ML20247F262
| ML20247F262 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 01/15/1987 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247F042 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-89-2, FOIA-89-A-7 NUDOCS 8905300036 | |
| Download: ML20247F262 (70) | |
Text
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?
1 UNITED STATES 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
'4 In the Matter of:
5 INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW 6
(CLOSED MEETING)
(VOLUME I) 7 Region 5 1440 Maria Lane 8
Walnut Creek, California 9
Thursday, January 15, 1987 10 11 An investigative interview was conducted with 12 Gregory P. Yuhes at 1:00 p.m.
13 14 Present:
15 RONALD A. MEEKS 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1
\\
8905300036 090516 PDR FOIA FRIEDMA89-A-7 PDR s-u-oio EXHIBIT
' 11 A
x1mv
2 1
1:14 p.m.
2 RONALD A. MEEKS:
This is an interview of Greg 3
Yuhas who is the NRC Region 5
Section Chief of-the 4
Facilities Radiological Protection Section.
As, agreed, this i
5 interview is being recorded by a court reporter, Margaret
'f 6
Devers.
7 Present at this interview are myself, Ronald 8
A.
- Meeks, Investigator with the Region 5 Field Office of-9 Investigations and Greg yuhas and the court reporter.
10 Greg, If you will stand and raise your right 11 hand, I will swear you in.
12 Whereupon, 13 GREGORY P. YUHAS 14 after having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as 15 fo11ows:
16 MR. YUHAS:
-- even if it is hard to raise my 17 right hand'due to bursitis.
18 MR.
MEEKS:
The subject-matter of this 19 interview concerns the liquid effluent releases at the 20 Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station.
We will just 21 commonly refer the Generating Station as Rancho Seco.
22 Ranch Seco is a a nuclear station under the 23 direction of the licensee, the Sacramento Municipal Utility-24 Districts and we will refer to the Utility District as.SMUD, i
25 S-M-U-D, during the interview.
i
- b 3
1 Basically, the questions will be concerned 2-with information reported in Greg Yuhas' Inspection Report 3
No. 50-312/86-15, which is dated June 6th, 1986.
And'that Repcrt concerns the management of, and admini,stration and 4
5 operations of, liquid effluents at Rancho Seco.
6 EXAMINATION I
7 BY MR. MEEKS:
l 8
Q
- Greg, on pages 5 and 6 of your Inspection-9 Report, you discussed the basis of Rancho Seco's-technical 10 specification 4.21.1, Liquid Effluents.
11 With respect to the word "not" in the second 12 sentence of the
- bases, who were the members of the 13 licensee's organization responsible for inserting the word 14 "not"7 15 A
Before I answer that question, I want to nake 16 it clear that there are two errata to this Inspection 17 Report.
18 The Report originally was issued on June 6th, 19 1986.
When it was issued, page 27, apparently, was not 20 collated with the Report and was transmitted to the 21 distribution list on July 12th, 1986.
22 In addition, during the enforcement conference 23 held with the Utility District on June 20th, 1986, several 24 typographical
- errors, or errors of transcription, were pointed out by the' licensee when they were asked to identify 25 I
_----ww-_---_
4 l
any discrepancies they had found in the course of review of 1
2 the Report.
3 Those positions and typographical errors were 4
transmitted to the distribution, including the' licensee, by 5
a letter dated July 18th, 1986.
6 In addition to those, be aware that, in the 7
course of subsequent review, another type of typographical 8
error was identified on page 23, last paragraph, within the l
9 quotation.
The phrase says,
...were made in the period of 10 July through June, 1985...";
the correction should read,
...were made in the period of January through
- June, 11 12 1985...".
13 So, prior.to answering your questions, I want 14 to make sure the record understands that there were 15 subsequent corrections to the Report which need to be 16 considered.
17 Q
Okay; thank you.
18 A
Now, with respect to the first question:
Who 19 knew that the word "not" in the second sentence of the basis 20 had been put in place?
21 I don'.t know, specifically.
Mr. Ron Colombo, 22 who is the compliance Supervisor with the Utility District, 23 told me that the word "not" had been inserted deliberately 24 about 1978 and that check sheets were used to verify that it 25 remained through the protracted review process to implement a
w_____
'4 1
the Appendix I Technical Specifications.
2 Q
Okay. -
Do you know who in the licensee's 3
organization was' responsible for that publication of the 4
basis itself?
r 5
A No, I don't.
They -- this'was done between 6
1976 and 1978; and then there were a
whole cast of 7
characters involved over those years from 1978 until 8
implementation-in 1984.
9 The point.is that someone within the utility.
10 organization recognized early in that their site ' was not 11 designed to meet the Appendix I dose objectives.
And they, apparently, as a result of that recognition, placed the word 12 13 "not" into the bases, which is a direct contradiction from 14 the standard technical specifications and were aware the 15 "not" was in there, in fact, used check sheets to assure, 16 over those many years, periods of time, that the word "not" 17 stayed in place.
18 Q
Okay.
Did you yourself ' review those check 18 sheets?
20 A
, No.
That's just word of mouth from Colombo.
21 Q
Do you know if, in fact, those check sheets 22 and all the internal documentation on the bases, if it.still 23 exists at Rancho Seco?
24 A
I don't know for sure.
I think that would 25 have to be the subject of additional questions of Mr.
-m_--___--__m__-_m_.-m_m.._m-._____ - _ _ _ _
./1
6 I
1 Colombo and other individuals who had continuity through the 2
years on the Appendix I project.
3 Q
Is there any one supervisor in the licensee's
?
organization, that you can
- identify, who,had overall 4
5 responsibility, operational responsibility, for issuance of l
6 the
- TECSPEC, which would include the bases of TECSPEC 7
4.21.17 8
In other words, in the chain of command, does 9
it reach a point where the pyramid stops and then it's just a direct line of authority?
It would be the top of that 10 11 pyramid I am interested in.
12 A
There is a whole cast of players involved in a 13 Technical Specification change; and that case variegl with i
14 time.
The key players in that would have been Mr. Colombo 4
15 and Mr. Robert Dietrich (phonetic) who, during that period l
)
16 of time, was the Manager of Licensing.
{
i 17 Other key individuals involved in the
)
18 implementation of Appendix I were people like Lee Kielman, j
J 19 Roger Powers, and Ed Bradley.
In addition, site-specific
)
20 people like Roger Miller, who was then the Manager of 21 Chemistry and HP -- or Superintendent of Chemistry and HP, 22 should have had a working awareness.
That doesn't include 23 contractors who might have also been involved in the j
i 24 process.
25 I don't have personal knowledge as to who was
__-_-__m-
l 1
doing what.to whom in 1976-78 period of time.
2 Q
When did Appendix I when was Appendix I 1
3 first implemented at Rancho
- seco, the provisions of 4
5 A
It became effective, I believe it was July of 6
1984.
I think the date is July 21st;.but that's based on 7
recall.
8 Q
Okay.
9 A
-- look it up.
10 Q
Then what requirements did Appendix I have on 11 the Rancho TECSPECS before July of 19847 I am trying to get here they are back working with their 12 a
feel for 13 TECSPECS, in '76 to
'78, when, in fact, the TECSPECS that 14 relate to Appendix I were not implemented until July of
'84.
15 A
Prior to implementation of the Appendix I
16 TECSPECS, the Utility had what was called the Appendix B 17 Technical Specifications which addressed radioactive 18 discharges.
The key element, in terms of Appendix I and the 19 design objectives, did not differ substantially.
For 20 example, Section 2.6, Radioactive Discharges, objective, and 21 I quote,
...to assure that the releases of radioactive 22 23 material above background to unrestricted areas 24 will be as low as practical, as defined in 25 Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50, for the following
___m__.m
8 l
1 des'ign objectives apply for liquid releases (a) 2 the annual dose above background to the total body l
3 or any organ of an individual from all reactors at 4
a site should not exceed 5
millirem.in an 5
unrestricted area."
l-6 This is.not substantially different than the 7
technical specifications which were implemented in July of 8
1984.
So, prior to Appendix I,
the Appendix B TECSPECS 9
applied'and they had~similar language.
10 Q
Than what was eventually contained in the 11 TECSPECS which related to Appendix I7 12 A
Right; that's correct.
13 Q
okay.
Greg, do you recall -- or do yo,u know 14 who are the members of the' licensee's organization?
15 Let me rephrase that question.
16 According to your knowledge, who are the 17 members of the licensee's organization who recognize that 18 the LLD values for their site might not be adequate to 19 demonstrate compliance with the design objective of Appendix 20 I Section 2(a)?
21 A
There is a short-term answer and an long-tern 22 answer.
It would appear that whoever inserted the word i
23 "not" into the original Technical Specification Amendment l
24
- Request, back in 1978, had an understanding that merely 25 achieving the concentration LLD values presented in that
=
___--____________.__.__.__.-_m_____-___.____m_
9 1
application were not adequate to meet Appendix I
by 2
inserting the word "not".
But I can't tell you'who those 3
were.
4 Now, in recent history, Ed Bradley, based on 5
his discussions with me and his memoranda within his own 6
organization, indicated that, in early 1985, he questioned f
7 whether or not compliance with the numerical values 8
presented in the LLD TECSPEC would, in fact, guarantee 9
assurance with Appendix I; okay?
10 There is individuals within the organization, 11 such as Fred Kellie, Bill Wilson, and others who say that
'12 they did not make a connection with the Appendix I numbers 13 and the dose objectives of 3.17.2.
In other ' words, Mr.
1 14 Kellie --
1 15 g
You are referring to, when you say 3.17.2, 16 TECSPEC 3.17.27 17 A
That's right.
In other words, Mr. Kellie's l
l 18 position was, he thought
- that, as long as he met the 19 performance criteria of the LLD specifications, that is j
That's 20 SE-7th, that,he would not have a problem with dose.
21 what he told me.
22 In fact, when I asked him if he knew the word 23 "not" was in the Technical Specification, via a telephone 24 conversation, he said, "No, I don't believe that."
I asked 25 him to read the Specification; he read it twice.
