ML20058D648
| ML20058D648 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1993 |
| From: | Grimes B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058D632 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9312030247 | |
| Download: ML20058D648 (11) | |
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i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
In the Matter of
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l SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT )
Docket No. 50-312 i
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(Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating
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EXEMPTION I.
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The Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD or the licensee) is the i
holder of Facility Operating License N>. DPR-54. The license provides, among other things, that it is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Comreission or NRC) now or hereafter in effect. The facility consists cf a pressurized water reactor located at the l
licensee site in Sacramento County, California, and is currently defueled with fuel stored in the spent fuel pool. Additionally, a confirmatory order prevents the movement of the fuel into the reactor building without NRC approval.
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The Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station (Rancho Seco) was permanently shut down on June 7, 1989, and completely defueled on December 8, 1989. The NRC in Amendment No. 117, dated March 17, 1992, modified Facility Operating l
License No. DPR-54 to a Possession Only License (POL). The license is conditioned so that SMUD is not authorized to operate or place fuel in the reactor vessel, thus formalizing the licensee commitment to permanently cease power operations.
9312030247 931119 PDR-ADOCK 05000312 P
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' By letter dated November 14, 1990, and supplemented by letter dated l
October 15, 1992, the licensee requested a reduction in primary financial i
coverage and an exemption from participhion in the industry retrospective rating plan requiring secondary level coverage requirements in 10 CFR i
140.11(a)(4), 10 CFR 140.21, 10 CFR 140.92 Appendix B, 10 CFR 140.109 Appendix 1, and an application pursuant to 10 CFR 140.92, Article II, l
i Section 7.
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The justification oresented by che licensee for the exemption request is j
that because of the defueled condition of the reactor, there are no longer any credible design basis accidents except the loss of offsite power and a fuel handling accident.
The licensee contends that, with the reactor in its permanently defueled condition combined with administrative controls which l
minimize fuel movement, the possibility of ar accident, an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, or a nuclear accident is further reduced. The licensee also noted that a confirmatory order was issued on May 2, 1990, which prohibited movement of fuel from the spent fuel pool into the reactor building without prior Commission approval, t
Because this confirmatory order prohibits the SMUD from resuming power operation without explicit approval by the NRC,.the licensee contended that Rancho Seco fell outside the ambit of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4). Other factors j
supporting the non-operating status of Rancho Seco included: Cessation of operation of Rancho Seco, the NRC approval of the Possession Only License, and l
the licensee analysis that the consequences of any postulated accident cannot 1
exceed the primary financial protection requirements in the current defueled condition.
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I In its request, the licensee indicated that it believed that reduced
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financial protection was warranted. The licensee analysis indicated that coverage of 550 million provides adequate coverage for liability stemming from i
L any alleged radiation exposure. SMUD also cited a previous NRC exemption which concluded that there were no credible design basis accidents associated with Rancho Seco that are comparable, in consequence or severity, to the j
design basis accidents of an operating facility.
SMUD further concluded that j
i there were no postulated accidents that could result in an extraordinary l
nuclear occurrence or a nuclear incident that could exceed the requested i
1 550 million primary financial protection insurance coverage.
j SMUD also indicated that since power operations had permanently ceased and revenues were no longer received from operations, literal compliance with I
the regulatory requirements for full financial coverage and mandatory participation in the industry retrospective rating plan would result in undue financial hardship to the licensee and its ratepayers.
SMUD indicated that the following conditions constituted " extreme and undue financial hardship:"
Payment of the retrospective assessments under the secondary plan, and Payment of insurance premiums under the primary plan.
On October 15, 1992, the licensee reiterated its request for relief and l
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exemption under 10 CFR 140.8 and provided a legal opinion from retained counsel. This additional information focused on legal interpretations of the 1
l Price-Anderson Act, statements of consideration, comments made by members of l
Congress during consideration of the 1988 Amendments to the Price-Anderson l
L Act, and past NRC actions with respect to the relief granted to the Consolidated Edison facility, Indian Point 1.
The licensee concluded that the
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NRC has the requisite authority to grant the requested relief on the grounds i
that removal of the operating authority, that is, granting of a " Possession Only License," was tantamount to termination of the " operating license." The licensee asks the HRC to exercise that authority by reducing the financial protection requirements in accordance with the reduction in risk posed by the Rancho Seco facility as recognized by American Nuclear Insurers. The licensee concludes that because Rancho Seco is no longer authorized to operate, the potential for hazards for which Price-Anderson coverage is to provide financial protection are greatly reduced, and SMUD is entitled to a corresponding reduction in the financial protection requirements for the l
pl ant.
