhat, I uculd think. . . _3' h oth2rs can testify io this, but I would think a freat den 1 of l [ I a M 1 nnxiety. 3 2" : O I'a n going to be uhatg cir? 8 I didn' t herr your . 23 - ! laut... ! N t n. Is In a ntate of anriety I would think, unt;.1 he
'!S ! knous ho'a received m. recovery.- Eut, certainly, it does edd - -._..-_.___x._._.-~__. _ _ _ . _ - -- _ . . . - _ _ _ . - -
1961 9 1 a defence indepth. Therefore, I think it's a good recotulenda - 2 ' tion. When he would use it te re-catablich a natural 3 l circulation or rely on a feed and bleed mode, or use a core 4
- g. valve to gucr. ntoo heat renoval with HPI would require ccme t,
i Si careful considorition. i 6
- DR. COLE
- I have no further questione, Thank you. ;
! j. MR CHONs To b sgin with, Mr. Webb I would like ! ) nI ' to ask you the Jane question that I caked tho panel yesterday. l i ' l Is this too spirited a steed to hook to our old j nf 20 l,. one horce shay? Is the very nature of the once-through ateam generator blown in the bottcz and it turns to steam on the fly, . ~. l nimp3y too fancy nnd responsive a thing to une for this purpomt. j l in ycur centimation? i i THE WITMGSSs D u od upon tne year we have had now E to analyze Three Kilo Inicnd and the other recorynndations-- i ' i l procedures, recorundation and onber itcmu, thort-term and ! I'[ i long tem-that have been considered at Rancho Seco, I feel 3 l 6m that de once-through ste na generator deaign is too responsivu, j E) and shculd bo fixed. 2'l IIR , SHON: In toa responsivo? m" - TFiB WI?DESS: In too responeive. m i l O "- 23 l'I . SHON: And Sould bc " fixed".- W V ~.l d : hat again, j carrying the same analogy to the horse, would that include j' ! l M simply turning it out to pasture and replaciig it uit.h actnethir:t 1. l 25 else entirely?
1962 1 TBH WITNESS. I fool that as 067 goaa forward, they 2 l ohould bite the bullet, so'to apeak, and eliminate the t 3 i sanaitivities. Now I have seen the ACRS analysis, which is . A the first sa'naitivity analyais I have seen where they hava- l 1 5 i incroaced prosauri::or volume by 50 percent. And they buy 6 15 acconda additional t.tno before the prescurizer empties. 7 They have lookcd at increasing HPI flow by an 0 additional 10 parcent. They have looked at different cetpoints: 9 for each earlier UPI actuation, and none other thinga. 10 They're not very encouraging, to put it, I guesa, in a layman's aance. r 17. MR. SEON: While we are diccussing that particular 1 point, the last graph, it does not boar either a fig 2re 14 number or a page nu=bar, in the Exhibit 2 attached to your i 15 testimony. It shows a cnae 6, inbled 'Treasuri::or Area Tons, " 16 One and a Half,"which nooms, by contraat to all the other linesd - p' 4 , drean en that graph, to result in a much louer upper head d N anality and, hturco, in much, mach less voiding. Is that 1D correct? THE WITNESS: Certainly in the reactor head, that's f q" true. There are no indicationn to give either of ":s what'n U happened in tho candy cane, which is more directly relater to U a blockage or to the feed natural circulation. M DettthepointIvanmakingwasmoreonthepressurized" 1 M levol recovery. Ua watkld hope Saot perhaps to empty the .
. . ~ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . . _ _ _
i
; ' f' . 1963 ' '
~
I
. ]
1 ! pressurizer at' all. The pressurizer level being lost, or ! , 3 t e. the emptying of the proscuri=cro, is the first problem; and 3 frcm what I understand can occur withont reaching naturation 4 I i t, coriditions, r
', ?"
[ The second one is actually.the racching of satura-c, , s . J
- 6 j ,
. tion conditions and what wou'1d happt.n in the candy cane. I l
,- i
, , would like to mike one point that I think is worth making. ,
I
. 4 2
L That is, the dogree to which the flow can c feop ou) the voida i iSem the candy cane appears to'he the critical parameter. i 10 l, s once you have a gac- I say, it's pure stesw, no l ' ft i condonsiblea--procent and you repressurize the cycten, the. bubble juct doesn't collapse and go away. Whatyoudoinp I3 ! u hermodynamic conce is you atart compressing this bubble, land a a' j l N]t you comprasu the buble, you do work on the bubble and it 15 i 3 increassa in thin temperature and, banically, 5:111 ccme into i
.fl again a saturated stato, whatever the pressure temperaturo 17
[ rd ationship in in the systcm. 3 E ) a But the void just doesn't collapse or recondenas.
- ,h At least in my mind is what murt be done is that bubble.must l 20 be Ewcpt in a' steam generator where it has heat transfer, which i
"c4 i I. will cool it and condence it. !