I had him 1
l l
-9 10 1
go back and read it again before he finally accepted the 2
fact that he was reading the word "not".
3 So Kellie presented a convincing argument that 4
he was not aware that the word "not" was in the Technical 5
Specification and that he earnestly believed that compliance 6
with the LLD would achieve the two factors which are stated 7
in the standard language, that is, the concentration limits 8
of 10 CFR Part 20 and an additional assurance that, if you 9
met those values, you would also comply with the dose 10 objectives of Appendix I.
11 MR. MEEKS:
Okay.
I am going to just go off 12 the record, here, to take care of some administrative stuff 13 as far as the functioning of the equipment and the 14 recording.
I want to make sure everything is okay.
15 (Off the record.)
j 16 MR. MEEKS:
On the record.
17 MR. YUHAS:
I would have to add that, based on 18 Bradley's statements and his memoranda, it would appear that 19 he brought his supervisor his impressions that there was a 20 problem with the lower limit of detection in terms of 21 meeting compliance of dose objectives in early 1985.
l l
22 Additionally, by October of 1985, Bradley had 23 published an LLD study which clearly indicated that there 24 was some problem with the LLD numbers in the Technical 25 Specifications in terms of the dose objectives.
en
___.__._______m_
l L
4 il 1.
1 In addition, Bradley stated that he had made 2
other members of management aware of his perceptions with 3
respect to the adequacy of the LLD value presented in the 4
Technical specifications to meet the dose objective i
5 requirements.
)
i 6
BY MR. MEEKS:
/
7 g
.Okay.
When you refer to an individual or his 8
title, if you know it, why don't you just identify him by name.
And Mr. Bradley's supervisor, who would that be7 9
10 A
It was Roger Powers.
Roger Powers, I'believe, 11 is presently Manager of Nuclear Engineering.
12 Q
Okay.
In your Inspection Report, you stated 13 that there were several individuals within the licensee's 14 organization who were not aware that the LLD values 15 presented in Table 4.21-1 of TECSPEC 4.21.1 were not
)
i 16 intended to assure that Technical Specification 3.17.2 dose 17 limits would be met.
18 You have already mentioned one, that being 19 Pred Kellie.
Who were the other individuals you were 20 referring to?
21 A
Roger Miller, who was the Superintendent of 22 Chemistry and Health Physics during the time at which the 23 Appendix I negotiations took place.
Mr. Miller had been 24 that position since licensing of the plant up until about a 25 year ago.
p L
i 12 1
1 Q
Now, what time period, again, are you talking j
L l
2 about?
i I
3 A
From the beginning of the licensing of the 4
plant, he was the original Superintendent of Chemistry and j
5 Health Physics.
j
~
6 Q
Up until 19847 j
7 A
Up until, I believe it was 1985, mid 1985, a 8
year ago.
9 Q
Okay.
10 A
When asked about the word "not",
his response 11 was he could not recall.
Mr. Colombo stated that he was 12 aware that the word "not" was in there and that it was in 13 there to indicate that the site wasn't designed to meet
(
14 Appendix I.
15 However, in the enforcement conference held on 16 June 6th -- or June 20th, 1986, he stated that he did not l
17 aake a
connection between the values and the dose 18 objectives.
19 In other words, he felt the Report gave him 20 credit for having more knowledge than he felt he had.
21 Q
Okay.
With respect to 10 CFR Appendix I,
22 Section 4(a), paragraphs (a) and (b), which you referenced 23 in your Inspection
- Report, what organization or 24 organizations, within Rancho Seco, had the responsibility to 25 establish surveillance and monitoring programs to assure 1
i 1
1 i
M@
13 1
thtt Technical Specification 3.17.2 and Appendix I design 2
objectives were in conformance and are in conformance.today 3
with effluent releases?
4 A
The primary cast of characters involved is the 5
Chemistry and Radiation Protection group; they are the folks 6
that take the samples, analyze the activity, and project the 7
consequences of its release on the environment in 8
cooperation with the Nuclear Engineering Department, which 9 used to do the dose calculations based on the analytical 10 data provided by the chemistry -folks; and the Plant 11 operations group, which makes the final decision as to 12 whether or not a
certain amount of liquid should be 13 released.
So, there is no one single group that has, total responsibility; there are several groups involved.
14 15 The Plant Superintendent, the Plant Manager, 16 is ultimately the responsible person.
He controls what goes 17 out.
18 Q
Okay.
Who was the supervisor of the -- what 18 did you say, the Radiation Protection group?
20 A
chemistry and Health Physics, for the first 21 several years, most of Rancho's history, was Roger Miller.
22 And Roger Miller was replaced by Mr. Fred Kellie.
23 Fred Kellie and Roger Miller shared the 24 responsibility during 1985, 25 Q
And who was the head of the Nuclear
14 l
)
1 Engineering group?
2 A
The person within the Nuclear Engineering 3
group who was responsible was, originally, Roger Powers and, 1
)
4 during 1985, Ed Bradley.
i 5
Q Okay.
Did Ed Bradley, in
- 1985, work for 6
Miller or for Powers?
7 A
Worked for Powers.
8 Q
Okay.
And you say the Plant Operations group?
I 9
A Right.
10 Q
That's a
separate identity from Nuclear 11 Engineering?
In other words, they are the ones that run the 12 plant?
13 A
Right; that's the organization which was 14 headed by Pierre Oubre and George' Coward.
15 Q
When did George Coward take over for Oubre, 16 approximately?
17 A
I believe it was sometime during '75.
18 Q
Seventy --
19 A
Excuse me; sometime during 1985.
l 20 Q
Eighty-five.
In your Inspection Report, did 21 you interface with anybody in the Plant Operations group 22 that had responsibility for approving releases in 1984 and 23
'857 well, some of the j
24 A
Yeah.
People involved 1
Operations staff and -- exit interview held on April 2nd and j
25
(
(
4
\\
b
i 15 1
subsequent interviews included people like John McColligan, 2
who was the Nuclear Plant Manager Acting; Mr. Schweiger, 3
Manager of Quality Assurance; the Assistant Plant Manager, f
4 Mr. Lawrence; and --
5 Q
Is that Ron Lawrence?
6 A
Right.
The Technical Manager, Mr. Croley.
So 7
there was a
significant number of licensee management 8
representatives, including Mr. Redeker, S.
J.
Redeker, who 9
was the Manager of Operations at the April
- 2nd, 1986 10 meeting.
11 Q
And they are all from Plant Operations?
12 A
No; they are all at the site.
Mr. Redeker is 13 the Manager of Operations; okay7 14 Q
But all those individuals are under his 15 supervision?
16 A
No; there are different groups of people.
17 They are involved in Plant Operations; okay?
18 Q
Okay.
19 A
But the actual titled Manager of Plant 20 Operations, on April 2nd, was Mr. Redeker.
21 Q
What I am trying to get at, were there any of 22 these individuals involved in the actual day-to-day -- or 23 some of the day-to-day matters of the inspection or were 24 they just involved in the exit interviews?
I most of them were 25 A
Well, some of them f
16 1
involved in the actual inspection process.
The key person 2
who was not there during the course of the inspection was 3
Mr. George Coward.
He was on vacation during this period of 4
time.
5 And, of course, he plays the part, since he is 6
the individual that Pred Kellie reports to and, apparently, 7
discussed some of the key technical issues early in, during 8
1985, which is the basis of some non-compliance findings in 9
the Report.
He wasn't there during the inspection.
10 Q
Okay.
I imagine, through the course of the 11 interview today, we will identify the individuals that you 12 interfaced with that had a bearing on what we are looking at 13 here.
14 What manager in the licensee's organization 15 had first-line supervisory responsibility to coordinate the 16 contrasting points of view of the supervising Health LLD values 17 Physicist in his cencerns that the LLD site 18 were not adequate to assure compliance with Appendix I and 19 the Radiation Protection Superintendent's knowledge that on-20 site LLD values presented in TECSPEC Table 4.21-1, as long 21 as detected, were sufficient to meet Appendix I criteria?
l 22 A
With respect to your first question, Mr. Roger i
23 Powers, who was the Nuclear Engineering Manager, was the 24 individual that Mr.
Bradley approached and expressed his I
25 concern to regarding the LLD issue, initially, the corporate l
i i
i l
)
I I
17 1
office side; and Mr. Powers reports to Mr. Kielman.
2 At that time, later, Mr. Powers reportedly --
3 reports directly to Mr. Rodriguez, who was then the Acting 4
General Manager, Nuclear.
5 On the plant side, Mr. Kellie, who should have 6
understood the dose implications of releasing contaminated 7
water, is s id to have discus, sed the matter with Mr. Coward, 8
who, was Manager of Operations at the time.
9 So the two key people would have been Roger 10 Powers at the corporate office and George Coward at the 11 site.
12 Q
And they both report to Rodriguez -- or --
13 A
They did report to Rodriguez at the time,.
14 Q
When he was on the -- the Manager of Nuclear 15 Engineering?
16 A
That's right.
17 Q
So the one individual who had responsibility 18 over both those organizations was Ron Rodriguez?
19 A
That's correct: Mr. Rodriguez was the holder 20 of the dollar bill.
21 Q
On page 7,
paragraph 4,
of your Inspection 22 Report, would you identify the licensee representative who 23 stated that the LLDs presented in Table 2-C of the 24 licensee's Semi-annual Effluents Release Reports of 25 September 26, 1985 and March 3rd, 1986, were based on a m
18 1
normal three-liter liquid effluent sample counted for 2,000 2
seconds, using the average background counting rate on the 3
gamma counting system?
l 4
A The question was asked of Mr., Ed Bradley.
l 5
Prior to responding, Mr. Bradley called the Rancho Seco site 6
from his corporate office and discussed the tan cer with the 7
people at the site.
I believe the individual he discussed 8
it with was Mr. Steve Manofsky -- that's M-a-n-o-f-s-k-y --
9 who is the Senior Rad Chem Assistant responsible in the area 10 of measurements for this effluent issues.
~
11 Q
You say the Senior Rad Chemist?
12 A
SCRA, Senior Chem Rad Assistant.
13 Q
So it would have been Ed Bradley?
