ML20209G057
| ML20209G057 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1987 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8702050256 | |
| Download: ML20209G057 (157) | |
Text
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ORialNA' UNITED STATES OF AMEF.IA r
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of:
COMMISSION MEETING Status Briefing on Rancho Seco (Public Meeting)
Docket No.
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l 1
i l
l Location: Washington, D.
C.
Date: Wednesday, January 28, 1987 Pages:
1 - 86 l
ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES l
Court Reporters
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1625 I St., N.W.
Suite 921 8702050256 870128M00031a Tashington, D.C.
20006 VDR locFB P Tct.'7 PbB (202) 293-3950
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D 1 SCLA 1 MER 2
9' S
4 5
6 This is an. unofficial transcript of a meeting of the\\N~
7 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on 8
1/28/87 In the Commission's office at 1717 H Street, 9
'N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
The meeting was open to public 6
10 attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain 12 inaccuracies.
13 The transcript is intended solely for general 14 informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is 15 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript 17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs.
No 18 pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in 19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement 20 or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may 21 authorire.
22 23 24 25
s p
1 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION 3
STATUS BRIEFING ON RANCHO SECO 4
5 (Public Meeting) 6 7
8 WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 1987 9
1717 H Street, N.W.
10 Washington, D.C.
11 12 The Commission met, pursuant to Notice, at 13 2:30 p.m. LANDO W. ZECH, JR., Chairman of the Commission, 14 presiding.
15 16 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
17 IANDO W. ZECH, JR., Chairman of the Commission 18 JAMES K. ASSELSTINE, Commissioner j
19 FREDERICK M. BERNTHAL, Commissioner 20 KENNETH M. CARR, Commissioner 21 22 NRC STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:
23 S.
Chilk W. Parler 24 J. Ward A. Taylor
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25 S.
Knight D. Army
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1 2
PRESENTERS AND STAFF (Continued):
3 4
J. Field G.
Cranston 5
R. Croley J. Shetler 6
R. Vollmer F. Miraglia 7
J. Martin 8
9 10 11 12
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13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
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v' 3
1 PROCEEDINGS 2
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Good afternoon, ladies and 3
gentlemen.
Today's meeting is a briefing by the Sacramento 4
Municipal Utility District on the status of the Rancho Seco t
5 Nuclear Power Plant.
Commissioner Roberts regrets that he 6
will not be present this afternoon, he is on travel and wanted 7
me to send you his respects and tell you that he will read the 8
transcript and carefully consider these transactions.
9 The Rancho Seco plant is shut down in compliance 10 with the confirmatory action letter from Region V.
This 11 letter was issued following the December 26, 1985 cooling 12 event at the plant.
The Commission remains quite interested
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13 in the results of the Rancho Seco Action Plan for Performance 14 Improvement.
There continue to be questions about the 15 readiness of the Licensee to operate the plant and the 16 physical condition of the plant for power operations.
17 To be specific, the recent even which resulted in 18 burning out the two upper banks of heaters in the pressurizer i
19 raises both of these questions, and so we'll be very 20 interested today in your presentation.
Before that, I would 21 ask if my fellow Commissioners have any opening remarks to l
22 make.
23 (No response.)
i 24 If not, Mr. Ward, would you proceed, please.
i.
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25 MR. WARD:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We have passed I
i
/
4 g
1 out some updated copies of the slides we'll use.
We've cut 2
our presentation down slightly, and those members of the 3
public and your staff that have our' bound books will find that 4
at least in the first opening presentation the slides in their 5
books may be out of order.
6 Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, good afternoon.
This 7
is our first opportunity to present to you the Action Plan for 8
Performance Improvement at Rancho seco.
We've been working 9
closely with your staff and with the Region V Administrator in 10 the plan's development.
11 We believe we have a general agreement regarding its 12 scope.
Additionally, we have full support of the Board of
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13 Directors of the Sacramento Municipal Utility District in 14 providing the necessary resources to implement that plan.
15 I'd like to introduce to you the immediate past 16 president of the Board and the current Chairman of the Rancho 17 Seco Implementation Committee, which is the Board's oversight l
18 committee at Rancho seco, Ann Taylor.
19 MS. TAYLOR:
Thank you.
It's very nice to be here 1
l 20 this afternoon.
I did want to re-emphasize to each of you the 21 importance of Rancho Seco to our District and to its 22 resources.
It provides over half of the energy that we do i
23 generate.
24 The Board does recognize its role and i
25 responsibilities in its leadership and support of Rancho
'5 6
1 Seco.
We are supportive of the nuclear management team; we 2
have an Implementation Committee which meets weekly that has 3
reviews of many of the leaders on that team, and then we in 4
turn pass that information on to the other Board members.
On 5
top of that, we have a briefing monthly to the press that we 6
are all also involved in on the Implementation Committee and 7
other members of the Board so that we feel that we are up to 8
date on what is going on at all times.
9 We are firmly behind the Action Plan for Restart.
10 We feel that it's comprehensive.
We have ongoing concern that 11 we meet all of the concerns of the NRC and of our Region.
I 12 would like to work as closely as possible with the Region and
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13 we have tried to effect that and I think we are being quite 14 successful at it.
15 We have also obligated ourselves freely to the l
l 16 financial commitments that restart is going to entail, the 17 monies required for the programs, improvements that are 18 necessary out there not only for restart but for continued 19 program improvement, which I think is most important.
We must 20 have a good operating plant and we must have it restarted, 21 too.
22 The policy direction that we're looking for is the 23 achievements of excellence thtt John keeps talking of and 24 actually implementing and actually being able to measure, because we now have in this performance evaluation plan a way 25
0 6
1 that we can tell exactly what programs are going on, where 2
they are and what the possibility is of meeting their 3
timeframe.
I think that's extremely important.
4 The Board has also exercised its authority by 5
finding the best management team throughout the United 6
States.
We've brought people in that are now heads of various 7
parts of that implementation program, and we feel that we have 2
8 been able to secure the best that were available.
9 We've provided all of the funds that have been 10 requested and there has been no question as to whether or not 11 there would be sufficient funds for the program that John 12 wants to install.
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13 We also have assured the continuity of the Board's 14 support by the appointment of myself as head of the RSIC
- i 15 Committee and the continuity with Mr. Wilcox as President of 16 the Board.
So the same two people that were on the team for 17 the last year are going to continue on that teams myself and 18 Mr. Wilcox, and I think that's very important.
19 So I want to assure you of the Board's support in
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20 the program and my personal dedication to see it through to 21 restart.
Thank you very much.
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
23 MR WARD:
Thank you, Ann.
I'd like to make some 24 comments on the agenda.
We've tried to include those items 25 that we feel are probably uppermost in your minds.
There are
l 7
1 many, many issues that we want to present to you beyond that, 2
and we hope that we'll have the opportunity at future meetings 1
1 3
to go into detail on other issues.
As we go through the 4
agenda, each of the presenters will introduce himself to try 5
to speed up the time that it takes for the presentation.
6 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Let me just say I appreciate that.
7 I've gone through your slides and it looks like we have a 8
rather lengthy presentation.
We're going to try to finish by 9
4:00 o' clock.
We have to have the staff, of course, come up 10 after you're done so I would ask you to please give us the 11 information but make it crisp and to the point, and we'd 12 appreciate that very much.
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13 MR WARD:
Yes.
Just to do that, Mr. Chairman, 14 I've insisted they all have scripts so they don't wander off.
15 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Fine.
And we'll probably interrupt 16 you anyway, but please do your best.
17 MR. WARD:
Our purpose is to provide you with 18 information.
And we're happy to answer any questions.
19
[ Slide.]
I
)
20 our principal objective today is to assure you of I
21 our awareness of the breadth and the depth of the issues that l
22 stem from the December 26th incident, and even more I
significant, the steady decrease in the performance of Rancho 23 1
24 Seco over the past several years.
We'll discuss our 25 corrective action programs and their bases; we'll outline our
e
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4 8
intent to prove material readiness by a comprehensive testing 1
2 program, and to demonstrate operator readiness by an 3
independent evaluation of their capabilities.
