ML20126D307
| ML20126D307 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1980 |
| From: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004250237 | |
| Download: ML20126D307 (174) | |
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U NIT E D STATES N UCLE AR REG UL ATORY COMMISSION In the matter of:
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT O RANCHO SECO DOCKET NO. 50-312 l
i PIace: sacramento, California y Date: Monday, April 14, 1980 pagg5 1985 to 2 59 l
lNTERNATIONAL VERBATIM REPORTERS, INC.
499 SOUTH CAPITOL STREET. S. W. SUITE 107 WASHINGTON. D. C. 20002 202 484-3550
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i UNITED STATES l l
2 UUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION I
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! 4 In the Matter of:
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$ SACRIPJn!TO MUti1CIPAL UTILITY .
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U.S. Federal Building 7; Conferance Room Fi-114C 2000 Cottage Way 12 Sacramento, California 9 9314 g Tuacday, g Monday, Anril 14, 1980 ;
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Tha Atomic Safety and Licensing Bon::d met, j 15 ,
f.ursuant to call, at 9:00 o' clock 2.m. I
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iC ELIflASE7H BOW 3PS, ChairIO.an j ~a MR., FREDERICK J. SIION, Mmober I
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3 MR. BAKTER:. Yes, ma'am.
4 Will you heivo Mr. Dieterich, pleace?
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RODERT A DIET.2RICII s
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4 of Wich is dated February llc 1990, is entitled Liconnees Ml I t:cetimony of Rol: ort A. Dieterich in Peapsaart to Liconoir'.9 - l ,
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February 11, 1980 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
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SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT ) Docket No. 50-312
)
(Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station) )
LICENSEE'S TESTIMONY OF ROBERT A DIETERICH IN RESPONSE TO l O
LICENSING BOARD QUESTION CEC 1-6 CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION ISSUE 5-1 BOARD QUESTIONS H-C 9, 20.
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH CONTENTION III(c) AND ADDITIONAL BOARD QUESTION 1
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TABLE OF CONTENTS .
O Page PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTRODUCTION 3 A. Auxiliary Feedwater System Reliability (CEC 1-6) 6 B. Anticipatory Reactor Trips (H-C 9, ABQ 1) 13 C. Containment Isolation Design (CEC 5-1) 17 O D. Method for Eliminating Hydrogen i concentrations in the Containment (H-C 20) 20 l
i E. Long-Term Modifications to be Incorporated at Rancho Seco (FOE III(c)) 24 O
1 Professional Qualifications and Introduction
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L-) 2 3 Q. What is your name and business address?
4 A. My name is Robert A. Dieterich. My business address 5 is Sacramento Municipal Utility District, Post Office Box 6 15830, Sacramento, California 95813.
7 8 Q. What is your position, educational background and work 9 experience?
10 A. I am a Senior Nuclear Engineer in the Generation 11 Engineering Department for the Sacramento Municipal Utility 12 District.
13 I am a graduate of the University of Kansas with a
(~N 14 Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering Physics, with a
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15 major area of study in Nuclear Engineering. I have also 16 taken graduate-level courses in Nuclear Engineering from 17 the University of Washington while I was employed by the 18 General Electric Company in that state.
19 I worked for three years as a Process Physicist for 20 the General Electric Company at the Hanford Operations in 21 Richland, Washington. In this position I performed all 22 routine physics calculations for the K-WEST Production 23 Reactor, and provided fuel loading patterns and operating 24 techniques consistent with established safety criteria.
25 Following this period I accepted another position with 26 General Electric as a Nuclear Engineer in its Nuclear
(-) 27 Energy Division in San Jose, California. In this position 28
1 I performed analyses of design basis reactivity accidents 2 for safety analysis reports. I also participated in licens-3 ',ing efforts for the Oyster Creek and Nine Mile Point Nuclear 4 Power Plants, and had total responsibility for the prepara-5 tion of the Nine Mile Point and Monticello Technical 6 Specifications.
7 Following the three years at Hanford, and four years 8 in San Jose, I accepted a position as a Nuclear Engineer 9 with the Sacramento Municipal Utility District where I have l
10 been employed for the last nine years. I am presently a 11 Seni.or Nuclear Engineer in the Generation Engineering ;
1 12 Department and have had responsibilities in the design, l 13 erection, startup and licensing of Rancho Seco. ,
1 14 I am a member of Sigma Pi Sigma (a physics honorary
(]) j 15 society) and the American Nuclear Society. I am a regis-16 tered professional Nuclear Engineer in the State of Califor-17 nia, Registration No. N103, and have reviewed applications 18 for Professional Engineer registratio.n in the State of 19 California to determine the technical qualifications of the 20 candidates.
21 22 0 What is the purpose of your testimony?
23 A. The purpose of my testimony is to address certain 24 issues raised with respect to the Rancho Seco design.
25 Specifically, I will respond to those design issues raised 26 by the California Energy Commission (" CEC"), contentions by 27 Friends of the Earth (" FOE") , and those questions posed by 28 4_
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1 the Licensing Board that are not addressed by Babcock &
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2 Wilcox Company witnesses. My testimony will show that 1
3 contrary to the contentions asserted by the intervenors, 4 and in answer to the questions raised by the Board, there 5 is reasonable ~ assurance that Rancho Seco will respond l
6 safely to feedwater transients.
7 My testimony is organized into the following major 8 subject areas: (a) auxiliary feedwater system reliability 9 (Board Question CEC 1-6); (b) anticipatory reactor trips 10 (Board Question H-C 9, Additional Board Question 1) ; (c) 11 containment isolation design (CEC Issue 5-1); (d) the .
12 method for eliminating hydrogen concentrations in the 13 containment (Board Question H-C 20) ; (e) long-term
(')
V 14 modifications we are incorporating into the Rancho Seco 15 design (F0E Contention III(c)'. At the start of each 16 section of the testimony, I have quoted the contentions, 17 issues and/or Board questions which I am addressing.
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A. Auxiliary Feedwater System Reliability l 1
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(,) 2 Board Question CEC 1-6: Will the modifications of subpara- i graphs a-e of Section IV of the 3
Commission's order of May 7 still leave the Rancho Seco emergency 4
feedwater system'in a condition of low reliability?
5 6 Q. Why is the auxiliary feedwater system reliability of 7
interest in this hearing?
g A. The Auxiliary Feedwater ("AFW") system is designed to g supply feedwater to the steam generators to remove residual heat from tie primary system in the event of a loss of main 10 feedwater. Use of the AFW system as the replacement for 33 main feedwater provides for an orderly plant shutdown and 12 redu es the need to call upon high pressure injection or to 13 g relieve primary system pressure by opening the pressurizer v
p wer perated relief valve ("PORV") or the safety valves.
15 Therefore,. reliable operation of the AFW system is of 16 g interest in the event of a loss of feedwater transient.
An additional reason for interest in AFW system relia-18 yg bility is that, during the initial phase of th'e transient that led to the Three Mile Island accident, the AFW system 20 g had been valved out of service. While the absence of AFW may or may not have had an impact on the subsequent course of the accident at Three Mile Island, it has been widely cited as an instance of improper operating practices with potential safety implications.
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Q. Is the AFW system designed to safety standards at Rancho Seco?
A. Loss of coolant accident analyses performed by B&W at i 3 the time of Rancho Seco's. initial licensing assumed the 4 availability of AFW since it would normally be initiated l l
5 during such an accident. For this reason, the District 6 decided to design the AFW system to safety standards to 7 ensure that AFW would indeed be available in a loss of 0 coolant accident. Under our design, the AFW system at 0 Rancho Seco is actuated by a safety features actuation 10 signal generated by either a low primary system pressure or
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11 high reactor building pressure (either of which would be ,
12 indicative of a leak in the primary system).
13 14 Q. Are all AFW systems the same on plants with B&W designed -
15 nuclear steam supply systems?
16 A. No. The AFW system is not part of the B&W scope of 17 design and supply but is a system designed by each utility 18 or its architect-engineer. Therefore, there are wide dif-19 ferences in design, although all the AFW systems at plants j 1
20 with B&W nuclear steam supply systems meet certain criteria l 21 specified by B&W. The Rancho Seco design meets the criteria 22 of 780 gpm flow rate to the steam generators within 40 sec-23 onds following a loss of main feedwater or loss of forced l
l 24 reactor coolant flow. With a loss of main feedwater, this l 25 response will ensure that the reactor coolant system 26 pressure is maintained between 1,900 and 2,200 psig, the 27 PORV is not actuated, high pressure injection is not 28 1
actuated, the pressurizer does not fill or empty with
.)' liquid, the steam generator inventory is not depleted, and 3 core coolant is maintained more tnan 50 degree.s F below d saturation temperature. If, for some reason, the AFW 5 system is not available at all, tha high pressure injection 6 system will provide adequate core cooling.
7 0 Q. Were improvements made to the AFW system as a result of the 9 . Commission's May 7, 1979 Order?
10 A. Yes. In response to Item "a" of the Order, one of the 11 shor.t-term modifications, the following changes were made 12 at Rancho prior to resumption of operation on July 5, 1979, 13 to upgrade the timeliness and reliability of the AFW system. ,
i 14 1. Operating procedures have been revised to ensure I
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15 that the motor-driven AFW pump starts in a timely and l 10 proper manner, and is powered from a vital AC bus on a loss 17 of off-site power.
18 2. Procedures have been implemented to require an l 19 operator to be present at the necessary AFW valves in phone l 20 communication with the control room during any AFW surveil-21 lance which would require valve alignment changes upon AFW 22 demands.
23 3. Procedures have been implemented and testing per-24 formed to demonstrate control of AFW flow independent from 25 the integrated control system in the event that system 26 fails.
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- 4. Verification has been made that the AFW system
( 2 will supply feedwater at a flow rate sufficient to accom-3 modate the decay heat level from the reactor core that i 4 would be generated in the event of an accident.
5 5. Modifications have been made which provide control 6 room indication of AFW flow rate to each steam generator.
7 These modifications provide indication to the operators 8 that the entire system is operating properly. Flow meters 9 have been provided for both injection flow paths downstream 10 of the AFW control valves, so that actual flow rates to 11 each steam generator are measured. The flow rate is ,
l 12 displayed in the control room and a calibration test has 13 been performed to functionally test the performance of the 14
({) flow meters.
15 6. Procedures have been revised to provide for alter-16 native sources of water to the suction of the AFW pumps.
17 The normal supply of water to the AFW system is from the 18 condensate storage tank, which is lar.ge enough to provide i 19 cooling for about 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Transfer to an alternate source i
20 is accomplished by manually operating.four isolation valves, 21 and the operator has about 40 minutes to implement the ,
l 22 transfer once a condensate storage tank low level alarm is l 23 received in the control room.
24 7. Control room annunciation has been provided for 25 all automatic starts of the AFW system. Conditions for 26 automatic AFW system action are: (a) loss of all reactor 4
( 27 coolant pumps, (b) low discharge pressure on both main l 1
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I feedwater pumps, or (c) manual start of the motor driven O 2 auxiliary feedwater pump. A safety features actuation 3 signal, discussed earlier, will also automatically start 4 the auxiliary feedwater system and has always been 5 annunciated in the control room.
6 8. Pr'ocedures have.been revised to assure timely 7 operator verification of any automatic initiation of AFW 8 flow. -
9 9. Verification has been made that the air operated 10 oTSc level control valves fail to the 50 percent open 11 position on a loss of electric power and fail to the 100 ,
12 percent open position upon loss of service air.
13 Several of these modifications are discussed in more O 14 .
aetet1 ie ticemeee restime v of aome1a 3. aoatiemez.
15 16 Q. Have these nine modifications been reviewed by the 17 Commission?
18 A. Yes. The Commission. Staff performed a safety i
19 evaluation of these and other actions taken by the District 20 to comply with the directives in paragraphs (a) through (e) 21 of the Commission's May 7, 1979 Order. The safety review 22 revealed, and the Commission Staff concluded in a letter to 23 the District dated June 27, 1979, that the modifications 24 performed by the District were satisfactory and that the 25 District had in fact upgraded the timeliness and reliability 26 of delivery from the AFW system at Rancho Seco in compliance O 27 with the May 7, 1979 Order.
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I Q. Are there any other modifications made by Licensee which 7
2 have an effect on the timeliness or reliability of the 3 auxiliary feedwater system?
4 A. Yes. The addition of an anticipatory reactor trip on i 5 loss of main feedwater has provided additional margin in 6 the requirements for auxiliary feedwater, since the loss of 7 main feedwater trip results in a reactor trip sooner than 8 when the high reactor coolant pressure trip would occur.
9 With this change the primary system heat input is reduced 10 more rapidly, reducing the boil-off rate of the steam l 11 generator inventory and minimizing the AFW flow , l l
12 requirements.
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14 Q. Have any studies been performed to compare the reliability
[v) 1 15 of the Rancho Seco AFW system to that of other operating 16 plants?
17 A. Yes. Shortly after the Three Mile Island accident, 18 B&W performed an AFW system reliabili.ty analysis for all 6
19 plants wit._ B&W nuclear steam supply ("NSS") systems. 'Even l 20 though the AFW system is outside of B&W's scope of supply, 21 B&W was chosen to perform this anclysis to provide consist- ,
l 22 ency in all the analyses. D&W performed this analysis using i 23 a method similar to that employed in a study performed by 24 the Commission of plants with NSS systems provided by other ;
1 25 vendors. B&W's analysis considered three events: (1) loss
, 26 of main feedwater with reactor trip, (2) loss of main feed-t
'v'j water coincident with a loss of off-site power, and (3) 27 28 q
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I loss of main feedwater coincident with a loss of all AC C:) 2 power. For each of the three cases, system reliability as 3 a function of time was evaluated. A total of 54 detailed 4 fault tree analyses were performed covering the six 5 different AFW system designs, with the three cases run at 6 three different points in time for each case. This study 7 shows that the Rancho Seco AFW system provides a reliability 8 generally equal to or greater than that of other plants.
9 10 Q. Are there any instances during which the AFW system has 11 failed to operate at Rancho Seco? ,
12 A. No. This operating experience will be described in 13 more detail by Mr. Rodriguez.
(]) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 O 27 28 B. Anticipatory Reactor Trips.
7 Board Question H-C 9: Rancho Seco, being a Babcock & Wilcox designed reactor, has not installed 3 adequate hard wire control grade reactor trip on loss of main feedwater 4 and/or on turbine trip, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and 5 safety of the Petitioners, 6
constit'uents of Petitioners and the public.
7 Additional Board 8
Question 1: At a meeting with owners of B&W reac-tors h' eld on August 23 it was noted that, in the interim then elapsed since O the TMI 2 accident, control-grade hard<-
wired anticipatory reactor trips (ART) 10 had been called to respond four times and had failed once:
A. Is this typical of performance by 12 control-grade trips?
13 B. What are the safety implications fw for operation of Rancho Seco before
(,) 14 such trips are upgraded?
15 Q. Why did B&W designed NSS systems not incorporate a reactor 16 trip upon loss of feedwater and/or turbine trip?
17 A. The B&W designed NSS systems utilize what is known as a 18 "once through steam generator." Such a design, feature im-19 proves plant efficiency and closely couples the primary 20 system to the secondary side of the plant. This close 21 coupling provides a fast response in the primary system to 22 events, such as a turbine trip, in the secondary system.
23 Because of this fast response, the plant was designed to be 24 capable of reducing power following a turbine trip instead 25 of completely tripping the reactor.
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1 Q. Were any modifications made to this aspect of the Rancho O
k# 2 Seco design as a result of the Nuclear Regulatory 3 commission's order of May 7, 19797 4 A. Yes. In response to Item "c" of the Order, one of the 5 short-term modifications, a hard-wired control-grade reactor 6 trip was implemented prior to the resumption of operation on 7 July 5, 1979, that would be actuated on loss of main feed-8 water and/or turbine trip. Previous to this modification, a 9 loss of main feedwater transient with attendant pressure 10 increase would have tripped the reactor only upon reaching 11 the. reactor's high pressure trip setpoint. This modification 12 directly trips the reactor on loss of main feedwater, so the 13 reactor trip will now occur earlier in the transient. For
() 14 this reason, it is called an " anticipatory trip". It trips 15 the reactor in anticipation of a high pressure trip. ,
16 similarly, a turbine trip now causes a direct trip of the 17 reactor, a result that would not have necessarily occurred 18 prior to the modification 19 20 Q. Are these anticipatory trips considered a necessary safety 21 feature of the plant?
22 A. These modifications are considered desirable in light 23 f the accident at Three Mile Island. However, implementa-24 ti n of these trips with control-grade circuitry is accept-25 able since neither a loss of main feedwater nor a turbine 26 trip would in themselves lead to any significant safety con-O 27 sequences. As mentioned above, the loss of main feedwater 28 o
8 trip is in anticipation of a possible safety related high O 2 pressure trip, and a turbine trip does not normally result in any primary system parameter exceeding its normal 4 operating range.
5 6 Is a control-grade circuit adequate for providing a reactor 0
7 trip?
O A. As a long-term modification directed by the Commission 9 in its May 7, 1979, Order, these control-grade trip functions 10 will be upgraded to safety-grade systems in the next four II months. However, since they do not perform a direct safety ,
12 function, but operate in anticipation of the possibility of 13 the unit reaching a limit with safety implications, operation 14 with a control-grade system is entirely proper. The control-15 grade circuitry has been designed to the highest industry 16 standards to provide high reliability of operation. This 17 circuitry is comparable in quality and reliability to other 18 control-grade circuitry installed at Rancho Se,co, such as 19 the turbine generator controls, which has proved extremely 20 reliable in over five years of' operation. The control-grade 21 trip functions have operated successfully in three turbine 22 trips at Rancho Seco and have been tested monthly without j 23 any failures.
24 25 Q. Is the performance of control-grade anticipatory reactor 26 trips (one. failure out of four attempts) up to August 23 27 typical of performance by .nntrol-grade circuitry?
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,3 A. No. Four attempts to operate a system do not provide adequate statistical evidence upon which a prediction can be
'made of overall system behavior. This is particularly true 4 in the time period immediately after a system is newly 5 installed, during which operator familiarization and 0 maintenance problems have to be resolved. It should be 7 pointed out that as of February 8, 1980, the anticipatory 0 trips have operated successiully eleven out of twelve times O at B&W designed plants during loss of feedwater and turbine 10 trip transients.
11 I2 Q. Can Rancho Seco continue to operate safely before these 13 trips are upgraded to safety grade?
n (j I4 A. Yes. As mentioned above, these trips are anticipatory 15 in nature and do not fulfill the function of a safety grade 16 reactor trip. The safety trips in the reactor protection 17 system at Rancho Seco prevent any safety limits from being 18 exceeded. The anticipatory trips merely provi,de additional 19 margin.
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l C. Containment Isolation Design l
\v' 2 Issue CEC 5-1: Whether those systems identified as contributing to the releases of radio-3 activity during the TMI accident, which are outside containment, should be 4 changed to vent into the containment building?-
6 0 Are there any releases of radioactivity during or following 7 a loss of feedwater transient?
8 A. No. Multiple failures and/or errors would have to take 9 place before a feedwater transient leads to a release of 10 radioactivity. Moreover, with the present setpoints for 11 reac. tor h'igh pressure trip and PORV opening at Rancho Seco .
12 there will not be even a discharge of primary coolant 13 inventory from the primary system through the PORV to the
- 14 pressurizer relief tank following a loss of main feedwater.
15 16 Q. Which were the pathways for the release of radioactivity 17 during the Three Mile Island accident?
18 A. The following five pathways had a potential for the 19 release of airborne fission products during the Three Mile 20 Island accident: (1) reactor coolant letdown / makeup system;
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21 (2) reactor coolant drain tank vent to vent header; (3) 22 reactor coolant drain tank to reactor coolant bleed tanks; l 23 (4) reactor coolant drain tank vent to reactor coolant bleed 24 tanks; and (5) reactor building sump to the auxiliary 25 building sump. of these five pathways, the first two were 26 the most significant.
(7,)
27 28 1 Q. Were these pathways open during the accident at Three Mile
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2 Island?
3 A. Yes. All pressurized water reactors have a containment 4 structure which constitutes a major fission product barrier 5 for.the protection of the health and safety of the public.
6 In order to provide containment integrity, all pathways which 7 penetrate the containment have redundant provisions for 8 isolation.
9 The pathways identified above at Three Mile Island had 10 such an isolation capability; however, there was no contain-11 ment isolation initiation signal, because the Three Mile 12 Island design provided for containment isolation on high 13 reactor building pressure, but not on low reactor coolant n
() 14 system pressure. Therefore, containment isolation was not 15 initiated at Three Mile Island until 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and 56 minutes 16 into the accident.
17 18 0 Are there any differences.in the design of Three Mile Island 19 and Rancho Seco which would have prevented such releases?
20 A. Yes. Rancho Seco's containment isolation is initiated not only on high reactor building pressure, but also on low 21 rea t r coolant system pressure. This additional feature 22 ,
w uld is~ late the Rancho Seco containment early in a tran-23 sient, such as occurred at TMI, well before any significant 24 release of radioactive material to the auxiliary building 25 m
g Would occur, and Certainly well before enough quantities w re released to overpressurize or fill a system in the 27 28 I auxiliary building and perhaps cause a release to the atmos-( 2 phere. The failure of the Three Mile Island containment to 3 isolate was recognized by the Commission as one of six main 4 areas of concern, as identified in IE Bulletin 79-05A issued on April 5, 1979. As a result of this concern, other pres-5 surized water reactors have instituted the type of contain-6 7
ment isolation signal from low reactor coolant system 8 pressure that has always been present at Rancho Seco.
9 Q. With this containment isolation provision at Rancho Seco, is 10 there any' necessity to vent systems in the auxiliary building 37 .
into the containment building?
12 A. No. Such provisions are not necessary due to the 13
" single-failure-proof" design of the present containment 74 is lati n system.
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 .
24 25 26
() 27 28 l .
1 fm I D. Method for Eliminating Hydrogen
! ) Concentrations in the Containment.
2 3
soard Question n-c 20: Rancho Seco, being a Babcock &
Wilcox designed reactor, does not 4 have a hydrogen recombiner which may be necessary in the event of an 5 accident caused by a' loss of feed-water transient, and therefore is 6 . unsafe and endangers the health and
- safety of Petitioners, constituents
/ of the Petitioners and the public.
8 9 Q. Are hydrogen recombiners necessary in the event of a loss of 10 feedwater transient?
11 A. No. A loss of feedwater is an anticipated transient 12 that normally will not result in off-normal conditions, 13 including hydrogen generation, without additional multiple rs
() 14 failures.
15 16 Q. Are hydrogen recombiners necessary in the event of a loss of 17 coolant accident resulting in fuel failure and the 18 generation of hydrogen?
19 A. There are two acceptable methods of removing hydrogen 20 from a containment structure. The first method uses a 21 " hydrogen recombiner", a device that combines hydrogen and 22 oxygen to form water and thereby eliminates the hydrogen's 23 potential for burning. The second method is to purge the 24 hydrogen through a filtered purge system before the hydrogen 25 reaches flammable concentrations. Purging is done at a
-~ 26 Point in rime far enough into an accident that short-lived
(
27 radioactive isotopes have decayed.
28
__ 9
l l
l l
l l '
1 Q. Does the Rancho Seco plant incorporate either of these l
l 2 provisions for removing hydrogen?
l 3 A. Rancho Seco has.a hydrogen purge system. This system 4 is calculated to start releasing (770 hours0.00891 days <br />0.214 hours <br />0.00127 weeks <br />2.92985e-4 months <br /> after initiation 5 of the event) some of the hydrogen generated in a maximum 6 hypothetical accident with one percent fuel failure. In ac-7 cordance with Commission regulations, the emergency core 8 cooling system at Rancho Seco is~ designed so that there will 9 be no more than one percent failed fuel in a design basis 10 accident. Rancho Seco's hydrogen purge system was reviewed -
11 in d.etail' prior to the issuance of the facility's operating 12 license.
13 .
Q. With this method for removing hydrogen from the Rancho Seco
([) 14 15 e ntainment, is it necessary to have a hydrogen recombiner?
16 A. We d . not believe a hydrogen recombiner is needed at 37 Rancho Seco. However, many recombiners are skid-mounted J gg units which can be transported from 1.ocation to location l
gg easily. In view of this flexibility of transportation and S an additi nal precautionary. measure, we have contracted 20 g3 with the Arizona Public Service Company ("APS") for its loan to us in an emergency of its hydrogen recombiner, currently 22 in st rage at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. l 23 24 0 could the APS recombiner be delivered and installed timely 25 gg at Rancho Seco in the event of an accident leading to O 27 hydrogen accumulation in the containment?
28
, 1 A. Yes. The APS recombiner could be delivered to Rancho t
)
2 Seco within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of its being requested. Since the need 3 for recombining hydrogen in containment would not arise 4 until several days after the initiation of the accident, 5 there would be ample time for delivery and installation of 6 the APS device if it were ever needed.
7 8 0 Discussingthisissueattbe.prehearingconferenceon 9
February 6, 1980, Licensing Board Member Shon observed that 10 a hydrogen explosion apparently occurred at Three Mile Island nine or ten hours after the incident began. Would a 11 12 hydrogen recombiner be beneficial for hydrogen generation in 13 the amounts experienced at Three Mile Island?
o First I should observe that our testimony demonstrates L) 14 A.
15 the ability to respond safely td feedwater transients at Rancho Seco, so that an event such as the Three Mile Island 16 ceident will not be repeated at this plant. To respond to 17 Mr. Shon's observation, however, hydrogen generation during 18 1g the Three Mile Island accident was at a rate approximately five hundred times the rate at which a hydrogen recombiner 20 which is available today could recombine the hydrogen.
21 Therefore, neither a hydrogen recombiner nor a purge system 22 w uld have provided much benefit during this accident.
23 24 O. What are the consequences of not having the ability to 25 rem ve su h hydrogen concentrations?
26 n]
w.
l 27 28 .
,s 1 A. The hydrogen combustion which occurred at Three Mile i )
~'
2 Island produced a pressure spike of approximately 28 psig.
3 It is generally agreed that the combustion of all the 4 hydrogen producible at a facility such as TMI-2 or Rancho 5 Seco would not exceed the strength of the containment 6 building. If all the hydrogen generated is retained within 7 the primary system, there is no danger of a hydrogen 8 explosion since there is no oxygen present for the 9 reaction. Before an explosion could occur an opening would 10 be required in the primary system for the release of 11 hydrogen to the containment atmosphere. Under these 12 circumstances the emergency core cooling system is designed 13 to limit fuel failures to one percent with a break or is ) 14 opening as large as a double-ended rupture of the largest 15 pipe in the primary system. Therefore, hydrogen generation 16 cannot exceed that which I described earlier, nor result in 17 the need for purging until 770 hours0.00891 days <br />0.214 hours <br />0.00127 weeks <br />2.92985e-4 months <br /> after initiation of the 18 event. consequently, a hydrogen recombiner is not needed at 19 Rancho Seco.
20 21 22 23 24 l
l 25
('; 26 LJ 27 28 l
l 7x 1 E. Long-Term Modifications to be (w__. ) Incorporated at Rancho Seco.
g 8 FOE Contention III(c): The NRC orders in issue do not reasonably assure adequate safety 4 because there is no reasonable time for implementation of the long-term 5 modifications established in the Commission orders.
6 7 Q. What are the long-term modifications established in the 8 Commission Order?
9 A. On April 27, 1979, prior to the issuance of the Commis-10 sion order of May 7, 1979, the District agreed to shut 11 Rancho Seco down on April 28, 1979 and not to restart the 12 unit until five items, usually referred to as items a-e, 13 were completed.
[/l w 14 In addition, the District committed to some additional 15 long term actions, not immediately required, to provide 16 additional assurance that the facility would respond safely 17 to a loss of feedwater transient. These actions could 18 therefore be completed after the unit. resumed operation.
19 The Commission's May 7 Order, which was confirmatory in 20 nature, stated that "the Licensee shall as promptly as 21 practicable also accomplish the long-term modifications set 22 forth in Section II of this order." There were four 23 1 ng-term requirements specified:
24 (1) We were t provide a proposed schedule for identi-fied design m difications related to nine ac.tions to l 25 upgrade the auxiliary feedwater system.
l
<^T 26 RI
\
gy 28 I
(2) We were to submit a failure mode and effects O 2 analysis of the integrated control system.
3 (3) The anticipatory reactor trip on loss of main 4 feedwater and/or trip of the turbine was to be upgraded 5 so that the components are safety grade and this design 6 was to be submitted.to the Commission staff for review.
7 (4) We were to continue operator training and have a 8 minimum of two licensed' operators per shift with TMI-2 9 simulator training by June 1, 1979, and thereafter have 10 at least one licensed operator with TMI 2 simulator 11 training assigned to the control room. All training of ,
12 licensed personnel was to be completed by June 28, 1979.
13
() 14 Q. Why were the long-term modifications not required to be 15 completed during the plant shutdown?
16 A. It was the judgment of both the Commission and the Dis-17 trict that these modifications were not required immediately 18 to provide reasonable assurance that-the facility would re-19 spond safely to a feedwater transient, but instead tended to 20 further enhance the capability'and reliability of the reactor 21 to respond to feedwater transients.
22 23 Q. What is the current status of these long-term modifications?
l 24 A. The first. item covered the implementation of nine modi-25 fications which would increase the reliability of the auxil- l 26 iary feedwater system. These nine items were completed O 27 prior to the resumption of operation on July 5, 1979,-as 28 l
1 discussed in Section B above in response to Board Question 2 CEC 1-6. In addition, B&W's auxiliary feedwater system 3 reliability study, which is described above in Section B, 4 has been completed.
5 The second item required the District to submit a 6 failure modes and effects analysis of the integrated control 7 system to the NRC staff. This report, submitted to the NRC 8 on August 17, 1979, is described in Licensee's testimony of ;
9 Mr. Bruce A. Karrasch and Robert C. Jones.
10 A third long-term item required the District to submit 11 a p.reliminary design for implementing a safety grade reactor 12 trip on loss of main feedwater and/or turbine trip. We pro-13 vided simplified conceptual drawings to the NRC staff on May '
14 21, 1979, for such a safety grade trip. The NRC requested 15 additional information on this system on September 7, 1979, 16 and that information was supplied on October 5, 1979. The 17 NRC staff approved the proposed design on December 20, 1979, 18 which allowed the District to proceed towards installation.
19 Additional detailed design information will have to be pro-20 vided for final NRC staff approval prior to actual implement- j 21 ation of the safety grade trip. Approximately six months 22 will be required to install this safety grade trip from the E time of NRC approval on December 20, 1979. As mentioned 24 earlier, this anticipatory trip is being installed to further 25 reduce the likelihood of the PORV opening during anticipated 26 transients and does not serve a direct safety function.
27 Therefore, operation in.the interim with a control-grade 20 trip is acceptable.
i
I
-s The fourth long-term item rcquired by the Commission's l 'r
2 May 7 Order required Rancho Seco to have two licensed oper-3 ators on shif t with TMI-2 simulator training by June 1,1979 4 with at least one licensed operator with this training 5 assigned to the control room. As Mr. Rodriguez will testify, 6 the last Rancho Seco operator completed Three Mile Island' I training on the simulator on June 21, 1979, prior to the 8 restart of the unit, and the' District is complying with the 9 shift requirements for licensed operators.
10 In summary, three of the four long-term modifications 11 directed by the Commission in its May 7, 1979 Order have ,
12 slready been completed and the last one will be implemented 13 within the next four months.
(~') 14 v
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 .
24 25 96
?. 1
'- )
27 28
L p
March 11, 1980 0 :
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD [
r In the Matter-of ) f
) .
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT ) Docket No. 50-312
)
(Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating )
Station) )
i O
LICENSEE'S TESTIMONY OF ROBERT A. DIETERICH IN RESPONSE TO CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION. ISSUE 5-2 ,
i 8
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?
i O-
?
h
4
() 1 Q. What is your name and business address?
2 A. My name is Robert A. Dieterich. My business address is 3 Sacramento Municipal Utility District, Post Office Box 15830, 4 Sacramento, California 95813.
5 Q. Have you previously submitted prepared testimony in this 6 proceeding?
7 A. Yes. On February.ll and 26, 1980 I submitted testimony 8 on behalf of Licensee with respect to certain of the questions, 9 issues and contentions in this proceeding.
10 Q. What is the purpose of this additional testimony?
11 A. The purpose of this testimony is to address Issue 5-2 12 raised by the California Energy Commission (" CEC"), which 13 reads as follows:
O 14 whethertae co t 1==e=* au11a1=e eaou1a be modified to provide overpressurization 15 protection with a controlled filtered venting system to mitigate unavoidable 16 releases of radionuclides?
17 Q. Will a feedwater transient result in an overpressurization of 18 the containment building?
l l
19 A. No. One would have to assume gross core damage beyond I 20 the design basis of a reactor to develop conditions which 21 could lead to containment overpressurization. With the I 22 present setpoints for reactor high pressure trip and PORV 23 opening at Rancho Seco, it is very unlikely that there will 24 be a discharge of primary coolant inventory through the PORV 25 to the pressurizer relief tank following loss of main 26 feedwater, hence a release of. primary system contents to
() :
i
l l
() 1 the containment atmosphere is highly improbable.
2 Q. What is the rationale for considering ways to mitigate the ;
3 effects of containment building overpressurization?
4 A. All light water reactors in the United States are 5 designed under a " defense in depth" concept which utilizes 6 multiple barriers to the escape of fission products. These 7 barriers include the uranium dioxide ceramic fuel pellet 8 itself, which retains fission products within its structure; 9 the fuel rod cladding, which also holds the fuel in a 10 critical array; the reactor coolant pressure vessel, which 11 acts as a barrier in the event of minor fuel leaks during 12 plant operation; and, finally, the reactor containment 13 structure. .
() 14 It has been theorized that the last of these barriers, 15 1.e. the' containment structure, may be subjected to an 16 internal pressure in excess of its design limits and fail in' 17 the event of a very severe accident. Under those hypothetical 18 conditions, it has been suggested that a relief device to 19 vent any radioactive matter through a filtering system would 20 mitigate the consequences of containment failure.
21 Q. Is the containment structure at Rancho Seco strong enough to 22 withstand any credible pressure buildup?
23 A. Yes. The Rancho Seco containment is designed to-24 withstand a combination of earthquake loadings plus the 25 pressure loadings resulting from the double ended rupture of 26 O
1 1 the largest pipe in the primary system. See Rancho Seco
(]
2 FSAR 55.2.2.1. The design basis limiting accident scenario 3 has often been called the " maximum credible accident" and is 4 used to establish the design limits of the reactor containment 5 structure. The maximum pressure transient produced in a 6 design basis accident would yield pressures in the order of 50 7 psi. The containment at Rancho Seco can accommodate such 8 pressures and probably much higher ones. Containment pressures 9 in excess of 50 psi, however, can be postulated if one assumes 10 complete melting of the core. Since the mechanism leading to 11 a core melt is highly improbaole, such an accident is often 12 called "the maximum hypothetical accident. " Maximum hypo-13 thetical accidents have been analyzed mainly to compute worst p) t 14 case radioactive releases to be considered in siting a nuclear l
l 15 plant.
16 Q. How does a controlled filtered venting system work? j 17 A. It is my understanding that the controlled filtered 18 venting system which has been suggested for study by CEC is 19 described in a study entitled " Underground Siting of Nuclear 20 Power Reactors: An Option for California -- A Summary of the 21 Technical and Economic Implications with Recommendations" 22 (" Underground Study"). See CEC's Response to Interrogatory 5 l 23 of the Licensee's Second Set of Interrogatories.
24 The system proposed in the Underground Study would create 25 venting pathways out of primary containment by adding a number 26 of large ducts sealed by discs ' designed to fail at pressures
1
() 1 above those anticipated in design basis accidents yet below 2 those which would jeopardize the primary containment." For a 3 surface plant, these vent pipes would apparently terminate 4 into "a vent stack, filled with selected filtering material, 5 (venting] to the atmosphere." Underground Study, S5.3 at pp.
6 5-2 to 5-4; and see 58.6.1 at p. 8-8. Presumably, if an 7 accident resulted in primary containment pressures near the 8 containment design limit, the discs would rupture and the 9 gases within the containment would be conveyed by the vent 10 pipes to the vent stack, filtered through the filtering 11 material to absorb radioactive matter, and released to the l l
12 atmosphere.
13 Q. Has a controlled filtered venting system ever been'used on a
() 14 United States commercial reactor?
15 A. Not to my knowledge. The concept has received some study, l l
16 but has not been incorporated into the design of any nuclear l 17 l power plant in the United States. In my opinion, there has 18 been little interest in a controlled filtered venting system 19 because it is safer to ensure containment integrity than to 20 provide for mitigation of a containment failure.
21 Q. Is there any characteristic in the design of B&W NSS systems 22 that makes it more likely J.nat containment building over-23 pressurization will occur.following a feedwater transient?
24 A. No. Nor is there any characteristic of B&W design NSS 25 systems that would make addition of a controlled filtered vent-26 ing system more desirable than at plants designed by odwr veibrs .
O ,
4
() 1 Q. Would the use of a controlled filtered venting system be 2 consistent with the concepts embodied in the Commission's 3 General Design Criteria?
4 A. No. It is my understanding that General Design 5 Criteria 16 and 50 of Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. 50 require the 6 containment design to be essentially leak-tight.
7 Q. Are there any possible adverse safety impacts from installation 8 of a containment venting system?
9 A. A number of possible safety drawbacks to a controlled 10 filtered venting system have been identified. For example, 11 Section 5.1 of a study by the Sandia Laboratories entitled I 1
12 " Program Plan for the Investigation of Vent-Filtered Contain- !
13 ment Conceptual Designs for Light Water Reactors", NUREG/CR-
[)
s_-
14 1029 (October 1979) ("the Sandia Study") notes that a l i
15 controlled filtered venting system could have adverse l l
16 impacts upon other plant safety systems. Thus, for certain 17 kinds of primary system breaks the containment pressure 18 buildup provides back pressure reducing the amount of 19 leakage through the postulated break. Relieving the 20 containment pressure through a controlled filtered vent would 21 reduce this back pressure and increase the leakage. Ano ther 22 example is the possibility that the containment pressure 23 reduction created by the venting would cause flashing of 24 the containment sump water, which in turn might result in 25 cavitation in the reactor building spray pumps and the low 26 pressure injection pumps.
,-~
( )) 1 Operation of a controlled filtered venting system may 2 also escalate an accident of minimal consequences into an 3 accident of large consequences. For instance, it is possible 4 that in a loss of coolant accident the reactor building spray 5 system would be delayed for some reason resulting in a !
6 temporary overpressurization of the containment. While in the 7 absence of filtered venting subsequent actuation of the sprays 1
8 would terminate the transient without consequences, operation 9 of the venting system could lead to unnecessary releases of 10 radioactivity through the vent system. It is also possible 11 that a vacuum might be created in such a situation, and that 12 the sump might run dry because of a loss of steam inventory.
13 Another possible effect of a controlled filtered venting A 14
(_,j system is hydrogen ignition within the containment due to an 15 increase in the concentration of hydrogen relative to air.
16 See Sandia Study, 55.3. Still another area of concern is the 17 possibility of hydrogen explosions in the vent line itself.
i 18 Id. Finally, there is the potential adverse effect of a con-19 trolled filtered venting discharge because of the temperature 20 reduction caused by the filtration system, which might make 21 the resulting plume considerably less buoyant than an un-22 filtered one. See Sandia Study, S5.4.
23 In summary, there are many potential adverse aspects of a 24 controlled filtered venting system, some of which may not have 25 been identified at this time. All of these aspects must be 26 considered before the desirability of a controlled filtered C)
i ..
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I i
{} l 2
vent system can be determined.
Q. Are there any controlled filtered venting systems currently 3 available?
4 A. Not to my knowledge. Such systems, as applicable to 5 commercial power plants, have not been designed and the 6 criteria for such a design have not even been developed.
7 There has been no demonstration of the effectiveness, re-8 liability or safety of controlled filtered venting systems j 9 for commercial power plants.