The licensee determined that the requiren,ent to maintain primary
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financial coverage of $200,000,000 is excessive, and requested a reduction j
from the full amount of $200,000,000 to an amount of $50,000,000.
SMUD I
I requested a total exemption from the requirement for secondary liability i
coverage as required by the industry retrospective rating plan, exemption from the 10 CFR 140.21 requirements to provide an annual certified financial j
statement, and made application pursuant to 10 CFR 140.92, Article II, Section 7, to enter into an agreement with the Commission to maintain an equitable amount of financial protection commensurate with the current plant condition.
The NRC staff independently evaluated the legal and technical issues associated with the application of the Price-Anderson Act to permanently shut I
down reactors in SECY-93-127, " Financial Protection Required of Licensees of f
.j large Nuclear Power Plants During Decommissioning," May 10, 1993.
In this l
evaluation, the staff concluded that the Commission has discretionary i
authority to respond to licensee requests for reduction in the level of primary financial protection and withdrawal from participation in the industry retrospective rating plan. Depending on the plant-specific configuration and the time since permanent shutdown, the staff also concluded that potential i
hazards may exist at permanently shut down reactors for which financial
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protection is warranted.
Lastly, the staff concluded that accidents and hazards insured against under Price-Anderson go beyond design basis accidents and beyond those considered " credible" as that term is used in 10 CFR 100 and cases interpreting the application of that regulation. The Commission issued a Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) on SECY-93-127 on July 13, 1993.
In the SRM, the Commission approved the staff recommendation to permit reduction of primary level coverage to $100 million through the exemption process after the t
appropriate spent fuel cooling period and after allowing withdrawal from i
participation in the secondary financial protection layer.
l In the exercise of its discretionary authority, the Commission may, so j
long as a potential hazard existed at a permanently shutdown reactor, require the full amount of primary financial protection and full participation in the l
industry retrospective rating plan. At such time that the hazard was l
determined to no longer exist, the Commission may reduce the amount of primary l
financial protection and permit the licensee to withdraw from participation in the industry retrospective rating plan.
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Since the legislative history does not explicitly consider the potential i
hazards that might exist after termination of operation, the staff generically i
evaluated the offsite consequences associated with normal and abnormal operations, design basis accidents, and beyond design basis accidents for reactors that have been permanently defueled and shut down. The staff concluded that in view of the time that has elapsed since plant shutdown, aside from the handling, storage, and transportation of spent fuel and radioactive materials, no reasonably conceivable potential accident exists 1
that could cause significant offsite damage.
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A severe transportation accident could potentially result in local contamination requiring cleanup and offsite liabilities resulting from traffic disruption and loss of use. This type of accident would warrant maintaining some level of liability insurance.
The liabilities and indemnification requirements associated with the transfer of spent fuel from the licensee to the Department of Energy will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis at a future time when spent fuel is shipped to a repository.
The most significant accident sequence for a permanently defueled and l
shutdown reactor involves the complete loss of water from a light water reactor spent fuel pool. This beyond-design-basis accident sequence could result in a zirconium fuel cladding fire that could propagate through the spent fuel storage pool and result in significant offsite consequences.
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potential consequences of such an accident could range up to several billion i
l doll ars. Although such an accident is beyond the design bases, it may be 1
considered " reasonably conceivable' and could warrant requiring substantial l
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financial protection.
Such an accident is possible during the first year after reactor shutdown for a low density spent fuel storage configuration and during the first two years after shutdown for spent fuel stored in certain high density configurations.
Concerns for adequacy of heat removal mechanisms as well as uncertainties in the spent fuel storage studies indicate a need for an additional year of cooling for the high density storage configurations. Accident scenarios involving blockage of coolant channels in conjunction with loss of spent fuel pool water could hypothetically extend further the time within which a zirconium fuel cladding fire could occur. However, in addition to being less likely than loss of water, air flow to react with the zirconium and to disperse fission products would likely be inhibited by such blockage. The l
staff believes that this sequence approaches the strictly hypothetical.
l Once the requisite cooling period after reactor shutdown has elapsed, the zirconium fuel cladding fire sequence after a postulated loss of water is no longer a concern since the fuel would air cool sufficiently to avoid zirconium fuel cladding combustion.
Possible accident scenarios, after these cooling periods have elapsed, have greatly reduced consequences, but could result in 3
small releases or precautionary evacuations which could result in offsite 1
liability.