14 A
That's right; Ed Bradley is the one who made 15 the response that's described in the Report.
16 Q
With reyuct to page 8
of the Inspection 17 Report, the second full paragraph on that page, would you 18 identify the individuals who concurred that a recount at 19 1500 seconds should be made to preclude obtaining a cesium 20- peak which could prevent the REUTs released to the basin?
21 And maybe I <hould state what I am referring 22 to, RHUTs; that's the acronym &P U-T, which stands for --
23 correct me if I am wrong, Greg -- the Regenerate Hold Up 24 Tank.
25 A
That's correct.
t
~
19 1
Q Okay.
Fred 2
A
- Okay, to answer your question, the 3
Kellie and Steve Manofsky are the two people referred to in 4
the 17, 30th, March 20th, 1985, log entry.
5 Q
Okay.
And whose log entry was that?
6 A
It's unsigned.
7 Q
Do you know who the individual was that made 8
that entry?
8 A
No, I am net sure who it was.
It could have 10 been any one of several people.
I provide you a copy of it.
11 (Document proffered.)
12 The course of the inspection did not afford me 13 the opportunity to determine exactly who made that log 14 entry.
15 Q
Okay.
Greg, what is the significance of the 16 LLDs 'of cesium 134 and cesium 137 of Release Permit 17 No.85-767 18 A
The significance is that it shows that, by 19 counting it for 2500 seconds, they could still achieve a 20 technical specification LLD of better than the minimally-required SE-7th, but not as good as the sensitivity reported 21 22 in their Semi-annual Effluents Release Report.
23 Specifically, the LLD printout for the 1500-24 second count shows the cesium 134 TLD at less than 8.23E-8, 25 and cesium 137 at less than 1.17E-7 microcuries/ml.
This is
20 1
less than the TECSPEC value of SE-7 microcuries/al.
2
- However, it is greater than the cesium 134 3
value of less than 4.82E-8 and cesium 137 value of 5.92E-8 4
reported in the licensee's Semi-annual Effl,uent Release 5
Report for the nominal 2,000-second count.
6 MR. MEEKS:
Okay.
Why don't we just go off 7
the record here and talk to the reporter about how these 8
values are written so that she can conceptualize that.
9 (Off the record.)
10 BY MR. MEEKS:
11 Q
Regarding the information on page 9 of the 12 Inspection Report concerning the June 4th, 1985 chemical 13 radiation log entry, identify the chemistry and radiation I
once again, that's 14 technicians referred to, the SCRA 15 Senior Chemist Rad Assistant -- Radiation Assistant?
16 A
That's defined in the -- the term they used to 17 discuss their first-level foreman; and they are called 18 Senior Chemistry and Radiation Assistants.
19 Q
Okay.
20 A
,SCRA; okay?
21 Q
Okay.
22 A
And their Chem Techs that actua11y do the 23 analysis are called
- CRPTs, Chemistry and Radiation 24 Protection Technicians.
25 Q
Okay.
And identify those SCRAs or the SCRA, j
i
l --
D
4 21 l
1 as well as those individuals who believe the motivation for 2
the change in counting time stem from the excessive 3
inventory of plant water in the licensee's public statement 4
that they would not release any additional liquid 5
radioactive affluents.
6 A
Okay.
The technicians that were interviewed, 7
they gave me the indication or inferred that other people to release 8
understood that the motivation might to be 8
water were Dave Mixa, Dean Kearl, K-e-a-r-1, and Mark 10 Leiwander, L-e-i-w-a-n-d-e-r.
11 In
- addition, they pointed out another 12 Technician, by the name of Rob Williams, took issue with the 13 practice.
The Senior Chen Rad Assistant responsible for 14 water inventory control was a fellow by the name of Bill 15 Wilson.
16 Now, Wilson's position was that, as long as 17 they met the the numerical value, 5E-7 value in the TECSPEC, 18 as far as he was concerned, they could release that water, as long as they showed no activity above that value, they 18 20 were okay.
21 With respect to the second part of. the
~
22 question, which is individuals who believed motivation and I
think Dave Mixa and Mark 23 counting time stem from 24 Leiwander were the two Techs that felt that the motivation 25 was water inventory control.
es
4 22 1
1 Fred
- Kellie, Bill
- Wilson, and Miller and J
2 Coward -- these are management types, now -- were, I think, 3
troubled by the political aspects of public statements which j
4 had been made following the problems in 1984.
,And they did 5
not want any activity released.
6 So their answer was -- is basically, that, as 7
long as they didn't see it and they met the Technical 8
Specification numerical
- value, they were not releasing 9
activity.
10 Q
Okay.
Now, is that an assumption on your part
- 11 or did one of these actually state that in so many words to 12 you during the course of the inspection?
13 A
At the exit interview, based on discussions with several people involved -- and I want to point out that a
14 I,
15 Mr.
Coward was not there at the exit interview 16 basically, prepared what I thought was the SMUD policy on 17 this thing; and I read it to them and asked if anybody 18 disagreed with me.
And nobody disagreed with me at that 19 time.
20 Just see if I can locate in my notes where I 1
21 said -- basically, the policy as I understood it was that 22 the coun. ting lab could change the counting time such that 23 the count showed no detectable activity so long as the LLD 1
24 value for that count was less than the technical 25 Specification No.
SE-7 and that, if it was, the release
-_-u_--
23 1
could be reported as no detectable activity.
That was the 2
company policy.
And no one took issue with that, that's how 3
they interpreted it.
As long as they make those 4
measurements, they met the 5E-7 criteria, they were okay.
S Q
Okay.
Did any one of the plant officials 6 voice to you the fact that the need to release the -- you 7
mentioned -#d 8
Who, again, did you say were the officials who 9 you attributed their public statement that they would not release any additional liquid radioactive effluents?
10 11 A
I think Rodriguez held a
press conference or in proximity to the release of 12 sometime, following 13 Special Report 84-07.
They made public statements to the fact that they would not release any more radioactivity.
14 15 Q
Okay.
16 A
And that was the political aspect of this 17 whole thing.
Regarding Licensee Procedure AP.306V-13, Lower 18 Q
Limit of Detection Count Time Determination, which is dated 19 20 June 26th, 1984, what organization was responsible for the issuance and implementation of this procedure?
21 22 A
That would be the Health Physics chemistry 23 group.
24 Q
And they were under the supervision of Roger 25 Miller?
I 24 1
A That's right.
l 2
Q In '84 and '857 3
A And then Fred Kellie.
4 Q
In '867 l
5 A
'85 and
'86.
6 Q
Okay.
Do you know who, specifically, was 7
responsible for that procedure?
8 A
Rita Bowser, B-o-w-s-e-r, and George Campbell 9
were the authors of the procedure.
10 Q
Okay.
Do you know if, in fact, they are still 11 on-site?
12 A
Ms. Bowser is; I don't know if Campbell is or 13 isn't.
14 Q
Okay.
On page 9,
paragraph 3
of the 15 Inspection Report, could you explain what conditions or 16 situation created the need to release the water?
17 A
Generally, plant transients, such as repeated 18 heat-ups in a short period of time caused the primary site 19 to reject large volumes of water which have to be stored 20 somewhere.
21 Other things like system leaks or flushes can 22 also add.to the inventory of contaminated water at a nuclear 23 power plant.
24 With respect to the specific things that were 25 going on during early June of 1985, I can't tell you; you'd
}
=
+
l L
25 j
1 have to ask the licensee if that was n'particular time when 2
they had -- were trying to get the unit. back on line and 3
needed to do a heat-up and didn't have an adequate capacity 4
[
to store the water that would be rejected during,the heat-up L
5 process.
6 Okay.
The summary provided by the licensee-7 which shows the date and volume of water transferred from 8
the primary demineralized reactor coolant storage tank to 9
the ' RHUT shows, for example, beginning on June 12th, 1985, 10 20,000 gallons were transferred.
On the
- 13th, 20,000 11 gallons were transferred.
On the 14th, 10,000 gallons were 12 transferred.
On the 15th, 10,000 gallons; on the 16th, 13 10,000 gallons.
And, again on the 16th, 20,000 gallons.
14 What this indicates is that, obviously, they 15 needed to make room in the demineralized' water storage tank 16 for some other source of treated, radioactive water, to 17 store it.
18 In discussions with Fred Kellie, in early May, 19 Kellie was asked, basically, "Why did you have to do this?";
20 and it was explained for two reasons.
One, up until the 21
- 1980s, the licensee had been
- shipping, off-site, its 22 radioactive waste waters for treatment at a
secondary 23 facility.
24 At one point, I think, it was Shippings Port 25 (phonetic), Louisiana; and then, for a while, I think they
=
26 l
1 used to ship radioactive water to General Electric's 2
vallecitos facility.
3 When they stopped doing that, they ran into a 4
problem on how to'get rid of water.
The ability to reject 5
water became a problem such that they actually get water-6 logged.'
7 In other.words, all their primary radioactive 8
waste water storage vessels would become full.
And the way 9
that you deal with a full situation like that is, you either 10 recycle the water -- if you can't recycle it, you initiate a 11 temporary change to procedure, install piping, and pump some 12 of that water over to the RHUT tank for eventual discharge 13 to the environment.
14 And what this summary sheet that was prepared 15 shows
- that, during
- 1985, they discharged some 787,500 16 gallons of water from the demineralized reactor coolant 17 storage tank to the RHUT for eventual release to the basin.
18 And the specific thing that, in June, caused 18 them to have to get rid of water, I don't know exactly what 20 it was, the specific evolution in the plant.
21 Q
okay.
Would you identify the document you are 22 reading from there?
I would like to have a copy of that.
23
. A This is just a worksheet that was provided to I
24 me by the Utility in response to my request to know what the' 25 activity was in the RHUT at various times during 1985 and h
~
27 i
when. transfers of liquid were made from the RHUT -- from the i
1 2
demineralized reactor coolant storage tank to the RHUT.
i 3
Q What is the date on that?
i 4
A The title memo is dated May 2nd, 1986.
5 Q
Does it have a subject heading?