10 Q. Is there any proposal before the NRC to examine the 11 feasibility of controlled filtered venting systems on a 12 generic basis? l 13 A. Yes. The Commission has before it a recommendation from 14
} the Lessons Learned Task Force to issue "a notice of intent 15 to conduct rulemaking to solicit comments relating to the 16 consideration of design features to mitigate accidents that 17 would result in (a) core-melt and (b) severe core damage, but 18 not substantial melting. " Included among the areas for 19 comment would be "(6) . . . What is the expected effectiveness 20 and performance of suggested means of reducing the con-21 sequences of events in which severe damage or substantial 22 melting of the core occurs, in particular, systems for 23 controlled, filtered venting of the containment and for 24 preventing the uncontrolled combustion of hydrogen?".
25 NUREG-0585, Appendix A at pp. A-14 and A-15. The authors of-26 NUREG-0585 recommend that a proposed rule be published 7--
u
<x 1
(_) for public comment within one year of the notice of intent.
2 Also,Section II.B.8 of the Staff Draft Action Plan (NUREG-3 0660, dated December 10, 1979) proposes that the Commission 4 issue in April, 1980 an advance notice of proposed 5 rulemaking on methods of mitigating the consequences of 6 degraded core and core melt accidents including, among 7 others, controlled filtered venting methods. The advance 8 notice would be followed by publication of a proposed rule 9 in March,1981 and hearings, if required, by December, 1982.
10 Whether or not the Commission acts on these proposals, 11 the fact that they have been made suggests that examination 12 of the feasibility of controlled filtered venting systems 13 is a generic issue applicable to all nuclear power plants; ;
()s 14 the proposed extended schedules for responses to the notice l j
15 of rulemaking underscore the primitive stage of understanding )
16 that exists at this point in time with respect to such systems. )
17 Q. Would a containment overpressurization protection device have 18 assisted in mitigating an accident such as that occurring at 19 Three. Mile Island?
20 A. No. Radioactive releases at TMI were not through breaks 21 in the containment, but through the open pathways as discussed 22 in my earlier testimony in response to CEC Issue 5-1. Indeed, 23 the 28-pound localized pressure spike recorded on the first 24 day of the TMI accident could very well have caused a venting 25 system to open, had one been in place at TMI. If that had 26 happened, there would have been unnecessary releases of
/s b
() 1 radioactivity into the environment. Instead, the bulk of the 2 radioactive matter has remained within the cor.cainment 3 structure at TMI.
4 Q. What is your opinion as to the advisability of modifying the 5 containment building at Rancho Seco to incorporate a 6 controlled filtered venting system?
7 A. In my opinion, such a modification is neither advisable 8 nor desirable. The reasons for my conclusion are that the 9 Rancho Seco containment building is designed.to withstand 10 pressures resulting from all but extremely severe and 11 improbable accidents, and incorporation of a controlled 12 filtered venting system would at best add only a minimum 13 extra margin of safety. On the other hand, such a system
() 14 might compromise the leak-tight nature of the containment, 15 could affect adversely other plant safety systems, could 16 escalate the effects of an otherwise minor accident, could in-17 crease the probability of a hydrogen explosion within the 18 containment, and could give rise to other safety problems 19 which would outweigh the system's usefulness. Moreover, 20 controlled filtered venting systems have not progressed 21 beyond the conceptual stage and are just beginning to be 22 examined, on a generic basis, by the NRC. Their effectiveness, 23 reliability and safety have not been demonstrated, and no 24 examination has been made of their cost of installation 25 and maintenance versus the potential benefits they might 26 provide.
O
February 26, 1980 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY' COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICEINSING BOARD 1
In the Matter of )
)
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT ) Docket No. 50-312
)
(RanchoSecoNuclearGeneratingStation) )
l LICENSEE'S SUPPLEMENTAL.
1 TESTIMONY OF ROBERT A. DIETERICH IN RESPONSE TO BOARD QUESTION H-C 20 O
/
1 Q. What is your name and business address?
O 2 A. My name is Robert A. Dieterich. My business address is Sacramento 3 Municipal Utility District, Post Office Box 15830, Sacramento, 4 California 95813.
5 -
6 Q. Have you previously submitted testimony in this proceeding?
7 A. Yes. On February 11, 1980 I submitted testimony on behalf of )
8 Licensee with respect to certain of the questions, issues and 9 contentions in this proceeding. !
l 10 '
11 Q. What is the purpose of your supplemental testimony?
12 A. The purpose of my supplemental testimony is to address part "b" 13 of Board Question H-C 20, as set forth in the Licensing Board's O 14 Order Subsequent t the Prehearing Conference of February 6,1980, ,
15 which states as follows (Order at p. 7): !
16 BQ H-C 20: Does Rancho Seco's present system for coping for hydrogen release in containment provide I ,t for:
18
- b. proper radiological protection of the 19 surroundings if purging is depended upon?
20 21 Q. Has an analysis been performed of the radiological consequences of 22 purging the containment building at Rancho Seco in the event of-23 an accident?
24 25 A. Yes. Appendix 14C of the' Rancho Seco Final Safety Analysis Report 26 (FSAR) contains an analysis of the radiological releases caused by 27 purging the containment following a design accident with one 28 percent fuel failure.
1 Q. What are the results of that analysis?
2 A. The analysis shows that the radiation dose at the Rancho Seco 3 site boundary following a design basis accident and a containment 4 purge to release hydrogen would be well within the guidelines set 5 forth in 10 C.F.R. 5100, " Reactor Site Criteria". !
6 7 Q. Has a similar analysis been conducted for an accident in which 8 there is greater than one percent; fuel failure?
9 A. Yes. Appendix 14C of the Rancho Seco FSAR contains a second 10 analysis assuming five percent fuel failure.
11 12 Q. What are the results of this analysis?
13 A. This analysis shows the radiation dose at the Rancho Seco site 14 boundary to be well within the guidelines set forth in 10 C.F.R. G 15 50.44, " Standards for Combustible Gas Control System in Light-16 Water Cooled Power Reactors".
17 1
18 Q. Has a similar analysis been made assuming the massive fuel 19 failure alleged to have occurred at Three Mile Island?
l 20 A. No. Neither purging nor recombining the hydrogen released from i 21 this magnitude of cladding - water reaction would have mitigated 22 the consequences of the accident and purging would not have taken 1
23 place at least until the times assumed in the above analyses. I l
24 25 26 27 j 28 t
1389 i y
'l '
l I
' MR. BAXTER . I would like to note that the offer
!. 2 ,
j aria the presentation of testimony by Jicensee in respoinse +
l 3
! to California Energy Connionion issue 5-7 should not be l 6 l
l construsd in t.ny way as a waiver of o'2r previously stated i i 5 }' + '
i i
objections to a consideration of thet issue in the pro- i i t!
l conding.
3 >
r l Mr. Dietarich is available for crost;-examination. !
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CROSS-EXAMINNIION ,
n BY MR. EABC".iERL !
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O Mr. Dieterich, in responso to Mr. Baxtelt's ques- ,
i 11 l
i tion, you stated that you prepared this tantimony, except j
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j ror your attorrays ir there any other perwn who nasisted l you 3r the prepsraticn of this ~tuatirenf? '
ut 4
'} A 7. guass I don't kno~s exach2y what you mean hv a ..
7 'anois t, " Mr. L Arqphe r, but yes , I'va rod utneronu converea- !
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tions with co-workers nn:i paaple ab 3&U which have pro-a i 4
.U. i rided tha knowledge, an5 no forth, that cor.,atitutes n.y l
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te at.imony. +
t *r 1, O Could yot 16 nti'?y thcse co-workers - . I assu:rn i m" ;Ii -
g p you vaan at SMUD ~~ with whora you conwlted on this toshimonyi -
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l M i A I mean .C could narn the whole group, t I prehs.bly I:
l .. , L l had c:aversations with ovarybody I ' corked with, . ove. tha 23 4
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!att aix months that we Na. besn acrkiry or.. this project ,
M I:at a l-i far as= r:ctaal tha actua! writing of the testiitony,
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i j l' A In epring c:? 1962 !-
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O And arte ycur gradue. tion Aid you go directly i.o l
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[' . wm t for the Gm ral Electric C2pany in the State of ,
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a m: : tnte Leral tom ac in nu:rlea ::ginaring. " What unx !
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A Thore were couraos i.n the University of W3shington 3 ' i q *
, i 3 !
I '
rnatm 's program fer a me.ater's degree in nuclear engineer- :
i 3 '
ing. l 1
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l i
p lou completed that program? '
i a s i
- l} l j L Ko, I did not. I did not tak2 those courses 7 -1 i I ,
u cc u rily with the intention of getting a manter's degree. '
r .
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h 0 At line 22 on the saae pc.gc of your testimony, [
i 6 n
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l y one of ELc function 3 which you perfor:md for the Gtmeral :
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a w' 1 !
- slectric Cc: ape.ny v:in performin;,; both routine physics cal-- :
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h c;1ati.ons, would yo'.. describe in a little more detall for !
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' d la what thoce Wre? ;
! A Certainly. .
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d The routine phyaica calcuationc at that time i i I .
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"'l 0; c -nsi.ni .ad fac1 loading pMternt for the reactor. 'They con-l j aiubs of zinon calculations 52.om which the reactor was i . n v -
4 pi - - ,
i q morated ::o acternine the amounts of cor;. trol rod neceasary '
i b ,
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l 4 p" i. %r operation, & Catermine(t shutdown safety narginu.
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! ]i t Et 10Jcid'3d roatino ti:D dcptndenC) Or C31CClatiOPS fCr ,
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3.rt.Hp of th3 IQCetar. 'itlat ' !!. O S S O n t i C.l l y i.t .. l
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M .mn 3 N.m;g i. ith GO. . Oral - Zlactric CC@My br.- C ?tn . U C S e ,' i n .
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1992 1 >
! . cpent about~one month working for United Nuclear ~hecauco ,
i
' Genera 3. Electric withdrew their contract at Anforn,. nnd I
3 l there was a finite-period of time I uan actually usrking l 4 i j for another cenpany before I uas back with Genera 2. Electric.
f Q DiCl you go to San Joco in 1967, then, in that the correct dato?
. c, 7l A Yan, 'GG. !
, 0 Was that your fixat exp2rlan c in working with ,
4 l ,. [ --
i i parer HDr.ctors? Cranarcial pr/zer reactors?
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j O You indicate at pago 4 of your testimony that I l' o __ .
12 y, .
73r p3rgj giy. . c ted in cM licensing of the Ovrter Creek l tl M' c + , ;.3 m 101 b Point 1;ucl.er r Pmrar Plants. Could you a 1 -
14 l clencrl h: c'.n : little more detni? what your parbicipation i
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Ubi? > I was a5 Goner:2? Elect:r;ic, the NRC chanc/ed - l
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! 'iy their requ' rem nts for technfcal speciEina.tions for I l lr '
I
. . ! i j l- c> 1. l ,,c h . renauora, ..
J. who res,penst.b.w, along.with a couple ,
f l A k' Q ( 1;Q .i. kT.dividwDs, for hho prparation of the Oynter Creek i ll i o
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- y two inch binder. I vorked'on tho-t;afety, limiting cafety I
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nyctes cettings and W e safety pcrtionu of these !
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techn.;. cal cpecincations. .
I 1
3, 0 Uben you indicated at line Sr pago 4, that you ,
6 4 i had tchal recpcudibility for the preparation of technical i 5 v37.acificnticna for certr>in plants, th3.t doaan'c mann you l i
i tera the only perccn who wrota those technical specifica-6f ,
i!
/ 'i tions, doe:3 it? Or who rorked on them? ;
I A Au for as Genen1 Electric Co.upany was concerned,
' [f i I did the bulk of the work on both 11dne i;ile Point and !
90.1 n ,
es I 10 h, <
- .'.inticello technical specifications. Of course r the ,
i U il 0u nr.ility hno a big input.
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12 i G Uhen did vou co.to co ucrk for the Sr.cramonto j!
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- d '*mi .ti m > 'l Uti!ity Dintrict? l 1
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t 4 l- . In Septorbar 1970. !
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B G 'fou 3ndicat'l thE.t YOU PuVO hal the responnihilities i
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- .u W d6C'Jn c:.chion, r Startupf and *.if.ctnsing of tho (,
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U .ic P M.co Pltni.. I'd like to thka tbost areas ona-by-ond.
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.} f - t l{ i [. 7 , Ui .l.kk.y [1 1,';75 & TQ10 7 O[ CCf.r$O }'QU Und.3rShDUdg t
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-M Cr.ciga 6N c. large plant _is.ke K.la f1113 uithin tho ;
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j'] n 3d . C *$3 lC [ ty O bbEN 1 i/NCY $g- O.O [ D U IU'4I .l '. h #3 or ,
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' thDS; 6pDCificat10nB fOr 0]GippOU.tg [. f TOL Will nLd.giVET,
- y 3 13; i LO' tlity ).'ho Uly COliiGMt ...Od Ch &D gG On.thCGu SPOOifiCd" i l ;.3 ' - I te nL For redesiva Or rinicc c portion of the systC@.' I i ;
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$ j that he desocn't particularly care for for: one reason or i, - -
2 i another e the utilities all ha.ve vcrying opinions on what l L
3 typa of valves shculd ha used to uhat type of purtp or what 4 type of notor should '$a u[cd$
- ; so,trydesignro$ponnibil'itionwereprimarily 1
c; a drdgn revir;;t c.nd coment on the design, design changeov i . _ .
S p
1 Q Iinving to do tilth the D?.bcock t: Wilcox steara ' ' 4 l' t
! gC .mpply ayetern oe t l1 PrinhipAlly,y$3, '
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Q Do you distinguish that from itema outsido of'
- O tha ncopo of thair aubply, fcr inatanca, the nuziliary s i o )
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g fcc5 Water system, and perhaps ao:re other items t-hich they're ; . ,
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,9 f no'c f reatly renoonsible for.: * ),
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i A 'Ihat i.' correct. The Ecbcock h Wilcox Compt.ny,- .! l
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i of e:,cr o , powide.5 the criterin too in cmr case , Becl.tel l 1 i ' nu -
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.. Carpateticn foy % dacign of an auxiliary feedwater ;
19 ,
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ny a t y?. , and na was.ld have tha epiprrAnity to con?ciant 9 6
- 1, revir.13 cnone errcerla 1 a 4 1 m.
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[n, Q Luz in the assign work thet you perforr.ed fcc !
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j CODr 3T YOk C'!. 00 in70lved in che dc9ign, for inntar.cce kf _
,i] of ti. .:nutiliary fecdwater systenn? l
- j. ., "i A Not directly. .;
, I :
'2D ETCCilitify 200dyfatO*.7 EJCtOH1 itGOlf. .
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r- *----'"*---g.owPfee.rsi- - - - -*-**'~-.-~de-ar e- e-mau.e- =Fw s ,4 4heew'w-we--yw_ wem'=- F@'-MJ p- y g'- 9g-eMM- " Y
Oo I, 1 l l h, A 1995 ! > -3 I was well avero thin design., as I'm intre we'll get into j j - r ,-
- later during the conctruction of the plant, we decided to 3
- .- [
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., nnko that a sa50ty grade sysh::c, nud anything that is '
i t i d H. . ,.. cafete-rela.ted in revietred and hac direct interaction from ' 1 4
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tim nuclecr dicaiplino. o . . .. l 1,)
- O Maybe we're juroinc; ahead'of ourselves, but since I 1
3
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t on f.id stabo that during the construction - - that co:re-
- 1 7sl 5
f l . .,> 1 tina in that phasA[you dec'inoil to s$ke the AFU syst+cu ' i G I safoty grade. I'
. f
.- ,. TRhat was the motivM ina., factor for SMUD to have tv (
l w,de that deciaio ? I understeind it was act a li. censing ), i i
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I raquiren nt of tha NF.C at that tite, is t. Tat correct?. ' [ l i o A That in correct.
- l
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- v. a L Very $.bply $tated[ thh nnalysis perforimd by M/ ,
dlI , scu:m! the enintar:e of amd...iary icedwator. They made ln n, i 1
,, lJ * - warghiva $ccauco ' ate ilisry fecdwater would normally j p
. , t
)
.h hwo own initinttil. Ecctuso of thi% w6 th6ught that .!
, .~ i [ia
>e# ,o calculntiene valid, va would upgrade our i b H,i .
[ mmilinry faaduatar syuhem to a cafety grade system, 19 d l . n - ~ ~ ! _: 8 p d to anur:re that it would bc artils le during thece specific j o I l < hll .U .' 1751 %
,1 '
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- }l Q When you c.tnte t hat the UnU cyctom ia safety gratie, 4 o. .
a, 3 .. N y n what m. voa incl (iding in ?;ocr de0inition of the IJT7 syntud
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/ ThO Uatur CCpplYr th? Pin'lP9 r tho Pi Pings 'IBlVCOs ..
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+
ji mid initiation in one specific 'inatance which is tha co.foty 4 - ti. ,6 l oro.m-----eerw.,..,-e.--
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., t faa nuto' r. inhittion, which 10 the acc10ern ':ce worn prima.rily i
6 i
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, lim intersited in of a GBLOOP. T.t's an ocaalycis that we
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, i wanted to nanure the railability oi the nts:lliary feed-
,' e o ,.. . 1 O.. , l .- 4 unter system. c Q Uhen there is na EFEhS initiation of
- i. .. ._.
the casiliary facawater nyctora, and for this purpoco 7'd 'i $ b a l l
; like to focus at the tine of the anucho 3cco licensing
) l
,, i relief, pre-TMI,- we gs.t into the many changes. When there's I o
4 1 l au f,SFAS initiation of aux feodwater, data the integrated
- c. 4 I control ayunom hEra any role in controlling the flow of ' >
10 ,
.l tha cuxiliary EmCxter?
.il i i '
i A ?io , it doesn'b
- . 1 ). ,b i I Q Mc' in the flow ra;ulated in that instance?
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i t. a i. ; l A A On a st[ety f ; a: P n initiation. A cafety > 3 f J .
% Q.cre'c val m conu r full cptn, ac ~:.bera would be full , ! , t.tw mioca e/ omrator takar sot <._on to i;e6.uco that. _ri.ow.
if g , l !q i, or b1k w chat floa. 17 Q So E3MS initiation athenationlly croates full-
.no, ,.
- flou and if thuc's any ahr.nga af'c.er that, it'c t manual
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+
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.achien by tha oporators?
o, i r i;
- li 1 That is correct. ~
71 L' ' d Q R can return to that crea - let :2e ntycc give
. . , H
.i
,. - 4 .
l f, you 3.n cpportunity to go had ".a an cirlier question, a p) ; R, me > tai!: liv; abopt the ' W.rious .rcrjpcensibilitlea n . - b- ,.,, ,. a O ye
.a
} y o:'t' ve. h ad 2:t QnChC ' ECCO. - ICU told As abCut yOLY.dC91gn
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i resp:nalbilities, did you coaplete that answer? Is ther'e l 62 l anything 413e'you wanted to nay en that? 3 A I think I completed that answer.
.. _ . . . . . .- . I 4 0 Uhat wcn your direction 2:caponnibilitieo? }
. -- i. . . .
5 A During tht: construction of the plant, a good ; e .. . e .e j
$ portica of the engineering department porconnel were located ~ .
_ . . . . _ . . ~ - . . . . . 7 at the uito. I waa one of thosc paople.
. ~
l . a' During the creation, the engineering departmont,. i l. 9 t611ch I represented the nuclear disciplinn at the site, 10' , had responsibilities for the determining norrective antion, t. i; l to any nonconfornancan that were discovernd during erection. l 1 l~
- . 1
.p 7.,nd t!nro wau alto responcibility in tha utartup testing
'~ ~
i of tha unit. l
- 13 icp 0 In this m k ucra y m again focusing on the d .
. ii, n alm x .m aun. 2c sycten cos tructed be. the B&TW Ccnoenv
- l .
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r~,. . to.o a.n burtac c. o r unnu aycec, em w2.t.a : .u,.n'.f a A m. , .en n a, l%, i. l!;- guten? w .
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- h. I th ~ak that's a vrlid statem nt, yes. . i {'
q j _. , gj 0 W1at was your vor~t in thic part of the plant? l. i, g . . .
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C. J ' khi. (?/]'lk.}FC D I*_. . , f l ! -l u w g D) Q You alco irdicate at pagg de that you had. ' i. I 4
. . .. i pe TORpO3din .lity frON thO liCG.D tillig Of l'Ui.3Cho SGOC Ellat i
l. _. z1 m mpmmme I I I l i I i i 1 , L _. .. .._. _ >
.,,.....__d i - - - ~ . - . , . . . . _ , . . _ . . , . _ . _ . -
l I i 1999 l A As. uo neared ~~ I shouldn't say neared - uaro I halfway through conobruction, then we init.iated the pro-- 3 codure to obtain an operriting licence, M ich includes tho 4 analysic and wr ting for the final n fety analysis report-I
~ '
5 Annwcria7 rany rounds of questionn from tha ERC,-and again, 6 I participated in thic effort as the nuclear engineer, and' l i j 7 reviewad anfoty analycea performd by the Dabcoc!: & Wilecb: 8 Corapany and by P.cchbol Corporation. . 9} Q tioulti it be fair to say that you've described i 10h , the renponsibilitics that you've had uith SMUD up to the . i 11 ;I t!.me that SMUD obtcined its operating license and right" ! { l . . , ! 1 ?. ! i to ubart up?
~
- 13 A Yea.
i M 0 And that would have taken you through approximately w i.975, is that correct? i 16 A ren. t j rj Q What have your responsibliities, -- who.t wera ' I ! 1, Yan reg ~iponcibilitica nubsequent to .startup and -f isl
._ -+
1 l'9 l prior to the CMI acci. dent? 4
- ;t ! A My pri:ac ra ponalbilitics ILtco ths startup f
i 21 of the unit have been in the acntihuing,iiccgning* ertort ' I thet's involved with the unit, and -1 appreci:tte that therci'a ! P.2 }
.c ,
t
- . ,,, j .r
- mny ruquestu for. Information, w.ny queatione, many .cladora.
i h". . hbI.Ye t( - hbDUrbi ep ' aNf.4 IU6.k M[$-[. .[ E $'b .l.Y b ko MO donP l l 3L s
-Mylprirae focus has bson in this. area since the [
t .. f , 1 I ;_,. ___.__......_.________-._______-.___---_..-_.._...,_._~_m.-.-.-
.es :
p 20no i Il t n !: >
~
- h. utertuo of the plant.
Thare's been rome, of course r con- ;
$. .a
-tinuina- devian effort for actign ruodifice.tien. i G 9
-f ,
6 Once a plcat hc$ startad up .9nd ic on lino r the i f r I , 9-
- t! . .
I J i . i 4 engizt. ring departent ic still re.sponsible for denic;n
]
i e
;l .. . . . .
l ,, jI chau tos and r.odificctions to the pitch. l . i a . q i m .. l .. . ,
.j Q Whan you talk chout tbn enginaaring deparimot, J
,t i
I 000 kn *Chr f If .ICQY'f r [390 = p ' 'fOU D 11b MbGb Eb gOUNU" i
h ft 05h. 0$Ur .$ I h55 LE'k? A l' - s Y$ 0 $ $ '
e * ; , l I COfCrrinV tO? d f 4 a. .4 :
"he.t' a cor~ca 2.,
.1 i h c,.
9 i o ceo etare other anginacring departments at sucD?, 1
.i. <
i 1, .4 3mm hm Uhat is calica, an angineering departgant I :
;; a -
i
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l . .. 1 niaa '.u racaeasible for engineering traucminaion and 1 l U~ l .. - . j j g diab *ihnlian 2cc111tien, not plant gsneration crientc5. 1 1 w i
, Q. Uf7d C.23.V. G D G. iUGC Z O in that GCuaratiO3 dnginN$NiDg . .
'fb 6
- i y upare m e e invo woa in nu dcar o.g.nuaring? I asuuto m l If l k i 1
a is
! !.esri LITJ kE' JOIiM3 vl* IA,VDrD[)T.'OlCCtC 2IDb ObbCr Ib U{8,
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2 '2hnt' c correa t , L d.
? The ajority.of thad e.ro'invoivo5. With Ranchs ,
'11. 'I . . ..
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; $OCC. S Ul QOID.C[ i O DEV6 UGUDC OTt Uf NID(!Or0 b$ FOU Milnt l N ;j j.
I O a nuSMr. 1 ii ;I ~ g I'd like nn nppron.0Mtb E mbC2., l
-D-
- e. , 91
- l-
' I l b Approd.iattely 2S. 1 I. 'l s , .
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. f $# 4e si b OM, M C #N* ' 53 .-bb .'e I bhh ~
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s se . t 4= s se. m #s - .. P = er l ' I
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t
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j !I ! l . . 200L I . 1 \
'i 11 l g Q What other departmzuta at 2nncho Seco -- nt SH3D ;
i
,4 q
l , hc.v2 reepennibili5y for the Rancho Seco P1Lut? i . J i ! l ?. Thsre's tuo G1partuents, one in the liuclear j
- t l ._ _
i Operation Depa.rttent ahich Mr. Rodrigues is manager of. , e . . I The cecond drJartntant in the one I'm in, G9arcatier!
~
I f. ga ___.- . 1 Img. incarinc. . I c.anse there's net really a department scatus {
., y:
out a third orgu.nisatica, is the Quality Jturar. inca Orguina-e ;
. ti,on which is at the same Icva1. also directly irwolved; 4 I i r t l Q Froa what you aaid be. fore, thm;e are approximately1
.d,'j . .
Q 25 puple in you.:: Ocnnrtrent in the engineerring departmnit I '.
i 1 ) Sirectly rosponoible for activitiien rola:dng to Enncho' ,
p l 1 1; Soco? ' i ,-
- i 'M , i h Taenty- five profecelonhls ,
i l Q Fino.
+
'** ^
s t- l l l Mow n ny in tu. EcGriquaz's departe nt? Againi
- 4 3, .;
] . __ .>-
J cpp* ro.cimatel'v? <F u
); .
. .g ., .
. n --
. :s
'l 4 p. Octal emplow,ont in in the nei4thborhood of "
.M + i
) , ..
4 uWer IJer:3 rndn, 15!,1 }jco:V.c , I.3 m, lit the nuclear opera.NiMG
.i h -- -
o . r" 1 neocrtrant. I ! ! l 1 dr i That wuld include anzitiary operatorn, and d O _ b l fI .. .4.,
)
liCCGICO.d CperGtOID, . and DGchnic6.1 Support; pCOple, is thSt ' t 1
...y NUO I
1 I a "e A Correct. -l { n n; .'
'" f Q Uow many people, approximately, in the quality .
,M
' I.
afb 6DranC0? 1 t ! g - l e l i C2*'~ :::X*,;*":' 2N :=. ..,:=~;;'t::' "7 ::"TLW ' .z:. ".. = . ,. ~ r .W : .:= ==:-~;;~:: _ ~ v =~- -.-~vr-- m--- : .. _. 'l
4 E 1 + t l .. , .n . l ,i t
- l 2002
- h.1 4
i , I [ l
; ! A Five, Appriocato that co??c oE the inspaction ic !
( < i . 9.. . donc under Mr. RodriGucz'n orc..anization. ?
+
1 I 'y O Ehun is the f anction o'f the quality accurance'
'l
[ _
. .) , departrant? - ,, ;;d t.
$ A Walk, quality assurance isro.sponcible that l , . -. . . . . . . .
! < .;; prrepar procedu::en are fo'llowd E.nd prepar retrius are given j- . , 4 ' 4
.. . . .p , j, l-j ,
to d.uaign changen, procodere ch1nges thiat any docuranta - E i
. .......m.. . . ...-. - ., ,
. nic:a is rev.!wed by quality assa.runco.: to inake sure propai. ^jL l ._ -. . . .
3
'i I r,
- , l revimis are ' ahtained . '
l ' l . . . ._. , , , g Q Ehen you ccy " proper revireni, ' uhat does that jj j v .3 w.*> e j y .m.s. .
, A Tha neca: mary utner and the propar peopla pep i * -
l ,, ;?c::xing theca r eicW. ljl Q .Mr., Diete"ich, Iba junt go. Lug to preface the 4 c
.,4 j nen question .
j k I ! ' l', Ac Mrs . ?micra abat: said aturing' tha henring a - ! i
},
[ q - . . - j _9 nrwar of tin.:m, '.scre, tines questions flow frcm ena antegory c ; i i l h.i UC 21no .*b C.7 g odd ~ NUoId. NO. b.O il14 2 it0 iS going to h? I
' - e I
,j e .$ s a se = -
4 m e e 89 I
>: .? '
- + m -
i p . a i; 4.I.t then yovi M unab.b t? :maWr Camathingg plWEG co ' n { ( $
,.c3 h1 indichhe r DCt ' I4 931UU.tO'PICCGOO )d,th thill (' l '
{i . d litt3e furthea. ! ; d, 4 1 I* a 3 m u' h c /y !p.r . w: m quar m.a..t n.pprecia.ta any help e in . we e t ei , g. a .t i ; i nq . .. li I ca;.i gina h 4. 4. ; L.% 'lh ! y . . Y' Q 90!'JG ,700 tGSti.fi.ed th".it #;;he C.m5i,litti &5SurEnce' 4 k q l --
, ~ - -_- J . __--._,_-.__..._L___.__,-_.._... .w---_._..-.-L-- .- -.,_ : .. . , . M ! -l
l l t i i 1 a 2002 , i j .. a > i 1, i a I I. P uants ' 0 mko nure that the propar pr .cef. uron are fo11cwed,
- a f ._ 1
' I I aasumed thv.h included the prop 2r reviw of the proce dnrnt l I> j w j
- l chmga n, is that correct?
( . A That's correct. j 5 ! 0 You'r[ [alid$g about operating proceduras. The i ; i e. ) . .- , j l proca5urou that the licenceG cparatorn in the control rocra i j T { would be follouing for variona functions?
'; 1
. . No, that van really n'at the point I was trying to si p . . _ . .
1 I usko. i 10 l
! Our various procedurca tu hrse bef.ng th.e gercrat.lon t
enginocring dcpart: rent, the foe.turen r.ro acalcar operati:: a departmut ad:rdn%trative proceSuren for th: proper stops j i m j uo ta).o in one ca'n to nd.e a change tc t.n operating pro-
~' [
! y1 i i ceduc:. 1%yba in another cc.co to promaa n nonconforning repo ei: e er in nother caso to reche n design changa to the n . f plcn . i j U' Q- Th% thoqualityencuranceOcpartm.athunresponsik l l V
. bili:y it: all % 3c5 Erons, not jtst the tactual operating ,
i h ' ., } . o hrCC li urQ [.i $k' A k D CON ,rQl rDMM [CDoD AC)., NDu Lb ki - i Jellodno, but i':, in fact, coverc'your 6 apartment clco7 j et 3' l! l,
- Cortcct. i i
{ Q Subsegu$nt t[o the TiiI a.eclint, have your reopensia l 1 , i
,o ;
j bill';icet btzen chtsgcd 1.rt sn't Mr.y?. ' 4; 1 M[ n
~
No, nry ref:,ponuiblitiera have sttyed banically the
}; ..
m- ,- f C hr'.C , I jUSI:.JO[ tbdb UOrd CUpb529kN k4CS b&dn-p),dC3d
- t. .
p - wet, y, , y,- y wr= w g ,, y- 1 A -* w e v - --w yy e, r-t-v a wr rw w -- - e v 4v=r - we,-*r,~.v.=v--.....-_ --
I I J p :' , d
!j 2004
) f ,
! , 1 apscifically on the Three Mile IcInnd accident, but ny ..!
.. (
n1 q
, ,, . h dution and my resppnnibilitie.c are the cme as they wara !.iL .
l y ' - , i i bafora T1 urea Mile Island.. . j- r3 I i { O You cay moro amphecis he.n.haen plcced on the tM1 -
.a aca16 ant, uhat do you munn? Q u
. 1 A More of my parsenti tiida .hns beon devoten to thq V G :
. "ihres Mile Island incident. 4 i 7o t 4 0 Q Would, it be fair to smy thch you' re not the cidy o l
- m m, mu q i m_clea mgincer v.Ao .abu11c.rly lina baan covered with
, , a }}
.i ,
l ! Multicnnl voc? l qe Il j A That uw.ld be a vury t roc statenent, s l :
.11 m n; j
i Q In f. net, isn't it trad that all your previoun , ;l ; I j "f i
-- .I
- ,,y a unian you a1=va aawedcen ware.r.ng, you una yng g i
t 4 i < . j i s . q do';nrbnant, ccill r.:1G to be perferr#d notuithstanding the d 4 h U 3C' "7+ ? nadi 3 Cn tht: TMI f.iOSt~uCCid3Eit f1TG3Gy Ot CetarEE -
-I j 11 0 ..
/
b A YO tl , thf.t f S trtB.
' - 6, j
.mi a led 'to a au;,u:t.atdally increased worP.-
! h 4 'Ja s * ' It . q: . u . 1C23 (( yQ (??* r,30 M 37 I' *I3 i?.h Q1/Q Y t.k; f3 1G.ED }T(RZ2 f gj
.%[ !
i p .t Tcs, I think we'In all typiCP.lly putting in i i i j 1.LQQ C D'ArG fel, fin l3 OD3 ID.CD% 31;'ft p@J00:*LD,121 in th@ . ,.9'" f t kf5 r D {$ m. y a. . i 0a e, Q 7 J< r 2 ; . 'be f 0W2 YO; Und C l}.0 thfic YOU fr.Oph (j s 4 . , { prGtty ?I1Ch CCD3hM'at'QVOK th?. 100t fiVO YOMrG., TOU Want o I IO UI2OON tbN. TOU$ $ I'E M M/O r. '
- , ;t .
n s t ~ f i A
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m It nte.yaii ossentially the sius in my di:tciplirio l 4'. : .1 jj . e +
.. q . -
- ' It .
._.._ _ ______ _ / _- 1-___.__ _.
1.__ i.._,_
4 i
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9 l .; 2005 O o . 1, i 0 , ik! in tha licencing arena. I heve anothe:c ouginzer helping e , i t , l 2 i ful.1-timo rmw, and we just hired a third are to-help ; I I. 3 cOppenu?.te for thi3 addo3 ticrhload, >
- 4l 0 ned it baon difficult ta find qualified ps
- :sennel :
-5 [ dc t h post-Tm I;3riod. l l.
j G IG. l3hr."ER : H n . Em era r l'u going to havo to ; 1 i object to thia hint,. N unden.Atnad vo:o ermining witi! ' ,F 7 ,!! ! y . .. . . l mf recpec5 to Tc., Dieterich's cualifioltioaa, but wo're going l l rabotantially 'beyoi$3 the.t ucu, and I don N coe the rolovenct
-^
f i . I I w t io Mr. Dieterich's testimen.v on nuriliary fco5 vater . !, 11 [j ryctrua reliability or any of Go other subject creum j G ;a n Mr. hdrique::, as Mr.La:;.pher earlio:: stated, Vill'
}
i ) , . . . l l uj ' 1e tantif ring Ic.ter on the opetratir.nial l'ncility and micipJa- {- I d { . 4 f, mnt 10:apatenas , vid I think tbase quer.tions may vell i If k l g] bc relevcat to his tactintenPr but 'c hey'ro not to Mr. j 1 v* d rie:e rich' c . ! lh
'4 0 ' _
t ! ,e l I.'h , [21L P d O M.! Md .3 . 30*/PTSp I-[. . Dic':Arich :seetre l I i
, e t erfe e a aq>a 21: , firn. e e C L, of eunaring theca questirzs ,
i4 - ! Ik { l jg p R3 i :,' not %prcDE.Gd nny innhi2.ity to &n., .1 am trying!',to { e 4
;.o j a .m .. oewasthsraiscaen= w w ..u ee a:premcut l
a bare Mr. Dieterleh is wczking., the nuclour ong.inearing n Wepu;c mnt, I think it's entiraly relevent to find out G o.} $. , .
. a E L. 's ib n d. 8 A . .* * .J 9 ) e Ld es 1
6 3.g cut' Los th;y ve hs:an carrying thou out,. the post-TMI fixes. i l l i a
- 1.
-{
- i. 25 j Lud thrx's bhai: I % trying to n anina. l-l . l. . 'I
r a i i l 1f ; p , J0% j , 1; _. I 1 ME BOWiiRS: . Mr. Lewis, dcat, ths ctaff have a j p . . . . . . i i SR position on thia? i i t
.. i j
+
PA LEWIS: W will 2.ov.c it to the two 4.avolved (
}
^
4
.curtien to work this out. W 7 .l .. .. ..
l _
- CA MR HimTant I think the ccpr.h.tlity of Mr. Dictorich 1 1 ,j j l .. ... . . . . . . . 3, 4 to annrar the question isn't the cole criteria for j
, n . =
] ,
70 Acidinp; uhet in releve.nt to his testimany. W nr3 free i l , put f0rtmrd wit' asses as us seloct en the subjects, nnd thMM i
- h. i mbjcets are aCdronsed bv idr. If.c$riousz, mpa 2 PO EL libWNDS : 12. EnEter7 I rect.11 of the testi-I h
! M[ w.f la that Mr. Dieterich andi Mr. Rodriquer are in h s Uf ,
.goparN c Cepnrtu. ants or tmita uithin EMUD and the quartlenc l
hm:0 crc c;oin] to the aperations uithin lir. Dietorich's
. . j i M, u 1
;rn20;5inte g. rcrxn and he just mont.ioned that two othar
- c 1 : .
) e . . J is (n ngin:3c:.ro he.vc joimd bit that aro involnd in the licensing,' l .s O TiO (50 (IdLlC it'C '?)E DyriE hb . Yh OhTACD DO DBLI EdLG!; a j
. . .4
; f:.am u.1:odriemn on his part of thb oncretion uhen hs , - *I
- .I +
o tertifiacy s o if you'll proceed, the bbjection in overrelod. j, i , ! if 3'AZD Of thi$ , ?.00 f 1 ' thin.e ??Ct " - '
' YG khCF Mt sj i ._ . . .. . c: =
j , hird GI a CLun*J3 h 2ppGr.Cd Withia'ntr brg&,13ation fC3(C"'W(* 5
, t TcH-2, co us do think it 's imporume ..o kista how t'n tai 31a . , l i i
. s . sg a 4 4 56 .h Ihr G'
5 {
! 3 ..4 u tilafar.
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l H, NR. UirLER: Than: :/ou re c . H nr. : . s s er .
- m! 1 w u en to w umb eau ==netr mu.1y. .<
9 i
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' .-....,._,,s__..-_.
_ _ _.._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _.. _ _ _ _ _ _ . - ~ _ _ _ _ . . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - 1
'?
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L ; q -' 290'7
- O-i 1j .
and W 11 spend v.oro tir.r.3 with Mr. Po.irigaa: cn thiu[ 3 i (
' DY MR, LAN?fiBN l 2 i 1 .
a s i O I belirva befora va ha6 tha $1scussion, whethdf j ; i
! . t, ,
i ( l, it hnd baen difficul:. to get .sualified, neu personnel i t 1 l for ycur departrr.cnt. It' a 'in the pcEE-D;I titteframe, , A It's always difficult to got ne. pacplo na 1 i -- . . ! ; ,! qunif.f ted as you unnt them for the tr i ney you'ra virling l G, < ehq to pay thent, I 3;cecs, but .I think thne's not a difficiulty ! 1 to o~Va at the n. rennt tirin to appreciate that the nucle ar
;t il L.i o p ind.untr:l has gone $nto co m htt of a se.gesaion.even befera .!
s .
*. I y
~
t the Din:cc Mile ':aland accidontr and. t'itre aza people i a ! , upy c.vailchle for hire that are very all qualified. '" g l o j i p. Q AG TOM h?.VO I? antilitd 3 19nS rjn;,i ng. this pany. -
!l h
l u 0 6';'"i unai.lenty it fms not baea n'ife?4ibic hu 2 co'k to and
- d n i', t ,
s
,p n:m a Ja., .v. iona.1 perso):.nol wbn' netm to r.u3et your ~ ,i
, . . . o
;n ,c au t . .
i; ' l .
'i t gj Nalflica.tions? ,
j i u i 9
,W c It M.: boon p s ible to n; thic.
p' _. .