!. i 4 i l
\ "4 So, if you will, .if you are in a very etesnent-
, i, condition, you'just don't build up thepressure and collapse [n I 2# b thece thinrs and theycondenser it's more one, I guess, in'a i o - il 25 clincical 3ense, itat you comprenn it and 'it remaina. It's
1 e o f 1 1964 J- i l i o . i 1 '; l ll - sr. aller but it remaine. j 2 ' s I [ The only i;hing that's going to condense it, if you 1 3 ' 4 vill, vill be the heat transfer th:3cgh the fluid. Ma unlens 1 4 I i 1 you havo lihe- -I think it was ahomr--if the recator coolant 5 l pumps remain operating, it'a dt:sirous, because it mixes these i e l thinge up so you get the heat transfer. Soyouwculdcondennel i I t l the void, in that scusa. i ! O j .!R. Silm You said semnthirig now that I think no one ! ~n { i, else ha, pointed cat to uo, that there is a thermal dyncmle i 10 I reaintance to collapse which in cler.r there truly in, in a large s !! voide or a nerica cf vcidt; in the cyatm. 4 3 m o l i Prevounly, we have been told that the operator 4 13 j' y ainply operaten his aigh preucure injection system until ; i U
" hic subcooling is re-catablinhed. You have suggested that he l 15 1 ,, coold run for a long, long time r.d nc t re-establish cub-l
' t:, h
{ h cooling. ' ~ 17 " l l Tho 6yncaica of the situation is not inmediately ! 16 : I cler r to me end it ic not obvious from a quantitativo atendpoint 10
} that, so to speak, ;he heating up of the surface of liquid i 7: Ji on which the bubble 1.c e.etezpting to conhnsa cE.n alwnye keep 2.1 !
;. the bubble presen an the prem;ure ri.ses.
I l ral - Why, in pote opincaon--leh ue put it' this way: I 15 pI
! What eniculation, gnentitative cair.sulation, htvo you done that 24 i
[ cuggesto you can't cintply ptung fluid into the cysten unti1 ~ the , x ;j l ..___ _ . _ il a ahb l o - - - - ' -- -- --- -'--- ~- -~-- - ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ' ' ' ~ ~
't i
f I 1965 > t' A Well, I think first of all I have done no specific 2 f analycia. I listened very carefully to the testimony by the 3 .1 r .' 1, mainly, Mr. Horian, on this subject. And he'Was very , 4 . c.t.wr in his ansucrn, and if you reread the transcript, that , j 5 , it wan the sweeping of these volds in the staan generator, and ! 6 i
~
l the, voids wora condensed in the stean generator. i 7 k' , And I am more er less hypotheticating that if there l- 8 was no f .ow--okay, looking at the othsr side of the coin--if 9 the bubble just doesn't simply collapse because you jacked the* 10 l prescure up, or the cooling--evon if you are cubcooling. 11 Let's say all the fluid becomes subcooling.. Tharo's , 12 ! a time delay before you would cool that bubble. down to 11 where it becomen smaller and zualler;aa you take temperature
- out of it, you will start to collepse it. And the pressare l 1!i
- will work on what's left.
. M But, as the synts wo :ks ,on what's lef t, it does i i 17 i work and raisco the temperature; iso it recovers the heat, if l 4- 10 /. l you will. It's the first law />f thernal dynamics; it has to + } 18 .. l j do with working on a system. l 2 EC Heat transfer out but you can Vork on a nyatem becaum
- 31 . .
!, you're collapaing it, and it keeps it internal energy up, which I I is suf ficient to maintain the . . . i g
.MR. SHON: Oh, sure, but the ? Delta V worked on a
?A >
bubble by collapsing it a nall amount is just frcm the size of _____._db .+hanica.d.nnnnhant notL varv 1aram cc:mared to the arannt of .
l l r /" p
. , 1966 [
(, i1 - I heat that you produco by collapsing it, by . condensing or ; 2 evaporating vnter, is it? .- 3 A Yes, I think that it needs to be considered. We 4 ,
/ are not talking about a small amount. We're talking about-5 uhat I see in one 300 cubic foot in a curva in a candy cano.
3!
. l Okay?'
?
I have to admit that I don't knou if that's a e
, function of time; that's an absolute constant in the candy r: {
cane at one point in timo but there's enough momentum forces 10 to continuButosofesputballegoedttbat.by -}uct pressure { 11 1
^
thermal dynamic relationship by a factor of five? I have not D?
,. done the calculation yet but I think it would be an interesting n~ I thing to see how much internal energy would be distributed. l l
l MR. SHON: It'ri a rather simple calculation to do. t l I would like to have you do it noractime and preecat the result [ to us. Can you do that? I i THE HITNESS Yes, I'd bo glad to. l 1 q' , l- [ MR SHON And comparc it, let's say, with the
.m
^ \\
amount of heat energy involved in ' the condensation of that o
"n l samo amount or voluma of nteam frca a latent heat standpoint o[
ThT F.ITNESS : Well, that's interesting bccause the t J^7 i l l' condensation, in ny mind, would take place at the boundary. D HR. SHON: Yes, it will tend to heat up the liquid 3 1 4", I lintowhichitcondenses,butweCon'tknowhowthat'smixing . 25 with the bulk of the liquid, or uhether it'a mixirig with the
I i i : ; l ./ 1 1 1967
?j!['
1 l bulk of the-liquid. l i 2 ! I just unted the two. You'll come up with two I ! .c,. i q nunbers, each of which arc in ETUs--cna a heat equivalent of ! 4 (wort) to collapse; and the other the heat equivalent of ' 5 j condonn. tion to collapco by the saua Kolume. 1 4 6 ? l It looko .shaple tc do; I wc id rather have you do it , ' J 7 , i i l than me. ,
"1
- G '?