And finally, l
4 we'll discuss our program to upgrade the quality of management 5
and to assure that competent SMUD managers are in place and 6
responsible for plant operation prior to restart.
7
[ Slide.)
8 The core of our action plan is the plant performance 9
and management improvement program -- an impossible acronym to 10 pronounce, by the way.
In general, it incorporates these 11 elements:
a systematic evaluation program which assessed 10 12 years of Rancho Seco operating history.
This phase involved
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13 over 250 engineers, operators and analysts with outside 14 assistance for a period of 9 months.
A two-level review t
15 process which included our best technical and managerial minds l
16 and it was supported by outside experts.
A consolidation of 17 the results by system and a subsequent system review.
18
[ Slide.)
19 This flow chart, while it is simplified, puts our 20 issue identification process in perspective.
Issue 21 identification took place in the five groups shown at the 22 bottom of the slide.
A group looked at the input we received 23 from the B&W owners' groun.
They assessed the completeness of 24 our processes for evaluating this information and the status 25 of implementation of their recommendations.
e 9
1 Tho December 27th incident group reviewed that 2
incident in depth in order to determine specific 3
incident-related problem areas as well as identifying the 4
broader generic issues it revealed.
The deterministic failure 5
analysis group performed component failure analysis on all 6
safety systems as well as many non-safety systems that have 7
been involved particularly in transient initiation.
8 The precursor group looked at 10 years of operating 9
history to assess the adequacy of our response to Rancho Seco incidents as well as a host of event reports provided by the 10 11 NRC, INPO, the B&W owners group and others.
Their goal was to 12 determine where a narrow or a rationalized view was taken and
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13 to identify the broader implications that should have been 14 addressed and to get those into our program.
15 Finally, we asked all on-site employees and 16 contractors to provide us with their knowledge of system 17 deficiencies, inadequate procedures, training needs, 18 whatever.
In short, with their hands-on knowledge, they know 19 what needs to be done.
And that was a very successful effort.
20 (Slide.]
21 This process resulted in the generation of over 5000 issues that required review for inclusion in our program.
The 22 23 initial review was provided by a Recommendations Review and 24 Resolution Board.
This Board, which included representatives 25 from B&W and Duke Power, assessed each recommendation for
l i
10 1
validity, consolidated duplicate recommendations, identified 2
recommendations by system and then recommended a priority for 3
accomplishment.
Valid recommendations were then forwarded in 4
parallel to the Performance Analysis Group, the PAG, and to 5
the Systems Engineering Group.
The PAG revalidated the 6
recommendations and confirmed or modified the priority 7
assignment.
8 In a parallel effort, the systems engineers, 9
supported by the systems design engineers in Nuclear 10 Engineering, performed a review of each system incorporating i
11 the information developed by the RQB.
Their goal was to 12 identify the testing required for each system in order to
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13 demonstrate the required functions could still be performed in 14 light of the modification, maintenance and incident history.
15 The PAG then reviewed and approved the system review documents 16 and the conceptual testing program.
17 The procedures that resulted from the review group I
l 18 recommendations and those which stemmed from system
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19 modifications and maintenance program changes are folded into 20 our ongoing long-term procedure upgrade program, and i
21 subsequently into our operator's classroom and simulator 22 training programs.
I 23 The intent of these two process paths is to 24 demonstrate that material readiness and operator proficiency 25 are the key elements of operational readiness.
11 1
(Slide.)
2 This process identified that the problems we face 3
are significant and cover every aspect of plant readiness.
4 However, the key to a successful recovery lays in a total 5
turnaround of the last two; leadership and management.
6 (Slide.]
7 The many corrective actions we must address during this comprehensive multi-year program have been prioritized so 8
9 that our energy and resources can be directed towards a rational approach to assure safety and to provide a steady 10 11 improvement in reliability.
This chart outlines the key 4
1 12 prioritization criteria.
l i
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13 Priority one, assure that the plant will return to a 14 safe and known safe state subsequent to a trip or a 15 transient.
Priority two, reduce the trips and challenges to s
16 safety systems.
Our 1990 goal, for example, is to achieve a 17 state where we'll experience less than one trip per year.
18 Priority three, improve the reliability of operations by 19 instituting computerized data-base programs for material 20 management, managed maintenance, reliability engineering and t
21 training coordination.
22 (Slide.]
t 23 The major program, however, at Rancho Seco is a 24 cultural change.
We call it the "make it happen" program.
25 It's designed to move the attitudes of 1000 site employees l
l
3 12 1
from one'of rationalization to one of commitment, of problem 2
ownership and accountability.
What we intend to achieve is a 3
3 shift in attitudes from non-commitment, "it didn't happen on s
4 ay watch", to one of commitment where it's "I'll do it, I'll 5
handle it, and by when."
When problems arise they'll be 6
brought to management's attention m'd we intend to fix them.
n And believe it or not, it's working.
7 3
8 (Slide.]
9 1000 SNUD employees are involved personally and in 1
10 work groups.
12 facilitators are involved; 5 are experienced 11 psychologists who have a successful attitude change record at i
12 over 400 companies and with 10,000 work groups.
They are i
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13 making this program work.
They're training 7 especially 14 selected SNUD people in these same techniques so that this l
15 program will become an ongoing program capable of maintaining i
16 the commitment as a permanent part of the culture.
j 17 Results are already apparent.
This program provides
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18 us with confidence in the prospect for long-term steady 19 improvement in plant performance.
l i
20 Now I'd like to get into the body of our agenda and 1
give you some additional insight into specific and important 21 i
l 22 areas of key material and operational improvement programs.
i 23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
John, before you do that, 24 a couple of quick questions.
The matrix that you pointed out, 25 that flow path, is intended to focus on procedural j
I i
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13 4
1 deficiencies, hardware questions, system design kinds of 2
issues, and yet as you rightly point out I think in the 3
subsequent slide, one of the key elements is management 4
4 confidence in the organization.
How has your program worked
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5 to identify the nature of the management problem, the causes t
6 of the management problem end what needs to be done to bring i
i 7
about a long-term and permanent change in the management i
8 structure of the organization?
9 MR. WARD:
Commissioner, it was actually the same l
10 program, and as I mentioned, it was a simplified chart.
There 3
11 were so many "do" loops I didn't want to get them all on.
But 12 that particular program additionally identified management
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13 deficiencies, and significant management deficiencies in 14 problem identification and in problem obfuscation.
I 15 One of the reasons that we felt that this very i
1 16 massive "make it happen" program was necessary was that there 17 was a pervasive tendency to shoot the messenger, such that l
18 problems were not brought to management's attention because i
19 the messenger was constantly reprimanded for so doing.
f 20 We are working with the supervisor and his work i
21 groups at all levels.
It started at my level and it goes down 1
22 to the head gardner and his direct reports.
Every work group, 23 240 work groups on the site are involved in this process i
24 whereby we are instilling a culture that problem
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25 identification is to be thanked, and that problems are to be i
l l
14 1
addressed and to be fixed.
2 So the same process identified that the concern was i
3 pervasive.
If we can't get the problems identified by the 4
people who are running the plant who are the ones who i
5 understand where all the problems exist, then we have a basic 6
problem.
And we need management support, and we need the 7
management support all the way from the Board on down.
And I 8
feel we have that support from the Board and I think that's 9
reflected in the attitudes of the people you will see on site l
10 today.
i 11 MS. TAYLOR:
I think one of the things, to maybe 12 further address that, was one of the things that you brought
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13 up earlier that you wanted to see SMUD employees in those key I
i 14 spots.
15 g
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Right.
I 16 MS. TAYLOR:
And I think the changeover that John i
17 has shown the Board and intends to implement is a changeover 18 prior to startup where SMUD employees primarily take over 19 almost every one of those jurisdictional areas with the I
20 support and shoring up of a person right behind them.
l 21 So what we're doing is switching from a contract 22 employee to a SMUD employee and now the SMUD employee is i
l 23 onboard, fully trained and supported with a competent and
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24 sufficient staff in order to insure success.
And I think that 25 was the problem before.
That was pointed out way early in the I
I l
l l
15 1
analysis, that we were too thin.
I don't think that's the 2
case any longer.
1 3
MR. WARD:
We'll discuss some more aspects of that 4
program later.