.o o sc,e tray people, approxintely, hr.ve you o ,
l l *
- s. ila c5 Sed in the2 nuclear, I'm going to eill it the r.uclear k! }
o , t3w, J I un31ncaring de urtannt? I can rc:Ta c.tr 1:hnt a littic , g t ne i CD Ck!* y t'inco vale '!M.I a.ccident? . I 1 '3~ I is
.r,
.}
NN, tO.$YM I br3 %3 @cNN.b9 Ob 'Cb6 h6ille r@.1 , 6'- i ! ,<', Engine aring Dep bcrent[? e M R ., LB.NPHEIt: Ye.n 28 dJ i i ..- -
' 75I3 N72.T-;Cb ! 1D N h':1 dILtdT'S CONC 73.tiCM En'ts"iD 63 1Dy t .%w
- , ./(
l- -, ,,, _ ,-, ,i,;- ,n., - , . ,,,.,.-,v,..n.n- _ . - . _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -. 3
p j l ? 3 I ' I fi D 2003 i 4 d i l 1 ' Drmartrcant, ~~ 1 1 I J 2 Q E::cuns me, naybe I better clarify for 11r. ! I 4
- 2. I Daxter's sake r also. I don't menn in the entiro i r
i
- 4 j) GanerationEngineeringDepartme[t, I mean how many l -
additionni, profencionel perconnel with the respcnsibility . 5Le .i 1 6 role. ting to'Fancho Saco have bnen hired? d t! ~ Oha A. I can think of fou$ p$cplo, I think. a _ . . . .
*] Q 00 thoco include the two peepic, I bal.'tevo '.d.oit h you clluded to Sc2are, ~the one who's trorking directly l
for you and another percon?
.m] J t
,, 1 A Correct.
l l ._ n, : And, again, I'm speaking of professional people,
, a
- 3. ;. Q Ey pr$d$asional people, do you mean nucicar i ... .
l e, [ engincars? 4 4 j g A Engiuoers, not all nuclear engineern'. ] d I - e y Cint other kind of engineerc are included in I I i, l' ;- , thic dc.partmnt? !
, n U011, electrien1 engineers, cechanical enginseTr7
)
!! ' nr vuen t .w? E$ trol enginears,: civil engineers. '
u Q Has the nonprofcacional;ntafd, sub uquent to l i l 3 . l
. y f TMI in you: departnent ind:reasse nbotantially? ] 1 1
0 1 A I cen think of tuo engineering technicians I
. o, /
g type people that $70
- ve hired. into the departnent.
i g' 0 Uhat la the size of the~ncuprofascional gruop q
.y .. 4 --in ~yCmr departroent? ' You indicated that : you 'hhve 25 '
i u.x p
'O _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . ~ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ - _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ - - _ _ _ . _ . - -
i , d. I l. T l l , l 7009 i l i profrinaionale, approniwitely? ' Dces that includo -the four l . o
~g
} cdditional ones? Say25toNOtotal? '
o, l ) )
,n j A Tuonty-five to thirty total, :fas.
i O Mhat is the uize of the ntnprofsscional eToup.d'n W ! L-a that departmant? A\ 3 ,.. i 6 -
- l A Probably 10, I'd guess 10 people. '
o ( 7 ._ . a. O And what kind of jobs tra : involved in the none,' p i e . .. l profou.sional gr:oup? , Of L Draf tsmt.u , engincaring techuiciana, engineering l . 10 0 -- -- F tiden, and of course we have typicbc. j l That I n included in the 107 O m A Ync. t'~':1
'll 1
0 Mr.Di$terich,turningycurattentiontopage6 ! d I ! 4 of your t mtirony, unless othenriet indicated, I mt I e p{ i i
i l l h refcrring to I am going to ba rafo.tring to the February llth !
i e v l.3 i l mean. A:ny which ycu filed. I
- s. t
- }
I i on page E, the questian which is erked is, Why i n i 11 p 'e
.. t' e aur:ilit:~./ fcelhvate.r bysture reliebility of intarent .
i I e
- .n this hearing, ar.d *;ou identifi the ne25 for the }
i MU cptn to rermva : enidual hect, and you niac indicated ] u O i h the ccncern at THI about valvind*cqi: tne APW syutem. In l n 4 i ;
"m .
draf t. SUEG D6G7, another . reason for concern about the i j 9 w~ M N system is och forth at page 5-40 of that MUREG, th2y: l I i
)
l F a decerihe an the extreme nennitivity cf the once-through. i l ,3 ! t d att.nn gnnerator nrd a reed for quich delivery for auxili$ry ! L _. _._ _, . - _ . - _ . . _ , - . . - . . ~ . _ . _ .. _ _ --- _ -______----. - -
i t l \ 4 i i s 2010 f f s 7 q feudster. I:4 there any reacon why that was not included : I i d in you:: testimony no one of thn rencons far the interont : I 3 I i 3 7, ! in the cyctem? i
.O A I think I !maically addrous that in my testimony I y6 whun I cay that auxiliary fac5uater system is -- reduces (
o 9 relitelce on a high-presaure injecticu ayetin following 'a j a.l - . . . l 7j najor perimrbation. ' i e.
-[; O So, you wean't trying to exclu3e that conce.rs?,,
- L I y !. A no, I wasn't.
j o
- 3,>. , p I don.'t think one could directly attribute tN t,o U 3 ,.(-.
to amuitivity. I think the satis ap,plion to HeatinghonWh...,.~ 1-4
,1 4.e.
i. [(. or cc.Wuntion ingineering plant..* WW @till need auxili'pr$ Wa , i e-1 6 .
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a
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%.6 p . 6 I . s hig,. 5 (.
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s . than in n ; E W,)si'. . l <- ,
~ m.aa tL:; m,11...ary mduator amum fw:.e:: i
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; *..! uent:bwaam or ceaue. tion un90 4 eng plant in udor .gy.jf - ,- ;I ,
J i j ;' ' j ovoid 3rf -out t.4 the cteam gene.rd:m.4?' J,i k'. )] 3.j d } 1 o
, .< h Ta TiGid dry- Out Of the 'f d[$U'.s genCratOt?p 700, yD? > ; i .
, s <
L [ . 4 ) " .o n~M ntui]1.my %dvator ccouw wo you would in the 7s . l ' j , . ,1 SI'3 C h i'i f')I TI. W C r C--s "bV.St kCD 3 nGEffpO,PNdQ pliGt, ; _ 'Y 1
- e s _
- t. p p.,qtg [g 91gg ggha gg.g ird $8 Undo 6irM 10 to Q s S h
' 4 2 l .
%.e 1 a, _ g, }} 1'/O D}; QG Qlu NhrO O')h StOP.~J.) 0,%Ch*I7i'kDf,$ dry QQh? 2 + '
.I
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.O h I gnatm I don' t. lilo d.te Mord '"undscirdlc.* *l}g fg
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' QI: .yl I
Azyba thnc 10 a 7073 Word. 1 Acn'tNc'casidGr
. v
= thub In 'itfd..U! . i l' j R ..y ,, *g g .' g i i'^ ... - Li _.._.c.~.---.-..-..-~O--.------.--a----L- -
-A-----'--
. _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . . . . _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . ~ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ .
i i r* I?f a j
.2011 !
h . 4 1i of safety concern. , I n ;
- Ej O Is it's consthing that you seek tc train your
- 1 u - -
i i 70o operators to avoid? j i I i .I
'y l A Ch, Aefinitely. '
q, ., . F5 p G Uhy do you do ch;tt? 1 Ai .. . . I T. W .u II h I think you train your Mparatorc to roe.intain l .l < . [ i t 7j an stable a plant condition as pouaible, and this is one' 1 4 - ti . .. ^
., _. . J. ;
.3} i
) of thoon .cnnen ? I . don't think va're ju:nping over the lh{s '
.:s- q m : 1
,l i j .9 ,
b af where we 're in an arca of real safety problens by honihg! ?. { . l . :.h; j ' gn3lt .:ttaan generator dry-out.
. , hn .
e '/ . fi t it1 0 i!haa yc)nr nlutt f.7 nobinua stable occdition, l' # 1 o i,
.. . t .
. [l.
think that' mnt 'tha word you used, la . thera an incre.ase5. l q.; z , p ;g .
'li!:aldhcad that cafety syntans by lia.. colla.1 upon to opglr.bne , ^ "
p, d . . z 1l l' ;de h L I p.mca timt would be tha enly timo that a adfetp ] i" h . . . . . q
- m. . !!p lyste ma called on to operate ~an in a nonstable condit1;on, y.
j 3 i 7~
. ~ . . .
.y i 1 , ic3 1 1e C So to the ottent that<it'la possible, you try. 9 , .. ,
m .
- i t, p ,
,'3- t-g g]
have c;sarntors run the plant in.much a way that you m$1n-lj .
, ,.m .
K, .; i up ;. q l. y tain atable conditions no that you 40s't aava the call;b;iy . h r, d n for ts3 of acfety systemn? , 4
, is,. .
1 ' 1 . . .i9
.,~' a it A I guana ': hat'c basically true. I can thinh;.gff4 ; ?.i i
n . . - .. e l g 3 inchmacc, such as during a plant 'shutamra uben we had ~ 9%. I n ( routinely used. nafety sy2tensy not because we had to,,but-j . t , i i - !. y becan 3e -- j ust to taaittain the, plant -in a note etable ' u.. ,-{ . s 4 n
- . y condition, ;
+
I f} Could ycn givo re nn exampic' of that? w.; . ,4. 'O- ____-___--___n______=-_- .. l} . . . . - - - . . - - . . - - - . . . - - . . . . --- - - - . - - - w
i i i it i , d ( 2012 o , 1O A Che use of high-prescura injection to maintain !
- b t
.H --
j 20 su sbiblo' e preccurizer level as possible. l 1 4l l 3 0 When would this be done, when you wanted a cold A{ , ahntdmin? ' i
'5 A When wn*?e tripped the plant and - on power
}
1 o opornhion. l 1 i i i '. 7 i 0 In those instances, is it your testimony that ., I i t
'?j 1
i operatora vill innually initiate HPI even before you get p s (; h} to the 1.600 psig levol? 10 f A There* o r.o requirenant that you do that, thut's !-
. _ . . l
! up to tha individual operator.
$ ;; e!
i j Q Z underutand that. I'm asking whether in the :j { a u i : i' ] i c d wmni couaisc of operation Rancho Seco is operated ' I. .a
! 7 j p b bu at lcast nota oporators in a made'thore if you have ). 1 t i 1 1
)
a reacher urip, the operatorn may turn on El'I' befora ' yo'i' 'l d, UL , a ' 3. l p ( gat to the HP set po nt? I 1 p 1
- o. i
,'- 4 A Shat'a cerrcat.
! p i .a , p . . . -. g~ ., .! Q 2:s it alno your testimony that come operators
- 9
-- ~.
- l e
a,. pG Co nah do that? \ , 7
!! k gg n it 5'here n no requirement that ha do that, and I i
l H . . i . n 1
. gue.ne ' .C cLn't anmser your quection in all honesty 'it? there L,
l
.r. i heve been instancon when an operatcr has not manually ?
, p. e L' ngh. initiated high preasure. injection; . , n i j . l
.. . , ,: !(
, -Q W.en you'any tharc's'no requironent, does that q
h
,,.y y
, .rcan.that no operacive precedure uhich m ndates that the v
.p ?
..c .-. _ .,- _, - A .a } }L., .- J ., . , , , - ,...___w.4..,J,,. ....-....w....__ _,._.___z__.____.____-
( t
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4 n 2013 ' , t,l ,
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}
l-1nJ 'l oparntar in to take thtt particular action? l i 7.I .,. A The.t's correct. i i ,. 7- (j 0 But la it also fair to any that there's no I
.h pro':cdure which direc that the operation will not ts.ko th ,
n J ,
; i, ,
cchion? t v., t A That la also, correct. l , y,! { . O Mr. Dietorich,.in sota of-the earlier testimon/ n 1 _ _ . __. o 6 l i
+ hat ea huard, a balieve tha fiydde with respect to the" HRI 1.
i y , , t -
'L
- n. h l tzwr r..tated that out of 40 cycles, nt leaat one HPI pihy *
' 5 I
d' Is thic raore o$ less routine use of j , .i,g.", i n n?. he.d 31 cyc1ca. ' i
'y*
- .E y '! cha EPI pungsi the roson that fthe ona ptup is approximtd3;yb e4 .
! :h::a qerters 'of the way throucic its. allwable_ cycles.;@c. i:O , ' ;P-s
- p. i - -
,d
, t p u
" j.; - a ,
1 , a. I herm to Iacha a little currection to your * - i
,\ op yl: ,
t ' l J
.,,,; q taic: rah. I n not cycles on thd puup, it's cyclea en'" i i
a .
- a, ,
3 -
!! nea rlo where the cold v2 tor la injacted into the pri: dry i i
1 4,- 4 1 -' . n eva ccm i ' J , ~ } l 'i 20e, this rentina operation du the reason for un 4 e , tl
~
y ( 5.J
.O 6$
having cbhained 5hin 31, whatove:r thn number is, cyclea ' ,
)
' H l J on thafc nonale. ,
/> p 4
n, 4 0 would it f4 11 within the responsibility of.the j
.. . {;
,, Caneration Rasginaaring Depa.rtunnt to uanitor the nu dec g of uses of those nc=las and -to parforn necoccary calcuIa-
, . tionc to aranro that it will be availe.ble ?.nd that you '
1 .
- m ;.O will not uco im all ita nas? --
ll' -.
- i. .
u ,, d}} g A Th( venitorinn ic t>arformtd by the. nuclear opdrctions
,n I y .
s j, ,
.[
l , _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . . . _ . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
I l
*
- l 1 j 4014 4
i if 3 i departncnt, It would fall under tira purvie.s, I believa, -i q i of the Generation Engineering Departitant to find a solution
'3 1 to this problem, a non-cporatisg.sciit'of solution f.o tha '
3 l r . ., Problem, ) t5 - . ('y
'j Q Has your department; been involved in siteking any 03 ..
. - ~ ... . .- .... ... , . . .
such pollution? i j "m '
^ '
7[ _. . . . _ . _ . . . . . . j
~ ;., ];
P. We,have requestad the Babcock & Wilcox Company / . I <
- wa don't have a forrani proposal frc:a thca yet to retnalyze a
9 - m j the no:rslo cycles for add.ed usage factor or added cycled:
, < . i I(.) !li
- t.
1 !! in thch nozzle. .
- >< 0,
, E O 'ihio would be the crist'ing nozzle which are on . l u . _ , . _ . . 1 there to see if they can ha used beyond the 40? (. I w ?l [ h Correct. 1 ll i. 0 If it is found that they cannot be used beyond 4' A U) dj the 40r what proce<.?uros sanst La inctituted to reple.ce those a r . r 1 t,. noznls? i li i l ) A Several things could ha done. l l h Firat od cl[, it needs tio be po$nted out that d n . ..
? there aro 40 cycloc nllowed on that noznle at the present U.
. ;j -
g tir.ra from initiation to high-proschre injection. Thcre's l v1 '
,j an additional 40--cycles allwed on that nozzio for testine l l <
m .9 e *
' ' h.
ij 1 of high-precaure Anjection that given un E0 cycles. Thoco 40 tect cyclen cannot be coz;.verted over to
.l'
...,, p .- __
"' q ocaga cycles..on a direct one-to- one baria, but I nucpect w: b,}
"ho so coa.ld got at least 50 cycles out of. thone 40 cycles
4 i e i ! 4
*t g 2015 1
- .. y . .
i i
, " I) -
for a nanal high-pressure injection initiation. . L p ...
- 1 !
i
}
I think the way those calculations are performad, f - i
'F
!i nhen the plc.nt is originally designed you dr.can up how .7 l
) ; .. .. .. 4,
... b l
Mf: j mny different kirdc of cyclon the prima::y cystem is going j 1 W to c:cparience. Tcu estimate that we're goins to use i J j 4
- 6 ,
{ [ high"pr:eacure injsation once a yonry so that means 40 cyclea] - 4 17 ;: d wa mt.9ht anticipa.to 10 plant tripo a year, no thet's ' l 400 l'CYBM cycisn, and you can gti on and on and on with a * [1 fh 0 - - L E l} cc.ge long lint of different kinds of operating transientti. / 0 , n ...
- 10 y You ann rob Peter bc'pe.y Paul, if you will, in' .i l
D _ . . .. , i' !1 [ t lot of thone casos, and taks unage factors out of one O e M colurm ud put them over in nnother column. But the wcy i ff tha trnycia is dorn, you go to th9 materials man, encl you ' i e l I b as ij ,- tell him "I want to otroca thid plant 400 titaca one w?.y* 1 .f, i j [ mad < C titcas emother way and 200 l times another way, wi'll;the }
.AL , 1 4
- 3) , . > .
;0 n 1-ig mi g J p1r.u21 take it?' Icd ha does his calculations, and ha snV4, l g' i '
..i
, j 'j } 'fu ii . r
~
c 1 j '. i
%. h, .lf it. turne out that 1 y initial g'13ss wan ccong', )
u ,
, 9 p
. 3p d - tro hack to hin and cny,
- Day,luutfanofthnt40cycidA,f. ;
r 4 i L 1;. l m j' for 'righ-pretaurc injectica r narbe wi really neod 120 ' ! ', 1 i
.a , i cycles, could you look at that for nap And ho goes bgek~
1 y2 0, und sunchea ~ the 179 button on his co:nputer code, and the , j
;gg: an.auc r c e!';cs b ack , "Yac, that's ' acceptable'," Maybe it cohaa t d >
% b, bnck, So, it 's not accep tab le . "
f
.'e
~
l a O .In that the calculation,athSt B&W in performing. ' '
? . . .
.j.'n sn s r n a b-- a a's -4 b a 'a L- iI w. ** ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - -~~~"--*- --A'---- I
, . _ _ _ _ . _ _ = . _ _ . . . _ . - . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ D 2016 9 .b! i I' A m have basically asked them for a proposal on
, what they shonld 30, yAs.
a O I thinh 90 have avoided your initial question to 4< rco .uhich was uhabcan we do uhen we get to the four 1 gh dieciplen? Nt'a a very airaply question, but very cortly,
..b F or relativoly costly, is to change the nozclo. Cut it out and weld in a now one.
i s , h
.,.p a Anothu fix that could be nutde, in my mind, is
~
. n. p j- uc can put a byh 2 rotmd a high prcccure injection valve, d - .
I II 4
.;o 0- a li:tle mini flou line and trickle cold watcr throutch
! p! . I that nonnlo cciatimmusly so that it's not abocked when S t - e> i h . - l . t w, % i high prcLcura injection i; initiated, that d,ocign featurd , j .
. . ., j l- t , ,,,
c::lchn on covoral pointo and would pho.sbly be a sinpla. i y*q . r
'(n ad fix to unke and would elimitrite any ' additional cycles on l ;f -
E[ that ac7zlo at all for the life of . the plant.
- 6 y
h DR. SriON:
}
%( m cane rao a ruonent, Mr. Ianpher. *
) , I Mr. Dint 5ericb, you doncribed the trothed by which I i i :D b' - ,. . 1 ) O t.hom nur'; 3rc, cuch an 40, ara arrived at. That la yom:sa'y=; i mP 1 0 ) i p' that yaa need 40 and comcone who haa;the proper conputerb ' 10 i
-DoJ c cib and drta on radiation and hr.rdoning and everything --!
) .i ] , olse says, ' Year'thut's all right," '
.,'-l 6
4 11 .i , 1 t ..
, Why is it that you Ge't aek chu quoction, what 9.
;G a j right or vrong t$ begi$ uith. %hy dc you bcvo to ask i n
i II "In tbis all right?" c.nd be told, "Yan." .Whan.will you gat i i 24 i i !. told No"? thuldn't that .be simplycr? T 25 l ', ' _ . , _ . _ _ _ . . _ . . . _ - ~ . , 0
- "* * " ' ' ' " * ' ' " * * ~ ~ ~ ~ " " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ..-.--..a-....=--=----"--~ .
I i i l I. 1 l 2017 {s h [
.. s cf . <[ TdZ WITNESS: It would ba simplyer, but the f 3, y
[ calculations in computer codes, ac I understand them, were R
) not - are tot-danigned to give that sort of an answer. j ' . . . . .- 1, 4 '
DR. SIION: I guess I'm s'till confused, but thank i i N yCQ CIlyWay. I ' t P??H2.LAMPbRt
~
'f
;< . I
. . . . . \
t @: .. Q Did you finish ycur answer, Mr. Dieto:ich? J .. _.. - , j 6 f a yes.
! t. _ .
E O You say that the cenputer codos were net derigned , 3 . . . , . 1 10 to da ca. i I You aann at the time of tho initial licencing , j 12 and t.he construction of Bancho Sceo, the computer coden " i
^
! wora not up this other wcy, based on the assumption that e i O you could 40, and just to find out how the espanity far 40r , 4 t not uhettuir it han GO or 100 also. t They just plug the 40 i i 'c l in a::d decidade can wa nutto it to that. j m, ,. A Tnct'a the way the problem is solved. You don't i n k; go to thc guy and say, "How many times can I SCRMi the . i , l' g plant, how ray timas can I inject high-pressure injsetions?" r a n .- . .
" Ind he corou urs with the matric lirjits. The problem hcs 2[ . .
'q rocko$ -just thD opposite.
] O i 1
.1 i
i O Tct mated that theEs noarloa are --- have a i nj cc7 ability non of peer $imion to go 40 'uses both for actual e , - y'. t j s . und fer testing, ad you might be abic to take com of t p . . qq g the testing and ucuges not 'on one basis, but gat nutyba ., b g; 1 30 out of .the 4 0 for testing. .Do you know at this timo
.\. -_,._..s.a,.-_-.u___..__--_---------- -- - - - -- -- -
t c + ! ? j 3 . . I
/.
- 01H i !
I ' l [ ! !Gt how many of the tenting cycles "or these nozzles i cii . arc ~atill. .!i . i 1 li; l I available? l t [ l ", 9 A Certainly, a majority of them. I don't knou ths I' i l ,I
- 6p specific nutabors, but we t' eat liighidessure injection , l
. _. . _ .. . . . . I, i
E. f ~, 'o! p. with actual flob into the vessel onco'a year, co we ;
- ._.m.,
. . ..t :
l , (gy cnly have used-three or four of tbsts.- lh' ; i ,. .
.. . .. ,W "X Q -It'a my understanding that this 30 or no out' 6f ='
~
r
- v. . ,
, { . . . . . . .. . :. . - 40 c:/ clos on the nozzle relats only to one IIPI pump or M
- 1
] y ' i h,- one UPI no2Zla r iG that corrcot?
- y - '
j g .3 Thay're all up in that ballpark. I don't knoW l . , . . the upacific nuntbors on each no:213. . i - 7 o s(l +. -- l . Q .All threc of the:sa? i a y q . . . . l .. is A RI.pht. c. a , g . _ _ . _. I i
, a 1 Q Wacn HPI is used for this ptmposo, the purposs .
i j q _ _ . - . . .. t J
-.ao heing you have a roactor trip., and rathor than wait until l j you got to FRAb, ycu don't know vlmther you're going tf _
j . .. -.
} ;
j d get there or not. You una HP7 'to help control preanurisev-i u,
) I l .
Icvol, are all thrse E--guide trains unad? , 4 i l w., A I think Mr T'odriqua: vould have to Enruer thi6 1, A 4 in the -- it's my understueding, of course,- j , m j o , i thorn's vue gun; ;cening, e nako-up persp, one cf the three 4 k . n-pt:pc. In rtmning all of the tine. 'I think during a r.ormal ,
. i[ p1 ant BCIWi or trip, an cperchor would typically start ,
y .
, e F. One of tha renaining tt:c pu.mpa b.
a , H j 0 You cantioned et.rliei- thct.in Eddition to asking 4 x l! . u _ _ I lL -. DER to Entfor2:UnalVnnft of uhnthin . vnn cnni A anhmL1mnua . ~
I i- g l l l t < 1 n ; il . h 2019 l . d I
,j ! these nozulos more than (O cycles. You vero aise, consider-z ing trhat stopa might be taken to avoid - and these werc ;
I i
$3 your or.act words, but I am trying to paraphrace - to j
/ avoid ucing FfPI at all for thin function, is that correct? )
cj{ A I don't remardbar saying that, but that certainly i 9culiI be one colutica of the problem, is not initiating ' ) g j J
)
]
,p h.igh -preocaro injection. . ..,
l ( .. - . , j h Q Is that being analyaede either by SMUD or by ; j ij .. - h
- m. 1, t
me or by soreaone clsa? . j 4, '!] A I think wo would prefer to have that cption
.j
_. _ _ . _. .. - 4 I
;q ave.ilable for the operator, l.f at all persible.
p' .. . .
, e s q lun't thct opticn alrc.ndy available?
t L d
,,n M Yen,, it is. ,
j d i 4 i l
...n h G Crut you tell n2 why bhat's not: being used by ;j
;j . . . . ~.
l l p.., } } aparw:crs? . p . -
~ "
j , n I think I'73 3att you. It'in being used by ' it ... . . . d ap^2r.*. core. .I l : ,j i h ( j in O The option I'm talking about - maybe the problem
, 1
)
! I was w;ch the gae bien. The option is not to turn HP1 1 20cc those circ.rutancea, hhan'ycu haven't gotten j - .
,, ; t6 F2G% but to jwit rida it out without HPI.
4
~t , ;,
l , il 2 Yes, that in an option. , a c l 1 0 In t'nt being used now?
,. iI - ,
e j .
,g . eg A I don't think ws've had a.renetor trip where i
, v i. - that unter .would not Sve .been .ue.ed for rotte tirce. I can't
- l. l l .. j L___-__---____ t_____-___- _ , . _ - - . ~ - . - . , - . . ..~-.,._------.-._----..~.-----.-,L.-------..,- - ..d.-- i n t
!' \ ! 2020 a [ j 1~
- l. ansuor your question, I really can't. ! l l L l 1
t 1 I
.2!'
i O Mr. Diotorich, turning your attention to page l I gf 7 of you:e testimony, v$'ve gotten into this a bit already I y. b that your statsrbnt is that tho'7dNi nvotom was de, signed I h . < l
; .[
r.; to safety standards. I undcratend you did that because '! 4 v. the nciit calculation anuutad th$t the atailiary feedwater i ^
- - l cyctem would be available during tho'courso of an 1
3 I - . , 0 accident. J a l rA
!! Isn't it trua that corttin of the actuations --
l p . .. - ..- g, { lo t 120 restart that -- certain' of the feodtrater -- au::;iliary 9 - . , . _ . . . l pj feedu.to control valves are not.desi.gned to safety grada, i d 1 3,y t et leaat in terms o5 t5e control of thone valves? n . . . .. g} A You, the nonnal cont'rol velve, then thre auxiliary P i
.,. O feed line..is not desiguca.to adfsty grado standards. _ _
pl . - - n ,. , l c 1 4 0 That valve ia controlled by'the integrated control,
~
.ay s t e.5, isn't that correct? .
.H '..
5 IL Correct, s e t. v. Dl l: O ticuldn't it be fnir 'to cay that the system is 'i I. . _ . . . . ._
/p desi E med to cifaty standarda, at least in certain respostic
- d n - . . . . . . . .
if tregarding the ESPAS initiation, perhaps, and not when-9 1 1
. dl initir.cion comes from othe.r courens e $cr.' instance, a locs ,
,t.
1 4- _ y of nr.in Deeduator or a trip in the reactor 'cao3ing pot? ' l x y a l q - 1 g A~ In that respect, initiation 10 not anfaty grado e l . .. .. . 1 F you cra correct. 93 i y Q Nor is the control? q
;__ O U[A7 by.._ . - _ _ .. _ _ . . - - . . , - - . _ _ _ _ -~*---------_-----..----,--<-----L
--w,-.
~ - - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -__
l g 0 In f cct, isn't it true that even. on an ESPAS f 2 initiation whilc the flow gosa to 100 parcont nutcratically,4
..._. . . . . . . ... 4
;, you have to rely on operator action -after thtt to cont:61.
l L L _ . . .. .. . ! q that fice to whatomr Icvol vould be cppropriate giving j l - . .. t j j l n prirary system condition? ' l l , .
-~ , ,
A Y 1 6[- 'les, that is trus.
~'
y 0 Do youAr$$$e~thatthosooperatornotionsmight d fi 3 p- tako place as no$n as $ minuto or tua after auxiliary '
/,i
. t t feeduaber corn acca? You understand uy quenbion, don't,$ou? I I
I JO 21 Yes, under Doms inAi ancas, it might be pecsible l < g __ .. .. . . , ! c' ,30 that an op rato: would want to reduco -- cho only time l f yonM want to Enduca $1ga, oU ccurm$, was an overcoolinp".
- gf
. 1, ... - . _ . . ,
nort of tranni ent. I';l trying to pictura enfety features 1 q:t h; I j initiationone. novo [ccolingcortoftransient,butnot l
- q. not com for soue time. The operator should be'voll auhre w
,a, /i of the event that'c taking plc co by upw.
I < _ ! O I may be confuced, but my' understanding of safety a/ '
, [
ntanme:GD and cafoty ' grade in that yda do not take creddit ,{ l 4
. i i
pa i q- for cparator action within a careninitinta paried. When. i ! r I you hava . -safety grndo systete ycu accuma that it'n 211 Y - [9 cutonatic action, is that correct? In that the way yen ' h !' d. underctand it? ! a_. s
.j A That it. correc t. '
,4 i" The cafAty featurca'instintion of auxiliary feed-
- s. ,
.~. .. ,
... ] i untek ic required - 1ra not required, hnt rac assumed in thb j l
J
I l i f , . .t l lpl ' 2 p 2022 i p-
- p ...
{ ; l q; j' small break analysis which in'that case, I would prefer 1 a
.i f i
j 2 '! cuxiliary feedwdter to come on and I vould not care if I't
- i 1 _ . . .
l e; cara-on full-flow. . t j ' 4[; 0 You kroul6n't cSrc if. it cor.s on full-flow. Might ghp you care however if it stayed at full-flow after it cars;on?? ! 1 y1 A I don't think that would be a prime concern is' '
- 3-
- e. smtll break, b ouldnt - I'd like to have at leach n' :
] i c. .1 50 parcent level in tbs aten:n generator, in that case., y ' h [ -b 3 O From the ESFA9 initiation causes auxiliary to- d'
- 6 l li i' ecmo cn, am I correct in statement .that that will ceuari 7
. . . , caly the turbine : driven pump to acttpte? '
C[ ', L L That is correct. [ L
- v. p p l .p.,
. - i f G And under the automati'c inf.tiation, what level., ,
I t , ,.,' . in the oteca gancretor does th'c auxiliary feodwater go taz
- i L -
,i
..XU L 9 Tat the safety feat lnrac ihitiation 1.17 I
. . ns .
~~.i
.c o
. . - . . ~ . . . . . m.m epprviata ttat you would probably also have had an 7
., ;]
t7..g [e 3 n, ; , t . 5 - . . L
', I initintion of Ec.c cther pmap frcm ftG no'nsafety grads ' . 7 ;.
h I.:dti ution, and the cteen ganarntor lovel wou2.d continus , , n - e co rise as long aa I ha.d -- had:'fdica position en thosa ;.; , l e nafety featurca valvas. I 1 N/ , e . i
- s. ; G 12 the other pu;:g initir.te.: 2lso anyou casur# $ lit.t
>4 n
i
- c. . e t
it probably uculd, that pump, havingJinitiated on non-: W
.. y ,.
.w r, cafety fcaturae initiation is #ubjcintr to tho; control of ' -
s
- 1 y
, 3 - .
, the integrated control syste.n, correct? ,W 'b a 4 ,
+e I j
_ g m A- 'Iho zefety features v'alvac, if there'd been,g,.W " "
.w ,, .~.-..-.s-...4.-.-.--.__._..._..~_--__ .......__.~.--._m......----.__..---__.w.----- -
l l ' \ l
.1
'l
.033 j q. ; nafety fanturas blguaf, a safety fenttures valve on both.
i l g treina, itwou$dhavaopenedfull-open,, i , a. , Q Eut the cafety facture valve, the safety feature 4 I . initiation uould Nt $ Eve athrted up the other an:,:lliary 3, -, S ' the punp? h Not the motor-driven valve. Q Flhen t.bo saht$ty feature initiation han opencd thoco valves, I forgat exac51y uhnt you cell them, the 'n.lves 0 - ( controlled by dafety featuren, 100 percent open, that meanc . iu .ii I that an::iliary fee 6xater flou can thereafter be h controlled only by nanuni action,'in that true? - 12-A- ?io, thoac. velves ccm ha -- well, nanual actica, 4 i m . remta muual achien frca, the cont:rol roon. 14l! , . - .- .
, l 2 I naant :nanual ac opposed to some automatic wt
! cation, for inst $$co, for an integr5ted control system?
19 !' . . . And i:1 : stating that the AW cystem on ESP.hS ir, designed i: n . -. . . . 3 h to c:iE:s t-/ yrnda, are you teking credit fcr any op3rator-l. 10 4 { I . : ti c".1, control flow? l 10 ! l g .i ' No, not in tha b$911 break analyais, I'm not.. i D li ._ n, 4 Q Whet nica.11 break analysis are you referring to? cs ba . . . .- ll; 1 I'm referring to any. of the 100 or 90 cnall bronk e, + 9 ; . . i r.nalycan .that hevo been perfenqed.
.13 l i dn a otall break, thare would be 'a ' safety fer.tures 24 . . . . ._.. .
p initiation, n turbine-driven pump would start:the two safety y; .
7._____.__.. 1 4 I l i 1 1 l n l a
-~ -~
1026}l-
\
j.h featurca valves would open, full open; I would asstuto that I g A the otler toto;:-driven auxiliary feet!wuter pump would also 3; ctarte if from nothing elso' but tha fact that the operator 1 t
- tripp2d the four main coolant pturpo 'und as the signal for the P
4hn notor-driven pinapa tt$ atart on that dignal -- I'm going ,1 n _. .. .-
'~
I , l;7 i! to be going inte natural' circulation, I want a high - - l + 1; ,c. 3 I 4' -
. j? uta m generator levol, so I'm providing as nuch !
4 - F annilinry feedwater aa'I can to tha cteam-generator, which ih o g _ . . .. q
, , h u? nt I vant to do. -
' p$ ( ! y, !! o O In all car;es, when you".. r . trip the racetor coolan6,
~
[I o _ -- . . . , .
,h Dw.cp cn an ETs'FA9 cignia, however, you' don't want the higpSat g y ... _. . .
}
a
.U:<.,
.yonsibla otoum <;;anerntion level, So~you? 4 cl
- .h
, ., H t .a
- It Mac ey tudcrate.ndirig that you wanted to got ;r j
'f
.; j l to 50 percent of the oparating ~ rmete, at leant initially, .,
i j } n !j aml Coterninc at that point whsther yon can confirm i 5 nntnml cirenlation? ' i h A I gucan I'm not familiar enough trith the proceduren t L I think if I'm gdng en nat$ ural circulation, I would want n93parccaticvalinthestenEgenerator. I don't stop i o L j d halfway thre to confirb that I hani it or not. i ti
;q i ._
c ( a ! p i ,, Yk
!} - !
25 f! ~ I l
) i
....--e-.-,-. k . - , . . . , , . - , . . . - . . , . . , . - - - - . . - - - . . - - - - - - - - - - - - < l
F , q ,/
'[ , ,.. 20'
,L ,
, ,.c . ,
hP3 3' EU'1 BY MR. INTPEI'R:
~
! I liccolburn2
}i O Hr. Dietrich, if you have a hundred _ percent aux 113.ary I
f feedvater flew from b'o th traina, what level in the steam
~
l t 4[ cacerator uculd you expect the water to be at en the secondary i ' t s4de? ,
/
(' 2 j A It . depends, of course, on the boil loft right on the a -
.. I nocondtry side; as the decay heat, or the hent in the primary O
y s sy~. tam drops, the level would increase on the aacondary , side, )i t'
]q nt whic h tina I'd take oporntor action to reduce flow i n 4 () il You would want to have cporator'for action so that you j lj Q
! i I! saintain a relatively conatant level on tio cecondary sidA, J p" a ntable ccndition? ii
! B A Yes. I u
i k.s 0 Ard during what i.ir,a frame Taccid an cparator be expected
- n
{ U j to havn t.c t.9.e auch ac tionP 5 1 -r i .*. ;! A T don't think he's expteted. He doesn't ha've to take. i ,. U ' I a D,. ] v;hlon. 4, i
, Again, if I vmnt to n.hintain natural circulation, M- i h cLnbi?ity of tha atenn generutdr legal is prcba.bly not of
, d G 9it . rrixe imnortance to the operator, as long an he han enough to ) ,,. ij l 4 S y baintain nobgel cirMN1 tion.
, l D 0 Ha has to riaintain at least 50 percent' of the operating '
l E M range co sabintaiu a natural circclntion. Im I correct? 4. p ( 23 6 A N o, I don ' t 161nk tha t 's correc t. .You can h?.ve natural 3 i h 24
'l circula ti.on at 16a0 - d.hnn '50 percenti c: w h 25 l- O .Can youhave c6 equate natural circulation!to remove the
- l . . . . .. .
_ _ _ - - _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - - ~ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ i
- I 2026 L$ 2 1 t
percont of the operating range level? 2l A .Yos, I believe you can. 1 3 Q What la.the'basie for that statement?
'l A I'u trying to recollect the elevation differences 5 but it econs like the heat sink corresponds to the' level of 6
the core, uhich is the heat source, is lens than the 50 percent) 4 7 level on the uteam generator. 0 l Q 11r. Dietrich, Mr. Ellison ,1uut handed you a lettar + 9 dated April 27, 1979 from lir. Mhttirec to l'r. Denton. I would j r 10
] like ycu to take a couple of inostants to reviou that letter. to-11 l see if you 're familiar with it. 1 12 A You, I em f amiliar with it.,
3 j - 12 Q Could you pleano identify it for the record? 1 4 My A It's a letter dated April 27th from Crohn Mattimoe. to . ! 15 .,i{ ihrold Denton pro 71dinr3 our ccanitment to rhut down- Rancho Secc. ! l
! . 1 j IG - l nn<t inglemnt itman A through E. I guess, for the record, therb
! 4 17 l 1s en enclosure one, which provides items for the c.n:r,iliary j
\ (-
1B 1;! feed system upgrade; and enclosure 2 uhich p' roviden guidelines t H: i'or tho: development of operational procedures. l I. u ! 20 I ilR. LAMPHER: I wculd like this-docun?.at marked as 1 ! I 21 CPC Exhibit 25. i- ,
)
i 92 i (Whersupon, CEC Exhibit 25 va.a narhed /. ! }! %s .. 23y- for identification.) N. . u . {. % y MR. LANF23R: ' Fir. Dietrich, in the first sentence of 2c.; 3 t' sat Apr131 - 27, 31979. letter, ref arence in made to lare OKER. sts.tus 4-
<p
l
' ' %g ! .
L
'2027 '\p 1
l 3 rnport. dated April 25, 1979. Mr. Ellicon is going to paan out, 2 a docrnent and I would like you to rovfact it and see if that
\
J. in the amne status report that in referenced in that letter. . 4 Mrs. Bowers, while Mr. Districh is revicating r.he 4 5 document which is entitled on the front cover "NRR Status 6 P.eport on Feedwater Transient:3 in B&W Flants", I would like 7 that to be narked as CEC Exhibit 26. I would like co note for i a 1 0 the record tlut cur copy, unfortunately, has fallen short, l 2 G once again., In a nucer of pl. aces, a yellcr.f markar,which was 2 2 10 { marke6 on thie doctracnt prc.vicualy, hac shoun up in the xeroxir.g . I 11 } in rm r:rnber of pinces. 13 I believe the pager still can ha rond but wo vill 1 I j 12 andonver to get copier of the pages without difficult reading. a : p' t , i MRS. BoiiERS: . Mr. Lanpher, I got caught on the aarns ^ I "' thing cae tifac,. 'I didn't realize that yellou fould terax- ! 10' black. 1 O MR.. LAMPUER: 1 Wily they don't always. Evidently, i t"o
- c dif farent machineo show it up nnd soraa rmchines don't.