6
.A It's to Roger Miller from George Campbell, 7
subject, T621 tritium for 1985.
8 Q
Okay.
9 A
And I'll give you a copy.
10 Q
Just separate that.
- 11 (Document proffered.)
12 okay, regarding the fi'rst full paragraph on 13 page 10 of your Inspection Report, if you have it, I would.
14 like a copy of Enclosure 7.3, Liquid and Gaseous Effluent 15 Release Recommended LLD Counting Time.
16 Also, who was the individual responsible for 17 this document, the author of it?
Steve Manofsky would have been the individual 18 A
19 responsible.
I don't have a copy of that attachment 7.3, 20 nor do I believe a copy exists.
I recall asking Fred Kellie and form actually was filled out and hung up there; 21 if that 22 I recall that he said that that never occurred until after 23 they re-did the procedure in July of 1985.
Up until that 24 time, they just wrote up in grease pen or something like 25 that, near the counting equipment, suggested counting times
1 2n 1
for different -- different geometries.
2 So, you know, you could ask the licensee; but 1
1 3
y had already asked him that and they did not provide me a j
4 copy of the one of Enclosure 7.3 which would have been in effect during June -- the period from March through June of 5
6
'85.
7 Q
Okay.
Regarding the information on page 10 8 concerning the licensee's failure to maintain records of 9
liquid radioactive materials
- released, what was the 10 licensee's explanation for not being able to locate the 11 records?
As I recall, initially,'it was the --
12 A
13 Q
Well, let me just locate the records which they refer to, Release Permit No.85-203 and S5=210.
14 i
As I recall, initially, when I -- there were a 15 A
of lot more records that were missing during the first part 16 17 this inspection, most of the initial 2,000-count seconds --
18 2,000-second counts were missing.
19 And they said
- they, based on the short 20 duration of the inspection, they needed time to go look for 21 them; okay?
They found most of thea.
However, they did not 22 find the ones that are referenced here.
And the explanation 23 of that is they had a breakdown in their program with respect to keeping track of these records.
24 25 Q
And who was it that was providing this i
29 1
explanation to you?
2 A
Fred Kn111e.
3 Q
Okay.
And was he the only one?
4 A
Well, Steve Manofsky, the same --
9 5
Q Also?
6 A
Manofsky is the
- SCRA, again, who is I
7 responsible for this stutf.
8 Q
Okay.
And what organization is responsible, 9
or at that time was responsible, for maintaining ~ these 10 permits?
11 A
Chemistry and Health Physics.
12 Q
That's Kellie's group; okay.
13 Regarding the licensee's alterina of the 14 counting time on the analysis of radioactivity in the 15 effluents, explain the process the licensee could have 16 followed that would have justified changing the counting 17 time by the licensee.
18 In other
- words, in
- itself, changing the counting time, as long as it's done appropriately, then it's 19 ther,e is a
method whereby it would have been 20 not 21 perfectly okay to alter the counting time or change the 22 counting. time; right?
23 A
Correct.
Let me try to explain.
24 There are two separate issues involved.
One issue is the licensee's instantaneous release rate limit for 25
~
30 1
liquid offluents to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 20, 2
limits for concentration in the water as it leaves the site 3
boundary.
And what that TECSPEC says is that, at no point 4
in time, can you ever have a release that ex.ceeds those 5
numbers of microcuries/ml; okay?
And --
6 Q
That's per release?
7 A
At any time.
It doesn't matter whether you 8
get continuous release --
9 Q
Oh, one or cumulative?
10 A
-- releases -- it doesn't make any difference.
11 The concentration of the water running 12 underneath the fence out there has to be always less than 13 10 CFR Part 20' limits in terms of concentration, 14 microcuries/ml.
It doesn't involve human beings or anything 15 else; it's a concentration limit.
16
- Now, the purpose of the Technical 17 Specifications is to say that you have to be able to make a 18 measurement sensitive enough so that, when you figure in the 19 dilution that you might be putting in the stream before it 20 goes underneath the gate, you can always tell whether or not you are mee'.ing this limit in terms of microcuries/ml; okay?
21 22 That 5E-7 value is perfectly all right for 23 meeting the concentration limits.
In other words, the 24 typical concentrations for some of these isotopes in water 25 are on the order of 10-5.
So, if you can see 10-7, you e
31 i
1 don't have any problem.
Now, if you --
2 Q
- Now, you are talking about concentrations 3
referred to 10 CFR --
1 4
A 20.
5 Q
-- 20, Appendix B7 6
A That's right.
7 Q
Okay.
S A
- Now, take the guy who is going to count a 9
sample and his only purpose for counting the sample is to 10 determine whether or not he is going to meet the 11 concentration limit.
In that ces he can count the sample 12 for a fairly short period of time 13 He has a procedure; he calculates, "Okay, at i
14 the site
- boundary, I
have to be less than
'X' 15 concentration.", let's say 1 x 10-5 microcuries/cc.
"And I 16 know that I am going to get a dilution factor of 100 because 17 of water from other sources that is mixed in with the 18 radioactive waste before it goes under."; okay?
19 So that means that he starts off with 10-5 at 20 'the site boundary; that's the maximum he could see.
And he 21 knows that the water that is going in there is going to be 22 diluted by a factor of 100 right?
So that means that he'd 23 only have to be able to measure the concentration in the 24 tank of 10-3 microcuries/cc to be able to say that, if he 25 knows he is going to dilute it by a-factor of 100, it's 1
i V.
}
32 i
i 1
going to be 10-5'when it goes out the gate; all right?
2 So, if you were designing a system to make a i
3 measurement for that particular set of circumstances, he.
4 would only have to be able to see 10-3 in the tank because 5
he's not measuring the water that's going under the fence, f
6 he's measuring the water at the tank.
7 Now, what the NRC requirement is is that he at 8
least be able to see 10-7 in the tank prior to it being 9
dumped and diluted and going out.
)
is, is.
I 11 4E-10, whatever he wants to do.
The only requirement,
12 that, before me makes the measurement, he calculates, using 13 the technique that he is going to have, to be sure that he (J
14 can see at least 10-7 microcuries/cc.
And then he makes his 15 measurements, af ter he has done this a priorf determination 16 that his system is good enough to see it; okay?
17 Now, that's an a priori determination.
When 18 he actually makes the measurement, his LLD might be slightly 19 different than that for that measurement.
But the point is, 20 he set his, system up in advance to be capable to show 21 compliance with the limits; okay?
22 For concentration, SE-7 is totally reasonable, 23 even for Rancho Seco's situation.
However, the second part 10 CFR 50 says you have to make 24 of the requirement is 25 such measurements as necessary to assure that the dose
O h
33 objectives are met in terms of liquid effluent releases.
1 2
That throws an entirely different wrinkle into it.
3 The dose objective model is infinitely more f
4 complex.
So that, in order to see a very small amount of 5
dose, depending upon what you are putting out; you must have 6
to make, in Rancho's case, a far more sensitive measurement; 7
okay?
8 Q
And that is because they don't have the 8
capacity to dilute?
10 A
They don't have as much dilution,
- okay, in 11 what the body of water that's going out.
So, if you don't 12 have the
- dilution, the fish get higher
- activity, the 13 sediments get higher, the cows get higher from irrig,ation, t
14 eating contaminated land -- or the grasses on contaminated 15 land, that sort of thing.
16 So, the mistake that was made here is that 17 they did not consider the dose objective of what they had to 18 meet in their TECSPECS, work backwards to a concentration 18 which would result in that dose objective, then take that, 20 considering dilution, into the measurement at the source to 21 see how good they have to measure.
22 If they had done
- that, they would have 23 determined that their
%D for the amount of water they 24 planned to issue during 1985 might have had to have been 25 down somewhere on the order of 1E-9 microcuries/cc as a'>
o
~
-O l
'1 34 1
opposed to SE-7.
2
- Now, had they done that determination in 3
advance and then counted their system -- their samples in 4
accordance with that system that they
- had, made the 5
determination for, everything would have been' fine.
6 Q
And they could have altered their counting
)
7 time, as long as their LLD was --
8 A
As long as the LLDs used always met the two 9
objectives, number one for concentration, number two, to 10 ensure that the dose objectives of the Technical 11 Specifications were complied with.
Those were the two 12 objectives that always had to be met.
13 Logically, if the dose objective is, more 14 limiting, then you would always meet the concentration limit-t 15 by having the lower number; okay?
So, they could -- they 16 could change counting times totally legally.
Anytime you 17 get a new detector or you change the volume, you change --
18 you might want to alter your counting time.
19 But the whole key is, is you always want to 20 have an LLD that is slightly below the maximum LLD to ensure 21 the TECSPEC are met, in other words, a slightly comfort If you knew you were going to release
'X' gallons of 22 zone.
23 water, and at, let's say, 5 x 10-8, that would put you right l
24 at your TECSPEC limit for dose,,then you would want your LLD-l 25 to be like half of that, or 2.5 x 10-8, so you have room for l
O 35 1
comfort to say you know where you are in terms of the 2
TECSPEC limit; you are not bumping right up against it.
3 So there is nothing wrong with changing 4
counting times.
What's wrong is, is if you chan,ge counting in a manner which no longer permits.you to 5
times to 6
demonstrate compliance with those two requirements, that is, theconcent[ationrequirementandthedoserequirement.
7 8
Q Page 12 of the Inspection Report shows a June 9
- 6th, 1985 conversation between the Radiation Protection 10 Superintendent -- who.is Kellie; correct?
- 11 A.
That's right.
12 Q
And you, tne Region 5 Chief of the Facilities 13 Radiological Protection Section.
What prompted Kellie's telephone call to you?
5 14 I don't know; you will have to ask Kellie.
15 A
Kellie called me and asked me what the TECSPEC 16 17 meant; and I explained it to him.
18 Q
Okay.
And you didn't get any insight, at that as to why he was calling you, what the motivation was 19
- time, 20 for making that call at that time?
1 21 A
Mr. Kellie is a very candid individual; he 22 frequently calls to discuss problems or things he doesn't
{
23 understand with the TECSPECS.