(Laughter.) 9 THE WITUBSS: I certainly won 't take any time today ;l
- 10 j 4 ; to do that ceticulation, but I think that is worthy of doing.
O 11 I I think the point . is though that i t's not simply e. fact that 4 12 l you de jack the preseure and the voids dirappear. And the I ! 13 j abilit.y to circulate those in the steam scaerater is an b in important paraneter
", . .l 4 MR ., SEON: Do you believe that voids w:.uld be
] !
! 1 { cfjcirculater), a erbathntial quantity of voids could be circulata
^
l e p
!. cd, into the steen genarctor. and kopt, cc to npeak, turned up
(
- . m {i simply by naturzl convection?
j . 1 s j-J TIG UITHESS[ 1 think once they are suspt'in the ] j eg ,
~
l j u steam generator, aecuring you haven t ~ 1ost the heat sink, they i
) f l wenid be collapsed and condenced. I see no problem in that.
( . e .:
- What I'm alluding to perhapc is uncertainties. ;
j Ut y l MA SHOL I'm worrying inbout the being nuopt as
-4
"' I far.an the steam generator by an actica in the hot leg. Does i
3 l- _____ _ _ tj_ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . . . _ _ _ - _ - - -it seen reasonable to you tliat the hot leg would he able' to do j-
l r i
- 1968 ;
1 I t
'i
! . thic kind of pushing? l P.
- THE WITNESS
- Early, the steam 1e expanding thero 3 {
l l beceuse of its lose of preanure. And as steam expanda i 4 1 i it occupies a considerably greater space. The hydronnmics j 5 i flow and the c.3& lapse of these bubbles have other conerquences. ' l 5 MR, SHON: To get back to what you have called. the. 7 } i ricncitivities of the once-through steam generator and the i
- 8 rent of the cyctcm, I would like to get acute feel for what
'. f happens when 'the lovel in the stocm generator changere; 1 1 10 )! i tipscifically, you mentioned the heat tranofer area changes. 11 i j And I think it's clear that that doco happen. 1
- Tihen that happann, one would expect the Delta T j -
a
~i 19 t
ahall cido to tube cide the driving force for the haat that is i i " l going from the primary to the accondary to change also. l
~
I , ] (; It may be that mathematically you would have to use 1 J r. 1
" p a logrithmic mean, or something, but there ic scoe average U taaparaturc differenen, i 1 4
Eh a i can you give me any idea of how much of a chtmge fM
" il);t in reaparcture would be involved for a cay 25 percent or 50
] 4 i ,#Npercentchangeofheattransferarea? l t
,, 1
3 I'n ' trying to get at whether this is a substantial 5 't h
), J C
" di change in primary temperature. I
' C ] i 3 TES hTITdESS: Well, we would havo to tastme at what j i t l 2A ) i enperature the feudwater itself is, I guesa, coming into the l i- ' i i ! And, if I reen11, 400-450 dogrees is probably a good nyctem. . L __._ _ _ _'a_ _ . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ "
l l - l 1 1959 { 1 ! 1 l , inlet tmporature, 2 p And there would he, nasuming we had a very large j heat trcnafer aren, a fairly close degree of approach on the 4 i secondary nido to whatever the hot leg would be, and I think
~
G 4. what the real unknown here is how much... what's the 6 i wnpercture in the cold leg? Or houtmuch additional Delta l l
'i 7
T would be involved?
- r" p That would be difficult to guesa .at without Octuhlly c.
~
doing that calculatton. He're talking about fluid that's w" l ; coming in around 600 degreen on the one end, and in apprcach 1, temperature on the other end down to 100 degracc. 3 i ., h i "I Nonnally, the temperature exits to utem generaccr n j
~
- f. 550 degreen, ao ycu still have a 150 degree approach on a cold a
# (
den. More heat trennfer crea would give you a closer epproach. u' 'c lj i; Im. SI!OH: Ya c ,, I'm just t2Ti ng to find out whether N this really nakee wi wful lot of difference. If there is a N
- j clocer approach, you know, that's a feu degreus, it might not. !
- 1
' 3 l p; Yce think it doen* 4 I il ge u tapa 9 eno.
'l I
TIIE WITNESS: Yet, I think so. If I recall...-
'\
n,
'" } ; think if ycn looked at the basic lo4rithmic r.ean -!
tapa 10begin{'. - be tenparature equaaions, and cither of un did a'guick calculation , f 22 the real noneitive parameter there that govenre the logrithmic 1 U i lucan hs;perature difference in the larger one, not the 4
> i L <* craller ene.
e-l 1 i 2.b 1 I _h-_-_
. _ _ _ _ - . ~ . - - . _ . . ~ . . , - - - . - - - - - - . - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4 i a i l l i 1970 O 1
, And because of that, if you input more heat transferi i
?.