- I 1
p' DY HR. LANPHER:
.l
-(lihereupoa, CEC . E::hibit 26 vnc marked - ~
5.
",,}- for identification.)
i [ 4 e
- "'j BY:Mn, LANE 1MR: a 9
l 23 ! O Mr. Dietrich, 'hnvc you had an opportunity ~ to review . j M CEC Exhibit 26? 1 lj - 25 .Yos, I have. 3 LAU
. _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . . - _ . -.- __ _ .. - . . _ . _ _ . _ . . _ _ . _ . . . . . . . _ _ . ~ ._
- l. ;
I i 5 , I ! h
/ !! 2020 ,
l < 1 t . .. Y . t 3' p'
'4 - Q And is that the atatus report which is referred to in.
l 4 - p-i
- t" t e.: firch sente.nco of CEC 25? '
l- i i 3h A I'm sure it is.
- i.
O tfould it be fair to chara.ctorize CEC 27 ca the UMUD ' i i' (!' c-l re sponoo to this status report? *
- 1 J' l 6' '
l ! MRS. ECWERS: Wait a minute. Our last number was 26 , .i ; 7 yo,: just refor: red to 27. J ;
., p i ai t t
MR. LN:!PHER: I'm corry. Iet me go back and start ; e i r, Ij d . 0%tr, 1 I H l I M !! B 7 7d R . L TdiP11E R :
- a. i g
3 O Ic CEC Exhibit 25 a dor:unont prepared by GMUD in
'n uponne ato CEC m$ibit 26? Or, in recponse to concerna !
l j .!! }, l r shibiM.5 in that clocumat? ?
-l
' /. /
4".s , I was going to GRf it wasn 't in response because [ I .; O I dca
- h think the OlER report actually ropi. red a responac !
, 1 i R [ cm such. But it was a clatament of ottr connitr.cnt regarding , I H i o theca cencerne, yea, j i,
^ 'j '
O In ycar April 27, 1979 letter you ctate three quartsra [
+ [ ci the vay down the first pcge that Rancho Seco will be ebut
- P .
e ! 20 dcun on April 28, 1979 and will rmt be restarted until Itca.s ! !i ; t
?) h A through .C above are completed. !
u h
"2i L:hy vas it that EdUD na.de this conunitment, or this j .? 5 . q p ;: c p o s a l ?
! h ! , .L l ca l! A' I think wo felt, in . light of the concerno expressed, i fls I l 25 that it would be proper to complete those11 tens during a plant l t . ..
i t I t,v h 2029 1 chutd.own befora restarting the plent. We felt theae five 2 l
; items vaald r.lleviate to a great c:: tent the concerna that had
,, 2 heen m:proam3 by the NF.C Staff. 4 j [ i O In it fair. to stato that given your coinitnent to l
- 5 li chut down until thcee items had been cc
- upleted that yen agreed n }
6[ with NRC's ccnclusion that it vould not nt that time. bc 7 x j-adequate aneurance that the plant wouhd be operated safely? i i 0 A j , I don't thinP uo felt that the plant could'not be j 0 i operatem safely at that time. } ( i l i 10 } O Uhy did you make this cc:xnitment then, or this proponal? l if i il j 1 d.tn't 51can to characterize the lettor, it speaka for itself, ' l i 12 bn: 1 gucca it ia a cor=itnant. p l Icn say that you will shut' I 1 1 i
- c '
dm rn . 6 i : 1 Mp A I gacan I havo to spen!: in all honasty. i II No felt'the I e, URC uculd chut un Sottn if we didn' t cotwit to -the shutdown o 4
;g " curcelvec.
l'i i 0 Nns thin letter cf April 27, 1579 norcething which was i-j j i u.; i
; prepared solely by SMUD and preu5nted to the NFC, or were there
[ ! l 19 nigotiations anft diccussiona with the NRC j?rior to thin tirce ' I . 6 l
' that this cenuitacnt was fornulated < in 20 E form.1 letter fonn?
.. I 21 3 -There were'acy diccussion:s.v3 th the NRC which I was 1
l n not c' party of thnt did tr&e place pr:icr to the preparation -
}ofthelotter,yes.
23 1 gj 0 Mr.:Dietrich, do you kncu whether Mr. Rodriccus was a " o 3 p".rty to thoec discuasions?
- m. . . . . _ . . . _ _ . _ . . . . . _ . _ _ _ , .
l i l 1 2030 l' 3 s- A Iio nas a pr.rty to come of thosa discunniona,. yen. 6 ,, j
' ; And if I wanted to ask quantiono about what thosa ,
O' diccessions were, it would be more appropriate to pose thesu to him? Your kncwledge la based solely on conversations yon ! 5 ' have had with other SMUD personnol? l }' i , 0 A j That's correct. 7 Q Turning your attention to CEC Er.hibit 26, the status i hl t l 8 report, the HRR Statua Report, I would' like you to turn to > ! ! I ) l 9l ! paga 1-1. There is no nirnber on that page, but go to 1-2 l i
.Ol,andtu2:nbackonepage.
4 li 11 The bottom centence en that page reads as follows:
.)
j LH "Tha integrated control cyctem in nore complex than i h J l i 15 ! other dauigna, has a greater burden placed on it in terms of l j 14 k!featresponse." l IJ Do you agree with that meatecent? [ 16 N A I'm not extremely fcmiliar with control systetts ured on i ! l T/ other Pims. Ucueror, it is my understanding that the integrated h: c 10 " centrol cy:;tc.a has acme features which are more involved, more j
, i 10 !, ce rplex than those other control systems, correct.
3 1 a I don' t like the word " burden" . That sounda like it's U 1- < t j' 21 l c :ack mule r or unething, tha t we ' re . . . I i n ' 0 Jounda like it': & uhat? D:cuse me. l . ! ! ad.c A A pack mule that we arc . going to try to wea:: down. M-(4.Maybe, " greater reliance" in a proper word. I TS Q #:o you'think that' sentence would be more accurato if-1 I,
t i 1
.. i
- a -
1 2031 : 1 i i I 7 1 i l l .] it read: "Tho integrated control systect is more complex than l 1
% r -
, .j other designs and Jhan a grector relienca placed on it irr terms 3j i
'! of fact responne"?
l 4 I j i A That's a good choice. 1 . I
~
Q It's yours. ! G
- A Thtt's why it'a good.
j Q I'd 13Ee you to turn to page 1-5 of that document. P j t bl:I I'll rend it out loud tmder paragraph ' number 2: 'The question i' o l
~
t posed is: "Does the ICS perform satTafactorily?" A. B&W i d l hac ctated and we agraD'that, anote, 'we're not catitified Uith j I t;n re.tlability of the integrated control syctem." n -
*, l. '
1 "lg Do you adre'c with that statement as of tho' time that I it U2.Et madO? j 9 i 4 p 1 I s h
"< j: MR , BAXTER: Point of clarification. Are you asking l
N'
/,, o the witnoca tibether he agrees that that's what S&M stated, i
\
l K h and whethcr the Staff agrees? l e i f D !j HE. LANPHER: Thank you, Tcm. s j Here you natisfied, you meaning SMUD, satisfied with i l U i W d the reliability of the ICS .at that tima? l 20h THE WITNESS: ' At the time thic document was written, j i 1 3, 0 L C pont-WI? I d[o M MR. LAMPEER: Shortly after. The.timeframe I'm focusing , .. .. d
<- U on, Mr. Dietrich, _ is the timeframe that this. document was
~
1 i t 1 i M14-incued. And two dayer later from'thc' Cates, SMUD made a responas
- .\
n EU ! u to th coaccrna ccpitting1 to _ shut _dcwn. Let me rechrase'it.-
e i la' 2032 O I' ls it fair to say that one of the retsons that you l 8 i . , t i l decided to abut denm was the concern which he.d been stated in t 3 this c,oemnent with respect to the reliability of the ICS? ; a 4 THE WIT!!ESS: I gueas I would characterisc cur feelingri j I c 1 5 noro at we had a concern over the relicoility of the ICS, not a l a G that we vere not entisfied win it. Certainly, it performed s 4
- 7 catisfactorily for us, always han, nut tharc was no integrated l l l 6) control nyatem performod properly througho2t the Three Milo 3 4
9 Ininnf incident. I l 10 And I think it being n controller of the nuzilitry
- i. l 1 i 1
1 11 foodw ter system, it received a great deal of attention and we i 1 F. I wore concerned at that tirn { 1 13 , , IE HR. LANPUER: q ; l Mi i O Is it f air to any that the concernu tms with anything in i p which might affect the rel.iability of timeliness of delivery 1 a p ' ! 16 ) of the auxiliary fendwater syr: ten?- War that t'2e cofus of your ! l l j rf ] concern? , li
,I I
ns [ A W ll, in our particular picco, ve-had the safety I ; to j iaturos initic.ticn of auxiliary f cedwater, I think, that ue j i i.' 1 i i i 9.0 d d.id hava a general concern for the ICS'n rolo in providing ! l r h. this - tinely responne to the at::iliary fdtduntar cyctem, -ydn. , a , I 5 l n[ Q Isn't it true that as of that ti'ne frame, le.to April' ~! g; i 1379,-. that tha f ailure moden in efi'e.ct of - the ICS had not i 34l.heensystr.caticallyanalyzed? l I 3; A Certainly. not in .the detaileddfc.iluro nodes and affecte e 1 ._ _ - _ _ ...a - - .-..-- - - - ..-... . - _ -- { - . - - - - -- - -
I { ed> 2033 e i 9 nnalysis which ims performed prior to that timo, a:2 tor that p time.
~
O Yen looked at page 1-7 of that came docto.cnt. There are uno shurt-tens items which are cet forth by the NRC. i !' ci l ' ,' And ainac this is one of the areas where the yellow was on it, i a r# 3 why don't I read the introduction to that a l "In the short tern wo munt take all reasonable stapa l ! 1 4 6! to reduce the likolihood of cecurrence of trancients at B W ; 1 L,
! i.
i i H l planta nnd to improva standing instructions training in emerganjy W. f 1 I 4a precedures availabin to plant operatorn." ! U "Itic can ba accomplished by. . . " and then it 90c0 on to C" lich itoma A through E.,
-\
Itua 3 the.re in, quote, "RevicWing R j j results of MEA analycis of ICS in taking notions as to reduce h M l i
] ita likelihced of initiating or extscerbating transiente".
4 i Ml That chart-tcrn step would have of cource required l
?li
, is l{ pa:fot ting an IMEA cne.lyeis, s.ta I correct? 3 9 , Ol . a Yea r it tyculd. o 10 d O Your April 27, 1979 letter responding to these concerns,. 1 I P I I EHUD d.f a not propens to parfora.! nn FID1n analysis in the short I 1
'" da terb h:' that colrect?
F 4 i' l J R Ihat is correct. a-i j " i[
; Q Uill you tell ine why you did not? , d t
i 7 , A I think a fcilure modea and effecto analysis, to be j Ii M dcne properly, is a censiderable r lengthy job. And we . appreciat - I 2[i f, Gd that that Could not be done in the Ghort term. I don't tliinh i , -
L I l , t i ' ll [ 2 2034 ;
!! 't !
) ,
i- 1L ; 30 p thzit, na.I stated, the concern of the ICS was that. strong in l 2'I our minds. It worked prcparly in the Tbree Mile Island ; e 3 > l
,; incident and han worked properly at Itancho. Seco.
I 4 ! Q Do you knew of any diacuccions within SMUD vhere the i 5 h' porcibility of performing an HGh on the ICS in the short-term, - n" by "ahert-tem", I mean a akutdown phaco, okay?--whether there jj . 4
; vere any diccucciens that you know of axcong SMUD personnel d
0 l about performing such an analycia? 4 I A 7:o, we did not con $dder dcinsk anaIt an analysis during i { ; the ::butdown , to my knowic<ge. ,1 Q ims. ECHERS: Mr.!Lanpher, it8 s abr>ut time for a mid-h i d p a 4 m0rn.ing brcak. I i
<3 AR. IJJGIIMR:
\
All rigfit, ma'am. J j "d q (Wheropuon, at 10:20 a.r2., aj .mid orning break was
- 1udotape ' j tak on . )
(~ ' "' . -t - 4 q
., L
- h. 9 COli"2 CEOSS EXAMIDNfl0M
,.4,"alcobe}t s
.,' 7
! d SY HR. Luu?IER: j IEli[i; q !!r. Dieturich, before we stopped for the breakr I wac 4 a . 3e
" { aching ycu nbcut why an rima of the ICS vs not included as l !
cne of We.nhutacun items on'your April 27th lettErr in'ViGU j ~ U u j cf the fact that it wt.to lictad to a shorb cann. iten on prge 1-7,
", h
] of die NRR .utetuc report. Would you please tell me why?'
HR. BAE'EEt i 23 I believe' that question'has been asked and answered. l i l N M R., I M PIIIG :-- I would.like it cnswered again. If it'a.
- r. w - i i l j ,. _
c a...__..a . repatit!.ve, - I: epologit.e, but I would like to get it on the - _..,,..-u-.__-____..--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-l --
'l
i ! .. I [f 2035 i I I' record so I can get my thinking back. l . 77 l- ',' t TTE WITNESS: I missed the ve last part of your i e, n - *[d quer. tion. You mentioned an item 7, b it I lost you there. 1 a l BY MR. LAMPUER: I
- . . 1 r'.
4 O In the short-term items which the NEC Staff identified a i 6 as 1-7, CEC Exhibit 26, they mentioned that they think in the 4
,g
.. t "- -
' y ahort torm it would be good' to review the results of an ME.A
.~ ..N - b o y analysis of the ICS. F l D}a When I turn to CEC Exhibit 25, the short-term items j 10j which EMUD committed to perfour. during a chut-down period, there l d $
*- ja is no FMEA and, in fact, that in put over on pago 2 of your i i
U i April .27th lutter ce scoothing you will do in the longer tenal W i i i bhit why waa that not included in your short-term .itsas? ! c i 14 p. A I think, inctesd ac a proper short-term iten we i a : 4 g h' t i cas.itted in the enclosure of our letter to provide operating s I a!! 3 U h proceduren for the control of the auxiliary feedwater. syntam D r j 1- [ indepandent of the integrated control system. h j F4 % do a proper failure modes und effects analysia wesid. V o u?ilhave tehen t considerable tirm. ' 1 ] N' O So una it the time fccter which war crucial -in - 3 1 4 9 n ; j 2
- f. i ;f detomininq what items were included in tha' shutdown section' l sl l
9 of your April 27th letter? 1: ] i 0o
- F A "' hat uns definitely ona of the' considerationh, yes.
asJ}. ;
.)
j L34 f.j 'Q Mr. L Ellicon Iia going to pass out_ a document labeled , r
- l. 2S CEO E:chibit 27. ;I weald liko you to review it briefly.
u ...;. _ _ _ . _;_ - .. _ _ .. a . _ . _ . _ _ _ - - . - _ _ _ . _ . - . . _ . - _ _ _ . - - _ .
.i 1
l 2036 9 . l 12 1 (Whercupon, CBC cchiblt 27 van l narked for identificatibs.) I
.l
- l.
- l A (Cotiplied.)
l O
- Pul. IAUPHER
- For the record, it in an April' 28, 1979 1
.)
1 5 4 letter to Mr. J. H. Taylor, Manager of Licentsing at B0W, to i l 6 Mr. Harold R. Denton, of the NRC. ' 7 I believe that I ached that it be marked as Exhiltit 27. U BY MR. IJGPIIER1 b 9
~
0 Turning your attention to the attachmOnt to that letter , 10 nr. Diotorich, B&W setc forth a neope and schedule for the l i lI FM5h which it ccamitted to perform on the integrated control q l 12 cy:3 tera. And at page 2 of that attachment, it appears that the a Dl MA would be completed and tranranitted to the NRC-this was 14 their proposal-betwcen June 15, 1979'and June 27, 1979.
- i 15 l Was that your enderctanding of how long it would take l 'l N ( to parfor~a an FMZA?
( A I think it wocid have been a best estimate at that i 1 1'l 1c, t. ((i i t timo, 1
!? O Well, is it your tectimony that to have included an cd l . FP2A'aa a chert tora iten would have been?tco long.because-l 21j completing the FF2A would have t: Ken until probablylcome tima i
j t 1 j 22 [o in late Juno, 1979? 11 . 23 ! .A Iluecs we didn t racludo its frca the short-te$rm itsns i
- i '
"241 just becauce 'it was too long; we didn tithink it had the i- 3 i
. '25l4 direct? cignificance ' thatJ the othar itps wo: performed did. l L _ -_ .. - - - _ _ - _ . _ . . a-
l. i i 2037 1 . 1 l 12 But, ycu, June 27th was our best estimate of the thne, , 1 ! o
)
! the schedule, at that time, f
3 Q And at leant ono... excuse me, had you fininhed? i 1l 1 "4 ' l i 6
! A Well, I -}ust think that vc locked to not heop Rancho
)
"e al Soco down for that long a period of tdze, simply to do a a
i H 61 fnilurm moden nnd offects analysis of the ICS. 7
, O It is my underctanding that, instead of doing an 7MIR ,
O l U }j! cartain of the short-term items were design ad perhaps to O I . compensate for any potential problemn uhich night arice in the a . i 10f')! integrs.ted control system; namely, training operators to caks 9 4: 12 i I nracal control of the auxiliary feoduater synten. correct? In that 3 l' I; e l 1 ' T; i~ A Tha t' n correct. i M ; O Can ycu explain to no that if the FiEA had not been f Ti nperforred, and the failura modes c.nd effects of the integrated I; , I 40 h control system not been systematically analyzed, how you could
!i 17 uN train operators to recogniZn all ICS f'lilurea cuch that they
- o l M j . t
- culd know when to take n.inual control of the auxiliary feed-
) d i iPj{ vater?
- H
'^ U z ; A 1 don' t think an operator. han. to cctually recognize D. wht;t the f ailure ic, or even tiat there was a f ailure, maybe 2Rijin the ICS g to recognine the resulca of that failure,"at whic!h N '
c l timo yoa wou,1d take menutl contrcl. i i
% 0 How would an operator know that the resulta which he:
1 1 25 1 coec in his control. roca, some result, . represent en ICS l li
.,,.,,,.--,-V' -. , - - - - - , - , - , - - - - - - ~a----------------- - - . - - - - - - - - - - ------A
I c j :i Y
- i. i' 4 i I
2038 ' a i 1 14 + i 2
]? failt.re cuch that he should take manual control if the P2EA l he.c not 'ceen performed? '
j l 3 .A Well, I think this is a subject that Mr. Rodriguez ' i t l l 4 l can address, but I'll junt give you an ea:anplo: If steam : I l 5 ] generator level abould be controlling the 50 percent and it i [ l 0 ) warn't, I would take manual control of the nu.niliary feedwater I
,/
l t cyste.m and control it to 50 percent. ! 3h O Go inntoad of doing the DmA--and if you can't answer i r h I d this at thin time, it's fino, we will purnuo it with Mr. 6 N NllRodriguw,butjusttofollowup--t/hdtyoudidwashavethe ! l 21 oparatorn learn what the parameters vere that should be l 9 rw.tored ar.d to azaume that if you had an ICS failure, thona U li p n anoters were not unticfied, at thct peint, you would take F 1/ 4 nm.ral control of the ALW? 1 , 1:> f A Sinco the %CS is athe cyatcm providing, in ny cumple, i M 9 the loval of control) I would nuepect that that's where the
;r pro:alam was if it uns not controlling level properly.
d i U Q Prior to committing to thie ch>)nge, or thic procedure j t : . e l j for tak.tnrf futual control of the AFW, if there had been an ! l u I 2 ICS failn::e at Rancho Seco which affected the water level in s tha ateta generator, vrere Rancho Seco oparators trained to take
- ;j '
s j -l 52 h ocm.'.a1 control of the PEU systca? d - i nfd A I don' t think' .I chould anawer that question. I really~ o ;
; -jdon t !c:.or tho artent of'their training in that area.
o .), p . q, 1 ' O Mr. Rodrignon would be the 'percon .to czh?
.-Ja- e.-Ee>---.-s+----:--..,e--..--m---
t \ i : 0 2039
- p .
Id . I 15 ll A Yes. i #
,, 1 .
(, O So you ' don't know weetner this in e aignificant change '; e I - t.1 %
. in Rancho Seco procedure or ceufirmatfon of something which :
e i I l , oparatora practandily already un0erstogd? 1 i 5h A l ) jj I personally feel that our opdrators would have been 6 ') - , i capable of tr2ing manual control of the AFM system; I don't
\
7 y katu if they havo boon specifically trained in that cubject . O ; or cpat.'fic proceduren in that area. d I nh
~h!* That's not outsido of the realm of what I uculd & int ;
I l ' , 10 0l nn Operctor could 'do, drau the valve in the control IcVel in. 1 ( I a .?airly otraightfo:uard operation. l
,O
{ :
"h e O I turn ycur : ttention .to page 2-2 oE CBC hhibit 26. . .
i . $I i ~ ll y'on have to iteep on a hit. There in a table in there that is l t; 1 !. g '.4
' i', nrt nin t e::ed. Under ' the ce.ption / "Inittal I wentory", the h
'h p" hh fcllouing statement appaarc
<r "g '"We have had little discuculon on' teether it is . g-
'4 e */ l i
~
)
i, p:coctical to increr.no the time to atoam gan trator. dryout by 1 1- !
,,, y imreacing during normtl opcratien the amottit of fluid in the 4 suaon6ary aide of the stcan generator,"
"' n
- Go you know uhethor it uould ha practical to incream i i
. 4,1 0 drycut t?pna by inc3: casing the fluid level ca the es:condary . !- 0 01607 l- H
)
i l 3$q- 1 A I havaa't dono any analyacs along t'ais line, of course,
*2 A i and there would be a lot of censiderations U f' 1 increaus thh 4
1
.)
) U l, steam geacrator ' level on the secondary -aide , I am certainly l
i 2040 l 1 16 going to decrease the amcunt of super heat that is available a to the stonn and going to lower the efficiency of- the plant. 3' And it would take considerable thought in my mind to 4 comb to cuch a conclusion. 1 5 0 There would definitely be a significant change from l 6 tle original operating parameters of the plant? 7 & Correct. B 0 Looking at page 2-3 of that same document, beginning 9 the lasc word and then going on to the next page, let me read IO thrt pr2 ceding scntence and it puts it in context. h i1 !: d c "After the ceram, the heat input decreases rapidly and-d E. O tha utr in the steam generator accordary boils off more I7 1 I 1 C f t%nlv. C @.:clations for lose of feedvator give D&W dryout ,
} ; I M j times in one to tuo ninutes for precent BSW design, depending '
15 [i on the cource of the event. Thic fast dryout ocmpared to other ! O 16 !! Was that makes LEW plants unique. The factor of two to'four . II - i 17 y larger inventory in the anticipatory scram in non-BGW ~ plants il ' B h give calenlcted drycut times of many minutes. Thus, the timing n n fG t requirencnts for our AFW delivery.are substantially note j ' 1 20 -ij stringont for ELU planta tecn ror othera." h .b q i 2.1 a no you agree with : th.at statcment'i . O a M, A Not nechtenrily. -I think this statement is based' on.
*C c . . . . .
23 i[ the face that it's deuirable to: avoid steam generator dryout. i
-!i -
g4 .ll Steem generator.dryout iu ' the initiating point for a ' reactor ! i 23 - coolant system heatup. And I think what I want-to avoid is the L
1 I i i
- j. ,I 2041 1
I , crecesive overheating of the primary syntem. l 17 2 But, yes, the wholo ccenario is quickor in a BEN plant. y1 3 f nnd I guess one could say that one thou3d have a' quicker 4 I AFid becauco of that. i 5 Turning your attention to pago 2-6 of the same document {. Q , i 6 the statua report raisce a concura regarrli: g a use of tha HP2 7 ) ac a rcutine device to respond to frecuent unticipated l B transientu. It in tav understanding ft cm ycur previous testimony- , i
) i 0 that opm ators at Ramcho Sece do routinely use the HPI even 11 l
l 10 ; whan timra may not be a cmall break, and even before getting , i il to 1600 poig.
- IR nae there been any change in oparating procedures that 11
-12 il yo:2 Jenw of stfreque'it to thin document being incued, in l
l M changing those procedurca? 1 I-15 h I think the procndure changes that no have are primarily 4 ; f 16 l ali::ceted toward the nozz]o uscge in directing an operator if 1 j 17 , he is geir.g to use hghh prescure injection to . inject it throag':. i
) the malzup nonlea re we don't une up nozzle cycles, if you 4 16 1 l '
l 19 I will. j 20 j Q So you are saying thoro it- hna been a . directive, or ! s t l at lens t informally, a new 'procedura ciqing do n'ot uas TdPI , l i 22 . ! routincly af ter a tw:: tor trip; jua5 -use your- nuheup? g E3. ] L 1 No, makeup nnd high presoure injection'is acceuhat- { i l 34 ' confusing. We havo thres pump.h One isz called'a makeup pump. i as It is: ry L understanding that if an operator wants additional
-L--..~.---.----.-.-.-------- :- - - - 1
- 1 4
i L, !- 4, 2042 ! _.. . 1 . I D a.r, he le to achieve that additional flow, if posnible, 1 , , 3 thrmish the nahup nozzle, sich is almady acoled co he in 3 act using up nc3xle cyclea. He can get that additional flow. 1 ' 4: l i j either by opening. a valve and/or starting a. second pump. ! S [
! O Isn't it true that thic statencnt on pwe 2 -C that 'I l
0- t i was referringto exprescea a concern by the NRC relating not.
, j j Stat i.o tha nczzle but fre3nency of use of nozzlac in toing' up Sl
- j .11 the cycler,.' but rathar the -uraa of part of ' the ECOS syster, i b
i ~p g y ler relatively rou t.ine :.ransient conditions. Irtn ' t tha.t t=c? ., p. d es 1 f; m.. BAIfiit; Excuse me, is tha question, Mr. Lanpher, I 3', , tu r.t .i 2 what the Secumut ntatesi I cor. lost,
]
4 1? p ; ) : n. L3NNEM Yea r dccan' t 'N doc'sent capreas Groh l 1 ?
- p 3 n , c cr.c er na the in:t of the HitC tituff?
- 3. p}
b EE41ERE h dcen.nnt nayas quote: "'this !.aisea ' o,
<a ns e
y g:midenn.," anquoto- 1 don' t know W.t I can any that'a real.lyl '
- r. H
<: s ,
Lb i:, COnCGrn. i ' J .* . n .!
' ' j!. UY NL LAUFH3E:
y . 1 g", j [ Q Turning your attention to page 2-9, the bottcc pare '[ _ 1 l p' ]li wraph utat2 u "B M is unable to. state whether failurca in j [. i ,> , . ' I the ICS could initista locs of feetra.tcr event and alno inhibit b: r l p' l ira:ilicry nMI via the firn control valva., We have asked BEM j ll p' s 1 ] ll1 -' to r..nalVro this qwsntion preaptly. If .this couen lotd failura j 'l a I-
<ri
[w can occar , and we see 'no rooson why it is not pcesible r - then .h
.t
,I c
! 5 O
" f)
L h -,tha. conbined fragaerce, the AB(see noction 2,3.1) could-be ;j n . l '$: ': d - . 8
' h5Jhl_h6C10$9 '$Cr dlOifC SVOntU f~Cy{I?.18 1' , ;
l 2 i i r{ 2943 4 ,. p. I ' Do you kn6v uhether E5M performed such analysca prior i 19 ; 2 ! - to.the time that yofa wroto your April 27th letter? i L _ .s , j A '2o be honest with you, I can' t answer you. . !
, i k
0 Do you kncy whether these analyces were perfarned at Q
"e any time prior to the performance"of the failure moden 0 and effecta analycac?
l , t 7 A I don't know in what detM.1 the analyzin has been dono; ! t n l v } I kncu it's betu lockcii at. It's my understanding there in no l J l 1 4 ': o . i nch comon nicdc raa.lu re . . l
,4 Do you Fnow when that analysis wac performed?
O l i i1 A I do not. 10 2 Yo2 do not kncu whether it tme performed bn. fore the , i j l j 13 re 3 tar;t at Rancito Seco, or not? 1 1 a y ] 14 I A I honestly cannot reir.c2 cr when I've had thace die-c a s s n.um ; 4 . 1 :. j .
- s. rec 1y en , ,c.
a g i M[ 1 Q Iir, Dieterich t turning your attention to enclosure ono 1 i !i [ to GMUD's Ppril 27th lettar, it is :r.y tndcratanding that those + \ y ! lb 171 H nine itezac wcre the proposals to upgraf.e the nFW in a short l fl 1 6 . . if i t tm.Ta, ic that correct? I i 20 hn A That is correau, i
;t l
1. 21 d C And the firct thcrt-tc.';ta iteic4 Tac a -I will raad'it:
,i-i u j ., Rov 2.au:procacurec revises, ac nsaccu ry and conc,uct.
9 2.31o j trainina to ensura, ti:.nely and_ proper starting of motor-driven U re il anziliary fcc5 vater (AM prmp; iS} to provide"AC buses upon-
.g, yd lanc ot . off uite ponr. "
O .
i 1 i I i T! -
!l 2004 l
20 1
'!o your k:nowledge, did Enneho Seco cycrators already i
2 know hei to cts.rt thz matcr driven cu.rilirry feedwater pumps i prior to thin requirecent'? e A I guacs I'd prefer that c.Mestien be directed to Mr. I 5 Dc5rigu n.. I don't hac?7 what cur prc '.iUI procadurea consisted ' \ G of in this crea. I think an operator chcul6. have a basic 7 uM eratada.nc of how to mentally' load a piece of machinery
. 1 i
- '.' 1 I 1
\ b. on to the vital bus. l i
S-p I don $t knou what traihing, what procedures, we had , 10 h I
; pre-2MI, to be hencat with you.
l .i 31 0 And uithuat reference to thoce procedures, and I under- f .l ?1 d otand you don't have perscual knaaledge to present a recollec-i i i i5 4 { tien of tho.2 at this tiac, ycu uculd neverthele s expect, bastG t : 1 ]
.4 .;1cc yon- c' acral Enculedge of how Rancho Seco operates, that
- o l [ op ; tors would h ve had en undcratanding of how to S this?
l n 1 :
-o q A _
- vou ,;.a "ra nF. general.1.y:. yoo.
T.nat"s a hsrd question 4 i 4 H
- D L. to anst .; u.r . i You kuaw, the basic principles of making sure that I
a i, th. gr!d has wough lef t in it to take this additional load ) ! l i W
- ;j ta's ht invol
- chedding ccme otbar non-eccantial equipent from ,
i s' ' the grid, from the bus. l l 21 I doa't know wich amntrednoon that an o1 crator uould 2
'i. i hav2 bcen able to achieve thic beforehand; I can't erswer that 4; 1 cpt;t:..c n. ,), l l
E4 O Do you ci:pect Mr. Rodrigues u%guld be able to renpond t TS to that? w
- m. ,. ._ _ _ , _ _ ., _
i i j t-1 l 2045 i i 21- t i A ! Yas. , t
. )
1 -
}
l- ' O The accond AIM upgrada proposal set forth in enclosure I
"n ' ,
l g [ oas c:0 your April 27th letter relatec to the curvoillance j l 4 tcat riada, your tenting the etu:iliary feedwater systen. Arc. 3 ycu fanilirr uith whr.t procedure; were in e ffect prior to l j ' : 1 l
- 6i this proposal rot forth in r.his document? <
4 1 i
. t i
) < ;j A W11, it'c ey underatcnding that an operator was not
! i i
!' 8 'i at"..:ioaud et thiu m:nual valve durin;f the tect; at leaEst, nct I 1
.I i-9 u'k chare at all ti:uen. He certainly would havo gone there to j i
y , I i M j;f ahr.ngo the position of the valvo. t l t 4 y i 11 le ic r;y undar: tending tha.t was a definite additional l 12 1 -ortced m to ruquire the statia. tine - cf an cperator at the . ] d)
; UF ;1/c. ,
; i I *? ! Q To voar Enculedga. had Hantho Ecco ever valved out in
-o ,
i i in y tL ' cn _ liny in@ niter cyrtena s1.n:iler to the nunner that it ; it i 1 li Uq im3 ccanrr:ed at T 1I? , rf b'l A Mot to nb kn vledge. But when ycn ny in a manner . 2' ciuilm to TI, I'm impposing yua 'ical a msnner that ertended l ml' '! i . (' !! w for ccm period of .tima unknovm. Un rcutinely do testa and i ! t 20 j thiw tnut does require valving och along the flow path dryn. '.i i
.. E t
t n! -} _ .for n u.iliary feedwater.; {
.t ;
I i l
'" b -Q' Lut I tinduratand that ed SUOn as lic test is 07Gr yo'1 o
. i. -
l 33 ' wculd to-aline %e valvec eo that both sexiliary feedwater f 24 o trains b2come c.vrilchle cnce again? ; y a
.f h
?
e
,, e
'W _ , 9
4 1 i i [ ] 2046 [4 4 , i
- 22 I' j C iconid it be fair to state that this then was a propoca".
I l 2 j :l to ensr.ra n' little more relinbility that there wculd not bc
- +
3 i an operator error in not re-alining those valves?
\
4 1 l A That is one of the concerns. The second concern is that 5 en operator is there to reposition the valves so that ] atu:llicry foeduater is available as 'quickly as possible, if 4 7
.l :
it he needed during the test uode. b Q .If a transf.ent should arise at that' time? 4 .i . A Correct.
, 3 7* 0~ t .
! O ICc have talked already relating to the proposal in U
your lekter' to take Canual control of the AMii in the event
' that the ICS & en not function prcperly. And in the e:tamina-4 13 E ticn of Mr. Entthour of the NRC panel, he could not differea- )
1 i
"a i ham between the prepocal three on enclosure one of CI:C j E i
Ed ibit 25. An'! if you look at the first paga of the lettor, 10 - i ite.a n, which us develop nna inplemant operating proced tres l ! l 17 I for initiating and ccntrolling aux fechater independent of , i i the ICE control. i ! w I Will 'you decersbe what differencca vere recent by D } o
. - GED between thoto iter.c? 'l
! U ji A- }.
-I think they're basically { the nana thing.
~
Item D in M '. the cover letter talks about initiation of auxiliary fesdvater q 2B in aCdition to bhc control of it. Iten 3 in the enclosure 1
- PA
' pp;imarily addrosses. control, level control.
t ~S
.i.
..---.,L_=-==~---
Ej :Q-- Iniciation of the auxiliary feedwater cystem teans .;
i -- 1 i' L.
- n a
2047 n c . ( i l 1 23 ettrting up of tho ',pumpn. Is that correct?
)! '
o( A Starting tha. peps and' cpening the valves. 3 d
.0 Mc11, am I correct in ay underatanding that the only-i
' I 4 1 3 function of the ICS is controlling th valven? 4- -
- b. ! A That'a correct.
i ). C Q I 'n . confused. I 7 h You have'to have a valvo coma ope.n in additionjto 8 having the p.uaps to star b to got auxiliary feeduater.- l 9 , O Yes, but you included in initiat '2n valve control. l >
- i. I l
10 l I A I gum:s in ile distinction we are making here today, 11 the va?.v. cou]d re.ain shut and we vauld still have auxiliary 12 facSucter initiation. l; th O What were the circuntances in ubich you would ua;.nt 4 N ^ manuml initiation of the nutiliary focinter 5ystem? 1 1-15 ' A If f or ecs racEoa the autum.itic initiation failed, 1 W I I O That, autantic- does not involve the integrated control i j n , w:tur. excapt for con @l of those flow valvez? 4 a j 1 . J 1 l ;5 Je That'n correc t, a l-l TS .. O To your Ynwlcdge, . did Rancho Seco operatorc, prior to 1 j
'i i 1 s0 ! April 27,1D75, (nou -hw to initiato. auxiliary feedwater flera o . .
t f, j li . in ' the uvent idE.t 11M nCtutltiork Dignals or utartup of the ptPnp' d g;
. *., , . 4 a?.a ncu wc' rx.%:
_o
, A ,
m - ~,. csn , t
-;p .
b . , , 4 _ -_ k . , .se % te1 h- h 4-n n- < 11 '
- A i gg]1l -L doubt if've had precedin;es fn offeat pt thati time to -
. t 1 .
- = = . - . . . ~ - . . . . - .-.. .. -- ~ . . - - - - - - - . = - . - - - - . -
._______.,y.__._.___________ _
l I-i f) \ v. ;> a.. :.;; ~4 9-50 r i 1 .; direct the operators: to the proper action. I'd have to let l < 2.,, r i ? l Mr. Rcdriguez addrese that, 3 i Q In other worde, . prior to this time, there may not 4
' have been prcoedures evailedile for operators, but you wcrald t r' havn expected them to understand how to do something even in 1
j Cj tho abaence of prcacdare? The "smething" that I am referring l I ] j to is maanal initiating of auxiliary feodwater.
- i
- 1 1,
t
.1 A Yec, I would. >
1 ; l 3 1 8 { Q The fourth requirement in enclos.nre one to your .t ! r , t
- lC )
c
. April 'J7 J ef. tar relates to verification of AFE capacity. Why [
li was this itent included?
^E' l !!
i A Welle I think there vas probably some question na ';o j O yl th rc.lio.ity that was in c:Listence, or was in omt exieting! ,, s ] It j technical specifientions. The verification was mEde that that I Ej was the propor nurion:,and an additional test was made to
- I j M li verify that we had that required flow.
n .
- r/ O
- szcuce me, hzvo you finished your anc4cr?
- u l
10 s 1,. rea.
- a. f-m i!q Q- '2ho se tents di6 verify that you had the pr >per flow? .
y j 20 y A Correct.
!I af I Q Lacordingly, .this requirement did ~ not result In any N
l , 5 !jo change of tho ?Gif cycted i pe u tue4a. jt .A no, it die notr i i l m - 1 1. s v ?
-vvey--,w w w w w . mew, -, we -
i 4 , ! Il [ ! 2051 I I tape 5 i, l. t-i f"~ B$l !!R. LANPERE: C Mr. Die'terich, do you have a copy 31 CEC. Exhibit i i , - i 21? CEC 21'is en En0 cover letter and it enclosos the ! 1 I 's t i reviec of.the auxiliary feadwater reliability analysis _ i t g ; .- - 4 in ac rt of a status of various ' auxiliary feedwater fixes, ! 6 1 dated February 25, 19807 l 1 y - ~ j A 'lo c , I do,
' i 0
i 0 Would y$u pleese turn to pngs 10 of the first i q l .- encicoura, that'c enclosure ona? j !.. i" l The top of that page is part D, The Design j , i l E t af.c for APW Systeva Flow Requirchehth . Isn't it trua ' 47)
- "- I that -- are you fhniliar with (
- his donument?
O l 3 W -Q
, A h e , I tm ,
.l l .Il --
I' l i 0 Cn the second paragraph, it statea , quote, "We 1 E b. 3 conci'M that the decir;n basis pco > des abova ior establish- . d ; o e R[ i
; ng NW ayatem flow requirc/nanbs in insufficient in that !
- j. ;
l D j- .t dcen not identify the limiting plEnt transients or l ! f ! E nacidents that were considered in establishing an ! 1 ll n y E[ , ast ounding AFW systen flev reqairemnt. " ! i I yt Could von Guacribe whr.t the limited plant trannients ai ; M l' or accidenta that ware cons!dared were .. Do f' ou unders':and l l - I Uy quastion? ! ! I
.P A I understand the questic:n, but I 5 not sure .h 9 E'; U l.t's that ency to- enswer tho --- it is spelica cut in the i
t 25 first s par & graph e the'ccuditien for WM ch wo specify or which '> i ( l e i _ . . _ . _ - . . _ . . _ _ . - _ . _ . - - - _ . _ . - . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ L- '
m 1 p , e- -,. l Ljn-2 '
.2052 .
l
\
b . 1 D&W apacifica a required curiliary feedunter flow was 1
,)-
l 2 a reactor trip simultanacus with the nloca of nain feedwater. - l i 4 i
- 3 Q That 'ean the only tranatheater accident which :
1 l ~ l 4 uns -- it vaG not really an accident it was the onlv . ! t i \ ' J transient considered coming up with that flow requirer.ent. , 5] , l E of 760 gallona a icinuto? ! I i .. f A Primarily, yes. They're looking at a DKE heat l { ' l _. ij renoval capability, Tao cconario has to be - we have to )- 9 trip in a loss of main feedwater. f i I 10 Q Havo you provided tho'MRC with a response to. i j l' 13 this doctr.cnt? . i 12 A Yes, ua hava. ,
.+.
j 13 The reajponse -- i y Q To this portion of the document?