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
One other question, and if 6
you're going to address it later that's fine as well.
Your 1
broad definitions for what falls in the priority one, priority 7
8 two and priority three categories seem to be fairly general in 9
nature, and I guess I'm interested in hearing a bit more about 10 the specific criteria that you've used to make the decision 11 for what falls in each of those categories and especially what 1
12 falls in and outside of category one, things that have to be
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13 done prior to restart.
And second, the extent to which the i
14 staff has signed off both on the criteria you're using and how 1
15 those criteria are being applied to decide what needs to be 16 fixed before the plant can restart and what can slide to some 17 point down the road.
l 18 MR. WARD:
A couple of comments.
First, as probably 19 you as a group know better than I, making very clear definite i
1 20 criteria that always apply is very, very difficult.
We are, l
21 believe it or not, using those criteria that you see.
Beyond 22 that, obviously, maintaining our tech specs and our license, i
l 23 et cetera.
That goes without saying.
But we did use as a l-24 strict criteria that if the issue was directed at improving 25 plant response after a trip or a transient, that was priority I
i i
16 1
one.
2 The other thing that I think is important to note is 3
on that slide you will notice dotted lines that show the 4
priority two's and three's really aren't confined to those 5
specific timeframes.
As an example, we have sleeved the steam 6
generators, both steam generators, some 500 tubes, and that,is 7
a priority three item; improve plant reliability.
We are 8
doing items in priority two and three during the pre-restart 9
period as we see it necessary to do so.
We are not strictly t
l 10 just handling the priority one's.
11 The prioritization is -- obviously, it puts things i
12 in order as to what you're going to do but it also focuses the
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13 resources of the site on those things that are important' 14 first, and that's one of the reasons we use those.
j 15 We have discussed those priority designations with j
16 the staff and Region V and I believe they may have some 17 comments later.
Generally, my feeling is they are in general 18 agreement.
I think we'll have probably some disagreement on 19 what ends up in priority one and priority two in several 20 cases, but I don't think there's going to be significant 21 problems in that area.
L 22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Perhaps as we go through 23 the presentation and you talk about some of the details of the 24 program you can give some examples of how those standards are 25 being applied so that we can get a feel for which items are
1 17 going to be done before the plant restarts and the kinds or 1-2 types of items that you would propose slipping beyond that 3
point.
4 MR. WARD:
All right.
I think Mr. Army will address l
5 some of those specifically.
Stu?
6 (Slide.)
7 MR. KNIGHT:
Good afternoon, gentlemen.
My name is i
8 Stuart Knight and I'm the Acting Manager of Quality Assurance i
j 9
at Rancho Seco.
I first came to the site in May of 1986.
The 10 status in May of '86 was basically that the SNUD QA program 11 was an audit function which provided after-the-fact 12 information to management.
The organization was basically a
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13 reactive one which was not in the direct line of work 14 performance but rather, in a cross-check.
The quality 1
15 engineering and inspection functions were slit apart and i
16 elsewheres in the organization.
17 (Slide.]
I i
18 Starting in May of 1986, we used the findings of previous audits by LRS, INPO, NRC and our own assessment of i
19 20 the situation.
We initiated a program of change.
We 21 reorganized the quality ~ assurance function at the site into a 22 much more classical approach with quality engineering, quality 23 control, audit and surveillance as the major operative arms.
i I
24 (Slide.)
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l 25 Additionally, we established a Quality Data Group, 1
I i
i
. ~
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18 1
since we recognized the fact that the plant performance and 2
management improvement program, or as it has become known, the 3
QCI-12 process, required very stringent control of each and 4
4 every individual item and the ability to historically determine where did it come from, how did it get acted upon 5
6 and how did it finally become resolved.
7 I would like to point out the fact that the quglity 8
assurance organization is charged with the responsibility for 9
the review and closure of every item on the QCI-12 listing.
10 other changes have taken place such as placing inspection planning in the in-process, up front position.
11 12 That's true for both maintenance and construction activities.
("s 13 A stringent material control process has been invoked.
14 Procedure revisions have resulted from these changes in 15 process and the procedure revisions are ongoing today.
16 Procurement review is an upfront process at this 17 point, where prior to placement of the order such things as j
18 the identification of source inspection requirements is now 19 contractually invoked as part of our contracts with their 20 suppliers.
21 We have one man assigned full time to incure the 22 coordination on NRC open items, their review, appropriate 23 documentation and/or physical action as is required, and their 24 closure.
25 Probably the two most significant items are direct
19 1
involvement in the upgrade.of the preventive maintenance 2
program; and secondly, the. expansion of the quality program into not only just Class I but all of the EQ applications as 3
4 well as selected Class II, those being primarily code 5
applications as well as operational criticality.
6 (Slide.]
7 Since last May a number of things remgin to be 8
done.
Our policy manual has been revised, is currently in 9
internal review and will be submitted to NRC for review and 10 subsequent incorporation into the USAR.
11 We have received comment that the quality 12 organization's presence is not really visible in the field.
[
13 To improve that, we have on site today unique headgear so that 14 anyone walking through that plant will know when they're 15 looking at an individual from Quality.
16 We have an active recruiting program presently 17 ongoing, national advertising, et cetera, to recruit my 18 replacement and also a permanent quality engineering 19 supervisor.
20 The audit program is currently undergoing a 21 strengthening both in resources being added to the group as 22 well as methodologies.
23 As a long range, that means between now and restart 24 or slightly on beyond, is to replace contractor personnel with 25 permanent SMUD people to carry on the program from this point
20 1
forward.
2 Probably the largest job facing us is the QCI-l2 3
item closures.
4
[ Slide.]
5 In summary, we are currently moving very rapidly 6
from a reactive to a proactive member of the Rancho Seco 7
Restart team.
e 8
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Before you leave QA, 10 looking back at the previous slide, what's your balance now 11 between contractor QA people and permanent SMUD employees, and 12 how has it changed, say, from a year ago?
f~
13 MR. KNIGHT:
Well, I can tell you how it has changed 14 since June.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's good enough.
16 MR. KNIGHT:
As of June the number of SMUD employees 17 onboard were 50; the total work force at that time was 72 18 people, through the and of December.
The SMUD force now is at 19 56 and the total work force is at 132.
Now, this is primarily 20 represented by the fact of the addition of contract inspection 21 personnel to support all of the modification activities.
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
And what's your target in 23 terms of permanent organization?
24 MR. KNIGHT:
I anticipate, based on the current 25 organizational level for the operating plant, that we will be
21 1
right at about 70 personnel.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
You mentioned that QA has 3
been an orphan organization.
That's not the kind of 4
organization you attract' top flight, top quality people into.
3 5
What have you done to try and deal with that situation?
For 6
example, how many people do you have in the QA organization 7
now who have been licensed SRQ's or who have been maintenance supervisors, people who understand the details of operations 8
9 and maintenance and who can strengthen your QA organization l
10 and build respect for that QA organization throughout the 11 operations staff of the plant?
12 MR. KNIGHT:
We currently have -- for instance,
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13 let's take SRO's.
We currently have two people who either are 14 or have been licensed SRO's.
We have recruited and brought in 15 personnel eith other plant experience and I'm working, as a j
16 matter of fact, with Mr. Army very closely to effect horse 17 trading of people in the future to insure the 18 cross-fertilization that you're talking about, Commissioner.
19 I would say offhand that we've got at least 30 people right 20 now with other plant experience within the department.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Last question.
What's the 22 status of your recruitment efforts for a permanent QA manager 23 and for the QE supervisor, and do you have an estimate for 24 when you'd have those people in place, and if so, how far 25 ahead of any request on your part to restart the plant would
22 1
that occur so that these people actually understand their job-2 in the plant and what they're doing and are in place and 3
familiar with the situation?
4 MR. KNIGHT:
My replacement, we currently have in 5
hand at least four qualified resumes that I am aware of, and I 6
believe that the recruiting period on that ends middle of 7
February.
I would anticipate about a 30 to a 45-day period of 8
time thereafter to effect recruitment of my replacement.
9 I would not talk to restart in terms of how many 10 days ahead he has to be there, but rather the fact that he's 11 cnboard and I'm not leaving until both myself and Mr. Ward are 12 satisfied.