And, normally, we don't infer 24 anything beyond the fact that he's calling to ask the NRC
)
25 our position on a certain regulatory matter.
- _. _ _ _ _ - - - - - _ _ _ _ _. -. _. _ _ _ _. _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - -.. _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - ~ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _
36 1
Q Okay.
With respect to what prompted Kellie to 2
make that phone call, what were his comments regarding the 3
positive values recorded for cesium 137 in Releases 85-98, 4
85-99, and 85-110, but which were not reported in the Semi-5 annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report dated September 6
26, 19857 7
A Kellie stated to me that he believed, if the 8
activity was less than the LLD value in the TECSPEC, that is 9
5E-7, it was okay to dump it if it did not see the peak:
10 okay?
He maintains that it was just a disconnect on his 11 part and that there was no malice there to deceive.
12 He earnestly
- believed, and instructed his 13 technicians, that, if a sample initially counted showed a 14 peak, that it could be recounted for another period.of time 15 and, if that second count did not show a peak, as long as 16 the lower limit of detection associated with the second 17 count presented an LLD of less than SE-7, the release could 18 be made and the words "non-detectable" or "less than LLD" 19 could be used to describe the results of the analysis.
20 Q
,Okay.
With what you have explained so far today, who were the officials in the licensee's organization 21 22 that had the authority to exclude the positive values 23 recorded in liquid effluents in the Semi-Annual Report?
24 A
Well, nobody -- nobody, based on the TECSPEC, 25 Footnote C or Notation C, however you want to refer to it --
nqw e=
o.
37 1
nobody has the authority to not comply with the TECSPEC.
2 Now, an individual might exercise an option, 3
either through error or for other reasons, not to comply.
4 But nobody has the authority to not comp,1y with the 5
Technical Specifications unless there is a written waiver 6
granted in accordance with NRC procedures.
No one in their 7
organization has the authority to say, "No, you don't have 8
to report that number."
9 Q
Okay.
Concerning paragraph 5 on page 12 of 10 the Inspection
- Report, identify the officials in the 11 licensee's organization who interpreted the Technical 12 Specification requirement
- that, samples only taken from 13 releases would show gross beta and gamma or tritium activity i
14 in excess of their respective LLDs had to be reported.
15 A
The two key people are Fred Kellie and Bill excuse me; three people Steve 16 Wilson and Steve 17 Manofsky.
- However, I understand from Kellie, that this 18 position was also discussed with George Coward.
19 Q
By Kellie with Coward?
20 A
,Uh-huh.
21 Q
Is that what you were --
22 And when would this discussion have taken 23 place, approximately?
24 A
I don't know exactly;
- but, certainly there 25 were numerous discussions following Bradley's December, 1986 um
a 4
38 1
excuse me --. December, 1985 memorandum to Powers.
And 2
Bradley's discovery of the failure' to report detected 3
activity, the work that he went to the site, confirmed that 4
that was going on, came back to Powers, told, Pc,wers that 5
there had been a violation of requirements.
6 Bradley stated that Powers brought that to the 7
attention of Rodriguez; Rodriguez brought it to the 8
attention of Coward; Coward brought it to Kellie's attention 9
in a most unfavorable manner.
The issue was discussed and 10 hashed out; and, at that poir4t, apparently, the conclusion was reached that the inte'rpretation offered by Mr. Kellie --
11 12 that is, as long as the LLD was less than SE-7, they were 13 complying with the
- TECSPEC, it had no problem was 1
i 14 established as the company policy.
15 (After a pause.)
16 Did you take my copy?
17 MR. MEEKS:
That's a copy you gave to me.
18 MR. YUHAS:
That's a procedure.
19 MR. MEEKS:
Didn't I ask for that?
20
, Let's go off the record.
21 (Discussion off the record.)
22 MR. MEEKS:
We have now resolved the custody 23 of Procedure AP.306V-13; so we can continue on here.
24 BY MR. MEEKS:
25 Q
If you obtained -- I would like a copy of the m
.. ~ _.
39 1
CEP February
- 24th, 1986 letter reporting the composite 2
analysis for radioactivity in liquid affluents, if you 3
obtained that.
4 A
Here is a copy.
5 (Document proffered.)
6 Q
I notice there is a lot of writing on this; is 7
that licensee people writing?
8 A
The handwritten stuff is.
9 Q
Right, the handwritten --
10 A
Yeah, that's correct.
11 Q
Okay.
With respect to this CEP letter, who, 12 in the licensee's organization, decided that the high 13 activities observed for February, March, and April we,re the 14 result of -- is that " years of contaminated glassware"?
15 A
No.
16 Q
The result of contaminated glassware?
17 A
Right.
I 18 Q
Okay.
19 A
That was Manofsky and Kellie.
l 20 Q
I don't know where " years" got in there.
21 A
Probably correct.
22 Q
Okay.
With respect to the information 23 contained in the fifth full paragraph on page 13 of the 24 Inspection
- Report, identify the licensee official who 25 maintained that Rancho Seco was not required to perform a e
40 1
dose calculation for cesium 134 and cesium 137, since no 2
measurable activities for these isotopes were. identified'in 3
the liquid effluent composite analysis performed by CEP.
4 A
Numerous licensee representatives,all take the 5
position that, if you don't detect it, you don't do a 6
calculation and report it.
And that is, in fact, consistent 7
with previous regulatory guidance.
8 In other words, if you have a measurement LLD 9
of 5E-7, that's really your measurement capability, you 10 don't hypothesize some number less than that and do a dose 11 calculation because there is no confidence that you actually 12 had that activity in the sample.
13 So, if you look at Regulatory Guide 1.2,1, you 14 will find that that is the NRC accepted position that, if measured, meaning it's 15 you don't measure the activity 16 above LLD -- you do not do a dose calculation for the LLD.
17 Q
Okay; good.
18 A
The reason, in my opinion, the licensee didn't 19 do a dose calculation on the data provided in the February 20 24th letter from CEP was that they simply did not want to 21 accept the results of the CEP data.
22 The numbers were very high in the sense that 23 either they sent some real high-level samples down there, 24 certainly not of the environmental-level category, or they 25 used some other problem like contaminated glassware or a
1 j
41 1
problem at CEP, something like that, i
2 And the licensee simply was very slow to 3
respond to correct or to resolve the numbers that 4
existed.
In fact, these numbers hadn't even,been provided l
5 to Bradley until I
got on-site for them to do the 6
calculations.
It's an example, talked about later in the 7
Inspection Report, of poor communication between groups.
8 Here you had CEP providing data to Manofsky 9
- who, apparently, took issue with the
- data, had yet 10 resulted with Kellie; and, therefore, the data hadn't been 11 provided uptown to Bradley to do the dose calculations yet.
12 So I wouldn't say that there was any malice in 13 why the dose calculations hadn't been done.
It w a,s just i
14 that it was disbelief that the values provided by CEP -- and 15 they hadn't resolved those issues by the time I happened to 16 show up on-site and ask why they hadn't done it.
17 Q
okay.
With respect to the licensee not 18 conducting dose calculations on CEP's composite analysis, 19 who in the licensee's organization has authority on this 20 matter and who was his first-line supervisor?
21 A
Well, Manofsky should have provided the data 22 to Kellie and Bradley; and Bradley, at that particular time, I
i 23 should have done the dose calculations.
{
24 Q
okay.
So it involves, like you mentioned just
)
25 previously, it involves two different organizations,
\\
\\
~
42 1
independent organizations, within Rancho Seco?
2 A
That's correct.
j i
3 Q
So, ultimately, it goes up to the level of l
4 hierarchy where it has authority over both of,those or has j
5 the authority to influence, even though it be~from one side 6
or the other, to influence both organizations.
7 When we are talking about the composite 8
samples conducted by CEP, could you just briefly explain l
9 this practice of composite samples?
l 10 A
Sure.
Some isotopes are more difficult to 11 measure than others.
And the
- licensee, in Technical 12 Specification Table, 4. 21-1, committed to sample each batch 13 of liquid radioactive material released by taking a pample 14 and then, on a monthly basis, analyzing that composite 15 sample for tritium and gross alpha, and on a quarterly 16 basis, measuring that composite for strontium 89 and 90.
17 These samples are typically sent out for a 18 third party, especially the alpha and strontium 89 and 90, 19 to measure.
20 What happened is the licensee, again, didn't 21 interpret their Technical Specifications correctly because 22 they only sampled those releases from the RHUTs which showed 23 activity to be present.
24 So, if you
- had, for
- instance, ten REUT 25 releases and only three of them showed' activity -- that is, f
i l ---
___ 9
~.
43 1
gross beta gamma or gross tritium to be present, then they 2
would only take composites from those three, when, really, 3
they should have been taking composites from all batches of 4
potentially contaminated material released fr,om each RHUT 5
Tech.
6 Now, the samples were sent out for alpha and 7
strontium 89 and 90 analysis.
That is normally a wet-8 chemistry type of analysis.
The volumes set depend upon the 9
volume of liquid discharge such that, if you had a lot of 10 RRUT discharges in one period of time, you would have a 11 large volume of composite.
12 Now, at the CEP facility, after they run the 13 wet-chemistry to look at strontium 89 and 90 and alphg, they
~
14 had
'X' volume left over.
It's that remaining volume which 15 was then gamma-scanned to determine if cesium was present 16 that provided the basis for the February 24th results; okay?
17 In some cases, some months indicate that there 18 was no cesium activity measured because there wasn't enough 19 sample left over to make that measurement.
That is, they 20 either had a very low number of volumes released during the 21 month or, perhaps, CEP ran the alpha or the strontium 89 22 twice and there wasn't enough juice left over to meet their 23 volume requirements for their LLD.
Hence, they don't have a 24 result for cesium for a couple of months.
25 Q
so they actually -- this' liquid is actually e
44 1
1 consumed in the test and not --
2 A
Some --
3 Q
-- to one or two or three tests and you don't d
have any more left.
5 A
Right. You've got to keep in mind that, when 6
you a r'e trying to achieve LLDs for different isotopes, it 7
isn't always just gamma counting.
Sometimes there's 8
chemical separation processes; sometimes there's 9
distillation processes.