)
g A Mo, va hava not. g We'vea given a responGo so that wo would provide 1
.- 7 l
j i a response to part'D sometites in the future. 4
- 1. i l.
l pl 0 Ao of thic timo r to your knowledge, you havn not ) o - l gg l prowided that respone,e? , r
. i s That's cerract.
- av.
- .
i .
- l '
y [c O Turning your attention to enclosure 1, of the l n r i j . c.,. .
. April 27th letter, the fifth 1TIJ upgrade was a modification I
) f' l , [ to provide verification in tha control room of auxiliary
.m i
3; f fecCuater flou - steau generator.
- g. Prio.c to imple;nanting nodifications pursuant to j
, ..a l
- ._.. x - .---_-- _ _ _ _ -_.- .
\
8 I t 4-
, 2053- l jin-3 l i i
- i 1 , thin comraitmant, how would an operator dotermine AFW flow? I l
2 A He would have relied primarily on steam generator 3 level. l 4 -Q Were Rancho Seco opere. tors trained in nonitoring I ! 5 stenri generator level? I l 6 A Yea, I'm sure they-vore. l 7 Q What , kind of reedificationn were implementod? ) 1 g A Weinst$11cdflowindicationontheauxiliary g feedvater lince themselves. Put the flow indic eic'c as- l i 10 c1000 ce Possible to the aboars generator while remaining a g outside' the steam contnimaent to provide actual verification . . l g that there was flow in tLat lina to the steam generator, g Q Are there any valysa between the flow raeters l g thathavobeeninEtalb5andthestea:t generator? A I don't believa so.
- lbc y ,
O So that flou meter should give a reliable indica.- is
~'
a tior of the actual flow to %e steam generator?
- 17 A Correct.
) Q Are tho$e flou meters that have been installed-r
,, safety grade? .
1 (.O ] .
- ,, A Hot at this time.
, n
,,, Q inly aren't thay?
l ,,,, a A Safetyhradoflowindicationinvolves.afairly i coraglox syster of dual acnatr, dual poaar .acpplien,-- seismic qualification en the elsstrical cablo conduits, et cotera, . B
-.--.-+,-.e-*. ..m.e%m----, ...--r--~- - - - - - .+ e,--r----.2. -,--*wew., ,.y .- .-,=w.em.
. _ - . . . _ - . . . . ~ . . - . . . . . _ - - . . - _ _ - - _ _ _ . . - - - _ - _ , _ __
l in-4 2054 i 1 et cetera. Ha are committed as part of the category B i 1 2 regtirerenta to NURF.G e 0570 to upgrado or install safety :
/
3 gra6.e flow indicu/ tion. , f e i a Q That' requirement is to upgrade by the January.1, l i-
.q, 19R17 Is that cocrect?
g A Right.
, Q Are Rancho Seco operatore, after restatt from 4
, i . the current refueling, expected to ruly solely on these , g,
>. t-..
flow matern to determine auxiliary feedwater flow or are l 10 i they atill inatructed to monitor the variables auch as l ater.m generator' level?
, 3 . ,;
j ql A I would profer you ask Mr. Rodriguez. I would
- i
}
@ g! ,
nacume that they ely on both, that both are available to I
..i them.
1" I, t . O Do you have any rer. son.to believe the steam c.. :, . 5 7merator lewal indicntion woula not 20 sn accurate indicator of auxille.ry feod.nher flou? g
.i n, 1> Stema. 7anerator lovel is not a ele.cs 1 indica--
tien. The pursch$ in adding t.h: flow indicator to the I m:x5.liery fcedw Sor line itaulf was to provido varification j that that indaad waa a' valid aignal for upgrading that to } i safety grade, and I'm sure that'a where the pria;ary
- a i
tmpim m ui] i be i.n the futur a. O Cn the flou ceter, once, it's up to safety i3rado? S-24 _ I h Right. < i 25 _.-
,4
*==*_es-_.____m___..--.-m.,-+-+.w.-- , , , , , , _ , , . , _ . . , _ ., . ,, __ _ _
q 1 2055 { jn-5 l 1 , Q The next upgrade proposal in or. closure 1 of your O a Q 2 April 27th letter is relatud to proceduroa and training l r 3 for :providing alternata 1:ourecc of water to the auxiliary I e'
- feedfater pump. What in the prinary cource of water 5
for those puups? ' 6 A The water in the condousate storage tanks. 7 Q Juid whE$ are the alternate sourcca? . 1
'. I A The plant reservoir or the rolsom South Canal-
.O.
O Is the.condencata storage tank a scismic cate;fory 1 4
~
IO ! A Yes, t in.
~
b Q Are the alternato sources? b A Ho, they are not.
- f'i Q Prior to thi$ proposal, did Rar.cho Seco opera. tors s.
Nf knowhowtogeta5tornatewaterfortheeuxiliaryfeedwat'er 15 ayatam in the event that 4 the condencato storage tank was; IIl' deploted? ,' b A Yoa, they've been t::ained ir. realigning the valve inf tor.acondarycou[cen$5 water. 4 16 0 Uhy dan this propocal put in? Or this upgradel l v _. .. ! j ^ 2d put in this enclosura if thaf have w.1 ready ~~ bhis upgrade '
]
Mt- put in this enclosura if they have airca6y received thatJ j
~' ' ' ' ' \
ZU trai:*.ing and had the procedurcs? 1 23 j A I'm corry, maybe I nisunderstood your previous c l
'M i queccion. I thought you anked ran if -it vere my understand-i 25 4 ng that they now know how. .
E l -
j y 2056 i L 7 , -) n~ 6 N LiL 3rior to',' thia upgrade pro;?osal, did they know hew? l Q
,,1 . i.
?; A I don't t.hink there usrc ::pecific procedures 4
-l' spelled cut at that time. Again,'you'd have to ask Mr.
i i Rodriguez. I'ra not that familiar with the detailed trainingi and procadures they woro operating with prior to Three Mile c.;
?, ',j
,R, I! Island. -
7 Tho$$~dternate cources of water that
- Q f
canal and the roEArvo E vere not provided for the first .l , P[ bime subscquant to TUI, were they? ' l i Mo,theywbronot. 10 ' A i t . . . . I
!! { Q They've all been relied upon for alternative -
d - _ . . .. . 12 sourcco of water?
.U i
A ThE'provicion wco there to use them. I thirlic
!.s l
, ?(ouhave'oapp$nc5atethefactthatit'takessomeamount c
i r>I of tiene to empty that condensato atoraga tank. L Hi .L I think typically one would c.3nume that the t .. . p l planc would be coolad down and using ctccay0 heat: . removal system 1 ic I ior 1emoval of decay haat in the amount of timo required.
- isj
- o orpty that tank, no there is no2e question in my mind j ,
20 ns ta'tha opLratoro' awarenes6 if ycu will, of exactiy how-l 2) ':o change that valva lineup or when to do it. 4 4 9 There uculdn't be any expecned thing for him't'o s j 3 do. N Q Uot an nation that operators would have to tako , 5l uuddenly, is it? 1~ j- I 4 )
2057 jn-7 j A That!n correct. 2' Q Apprcrimately how long would Mty neve with j g available volume in the condensate storage tank? ) .
~ " , ~ " '
I s; A A day or two. I j 3 Q We're about actions the.t would have to be taken !' G CODHi3'irably af ter an accitent, not an accident , a l 7 transient had occurrad, which required some sort of i r 3 feednator flow.
~
, g The Aub upt[rade No. 7 relaten to petroleum 10 control room snu[iciations and auto neart conditions
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during the " auxiliary reedwator systen. What are those i
"j
.. auto start conditions?
1 ; j A The automatic restatt on either a losa for < q 13 l 1 gj fcur main reactor coolant pinnps or , loss of main feedwater. ,
- The nnunciation is also providad forthe manual 4 l
10 .,
!g start of the 1 rotor-drivnn f.uxiliary foedwatar pump.
l O Absence tsuch indicatian or antaciaiotn, would
' . t.
3 ] you agact control rocrs operatorrt nevertheeless to be able 1 I i to tell whether auxiliary specuewater had started? - ! 19 l 1 20 A "his would . have len r: ore difficult.. You would i hava had enunciation bk EOmo Sort that he Would have Joct. i '
.the main feedwater, and that ha could conclude that he- ! 22 should have auxiliary feedwater. I think the enunciatien t d.a
" i provi. dad now gives him a throab, visual alarm, if yon wi11 ; 24} i l that.an aux:iliary feedwater in sLpposed to be runni.ng., #
- 25 -
i : I ! ,I ' i f.._,_._......____,,._..,..a_.___________. -
i Il 1 t 2058 i, 1
\1 i 1
1 ; i 0 How does thic requirement relate to that next < I 2 < l l l requirement in your upgrade, this about procedurca to i 1 i i 4 ; 1erify nutomatic ini6ia. tion? hre operatura, once 'they see tlye l ! j - . . , . , enunciator supposed to take certain action sto confirm that i
'5 f that enuncaitor ic corract?
4 L They are supposed, to taka cortain actions to y verify that indoU the auxiliary foodwater system has i i 1 t a~ i initiated by reliance on the new flow in6ciation that we've i i L -! f., a 1
~ ii inctslied or by reliance on the steata generator load. !
- I q He ncy knoM.: he'u nupposed to he.va it and he natt knovre he's 4
l -
'i suppcsed to check m aak+.: surc he har it, t
, O Prior to the exchangec, waald you erpect an oparatoe l
.d
' .. I alwayo anyway to verify that ha has nordathing he's suppoucd a
- h. i
! to hcve7 i i 1 F '-
j , 4 Yan, but it uoald have bur a more complex, j _ . - q :, nvo'i ved thought procens, I'm curo . i h - l L Q In dat way would it no wro complar and invcimd i 1
..k' 'u 3
1[ fC u h.'.no'912 { l, t' i, A W11, I suppose he might havo good indication tht1 i ) t ) '. an:d liar f owtm: u n a2cpco o 60 he on.;but in the cource - 1 >
}
i i 1 'i
; . 01. tl: 0 accident, if you uill, o; w rious traunient that may l i . i 1 ,
] 4 not co m to mina, that., " Gosh, imleed I just lost all four l
)
E00Ctor codladh pm pD and SUKiiliary fCOdWSterB I r l
! j
'l . )
.Cuppcd:cd to be Ca, ~ OObter C.c Over and chack if it 15 On."
5 j F:ow , he hee a definitc proceduin that raya the nuxiliary l i d 1 i l , l .h ! , i 4 l__._,_._._'t. ~ . - -, , - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . . . _ I
l' 2059 I feedvater supposed to be initinted, good look at the flow
~
mete:: and make sure it is. h - I think it's a definito step in improvement of I
~
4 the timeliness of initiating auxiliary feedwater or assuring 5 that it is initiating. 6 O Say you feel it was a dafinite stop, can you erplain 7 thenwhyitwasn't$acquiredevenpriortothin? 8 A Well, I don't think the inportance van placed on 9 the auxiliary feedwater syntom that it is today. 4 M 0 Well, I thought THAT !! MUD nlways had attached l i 11 I quito a degree of significance on ths av::iliary feedwater , l
$2 syF:ca, that's because of the fact'that you did make it .,_
h-3 cafany grade. r . U. You did make it safety grado i~nhanyways,ab.) f is lea 3t in uny ToEhect:I.
'S h That'a true for a cafcity featurea initiation.- ',
17 Thesechungeswemado'donotaffectthecafetyl- l 18 featurer initiation a5 arm. They . 5 19 0 The 1.ro already van that alarn? i l __ .I, 20 A Correct. '
,.. N }
21 0 Tim, final AFW upgrade'in enclosure 1 relaten to 2? the :!ailure pondthens of the- Eir-operated level control valve s!.- Tray vas thin upgrade'in proposed?
.I '
i 23 , I ,
.M- A I think concern had been expressed that p.aybm na 1
1 hadn't~dont a thorough enough tdesign analysis and wanted 75 4
- v. .,
-- -. -. -.-.- - . - .- -.- - - - _ . . .~. . .- _ .- . .. - . ~ - - . - - .
i 4
'II 2000 a
'I varificatica nuia that hyloed igen a less of pome or lo3s of i ,
#- I nir trot the valve trald fail en tin rzfe diructdon. l 3
l . Q .sh:c this uns just a ecnflin tien accething that already e L .t - i cxisthd a.) far as the puxilimy fe:diwnter sychese
! i j 5 A Tnat'a correct.
1
. 1 0
If thra is a failure, plus if thny Iall 50 percent 8 0 I 1
- 7I u cr 103 peur.nt opm, c.nd if h c; rators naed less flow, can that r.
' ,I i
Le acetmalithrl fnu the control arc.n? I 1 1 - l i u ; n I ge'rs that v:m3A a: pend en ti;a failure ::volud. i i a m llii So I can't daf.initely say vbs or no for cil canas. h I [ 11 [ Q It'e f.: ray, I'll at it x::eth7x <.my, i
!2 ' ::n cr3er to c2nse thocc w.lvs, cirm thm, not nra:rarily .
i i i ._ j ll3 sli iha itay, but rath:co ttw f'ta..r e enn thr.h be done by adjust-i b i ing tioEO va? Y an th::augh come mahaniarc 4 or Go you havo 1 i So trein off tha pcp er hou d;nuld you go .2 bout reducing i e in flor:? i
- f h You cocid do it eithrx ssy. You could atop a ld l .- .
ef i posip or both pumps. You could reposition the valve, if .
- 9 s
l possible. from the control room or you could certainly acnd 1 i - i- a, 4
! an opantor to the valve to manually reposition the valvy , , 9 .
I i a hil with a hand whool. ~ j t
-l .
I py ) -0 I'.d just like you to clarify one thing on it. - . 0 y m. . i c3 g The enclocure on page 2, that item 9. j i p i g In there a typographical error in the accond c nd. "
.m. ._..
[ )5 - } third lino, it says: SJpon lose of electrical power to the ! l' i 1-i
,,.,--n,N,-wr, e n e--ev,----*~ - = ~ ~ ~ . ' ' " ' ' - ~ ~ ~ ~ = = ~ ~ ' ' ' ' ~ ~ ~ ' ' ' " " ' " ' " ~ ~ ~ " ' ' " ^ ~ ^ ^ ^ ^
l ! l .I I i 3; i
.I 2061 !
I I i. elect.rical to pressuro converters," should - that bo "to ths ! E presouro converter'? 3 A no, that's electrical to prescure converter, , l t
.j ..
4 sometimus called -- ) i S lats. BoimRS: I think, Mr. Lanpher, ce my copy, I 6 neither the 8 or the 9 reproduced. I thought 7 had three ? I
- 7 pararrapha until you got into it, and when you started out 8 you said comething ab$ut 9 and I thought you junt misspoke.
9 Now, it's no big problem for us, this copy the j l 10 reporter has, you know, should be carefully marked,. l II ME. T4t11PHER: We vill incrk them. i I ! 12 in nn, nmalmn: 1 13 Q Hr. Dictorich, you testified oarlier that on i 14 ' ESP 23 initiation e only the turbine punp io startcd c.uto.- I !
' 5 hlmntically; is tht.t correct?
I ! 16l A Froia the ESFPS aignal, that ic curred.. i i 'l j 17 Q If there in L ocnditinn wharchy the ntcam i- ! 10 , gencrutor has boiled dry, can th.it turbino pump operato? I l l i 19 l A Yec. There le conaidarable steen precuure avail-I EG able to the stemo,line to drive the turbine driven pump,. 21 0 It raa my endorstanding ths.t the stern for tho l 1 '.i 22 turbino driven pirap cemen off the train steem line just ! l ! 2 23 after 1rmving the ono-nuit(?) cheSm Canerators 10 that l i l 2.4 correct? 1 1 25 A Thatia correct. i 1 l ! O liow long will you saintain pracsure in thoco i l' I',,,.,n w w,w ,-, w ,.i,-n w n ,- - v w,,w,,,-*.-~
~--.- -- --,-,n,----~~~--.,,-~-~ - - - - - -
2062 D -1 1 steam lines if you boil the steam ganerator dry? 2 A I assume you are asking sufficient pressure will 3 run the auxiliary feodwater pump, I am not sure I know that t
/; unswer. ,
5 Q MR. SHOM: Excuse Me, Mr. Lanphar. You seem to not r, ( havo given an awful lot of conditionn. I would expect the 7 ancWcr to that question would depend on many conditions such 3 ac uhether the etcan bypass valve or the turbino driven valve p or anything like that was utill open or whether you had a I m steem line break or something on that order was-causing a l i l 33 tranca.ent to begin with. Ynat circumstance did you actually j gl nean to ack the qucttion? !
! l
- , ' 13 #" NEER
- s The onlyccircumstance that I was y nacuming at the outset was that the cteam generator boiled g cntirely dry.
t g MR. SEOII: Well, in error, Mr. Dieterich, in gf m;uming that any of .those other things mf.ght affect 'your , nnrwcr cubstantially? l l NR. DIETERICH: No, I think that you are definituly g; i g correct. W e bypass valvo or a safety valve was open, j
-.l definitely going to leave the stem precnure much more ;
&,_ rapidly than if the systert is bottled up and it la junt leanine
, steam acmo place. -l 23 ; -
i j . MY MR. lANPHER: O But, is it truo that shortly after - is it truo d, that chartly after tho boiling dry wnce yar _ ctenra generator t i!
- t. . , , _ _ _
O 2063 I i 1 you uty loona your stemn feed to the turbine drive on that
? anziliary feedwater ptmp.
1 1 3 7. At some point in time, yea, you could loose the 4 stenn to the turbino driven pu:rp, l 5 C There is no other source of cts.m for that prmp? i 6 A Well., in the long-range, one could startup the l l 7 3, hoi 33 fired atmiliary boilor and then get the dried steam. 8 Q It in my understanding, that one of tho, not i j 9l really unique features, but one of the very faverrble features 10 j that tha Rancho Seco Auxiliary Focduator System has is that 1; you gr.t a very zapid response fron that turbine driva; is i 12 ; that ccrrect, because ycu havo the atoam prensure right i ni nuay on us? i. pl .R I do not think that that in an unnececcary design i 15 l Scatuxe when an electric motor can star up. I would think I ,
;6l relatiV0l Y., as fact as the turbine driven driva.
p Q Dut, in the cvent of offsite po'fer, you uauld have 4 g to de' lay the electriani motor drive, would you not, until
- l 13 ! the dieaal is started up and there 2.c porper sequencing of !
l ;) tha mctors onto the diosals while the t.trbina drive would I { 2! nt attp considarchly faster. i l l 22 I 'A In that particular pahca, that is correct. l I g But, I would think that there wanti be enough steaa j e (" a nvaiDtble to drive the turbine prap for that period of tima. > s 3 Q Is that one reason that is thf you would wnat to f i
- _ . . . .._-.w.,.m, ,,,--,-e-m,,,-,,-er,,.---,---y,.d
l [i i i 2064 l 1l encuro at all timos that you could not boil the steam 2 generator drives no that you would have drive for the turbino i 4 l 3 ptmps? l l A A I do not thirtk so becauce I uould utill hang my l 1 S hat o:1 a motor driven pump. And as I said. I thinir thare 'l e in going te be e.nough utsamava.ilabic to c. rive the motor 7 drive.i stea.m pu: rip f ar come period of tie.3. You know, beyond 1
- a cho - boiled dry time of the steam ganaretor. Apprecintes J
n ; that uitit the anticipatory trip in place the stor.m generater l ,o does not boil dry for maybe canc four minutos. i
- ,
- 0 0 In that your understanding of the sort of revised
! il i i j , .! ! boiled dry tins now? o A Mith thab nnticipn:ory trip, that la correct. o
,3 Q 7pproximately, four mim: tea? )
[ ! e ' l j g [l a Yoc. t
--3 ; O Mr, Dieter:lch, if your only potential drivo d
v p for an auxiliury feedwater ptcp eyatem vare the turbine ; h g; jj pt.mp, nostre the loac of offista and all AC pouer, could t , 1
- the aurillary hoiler provius stca
- n drive or nuffidient oteao.
g- H.; i a i l cj to get the turbina driva going within 20 minutos? l 3 ! , d A I would think co, yen. : I o f i l .. O Are thera procadures. for firigg up that bcilor an !
- ,l I .
utiliring for than purpoco? a! ,
.)
;j A You are goir.g to hese to aak Mr. Rodriguez. I 9 ,g,
<y>
.i i
j ,.
- tnow t hat there is definitely a procedure for firing up the
; i i
t __.._.---i_ _ _ - - - - - _ . _ _ . . - - _ _ - - _ . _ . _ - - , - - - - . - - - - - - -- - - I
j' q . 4 j j 2065, , 4 1 boiler, I do notkno,u hbv far it goca 2 0 Is that what that boiler is fory . 3 A Yec, well,.t'ho boiler provides a steam for many. ' 1 WBen you are shutting down the plant'you need
~
4 pupposen. 5 steam to start the plant up, it ic the prime purpose for e being there. i l 7 0 When you are in the startup made, do you regularly 1 i a utilize the auxiliary feedwater systen? 9 A No, we do not. 10 I Q For how long is Rancho Soco permitted to operate ! ! J
;l t: h with onc of the diesel generators unavailable for whaterar, {'
i l l t 12 j reacan? ;
; s
, i i
u ;- 13 l A 30 dayc, I l ;4 ; O Arc there any actions that have to be taken 4 4 1 g within tht 30 day period? m , A Yes, there are the ca.mu actions that, I beliove,. -
~
{ i
; .; it wao Mr. Matthewn described if ue find one diesel gonnct_.
g inoparable we can stay in operation for 30 days provided that , g -j - during that firnt 15 days, when va start the operabic diesel i i 3 []1 1 gancrator at least enco a day to prive that it la operable l g j and during thei second 15-day period ue must stcrt the operable diaan generator and leava it oparcting. gl l
, ., F a,.a G Havay.ouoverhadadicaalganerator6nt;of "y service for na long ac 30 days? !
,,5).
A Not to my knowledge, no. . L , , ) I 4 3
.- - ~ , ,
~.,-.._a , - _ _ - - . , - - . . - . . _ . . . , . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _- _ . . - -. .. s--.-
I-r 2066 i [- i Q 10 daya? 2 a no, , 3 0 They never have been out of service or except l-4 for very ahort maintenance? l i 1 5 A There are niaintenance outages, of course I gunas 6 I do not know what the longest time has boon. I cannot i i- 7 think of any significance to the outages. l 8 Q Is it a requirement that you have availabic both l , 9 auxiliary feedwater pumps at all times? l 10 A The tech speca require that we have both auxiliary I i 1: foodwater pumps with the exception of a present tech spec 1 ; 12 analysis, 72-hour period which would -- maybe one pump might 13 be cut of service. t i N O So you are permitted to oporate with just one is pump, either the solely notor difere pump or the motor 1q turbite pump, or as 2.ong aa 72 honra - are there any other e iy conditions? to . A No, I,wan mistahon. It van 48. hours. We are , 19 j revising that to 72 hours. So at the prosent timo it in I i
;;re ! at 40 houra.
l 21 G. Are you required to keep the operable pump running I
'22 during that time period, are you required to do any tenting
. 23 of that pump durigg that time period? 1 j A Ho, I an; curc -that there mtst be a step in there
) p,4 i
gg that voilld requiro Nerifics. tion of its operability. l-i
2068 l 1 offsito power. How quickly could that dienol generator Z he started up and the auxiliary feedwater cycle be on, such , 3 that it would be delivering 780 gal 6ons per minute to the 4 steam generator?
.'i A I would cay in a matter cf a atinute.
6 0 So would it be fair to ss.y that~in your statoment,l ; I 7 on Page 7, dhich we read before, asstmies that offdite power ' 8- is availablo? t' O If you viant to cover all tho bases and give :n 10 . ', the uituation of not having the turbino driven paup i . l
!I j avai.'.ablr or not having offrite' power availe.ble, I say j 12 that I can still piovide the 780 GPM from the diecel power i i C
q t2 vinyl bus of a motor driven auxiliary feedwater pntp traf n. 14 MR. SEON: 14.r. Lanpher, I would like for
.13 Mr. Dieterich to clarify one other thing. It takes as I
,6 understand it, at least with the prescnt aituation, operator l 9 j acticn to put those pumpn on the buc.
tg . MR. DIETERICH: Right.
;3 MR. Si30N: So, helt could you say that you could 50 70 it in nt minute, when the standard is operator reaction takes g at icist 10 minuten. 'I mean' that .'s the uay that onc usually y j figurma, isn't it?
i gj MR. DIETERICH: Okay. I gunas With~..those accomptiong fl e,,3 vc could limit that to 10 minr.tcu and I think I en still-g ! within the 20 or 30 minutes, though, before I have to hava
.I
?.007 1 0 To your knowledge, sas c.ny differiention made i a . hetwer. the single drive pump, the motor only, versus the 1
3 turbin motor cor.bination in terme, of how long one or tother 4 nuxila cy feedwater pumps would be out ol ner, rice? 6 A M , there is not. 6 Q Turning to Page 7 of your teatimony. I.s it g I e'ru$ lbte? g A Yes. Q In Lins 21, related to the criteria cf the g g cuxiliary feeduator systera, you state th.at the Rancho Seco oc-Eign meetc the criteria, 700 gallonu par minute, por flow rate to the steara generators within 40 seconda following .. , l loss of nnin fec6aniter or Icas of forced reactor coolant 13 , flow. l 14 In making that stater.ent have you arsured that off.t.iS2 power is available? A I do not think that I conoissrod the availabi.1.ity er nonwailability of offcite power when I made this statera nt a o ptmp 3 a capabic, but delivering actually M0 gallons t hat t'
! E minato, 20 0 Peyardless of whether you he.ve offisto pousr or 27 '
rot? 22
. Yes. If I acnuro that I havo the dicaci ciencratcra 23 I can still get that with the low requirenent, 24 Q If you did not heve the turbine driva pamp, bt2 of 2D for l'istance it is out for meinteneace, and you had.a loon of
. .. - . . . - . . - . - - . - - ~_ . . - --- - - _ - -. . - . . .
2069 1 auxiliary feedmter providing that I did nct havn hi.gh 2 pretanre injection. 3 MR. SHON: Fino. It was just an order of
+
,; magnitude out - - okay, thank you. I am sorry Mr. Lankher.
3 MR. COLE: Mr. Dioterich. you mentioned C 840 GPM, where did thr4t cone from? 1
, MR. DIETERIC3: I thinkctrar pu.ups have to sted, g naturally due to deliever 840 GPL 9 DR. COLE: I have seen a couple other numbe:ca
.I O in vari un testitecny. One nurlier that I recall was that g the requirerent of 760 GPli and then that tha pumps actually l
g dal;ivored ' ISO and then I eee the i'i.gure 340. What is g your recollection? a,
, MR. D~ETERICH: The 7e,0 Imd the ~160 are *-- the i
780 was the original design criteric that har since been i
., y ,
l ) sennI.tized, if you will, to 760 GPM ce a valid isoro tuac j 16
- nur.b tr, a kind of gencric criteria of 780 Gai; but the.
- s ncner.;> Ecco, specific is 760. Thtt ia those tw:i nsherc, . hr :
third inrnbar is our actual performance which is nomewhat _9 3 high n. DR. COLE: Thank you. !
- 11 j.
BY F2. IANPHER: I
- !t !
l Q Mr. Dieterich, naybe you e nld clari?y the 4
- .3 t sitursion. Isn't it true, I am referring to the conpliance 24 repo.ct of Juno 27 the compliance report of the.IFR0 where they i 2S
._ - . u- . _ _ _ ._ , . - -
I 2070 1 1 refer, I will just quoto from Page 7, each..of the tus B&W '
,) 2 pumps are sized to deliver 780 GPM to steam generators with 3 60 gPM mini-flow and services, is that cooling water 4 , going back to the pumps that extra 60 gallons? l i
5 A It is not really cooling the water,,it is a flou I i G paththatistherntoensurethatyoudonotdead=headthej
/ pump, or burn out the bunp, it is a recuit line which a starves the water from the main flow path correctly.
9 Q But it in that e::tra 60 GE4 that gets yon up to 10 the 840 figure which you wero I think you were talking abou 11 an 840 figure versta the 7807 12 A That in correct, 13 s t
,1 i 13 4
h0 $ 16 17 ION ti 15 k I' s, I I.. F.1 j zej u[ n H
'y es 3 e
l-l
! ]
h 6-1 I - i!071 l , I I' F 1 33 1 O I do not want to bolavor this etntence that we ' [ 2 Uere :. coking at on Paga 7, too much, but is it feir to say l l 3 that yo:4 can only deliver in the ovant of a offsite pownr. i l 4 you could only deliver the 7fl0 gallonc per minuty with m i ! ) 5 i 40 seconds if you have the turbine drive? l S L I guoes that that is a valid stateramt, yes, sir. i l 7 O In the next auntenos you ctate with a lesa off l 9+l ' ' min fc.edwater, in this renponso, Mott responso Isfers Po g ! 9 that 1Tlou rata uithin 40 cocoMa? ! I ', l 10 : { A Yes.
- ll j ; ; ;-, O Is thic also annumed a pn tf.cipatory rnactor trip? ;
! h 12 9 A Yea, it dosa... g Q If you would look o;rer on the next pacje, Pago 8 i p j Line L: you etate that the stcant goaarator inventory is
)
! g 1 not Gtc;1cted and I understand that it in cader the eccranio ' s ] 35 i which you postuinted the responso, 40 scLonde, and you have 1 i 4 p a caritein -- well, you use tho word depleted, do you mum 33 empby er do you maan not reduced at all? L i I py L Does not empty. , f , l-O So there will be a reduccion in inventory out it pho L 'illl net get down to the very botttn , no you will still
,y n have ieme h'3at sink left.
. a A Correct.
23 , j j . 1 u. 1 Q The nent centence, shnrting with page - Line 41 of Page 8, states for come reason that the IN systen la
,y l
l
il J 2072 ] g
! not hve.ilable at all, tiba high pressure injection will Movidi, Sh 2 an adequate for core cooling. Are yon referring to what.:b:.s 3 boon called the feed and bleed m. ode in this proceeding?-
]
4 a Yes. S, j Q Eave you perfomred any analysis of that mode? I 6' h Not personally. There has been entensive study 7 in thin aren over the past year, t 3 MP3. 130 NETS: It is noon tima, and we have to 3 break ser.etfr.o. Is this a good time or doen it creat a i i 10 prob:!.em? ?
;I ; MR. LM? PIER: No e ma'cm.
i u (KTIEREUPOM, a luncth recess was taken r at 12:00 noon) I' L mg u id l 17 i { a m 1 e. t 20 . g e bi m4 I ( t l
.~
$?>
l l'M mi a t l' , t 7 _m_ A.
2 0'73 i 25 wrEFROOM SESSION i I MRS. DOWEES: Are we ready to proceed, Mr. Lanpher? 3 l MR. LAMPHER: Yes. DY MR. LANPHER: 5 0 Mr. Dictorich, onc of the short- tern requirements of the Pr 7th order, one of the items nentioned in yuar Mc.y 27th - 7 lotter, was the training procedures for operatorn to take 3 ! manual control of the auxiliary feedwater system. a i I O Are you fc.miliar with procedures in training which N was implemented related to that item? I II A Juc,t very generally. .-: think I would prefer tiut t thac , s 12 line of questioning go to Mr. Rodriguez.
't3 0 iTust one other question then in i-hat area. Do you have M any as: Ee of the difficulty involved for an operator exercising a
l 15 nrtnual control to control the nteam generator level with any 16 procisicu compared to when the ICS is operating normally? l 17 A Ucll, when the ICS in operating nornally, of jcourse r . L g ! 18 the op; rator doesn' t have to do anything. 4 - M ) l i Q ': may have been incbiguous. Whon the ICS is operating I i I i 1 ' 20 nostclly, you katp a fairly steady lovel, isn't that true? l- { l I 21 Or that'o.the objective. EE h A Yea. 23 ~Q and what are the actions which an onerator.would have 1 ' E4 to do, if you know, to. maintain that steady level when 1:a the f' 9. i l 23 manual operation mode? ' i = 3 l i
.I 4.h 4 w =e =mme.--_ m em ww. w-.= _ __ .e.. ._enewesvewee-wr-+----e=-em-=.--, , - rwm eun--rw-s- -
.--- == - - _..--me--ww-- _. ..tn.I
l 1l 1 2074 1 A Well, in a manual mode, you will have to adjust the l 2 valven' position ao that the mkeup 'is equal to the enount of ! 3 , water being boiled dry. And that in going to change grtdually , i 4 you know,. during the decline and decay heat input from the , 5 core. So there will be a periodic alcoure of the valve, if i a 6 ycu will, to negate or give the name end result. - ! 7 Q Would it be true that, given tha rather quick response-B titre between the primary cyctem and the secondary system I O threagh the once-through stema generator, that rather anall ]. to changes in valvo pocitioning by the operator could have signi-11 ficant itnpacts on the level in the steam generator? ) 12 A I don't think under the conditions where you are uaing y 13 mtzilit.ry feedwater the responcivenens everybody's talked 4 l l 14 , about typically in the rapidity of change folloering a reactor 4 l 15 trip or loss of foeddatar, ccro.ething olike that. 16 When your only heat source is decay heat and that'n gf not going to trip or change or anything, it's a tutter of I l [- 18 !! f act that you ucn' t havo the rapid chmges on one FJide or the ji , other of the cten:r, g-merator make it difficult to control. a l 0 Would it ha your testinony th n that once yen trip the toh T
,a reactor and you are Just trying to remove decay heat thqt it's n i c rc]atively simplo job for the operatore to manually control i.
n3 g I t, centinue every now and then making a manual adjustment z.s t V 24i the decay heat level reducen? gg ; A I guesc I'd have to have a definition of " simple", I t
?- +,sa._---,_, .w,..s-...,2.- , -- n - ,,_ -,,-..._ -- - _ _ . . , _ . . . , . _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ ..-....,,,--..s-> --~_-,--n--
~ . - . _ - _ . - _ . - - - - . - . - . . - . ~ ~ . . - . - - - _ _ - - . - -
! r i l 2075 1 ! 27 but def:.ning " simple" ist within h'ic means. I think it's 2 certain3 y within his capnbility to maintain a fairly tteady i 3 steam generator level. l 40 0 And that would be the goal? To keep- that steady ? ! 5 A res, I i l 6 0 Considering the atrsiliary feedanter upgrade, their 7 upgrade requirements which are described in your April 2ith I 8 lotter, do you ca,y that the overall intent was to guard against I 9 the ove2 heating kind of transient of the kind that waa present 5 l 1 10 at TMI, where you had a valving out of auxiliary feedvater? l
!! Or, let no rephrase it. Was the deatinant parp'aae to i
! 12 ensure ihae the auxiliary fcedwater came in fast as poaaiMe? ) 1:3 A Yea, I think the basic intent uas to ensure the i 1 j 14 4 tiuraline as of the auxiliary feeduater ayatem, yes. 1 ja .. Q To year kuculedge, was any consideration given at the,t t 16 time to the possibility of overcooling transients, or over-l g U cooling events which would be caused by rapid inductien of l l i 13 enxilialy feedwator? l 19{ A Scoms as how wc have experienced probably one of the , d - ? 20 - j nore drmratic overcooling events here at Rancho seco, yes, that i j 21 was in ccr mind. L 22 O You are referring to the... l l 23 A The fanicus lightbulb incident, yes. l-l g4 1 Q Did you havo a concern that the chart-term items which l- i
- . 3
- re deccribed in your April 27th letter might cause serious
i I l l l 2076 i l l I ov3rcooling ovent? Or sehe it ntore likely to havo such cient? , .23 , o l A Ko, I would think probably galto the contrary, you
'I
! 3' know; intitruction as to manual control of the a.uxiliary feed-I 4 water ayntem, and so forth, I thin!c, probably has va better S capable of coping with such an event. 6 Q Better capable than what? Better capable idmn ICS 1 l 7 . control? ! 1 l U A Maybe an ICS malfunction or sonathing that vould lead ! J ! D to un overcooling transient, I think the operator training took 1 10 pla e during the chutdown made him better ccpable to control 11 auxilla::y feedwater, better understfuld it. 12 MR. .'LMTPHER: Mr:3. Bowers, I would like to ratve the 'i i 1h admi.csion of CEC Exhibit 25 into evidence- That 10 the i i 14 ' April 27th Ictter i l l 15 MR. BAXTER: do obje : tion. EMP. LEWIS: No cbjcotion. ! l 16 , 17 MRS. LOWERS: CEC's exhibit which has boon Imrheto for j ! N identif:ication an No. 25 ir Admitted in erddence. ! N (Whereupon, CEC Exhibit 25, heretofore i 20 marked for identifica. tion, was i
- 2) received in e.ridence.) '
i 22 BY MR. LANPHER: ' i !- r Q Mr, Dieterich, in occing up with a list of short-term, 24 long-te::n auxiliary feednat<3r requiremcatu, is there _any 25 - consideration by you, or by your cc11eagues,. to your !:.nowledgni
, _ _ . . . - _ . - _ _ . _ _ _ .,__....._a_._ .;_____-...
e i , 20*/7 "19 1 l if unckydubg a.rekuabukutt stydt if tge auxilir..ry feedsator systLem 7 prior to -ret tart? i
'3
'! A .To my knowledge, that was not considered prior to i
4. res tart, no. I e-Q How were these items, as cet forth in the April 27th l q^ - j i letter, chosen; that is, are particulsr items top grade, the I tielinoas and reliabilty of the auxiliary ~ feedwater systela? 3 )' 4 A Well, I think it's pointed cut in my testimony tint 1' i the fiva itnes that were I.iated are chort-term items that were i
- l thone taat ucro more directly related to the safety of the s ,
j i j e' Iplant, r
?
I
$ I Tha long-term items were more for furthering our I '
,,, i t
>' lknowicngo and understanding and possibly determining if any- 1
, ( .
16 I { ithing elae was noccanary or desirable. 1 1 6 < Q I am only concentrating on the ittua relating to the J i l-N Eauxiliary feedwater ayeten, How in your previous annver when I i l i 1../ :j
) you said there were five short-term items, were you including W ftheEnm2.1breakane.lysen, and islat kind of thing?
. l.
1 M j A As f a.r as .looking at items A to E. ] ' i M Q On the first page of. that letter? 21 A Right, f C l M !! O I am focusing just on the auxiliary feedwater ittuns l l l j M j and the need to upgrade the timeliness, and reliability. How i N lwas it ihat you were abls to determineE particular itemn to l 115 jinclude in this letter absent having p rformed a relichility 5 i [ g 3 , Q. .p.. ~ .m.I%.. . #- ~ - - - ' - - - - ~ " ~ - - - - - -
,_= j .I l~ i i 2(170-r , 30 5
- type analysis of the Rancho Seco cysten?
l, 2 ' 1 A Well, I think there ucre lessens learned from Threc r 3 And I think we all developed an w areness of sozie Mila Ir. land. i of the things we could do to inradiately tha tiuolinersa end '! 3 ! 5 relichility without the necessity of perforning a relichility 6 otudy to determine thoce items. 7 I think a reliability study vao score a long-term itent, l E a drwn-out proccSure to develop oven bouter underatsnd.inge and 9 find cut weakncases of the nyster.. Tha things we picked ucre 1 i N innediately obvious to everyone conceracil. I think that was the 1 11 innin baait. for the dcaision. I i i l. 1 i 12 0 If time had permitted, wouldn't i': be preferrable to l g7 M lperforn the relidaility studies prior to the restart to ennuzt ! l l 14 tkx ycu have identified all significant contributors of j l
^5 1:
lfailure? 1 1G A I guess if time were of no concern that night be a I j D ldecirnble approach, yes. l . 19 O The ease would go . We vore talking abtnt the IRUV. , a > i l
- 19
! lfor the ICS and whether that should"be perforned in a chart-cw 2D tr a 1cng-term. Again, I believa you teatified that the time {
! i 1
< 3 pino an important factor in terms of when that should be .perfc2ued. !