{'
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
14 MR. WARD:
Commissioner, in each of the cases where i
15 we've put a contract manager in a management position we have either recruited a SMUD manager who will eventually replace j
16 17 him or assigned one there for training purposes and he serves 18 as his deputy, and he remains as the deputy manager until both 19 the contract manager and the deputy SMUD manager say we're 20 ready to shift jobs.
Then they shift.
The contract manager 21 then becomes the SMUD manager's deputy and he remains there 22 for continuity purposes until we're satisfied that all of the 23 information has been transferred.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
One last question.
25 What measures are you looking to to gauge the effectiveness of l
l l__
23 1
this kind of major upgrade of the QA program?
How are you 2
gauging the acceptance by the plant staff of the CA 3
organization and the improved effectiveness and 4
professionalism and more proactive kind of approach to quality 5
assurance by the efforts that you're putting into place?
6 MR. KNIGHT:
That's part of the strengthening of the audit program that I addressed previously, to gauge the 7
8 effectiveness of what's going on.
That auditing program is not just looking at what other people are doing; it's looking 9
10 at is Quality getting the job done, is it getting it done 11 properly.
I think probably the most effective gauge is in 12 seeing the smooth processing of work, the smooth handling of
(~
13 problems as they are identified, and when it is rocky you know 14 that you've got problems and you pay a hell of a lot more 15 attention to it at that point.
16 MR. WARD:
Beyond that, Commissioner, we are 17 adopting the INPO performance indicators.
We have completed a' s
18 Rancho seco business plan which shows what we intend to do 19 over the next several years, five years, in improving the 20 performance.
One of the things I'll be looking for is a 21 reduction in the number of Non-Conformance Reports as to l
22 whether or not this program is working.
23 And even beyond that, one of the requirements that 24 we are putting in the training programs for our senior 25 management is a stint in the Quality Assurance Department.
l 24 1
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Thanks.
2 MR. WARD:
Dhve?
I 3
(Slide.]
4 MR. ARMY:
Good afternoon, gentlemen, my name is 5
David Army, I am the Nuclear Maintenance Manager at Rancho Seco with responsibility for mechanical, electrical and 6
7 ins,trument controls maintenance as well as maintenance 8
planning.
Prior to my arrival at Rancho seco last March, I 9
was the maintenance manager at Consolidated Edison's Indian 10 Point 2 where I was responsible for all mechanical and 11 electrical maintenance.
Today I will speak about the status 12 of maintenance activities at Rancho Seco.
[
13 In the past, various audits indicated a legacy of 14 historically minimal maintenance.
This was deemed responsible 15 for many of the plant's operating problems.
Without dwelling 16 on the past, it's important that we review specific 17 deficiencies in order to appreciate that our program today 18 represents significant accomplishments of which we are proud.
19 Here is a summary of the past conditions of Rancho Seco 20 maintenance.
21 (Slide.]
22 Programmatic issues were identified as follows.
The l
23 existing maintenance organization had structural 24 deficiencies.
Administrative procedures were inadequate, i
25 overlapping and sometimes conflicting.
Work controls were
i 25 1
under-developed and under-utilized.'
Preventive maintenance j
2 was identifibd as weak and the activities were limited.
The 3
training program was essentially inactive, and again, the 4
plant operating record indicated a direct relationship to the 5
above.
6
[ Slide.]
,7 There were also technical issues which were 8
identified.
Specific maintenance work standards and practices 9
were hidden within the conflicting administrative procedures 10 onsite.
Technical procedures used to perform work needed 11 improvement.
Control of measuring and test equipment was not 12 in accordance with accepted industry practices.
Preventive
(~
13 maintenance of non-safety related equipment was neither 14 trended nor tracked as part of the program.
The welding 15 program was uncoordinated and quality involved in maintenance 16 activities was limited.
17
[ Slide.]
i 18 There are several tangible and intangible elements 19 of the maintenance commitment which serve document major 20 accomplishments which occurred during 1986.
Early in 1986, 21 the Nuclear Maintenance Division was established with a 22 division manager reporting directly to the nuclear plant 23 manager.
In turn, reporting to the nuclear maintenance 24 manager, are the superintendents of mechanical, electrical, t
25 instrument controls and facilities maintenance, along with
26 1
maintenance planning.
2 In the past, we were criticized for having 3
insufficient numbers of staff.
In contrast, today we are 4
fully staffed with personnel who are talented, competent and 5
fully committed to the turnaround in which we are engaged.
6 A procedural hierarchy has been created for the 7
entire nuclear organization.
This has allowed the 8
establishment of administrative guidance within specific 9
disciplines including maintenance.
Specific Maintenance 10 Division administrative procedures have been identified and 11 prioritized.
During October as part of a special INPO 12 maintenance assistance visit requested by myself, we received
{~
13 review and comment on our new preventive maintenance procedure 14 by the INPO staff.
l 15 All maintenance superintendents are working jointly l
16 with the training staff to insure that the maintenance 17 training program is ready for INPO accreditation by April of 18 1987, and the singly most important event was the 19 establishment of a centralized maintenance planning group.
20
[ Slide.]
21 Specific technical improvements are as follows.
An 22 administrative procedure outlining the control of maintenance l
23 activities has been approved.
This procedure applies to all l
l 24 personnel working for the Nuclear Maintenance Division.
25 Detailed training has been accomplished and follow-up audits
-u
--y
__-----y
27 O
1 by Quality have been requested in order to measure its 2
effectiveness.
New sitewide technical procedure-writing 3
guidance has been provided, and all maintenance procedures now 4
comply to that guidance.- However, to further enhance f
5 maintenance technical procedures, a maintenance writer's guide 6
has been created.
This guide was modeled after INPO 85-26, 7
Maintenance and Testing Procedure Writer's Guide.
8 A new program for the control of measuring and 9
test equipment was put into place and this program has since 10 been audited and found to be effective in eliminating past 11 problems in this area.
A new selection criteria for the 12 preventive maintenance task has been created.
This criteria
{"'
13 addresses the functional use of equipment and not its safety 14 class.
15 A comprehensive welding manual was issued which 16 pulled all the elements of the welding program together and 17 placed them under the controls of a welding engineer in the 18 maintenance group.
19 Finally, quality engineers were matrixed in a i
20 planning group to provide detailed front end review and input 21 for maintenance work packages.
22 (Slide.]
23 There are remaining actions to be taken in the 24 maintenance area.
Administrative controls and procedures 25 which have been identified and prioritized must be l
28 1
implemented.
The preventive maintenance program must be 2
expanded to include the latest predictive techniques.
It must 3
also become integrated with surveillance activities and 4
corrective maintenance and refined to insure safe and reliable 5
operation of plant equipment.
6 The cultural changes begun must continue.
The 7
maintenance organization is transitioning from strongly independent groups to a single group in which the support of 8
9 operations is its main focus.
Our involvement in the "make it 10 happen" program is insuring that this transition is a smooth 11 one.
12 computerized work controls must be improved to the
(~
13 point where we have a truly integrated system serving the 14 entire nuclear plant organization.
Specific work controls 15 identified within the conduct of maintenance activities 16 procedura must be implemented in order to improve upon our 17 existing practices.
Follow-up by Quality will be used to 18 insure its effectiveness.
l 19 Finally, we must continue to improve the maintenance interface with other organizations within the nuclear family.
20 21
[ Slide.)
22 I would now like to say a few words about the 23 current corrective maintenance backlog.
As of January 5th, 24 the corrective maintenance backlog was approximately 2500 work l
25 requests.
Of this total, 1200 are required to be completed
29 1
prior to restart.
The remaining 1300 work requests are broken 2
into Power Block and non-Power Block equipment categories.
3 These 1300 work requests have been evaluated by both 4
Operations personnel and the systems engineers and are not 5
required to be completed for restart and will not affect 6
systems operability.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Give me some examples of 8
items that aren't required for restart.
9 MR. ARMY:
Ben conduit, doors, building partitions, 10 squeaky fan belts, some equipment that's located outside of 11 the Power Block that might be some sub-equipment sumps or 12 those kind of things that we can fix on the line; we can fix
[~~
13 during an equipment outage.