And
- that, sometimes, uses the l
10 volume of water up such that, if it's gone, it's gone.
You 11 can't --
12 Q
I understand it; right.
13 A
You can't make a measurement on something that 14 is not there any more.
15 Q
Right.
So, on compositing, they actual 1y, 16 when they have the samples from the various releases, then 17 they actually combine them and send them off to CEP for the 18 composite?
19 A
Right; it's a jug of water.
It's like there's 20 the volume of composite is specified in, I
so many 21 believe it's in Footnote D of Technical Specification 421 22 which says, "A composite sample is one in which the quantity 23 of liquid sampled is proportional to the quantity of liquid 24 waste discharged and in which the method of sampling 25 employed results in a specimen which is representative of
45 r
1 the liquids released."
2 This might be something like one gallon of I
3 sample per 100,000 gallons of water released.
)
4 Q
Okay.
On page 15 of your Inspection Report, 5
you state that you returned to the site and corporate office 6
and that the visit found that, since 1983, the licensee had 7
engaged in a water management practice inconsistent with the 8
description in the Final Safety Analysis Report.
9 Prior to that April 29th visit, what was your 10 knowledge regarding the origin of release activity of liquid 11 effluents at Rancho Seco?
12 A
The basis for NRC knowing what the flow path also 13 was is the updated Final Safety Analysis Report i
'14 referred to as the FSAR, or the UFSAR -- and the licensee's 15 Special Report dated September 27th, 1984.
16 Both of those documents -- certainly the most painted a picture of 17 recent one, September 27th, 1984 18 flow path dealing exclusively with contamination of the 19 secondary system by a steam generator tube leaks resulting 20 in trace quantities of radioactive materials in the RHUTs 21 being discharged in the environment.
22 What I found, based on discussions on-site, 23 was that the, licensee had engaged in a
practice of 24 installing temporary piping to allow transfer from the RC 25 domin water storage tank and the miscellaneous waste tank to
I 46 1
the RHUT and then filling the RHUT with service water, then 2
discharging that volume into the basin, then of fsite into 3
the environment.
4 Q
Okay.
So you weren't aware of thesie transf ers 5
to the RHUT from the DRCST or from the miscellaneous waste 6
hold up tank?
7 A
I believe that is the correct title of it, 8
yeah.
9 Q
Until after April 29th -- or on or after Apr'1 10 29th?
11 A
I don't recall precisely the date.
The 12 individual that provided the information was a Technician by 13 the name of Mark Leiwander, L-e-i-w-a-n-d-e-r.
I had gone 14 to him on an evening of the inspection to try to get a 15 history of modification to the computer program which 16 controls the amount of time used to count samples.
This is 17 the issue of 2,000 seconds versus 1,000 seconds.
18 And I asked him if he had ever been involved 19 in a situation that resulted in him being told to count a
20 sample for a, smaller period of time after seeing peaks of 21 measurable activity.
22 He responded
- that, yes, he too had been 23 involved in that, had been directed to count it for a i
24 shorter period of time, that he thought it was wrong, that 25 he had expressed his consternation to his supervisors but a
'i l
1
~
47 l
1 they told him that, as long as it met the TECSPEC Ilmit on 2
Table -- whatever it is -- for 5E-7, everything was fine.
3 I then asked him, "Well, where do you think 4
ibis activity is coming from?", ber:ause we were,. talking mid-5 1985; the reactor had been shut down for a long period of
~
6 time.
And it just doesn't make sense that you would
/
7 continue to have this much activity going out into the 8
environment."
9 His response was, "Oh, you mean you don't know 10 about the RC-DEMIN water storage tank?"
He said, "What we 11 do is, we-have a procedure that allows us to make a
12 temporary piping hookup to the DEMIN-RC storage tank..." --
13 and I think that is T621 - "... and pump that water over to 14 the RNUT tank.
And then we dilute the RRUT tank with SS service water to assure that the tritium concentration is 16 below a maximum permissible concentration in 10 CFR Part 20, 17 such that, when it's diluted with water from the Folsom 18 South Canal, will be less than the Part 20 concentration 19 limits as it goes under the restricted area boundary fence."
, So he, basically, gave me the initial sense of 20 21 what was going on.
That led to a series of questions of 22 Fred Kellie and Carl Stephenson and Ron Colombo and others 23 which were then used to develop what the real seurce term 24 was likely to have been for 1985.
25 So, basically, I came about the information
48 1
based on discussions with Technicians who had been involved 2
in this manipulation of counting time and sensed that there 3
was a bigger issue here.
4 Q
When you refer to source term,.that is the 5
radioactivity, if any?
6 A
The amount of any type of radioactive 7
materials released to the environment.
8 Q
Yeah, okay.
9 Now, what was this individual's name, again, 10 Leiwander?
11 A
Right; he's described in the persons contacted 12 section of the Inspection Report; and let me spell the name first initial 1,s
'M';
first name is 13 properly.
It's I
14 the 'last name is L-e-1-w-a-n-d-e-r, Leiwander.
15 Q
And his title, again?
16 A
He's an C and RP Tech.
in your 17 Q
And who did he report to?
He's 18 response, his supervisors?
19 A
Yeah, Bill Wilson, Steve Manofsky, then Fred 20
- Kellie, 21 Q
Okay.
Kellie being a ' supervisor of IJilson and 22 Manofsky?
23 A
- Yeah, Superintendent; Kellie is a
24 Superintendent.
25 Q
Kellie would be his second-line t
49 1
Superintendent?
'2 A
Yeah.
3 Q
Okay.
The practice of transferring water from I
4 the Demineralized Reactor Coolant Storage Tank to the RHUTs 5
for ultimate discharge to the environment -- we have already 6
talked about briefly the plant operational configurations that prompted the licensee to transfer the water to the RHUT 7
8 from the DRCST tank -- D-R-C-S-T tank.
9 Is there any actual physical plant 10 configuration aspect that is factored into this?
11 A
well --
12 Q
Or is it the fact that it is a dry -- it was 13 intended to be a dry site with no --
14
~A.
The basic problem is, Rancho Seco, when it was 15 licensed, was thought to be a dry site.
- However, they 16 recognized that, at times, they might have steam generator 17 tube leaks.
And the Final Safety Analysis Report said that, 18 if you had steam generator tube leaks, you recycled that l
the radioactive 19 water back to the reactor or -- excuse 20 waste treatment system, which they did.
21 Q
The primary --
22 A
The primary side.
23 Q
-- system, yes; okay.
24 A
Now, when you do that, if you have 'a whole 25 bunch of contaminated condensate, you overload the capacity t
e
.________-___-___-_________-._---_-_Q
.50 o
1 of the radioactive waste treatment
- system, both in 2
processing ability and in storage capability.
So what are 3
you going to do with all this water?
Well, the answer is, 4
you are going to release it to the environment., -
5 And there is nothing wrong with releasing the 6
contaminated water to the environment, provided you meet the 7
Technical specification requirements having to do with 8
concentration and with dose; okay?
9
- Now, had the licensee followed their o w.2 carefully read ' Procedure 10 procedures if you look at 11 AP.305-113, you can see that whoever wrote that procedure, 12 when they first started doing this maneuver back in 1982, 13 understood that the proper thing to do would be to. sample 14 this tank before you transferred water to the RHUT because 15 the tank contains higher concentrations of radioactivity 16 which could easily be detected in terms of the LLD criteria 17 of SE-7.
18 And, since the volumes are low, if you made I
18 your dose projections from the source tank, you could have 20 told, just fine, whether or not you were going to bump up 21 against the dose limits.
22 On the other hand, if you take that water and l
23 you put it in the RHUT tank, because that's the place that 24 you make the determination of the amount of activity, and i
add service water to it to dilute the 25 then you have l
l se
_.__._-___________m.
_______________mu__-
o 51 1
concentrations, and then you say,
- Well, I don't see any i
l i
2 radioactivity in the RHUT tank.", you have to question the 3
logic of the person involved in that decision.
i 4
what is 1t, again
.y Q
However, Procedure 5
AP-137 6
A AP.305-13, Rev. 16.
7 Q
- And, specifically, what section of it 8
indicates that sampling should be taken from the DRCST tenk?
9 A
Well, this is -- the title of the Procedure is 10 Environmental Releases of Liquid Radioactivity.
It's the 11 part that describes the Chem and HP Department's 12 responsibility.
13 Another Procedure, which is A-10, describes 14 the mechanical aspects of transferring the water from the 15 tank 621 Demin Reactor Coolant Storage Tank, over to the 16 RHUTs, Tank-950/A or B.
17 Now, Procedure AP.305-13, in Section 3.0 18 and I
will just read it because it's very easy to 19 understand-; okay?
20 "3.1
[ states]
" Prior to deciding to release 21 radioactive liquid waste to the environment, every 22 reasonable effort must be taken to reclaim the 23 liquid for in-plant use."
24
.2 When it is determined by the plant 25 operations group that it is necessary that a batch e.
.---_-----_,A----,-----.--
___---a_ _ - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - -, - - -, - -
52 1
of liquid waste should be released to the 2
environment, they sha11 isolate and, if possible, 3
begin recirculation of the tank or sump containing 4
the waste water."
5
.3 At the time of isolation, the. Chemical 6
Radiation group will be notified."
7
.4
'"he Chemical Radiation group shall grab 8
sample of the waste and perform laboratory 4
9 radiochemical analyses to determine the proper 10 method of discharge disposal or reclamation."
11 At that point, right there, had they followed 12 that procedure and taken the samples and analyzed them for 13 all the isotopes of concern from the Demin Reactor C,oolant 14 Storage Tank, they should have known -- they should have had 15 a sample from each one of those many, many transfers that 16 said what the activity was in the tank prior to transferring 17 it to the RHUT; okay?
Because those were small discrete 18 transfers each time.
19 The next step in the procedure,
.5, states:
20 "For controlled discharge of radioactive liquids 21 to the plant effluent, the operations group will 22 transfer an acceptable quantity of the liquid (as 23 determined in Step 3.4) to T-950A or T-950B, 24 Regenerate Hold Up
'ianks, add any required 25 dilution water, make pH adjustments a.s necessary, l
53 1
and ensure adequate mixing of the tank contents."