With respect to the Rancho Seco plant-specific evaluation, the NRC staff independently evaluated the legal and technical justifications for the i
exemption presented by the licensee. The NRC recognizes the current Rancho Seco condition, that is, permanently shut down and defueled, licensed Y
4 to authorize " possession only," and under a confirmatory order that prohibits fuel movement from the spent fuel pool into the reactor building without Commission approval. The staff concurred with the licensee evaluation of credible design basis accidents, loss of offsite power and fuel handling accidents, and their minimal associated offsite consequences. Although the z
licensee presented substantive legal views and opinions regarding the application of the Price-Anderson Act and 10 CFR 140 to permanently shut down reactcrs, the staff did not concur with these licensee views and opinions.
The licensee evaluation of potential hazards and liability coverage needs was less than comprehensive. The licensee-identified need for continuing liability coverage, 550,000,000, was limited to liability stemming from any alleged radiation exposure.
Coverage needs associated with decommissioning l
activities and transportation of radioactive materials or precautionary evacuations were not identified.
Beyond design basis accidents, such as the i
zircalloy spent fuel pool fire sequence, that could be applicable to the currently defueled and permanently shutdown condition of Rancho Seco were I
likewise not considered.
The licensee also contended that compliance with existing regulations would result in potential payment of retrospective assessments under the secondary indemnity plan and payments of insurance premiums under the primary financial protection plan. These payments would allegedly constitute an
" extreme and undue financial hardship" to the licensee and its ratepayers.
1 Although the staff recognizes that the potential hazards and consequences assuciated with a permanently shutdown reactor are greatly reduced, the state
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of greatly reduced risk does not exist until a minimum cooling period for the spent fuel has elapsed. Thereafter, the permanently shutdown reactor does not contribute a level of risk to the participants in the secondary pool proportionate to that of an operating reactor and relief from financial i
protection requirements would then be warranted.
Although the licensee justification for this exemption was not conclusive, the staff, on its own initiative, did consider liability coverage needs associated with decommissioning activities, transportation of T
radioactive materials, design basis accidents, and the beyond-design-basis i
accidents noted above. The results of our evaluation, as embodied in the July 13, 1993 SRM on SECY-93-127 and in SECY-93-127, allow, after the requisite minimum spent fuel cooling period has elapsed, a reduction in the amount of financial protection required of licensees of large nuclear plants that have been prematurely shutdown. Unless the licensee provides an analysis to determine the appropriate cooling period for a site-specific spent fuel configuration, for a pressurized water reactor, such as Rancho Seco, with a high density spent fuel pool storage configuration, a generic minimum cooling period of three years after permanent reactor shutdown is required before a i
reduction in financial protection requirements would be permitted. The Rancho i
Seco Nuclear Generating Station was permanently shut down on June 7,1989, and i
l' completely defueled on December 8,1989. Approximately four years and three mo. abs have elapsed since the permanent shutdown of Rancho Seco. This meets the criterion established in SECY-93-127 for relief from financial protection requirements.
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. Although the licensee requested a new primary financial protection coverage level of $50,000,000, the staff has also concluded that the Three l
Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) claims settlement experience (an accident which did not result in a significant release of radioactivity) provides a reasonable basis for establishing the appropriate level of primary insurance coverage.
Because THI-2 claims have reached $60,000,000 and a large number of THI-2 claims are stii n unsettled, the staff concluded that a level of $100,000,000 for primary financial protection coverage is warranted.
This level of primary
,i insurance coverage is consistent with the Staff Requirements Memorandum dated July 13, 1993 on SECY-93-127 for relief from financial protection requirements.
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The staff, based on its independent evaluation as embodied in the 4
July 13, 1993 Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-93-127 and in SECY-93-127, 1
" Financial Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During Decommissioning," has concluded that sufficient bases exist for our approval of relief from the financial protection requirements for the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station. The staff has also concluded that granting the proposed exemption does not increase the probability or consequences of any accidents or reduce the margin of safety at this facility.
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Based on Sections III and IV above, the Commission has determined, that pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, that this exemption is authorized by law and is otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, the Commission grants an 4
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exemption from the requirements from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) to the extent that i
primary financial protection in the amount of $100,000,000 shall be maintained and exemption from participation in the industry retrospective rating plan (secondary level financial protection) is granted for the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the granting ~
j of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment (58 FR 60883, dated November 18, 1993).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 19th day of November 1993 l
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