)
22 A Yan, it was one of the factors. And I thin't tbc sette I 23 awinent applies to tha)TN reliability study. So coct benefi.t s: M cne hna to weigh in hic own mind as to if the electrica3 power. , 25 ! generation or the reliability study in nost important. i; i 1 i i
-I
_______ .___..._ 1 _ __ .
.4 r l ,
1 I l 2079 ! 31 I I Q When did Rancho Seco, or CMUD, determine to perforr n l 4 2 reliability study on the auxiliary feedwater system? l l , l ; 3 ~ l A I'.ve drawn a blank. There were rrany discussionn with i i
^'
] the NRC, Au I'n-trying to recall, it was during the course of 4 0 the outugc that the offectiveness of such a reliability stuoy 6 was determined to be of some benefit. And I can't pinpoint just ero.ctly when the decision una Ir.adh to do the ntudy. 0
, O But thero were some diccussions between SMUD repre-9 sentativeu and NEC reprenentative:s about the possibility of j
N 4 perform'.ng such a atudy, 11 f Those discussions at lentit comenced prior to the p" rentart of Rancho Seco? g GI A Yeo, that's correct. i 14 0 Do you know if there van any consideration to deferriny i 15 { the restart until that study had been done? b M p A Not to my kaouledge. 17I 0 Do you have a copy of CEC Erhibit 207 f 18l A Ubich :is whit? e W G Uc11, ..I uns going to ask you to identify it, It's FU , a SEUD lotter to Mr. Reed. And I halieve that it encloses the 21 auxiliary feedwater reliability analyuis. U A That' c corycect. I havs it. e
. i 23 ,1 Q Could you please for the record identify the docTrent I
E4l4'which ht.n been marked an CEC 3xhibit 207 i I 25fi A Yres, CEC 20 is a December 17, 1979 l~etter from John l I
20 % 32 i Mattitxic to Robert Read of the NRO, and providen the final l 2 au::iliary feedwater system reliability analysin.- 3 O In that anlycia attachnent one co that letter, Mr. l i l 4 l Diotcrf ch? I i Sd A That's correct. I i 6 Q And is there a second attachmant to that letter? l I ! 7 , A Yes, there is. l a p . fi f Q Cnuld you plensa decaribe tht' attachment? - 4 I i A It' n entitled " Outstanding UU?,EG-0!i?S itemt". l 9h il 10 ; O And in that attachrent prsrpared by SH7D? ' ) 11 ; A Yes, it tnis. l . 12 Q And who prepared attachment one? l 13 A The reliability analysis itreli' van performod by j 14 f 34ccek ud Uilco:: Ccmpany.
.\ O.
I :S b, 0 H".n an it that Ei1 wars requaceed- to perform thiu 1 L J l [0 an.iynin,, given the fact that they had,not supplied the 1 J ;- l r/ qnurillary feedwe.tcr system. l 1 0 i "6 i O As I pointed out in my teatimony at page 11, to l 19 6 cwrdrs of the DLW planto colected NM ne one vendor to the h l yo ' rescitr, M the varying analycis would be connistent with each \ l 21 othcr. bd D&W cartainly at this tiras hnd a lot of the act n j n t ineccascr? to start cuch a study. And we figured tlmt vanid bo 1 t t e la t.ime-s a inq choice, uea to pick Be17. I l' y I Q The study that you referred to at page 11 of your 4 i i l i l 3: a ll tes timony , is that the same study as identified as ettachment. 1
V . ,.
. e i n.'
j- 2081 I
- j. -
I ne to cr:C Exhibit 207' 3, ,., 2 3 yeg, l 3
~
O After B&W had performed this. analysis did SIIUD
'I officials revicw the analycis7 p
{ 5 A Yes, they did. i 6 Q And after that review was it then cupplied to the NRC? 7 A That's baaigally correct. bra provided us a draft [ 6 ' analyzin that we ccr.nonted on, made come corrections to, and , S-
) then it was finalized and we transnitted that to the NRC. ;
9
%1 MR. LANPHERr Mrs. Bowers, I lacyc the adiciauion o.? l 4
,i :
Il iCEC Exhibit 20. i 4
.s,.
E 14R. EAKTER: llo objection. t i 25 l MRS. BOiGRS s Staff? l 14 i, liR. LEWIS s No objectica. Si 15( MRS. 164ERS : CEC Exhibit Ho, 20 is admitted into cvidenen. 16N 17 l Uthereupo4 CEC E:Ihibit 30, heretofore l
\ f to +
marked for identification, was received 1
'I
, 79 h 1 in evidence.) 20 E BY MR. LANPHER: 21 1 0 Did. SMUD decide to do thic Rancho Seco on its own, ; I 2P, or at the request of NRC, or was it a combination of factorn? I
\ \
f a 23 I h I'm not sara I understood yotr question. i , 24 ]< O Mhnt was' the 1:ctivating f actor for preparation of
.O ys this stt.dy?. Was it comething that yo:2 or SMUD determined to j i
P ' 4 .._..._m......._ t. . m _ _
ll 2002 l I 34 .- do becaune you thought it was the propar thing to dc.? Or, did j 1l 2 NRC request you to perform this ctady? p 3 A As I recall, the NRC determined the advisability of i 4 auchastudyandproceededwithsuchn!studyonthe57esting-
'l
-1 l 5 house er.d Combustien Engineering plitnt$; then they asked un if
{ 6 we would parform auch a study. And waiagreed that that would i 1 8 7 obo beneficial, and proceeded with the' task. , l 0 0 What was your understanding of blu liRc l role in 9 prepara tion of this study? 4 10 A There were note discussionn 3etwaan B&W engineers 11 p':formnce of the study and the NRC uo that criteric foz the i j 12 ; study v cre conrictent with those that the IGC used in their
;3 scudiez.. ,
i n j u { The HRC did provide f ailure rata data fcc components I w ! to be cent,ictent with the other utilitica, they providda l 1 i w baaically the scopo. of the study. We eriginally, in fact,- 1 O g ' p :cponed a concuhat more lengthy detallc.d scudy, but the NRC, i l m for the cake of concistency, requested that we keep the acopo 1 79 ' ltho annc as the other Otudies. 20 j O In what way woul6 GMUD prep med s' cudy have b aen note g; j detailed ? i ! n , A It was not n SHUD-proposed ohndy, it was a:B&W n3 } proporc G etudy. l I stand correctcf, But could. you tell m.: what I l 9 y g
) C additienal natters would have been covered in tilis .broador-
.-.,..~_.__.----.;___._.~._,._..-....._.,l,......-...,....-.,.
..--___~-.m.
_ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - i i 2083 I scaled study? 45 0 A :Iitihink, just a more detailed, more involved complex i 3 otudy; consideration of more components and more faultries, if I , 4 you will, i 5 Q It was my enderstanding that itis ntudy vaa designed t 6 to cover all the fault trees which would offcet the i ) 7 auxilbry feedwater ayctem. Is that true? j B A I think that's true, but you can take a black box i 9 and give it a failure rate, or you can take all the little l 10 thinga within that black box and give cach of them a failure 11 rate of their own, to como up with a taoro sophisticated approach 12 d to the problem. j 13 0 Would it be fair to say that the B&W proposal wcn16 , l ) l , 14 ] have had incre detailed inputs in order to como up with a more t5 rafined end product? l h3 A For the purpoca of the atudy, I don't think that's i gy true. The study was done for ccmparative reasona. :And for p3 Uthat reason, we agreed that the scope could be narrowed.
- 13 C To your knowledge, ic BENI purening a broader study l
j ;. o
. at thic tinia?
I l 2; A Not at this t:ims, no.
-{
l l' 22 . 0 11as any convidaration been given in SMUD to eching. ! I J p3 BAH to completo ' chat brender study? i a 1
$ 1 PA A EO*
j 73 Q. How would 'the results of the broader study have l 1
- i
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . - _ - - _ , _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - 2
?
( S, 2004 , 3 ti differed? I don't mun the actual . resulta ur terms of l,. the reliability, but what kind of additiona:. data wculd SMUD 3 i have gained if the broeder study had been performed? 4 A I thinh, in very general temo, the more detailed 5 { ntudy would have provided a.more accurato ansvar. ' Bat l i t l 6 cecuracy wno not cur goal in this enza. Our goal uns to find j 7 l- vbich ware the more decinant ecutributort! to failures of the 8 auxiliarf feedwatsr cysten,and to cupare our nystcms with other
- i s
b systema. , l 10 0 If a acero detailed study had been performed wonJd y:u ii l 'i pez. haps have gotten more detailed date in tha and as to what p M thesa d minant contributors were? 13 A I don ' t think oo. I think, possibly more accurate M I determi:tation en the level of reliability. .; I 15 Q At page 12 of year tootin;cny at 13no 3, you otate l 10 that a total of S4 detallod facit tree aralyses were perfomed, 17 : cevaring the six different APW system designa. 1 I fa And it gone on., Six Cifferent MW deuigne, are the
- E lsix B65 operatid; plants?
l i 20 t A That's correct, i 2/ Q ilow many of the fault tree analyses then were perform-i 22 li -ed for Hnncho Soco? Nine?
?3 A Elne.
i 2e Q Iou conclude in your testinony that the study chows i gj that the Paincho Seco AFW nystem gantrally is equal to or greater ! l
-ra e m e,,-,--,,vn.m, -.,,,,n.wr,~,,,,~~,,, ,> Ne w,-~,.-en, n.v , , , - - - - - .---.,l:
!I I t
3085
' i i
37 I!; reliability 'than other plants, at page 12. Is it not't.h e thst i r 2 i for certain casen--or at leect for one dase, the loss of main I 3 feedwater together with a loss of off aite power--that the
'I reliability of the Rancho Seco nyttem is somewhat less that ,
1 S for the Wistinghousa plant? l
) ,
6 A In that one particular case, at the five-ninute tima f { 7 iwith the loss of off site power, it's truo that the Ruicho Ecco B ranks in the lo.cer portion of the range of Westinghouse planto. , I 9 .1 Q And that's the result thttt I believe is deacribed 10 briefly on the Executive Sumery of the Reliability Stucy, - 4 i I 11
.l,whereibrasys: The results indicate that the Re.ncho Seco !..
, i i
!Z jauxiliary feedwater ayoten reliability is low to medium for locbi a 4
+
g G Iof main feedwater cambined with the loza of off cito pcuer, d i R ' 4a Is that correct?
!ql is d A Yon. j
( l 0 Uns SMUD perforned any ana.lysen. or oteps that con).L j l 16 9} 1 i nr jbo caken to upgrade itu reliability in the.t case so that it unu ) d ? < ji : in Hequal to or botter than the Westinghouse system? l H 4 M fj A I don't think we have looked at this as trying to 4 1 1 i m [4better 1 Weatinghouso syntch We havo tried to, in our own ' 1 N l tainds, establish necessary critorion goals. And, yes, we have J l 2?. come up with come modifications that we think will imprett the x relichility of the au ciliary feedwater syants i h w! O These are cosa modifications that era based upm. the ' I 3 penults 'of this study? ,
. l b * * * ' * ' ' " ' " ** ** ' **- D' "# ' *~
.m ec wh e+t 6.m ee = aha W '* '9"*- e, s g-.__=e.+e*are _ _ = - * * * ._, . _ _ ".-* ' ._' ' ' - - _ .' -- -_ . ~ . _ _ _ _- .,-.. . - -
_ _ . _ _ ~ . . _ _ _ . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ - i 1 1 l} 20fM l J 18 ' l i
'.ll A Yes, that's correct. i i
! I It i Q Would you describe those modjfications? ! U > A One modification is a repipi'g of the valve arrange- ! i Si ' l ments so that we don't have to remove loth auxiliary feeduater a:rstes 5 ' from se: mice in order to do a flov tes on the b i i C i auxilia)y feedwater system. 7 Also, the decision ir3 not finalized but we have a 8 : nod that tho. capability does exist for entomatically dytt4 2 9 load w the motor-driven pos:p on the diesel generator, which W- woald introve the loss of off cite power reliability. li 5' hat would improve the reliability because you would
, 1 2
i el.iminate. a manual action; you get faster actuation? Is that I ' 13 true? 14 . j A You can take credi'c for f aster actuation, correct. ! $ L Q You caid that the analyser as to that automatie i R loading i>.re not yet complete. Do you know when they will be a 1 2 r1 completn? r - l . i j 10 A We have provided the de ta to the MRC for their j ] ! f 10 onluation . So I gucas I cnn't give ycu a definits tims 20 table, bt;t I would suspect that we would pcrform tais nodifica- ! i l ' 2L }, tion an tc. Category D item, the NOREG-0573, January of '31. i 22 Q Why was it that frcm the start the motor-driven motaro!
- i. 6
! 22 p ere act auto matically loaGed en the dicsul generatorn? M A We didn't consider it necessary at that time. We The tiects were performed PS had the turbine-driven purrp available. I-i
ll I i. i 2087 ; 39 to ahow thst during initial start up of the ple.nt that the 4 operator could load manually an euxiliary feedvater pump on a Qi
'~ '
dieuel generator. l Following that time, scrue of the regulatory guidas !
'H l changed, which give criteria for maximum dreps in bus voltage, l and ma:tiraum reduction in bus frequency-which is what has led 7
us to the cituation now of anclyning the prcblem to determine S bita applicability to Rancho Soco; or if wa indeed can autaae-f al t
~ iftically load this on the ban. ,
- l. ;
Nb Lut the orig:inal design of Rancho Seco, with the U lexception of the cuall break, we did not consider atuciliacy 1 4 Id
)!fe:6wata: to be indeed a safety related system, a cafety l l
D jfcaturcasystem--catstygradesystem j I ; Mj ..; And so thn enly autecitic initiation we had was on if jeafety featn:cu, to have the turbine-driven pumps start, t D I Reembe:: that we have always had during e ncrmal power supply l i i T/ lto the plant both motor-driven or botcn pmaps do the start M butomatically on a normal initiation signal. Oflg Q It's only where you loce the off site pe+;er that you'l.\ l -i D !hava to go to the dioacis? ' 22 A That's co;: rect. !
]
22 . O Mr. Dieterich,. in CEC Exhibit 21,.which is the l l C Webruary 26th NRC latter which encloses NRC's review of tt u I 2A re.liebility study. Do you have that scmewhere up there? 25 A I found it. ! i i l-
,= -- - _ , - .- . .. - - - -.---. . - - ... _ -- .- - - -.. - --- l e 2008 i , t. i. I < i 1 i 40 0 on the first page of enclosura one for that letter, they augceat that a necesscry change to the mission's auccess 3 j criteria is getting flor from at least one auxiliary feedwa.ter . 4 pump to at least' one steam generator before it boilo dry. c) i In that change being made to the reliability ctudy? 6
- A Ho, wa have not made that change. We are still cf 7 Y J the opinion that en appropriate mission suecaso criter La, first ;
8 of c.ll... we do not consider boil dry to be an item in itself 9 > )' of eafety concern, l' in ~ He purposely chose non-time 6 dependent mission 11 s m.tececa crij eria in order to have, if ycu vill, the criteria a 12 1 1 lof five, 15 and 30 minutes--if we are censistent with the 4 i U f ather plats, connictent with the failure ratec supplied by the l y' J NRC. 1 1 4 U", I h 0 Let me ya hack to something you said at the firet. 3 o 1 1C
;of that :cntence. That was a' pretty complete cenuenco, 7 @ in). I D
Mna t is an itua of safety concern, according to your definat. Lor? l E i lI believe you caid that boil dry ic not an item caf aafety M concern? A In my mind, en item cf cafety concern, or nafee y-i U rel.ited . tom, is something which can laad to the release of 1 i i a ( m" tradiation. In other words, something in this care would lead i .i j 22 .to cora Q xage. Ar.d I would not considor n stern generator < q l- 24 boil dry . ac fety concern, in itself. i 25 0 Uhon you cay "releaca of radiation", do you menn'to ; i l 1 f
._ . _ _ _ -_.._.._.2...__..-_._-.-.~-----~~------------- - - ~ ~ - - - - - ~ - ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ' ' ~
1 l 1 2f)S9 i 1 1* '
. the environment?
41 6 8 2 A Yen. 3 0 Under your definition, was the ' Crystal River J
'4 ' decident an itern of cafety concern?
)
\
U ' A Onder that definition, no. It's a natter of great 6 interest to those of un 'in the inductiry, but not of safety 7 cencer rt. 8 Q I beli.vo in one previous answer you also said that 9 iyou ara not planning any revision of the ccxiliary foodwater j ,, 10 "* study to revise the succaca criter:.on. In that a correct i l 11 paraphrace?
't 12h A That is correct.
13 Q Uave you communicated that view to the Nuclcot' I M ; Feyula t.ory Comincien? Other than : ight now.
;f 4 (Laughter.)
tncludo 6 ) A Do, we have not. - iv A tape '1'D: q Q I understand that you are,90t planning to revise wgin +"-B
?6 l the sMoty criterien and, thna, I sssrc % . leavei th t the.
I RI. reliability ntudy basically uncharged. I I I would like you, if poesible, hypothesi::e to ne that 20fI 21 }would change tlye succecr4 criterion along the lines tha:t HRC ! 22 h han summsted, And if. you were to change that criter.icn to the I il
?? {botiddar time, would you not have to revine this study to have a
rg ha timframe of less than five minutes be. fore the B&W planta? ( Ii i 25 ,lGiran your previous tectimony that the boil dry tirse given 'with I 1
l
?
2U50 t l 42 I l your anticipatory reactor- trip is approximately four minutera eE A Yeu, that would be a val'id ~asscapticut. He have ! i 2 changed the criteria frem five rainctea to fcur minutes. j .Wi l 4 I thi:1 wa would find very little change in the results of 5 the ann.".yals. t 6 Q Ubat la the basis for that conclusion? 4 l I- 7' A The five-minute results that were given in the 4 ) 8u. analysin would. he pretty well accurate for four ninutca baccuse c l t D thne imo no operator action asarmed in that first five l lf I mi?ratec of the antlycis; so thers would be nothing that vruld h a i i
?! hamen in the period between four and five minutes co change.
1 12 I'
; the reatits cignificantly.
i ! 15 MR. SHON *. I'm sorry, Mr. Dietarich, but it sesas to 1 14 'me sat apper.dir B to that analysis suggesta that a probability t 15 wa aantned for manual actue. tion within five n:inutes,
- 16 It was specifically 5 tires 10 to tha minus 2. Or ,
i : i !' i I p that wac tim f ailure probability, the chance that 'the operatot tg t would nct take ac; ion at that tima. It's a lot greater then j L i 19 tlm chance that he won't take action in 30 minutes, but it
.E
- j. 20 doen have a... you don't knew how thct cune goes for inom.ts I s i l
3; urutor fiva minuteo at all. i i j l ' ~ ' 1 22 THE WITLiESG Okay, I guesa... I thinkyour very ] i ?S lact statment van a point' I was: trying to got. We 6.on't have } ! g really valid data for assuming anything ia going to be any j g lbett.or or any varse in four. minutere than it in at five rainctea. i i i l [} L. -.....- - d ...- - - . - - . - - . - - - - . - - - a
p h i l 2091 d3 I 1 I would assume if you ara going to assume an operatoi-
- t e
{ action, that that operator schion la going to occur primarily ; 3 in stant.nleously. l 4 MR. S110N What I mean is they didn't play the gare 5 in the ume. no action for 10 minutes fashion when they d.id ! 5 th3 u. ' 7 THE WITNESS: That critoria applice to ECCs sort of r 8 analysis and catergency core cooling analysis you do not take D ] credit for operator action prior to 10 minn+es 10 .i MR. SHON: Yes, I think ycu raight charneterize this i Ii as perhaps a noro realistic analysis. 1E THE WITNESS: Correct. Correct. E I HR. SHON: Thank you, I didn't nean to interrupt, but i 3 14 , jIwantedtogotthatpointacroso, i
$ ie BY MR. LANPHER:
i 16 . f 2 0 How much additional effort would be involved in-i 77 l. performing that additional analysis for a shorter time frama , 1
' 4 10 to capture the NRC's proposed additional cuccces criteria? l
)
10 A That'n really hard to anever because we don' t hava ! 20 any valid ... rate criteria to use at an earlier time. End l 21 thoce would have to be developed with como senso of reliebility 1 I n or justi.fication for them. That woeld be the bulk of the efforte i 23 i would bo in coming up with appropriate failure rate data. !
! l 2( b Ar.d as I tried thI say, I think you uculd find that ,x ;
23 that data would very approxihute what was used for the fivo j ! i i
~
- I
- __ , _ ___ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ L -.;
l l : 3 2397. l l i ninnto.cacc. , i l 2 Q Wo jur.t don't know at this timo because that data is ) 3 rot rendily availrble, correct? l I 4 A I think you've got to have a gut feeling if s< nething i I . .
- l. 5 dcecn' t wrk in four minates, it's not going to work in five 1
6 ntinute s. There is juet no reason to asctunn a dis::rinination i 7 between those tifo times, neccesarily. { r i; 8 0 Isn't there c. rcaron to nacune there would be dis ~ { i I 3' cranination given the fact tlJtt,. even with the anticipatory l g reactor trip, that four minuten is 'iu. tima for boil dry.- i ) g If that were the success criterion, uculdn't tha result c l 12 letwcca Maatinghousa and E&N systeme pcusibly chanfge in that l
- ccmparison? Since the iiiestinghouse do hate a. longer boil. dry?
73 j p So if the success fcr comparing the two, the likeli-I g Leod of avoiding boil dry, you'd have a shorter time to a i stcceed in the D&W systen. And 'in the nacrter time, don't :roa le $ > eh
'in ve a greater likelihood of opero.tcr error? !
2 - g,, A T thi-Jk you would find... ngnin, I'm repeating' ; l l, .
,, ,J. l npelf . . .
~
the dive minute reaulto ver:y clone rc the four ! l . i ,, d) [td nut o reenits. l i j As for where sinilar resulta for bo!..'. dry criterit ' ) i ; I h i l y i for Wootinghouso plants would fall in their range, .I guesa ! l 23lIdon'treallyknowtheanswertothat. o But I don't think no i' i are in a race with Westinghouse here; I think the objectiva is 24 I i tc hava na rcliable an auxilir.ry fa.dwater syctem ac we dem i h, l l i i l L____________ --- _ L_ _--__
l Il I 1 3{ : 2093 - ltobenecessaryandnottobebetterthanWestinghouse. P ,, 1 l 0 Do you' helieve that, given the quick response which
.s e ve have at various timas called "sennitivities" of the B&W
' 4 i
!synten to changes in feedwater flow, that the reliability of f
'9 l3 au :iliary feedwater cysten on a 36W plant should be greater than ;
1 6' )thr.t of a Westinghouse or Cw1buntion Engineering? I I
; A No, I really don't. They itay hese twice cs a reliabloj 1
0 systeu an is necessary or needed; and thare is no reason that D we have to be bottar t.twn them. I think as long as we meet M]i tha i baaie criteria for an auxiliary feeduator system, that's 1ihourgona. l t i
?E HR. GIiON: Mr. Dieterich, you said au long no you neet ;
G[ the bac.c criteria. What tre basic cr2.teria for an , i L ! a 14 0 availiary feedwater system with regard to reliability? Are ! e I! ! ' iS l- there any?
}
16 i TILE WITHESS: With regard to reliability... 9 ; 1 il f IE. SE011: That's what we have been: talking about.
- IE ], THE WITNESS: Yes, we want a very reliable i I ,
That's bar.icelly why we are ! 10 anilla2:y foedwater systea. 20 conitted to a safety grada initiation and control spitem for i : P1 {
.,our en:iliary feedwater system.
- 21. " As far as roliability and preventing boil dry, I 23 l vould still tend to prefer the critoria 03 being capable of i i
24 [ removing decay heat from t.he core to prevent core damage, l l s[ im. snon: I.eee. Thank you. Pleace go on, nr. l r
- . - - . _ - - . - _ ~ . - - . - - . - . - . . . ~ - - - . . - - . . - . _ _ _ . . - _ _ . . _ , - - . ; 2094
- i. 1 1
Lanpher. 46 ) 4 BY UR. LAWHER: 1 3 0 I think you used the trords This isn't e. race againnt , l 4 Won'inghouno", c something to that effect. But if it's .not a 5 .. n=ce, what van the value of comparing the imW system against 1 6 the Westinghouse nystem, if you are not socking to. . . to acek , 1 I ~ mecns to make it as reliable as that? l 0 i A I think there are raany qucLtions in a lot of j 9 I i people's mind back in this tune when this study was instituted 1 1 i l 10 to junt give a good general feel of where do we stand. And i 4 11 I think that's basically what the study provided. It shaded i o ) i thct va were generally in the ballpark of the Westinghousa - i 13 1 plants and no weren't aticking out lika a sore thath on the 4 I l 14 1 beli side. 4 15 l Yen have to appreciate that the ateciliary feedwater syw em . I NlisapartofthesecondaryciteoftheplantandtheNRC,up , i U ' until this tima, had devoted relatively little a=crant of effort l i j U and study on this type of a syst.em. l- , I U Q I understan$ there's a lot of hindulght going on in {; e U this whale affort. I call your 3t.tention to draf t HUREG-0667 $ i 1 21 at page 5-10. I would like you to octwent on the conclusionu' ;
+
'm" they reach. It'a just one sentence. -Do you have it? l 3
U A No, I don't have it. ! 4 24 (11anding documentn) . e 25 Q Ths first' sentence on that page says - "The tank. i l t
l 1 ; 2095 47 I j force believes that because of the dcmonstrated acnsitivity ' 2 of B&W plants to a loss of feedwater trancient, the APWS t 3 design nunt be extrc:aely reliable." 4
- Can you plence tell me how~ue can be cure that the !
5 .i l Rancho Seco design ia extremely reliable if we don't take stepa 6 l 1 to insure that it is at leant reliable for all cases as the 7 Westinghouse plant? l 8 A Maybe I don't exactly understand your question but j 9 3rsure rollability, as I pointed out, we are committed to ! U. 10 i upgrading the initiation control of that syste'n to a cafety ' t 11 grade attndarda. l 12 O And if it's upgraded in all respects to safety grade, , 13 is that, in your opinon, would that satisfy this criteria i ! 14 , hocceing oztresc3y reliable, assuming that the NRC does adopt 15 .that? This is a draft, I understand. 16 A You, I think it would. l 17 Q What is the timetabic for the upgrade of the AW ' , 10 nyctem to entirely safety grado? 1 l 19 A That again is the category B of NUEEG 0578, January 1 20 of 1981. I i 21 Q "*ill Rancho Seco be able to racet that date? i i
.22 A I guccc I ccn't answer that yen or no. I thinic f l
i 23 there's some reasons Sty it might be very difficult to meet f 24 ' that date. l 25 Q Do yoa have .a copy of CEC Exhibit 22. It's'a I i l l l i f l . , . . _ _ . . , _ . _ . _ - . _
{l' 1
- l
! l
; 2096 l f.'
I 4 tl March 10,fl980;1etter from SMUD to NRC? l e , A Yes, I do. l T ' l" 3 Q Ceuld you plaare idantify that letter for the record, ' 4 l l Mr. Dietersch? ' q r: A Yea, this is a letter dated 11 arch 18, 1980 from ' 1 6 l l John Mattintoo to Robert Reed of the NRC, and provides our > ! 7 response to the NRC's February 26thletter regarding upgrade 8 f of the auxiliary fecowater system. l l 9 O That February 26th letter that you montion is CEC I l I 10 ; Exhibit 21? 1 j e '- t il l A Correct. Yes. l l 12 l O Are there any attaclunents to thic March 10th letter? ! 13 A Yes, there is a threo- Page attachment. J la , O And uhat does that cttachncnt concern? i t 1 1 15 A That attachment provides the responses to the i j 15 Edbruary 26th letter. I 17 0 -
-!?aa thin letter and its attachucat prepared by i
1 4 13 Ii SI!UD ? i 1 19 j li Yes, it wac. ] 4 1 20 M ii.. I M iP lip R . I would li);e to move the admission of p ! 21 CIr0 22. 22h I MR. DAXTErt : No objection. 23 j MRS. IDHERS: Sunff?
-2A . MR. LU3IS: No objection.
! 3 _ LIRS. EGiTERS: CEC Exhibit 22 1G admitted into 6 I ( i 1 i r -
._ s-----a---~-------- - -- . _- . . _ _ - .
I I I + l l 2097 i 49 1 l e v m. .. enc o., i ' 2 (Whereupon, CBC Exhibit 22, heretoforo ; 3 . marked for identification, was received into evidence.) 5 BY NR. LANPIT2R: 6 0 Hr. Dietarich,. I would like to hava you turn your l 7 attention to that first page of the attucluent to that letter
- 8 l about two-thirds of the way acun, the paragraph starting:
, ,r -
"The magnitude. . . " and uould yoa read thuc for 3l i
IC yourcelf? i 4
' s N
- 11 ' A (Complied.)
12 O Have you had. a:1 opportunity ta review it? l i f i 13 TL Yes, I have. l ] 14 : Q If yon era unable to ccmplete the ;rniliary feadwater 1 i l 0 cyntem u grade by the January 1, 1981 date, vill Itanche Seco i , I f 16 ' hs w to be shut doun? i 17 ; MR. BJCf2ER: T. object to the qunation as calling for' - t isj a legal conclusion. 'i ! 19 ML LMiPHER; I'll withdraw tb3c quantion. r l 20 BY MP., L7MP11T!R: I i l ! 11 O You had stated befcre that there were a number of l l 22 factors that imdo it difficulv.. I believe, to determine whether j 23 , you could inect tht Januc.ry 1 inple:aentation date, ~ the turn-in ' j 24 implementation date, is that c:r7:ect? 25 A That ic correct. > 4
?
A
. . _ . . . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ . _ _ . . . _ . . _ , , . . - - - - . - _ _ . . _ . . ______.___.__...____.-4 -
4 i: :l ' [ i (jj 2098 l' : l I Q What'.are those factors that may mako it difficult? 5 !
- t 2
! 3 Typically, the procureraent of the equipenant irs the l 3 ' l . .most lengthy item in a change like thin. The design han to bc l ! 4 ' completed and specifications have to be written for the -purche r.a. 4 s 5l of equipment. And it takes time to get delivery on such sadnty l 1 l 6l grade equip:2ent. I i 3 7L And it is quite possible that ue will not have all ! 8
- g the equipment available to us for a January 1 installation.-
)I.
D!! Q Eas the URC npproved'the design of your system ; I
~!
j' 10 h upgrs.de in this regard as of this date? j O M j. A No, they have not. 1{ , . ! f
!2 O Is that a prerequisite to being able to go
]
D o,tt and line up vencora zor this equipreent? l.; ; j 3 j! A Yes, in my mind, it certainly 13. i l is ) O It's impossible to go cut and begin preliminary 9 f ki consaltations trith vcndora and contracting so that when NRC '} e . l
- oi oc.ec give final approval, you'll proceed rapidly? ~ '
1 4 sa A Well, we are of courac in .constc.nt contact trith
- i l i
i } t D )I vendors that cupply thia hinti of equipment. Decisions suill i i
, 4 20 have to ha made as tc. just cacactly what we want.
I d i 4 21 0 Mhat is your current proposal on what thia upgra6e i ,- l 22 g in going to involve? .. l ) p3 ' ' A- At the precent tiin, we are looking at a stearr l i 24 genorctor level cnd level rate of' change control on tha gg[ auxiliatry feedwater syutem.- } ! j !I
,j
,d
.t
! l 1 [ , b.,..-~~~--~~-~~~=-~~~~--~---~~~~'-~~ ' ~ ~ ^
l, , i IDS 9 51 b-! O Can you dincuse in n' little norts detail uhat %a t 2 con :rol in? Thin will be.: independent cf che ICS. Correct?
- J It'a a completely new control syatcm?
I l 4 A It is entirely reparate f ren the integrated contr:J. l system, entirely neparate from the ncn-acclear instrtnentinion . 5 6 ... safety grade inotrtmentz. tion and paver siipplies, Ife i 7 seitnically v.alified, just the cane as are che cohtrols for e high pressure in %ction,lo's pressure injection, em rgency g jcore i cooling systems. - i w i O What in your best estirute af. this tins of hotr long i 1; it vil3 take to procure and. . . procure the systen and tr.cdify ya the 2xinting cystem once Nhc approval is obthir.ed? y A That's a hard question to anmrer but I think it y ,world be during the first half of 1981. g Q Tnat didn't exac tly ancuer ry gaestien. . Are you i g r tating t?.at you think that just cometime in that six month g period 12 chcn you likely could get this installed? i
.} l
.A ~.'orrec t, 1.,. i I
g
\
l 0 1 When is the 1981 refuel:ng cutago enticipated to a j cacur? my. g l A I don't know what the present notedt.le is. I'm i t j p hJ ussaing at along the February . Mat ch titrefrswe, text year. 9
~3 .
Q W uld that be the preferred tiet. to implement changiu 1 g bach au thic? I g h Very definitely. f l.
~ - . . _ . _ . - - . - .. - . . - - . - . _ . . . . . - - - - _ _ _ _ . .-
h, 2100 e' I52 I O Rancho seco is still down for refueling now, correct? i
-- 2 A Wa'rd still down. 2efueling is completed.
l a
- 3 i Q You are expecting to go back to powier this week?
'3
! } A I forgot what unck this vas.- l . 5 (Laughter.) 6 ! That is the precent schedule, this week, c 7 f Q I had thought that usually refueling outages were i i
)
8 jepproximately at 1(~ month intervalc, which led me to think that 9 jin 1981 the refueling wculd have been late spring early a . i
}
l 10 lr>tnmer of next year. Am I just ni 5taken on that? 4 11 j A It dependo on what capacity factor you assume for q 12 hthe plant during the fuel cycle. We're still on a 300 68y < t 1 f u fuel cycle. i - l M ! Q You state in a paragraph that I ash you to read... 4 - 15 4you den' t cay it but it's stated in that paragraph that with l 16 l respect to the auxiliary feedwater system that it's a subotantia:t i 17 /taek. And that nany other NUREG 05'iB category E itsna are of
- e. t .
] isfi;equalorgroatermagnitude. t 1 f is : ! Enon you une the word " magnitude", is that in tercur -i 6 i 1 EO mef safety itoportance, or the amount of work involved in , a
! l i ?
3 21 direplementing the task? i. I i 2.2 1 A The a:nount of work. 1
- i. : l 23'l 0 would it be fair to say that there are other cr.tugory j e
;g S itoras for which there 10 going to be a clone call cn'whether j 25 the January 1, 1983 current deadline wi?.1 be met?
L 1 i-L...,.._._a.m. -
i i i I
- 101
}
l 53 1 i A I think that's 6. valid characterization, yes. ' i ! 2 ! Do youhave a copy of MUREG 0578 available? Q 3 l 4 No, Idon't. \ 4 i (Handing documents), i i 4 , Yes, I do. I think Id.o. 1 0 Could you turn your attentien to Appendix E of 4 7' ) tTT4EG 05787 0 A Yes.,
- i
'9 Q Please indica tri uhich Category B itetus Inay have e 1
! close call'on January 17
- MR. BAXTER
- Mrs. Howers, I objec h to this as vague b.
I 4.>
' " > and, i
1 l { 3.r,. none cases, cutcide of the scopo of the direct. We are ' ) 13 ' i not here as an enforcement proceeding on the implementation of U a.t.1 NuriG 0570 items. If Mr. Lanpher can be a little more i
- E I upacific and relate it into auxiliary feedwater system upgrade, 1
M l or atrac nep2ct of Mr. Dir.terich's testimony, I think. it would ! 17 ho ho3pfal. 10 Otherwise, ue'll have to tcha soma tine to rev.ie>9 h, !. ' fd .. 20 MR. LANFHER: 14r. Dieterich is aluo testifying on a M '
' ic:.g-teem taodificatione e
) MR. BAXTER 'Of. tho Enf 7 order, y : 23 MR. LANPHER: Thank yua, Mr. Nc:ter. The May 7 ! M orcer, It is luy understanding that we are not: narreN1y conff.ning if I carceivn to one point in time. If we were.. if thia'procand-
. . - _ . - . _ _ _ , . . . . . _ _ _ . . , ~ . . - .
_ . ~ ~ . _ . _ . _ _ . _ . - . _ _ _ _ . _
' . ls 2102 1 I ! ,i ing were only woether the items in the May 7th order narrcwl:t ! 5' 2 5 l
' wore, in and of themselves, sufficiento well, the prcceedinc, {
2 , I l wouldn't have much meaning because, as you have caid a nunber { i s 1
'I of times., Mrs. Bowers, this in a 2tovind target.
[ i 4 Things are
*1 D.
happeniItg all the timo. ,
#-I t At la extremely relevant to j j ind oat what is happeningi
.e .
. 7ffandwhenitishappeningsowecanget!lafeel.ingocthisBoard ' 6' ' can make a finding about whether it is safe to operate thia 4 9 1 plaat. 10 I'm trying to find cut tihether these itemn which the l 4 i f [' 11 HRC has directed be implemented v{ill in fact be implemented t
- t
\
W .! accordir.g to the current timetable. d l
'3 I think it's completely relovant. If he doesn't 9
i 14 1 hav? knowledge, he can :certainly tell vs. Ua, of ccurse, don't s t k : G }; want him to tiestify if he has to upcculate. j 1 16 I
~
- ./ ER. BAXTIlR s I'm just trying to be a littls bit
- 17 ! officient r. bout this record. I
- you g.tance down the list of ,
! I i 18 itear, '!irst of all, thin decunerit ap?Iles to all plants; it's 1 i ). 19 y not juut . limited to B&W plants. And there er e many items in 1 O ie herc- that simply aran't relevant to the responso of the p:. ant
- M h to feedpater trannients, or any other aspect of the May 7th d !
J . l ) 22 jordsr;whichin,in.thelastanalyzio, still what we Ero here - l l i L 23 lto litigate. k .. . 2r If there is.a relationship to the May 7 order and
- 2S the adequacy of those modifications, I think it is appropriato. ,
. i 'l i I I l
f i- 2103 ! But some of these items aren't. "Pl' ant chielding review, !"' 2 I Ita:a LL 6. (b) , as an example. l MR. LANPHER I would only point cut that all of i d~ l theae cho::t-term lesson learned requireatento do .arise out . 0 j i. of a reuponse to feedwater transient at TMI and the continuing 6 j reviews clnce then. I don't think we should be too narrow 7l in the ocope of these proceedings. O MRS. 30MERS: Doec the Staff have a positior. on this l o,
,-l matter?
MR. LUIIS: I basically agree uith Mr. Ba cter. I N fI M think , first of all, there are a great many things in thia ! l l 12 document that relate to matters that nny well be beyond wh2it 13 Mr, Dietcrich in testifying, that is to say, they-may be I 14 ' matters nore related to B&W acope i 15 . But, in addition, and I have taken this position all l l 16 along in this proceeding, unleso there ia come kind of an i l 17 c::eu 'shown bet. ween this trenendously long list of items and M {lspecific responne of thic f acility to feodwater transients, I l l 19f - don't think that thcae items are all autunatically.. related to i. M' j the ability of thia plant to' respond to fendwater transient. I
- \ t
- 21 ! And I think Mr. Sa'
- ter is getting into a good point.
- I i
22l I don't know how definitively we can pursue it right now,.but 23 he pointed out- that this is not an enforcement proceeding with , i 24 lrespect to coupliance with' the. provisions of 0570. (- 25 ) And I think that la quite trua, it is not. At.none i 4 i I:
.r b'
I .,_____._a..__._________...__~.~_._L___.a~~.---..--..-----._ - + - - - - -
i
- i. , - 1 l
2104 1 point uc are going to have to come to grips with the questien 1 62 of just exactly' uhat it in this Board's juriadiction is with ' 3 respect to a whole variety of requiremento that the Comniscion,
'4 through its Staff, has imposed in such documents ao 0570.