! area or better coeff.tcients eu vell-%re* re doing both--that 3 .i it would chango. The one parameter that you are really going h 4 4 to change in the cold approach, cold leg, And if there la a y .i 'l C percont batter haat transfer timras coefficient tims area C tinac type turn that it would aluoat be closely directly. 7 proportional; that iu my recolle.ction of how that log really l 1 0 I neat trnperature equation really calculatec itself out. { O s I HR. SHON: You caid the result wculd be that the 10 cold leg temperature would rico chraply, is that right if you
" drop the heat . transfer aren?
j 3 12 4 O Yes, if you dropped or raised. I une thinking about i 13 overfeed. , MR. SHON: I am acrry. If you rained the heat 15 tr3asfar area, the cold leg temperature would drop. N A If tint waa 30 percent greater than the - the opproa h II a would be 30 parcent leon, which meanc that if it was a 150
- .n
' degrees then it would So a 100 degrees, co uo uculd have a 4
y'" ] 100 degrees Delta T, across betracon the hot leg and the j W cold leg rather a 150. j - E
^l I j q MR. SHON: In CEC'n h hibit No. 19, do you remember U
what that waa? It van the analysia of a double cnded steam ! U[ q lino rupture. Ua anu yeatarday, talking to Mr. Norian that d- y fi L there van nome change -- chance er ceemed to be uomo reaaonable H I \ 3 il( probability
- . _ _ _ _ __that nitrogen gtn would enter into those circumstangec.
1
+
I. i l . i 'l ! "s 1970 -j:: 1- l Can you give ue any idea of what the situation in the primary I i i 4 systet would then be. Would that be a very serious situation
-i
, ,1
- j -
3 in ycur sut unan, en , i i 1 4 A Yea, there are two things to that recponse that'I i 5 guesa dicturhedi me and then I gueno we will try to discusa P j 6 hcv nerious it will be. 7 , First of all, that there was a rnote operator i l 0 ; iren the cor.tret room tc cloar that valvo. Again, given low a { .J;I prebabioity, is tN : a anfety grade power that uonId operato L .! p l Bt that va? ve, or should uc asame that prevent events sufficient 1 i 11 to ruptu::e th; ntene piping that perhaps we do not heae n i 4
'? f nomally wrar to nwny of t3 tac valves. I dcnot kncu the J
4 13[ n ue icr to that, but at:uming no operator action or olaa the 1 ,
,/ <j valve did no'c h:.tve pra:cfr. Ho one wao sont dcwn to inanually j L r.,, I, cloco :hin v 11ve Thac it h dif ficult to 4ude a an -- because n
;;; 1, tMc tranrient, st least when I looked at it yeaterddy, doca t..
[ d
., u, !' :v:.'c co much bsy krA tha t ', in terms of precoure recovery
< - I 9
qu fl do not ktum whet.her the systsc la starting - a trend to re-l t: y .. . I l
- a. .r, q pfE GGrjIu at (DIS polut Or nob, a
I !f w u ,!; MR. SEOn: Piqurc 3.13 nuncat:ted at e H.m? betwcen 11 el l _3 i d 12 .r.nd 14 minutos that tite core outlet preasure would have \ o
~ ,
d :cimed nubotantially to the klud of preanuru6 that the Staff
-- i I
t; e k) pnal suggentea d13 1cquire for bicuing nitrogen into the f 4J sys te:n , 'I'hnt is what Immnt. Eere you acid valve with a-i i
,e
..2 i accled system uith ni trogen in it the ven valves have not been g
c
!I 1971 t
1 installed yet, let us say, how can recover from that in the-- l 2 13 it seriona? 3 A The first thing that co aes to my mind is that having
? reviewned the courco temas of non-condensables, this is a l
5 aignificantly quantity of non condensables. Although I 3 can ::ecall those numbers could be significant to -- might
~/ grade into the steam generator, occupied up come substantial 1 1
8[ space, would not condense, wculd block natural circulation, 1 f and I think the question to this 3.s does, with the reflux j
?l fD boiling occur or would it essentially block -- occupy the 11 space of the steam generator. Since the steam could not com l p
12 4 bach in and condenne on its cran, all I know is that it was - a w n j subutantial nuuber and a substantial concern. Anorning that i le happened, we could pretty well have lost your heat f. ink, so n ! you are into the scenario of the long term feed and bleed ccdo. Until you can - well it is juat long term, you are stuck, 1E p , MR. SHON: Well, lastly the question that Dr. Cole I
!s esked you about the vent valven, jnd I mentioned blocked
. I i U. valves a mcment ago myalf. You oecm to think that it would bo .i j e 'l 20 ' a good 16eal to install such devices, is that right? ; i H A ha a defenso in dcpth, I think that thin is a I n ,. recconmendation that will cartainly thould be done 'and probab3y i, l' '
; 13 , tho nooner the bbtter.