14 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Does the Power Block include 15 balance of plant?
l 16 MR. ARMY:
Yes.
But again, these have all been 17 looked at again and again.
I've sat down with an Operations 18 superintendent and given him a chance to take a look at these 19 and say if there's anything on that list that you need, you've 20 got it.
And that's a maintenance commitment to Operations.
21 However, we are working on these as time permits on 22 a non-priority basis.
23 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
When do you expect to have 24 that list down to, let's say, a couple hundred work orders?
25 MR. ARMY:
As we go over our work request system,
I 30 0
1 that's about a 30-day backlog of work requests.
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Thirty-day?
3 MR. ARMY:
Yes.
It's not an unmanageable number.
4 You noted that during 1986 the maintenance 1
5 organization completed over 7000 corrective maintenance work 6
requests.
As for predicted preventive maintenance, our goal 7
is to be current at restart.
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Does that mean that the 9
oldest item on the backlog is no more than 30 days old?
10 MR. ARMY:
No, that does not mean that.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
What is the oldest item?
l 12 MR. ARMY:
I don't have a handle on what the oldest
(~
13 item is on that.
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
15 MR. WARD:
We can get the answer to that for you.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
What kind of balance do 17 you think you are striking now between preventive maintenance 18 and corrective maintenance in terms of percentage of work 19 effort?
20 MR. ARMY:
Between 15 and 20 percent preventive to 21 corrective.
My goal for the end of the year is 40 to 60 22 preventive to corrective, and that's just for the and of the 23 year.
And I want to go from there.
In my experience, the 24 best run we ever had at Indian Point was the year that we 25 really dedicated ourselves to preventive maintenance; we l
-'--u--
e-w
_9
31 1
established capacity and availability records that we had 2
never met before with that unit.
Even though it's very 3
subjective I'm fully convinced of the preventive maintenance
' program -- going after things that were known bad actors yet 4
5 were not broken gave us a real good run on that unit.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Have you looked at the 7
number of corrective maintenance items that are being identified now as compared to, say, a year ago, and if you 8
9 have what kind of trends do you see?
10 MR. ARMY:
We're talking corrective maintenance?
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
12 MR. ARMY:
To give you a handle, Commissioner Carr
('
13 asked me the question last week it was about where we stood 14 with our corrective maintenance and were we getting ahead or 15 getting behind.
The best answer to that question is we 16 increased by 630 corrective maintenance work requests over the 17 last three weeks.
And I have been getting the staff to handle 18 that work that's coming up.
And again, a lot of these types of items are being identified out in the field or through new 19 20 programs, and we are responding to those.
21 I see an increase.
We've got a lot of pe'ople out 22 there writing work requests; that's their job, that's their instruction, to identify the problems and then it's up to us 23 24 to handle them.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
It seems to me that
32 1
John's point earlier is correct, that the old philosophy was 2
you shoot the messenger for identifying problems.
If you've 3
really changed that philosophy, one measure is you ought to be 4
turning up a lot more problems.
5 MR. ARMY:
My philosophy is I would rather know 6
about the problem because then I can address it 7
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
One last question.
On the 8
numbers of maintenance people, you said you are pretty well 9
staffed up.
How does that differ from, say, six months or a 10 year ago in terms of the number of people, and also, what is 11 your relationship between first line supervisors and craft?
12 And how does that change from, say, a year ago?
{^
13 MR. ARMY:
In 1985, the end of 1985, we had 185 14 permanent maintenance staff.
Right now there ar,e 340 15 maintenance staff onsite, of which a portion of those are 16 contract.
Our permanent staffing for 1987 is 265.
I can think of only two positions I have on my staff right now that 17 18 are contract positions, which I will fill at my next 19 opportunity.
1 20 As far as the ratio, it's about a 5 to 1 ratio of first line supervisor to craft, and we're talking the direct 21 22 leaders out in the field.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Is that about what it has 24 been or is that a change for the better in terms of --
25 MR. ARMY:
It's a change for the better.
I have to n
e n
--n y
.,,,e
,n.
n,
33 1
go check the numbers again but I think it was about a 6 to 1 2
or a 7 to 1 ratio a year or so ago.
3 COMMISSIONER CARR:
It shows you're really one 1 to 4
5 and 1 to 7 for supervi'sor to craft.
5 MR. WARD:
Yes.
Only road construction rigs have 6
that ratio.
t 7
[ Slide.]
8 MR. ARMY:
In closing, today's organization bears no 9
similarity to the one of yesterday.
The work is controlled 10 and performed to specific documented work packages.
The 11 maintenance personnel are receiving the training and 12 leadership required for them to be accountable for the work
['
13 they performed.
In order to guard against being overwhelmed 14 by the challenge of change, specific goals and objectives have 15 been developed to serve that end.
16 Our biggest challenge lies ahead.
The work that 17 will emerge from the restart test program will, in turn, test i
18 our ability to respond quickly and effectively to unknown 19 problems.
I believe we are now ready to meet that challenge.
20 Thank you.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
And you're permanent at Rancho Seco.
22 MR. ARMY:
Yes, sir.
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
How long have you been there, again?
i 24 MR. ARMY:
Since March.
~
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
34 1
MR. WARD:
He was part of the extensive recruitment j
2 that SMUD performed right after the incident.
Jim?
3 MR. FIELD:
Good afternoon.
My name is Jim Field, I 4
4 am the Director of the Rancho Seco System Review and Test 5
Program.
6 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Are you permanent, too?
7 MR. FIELD:
Yes, I am.
The position I hold right 8
now is not a permanent position but it's a restart 9
organization.
My permanent position is nuclear technical 10 support superintendent.
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
You're going to stay there when the 12 plant gets running, are you?
(
13 MR. FIELD:
You bet.
14 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Good.
All right.
15 MS. TAYLOR:
And he's young, too.
16
[ Laughter.]
17 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Hope he's good, too.
18 MS. TAYLOR:
He is.
19 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right, Mr. Field, with all that, 20 you can start.
21
[ Slide.)
22 MR. FIELD:
In addition to meeting the obvious 23 objective of assuring the readiness of plant systems for 24 return to power operation, our System Review and Test Program 25 yields several side benefits including improved communication,
35 1
system betterment continuing beyond restart, and operator 2
readiness through participation and testing.
3 (Slide.]
4 Our program has been implemented in three phases;
}
5 identification of system issues, followed by creation of a i
)
6 "get well" program for each of the plant's 78 systems, and j
7 finally, demonstration of system readiness through testing.
8
[ Slide.]
9 During the issue identification phase, several major lo studies were undertaken.
These included plant staff interview 11 process, the precursor review, the deterministic failure 12 consequences analysis, NUREG-1195, and B&W Owners Group work.
(~$
13 In addition, all Rancho Seco corrective action processes were 14 used as a source of issues.
Each open work request, 15 nonconformance report, abnormal tag and design change request 16 was addressed.
17 The issues identified during the Davis-Besse system 18 review and test program are also being factored in.
We have 19 maintained close contact with the Davis-Besse program through 20 frequent phone conversations and review ~of each of their 21 system reports.
The system review and test program director 22 from Toledo Edison has been a part of my management team for 23 the last six months Material condition inadequacies are being l
24 identified through system walkdowns and review of maintenance 25 history for unfavorable trends.
-m.
+--
w----
e.
r
36 1
[ Slide.]
2 Once a complete list of unresolved issues was put 3
together for each system, a system engineer compiled an 4
extensive report which detailed the corrective action plan to 5
address the issues.
These plans have been an effective tool 6
in defining the work effort necessary to prepare the plant for 7
restart.
Again, I emphasize this was done for all 78 plant 8
systems, from the reactor coolant system to the sewage 9
treatment plant.
10
[ Slide.]
11 All plant systems are subject to post-maintenance 12 testing, post-modification testing and surveillance testing.
{.
An example of major plant modifications requiring testing is 13 14 our~new emergency diesel facility which liouses two additional 15 diesel generators, EFIC, our replacement of our station 16 batteries and a diesel-driven instrument air compressor.