5 !' So I think this gets right bach to relevance. I 6 mean, yes, thero are a whole lot of requirementa listed here I ! 7 in Table B of 0578.' O Number one, they are not all automatically relevant i i 0
.$ to the ability of this facility to respond to feedwater 10 transientr<. And it is not clear exacidy how the interface in l II goir.g to play out between these varicus requirementa and 12
, enforcement kinde of proceedings such as the Shou Cause lettero 13
; on the ci tort-term leesonc learned t'.mtthe Conmtission's Office i.
14 cf Ittspcotion and Enforcement undertook. l i l 15 So I'm kind of j1 raping ahead of myself here but. . . ( 16 p I know that but I think Uhat Mr. Baxter 10 re.ieing gets to a -I
- l'1 fairly fundamental point which we haven't really focused on.
1 10 MR. SHON: In your view then, Mr, Louis, the fact that i ! 19 theca thinga sall resulted from the TMI-2< incident and that that 1 . 20 [. incident originated by a feedwcter transient does not provide i 21 a sufficient' nexus fer us to discues them all. Is that right? 22 MR. IMIS: I think they reaulted from tho.TM1 23 incident in caly the vaguest senc.a of that word, Yes , I 24 agree wig wbtt you just.said: It does not supply the neensaary 25 nexuu automatically. !
,_ _____________.-..._..___..___.~_._.__1. _ _ _ _
__..._.__..,.....___....-..,..._..-.,........2
I i i 1 2105 l. The nexus may be able t'o be developed with respect 1,udotspo 8 to many of then, but it's not automatically prosent. r n j in-t-9 3 > Mns. BOWERS: Do you think it would be helpful bc 4 i, inf ormation in the record if the witnens would answer what ! S j information he has on those items that will not make the i 6 l January '81 delivery date? , New anything boycnd thic in the vs.y of inquiry on l 8 theno itemn, in order for us to peruit you to proceed, you ! I 1 jwouldhantoshowanexusrelationchipthatwedon'tthink... 10 rrore of a nemus than exiata right now. II TIiB WrHIESS: Au far cs other items in the NUREG document that I see, and th,is,ic a personal observation--I'm i U not intimately involved in the design. offorts and in most of i j N 'thcae arena, no thic is strictly a perco'aal opinion. 1 j '! S However, the plant fueling. reilew and the plarit J M' modifica.tiona that are going to have to be made an a result l 17 { of that could tako concidernble effort, and could Ivery well i l 10 l go doira the January 1, '81 date. l a 10 l- ] The pbat-acgident samplign systan is very involved.
- 1 M \ We have bean given a very high. cource tetu by the NRC to try i
I 21 to have tha capability on:r.ite of analyzing such a cample. 22 The high range effluent monitorey an I ur.dcIsts.nd, there is i 23 [open sene developme$tal work that has to be' done in the industry 1 24~ to provide monitora of'the re.nge that are dcsired. I i 25 Some of tho items, like on site technical support - l
l .
- j. .
! 2106 i. l . 58 1 i P'- cen. ter, involve a large amount of inst 2.umentation and must be l nide available in the center--that could be a significant
'a amount of work. r e' ,
I guess I'm sure there's probably some othere here-6
- I've micsed. I think it's important--maybo more so than if I
6 we can make it until January '01 or not, that most oftthese : 7 i s will require an e:: tended outage to implement. ??e would 6 of courno prefer and I'm sure find it desirable to wait until O reviewing out each implement, most of these itens. 10 DY MR. LANPHER: -! Il O We .were focusing on the last qncetion on January 1, , i i + 12 j 1981. You have identified as close items the plant ' chielding, 13 sampling, high range effluent monitor, and some of the on site i l#- scoport centor. i ! 15 Is it your feeling that if there were a delby until 1 e 16 the fueling cutage next year that those iteres could be 17 accmpliched in an orderly fashion at tnat time?
)
I 18 A Probably, ,
- 19 0 It's a delay of three to six months, I assume?
20 A 7es, it ic my feeling--my opinien, I should say-- toasy 1 ! 21 that that could be accornplished. 1 22 Q ' Mr. Dieterich, on the first page of the attachment to 23 CEC 22-f.s the March 18th letter? ' t 24 A Yes.
- 25 Q We were talking earlier about3hether SMUD was~ going
= ,,-.ww -- 4 ,e -- .--,-------.--e. e-- _ - - - . - - .-----.-----yi.---r . . - --- w-.- .r-.---+-t,- = - , - . - -.-- - - -- - - -,+ ~ . - .,---.-*m.---.ww nw----u-- r+w'
s H ! 2107 i i ! l k l i
' l to apgrade or revise the reliability study to include the new ;
5 ; At the top of that letter, part A, item 1, j success criterion. l ; AFW reliability study success criteria, SMUD provided n , A responna to NRC which, to my way of thinking, indicates that . 5 pon vero going to adopt tlut new success critaria. Am I l O read.ing this wrong? !
'/ A Mc, you're not reading that wrongi- I think our. l J
U position has ccacwhat changed 'since this letter was subnitted, ; 1 'l C D and we still feel that the mission succccc criteria in the ! 10 l original AFW reliability study is valid. 11 Q What were the f actors that led to this change of l l ! 12 opinion? 10 A I think, further insight into the effects. I guess, i l 14 , .i the little better understanding of the fact that the end result '!
! 15 probably could not change much. And that what would be required ,
1 i 16 to come up with a rather inaignificant change--I should say
- 17 reletive]v insignificant change to the study--doesn't warrant 18 redoing the study, 19 Q Mr. Dieterich, in CEC 3xhibit 21--that's the 1
1 l 20 Feb unry 26th NRC review of the reliability study--in addition a f 21 to that ravicw they have listed further items ' for upgrade that I j 22 they wanted accomplished, ene of whica related to emergency I 23 procedure for'alternata water socces, at page 6 of encionare 24 one to that eachibit.
- 25 Do'you find thtt at the bottom of that page?
1 ) .
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ __ _ .- ..-.. n _ _. ) l _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
l
,3 2100 I
i 60 - t 1L! , i A Yes.
~.
Q They state there: "ycur existing procedures do not f 3 ( . appear adaquute for obtaining water frc,m the Folcum South ! l- e q a Canal, particularly with respect to stkrting the pump (S) . " 5 l 1 nava you made a review of this cement subsequent to receiving 6 i thin lecter? ~ 7 . A Yes, we have. The reservoir water supply doco net j 0 ] l require the use of a pump. That's n gravity drain. , 8 Q Excuse ma, aren't uo referring to the canal? N A I'm sorry, you are correct. il O I don't know if this will assist yoa. On CIC Erhibit M 22, page 2 of the attachment, it states part way down: The l l i 13 District will review the proceduren for providing alternate 4 M
;wracer, prior to startup will innure that proceduren dnEcribed ;
l ) ' 15 how to obtain water frc.n these alternata sources. ' i 16 I'm trying to find out what han bean done. . ~ 17 q A I guees, te answer you, I don't knn npocifical.ly. We j t i j t M idid makt. the comitntent to revist the proced.2res and change i i M them if necessary. I'm not' cure if that was required, l 20 0 And do you know what tha alleged procedural deficiency l El entailed ? 22 A. No, I don't. 23 0 You don 't know whnt ch:Inges were made either? f. 24 A No. PJ , O If any. t I'. l' a
-1 L. _ ,...,_ ,. w. . . . , ~ , - - - - - . . - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - ---
.--- -..-.- _ - _ .- -.- - . _.-. _ - - - .-- - - - . . ~ . _ - _
l
- l. ' .
l L 2109 l L 61 h ' 1 l . A ' Correct. ' I 2
- MR. LANPHER
- Mrs. Bowers, this might be a good -
3 l time for & recess. t ' i f' ' j MES. LOWERS: Fine, Mr. Lanpher. l 4 r, i ! (Whereupon, at 2 : 20 p.m. , the recesc was taken.) i : o 1 E' MRS. BOWERS: Are you ready, Mr. Lanphor? ! i i' ,
- 7) MR. IANPHER: Yes, maam.
0 l DY MR. LANPHER: l 0 ' l 0 To your knowledge, Mr. Diaterich, referring to CEC 10 i Exhibit 22, is the change in > position relating to the success l
- il criterion the only change 'in this letter in terms of connitments l
l 12 ande by SMUD to E C? ! l M A Yes, I believe so. M 0 The atu:iliary feedvater reliability study, as you J 15 1,know, covered three cases: the loca of ma.in feedwater, the i$ 16 f lose of main feed, the loss of off cito power and 'then the 10PM i l 17 a of ::ain fead uith all AC power. {. U. ,
- 18) How vere those three scenarios chosen?
10 ' A They were chosen bc.aically by the NRC in their i i p otudren or the Westinghouse and CE plants. 2C i 21 Q Did you, or, to your know, BfM, have any objection 22- . to'theicholso of these'three scenarios, or the. exclusion of 5 l 23 f any other scenarios? 1
- 24. A. No, I don't think so. 'Theyccecned to represent tho
, 2f lbreid... as broad a case as poecible. , i . j L i ;j k- .. , 1
__-_-- - .. _..~..._ - _.--- -. _ ~ - -._ _ -_- 2110 1 Q Wa.a there any ccnsideration, to ycur knotriedge, of 2 whether to includa a scenario of An acting on when not called
~3 for? ,
4 A Nct~to my knowledgo. ! 5 Q In there any reacon that should nct also be considered-l G one of the ccenarion in this reliability study? l 7 A I can't envision a cace where auxiliary feedwater i l G would come on that you,didn't decire to have it on except I , 9 during full pcwor operation in the full norcal foedwater flow. 10 And in that cace, it would be a relatively meaninglese item. i i ! 71 , O Why would it be relatively meaningless? ji i 1a ! A The effcat of auxiliary feedwater is una11 compared f.3 to P.he inrge amount of unin feedcator. , g4 Q To your knowledge, hun that wer occurred at Rancho s l g, Sa:0? I g A Ho. i l . pj Q You stated earlier that you did not believe that the I j . ! g .9tum generator boil dry criterion was an-appropriate one for 1 l g this reliability study. In the case of' losc of main.foedwater . 20 and losa of all AC power, isn't it true that . an AW systcci l
, 7,3 [ rolics volely on the turbine drive?
l A Thnt would be correct.5 22
't
.g O ' n that case, isn 't it , cxtremely 'important to f actor -[
I ga ;p eto pces le boiling dry of the steua generatorr 3[ A I think we discussca .that comrf.inat this morning. lThe r 1 l l
-.,4 --,,---m --.,,,,.-.,,-+--.,,,-----me---- - - - - * . - - - - - , . - * - ~ - - - - - -
i 2111 i ! l voinme of the steamlines is signifdcant in comparison with the 2 ' steam generator itacif. Just becauce the nteam generator - 3 boils dry doezn't mean they do not have ateam unavailable to l I 4 E the turbine-driven auxiliary'feedwater pump. ; 5 Q I understood we did cover that point. I don't mean 6
' to be repetitive but you were not able, is it not true, Mr. ;
I {Dieterich, to tell me. how long you would ctill have steam ) a i ' I b available? 1 9 A i I would certainly think it would be at least the I 1 W one ninute that would get me frca the four minute to the five 3I minute tima criteria in the study.
~
G Q and that is baned on ycur knowledge of tht plani ? j 13 Or ,is it baacd on any analyses? .i 14 A 11 o , it'a just my judgment. 15 0 Depending on the positioning of the various valvos i 10 in the t.urbine, it could be a longer or shorter period? 17 [ A I can't picture a time period of less than a minuto-N 18 h the steam wo21d not be available following a steam generator 19 hail dry. l 20 Q At page ~2 of the auxiliary f4;ef. water reliability I i 21 otudy, It acsumes that delivery of auxiliary feudwater. I PZ - within five minutes vill prevent stean generator boil dry-~
! I towards . the bottom of that page.
l- 25 1 . { -- 24f You in your testimony used n fcur-minute timo for bcil' 23 dry, is that correct? _____.-,-w-r-,,,r-.,,,,m
-v.-.r,. ..--,,.---........-r ,,,,,,,,,.w,,, . . . . - , , , i,-,-- %p, , wo,j
l II 2112 , G4 1
. A. Yes. '
2 O Is there an inconsistency between your statement and
.that of a. study here?
/' I A No, I don't think so. I think maybe the four minutes
- i 5
. lthat I've been citing in a refinement, if you will, over the j l 6 i five minute that is reported in our repart. *
'l '
O l It in based on further analysea that have been per-i 0 h formed since then? Since the time that this was initially done? l 1 9 A Yes, it would be cince then. : i N O When you cpeak of a four-minuta boil dry, you are aiwq 11 neauming, are you not, that the anticipatory trip funstions as r l I ^" intended? l 13 A Correct. , 14 . O Is a failure of the enticipatory trip one of the ! I'
- 15 failuroc that is considered in this study? I 4
i 10 A Not to my knowleds;c. l I'i Ii O Ia there a reason foe that? ' j l J i [ 18 A The failure of the anticipntcry trip would not affect I '
- i- I i l 19 the reliability analysin, an I sea it. '
i }
- j. 20 0 That would be because it doca not, in and of itnelf, ,
l 21 af fect the auxiliary fEedwater cystem itself? ! , t i , i 22 A Correct. ; 1 ( l '23 .O I would like you to turn your v.ttention to CEC Edlihit 24 21 again, plence. On page'2 of enclosure one,-item number 3,: l 25 1raices a question regarding the'analysic;of the study concerning 1
- k. i e .
_. _ -- - . _ _ _ _ . - -- 2 . _ . w
- n
- 2113 i
I the integrated control system as a potential cing~ le failure l 65 j source. 3 Has SMUD performed any analysic subsequent to this 4 letter from the NRC relating to this itens ! p l f' ' A Well, I don't know if "analycin" is uhe proper word, l ]
- 1 6 I but the HRC requested at the outset of this analysis that a l ]
7 single control element that could affect both trains would give l j - j 8 one specific relinbility. I'm corry, this is the power supply, , l 3 not the ICS itself. I'm on the urcng subject. i l J 10 0 I probably misled you.
.l T1 A The NRC did not want to include in the analyais the ,
12 effect of a battery-backed power supply since that woul?. be i i I ! 13 conaidored to be extremely reliable. lead this is the case > !
) l l 14 where ICS-NHI ptMer supply, even on a loss of all AC power, ;
I
- j. in you etill have battery-supply power available. !
16 Q Wh1.t would that battery supply poner be for? In that ft 17 for tha control valve? The flow control valve? ' l !a Q Ho, the control valve is an air--operated valve. The j l . f3 Power empply le to power the ICS and HNI, A ; 5 20; Q -I would like you to turn to page 9 of timt enclocure r ,- 2I pl en.se. Iten 2 relating to postulated high energy pipe breaks ! : I l [ P2 e.icues that the Imucho Seco IiN system doen not meet the high ; ! 1 i ! l ;.3 energy line break criteria in Sele 10.4.9 cnd branch technical j i t
- i. ja position '10-1. Do you agree with'that?
l a; a . rec, 1 do. c : l- , i l '. t
- i. , , ,
z-.-..-A.__.--___-___-.- _'__-_._--_. ' . '
tl 1 1. j; 2114 1 l 6 0 "t ** P" "" h"'iU *"k"" t " " t th * "It "I'2 I y A Hell, I think at thir time what we have comitted to n
~
4 do is raricw our aauxiliary f eedvater aysten in accordance with l
,h h
ti the crimrir with Standard Etevacu Plan and determine areas "e u [I where 'in 0.re weak,.aro strong, at that tina. c 0I
' !!n And we'll nah recoraandatiens as to any modifications
.. I I 3' that uiqht be nccer,cary.
'.f i, i
MRS. EOUERE: Mr. Lanphcr, befere you leave this E1 [page9,un.mycopyunderPustulatedHighEnr.rgyPipe?reaks, l j l1 10 i the figura 1 is chewn but there is no figure 2, Now that I ; 1 i cacen'2 .oaragraph . . I don't mean figure nut pantgraph 1 and a +' h 1 than th erc- ir no 2 on that pge. i r - u Bct you rc4:0 that fir;t sentence in paragre.ph ! I! I'l 1
' fol 3 oUir.Cl .
i 55 MU. SECN-a la tiiere a chr.nce a.?no of three? l' p , y -n
'O q IM. Lh?iP11EI'* lIO , the '.*e ' r' no th ree , but I3 tic: go'ca
--i.
ll n ', O a
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, CS 0 1. P.2 0 e ?trin'.ge XSXOr ir.aChineS.
4 t<G D WL 11E.E . iG.di' 5 r Vle31 the cencent, teo, while uc can f
. le I ; NoI 3 0.i t kli' l"O Ili kb C.i. b Od (' C C})kCC } 1.7.V Q h00D {k'J T.n E,'s DN O f l t
j re:c ar t: ad they have th ..: Sillin. ; 1 25 M3. LEWIS: "Thornfere..," g ibera does 2 ctart.. , l l t i S 112.. Lhl2:F id.',' R ; li'J , .l.**. 3 l.i rt t At"thO R*anChO S000 ETd l L n is f.7 ', ,. CQ , , . " I hk l l '" ]
,e HP. . J UD S : hau thm efcre i3 purt of the.t. . . ci;3y, I F ) r e.o it , Okny.
u il 4
2115 1 MR. MNPHER: 9 2 to both one and tuo, or juct to two. I'm not nure if "therefore" refers back 3 BY MR. LARPHER: 1 A O Under the implomontation schedEle which is attached a to thin exhibit as enclosure two there is a January 1,1981 6 3-date for propoacd implemantation, although the NRC Staff f l indicates through a footnote on page 2'af that enclosure that 4 0 minor delaya might be justified. O Would you expect to be able to complete thiu item by 10 Jeruary 1, 19817 i II A I think it'c too early to real3y be able to predict 12 on this itcm. We haven't even completed our study that 13 determined what modificationc might he n w assary, if any. i 14 Locking at enclosure tuo and go through the 1981 itens i O l 15 here. 1 just note for the rccord that they all seem related j. i W [Ito I the curiliary feedwater cysten. It in my understanding that l 17[ , under Part 3, _T. tem 1. 4, that's the autome. tic initiation in the l NI control cysten that ue've been talking :Acut. And that's the 19 ' enn whora the auxiliary feedvater cystem, where you believe you d,' mhyhhnvc cubstantial trouble in nceting the January l' deadline, 21 . ecpecially since the NRC has ncit yet approved the design. l E A Correct. j U Q. The NRC cn that exhibit han . set an August 1, 198G 24i hate for submittal of cafety grade design for. staff review. 25 I Doca..that date leave adequate time for procuroraent af ter their J l l l ,.-.- _ _ a -.- -_ -- _ .- . _..-.._:-. _ _ . . - _ .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ -- __~ i i 2116 i
-68 i 1 j approval? l i !
A I guosa that dependa when their approval comes. ! ! 3 - O If their approval came promptly, within 15 days i ' l! 4 j af ter that, would you have adequate time? I i .I i 5 ! A I can't answer that toda.y without talking to equipment t 6 vandora. It's possible. { 7 O Am I correct in my understanding that you have already 1 6 ' 1 submitted this decign for their approval? i d l 9 A No, we have not. It's not in its final font. ! 10 l 0 Wheat do you expect to submit it? : I i l II A I think it's by August lot. l'- 0 In this a matter of priorities in your offico, that i' i O 13 it's jur:t not enough... given the numScr of itema that have 1 i' to be done, there's just not enough people to work on them? l ! 15 A pe, we ra not doing this design ourselves; the design e j 16 in being donc by both Dechtel Corporation and Babcock cnd : l ; 17 Uilcon. 13 l e 0 Itua 2.A below that indicates that ITN flow indication l 19 mus t be install ed by January 1,1981. l Do yan expect to be able 'l 20 to meet that deadline? l ! i j El A Yen, I do. ! I , 22 O Item 3 relates to the cystem mcdification 'for i [ 4 23 periodic AFN pump testing. I believe that's the item where vcu 24 will no longer have to. valve out'onei train, is-that correct? -
?I; 'A That's correct. >
i i
,_ ~. _ -.. - -~.. ._.-__.J__...___.___.L.. ,
2117 l-0 Do you erpect to meet that Jance.ry 1 deadline' on that? 6 l 2 A Yes, I do. l 3 Item 6 relates to the condensate storage tank, level Q 4I indication alarm. Again, thero is a January 1 deadline. Will i 1 5 you be able to meet that? 6 A I would think Go. 7 Q Item 9, on the backnido, rrlates to an AIM j D design n odificaticn relating to operation during losa of all' i l 9 'Ac power. We have covered that previously. Are you familiar )
- 10 .
with that item? 11 A Yes, thia requires the capability to be able to 12 control steam generator level from the control room without 4 I3 anf AC pcwcr. { 14 MRS. BOWERS: Have you concluded? 1 l 15 MR. LANPHER: No, I think I juut unnt to state that 1 f6 it's ny judgment here today that tNxe uculdn't be any extreme f C diffica.ity in meeting that dato. I
- 10 MRS. LONERS r. Mr. Lanpher, the copy I have of enclo-1S ! ct
- ra on the second page, the nuitering on the left has been, D) Well, it just didn't print out. From what you have said, though, l 21 , the top line in reven, the. next business is eight. And the thing t- l
'22j you just read from da nina, l
23 " MR.IJ11PHERS: That's right. Et, - MR. SUCN b. ~ And the not',es at the botten are 1, 2: and 25 as teterick, I think. They didn' t print soll on mine either. , . - . _ _ - . . . . _ _ _ - . _ . _ -______.._ __ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ . _ . _ . ~ . _ ~ . - . _
_ - - - - - - . . . - - . . . . . - - . . . . . . - . . ~ . . . ~ . . - - - - . . - . . . . . - - - . - . . -. l 21i8 6 MR. LMPHERr I apologine. We'll fix that up for l l 2' ttle copy for the reporter. I e BY MR. LMMIER: 0 Q At this tilac, if there is a loco of all AC power, l e
*5 ; . lir. Diete.tich, how is steant generator level controllsd?
l 6 A I think you would have to direct that question to lir. . I i l Rodriguez. I'm not cure. !pnDeoncludE' ' I i l bc 9 10 , n I i ! 12 15 ib 15
- 10 t 1
)7 !
I I
- i8 i 20 i
21 J j. l 1 E3 bb g
.25 i
i
-a. .. - . - _ . - - -
i ! i {: ! 1 r ! t 2119 g l i
- f. 0- i .0 Mr. Dieterich, roferring you back to your testimony, ;
i 1 ; j 2 Pagen 10 and 11., Pego 10 you complete the listing of the 9 l l l 3 short-term modifications, the hW system which were included i 4 in the May 7 Order and at the top of Pa.gc 13, questions ; t . !
-5 ccted was there any other modificiations trade by the Licensee :
O aNa yon list the inventory reactor trip. This question j 7 related, solely in timeframe prior to startup again, is that-
\ ,
a right? You woro not mening to excludo mocifications which 1 a I , 1 af were continually going on at the PST system. . I l 10 j' A Yes, that is correct. ! l i. g i l
, ; -; i O I turn your attention to Page 12 of your l* l l [
i l' gg j tantinony. Lina 10. The question was e.shed, uas there any ) n.; instances during sinich the KM syntam has failed to operate 1 l l l y I at Eancho Seco. Nould ycu plcese dafine failcre in the way j ? f. n;[ yon used the term hore? I
;g[ A In ny mind we bave alWays provided ucter to the L
' i 9j shoat generctor anytime tho auxiliary feen.ter cystem was I '
., ,, a eeked todo that.
'" Hq
- u. . r O You do r.ot use a boil dried criteria?
g A I did not want to make this atstement. And I l g: think in even using that critoria, the auxiliary feedwater' 3 system it c1waya provided with water and. the time to prevent a3 hM up,whenwer h Ns bn dom, yot imov initiation
- I nignal var given.
g g O During tiid Lightbulb incident tchich yoe mentioned earlier, . isn't it true that one or maybe' toth of the steam
)
i
. I' - . _ . _ _ . I
l$- j l- 2120 i j l10-2 r j generatorn boiled dry? 1{ - l 2 , A Yes. At that titac t.ho initiation signal nn not l 3 givan to the nuniliary feedwater systrna. l I f 4il
- Q so thoro vac a failure in the initiation signal L L l
! 5 itallf? I f C fl & Correct. 1 i l 7f Q You do not include that as an AFW failuro? l I l l c[ i A No I do not. The auxiliary feedwater,idat was l l g, }[ necemmy to provent any co::e daunge, uns cartainly prov!ded.
- t m( Q I understand tha there was not any cora daugga. l l i g I au just tyying to find what your definition of failure was l h! ;
;g and then given your cubacquent anatrar, eith what you includa j 3 in yorr anraer es what you mean by the aarillary feedwater
- t i
g l aystmu. Is it your testimony syntecs,. ara not inclue46 , m hl udthin thone cyz.tems? o p g y! h, I wac not indluding initiation system of my 1
, ./ r h toctintnty.
W 4, 0-g Q M.t . Dictcriche in Draft HUREG 0667, the general aret f gg of ir:provraent which is i&mtified on Page 2-12 is the H ' I
.g re-evoluution of t.he int.roductio of thc M'tV through the top of
! 4 1 j g 4 the enco uced steem genere.b c. Just a 2tomeit and I will got ,' 1 j 't you a reference to where it .ic. dincrased in more dctail.
,33 l I car;not locato .it right at thic tiac. What in ycour view 73 I
y on tim'c propoced recocemendction? I would- have to analyae
. tin .cf fcets for' uhare the cuxilinry fccavater was introduced
1 t 2121 10-4 1 in order to make up my mind that this was a viso declaien,. 2 and I have curta. inly have not done that analycis. 3 Q Do you know whether InitD has any analysis underway r ( 4 regcrding that? I .
- 5 h No, I do not think no. i l
l 6 0 Just one nioment, I night be done on the PStir system. I i
- 7 I would like you to turn your attentien to the second part of a your tactinony of anticipatory tripa.
I 9 It in my understanding that on a loss of main ,
;0 feoduatar, the Rancho Seco Reactor woQld have tripped in .
1i any cccc, is that not correct? i 12 A Yce, that is correct. ! i 13j Q given that fact, why was an anticipatory trip not i 1,5 }' always included cn part of the design of the reacter? l [ t
;g A I guese e.t the time the Unit was designeid i
i gl thi need *.20: cuch a trip was indeed necessary, the high gj i praecure roactor trip provided - required protsetion from
,l ' ..
;ir, the a::cocaing - concern',np 'a coro to the reactor vencel 39 Q It is also my'underntanding'that under Pre-TW.
L
- . 1 29 j. operations, a turbin e trip would not nocasserily have resulted <
i g :!a a reactcr trip at Rancho Secos.is that correct? l 22 A That in correct. a l- . . 23 u Do you .aupport the ant;icipatory trip on' a turbine i
, gg l trip?
- g. A Ao a short term item, yes. %-think it uns an advisable stop to take. I.'am not sure that I would went to :
-,,.~-,-r-.- ,--a ---.n.,-. -..-..-,-.,.---,.-..,-..a.----.._...-..-.
2122 : !0~5 I keep it there in light of other stuff.- modifications that O. 2 could be mada in the long term. 3 Q Icn't it about to bacome a.long term item 4 trith .your increase into the safety grado? 5 A- Yes, that is correct. l 6 0 You say that you - go ahead. i 7 A That is a definition of a long term. I do not 8 know hou long tre will keep it. f 9 0 Well, the fact that-it is being upgraded to 10 nafety grade, somcway in my mind is - instutitionalizes . l t1 it. Docn it your' mind, also? ; I
'2 A Not necessarily, no.
;:3 , Q You have iddicatad that. you did think it teac a vi necoscary long term position. Maybe samothing else could
.i l e;
] be done. What would you propose inctead?
l 2 to A People hwa mentioned in the testimony previously I I that the possibility of ensureing a PORV line closing b3 g , 37 m pr.tting redundant safety b1cok valve on that line, I think 19 vith the inste111ation of that cort of thing -- design change, i l 20 that I might prefer to lexm the anticipatory turbine -- trip - I l 2; on a turhino. trip off the plant. Hopefully, impooved plant 22 relichility. P.3 0 In terms of power generation? 24 A- In tems of power generation, yes.
-25 O' Do. you believe that it is fansible to design la
' l. - . _ - _ . - - _ . ..._ - - - . - . - -
- 10-6' 2123 1
anfoty graden and'a redundant reform valve would accomplich-i
- ' 2 those goals?
I 3 A I think it is a possibic that the design and the ! 4 redundant safety grado FORV system that includes two block l- ! 5 valvec to accomplich that, one single PORV doca not give l 6 a redundancy to the performance. l 7 0 You need the redundant block valve, in your mind? j e A Correct. d 1 a 9 0 nhat hind of a tinefrain vrauld be required fcr ! ! l i > l 10 ! implerenting such a change? i i 11 [ A It would depend on the availability of the vl..lvas h i i and the motor operatore of thcae valvec that arcqualified. I 12h ! 73 I erpoct that it night require a year to prepare for the. 1 p; I necosaary equipmnnt. i b I i , gl Q That 10 jufJt in terms of equipment, that is after i l 16 L the design has been thoroughly reviewed and decided upon? l' 8 l 8 37 A Yen, I belicve so. - I nn boning this on 4 recent : t la f purchtfo of safety grade motor oper4.ters that require approx- , I ' 7 9~ q intoly a year workin time. l l 3 ] I G And your mind is that the design that would ecod j 3 i to be implemented terribly complex or difficult to concoption-li all C2 ' 22 , 73, A Wo, it is not terribly ecmplex to conceptionalize. $ i g, .O Go,'there 10 no real reason that it could not bc .
.a.>
done. -It is going. to take mancy and time for procurement, 'bnt . I t l,,,,,_,-.,-n.,A+,...~~.-~~~*-~~-*~~-~'#"""~'" ~ ' ~ ~ ' ' " ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ "
j l 2124 1 it la certcinly ic comething that in fcacible. 2 A Yes.
..10-7 3 Q Has SMUD instituted any program to investigate 4 the design o f and/or procercr.ent'of cuch a redundant ayatem?
i 5 A riot at this time. It has been diccuene3 in the s houce.. l 7l 0 Is thic normal procedure at SMUD that if 3ou i ; I ) aj first of all, discuss it just among yourselves for a faily l t l 9f long paridd or short time for deciding on come source of i i l 10 l action? l 1 A It dependa on tho change. Ecw long or how short j; i : l l , ja j your in houco discussions are going to be beforo you got .i 33 curioun. You hiro comebody tc design an appropriato systcan. l g 0 You have knot.cl ebeat thic now for a bout a year. I t Do you have an in houca Umotzble on when you hope tomake - 15 ll ! l l jg[ a decisich on thic? e i t g, j A Uo, we dd not., { i i : i p jgj Q On Page 13 of y wr teetimony, the question l 5 4 gj starting at lire.a 15, why did EDW design USS system:s not l r i . l
~j m incorporata a reactor trip upon 1000 of feedimter and/or
?
\ i g y c'urbina' trip. Your answer there rela.tes only to turbine nip 4 r 7 g ll and the chility to ride throgh it., la there any reason Vny
'f
,, 3 . y u did not include a 01acuculon or loca of main feedwater l
.y p ,
a k thin ancuer? i 2,4 y
- 9. o y" Il A I think in regarda'to a trip on a total leso'of.
q i I v y = n--,w hi --w w.-% ,, - wwe,m,,,,-,-.w-,yw,-,wc.rm.,,,,,m ,-,,,,,.m._om.__m_.,,__,,.s ,,-.e_,r.___
l l 0 s. l l l ! 2125 i l10- 1 feodwater, I gave you the answer that I did not discuss it 1 ! 2 in my toctimony. I think as far as plant reliability gona, 3 it would desirabic to maintain ability to keep the plant 4 on line on a partial loca of feedwater. l l 5 0 You atill have that ability, don't you? 0 A Yes, wo do. j 7 0 Khat is being donc to the presently inntalled e control grade trip that upgraded it to aafety grade? i ! 9 A A contemplation of safety grado impliec redudant i' I power cuppliou and repliec to the radundant sensorn, coismi- ) tol i 3i i cally qualified inctrumentation and power cabling and that is u essentially it. 13 0 Would this in your view provide a subctantial L , 14 F additional u.argin of anfoty to the operation of the Rancho l- ;g ' Soco Plant?. t 3h A Hot necausnrily. I think ao I discuased earlier,, I g; the anticip2. tory trip is not a true es.fety related trip, is p; [ It is a trip in anticipation of a' safety related trip, nainly 0 g; q the hf.gh pressure reactor coolant trip. I think this trip 20 provides a greater nargin of anfety and upgrading at the i j . se.fety grado, possibly further onhancon that margin, i i ya (l l w 0 I taha it though that ycu do not believe that'it
)J t
~3:
., enhancea that marginwith reapect to the turbine trip?
! l g Given in your earlier responco? l .. .; 4 A i Yes, I think' that that is correct. In regards to l u 3 i i I e fil !
- i. -!
l . 2126_ l l
. ~ .
- 10- the turbine trip I think the raain purpase of the anticipatory }
je2 \ i trip ia to help prevent any undnosded help -- actantion of the j i l [ 3 PORV's. i k l' 4 .O Do you agree with the statment that the anticipatory ;
- f. .!
l 5 reacsar trip increases the possibility of over-cooling l 6 trannienta? l t i 7 A No, I do not believe that it' deco. i 8 Q What is the bacis for your conclusion? 9 A Well, both the turbine trip and the lons of to feedwater e.re ovcIheating events provinding that a reactor i 11 l trip in Mont canes are not doing anything to create an*over- l ' f p cooling transient. ! 13 > 0 I did nht mean to imply that you create one, but ta create the pocaibility of one. If you are tripping the w rcactor G or 8 seconds earlier enough t I think that there is l 1 16 testimony to that, in that tinafrare it la that nauh less i 37 decay heat then if there is overfced rituation on the 7 , g3 necondary aide, does not thin anticipactry servs to exasperate s la >!! that overfced cituation? y; A I do not think co.. I think that the times that 21 nre ' involved, . whether ~ it la Lima for operator reaction on
- j. 22 'oither case if an overfeed situation ca' one exists, a
4 [ .g Q Have you communicated your vinva with. the 2mc 't
;g4 concerning the need for the~nnticipatcry trip on-a tarbine py trip? To characterize those vieva,, y think lpu are at. least, i.'
i 4 l -
1 2127 P i l b10 1 comeichat opposed to the need for that. 2 MR. BAXTER: On a long -term basis, I -think the ! l 3 testimony was, i i l 4 DY MR. IIRIPIER: I l 5 A No, we have not, at this tiin. j l l ! 6 0 Is thero any rencon for that? l i j 7 A We argued quite a bit when it was first being i. e implenented. I do not think now is the proper time to j i 1 9' i argue anything more. I ! Q Such an analynia has not been preaprod, yet? l 10 ( A No, it has not. j j; , ! 12 f i G Would that be cc:r.ething tlmt would normally be - ! 2 g prepared by your department, by DEW or - , y A It could bn done at either place. We would be I ! g the department initially, at least for a subsequent analysia.- 1
; r 1
g 0 At Page 14 of your testimony, Lina 24 -- 23, you , j ) .f state that implomentation of these tripa, with control grada. l g circuitrya c:Kceptable, ninca neither a loss of maia feedwater i g [l nor a turbina trip would themselves had to any significant I i l safety conr.cquencom. What in the basic for-thia statemet?- 7+ . - ) l l g . K- Well, I think that it hes been pointed out many , ) ! I g timos previoucly that'it takes more than 'a nimple loss of l j. 3
' ff.cdwater or simple turbino trip to croate a' safety problem 'l i 4
h . Of ChalIIS Of Oventh Wher0 thC1 I wp g i ' s
- ! hed a problem,- !
2a 1 1 3,. i- i ! t , j l-- _...._ _.~.J-- --- ._..-_.---L-. - _ _ _ - - ~ - - . - - - .
i 1 2128 1 11 1 Q. When you use the term that you do in your 2 teatimony, "significant safety consequences" does that mean , 3 offaite radiation consequences or are you using that for l l 4 to nean someth.ing elso? I S , A Yes, I am using that to mean the releanen of l 6 radiation to core damaga, i 7 Q Anything that does not lead to eithar dore dangge l ej or reloaec of radiation is not 2.n your vs.sw create a i , j g[ acrious safety consegnance? i 10 ! A That is correct. , ;; O Mr. Dieterich, on Page 16 of your testimony, you l t i 1 l u- respond to the Board's concern about one failure out of the ; firch repcrted in temp's templenent control grade trip. You ! 13 1 i j u stato that this is not a concern and that is is particularity ) ! l i g ,t ly truccin thetime period imediately r.fter a system is nowly j j gy inatalled during t(nich operater fami1Mrization enr2 l F g rnintenance problair. have to be resolvad. l I I g Would it be your vicw that whenever you arc. g implenanting a new syctom, that you ara liable to get soom ) ' l l go break-in problema and come operator errors, just until'there i ' t in a familiarization with that system? ) g { 1 l e j g A I do not think that nacessarily they hava those s . . j g.[ probicus if you have any problons, but theyaro bound to come. ; i r carly in the life of the subject.nystem. 3 '.' u . g[ Q You' feel that.the 12 anticipatory trips 'the-1 i l
.1 I
[ .
, l' l 2129 1
10- t anticipatory trips, the record of 11 cut of 12 uhich you i , :: refer to as the data of this testinony provides inadequate l 3 ctatistical evidencc7 ' j 3 a A. Not neccesarily provided that number - I lyrovided ! 5 thht mubar as an update. : 5 { G Q Mr. Dieterich, I nu going to turn to your ' ] 7 testir.ony on Containment Isolation Dasign next, starting at (
)
i 6 Page 17 of your .testiinony. . i i 9 Mr. Dieterich, would it be fair to characterize li in ll your testinony on this incue as being that a bent back system !
;; doen not need to be implemented because the containment I
1
. gj isoln".. ion cyatem at Rancho Seco in adequate to ensure that '
g we never have the cocapes from the containment in the first ) : i place 1 ui l ) l l A That is particily correct, yes. [ g ] g{ I think that I alco want to make the statement 1 i ,_ 6/ that the bent'back provision provides more penetration t l g through the containment, but could in' themselves lond to e m failure. j 1 t
&y O It 1u true, is it not, that thora are a lot --
l J 4 4,1 largo number of penetrations, already through containment?
,.2
'A There is approximately'S0 come, I do not considsr-t.3 titat very larga. .
3, f' I Q- . Have you perfastnad any analycen-; subsequent to i TEI, or in preparation for this testimony, to asnaca the 1 n.a j reliability'of.the.Dancho Seco cont W ment inolation. system?. I _._ _ _ . _ . . .~.-
1 l , 'l l-l 2130 ! ! A. Mot of such. The icolation systens are fcirly 2 cimple yee or ncw ryntem, if you will;.it does not blend it- . l 3 celf to a complex analysen,of thnac techniques, but we have i
.1 reviewed the containment isoletinn and response to one of the
- 5 hulletins innediately followig;g 7.MI and also some discussion i
l 0 of that in reference to NDREG -0578 crder. l l 7 Q So there has been no analynis of the ayatem, 3i l. itself, to ensure that it will infact function es intended? I i
- A Ho cdditional anclyses, all of thet dona, all the l 9; t i .