1 gj 11R. SHON: It occurs to me that these balves would
'l pp ; probably be very seiden used for thoprpone for which they ;
__,_____)
l t l l I 'ti
- 197' Le p
1! were 5ntended; in that correct? i 1 s 2' A Yes. I think th0.t the procedures vould hcve to be i i
'3 very rectrictivo and very real in their tee, because I can I
i 44 n o zoan of the dicadvantages. l I l i MR. SEON: Would there be not a certain chance, with 'l i 0I even the bent design valver, and actuations nyctems that come- -
'l j, thing raight go nido, and cc.ure a maall break LOCA by simply i
U' ! opening. cne of the vc.1ven when yondid not want to? i 9 ' A Precicaly, And, again e it would be a very sensitive j 4 10 g point, if I recall it at the top of the candy cane or the i l i i! ho" Icg, if I recall tuir kind of system point thermol-u lo j dynandcally a nyutem and without roccter coolant pwnps it i o I
- i .i ! uculd be iteronting to do that enalysis to see what type of j 14 pimh Lnaa thc.t you would have. Eccentially you could loose 1
l w tha heat cink. again, and I think that is what va are both
~
3} ,. concerned abett, the abilityto une the steam generaotor l 7 an6 vau r.tre back on fe0d and bloed long torn which - l.. , J t' j ,a MB. S!!ON : So, do.ncn ' t it seen the.t if this bandand - 79 , night inf act the cut in cottain circu2;r:tances? It might make j .k
;cn j troubloa ' that you had not inthuded to' have?
g A Yec, but I do feel - that you shculd be very -- it ! fj its use should be verv rerdtrictive, chey and anauming that it l i . gl q- j .is not-required to cycle open, that at least vc would have ! te !
- j. h,j intdgitY contdoif syst6m de phi 4c9. supply i$ ht ieastin6t fhil 4
I n- if-it is closo fil on opon. 'But that' defense in dcpth I as y..=-v y , , , - . ..,m,a,ev,,r.., .,%-ie,we,w-,.,w--,,y-.,ww-,v--.m,--,-.1-,-.-w. -v--- - - . - - - ., - - . . -
i ! l 1 1973 l 1 mainly becauco of the non-nitigation type thing that even j l 0 l l though vo have unticipated certain things that un~ anticipated f . I 3 low probability th!ng that could happenaand I -- utjor l l . l 4 carthquakeo r unactural phenomena or what have you that l l
\
U ; it would provide the bent depth, particularly if you t.ad i
; O
! the hydrogen problem., I do not know where you would vent i
/ the hydrogen, but certainly that was a major concarn .
a u , at W I and if wo did not learn from that, any if we decided i l i 0 not to do it and ue got ourcolvec bach on the same hard spot 10 we would not bc very ocuforting tokncv 20/20 hindsite told 1> us that once upon a tirou that that was a good ' idea. u It depende on depth that if it makeu sence. It i 1;; doec nbr apperx to be a economically prohibitive thing to %. l q hl MRS. SUON: Instly, do von have anythinj N do - l y do you have any specific denien changes that you would i ?- m recc:xamnd to reda e tacee acnsitivities that you talked
;j abcat? I ga.ther v. hat youdo, is that right?
I p3 A Tell, I certainly have one that I have nny g interest - that hac interestal ma for ccme tlwa and it. 2a l relates to at letst the ayuteu response to the acncitivity 21 and that is the PORV valvo itself and- it in. cpecifically 9, I la a concumer pouer racec=nendation and CEC 'a - maybe it
~ i
.k ' l g is not enswering your question but it is CEC's 1-12 about )
1
,)
the occurrence of trore transients bocasue of1 the inversion of .l a
. . . 1' g - the high preannro set point ' in~ the .PORVvalve. - It wtkes good
. - = - - - . - - . - - - - . - . - - - . . - . - - _ - _ _ - - - - - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
l l l i I O 1974 i ! l 1 j eens,c tote becEuGo cf the conoitivites of that valve does 1 i
^
e {i j ; play a role to take it out fo the systen and held one reacto:: 1 i 3 ( trips in the short term may reduca the likelihood of that I j f ailuren in thtt valve, but in the long term it may have d i 51 a more of an interval role to play then if yondid :.nve i y 0 { > redundancy , unfaty grade centrol type cystems. As I d 7[n underatard the PORV on the Weetinghouse plant which in ny , 0[, e.ind were put there to provide the operator with -- that j 9 ,; ha thought that he had a ctu % valve or a leaky valve he could i j t j
,r 10 )( bicek it off and he veQld ntill have one to rely upon, so he il donc not have to corryhincelf. You know, worry himself
{ I I R p; about kooping the single valve on line or using poor judgment . I 13 h, In the chart tenu, I can see ocme of the advantages perhapa 1 ! l Mlu dan ;:eturning to tha PO1W valve unnege depending on what d ! "5 - tha modificaticna would take to put a redu.ndant vslve 1* 1 in, otvotorc, et catcra, Sut, I En somewhat diecouraged l [
; r;p d and t.his U; a personni opinion that a year fran now which la i:o cro juct now starting torcally get concern that the i h tr 0h only solutions to the censitivies is to may modify thoso ,
o li . l 20 ? 4 consitivitica, clininnte those censitivition. I am
.a rO p encouragnd that 0667 now in finally cutlining and hopefully 8
3 4 j 4 nj Uhen the roccanosadations come forward now that we have l j = priority to analyze in more detail the-intergraded -- from thb i
;q intergrading the sensitivitien as well as wcys to control the i
;.j; qu sanzitivities that that would eliminato.them.