17 In addition, key plant systems are being subjected 18 to a pre-restart test program.
These systems were identified 19 using the following criteria:
if the system had a problem or 20 a history of problems, the system was involved in our 21 transient of December 26th, the system is being significantly modified or the system could initiate or affect plant 22 1
23 transients.
24 Application of these criteria resulted in selection 25 of 33 systems for augmented testing.
This is nearly one-half
37 1
of the total plant systems.
2 The system reports that I previously described were 3
expanded to list the functions of these systems and 4
appropriate testing to demonstrate each function.. The system 5
engineer was assisted in determining the solution to system issues and in identifying system functions by a counterpart in 6
7 the design organization called the system design engineer.
8 (Slide.]
9 Currently, the "get well" programs are being worked 10 in the plant by the maintenance and construction forces.
As 11 work is completed, the systems are being turned over to the 12 system engineers for testing.
The system engineers are
{'
13 accountable for maintaining an oversight of modification work 14 from conceptual design through completion of testing.
15 The test programs have been defined for the selected 16 systems and have received a working level review by the NRC.
l 17 The testing programs have been incorporated into the overall 18 plant restart schedule.
These procedures are being written 19 with the effort approximately one-third complete.
20 (Slide.]
21 Important aspects of our program that I would like 22 to leave you with are:
although the Davis-Besse system review 23 and test program influenced our program, we believe that we 24 have gone beyond their example until we were confident that 4
25 our program would yield the needed results.
Our program looks I
38 1
ct all 78 plcnt systems and performs augmented testing of 33 2
of those systems.
In addition to identifying system 3
improvements required prior to restart, our "get well" plan 4
for each system defines short-term and long-term improvements 5
which will be implemented following restart.
6 The program has allowed us to establish a system engineering approach within our normal way of doing things at 7
8 the plant.
By creating the counterpart to the system engineer in the design organization, called the system design engineer, 9
10 we have greatly improved the communication between the design 11 and operating organizations.
12 The combination of our in-depth system "get well"
("
13 program and testing program will demonstrate Rancho Seco's 14 readiness for restart.
15 MR. WARD:
I'd just like to comment.
Jim mentioned 16 that the system status reports which define the conceptual 17 testing program had an NRC working level review.
That does 18 not imply that they've approved it, but they have reviewed all 19 of our documents, both the initial Revision 0 documents and 20 the Rev 1 documents we supplied.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Fine.
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
How far along is the l
23 teating program?
You say you have 30 percent of the 24 procedures done.
25 MR. FIELD:
That's correct.
And we have run one or
39 1
two tests but we're not in full swing of the test program yet.
2 MR. WARD:
The principal testing involves the new 3
TDI diesels and the control room HVAC system.
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
How do you compare the 5
scope and depth of your testing program with that at 6
Davis-Besse?
For example, what systems did they test that 7
you're not testing or vice versa?
8 MR. FIELD:
The list of systems starting'to test are 9
very close.
The emphasis is on safety systems and systems 10 critical for secondary heat removal.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Is the ICS one of the 12 systems you are testing?
~
13 MR. FIELD:
Yes.
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
And what kind of testing 15 are you doing to assure that that system will indeed function 16 reliably?
17 MR. FIELD:
We are doing tests that will test out 18 power supply changes, we're doing a loss of ICS test to 19 demonstrate the ability to withstand that transient.
We're 20 also d.oing ICS tuning at multiple power levels.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Could you just give us a 22 list, supply it for us, of the 33 systems that you are going 23 to be testing?
24 MR. FIELD:
Certainly.
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Proceed.
l
. _. _ _ _ _., _.. _, ~,,
40 1
MR. WARD:
Gregg?
2 MR. CRANSTON:
Good afternoon.
My name is Gregg 3
Cranston, I'm the Manager of Nuclear Engineering at Rancho 4
Seco.
I joined SMUD as a SMUD employee in September of last 5
year and assumed my current responsibilities as Manager in 6
December.
7 The message I would like to leave with you today is 8
that the design engineering organization has completed a 9
significant amount of design work in support of restart to 10 enhance the safe and reliable operation of the plant, and in 11 parallel, is going through a concept and cultural change as to 12 how we do business.
We are not where we need to be yet, but
(~
13 we will be for restart.
14 (Slide.]
15 The basic concept is one of cooperation and 16 coordination between Engineering and plant operations.
17 Engineering will look to the plant as our client.
This is 18 being accomplished through organizational and functional 19 changes.
l l
20 Engineering has established a dedicated plant 1
21 support group to respond immediately to concerns that the 22 plant has that impact plant operations.
This group will l
23 coordinate the services of other discipline engineers as well l
l 24 as the design system engineers as required.
25 A centralized configuration control program and l
l l
,__.__..__,,_m
_ _ ~ - -. -.
41 1
manager are now in place.
This group will implement an 2
improved design change package program that controls the 3
design process and close out activities within Engineering, as 4
well as tracking and close-out of other plant activities such 5
as reviews and acceptance by other departments, procedural 6
changes, material procurement requirements, master equipment 7
list updates and final document closeout.
8 our planning and scheduling group han been matrixed 9
into Engineering from the plant side to improve coordination 10 between all departments so that engineering activities could 11 be more efficiently planned and scheduled both from the 12 standpoint of time duration and sequencing work to match plant
(~~
13 priority requirements.
14 By providing the engineering discipline the tools 15 they need to properly budget and schedule their work, 16 engineers will be held accountable and can be held accountable 17 as well as receive the satisfaction of completing a job on 18 time, on budget and in support of plant priorities.
19 A project engineering manager will be in place to 20 provide task control using project engineers of contractor i
21 tasks as well as large and internal tasks.
This manager will 22 be primarily responsible for review of management design 23 change packages performed by contractors.
Engineering is in 24 the process of phasing out secunded employees, secunded i
25 contractor personnel, and will assign contractors complete
42 i
i design change packages in areas where design engineering does 2
not have available resources or sufficient expertise.
3 Nuclear Engineering recognizes it is a department in 4
evolution.
To achieve our goal of providing design activities 5
that support a safe and reliable plant and doing so on time 6
and on budget, some cultural changes now in process must be 7
realized.
The two major cultural changes I an emphasizing are the importance of completed staff work and the understanding 8
9 that quality engineering is not a QA function but an i
10 engineering function.
11 Completed staff work relates to understanding all 12 that has to be done to issue design change packages, not just (7
13 providing a technical answer.
The engineer responsible for 14 the package must accept total responsibility and recognize 15 that both Engineering and the plant must understand the 16 problem, understand the resolution and by input; that 17 completion of the paperwork is just as critical as the 18 technical resolution; and that the job isn't done until the i
19 last drawing change notice is incorporated to reflect as-built 20 plant configuration.
21 Regarding quality engineer, each engineer must 22 realize their responsibility for quality and that they cannot 23 rely on the checker or QA or the plant to catch an error.
The 24 engineer is responsible.
25 (Slide.)
.~
. _ _ _ - ~ -
43 1
I would like to briefly cover some of the key i
2 accomplishments of the Nuclear Engineering Department in 3
support of restart.
We have completed over 90 percent of the 4
design packages to support the restart schedule.
We 5
negotiated and signed a contract for purchase to install a 6
simulator which will be operational in 1989.
We have 7
established a Configuration Control Program as previously 8
discussed, and have established and implemented a 9
computer-based action tracking system to better track and 10 schedule engineering activities in support of not only restart 11 but NRC open items and other tasks.
12 During the past five months we incorporated in the
{
13 plant drawings over 5000 design change notices that had been 14 in backlog for quite sometime.
We have initiated a field 15 problem report and engineering action report to provide a 16 method of efficiently documenting, resolving and tracking 17 plant design concerns.
And in conjunction with that, 18 established the plant support group previously discussed.
19 (Slide.)
20 our remaining challenges are to complete remaining 21 restart design change packages, complete non-design restart 22 items, implement the concepts and cultural changes previously 23 described, and phase in the permanent post-restart 24 organization.
We will be ready to support restart.
Thank i
25 you.
44 1
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
Proceed, please.
2 MR. WARD:
Bob?
i 3
MR. CROLEY:
Good afternoon.
My name is Bob Croley, 4
I am the Rancho Seco Plant Manager.
I joined SMUD as a 5
permanent employee in March 1986.