10 l plant with liconeca (?). i
;i [ Q That is the analynia in the final safety anc. lysis i
f jz ! report or sumarized there? ! gl A Correct. l ! l
- g ,
0 You cay that the icolation nystem is fairly l t i l 15 simple, Ian't it true howevur, that some systema inolates ] l h
! and come do not, come have different' failure modes, come g
7.j j fail open and some fail clone. Speaking of the penetration. g ! of the containment?-- l ! p; } A Ye s. That is that I an getting at. There is.no .] l l gj i contz.cIligg syctem, it in a ninple mattar of cafety feature l I
-t signal which closes certnin velves and opena certain valvw,. I l g O Ic that the only failure raoCo that could effect l l
y cants.innant icolatiot? Is that for' cach individual. valve >
..J ;
g .which could possible fail? A Yes, I. think that . is a proper characteri:.ation. l 2n_ .p i l
- i
)
2131- b 0-14 1i O l'ald that is a anfoty actuation system, right? 9: P. A Yes. i 3! O Have you considered in preparation to this I t r testir. tony, the variation tinich there would be a capability l 4' l l 5 of bending back into the containn:ent from various systems ; 6 outside the contasnment? l j. I l 7 A No, I do not. i 1 4 l C I i i I
),
10 l o i 11 h, 1 I , hn s
'l
)
l k' 1 3 1 15 n[ ', w :) II
- t l 17 k i t
', m l, i 19 ] t 1 i 2l: Vn l ' i i 21 !i ' i l 22 I l ?31 i 1 24 i
. 2S ! 4 4
A
.-,_,-..,._-.-.;L_- _-c-,...-.a.._.a.--...-._.___~,..;u.._,.-~_.:
i i= 2132 tape 11 ! MR. WIPERH: Mrs. Bowers,..I'd like identified > l , n- , CEC 3r.hibit 28, docunant is first page, states, "The s, report of the Subcommittee on Syctems and Equipment t i + i
, Design Criteria, lucommendation of the AIF Policy Commdttee on l
'.i Followep to the Three Mile Island Accident."
_ For the record, the first part of thin document - I o hope it's all here, includes 8 pagse and after that there's l 1 a second document entitled, " Subcommittee on Post-Accident I 5l , Rocovery, Reco u ndations by Policy Committee on Followup ! e } cn the Three Milo Island Accident." i i
!O i, l ! I'd lika Mr. Dictorich to turn his c.ttention to page 3 of that necond document. We included a firnt docu-i :1 l '
l ! nant beccuse it identified this AIF Policy Committee. We l #i , l thouch it Would^ helpful. ~ ,
!?
sl i ) j MR. RAXTERt Excuse me, Hrn. Bowers, I have no+. j _ -_-_ . ro:In thin doenmant before, hava you;r Mr. Dieterich? i o . i THE WITHESS: No, I have soi. L: i ] i l MR. BA553R [ I'm afraid w 're going to have to l N! ._... . . I rc.quent tha opportunity to raview it before we answer
- i quan'
- iants on is$1ated parts of it.
i l 20 l MR. L NPHEC: I don't object to taking an opportunit.y D .. l- ; I would be happy to tell you whoro I'm. going to be asking i
?:. j
'qucatione <>n.Go you can r uiew it.
..-3
. On page 3 of the second document, ntarting a third 1% j . . _
. j of the way down the recomende. tion, and going through the
' 25 -
e.--,, erw e '-ww m-
l I i J jn~2 2133 i next pager page 4. That's what - So, Mr. Dieterich, you l vould take a chance to read through that? I 3 ! MR. Bra:TER: What I an getting at, Mr. Lanpher, l 4 . . ; is we'd liko to read the entiro document rather than just l ) 5 j reading two pages that you are gong to b2 talking 6 from. 1 7 l Do you expect to complete your cross-examination l l 3 .-
)
- this afternoon? If not, I wonder if we could ask to defer l 9 this particular line of questioning until the norningt i i
l ;0 l , Mr. langarlu I'm not sure if I will colnplete this ! 11 ! , afternoon or net. I have a policy c:1 not making that pclic- : I
. t
. L, i ! I tion. 11RS . BOlfERS : , 13 - j j j HRS. h0GBRS: Ncil, it's certainly tulfair thettjh j i u .. j {. to Mr. Baxter and the witnata to e;: pact them to do a quick , l 15 and 6irty revieti of this, so -- l m ! 101. LhMPHER: I have no objection to deferring ' l l .. , oramination on this if you want to r I hope it docan't l l
- g. . -
I ; requires to. bring Mr. Dieterich back r.t a later tine. m t ; j . MRS. DONERSf Wasn* t he goir.g to be here tomorrov l
- u. ,
p(. p .. ! j nnyw y? ! i i '
- ?.1 MR.LA11 PEER
- He
! was, yes,. ;
I \ g; -.. ... l MRS. BOUERSt He's a permane.26 of the group.
3 MRsLA((PHEE: I suspect he tculd utill be tastify-
! ing tonorrow, voll - I expect that's pr obably true.
t or : l HRS. DOWTS: Unll, if you.0an go on -)'
.4 . - .
d
~,~.,----,,-n.m,,w,.aw-. w ,,-m m a a,_,,-m_.,n,,_,-. . . . , _ , , , , - - , , _ . . . - . .
i !
. 3 l 2134 ;
- )
1 jn*3 l } I to anothe matter now,orm' Laupher. ! i
'O !
j b 2 MR. LANPHERt. Excues ma,a moment then. j i 3 Mns. 35hERS: We took our racess rather early - ; i l 4 this afternoon, ao we will take another quick break now.' f a 5 TShort recess.] f l 6 MRS. BONERS: We're on the record. 7 BY MR.. IJWPHER: l 3 Q Mr. Dieterich, is it fair to say that a primary i ( 9 I retcon for your objection to a filtering back system i 10 would be the additional penetrations that it would require 1 1i throughthe contaironent? l
\
l. 12 A That la certainly one of my concrns, ycc. I 13 Q In thate any reason to believe that those , l 14 penetrationn could not he just as tight and safety gr'clo a l
, 4 15 an any other panetrations that you have provided? ,
16 ; A These are penetrations that would be required to , )
- n- he opened to a pump back into the contd.nment. l 3 i l
l ta Q When required, then -- of the radwaste sycte.m j j 19 or whatever, in the auxiliary buildingc for instance, was i 20 ovcrflowing tnd there was rich that thorn might be d.ia-I l El chargen to the outside. At that point, the system perhapa ? i 22 would bc actuated, beat ca.bk into the'contalnn nt building. If that_ tere the system that. it was actuat6d only at tho m 23 ki [ . 2t. point, would have you an ohjaction to that point? p 1 !- 25. -A Yoc, I think that there are other concerna to [ l _ ._. _ __ . . _ . . . _ . ____ _ _ . _ =_
_2135 i
- l. 11-1 l . 1 that that one neede to vorry about. Dopending upon the !
ccg . I 2 1strol of radiation that is outside the containment, the ! l > 3 auxiliary building 10 cortainly designed to contain this f 4 type of radiation, it is a building that has the proper f i I j . i 5s ventilation and so forth to withstand that sort of radiation l-I c, outsido of the aturiliary building. I uould have tobdo I i 7 . a Pretty thorough analysis to determine the advisability l ! 6 of reopening the containment, if you vill with the pumps : i i l 9 atue:c back into an uncontrolled containment, fi you wi31, f 1 , a l g jart to fill up the containment with miscellaneous radiation 1
;; doesn't necessarily make acnco. !
12 Q Docs it maka sence to more sence of thought [ t ] ' ! 13 that the auxiliary building to fill up the containment-y building? l g A_ It woould depend on the circuncuancec. g O In the circumctancos at the TF.I accidnet, for I/ j inst.uico . Containment did not actuats ur..til later, and g I nntretand that your actuaf. ion dystem is cignificantly g differente'but at THI uvuldn't it have bcen an added cafety l m ohaninm if the operatora had not had the capable of o.,a I-, e taking ecme of the cycrflow from the aro:iliary_ bui.1 ding and ot l ! O g i punping that back into the containme 2t once the containment i had inlor.leed? i A There is an awful lot to consider, I do not think 24l that it is that si'aple. These pumps that you are talking _5
- 3. bout are undoubtedly goint to have a certnin' leakage rate
\
F I 1 11 - !
- ,1 l l 2136 i-1- associated with them. There is many, nany tanks, pipen O 2 !
outaf.dn the containment that contain radioactiv&ty that is . i I 3 goin(; to take a magnitude of valves, rtmtps, pipes in order .
- 4] construe a syttem to gat it back into the containment and I I.
S l think that thic mass of a system itself, plungen to a leakeat e. 1 5 j I woGld have to do a varyddetailed cnalysis to come to th?
- i
'I , 7 conclucion that it gets the prnp back into the containment., ! l li a; O That analysis is not -- has not been perfomred? a A That is correct. to Q How such an analynic, how can -- is it your position e I ! l 1; [ that tne concept is auch a bending back that it should bc , 120' dismiased out of hand? ! i
;3 A No, I instead placo relianca upon a proven i yj isolation cystm to prevent the accident rather fl.ut to l q
g i mitigs.to it. o m0 0 Icn' h it true that we have had instances where
' ' ' ij >
;7] thern has been some off MW, TMI is the main instance, and i
g ] given che fact that you are not always planned or to pred:Act- , ir
- p. 0 exactly how the containnent will operato, if ycu could danign.
pl I 20 q cuch a syaten, would not that give you an added redundancy i g In snfety factor and mrgin? l
,g A Well, as I pointed out you can gain somthing, i
.g j hat ycu :might loose comething at the eneca tino, so I i
g , em net convinced that that won.ld be a proper deaizte. ( 1 MR._ IJGPHER: - Mr. Ellison in1 going to distribute 25 < 2 i. l . 5 k-
_ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ . _ . _ _ - ~ _ . _ _ . - - - - - _
-[t i 2137 i
l 1 a' docunont which I would liko narbd CEC Exhibit 29, . l j . 2 which la taken from the Rancho Soco Analysis Repart, and it , l ) 3 is entitled Table 5.2-2 Reactor' Building Isolation Valve ! 4 Arrangement. t ! 5 (Whereupon, CEC Exhibit No. 29 was l l 6 marked for identification) l l '/ BY HR. IMP IER: ' i
- E- Q I$r. Dietarich, are you familiar with this b
i 9! i Tabic? t ' I 10 - A 'Mc, I am. l 11 O You stated earlier the.t you believe that thsre I l el are approximctely 50 penetration in the contair.nont. I 13 am counting this, I think that they are closer to around i 1 l p: i 70, would that - is that in the came bcIlpark ac You in- i i ! t
- g! dicated beforo, docs thet surprice you? l 5
g, A I will tnku your rord for it, no it' doos not 4
- s. , ,; curprice me.
u ) p l gl Q At Pc.go 18, of your testitony, Line 6 you said . i
- ;g j i that all pathways whihh penetrate the containment have 1
i 20 redundant provicions for isolation. Try to read through this i j g
. table and it appenra to 9t.that maybe some pathways do not
- p l g hava ent.irely redundant isolatien. Por instnce, the last g page of - Mrs table,' the penetrations 52 and 53, reactcr -g
- g. . . building atmopphere owplo linec, does thnt not .ind'actio .
. that the singlo. valve?
cb -
,.+.v--.. ~d-.~~.., .U--._~.----.. . , . ~ ~ _ - - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-. _ . _ . . . . _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
2138 1 A Yea,.and the reason for this is that you wnat to 2 he able to take a sample so you would only he.ve one valve ' 3 in cuch a line co that you can assuro yourself that that 4 valve will open. s Q Sinilarly, on the accond page, the Reactor 6 Duilding Emergency Sump Recirculation Id.ne, penetration 7 30 and 31, that indicates a gate valva with a prenethesis ' e jacket, in that juct a single vidve or is that - i p A A jacket for providing redundancy inthis caso, m , Q How does that work? !, j; A The valve is 6nclosed with a second pipe, if g you will, that in why we are going to the reain $$pa outside g of the valve,co the valvo leako, you have a remaining pip. ; y Q So you have a cingle valva and two pipe going
} )
g 5 through? g A It in hard to describo, the.t is all. A singis g valve in a redundant pipe, if you will, This again,is a g[ valve that is made to open to provide recirculttion from the g snap for high pressure injection and natural circulation. 4 g Q I have a question which Telaton to a number g of ite;na on here. .Tuot to help me to be able to road thia 2.. g table. If you look at Pago 2, Penetratin 32 of the Reactor: i i . 23
; Coolant System Vent Header. isill' yuu go over to :tha right- ; j hand aide of the. tabla, and it indicates that the normal-e5 laalve is open,'and then the next column says position with l' ,
! 1 l
.1
t J. 4 ! 2139 l 1 motor power failure, an in. Does the mean it fails open? I
- 2 A Do it falla as a position tM t the valve is in. 1 a If th2 valve happened tobo closed when the motor failed, the l
4 valve would fail cc in in the clocad position. ,, l 5 0 .If the valve happened to be open, it would fail 6 in thra open position? 7 h{l A Correct. a 8 0 On the far righthand side it indicates a post-n eccident position but cloned, 1 < l 10 A Correct. 1 I t; O THat consumou that the pouar source ia availtbue?' 1 , in A Yea. l m Q So if thore 134, in this cace, if there were n j t,; failu.co with reepcot to thaac valvac the failuro vould lerto 15 i it open and youwould net isolate it? ig A There I.s a failurs in the air valvo th.at valve l uill closo, if there is a failuro in the motor operatdd g l l 1 7g , valve, that valvo would ' ail as ia., But if it happene.d to
]
j g be op2n, that valve would remaincopen, the syctem would bs i l 2 isolated. I 4 "3 l l { g Q It xonld be just a ningle valve irointing it? j l 22 A- Right. l- ! 23- .O Did you.say before that.this Tas a simple g Lystom? And I see all of theco penetrations e.nd it looks l- y .liko -- l
- s ..
I 1 h; . Ratdam pernpoctive, . I . gu,eno. l l l .i i
.i l
, q, , l ! l l 5 I 2140 , 1 f MR. LAUPIIER: Mrc. Ikracra, Mr. Ellison in le j. 2. dintributing a letter which I would like CBC Enhibit no. 30. l
\
l' 3; (WHEREw?ON, CEC m&ibit No. 30 , i i l 4! tma turked for identifice. tion) l l 5 MI'. BAH.'ER: You should note that, I bnlieva, that ' I l l 6 thic lotter la improperly 6ated, i t abould be 1980 instead i y j of 1979. 8 ;l Il l MR. L2DIPDIR: Thank you. That was my first .t n 3 question. ) ;q 'i BY MR. LANPHER: ' i a 1 i
- 3) h O Mr. Dictrich, could you please identify thia t
32 ii record for the record? 4 g A This is a January 7 , 1980 Letter from John i I uf itattimoe to Robert Roid of the HRC which providen thn g statis of actionc required by inTa.EG 0573. y> h q Q In there an atteclanent to that letter? 37 A Ye .7 , there ic. Attachtaent - it provides the - Lc 'l . actual statis report.
)
u m MR. IJdPRER: I rould notte for the record that i ! .
- pg uhile the covar latter of Janucry 7, 1980 indicates to be i
i "1 . other atte.chmenta. This - theno are t.he copieri that wo ' ! [ l p., [ distributed only have one. It van my understanding that tha' .
-l ~
i
.- copy IVhat we got only f.n ditcovery onlyhhts one attachment.
da g 3at I can bheck that mope. At thit. tine we are not l'
- - 4s5
'I planning to inti:oduce it into evidence, no we will $ust continue with'it. ~vme erv , -. ...-v- w eerre -w w w w -,, w. r-==w--..=am-*re-=-*--e- - -.~------.-E=>*+--~+---+-= + --. - + -
4- i i , f ; I 2141 l L 1 Q Mr. Dieterich, I woc 16 liike you to look at l9 1 2 Page 3 of that Attachment and at the top of that Page it 2 j/ . *
- b lY 2 atM ca that the District repointed actailed review of ;
l 4 cysts.nn acuociated with c ach containtant penetration, the . t 5 revicu to find essential s.nd non escentit.1 items. , 1 S Uhen was this revicu perfortao67 , i 1 7 A Icun't tell you precicely Vilen the review ; 1 , 1
- e otarted. It was certainly cenpluted at the tine this '
l l 9 letter wcn written. I , 1 l to I belicve it was performed over about a.Dhree- 1 i
)i m nth period.
1 I , 12 Q Prior to January 1980? o . 4 33 A Correct.
. I ,
4 yl Q And in the cource of thic review, did you perform i !
- gi any analyses as to reliability or fcilure motles of the j
isolation systems? [ 93 ll ' A Uct as cuch. I think I tried to point cut 37 gf earlier tl at a roll.nbility analyuis or a failure Inodes < and i 39 exfecta analysde of a sitaple on/off system is not a proper . t l 33 hind of analysis. 1 l p,3 I'm going to look nt aingle failuro effectc. g
)
O Have you completed lyxx enster yet? l 1 1 z.3j
-. A ?cn. !
q g .O What yac the ~ purpouc of thin 2cvica. then? i g
. a A. The purpece of the review waz'to natinfy our own ]
- 1. . _ _______.._._-.___._-___,_.,...-,L.,-.._, .~.,-..-.._,,.m., .:...,,,.i-,,.
i . J ! 2d42 : L / i l t .
. i g
mindo that we were isolating the proper lines on the cafety M ,
-featurce initiation signal. We judge in our own minda what l 3 systems are canential, which are not casential, to incure r
#) 1 that propor design had been incorporated into the plan.
)
"r j !
1 l 0 If the lino is isolated by safety feature, do l 6
- the operators have the ability to override that isolation 7
signal? O A Yes, they do. . l s 9 Would it bo on an individual penetration basis? ! Q l Ml f A Yes. 11 j Q Are there proceduren to guide the operatore on l I . l . . .*i then it le appropriate to override itcolchien signal? ; 13 A There uould be procedures directed at cartnin i ! i i l '. > actions, auch as the re-establichment of the sump recircala-- ; iS! tion that would tell En opere; tor whaa to open that panotra-l l l li l tion, yes. . l , 1 ~7 0 ion't it true that nt TMI, after containment had 1 i i Wj l' i
. isolated, operatora subsequently defonted containment in !
4 f 1D 1 certnin regards? For inatan':0, to get a cooling water for l i- I i 23 ' the rer.ctor cooling pumps? j 4 Zt I'.m not certain:about that particular action at Threa 22 1tlle ILland. l 23 0 Mr. Dieterich, at page '17' of your-'tantimony, you ' l- . ! 7.4 ! . have identified fiva' potential relence pads during tiu T141 1 25' accident. What vara the basis for this information? I p ! _ _ _ _ . . . . . _ . _ _ _ .______..._-__n___.-_ :__________.___________,
b
,1 ,
f 2043' l l t A The basic for this infornation is . descriptions 2 of what happened at Three Mile Island, primarily, the 3 (Kemedy) Comission Report. r 1 4 O An:1 is that same report the basis for your l 5 conclusion that the first two of the rolsase pads werc G the most significant? . A Thatstatemobtplusmyownjudgeant. 7 l-cl 0 On the cafety features go,tuation'at Rancho Seco, ol i wonid the reactor coolant lot down and m?heup systela , I 10} isolate fully? ,
! ; i A 109, they do. l 31 {
l: ' ! 12 Q I'm sorry, Ididn't hear you. 1 g - A Yos. I t 3; l 0 Could you tus:n your attention to page 4 of the ; J mf attaclment to CEC Exhibit 307 I bel.iova that's whero thoro [ mg is some diccession of 1.he rtahews and purification system z.t ! l
;7 I
Rancho Soco. Where it saya "first seccion", the letdown gg i portion, that indicatcu that it is icolar:od by an EGFAS g, ! aigtal. If you go down to tho third paragtaph under that, 4
.g g l the Ranctor Coolant Priaps Seal Supply .Scotion of thn cyntem, i 1 21 it is not clear from that discuncion whether that in i i
2., I isolated on SSFAS. ,
"l .
f i A The reactor t.icolant ceni cupply is not' isolated u% 7q , on containment' isolation cignal. t
,,..e, 'O 10 that ptrt of tha rCactOP Coolant .
.I
I l . 2044 i / . 1 let6own and makeup system? 2 A Ho, the ceal injection provides cooling to the , 3 seale. Sone of the normal mahoup taken this path out, i l 4 conaider that the nonni makeup path. There is a makeup i 5 line throtgh one of the high presnure injection linea that 0 the::o is nornnl makeup. 1 7 In addition to that there in coal injection l 0 which provides cooling water to the pumpscals and that ic 4 !. 9 not isolated. Its purpose is not makeup; it's purpose ir to real cooling. 11 l 0 Will you please describe the actuation cignalc
, 12 uhich can lead to containment isolation at Rancho Soco?
\ ja A Yes, containment isolation signal is the cafety j l u[ feabures -initiation signal which origine.tes either from a : i j is l low primary syctcm prencuro of 1600 pour _do, or a high f i ! m7 reactivo building prensure of 4 poig. 4 i 0 Ycu state at the bottom of.pr.ge 18 of your ! 17 j p, l taudnony that the additional feature of the high; pre'3eure i
- p- injection catpoint, being one of the sipals, insures the.t !
1 i 20 , an accident like TMI wouldn't occur, that you wouM get l - 1 early containment icolation. And'I quote, "Certainly, j { 21 l 1- l 22 well before enough quantitics are releaE.cd to over-l pra,urice or fill a ayate:: in.the auxiliary building.and f 23 ;. !- 24 perhaps'cauno a release to the atmoophere."
~
g Did you prform any analysac to support that, , l-g : L_ _ _1_ _ _ __. . _ _ _ _ _ _ -
l, .
- l. 2045 -
. I- / .
II. ~ statencat? 2 A
, .oh, I think that analysis'has been long-standing i
3i in our original containment isolation deuign. nofore thoro , 4 ' is any significant release of radioactivity, one vould have 5 to postulato coro damage, and that'a certainly going to:come 6 long after a low primary system precsure. 7 Q At Crystal River there was effective containment 3 ian it isolution, that true? 2 . ' A No, I don't believe there was. They had not J O[ , (
, laj irmtituted the low primary cystem pressure isolation signal.
)
11 O Let me rephrase the question. Thero w.2s contair.- l i
- 2 ment isolation before there unre any releases--or at least ,
ja] cignificant releaces--to the environment. , 4 14 l A
; That ic correct.
]
1 15 j Q. I believe it was a manual containment actuation. J l i
'h-1s ) Correct.
17 0 In that situation there raa radiation in the w containment building. Mas there any core damage? I i 19 A tio. 20 0 So it'c poonible to get high radiation in the ) 21 costninment building, even though there is no core damage? i 22 A~ I don't think that's-true. 'If that vers true, )
.I '
d 23 ve cartainly wouldn't flood the contaimnent building with 24 f primary system water to refuel the reactor. 25 There are some very abort-lived isotopes in the l l l i l _ , _ - ., . - . . . . . _- - --, , . - - , - - - - v i
?
8: l i 2046
/
1 pritanry system water that might have had an instantaneous j . I higher than normal radiation reading, but they cortainly
.< '3
.,, didn't .... at the time.. -
4 0 2nt if containuant is not isolated properly thera i U colla have been significant releases to the environment, i could there not? 7 ' A I don't believo so, no. 0' What, in your view, would constitute a significanti Q 9 release? , , 10 A Something in excusa of the guidelines in the ! Il regul'ationc. I IE l Q You described earlier the operating mode at W 13 Rancho Seco ia often to turn on the !IPI pump before you get i , M down to the BSFAS initi tion point. , A Correct. 1 ; 1G Is it pocsible for you to hc.ve a small break, Q f 17 0 a very cnall break, under uhich initiation of tha EPI will ; E he:::p ycu fron reaching the ESFAS initiation' point? 1!! j A Oto reuponso.) 20 0 I rray have nicsto.:od that. Whern.the HTI running q i 21 by turning .it on before reaching that point, that you actu. ally 22 never reach it? ; 23 i A Yea, I guess that's possible. ] i b s 24 0 And, in that casa, could you not got radioactive 25 reletzes. through tha break in the containtnent prior to the
2047 &
/ '
1 tima and still get no containment inolation? 2 A I gueca anything in possible. Normally, under f 3 auch a situation, the break would leap to the containment j l i 4 floor and until a high containment pressure signal is j t S! reached, at tchich time the containnent would isolato. I I 0l Q It may take quite a long time to reach the i 7 core pai g high precouro containment isolation, is that not 8 true? , f 9, A If it's a trnall enough break, I guess so. ; i .
- 10 0 But, in that intoria, couldn't there be pathwayo 11 outside tbs containment? '
I n ;,I A I gucca I can't think of any that would be semo- , l 1 ry ! thing other than lesda to a normal tank to container - I m' , radiation outside the containers. 0 But, thoca hanks, J.f you didn't have contain ! l 33 l - l 16j isolation, if those tanks became full, in that circur.atance, l i y; 4 would you war.t to have the citpability of putting that back i into containment? I 10 4 p- A 11 0 , I'd rathor inelate the containment. i I ! Q Esfore they fill up? l 29 l g; ^h Yac. O Are there proceduros directing Rancho Seco 22 23 j operat rs to icolato contninment before their raduay systems l 1 y- ; fill up?- f i 1 ! A I' don't.tbink the.procedcre is probably quite-
"y r l
j t i :
., l 4 !
E l
.__._._A_.___._.__._..._ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ . . . - . . _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . .._..__a
a i 2043 I 1
/ i thc t simple. I'm not that familiar with those procedures 2
to anrrear your question. 1
.;. i ,
O There he.ve be.cn proponals to add a third contain- ,
+
4 mont inolation cigne1, r.reaoly, high radiation level, Do i e you support that proposal?
+
) 6 A Ho, not nececcarily. I think a high radiation i 7 aignal in probably the least reliable of those three l ! 3 nignals. l We purposely left a high radiation signal out of l ! C' the design for that purposc. He didn't uant spurious l l i 10 l isolation signals which could eventually degrade valva ! I I 1i
! lenked items over the life of the plant-t I 12 l
,i i
I l j /' j wa i f: ) i7 m l l 1 (' l {i l 2fs
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I 21 i n 23 26 _ i 24 f I
l hape 12 2049 J / ; ! jn-1 I Q At page 19 of your testimony, you conclude that I
~
bls 'z ' t
-- is not required or necescary, due to the, quote, " Single-l 3 '
failureproof design of the containment and isolation *
- t. .'
5 syr, ten." , e 5 1 Could you define what you'maan by single-failure-6 proof in this cenkext? I !' A I define ningle-failureproof and other contain- l, j mant isolation system will withstand any single-failure .; I D i l of an active component and so maintain containment isolutiva,I i i f Q ' On each icolation, on each penetration that has l *' I
; redundant vcives[ would you consider a failure both tho
- I !
! R valves to be a multiple failura? l A > i j On thoco several aystamo uhich we identified i i' ] l oarlier that havo just a single valve for the reasons that c' ! l ] l you indicated. It would not take a niultiple failure to 3 ; , ! W defeat isolation, is that true? P , a I think, if I recollection my memory . l .. . li l which ones, but I'll think you'll find anywhere that's the l
- i situation, that line is not in manunication with the M' ; priwiry coolunt. There is a hone nystem so that a single-l 21 ailure - 'docsinat open that line up,'if you will, to j- - 2s i,
the radi'anctive ' water incide the contniiumnt. j 23 l Q. There's' h si.nglo . valve on that -- I think one of
- 6 -
2 l W ;the examples was the rcactor haing atmosphere lino, is that
.25 .it?
p. j !. f .i n m.v. , -0 - wen -w -- ,wes,~w v*,~- m*'s*'**O~"~*"'*** * " ' ' ~ ~ * ~ ~ ^ * ' " " ' ' * " ~ ~ ' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ~ ^ ' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
2050 :
- jn-2 / ;
1 A Yes. O~ - 2 -Q Atracaphere sampling line. I 3 Now, a singlo-failure in that globe valve, doesn't j 1 4 that leave the pathway open outside cont.11nnent? * !. 5 A It would in that case be an additional valve , r i i 5 downstream of that globe valve that could be closed by an i { l 7 opuIator. It is not a part of the isolation nystem as such. i [ 1 a Q You couldn't take cred:lt for that since it would ' i p beait.cudalactioS7 10 A That would be correct. i ,3 i 0 To go down and cloce that valve at that point, i g if there was a ningle-f ailure which defeated this line, 13 wouldn't the operator bc exposing hiracel:? potentially to aigh radiation levels? 14 g A I don't- think, un]asa significant core damago , e , g occutred to give you that high radiation., .I don't know,
,. O In Exhibit 30, where you are talking about essentia.
< v
,, systoma versus nonensontie1 syctens, is it true that those i syntas which are nonescential, which are isolated on g' }
l g - -initiation ere no longer available to the operator ~or in tuo course of an accident? A They?raiavailabic, if ha takes action to open - u,
~
the ay.aten uo. -
-n O Thsy would only be svaileblo if the operator i
?.5 ;e
- manually defeats the isointion ayatem?
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t l j Q miat criteria did ycu use to determine what i U Ip i.ysters were going to be included an essential e.nd uttat , a
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r;vatu ' ware r.oncocent.T.al in doing this review for the NRC? e I , d A An m,cer.tica cystma is one that n.mded to aitigate t - 1 the co.aeequences of tha accid 2nt which gttvc you the iaalt.1- !
._ 1
) l n
q-tion signal in the first place.-
! 1 I
1 0 What was the accid mL th.zt was ascu:r.ad or tha . o
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f [ n Sna ru.e:i:as occidant uculd be a inrge break 1.oss
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apc u m, b act in to mintaintain th- prmsure then?
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!j t. It acom:' t blow it back in, clean e.ir would ae {
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..> I h urtma he.ck into the conWinmunt to mtha up for the air r
that you hics out, yas. I .'
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! O D this uma only wheti ther:c's high hydrogen li couc'. atrJ tion Invelri?
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a <$ Y (- ,..y $ l ,. ? , Ia L'. N DW it! UVGtGI p.?JC'fidW1 3 SC E. 358:.ction DOlution to th? prOble3., I O [L1'i jT O i l.L'.ly Ol'. that. clac.2tgc;C in anir <7ay?
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- ' ; . ... nd . 1.a .t e- ce3 ~ .efi the hy? ec g e:: recrbinar rcil -
j ab7 - o uu t ue neede:!. n & m+'n-i i : c.D your tortin ny i h. t thin recom-i U . . [' 3 2 C C'Vltk f):
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jn-5 2053
- f. <
i i e' O A Ens it ever been brought to 'che Rancho Seco site? lio, it klas not. .
~
i 3
--0 Have operators over been trained in its uso?-
It We have the operating manualu for that systen. 1 . U j Fa're not sure if the operators have been trained in ita.
- 0 l' , use or not. We have engineers that'have cartainly stuclied- ,
[ ' .. > .c 1 ? thia system and know how to operate it.
, n r i
it 0 If there ccian a tima when you needed it' arid it- ! were delivered, Yho would operato it, who van in chargo of , l ) . ) i , 10 It? ' IIl\ A I guase that would be~np to whoever van in c!dr'go
' ;i l.
i i of the shift at that, time. .. , . . , _ j . 3l 0 The chift supervisor vould'ba in charge. Wodld* U'I I it be control ro$$~ operators who havo to hook it up? Ib A l I'm sure under an accident situation it would i ! --. l * ! ba a joint effort by onginacra, maintenance people and u l 'l operators. Mniritenance p$opl.2 do the physical work of ' i - hooking it up. 10[ 1 - 19 [i Q Whet uito recombiner do you have available from E I s i, ArisenaPublicServich?
- t j 21 i i
A I don't know how to. rate the sine. It was ona L
'd 2 that was desic;;ned uith the cane criteria as our purgo system i
23 1 vaa denigned to. 1
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'M j O Are you familiar _ oil how it vould ~ be attached
- i. 3, to containmont r that it could ba utilized?
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i I l ! i I i 2054 I jn-6 I A' Not specifically, no.. f l O Do you knou what penetration would be used for 3 the recortiner? 4 A I don't know that.information. 4 5 MR. LTWNEER: Mrs... Bowers, I'd liha marked CEC 6 Exhibit 31, a doeuraent which is entithd, "Racord of 7 Telephone Convernations, April 24, 1979." I'd like Mr. i 6 , Diatcrich to revicw that documnt, i + l i 9 (CEC Enhibit No. 31 tran to marked for ddantification.) l i
<1 BY MR. Lid 4PU3R:
l l t2 Q Havo you had an opportunity to review it? l { i - > 13 ! A Yco. l L4 0 Are you faniliar with tbia docum nt? , 15 ! A Yes. g l0 l 0 In paragraph 2, and 1 nepo everyone has the i I . . ;7 j nue.bar 2, it raissa the concern that the sine recombiner l ic j availabicatP$10V$rdemaynot fit unto the cne inch line 1 29 i at Tancho Seco. Do you know whether that oscential prehlem 1 >o han been retu')1vad? 21 A -' I'rn nct certain. { l , s
, i i
nf- The question, of course, is one of the tienn g in NURM 0578 itS$1 hns brsen delayed panding rulenakir3g in i .! > i -y ! this area for'a-dedicated.panetr?. tion. I'm.not sure.What a 25 the' resolution of.this specife.iteti was. a i: ( ; l
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t i 1 .j I [ 2055 f 4 in-7 ' i ,
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Q So, you don't know whether any analyses have been I ! (.
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2 i . l performed to determine whether the Palo Verde,reconbinar l 3 , l could, in fact, he used at Rancho Seco? I d i A ch, I'm cortain it eculd be used. I think the 1 4
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{ . questien is how effectivaly. 6 1 j Q How would you hook that recombiner up, given the a 7 .- -- different cize line? i sf ) J A I guess I'd use a pipe reducer. I don't under- I 1 6 1 stand the questio$. i 10 ! ! O You're not aware of any analyaes which havn been j 11 -- performad at SMUD to determine how effective that recorbiner (2 would be? ' i < - j 'o ! \ A Under the si,tuation, they're using a one-inch . I' lal i line. I'm not share of any,' no. (O .
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Q Or cry analyces which have been performed to con- ! .e t .. ._. i '" firm that, in fact, the Palo Verde reconbiner would be 17 ' effsctive at Rancho.Seco? > j
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g "3 ' ., 4 A Oh, they will definitely, an I.sny, be,offectiva. ! g . . . .. . . It's a gunstion of how effective. I i
#'O i Q What is the basis for your att.teilent that it - '
' I. ! 21 vovld definitely be effectivo? , ,, . 22 : 3 - W911, it'a got to provido-some: recombining. . q 23 t. l If'its source is 5 ono-inch linc instea6 of its design -i 24 four-inch line, I don't know what the reduction'in its-f. 1-i i 95 ) efficiency would be. i l _ __...- .__ _ __-_.. ----._ _ --. l "--.
_ _ _ _ ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .._ _. _ . _ _ _ - . ._. _ ________ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ ~ _ . 11 ' a t jn-8 2056-I f Q lit paga 21 of your testilcony, :!ou describe a l
, y hypotheticalaccidentwithcl'percentfaal. failure. Is !
that your definition of the hypothetical accident. Im A accident with a 1 percent fuel failure? !- s Do you see that, that's line 6, excuse me. ; i 6 ,, I ! A thximum hypothotical, that's a word being given to the decign basis accident, correct? 1 ,, , ) 4 o That in a one percent fuel failure? 9 l i A Correct. l 'O. } . . _ Q Elhun you refer to 1 percent fual failure, are 11 l youraferringtoipercentofthecladdinghanfailed? 12 ;; I l A As far as this discussion goes, we're talking i 13 l _ l ubout 1 percent of the cladding entering into a metal 1 1.1 :j i watcr reaction yiciding hydrogen, the.t's correct. l 1: l{ -'en believe that that's a realintic, . , h Q C } 1t I . . . . . . _ . 4 maninum hypothetice.1 accident in' light of the TMI 17 , i accident? . 13 A Yes, I do appreciate that the design require-l 19 .. .- j ment for hydrogen control exe not this accident 1 20 h) itnelf, but fiv$ timen that anount of hydrogen generatilon. U1 i j. Q Five percent fuel Inilura? i e i 2P l' A Atlead5Shercantfivotinesthatmuchhydrogan,- 23 -- -
. correct. j s
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-O DR. MICH: E:rcuse me a moment. You've been y . . . . _ _ . .
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- usirg the term " fuel failuro" all clang, and'I think this- !
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t __o!_________._____.._...
i-i l l
- 2b57 in-9 is rather a deceptive term. Don't you mean 5 percant .
L g reaction of the circonitm with water to form hydrogen, isn't [ Y l this closer to what you mean? i . THE WITNESS: That's very true, yes. { 4 j . _. ] BY HR. L.KPHER: i 5{' ' ! Q If there's a 5 percent zirconium reaction or 5 6 e percent of the cladding has that reaction, is the hydrogen ! 7 purge system presently available at Rancho Seco a i F sufficient capacity to handle that? g A Yec, it is. l
! O What an$lysen have been performed for that 5 i i!
1 percent accident? 12 l l A That'a decaribed in the FSAR. l 13 _. _ . . l Q Uave any analycos been performed concerning a 14 ; , .._. . j larger accident than that? More ; ?1 cladding involved? 15 ~
- 1 i- A Mo, not specific to Rancho Seco, noa 16 I . . . _ .
i O Do you know any nonspecific to Rancho Seco? j 17 i i i A Oh,Itt$inkpeoplehave1cohedatthelargor
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i [ :1waunto of hydrogen generation as a result of the Three. Miler - 1e [ . 20 ! ( Island incident. I' don't know;of any others offhand. j O Would it'be poscible to upgrade the hydrogen 21 .. . purge cycte:n st Rancho Seco to be able to handle a larger - l 22{ ,, , , l marinum hypothenical accident? . 23 ! I L -- 'It Would'.be oossible. I, don' t know to 97hta.u i 24l .. [ 1 mttremo it can be updated, nnd carteiinly not - required by - 25's j proemt regulationa. i i , f
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II 4 suo 2058 d.k2 jn 10 / 1 1 - Q , Is it prohibited'.to your knowledgo? I 2 A No. ' I 9 l . -
.O What analyses vould have to be performed to ;
f ' assosa whether the-hydrogan purge cystem couldn't, in fact;
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L be upgraded abova the 5_parcent icvel? l l (i I A Oh,_I think it's a tradeoff between reactor j bui~tdintj punet. ration'-Bi:v!* bicue'r 'i'3'io, tilor efficiendier,
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p~ i . j wind and-tice,.tho hydrogen gancration is going to ' ; a i e" t o'e pontulated to havo occurred. { N 1 Q That would not necessarily involve inahing a V new penetration or a largcr penetration? You might be i
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, ; able to upgrade the motors and the nunctionc on tha } U i existing systema? l W ' A I don't thin?t one would gain a uhole lot by - ) b putting a biggar blower on the same one-inch line, no. 1 K DH. SHON: l Excuse cc again, Mr. Lanphor. 70a've l . R b2en sort of design'ing a system inf crocs-examination herein.- s, l 1 m l -It occurs to me that there is vant clifference W l batucen the kind of system and'the s. ort of thing you'vo; 4
'S
, baan talking about, which is a purge cystem that teikes '
I 3 21 ~ i carc largely of the radiolytic hydrogan_rolenced after L l j' M 100'c and 100 b of elhnanta when thc.high ehtivity has 'i i + ' .i .l i 23 decayed in the reactor' buildincj and jone that takan enzo p 1 i 3 24 of.Ihrgo amounta of hydrogen released'by the circonium 2d Water, reaction which wcmld be pressat in the bu41 ding ~ l P l i vgw=y,+ , ~ ~ywarr y,w-v g - n- . 3,..- e+ ws .+ to-+ =, w .vU + +w t-w--e ,--*.-s-=see.=- -, - -.. - - . - - + - ----
s I ! i l jn- 11 /
- 2059 1
; sirr.ultaneously with very large, compe.ratively large amounts ;
i ! 2 of gasen e,nd particulate radioactivity that had been decayed. ! 3 s You seem not to have talked about that at all.
- 1 4l 'I th4.nk that these systems would have to be very different, !
! I - 5l wouldn't they? j . I 6 , THE WITNESS: Well, I guess that's why I mentioned l l 7 at the time at which the hydrogen would be ganerated, it's i ~ 2 ! not c inatter of having twice as big a system given twice
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i j <, i the hydrogen to equal zoro, i i I 3g MR. SHON: You might not be able to do it at l l
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1 , all and blou atuff out at that time. It seems tha.t uay ! l
;..,, to re, l
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g TIS WITTIESS: I would highly suspect that, that's cortect, i .i i k, DR. SHCNs Thank you, ' go n'tead. I didn't mean to 4 t ! j interrupt.
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MRS. BOWERS: We have run out o.C nir, we will 4 7 . i i s,, reconvena at 9:00 in the morning. l j (Whereupon,.at 4:5S o' clock p.m.,. the honring , 1.4 1 -. - 3aa l'EculiEUd p Lo fc0CnV*Jnu tit h!YO U.D. of fhe olloWing t0 day ) i l 23 (
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