l l ; I 1975 e i 3 I i [' t MRS. 20NER9: I have just one just very general l .2 question, When un started out you gave un your new title, 4 3 it van noncthing energy chief? I i 4 A The California Energy Commission is basically i ! E. divided into 5 major devisions and I have recently been b 6 appointed if you will to be the division chief of one of L <sy: thoce major divisions for the Energy Connicsion. I 1 8 MRS. UFIERS: Well, does that mean that you will no i l ! 1 1
- 9; longer be involved with nancho Seco matters? l l 10 A Either unfortunately or fortune.tely, yes. My i i y tarstdztony has completed and the dasgn featurge have been 12 completod I will no longor be involved with the Rancho Seco 1
l
- g procec.dinga, dircebly at least present.
i l 11R3. BONERS : I am going to retire in a conple of l l 4 g yearc co I do not know whether nancho Seco will be completed i i i i l g , or not. I think it is about time for us to loose our ) p' . air conditioning. j t I , r j h., j MM. 7 W1ER: I think that we raight be very close
)
j i ," to finishino this witnena, if we could -- a .&- g 2 ! g M3S. 3 GAELS : Mr. Elli.acn? l ! t j g ; RE-DIRE 01' EXMini.iWION BV HR. ELLISON:
?
Just a fe's questionc, Mr. Webb. ! y m l Q l 7~,,y I . In response to the questica from Mr. Baxter with
- q i 1 regard to your stateaunt that you were contracted as a special l
y9 f ,,; ; consultant by the General Atomics Company, ~ vas .it your under-
,_a
1976 I standing that the General Atomics Company contracted with 2 ', commonwealth to obtain the general services of that company 3 , or was it your understanding that they contracted with i 4 Commonucalth to obtain your services */ 5 A 14 ell, I think it was the later. I guess the best way
'S to explain that in that I was' deeply involved in response, '
7 hanically, the heat sink design of the portion of the a cursory (?) core cooling water system, because of that. 9 a tre had inctituted a program to improve that design as part ofi
)
10 l the Ohio Edisen Contract. Basically, if you will', my pay i n ! chech van being by Ohio Edison Company. When that ETGR was t 92 ; f withdraunt of course, my nervices were withdrawn and tha r3 l' Gneral htcmics had a groat deal of donirability to try to i u ' j cone thic probicm in the change--chance that they may wish l 1 15h enter tha ecmcreial narhet or rejuvinate the HTGR contracts. I 16 Bacically they sent un a regnest for a proposal as -- and I
;7 believe that it wacn't the cole source, that other people
;g i had been on it but certainly the proposal responae specifically I ;
39 identified menne than the principle engineer would ha d 3I i assinged and a raatter of fact theonly pernon that uculd'be i 21 i ansicnod full tino through the total duration of the whole n 'j contract, Mr. McCarthy'n time raa something like shall we say, O 7.; . less than.5-percent of this whole time and was charged against 3 this contract. My full titre was charged against this contract
.}: .
$g 1F# 4 4 e b
L
_ =_ _ -. . . . . _ - . - - . - - 1977 1 project engineer became part of the ctate work and was part 2 of the contract that was singed between Connonwealth' and 3 General Atomics. 4 Q Mr. Webb, cloo in response to Mr. Baxter, you were i- asked whether you had done anh safety analysis of nucicar 0 power planta in the state of California. And inresponse I 7 believe you mentioned your work on the Sun Desert Nuclear 6 Project. Isn't it also true that particularly since the p Tf1I that you have done safety analysis with respect to 10 Rancho Seco, preparation for your tcs;timony? n AY Yes, that is certainly true. I have revimced a 12 substantially a cartain ame,unt of the doctu:tentation of TMI
;3 cnd kept tract ina tiucly faahion activities and reccommodn-tg .
tions of the Uncicar Reguintory Conniesion. Off and on I l
;g j continuonc'.y hept track of the statia of the Ranch: 2 Seco Plant by which California Energy Coutission is very wh' pj interestad bocasue it is one of our najor sources ef electric ja . .
power and tenan of nutking sure thatit ir, reliable in the i 39 i mt.nce that. is availabel we kept track of the ramificationa g) .f of '2MI, T}11 changes on Rancho Seco, I guess I worked
.i g ]
continuoualy in that fashion cinco THI and have reviewed a
.n l ; cubotantial omount of informction.
g i 0 You vere also caked whather on your inspection ~; I L g of the either two inspections of the Eansho Seco Facility that you were given the opportunity to inspect the Babcock 3 {
ee - - - - . -.--n-_-JJ-J- ..m- :-~4- e w 2 6--eum_ 4 --__.m m _ s- , . _ _ . _& 1978
\
I cnd Wilcox Nuclear Supply Syctem and you replied no. ilave l i 2 you eror had the opportunity to visually inspect a Babcock l 3
& Wilecx Muclear Steam supply System?