2
- Now, to me, that procedure, had it been i
3 followed, and then had people understood the implications of 4
what they were doing, would have provided a rea,sonable basis 5
to make sure that you complied, both with the concentration 6
limits of Part 20 and the dose objectives.
3 7
Unfortunately, the next step in the procedure 8
tells:
9 "The chemical Radiation group will sample the 10 Regenerate Hold Up
- Tank, analyze for gaimma 11
- emitters, complete pre-release calculations as 12 specified in Reference 2.6 for monitor set-points 13 and site boundary radionuclides concentration, and 14 initiate a
Radioactive Liquid Waste
- Permit, 15.1.
A member of the Chemical Radiation 16 group reviews the analysis data to ensure it is 17 correct and that the activity in the Regenerate 18 Hold Up Tank meets the requirements of
- RETS, l
19 Appendix A 317.1 and 317.3.
If a hold-up tank 20 contains greater than 60 mpe
- water, special 21 consideration must be given to ensure that a
22 retention basin will not contair greater than 20 1
23 spe or it will be difficult to establish the i
24 proper dilution for releare."
25 I want to take this time to point out what 1
_____.._.m_
--_____._.____m._m
v 54 which I am 1
Technical Specification 317.1 and 317.3 are 2
now looking up.
3 Q
When you say RETS, what are you referring to?
l 4
A
- Well, that's the Radiological Effluent 5
Technical Specifications; okay?
6 Q
How do you spell the acronym?
7 A
Radiological Effluent Technical 8
Specifications.
9 Q
RETS.
10 A
- Now, Technical Specification 317.1 is 11 concentration.
Technical Specification 317.3 is Liquid Hold 12 Up Tanks.
Unfortunately,. the critical that's missing here 13 is Technical Specification 317.2, which is Dose, whjch is i
14 what, exactly, the whole LLD centers around.
I 15 If they had done this sample from the T621, 16 made an appropriate measurement of the activity, plugged it 17 in to the formula used to satisfy the dose requirements, 18 they would have been fine.
They could have controlled their f
i 19 effluents consistent with their TECSPEC limits.
, However, what you see is a poor procedure here
)
20 21 that sort of leads someone who is versed in the area to the i
22 correct thinking; but certainly doesn't provide adequate 23 guidance to the Technician involved to specifically 24 recognize, " Hey, if I sample the Demin Water Storage Tank, I 25 need to project the dose associated with that release."
It t
i t
55 1
is not enough to put 10,000 gallons of water in the RHUT and 2
fill the rest with DI water and pretend there is no activity 3
there.
4 And that's what this Procedure, seems to be 5
doing.
It says you put the water over, you regenerate it-or 6
you flush it with service water, and then you ' sample - the 7
RHUT and look for gamma emitters.
Well, at that~ point, 8
you've already diluted it down to the point where you don't 9
see it; but you are still putting the activity in the 10 environment.
And that's-part of this predicament.
11 Q
Who has responsibility for sampling the DRCST 12 tank?
13 A
Chem HP Department.
i 14 Q
Also the RHUT7 15 A
Chem HP.
'16
-Q Okay.
With respect to-the licensee stand and 17 official reports, what are the ramifications of filling the 18 RHUT from the normal secondary systems forces or the 19 service-water systems to dilute the tritium as necessary in 20 order to comply with the limits of 10 CFR 207 21 A
There is no negative ramifications, as long as 22 you properly account for the action you are taking such 23
- that, in order to comply with the release concentration 24 limits of the Technical Specifications, you can easily put 25 service water in there to reduce the ape of tritium in that ao
'G 56 particular RHUT tank to the point where you know you are 1
going to get enough dilution between the time it's released 2
3 from the RHUT until it goes under the site boundary, such 4
that, at the concentration of the site boundary $s less than 5
the 10 CFR 20 limits.
That's acceptable.
6 The spin-off of that is, is while you are 7
diluting it to reduce the concentration of tritium, you are 8
also reducing the concentration of cesium and other isotopes 9
such that, by diluting it to decrease tritium, you may 10 dilute it to the point where you no longer are able to see 11 the amount of cesium that you put into the tank because of 12 the LLD issue.
13 However, that cesium is still in the tank.
It might be in lower concentration that you can measure in your i
14 15 terms of your LLD; but it's still going to contribute to the 16 dose to people in the environment.
So, if you are going to 17 dilute it,"then you still have to consider the requirement 18 of Technical Specification 317.2, which is Dose.
19 Q
So the dilution
- factor, so far as safety signi.ficance, doesn't impact on Appendix I' criteria?
20 21 In other words, if it's in there, even though 22 you can't see it, it's still going to be a factor in the 23 ecosystem and the environment?
24 A
I want to make sure that you understand the 25 point, here.
Just because you dilute it, doesn't mean one
57 3
1 thing or another, except you make it harder to measure.
2 If you make it so hard to measure that you 3
can't see it and you still think that it's okay to have an 4
LLD of SE-7 and you make the release, you're, in trouble 5
because now you are reporting that you didn't detect any 6
activity, therefore, you didn't do any dose calculations, 7
when in actuality, you really did put activity into that 8
tank; and the real dose to people may exceed the 9
requirements of the Technical Specification 317.2
- and, 10 perhaps, 40 CFR 190 values.
11 So there are severe ramifications to diluting 12 that.
But the ramifications don't have to be negative af 13 you act responsibly.
14 Q
When you say responsibly, what' are you 15 referring -- to make sure that your LLD value will keep you 16 within the Appendix I dose objectives?
17 A
or use the higher activity of the water that 18 you measure before you put it in the RHUT tank, then you do 19 your dose projection based on that.
20 Q
yeah; okay.
Regarding your best estimate of activity that you calculated concerning the releases during 21 and it's contained on pages 16 and 17 of your 22 1985 could you explain, according to your 23 Inspection Report knowledge, why were largo volumes of water released from the 24 RHUTs and classified as non-radioactive from January through 25 4
58 1
- October, 1985, and not composited for gamma-isotopic i
l 2
analysis?
3 A
You know, the licensee's procedure was such 4
that, when he sampled the RHUT tank, if he did not detect 5
either tritium, gross beta, or gamma activity, he thought 6
that that was a non-radioactive release and, therefore, did 7
not make a sample for the composite.
And he did not keep 8
track of the volume for the purposes of reporting 9
potentially radioactive effluents.
10 Q
Concerning your best estimate dose release 11 during 1985, you indicate that the amount of activity to the total body of the hypothetically maximally-exposed member of 12 13 the public is 3.89 millirems.
I 14 Could you comment on that value as it relates 15 to 10 CFR 20 requirements and ALARA.
16 A
Okay.
There are several different thresholds.
17 You start off by appreciating the fact that most individuals 18 in the United States receive a natural background dose, from 18 the earth and its surroundings, of about 100 millirem per 20 year -- millirem per year.
21 The EPA established a criteria called 40 CFR 22 190 which says, for real people, the total dose that they 23 should be allowed to receive from the uranium fuel cycle, 24 which includes reactors and processing fuel, the whole nine 25 yards, is 25 millirem per year.
n
59 1
At 25 millirem per year, the NRC would then 2
have to justify why that utility or that function should be.
3 allowed to proceed above 25 millirem per year to a real 4
person.
5 So, when we talk about the EPA requirement, 6
it's expressed in 40 CFR
- 190, it's adopted in NRC 7
regulations ' through 10 CFR Part 20, and it talks about a 8
dose of 25 millirem per year to real people.
9 Now, because of a Memorandum of Understanding 10 between the EPA and, then, the AEC, AEC was charged with 11 developing rules and regulations to ensure that their 12 criteria are met.
- Hence, NRC developed the Appendix I 13 Technical Specification requirements called RETS.
(
14 Now, the RETS criteria talks abwt doses for 15 liquid effluents, doses for gaseous effluents.
And they 16 deal'in what's called hypothetical individuals.
This is not 17 a real person; this hypothetical individual assumes that it 18 is a standard family.
19 There are numbers for men, women,
- children, 20 teenagers, who would be residing at the site boundary and 21 who would drink the water that came from the effluent 22
- releases, eat the food grown from watering crops with 23 effluent radioactive water, swim in the water, fish on the 24 shoreline, eat the fish, the whole cycle.
25 The reason for using this hypothetical
l 60 1
individual is that it's very unlikely that a real person 2
would ever do all of those things in the effluent stream:
3 okay?
So that the Technical Specification concept to 1
4 ensure compliance with the EPA requirements was that, if no 5
hypothetical individual received three millirem per year 6
through liquid effluents, there is a very, very small chance 7
that any rea.1 person would ever approach the 25-millirem-8 per-year limit.
9 Now, understand that the 25 millirem-per-year 10 limit of EPA involves not only liquid but gaseous and direct 11 radiation as well.
So that, 10 CFR 20 incorporates this EPA 12 criteria as the first step to this 25 millirems-per-year 13 total.
14 And what it requires is, is if the utility or 15 part of the uranium fuel cycle is going to result in 16 exposures of more than 25 millirem in any given year, the i
17 NRC, then, has to grant a variance for continued operation.
18 But the NRC cannot grant. a variance for 18 continued operation in excess of the base values, that is l
20 the Part 20, limit of 500 millirem per year, the Appendix B 21 concentration limits, airborne limits.
That's the point 22 where you shut them off.
f i
23 So, you've got these several thresholds.
The l
24 lowest threshold is the hypothetical maximum individual for 25 liquid effluents, which is, basically, three millirem.
i 3
\\
J
61 1
You've got the EPA requirement, expressed through 10 CFR 2
20.106, of 25 millirem to a real person.
3 And even that doesn't cause you to shut 4
anybody down.
It just requires that the age.ncy grant a 5
variance, all the way up to the equivalent of,the 10 CFR 20, 6
which is the concentration limit for activity in the water 7
going out and 500 millirem per year, where you'd actua11y 8
have to shut them down, stop them.