I came to SMUD from South 6
Carolina Electric and Gas, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station 7
where I was Deputy Director, Operations and Maintenance.
The 8
topic I will be discussing is operator readiness.
9 (Slide.]
10 Rancho Seco Nuclear Station has been in cold 11 shutdown since December 26, 1985.
I'm concerned that our 12 operators are rusty.
I believe a rotuning program is required
(~
13 to bring their skills up to the standards required to assure 14 operational readiness for a steaming plant.
This was 15 emphasized in November of 1986 while attempting to draw a 16 steam bubble in the pressurizer.
We burned out 11 of 13 17 heater groups in the upper pressurizar heater bundle when the 18 heaterm were energized without being completely submerged in 19 water.
20 Operational issues were also raised in NUREG-1195 21 and in our assessment of the December 26th event, such as 22 command and control within the control room, casualty training 23 and event recognition.
These issues taken together point out 24 the need for operator retuning, and we are taking steps in 25 that regard.
---,,,,,wnw,,-,--,pw,
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45 1
[ Slide]
2 We are instilling a plant ownership ethic into our 3
operations department.
They are responsible and accountable 4
for everything that happens in the plant.
They must have l
5 pride in themselves and in their plant and conduct business in l
6 a professional manner.
We in management fully support our 7
operators in making that happen.
8 As Mr. Ward discussed earlier, the Make It Happen 9
Program is having positive effects throughout the plant, l
10 including the plant operations department.
A significant 11 cultural change is taking place.
We are emphasizing to our 12 operations people that doing the job correctly is more I (~1 13 important than doing it on schedule.
14 We are in the process or instituting an operations 15 adviser program.
In fact, we are recruiting those personnel i
16 now.
The objective of this program is to enhance the analysis 17 and decision-making ability of the operating shift crew by 18 providing the shift supervisor with a senior level adviser who 19 has or had a senior reactor operator's license and experience 20 at a B&W commercial nuclear power plant.
21 The operations adviser will receive training on the 22 Rancho Seco plant systems, procedures and technical 23 specifications.
We expect these advisers on duty from plant 24 heatup through stable power operations.
Then we will evaluate 25 the program at that point.
~-
~-
- -- - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ -
46 1
We are developing and will have available in early 2
February a computerized plant equipment status control l
3 system.
This will improve the operators' ability to know what 4
equipment is available by identifying what equipment is out of 5
service and why.
This is another lesson learned from the 6
pressurizer heater bundle incident.
7 We have concluded that we must be aware of the 8
experience levels of each shift in conducting the various 9
plant ivolutions.
We have developed an event-related matrix 10 that demonstrates the amount of experience each shift operator i
11 has in conducting each of 27 plant evolutions.
In preparing
{
12 for particular evolutions, we will evaluate this material to i
j {~.
13 assure that the shift has adequate experience to safely 14 conduct that evolution.
15 Plant operations personnel receive a great deal of 16 management attention.
A member of senior operations 17 management spends a minimum of an hour with each operating 18 shift five days a week to reinforce the principles of 19 professionalism.
I personally spend a minimum of two hours 20 one night each week in the control room in addition to my l
21 regular, routine visits.
22 As proof of the pudding, we will have independent 23 verification of operator readiness through an INPO audit on 24 the simulator in Lynchburg, currently scheduled for late 25 March. This will provide us with added confidence to recommend i
47 1
restart to our board.
2 Changes to the top operations division management 3
structure is providing additiona1 management attention to 4
detail.
The single operation superintendent position has been 5
divided into three functional heads.
The superintendent of 6
unit operations is concerned with plant equipment and 7
hardware.
The shift operations superintendent is responsible 1
8 for personnel matters such as watch standing practices and 9
training.
The superintendent of projects and procedures 10 assures procedures are up to date.
11 We are currently staffed at 96'in the plant 1
12 operations department.
As you see, there are 14 senior
- (~
13 reactor operators, 16 Ros, and 43 non-licensed operators.
14 These numbers do not count STAS for staff licenses.
In 15 addition, we have seven people in a hot licensing program 16 which should be completed in October of this year.
Staff 17 personnel and procedure writers make up the difference in the 18 numbers that you see presented.
19 We will heat up with five shifts, each with six 20 licensed individuals.
This is two licensed individuals more 21 than the four required by 1C CFR 50.54.
Again, this does not 22 include the STA.
The STA would be additional.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
So it is going to be three 24 and three?
Is that going to be three SROs and three Ros?
I 25 MR. CROLEY:
For most of the shifts, but then, of
48 1
course, for one shift it will not be the case.
2 We are conducting an aggressive training program, 3
both classroom and simulator.
The classroom training is 4
extensive due to the significant number of design 5
modifications that we have made to the plant and resultant 6
procedural changes.
We have increased our simulator training 7
from one week per year previously conducted to two weeks last 8
year and three weeks this year.
Two weeks will be prior to 9
restart in February, March and April.
That is, the training 10 will be conducted in those three months.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Still go to Lynchburg?
12 MR. CROLEY:
Yes, sir.
['-
13 Emphasis during the simulator training is being
-14 placed.upon normal plant operations, which has not been done 15 in the past.
Diagnosing casualties and control room command 16 and control.
The restart testing program provides an 17 excellent opportunity to reacquaint the operators under 18 controlled conditions with equipment systems they haven't 19 manipulated in some time.
I make note that the Rancho Seco 20 simulator will be functional in 1989, and we are certainly 21 looking forward to that.
22 We will have written or revised 145 operations 23 procedures by April 1, 1987.
Included are emergency operating 24 procedures, which have just had their B&B performed in 25 Lynchburg on the simulator, annunciator procedures, casualty
~
49 1
procedures, as well as normal operating procedures.
- Training, 2
of course, will be provided on the revised procedures.
A 3
long-term procedures project is in place to continue to 4
enhance operations procedures.
5 In conclusion, with the implementation of the 6
programs and improvements I have just outlined, I feel the 7
operations group will be able to operate Rancho Seco safely 8
and efficiently.
9 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Are the three new 11 functional heads new people?
12 MR. CROLZY:
They are existing people.
They are
(^.
13 people that have a great deal of experience at Rancho Seco.
14 MR. WARD:
I will give you a few comments on the 15 transition plan.
16
[ Slide.]
\\
17 One of the key elements of the action plan is the 18 development of a competent management team dedicated to 19 making Rancho Seco one of the top performers in the country.
20 (Slide.]
I 21 Since the December 26 incident, we have hired six 22 new senior managers, department level managers, who bring with 23 them experience gained at well-run nuclear plants throughout 24 the country, and each has his own proven track record.
These 25 are the plant manager, the operations manager, the maintenance
50 1
manager, the training manager, the nuclear projects manager 2
and the nuclear engineering manager.
3
[ Slide.)
4 Executive recruiters are currently searching for the 5
replacements for the two remaining department managers.
Once 6
these are filled, we will have a complete changeout. These are 7
the nuclear licensing manager and the quality assurance 8
manager.
As was mentioned by Stu, we have identified four 9
very competent QA people that are going through the process 10 now.
11 We have identified and are currently interviewing 12 six candidates for the principal nuclear operational
(~
13 executive, that is, the assistant general manager, nuclear 14 operations.
15 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Is that your relief?
16 MR. WARD:
No, sir.
He will report directly to me, 17 and I will discuss my situation here in just a minute.
l 18 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
19 MR. WARD:
Our goal is to have all management 20 positions filled with qualified SMUD people by the end of 21 March of this year, with the exception of one.
After restart, 22 the search for my replacement will begin.
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Why are you waiting so long?
24 MR. WARD:
Basically, I have been asked --
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Why don't you do it now?
51 1
MR. WARD:
I have been asked to remain on the job to 2
provide continuity.
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
I understand that.
Well, go 4
ahead.
I will listen to'you.
5 MR. WARD:
And particularly to begin the critical 6
operational phase of the new Rancho Seco.
Key to that is 7
maintaining my purview over the necessary actions to see that 8
- the action plan remains effective and that the longer-term 9
programmatic improvements are initiated.
I estimate that a 10 successor will be identified no later than the and of this 11 year and will be on board prior to the next refueling outage.