4 A Yes. It was a rather unique oppfortunity in that 1 1 5 Ohio Edison was part of the Cap-Code route which although 0 ) I amnot cure that Davis Ecsso was actually cap-code i 7 unit, it was between the Cleveland Electric and Toledo Edison 8 And, of course, bocasue of our pending a:tivition to the 9 Babcock & Wilcox plants, we were allowed accesa escotially 10 free excess to that plant. That plant was 95 percent - 11 c rglota no fuel on site and a containmant building was not
!? yet under a clean route typo ccaditicns and we were allowed 13 to thoroughly inspect, climb on top of the steam generators 14 totally craul thrcugh every knick and cranty of the contaizunettt 35 buildiniJ and with a very unique experience, and wo 16 _
i visited it that way on two tspecific occacaions to do that p,- was mycoif and the other donign engineers working on that p3 f plant. l 19 Q Mr. Daxter, also asked you to discuss the. operator 20 action an well as the understanding that operatorn need 21 { to have perfomrod those actione for a particular seenario I n involving the loca of main feedwater together with the loos t I 23 ol thcoversite power. You mentioned a number of'offsite - y operator actions that were generally involved in ' confirming 23 _the naturnl' circulation was taken place. - I would like to ask' i
1979
/
1 you uhether there are some additinal operator reactions 2 I will just list them and I will ask you if it in your 2 understanding that the operatcra would perfomr thene actions 4 prior to the actions that you were describing. 5 A Certainly my respons.2 uns more indictive to i S those required in judgment and you are correct, the proceduren 7 do require for others that -- S 0 Again, I would like to to -- list some of the actione 9 not all of then. Operators would have to confirn that the 10 turbine drive on the auxiliary foedwater pump would start, 11 confim tht porper flow from that auxiliary feedwater 72 train e une flowing frcm the etcan generator, confirm that the
;; diesels had attrted, nanually connect the electric dirve 1.3 auxiliary foedwater pump to the diesci -
i 13 HR. DAKTHR: Mrs. Bowers, I chject to this leading 33 the question en direct examination. Ithinkheshouldaskthbu
$7 witness what the oparating reactor actions are if he news.
73 tiR. ELLSION: Mrs. Bowerd, I could ask him that is
;g ' j t true that the operator has to do each one of theart things.L 20 MR. BAKTER: That still in a leading question.
21 MIt. ELLSION: Oh,-I do not think 00, Mr. Baxtar. 22 MRS. BMTSRS: Wo.11, ac you know, 1cading questions 23 'are parmitted under certain circumstances. I think.that Mr. Ellison, here la trying to save a little time, so go ' 2e4 25 ahead. a 1 u
9 1980 1 HY MR. ELLSION: 2 O I just mention that the operator would be connectinty 3 the electric drive of the auxiliary feeduator pump to the 4 diocel manually and that of course he would be confinning L that that particular pump was generating the flow and at 6 that point he would go onto the confirmation actions that 7 you mentioned. In it your understanding that those actiono 8 are also necess wy in that scenario? , 9 A You that is correct. 10 Q You were acked a ntutber of questions with respect 11 to whethe you perfomred a specific analyis of hcra long it w 12 would take, if you were operating a high pressure injection , 13 system to read subcooling margina that night violate pressure 14 temperature, technical specification. You responded 15 that you have not done the analysis to daterminc cxactly I S- how long that that would tate. Is there any doubt in g your mind that yca2 would evt utually reach the technical 18 specifications? . 19 A Ko,given the fact that the high pressure injection . 20 aystem ic injecting from 'a ics pomperature water source it 21 would continue to'censibly cool ihe reactor intiontory. :
;v 0 You were also acked wheti er Rancho seco was probably-- ;
e l- Properly cope with the sencitivity that you described and l g3lI
' 24 .you rosponded that you d id not knos . Did youmoan when you g said that'youLdid not hnow that in' ya er mind that mattor
I i . l l l 1981 LO i 1
! remaina re--unrecolved?
! 2 A
~
Yes, that is perhaps a better characterization' oE my 3 response. ; 4 Q And lastly in the cource of -- two more questions ; 5 In the cource of one of your annuara you mentioned'that the S Cryotal niver I? vent involved a stuck valve. Is it your 7 undcratandimg that there was stuck valve during the crystal i
- I B( River event?
l 9f A Yes. Well, atuck in a conse that it had failed i i 10 ! O in an open position that -- due to a power cignal
! , l 11 that had been sent to that valve and that it remained in ,
y t
- n l such a condition tmtil an opertter identified or at least i .