9 So, the way NRC regulations work is, you've 10 got a concentration limit that says, if you are exceeding 11 the concentration limit in Part 20, you immediately have to 12 take action to reduce the release rate.
That's one thing; 13 you've got to do it.
14 The next approach to assure compliance with 40 15 CFR 190, there are two Technical Specifications.
There is 16 the set associated with liquid effluents which says, " Heck, 17 you've got to make sure that your liquid effluents don't 18 result in more than three millireti per year to the 19 hypothetical individual."
20 And you've got a total dose,
- TECSPEC, that 21 says, "If your liquid effluents and your gaseous effluents 22 look like they are going to exceed it, you have to submit a 23 special report and request a
variance for continued 24 operation."
25 So all the bases are covered by this matrix of i
62 1
regulations.
But the point is, is that three millirem, 3.89 2
millirem, only exceeds the lowest threshold, which is the 3
Appendix I maximum hypothetical individual.
4 It-is not a health and safety 1,ssue.
There 5
are not -- you are not required to go out and move people or protect people or try anything sophisticated.
It's a
6 7
hypothetical individual; it's not a safety issue.
It's the 8
first administrative point of control.
9 Q
Knowing beforehand, a licensee, that he does 10 not meet those dose objectives in Appendix I,
then he 11 doesn't release the water -- well, what position does that 1
12 put him in, knowing beforehand?
13 A
- Well, knowing beforehand would comp,Iicate i
14 matters because, basically, what he is required to do is, if 15 you exceed the dose objective of TECSPEC 317.2, which is the 16 three millirem per year total body, basically, it says, 17
- When'the calculated dose or dose commitment from 18 releases of radioactive materials and liquid 19 effluents exceeding any of the above
- limits, 20 prepare and submit to the Commission' within 30 21 days, a special Report.
The Report will identify 22 the cause for exceeding the limit and define 23 corrective actions to be taken to reduce releases 24 and propose corrective actions to be taken to 25 ensure that subsequent releases will be in 1
0 e
-_.mmm._.mmam_--m___--m_
__w_
c 63 1
compliance of the above limits."
2 Q
Right.
3 A
From the tone of that word, it's an after-the-4 fact Report.
It doesn't speak to whether it was deliberate S
or not deliberate; what it says is, "If you do it".
It 6
doesn't say, "You can't do it."; it says, "If you do it, you 7
write this Special Report to make sure that, in the future, 8
you don't do it again."
9 Q
Okay.
In retrospect, in looking back at 10 Rancho Seco, if, in fact, they would have made that kind of 11 determination, said that we -- and stating to NRC, " Yeah, we 12 did do it.",
then they would have had to stop releases of 13 the water until they corrected that condition?
i 14 A
No.
If Rancho Seco had calculated the dose 15 projections properly, what they would have done is, they 16 would have come in and said, " Gee whiz, guys, our corrective 17 actions weren't fully effective; we, in fact, had to release 18 some water from the domin reactor water storage tank to the 19 RHUT to the environment and that these releases resulted in 20 doses of 3.89 millirem during this quarter.
However, next 21 quarter, we are not going to do that any more; we are going 22 to do something else."
And everything would have been fine.
23 It's a matter of being up front with what you 24 are doing.
The amount -- the safety significance is not the 25 issue here.
O i
~
o.
64 1
Q Right.
so the release of the water wasn't the 2
primary issue; it would go back to what they said they were 3
going to do in their Special Report 84-07.
And that was 4
that they were not going to release radioactivity in their 5
effluents; is ths correct?
6 A
That's right.
And the way the story picks up 7
is, in response to their very definitive commitments in 84-8 07, where they said, " Hey, we are going to take measure A, 9
B,C, and D; in addition, we are going to tell our techs to 10 look harder, we are going to make sure that all the releases 11 from the RHUTs comply with the Appendix I dose objectives."
12 In response to that statement, NRR issued a 13 licensing action which makes the statement material, The 14 licensing action was that NRR found and issued a letter 15 which says,
" Based on the licensee's submittal and their 16 commitment to meet Appendix I, we do not find it necessary 17 to grant a variance for continued operation."; okay?
18 So, now we have a statement that's material, 19 it's important, and licensing action has been taken.
20 What happened now is, after that action was 21 taken,.the licensee reported to us, for the first half of 22 1985, that they did not detect any activity in their liquid 23 effluent releases, therefore, they met the design objectives 24 for dose, therefore, everything was wonderful.
25 In
- fact, everything wasn't wonderful.
In e
4 65 1
fact, they had detected activities, they did not report the 2
activities, and, therefore, they erroneously reported to us 3
the dose contribution to the environment as a result of 4
their releases'made.
5 Now, in following this up, we found that the i
implemented these good words, in the 6
people who were 7
Special Repbrt 84-07, weren't even aware of
- them, Fred 8
Kellie, Bill Wilson, Roger Miller, Colombo, and Bradley, 9
These are the logical people who would have developed 10 specialized procedures, to look harder, to ensure that the 11 met the dose objectives of Appendix I.
12 Hence, we had a statement that was hollow in 13 nature and not carried through, a false statement.
In fact, i
i 14 they did exceed Appendix I for 1985.
15 Failure to meet the commitments made which 16 resulted in the finding of no variance, would logically lead 17 NRC to revisit the issue of whether or not a variance was 18 now required.
In the act of doing that, NRC would have to 19 determine what management systems failed to ensure the 20 follow-through of the commitments made in 84-07.
21 As a result of that, NRC might have called in 22 the question, not only the competence of the first-line 23 people like Kellie and Wilson, whether or not there was 24 evidence of careless disregard on the part of people like 25 Coward; and, perhaps, whether or not there was malfeasance i
i I
66 1
in respect to people like Bradley, Powers, and Rodriguez, 2
who apparently had been told, in early 1985, that the LLDs 3
were, in fact, not adequate.
4 So the issue that we are talking,about is not 5
a safety issue in terms of 3.89 millirem fo'r 1985, we are 6
talking about a material statement, a commitment to meet the 7
objectives of the Appendix I,
and then a failure to follow 8
those actions to ensure that it would be met.
And, in fact, 9
it appears it was not met for 1985.
10 Those raise serious questions about the 11 management of the Utility.
That's the issue that we are 12 concerned about.
13 Q
Now, Rancho Seco was off-line from March to
(-
14 the end of September, 1985.
15
- Now, if, in fact, the information that you that was published in your Inspection Report 16 developed if that were to have surfaced to NRC before their 17 86-15 September of 1985, then 18 start-up in September of 1929 19 this whole factor, which you've just explained about their 20 management and competence and the integrity of the 21 information they reported in 84-07, as you stated, you would l
22 have revisited the whole variance issue, what effect would 23 it have had on their re-start?
24 A.
I suspect that they would have been required 25 to get a Technical Specification change implemented prior to
.c 67 1
restarting the reactor.
And that could have caused a delay.
2 Q
Okay.
What type of delay are we talking 3
about?
4 A
I got no idea; you have to ask NRR.
You'got 5
to realize. that the public has been told for years that 6
Rancho Seco was a zero-release site.' And, any time you 7
implement a Technical Specification change, there is..the 8
opportunity that the public might request a hearing.
9 In requesting a
- hearing, the. public alght 10 demand to know, "Why have all these people been out here 11 sampling Cray Creek?"
"Why have people been whole-body 12 counted?"
"What is the contamination in the Creek?"
"Why 13 haven't we been told?"
14 They might have intervened in the proceedings 15 and resulted in a very long delay, perhaps prohibiting re-16 start until the whole issue was revisited by the Commission 17 and by the public.
18 Q
Okay.
What physical requirements would have 19 been placed on them as far as their whole effluent-release 20 program, which would have possibly caused a delay, actual 21 physical construction of any particular aspect of the plant?
22 A
There is always the possibility that NRC would 23 have required them to carry through with the long-ters 24 commitments they presented in Special Report 84-07, that is, 25.the construction of large settling ponds or evaporation
e c'
68 1
ponds.
2 If
- they, in
- fact, have a water-management 3
problem and they are forced to release liquid radioactive 4
materials, the answer might have been these,large ponds, 5
similar to what has been built at Palo Verde.
6 Or the answer might have been more tanks at 7
the site.
The answer might have been more filtration 8
- systems, more mixed-bed ion exchanges, perhaps a bigger 9
waste evaporator.
There could have been hardware changes 10 required to ensure that, over the long run, they continue to 11 meet the design objectives of Appendix I.
12 Q
All requiring a
commitment of time and 13 financial resources to put them operational?
14 A
I would say that, definitely, there would have 15 been a considerable amount of energy expended, had NRC known 16 that they had not met their commitments in 84-07 with 17 respect to Appendix I.
Whether it would have been a
18 paperwork shuffle or hardware changes, who knows?
19 Q
Okay.
20 A
,For example, the evaporator ponds, which were 21 originally proposed in 84-07, I am given to understand that 22 the cost involved in construction of those ponds may have 23 been on the order of $8-10 million.
24 Now, the licensee has since let their plans to 25 construct those ponds fall by the wayside.
It's not clear w
l' 4
69 l
1 whether or not NRC would have allowed that sort of thing to l
2 occur, had they known that there was an ongoing problem in 3
liquid effluents.
4 MR. MEEKS:
Okay.
5 (Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m.,
the interview in the 6
above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene, Tuesday, 7
l January 20, 1987, at 1:00 p.m.)
l 8
9 10 11 12 13 I
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 e
3 70 1
EIEIIEIEAII l
2
(
3 This is to certify that the attached' proceedings before the:
4 5
KUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 6
IN THE MATTER OF:
7 INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW (CLOSED MEETING) 8 DOCKET NO:
NONE 9
DATE:
JANUARY 15, 1987 10 PLACE:
WALNUT CREEK, CALIFORNIA 11 were had as therein appears, and that this'is the original 12 transcript thereof for the files of THE COMMISSION 13 14 15 16 e
L+ - -
g
*#~*
MARGA T DEVERS
[, f}
19 offic al Reporter h.'.kfN 20 21 22 23 24 25 EXHIBIT (1
A
%R A
Gi10.
w