Is j sunpcoted that it may have opened and took acticn and close , 12, the block vlava. . 1S 0 Lactly, Mr. Webb, you vero asked a nrsber of ! 16 quentien with respect to Page 3 of your tentimony. There in i i
;f r the numbered paragraph it states thatto your knorledge j i
13 that natural circt.lation has not baan succccafully relied [
- u. ,
;3 L upen' that any 28.H facility folooring the raccurrence of any I,
20 I sevare tranaient conditions, in particular you were asked. f t nf by more than one paraon what you meant by. severe transient
! I t
2;. 2 conditions. Mould it be fair to say that you were referring f
'I 2'3 i to events which involve any possibility of voidng becasue. ,
I . 24 voiding is the principle concern uith natural cirucaltin.. 3 A. hat 13 Correct. l
. . - _ _ . . . - - - -- . . . - - - - . - . - -~. _.-.-- -.-.- - - - . - - - -
I i j l l 1962 l 9 I mrs. bowers; f Mr. Baxter7 i 4 1 I RCCROSS EXAMINATION DY MR. BAXTER: S Q In response to a question from Mr. Ellison you 4 said that you had done a safety tmalysis of Rancho Soco { I i I 5 and you proce3ded to state that you had since the TAI accidno t, I 6 revievn, atudion, monitored reporta by the NRC.and others. 4 7 Is that what you meant by having perfomrod a safety analysis? 3 0 l A Yes, l l C Q Thank you. That is all that I have. f
! i l 10 MRS. BONERS: Mr. Black? '
L l i ! I 11 Wd-CROSS SD MINATION BY MR. BLACK: d 12 Q Hr. Webb, I believe that you indicated in a renponse l I
- a to e goantion by Mr. Shon that there was really no problera 1 1 N-j with volde, once the voids vero swept into the steam generatcp
! ]i m:b turned or quenched in this matter. But Ibelieve that u
m4 the question from Mr. Shan was hav o ;rcu any evidence to I h I 17 ; indicate that v61ds vould not be swaps into the steeln { g generator? [ m' A I think that that was the bania to my. point. Thare i l 20 there is ocmo uncertainty to a reactor coolant perap being 23 casentin11y coasting down,- if you will, and as thoaa driving . I
.22 ; functions, you also have mcme.ntum taking place which I
O 23 , a l' basically'is the coact, youhave the ncuentum of flow, and l 24 the resistence to that is the resistnece in - the system is 25- fthat is : dampened out,it must the only force lef t to maintain ,
h 1983
\
_,c. 1
' ,the flow as. it comes act.in is essentially the thermal driving heada.
U And, of course, the p6 int at which thermal driving
, heads becoto important is directly afEccted by the voiding, 5
which is directly affected by the thenaal driving head's ability to sweep out the voids. 7 0 I guesa my point being is can natural circulation U tcove the voids into the steam generator? 9 A Basically, that was the testimony of the panel l 10 yesterday, that their new analysis with their analyzer... II And I assume it hasn't been, I've not secn the analysia. 12 ' quote, "eprinkled" with, you know, final, approval by the NRC.. 13 But it was prene ted to ACES, r.nd ..that analysis--as l'1 Zar na is correct--indicated that that there dould be enough IO flow to ixeep out the voids into the titeam generator.. 16 And uhen I- eay no problera, I meant no problem -in 17 i tence of ecotuaulation of voids suff&iient over a long enough - i l 18 ' time to .etop natural circulation. lD MR. BLACK: No further. 20 MRS. BOWER: The Board han nothing. Mr. Baxter... II MR; BAXTER:" Just onc closing matter. 22 Do I ttnderstand that in= doing the calculation in 23 racponse to r. Shon that it'a planned that the witness will 24 .. raturn to the stand at some appropriate junctura? - Is that I 25 i t; hat you had in raind, Mr. Shon?. ll - . - __ A
_ . _ _ _ - - _ _ . . - _ _ . _ __ .. _ _ _.__._.~___..___._ __. __._. _____. _ .. _ _ _ _ l. l i l .I904 1 i MR.-SECN: I assumed that he ve.s going to be here
+
p l next week, anyway, are you not, Mr. Nchb? i f 3 r i THE WITNESS: No, unfortunately, I have bt:sical.'.y ' 4 - j i a new job, atarting effective Monday. 1 0 i MR. SHON: I had no intention offhand of purnuing ! ) ($ j i that any further than ci:nply getting a pair of numbers, i 7 i
, nctu lly.
T 0' j-MR. HrBB: Mr. Baxter. perhaps I could euggast that, if ' i n i
. not e. : solution, a postponement of the probSem., I propose 10 that Mr. Uebb would do the calculation, that we would submit l 1I l dt and have it markc5t'for identification and provided to all E
the uarties, end not move it into evidence. ! I3 ' [f at that tinue acmebody wants Mr. Febb to return l i for crose -enatination on that, we can discuss it further. , \ 15 f ] NR. NI'ER : All right. I i M' MR. SEOM: It certainly suits me; that's fine. 17 MRS j BOKEPS: May thic witness be excused? Is ! 18 there any objection? t I 10 t MR. ' BA%773: No. 20 gn, LyyIs: 4 No.
?'
i o MRS. B0t'ERS : You are excused, and good -luc' k on 1 4 22 your now jcb. Z3 Is t.here-Emy other matter before we conclude tonight?
?A Who do we' start with on Monday 25 blu - BIJCL Kr. Dietrich.
Dihorcupon, at 5 :29 p.m._ , the hearing was adiourned) . _
-}}