12 Ann, you might want to make some comments.
, (~
13 MS. TAYLOR:
I think the one thing that the Board is 14 looking at is we don't want backsliding on the amount of work 15 that has been done out there, and you know yourself that 16 whenever you have changed a whole environment around, the 17 feeling is that, well, when that team goes away, we are going 18 to go back to the way things were.
We are not going to go 19 back to the way things were.
We were not efficient that way, 20 we were not operating properly, and we have a new team in 21 place and we have a turnaround out there, and I want that 22 sustained.
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Fine.
But how long is Mr. Ward 24 going to stay there?
Are you going to be permanent?
i 25 MS. TAYLOR:
Mr. Ward is being considered as a i
52 1
possible permanent replacement.
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
If he is going to stay there for a 3
considerable period of time, then I --
4 MS. TAYLOR:
Yes, he is.
It is not just through 5
restart. I would see to it that he stayed there a longer time 6
than that.
7 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
That is. fine because 8
continuity is important.
9 MS. TAYLOR:
The continuity is extremely important.
10 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
And a permanent team is important.
11 MS. TAYLOR:
Absolutely.
12 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
So you are not there yet everywhere,
{'
13 as you have pointed out.
You are coming along nicely in some 14 areas, but now you are talking about rather senior management 15 people, and in my view management involvement, management key 16 people are so important that this area is extremely important.
j 17 MS. TAYLOR:
I think the one thing that we have 18 looked at is that we have added considerable depth to the 19 management out there. Not only will you have a deputy manager, i
20 but we have several various levels below that that we never 21 had before.
So I think that what we want to do is build that 22 depth and have a good basis for it and have that really strong 23 and the continuity there till we get into the new regime.
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Fine.
I just emphasize to the Board 25 that it should be, I think, recognized, as I believe you are
53 1
tolling no right now, that your management strength and a 2
permanent staff is crucial.
I know it is crucial to us as far 3
as we are concerned -.
4 MS. TAYLOR:
It is crucial to us, too.
5 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
-- for confidence of safe 6
operations, and I think it should be crucial to you.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I would say the key point, 8
though, is that, John, you are. staying well beyond any projected restart, and in fact, I gather, well into next year?
9 10 MS. TAYLOR:
At least a year past restart.
11 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Long enough to be held 12 responsible for his actions.
(~'
13 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
That is what we want.
We want you 14 accountable.
15 MR. WARD:
Absolutely.
I feel that.
The Board has 16 asked that I stay on until next refueling.
We are talking 17 fall 1988.
18 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
And you plan to do that?, They have a
19 asked you, and you have committed that to them?
20 MR. WARD:
I am committed to this program, committed 21 to the Board.
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
And to stay until the first 23 refueling?
24 MR. WARD:
I am committed to stay as long as they 25 feel it is necessary, and if that is the first refueling, that
54 1
is where it will be.
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
It is their choice, 3
then.
If they want to get rid of you, then can get rid of 4
you.
5 MS. TAYLOR:
That is right.
t 6
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
That is fine. But if they are 7
satisfied with you, you oug,ht to be able to stay.
So it is 8
their call, right?
f 9
MS. TAYLOR:
It is our call.
10 HR. WARD:
Absolutely.
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Fine.
12 MR. WARD:
Some comments on the schedule.
Jim.
(
13 MR. SHETLER:
Good afternoon.
My name is Jim 14 Shetler.
I am the implementation manager at Rancho Seco, and 15 this is equivalent to an outage manager position.
I have been 16 with the district since December 1985.
Prior to that time, I 17 worked for Babcock & Wilcox for 14 years in both design, l
18 outage coordination and management experience.
4 l
19
[ Slide.)
20 This afternoon I would like to discuss the 21 scheduling process and controls at Rancho Seco and the current 22 schedule status.
23 The restart outage schedule for Rancho Seco is 24 maintained on a Project II computerized data base.
The 25 process for schedule development has involved two phases. The l
4
--_y.
55 1
guesstimation phase of the schedule development was in 2
1986.
This phase was represented by the use of summary 3
schedules based upon preliminary scope definitions.
- However, 4
by September 1986, the plant performance and management 5
improvement program had generated the details, prioritized 6
scope definition for the restart.
7 Using thip definition as a basis, the detail, 8
estimation and schedule development phase was initiated and 9
has been ongoing since September.
This definition, coupled 10 with the detail scoping of design packages and definition of 11 the test program, has resulted in a more detailed and accurate 12 schedule projection.
(~
13 The control of the restart schedule is maintained 14 through the use of the implementation and management 15 organization. This organization directs the execution of the 16 day-to-day restart activities.
In addition, all schedule 17 development and scope changes are coordinated through this i
18 organization.
j 19 Schedule accountability is also a key to the control 1
20 of the restart outage.
This accountability is maintained 21 through the normal line organization for routine activities 22 and through the establishment of special projects for major 23 activities such as the TDI project and the EFIC project.
24 These special projects are staffed and dedicated resources in 1
25 order to create a cohesive team.
. - ~..
56 1
[ Slide.)
2 The restart effort has been progressing well, and I 3
would like to share with you some of our major accomplishments 4
to date.
The EFIC system is approximately 50 percent 5
complete, with the new steam generator level taps and aux 6
feedwater isolation and control valves installed.
The TDI 7
diesel 100-hour test runs have been completed.
In addition, 8
the' phase two engine teardowns have bee completed and no 9
problems have been uncovered.
10 A preventative steam generator sleeving effort on 11 approximately 500 tubes was completed last fall.
This is 3
12 expected to minimize future shutdown due to tube leaks and
(
13 the impact due to potential off-site releases.
14 Of the nearly 240 design packages identified for 15 installation during the restart effort, engineering has issued 16 approximately 90 percent.
Approximately 30 percent of the 17 design packages have been constructed and turned over for 18 testing.
In addition, approximately 10 percent have been 19 tested and released to the plant.
20 Also, late last year the test program scope was 21 identified and finalized.
This has allowed the detailed test 22 schedule to be generated and integrated into the overall 23 restart effort to determine their impact.
24 (Slide.]
I 25 As a result of the scheduling efforts conducted to t
i 57 1
d to, wo new hevo a fairly accurate projection for our restart 2
activities based upon the presently defined scope of work.
3 The schedule projection can be summarized as follows:
The 4
known design packages required for restart are nearly complete 5
and are forecast for final issuance by mid-February.
The 6
critical modification and maintenance activities are ongoing 7
and are presently forecast for completion by mid-April.
These 8
activities currently'are paced by the logic ties of completing 9
the pressurizer heater repairs, performing our A and B train 10 safety system outages, and the final tie-in of the EFIC system 11 and transfer of aux feedwater load to the new electrical 12 buses.
- (*
13 The system test program has started on a low level 14 basis with the TDI diesel tests and will be expanding as 15 systems are turned over through the end of April.
16 The cold shutdown integrated tacting is mainly 17 represented by the containment ILRT to be conducted in March, 18 the EFIC functional test in late April, and the loss of 19 off-site power and emergency safety features actuation test in 20 early May.
21 Plant heatup and the hot shutdown testing program 22 are scheduled to start in mid-May and run through mid-June.
23 Testing at low power prior to close of breakers is scheduled 24 the second half of June.
This is then followed by the power 25 escalation through various test plateaus during early July.
58 1
Of obvious concern to the restart effort is to 2
ensure that'tJun operators are ready for plant heatup and power 3
operations.
The generation of new and revised operating 4
procedures is ongoing and forecast for completion by 5
mid-March.
Procedures required for operator training on the simulator have been completed and are currently proceeding 6
,7 through their verification and validation process.
8 The operator readiness training on the simulator 9
will be conducted from early February to late April.
This will involve two cycles on the simulator for each group.
The 10 11 result is that the operators will have gone through their 12 retuning program well before the projected planned heatup and
[~
13 restart.
14 In summary, the restart effort has a defined scope 15 based upon plant performance and management improvement 16 program that have been well integrated into a detailed 17 schedule.
We recognize that there are exposures to the 18 schedule, but we believe it represents a realistic basis fcr 19 our planning and management of the outage.
j 20 Thank you.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
22 We still have to hear from our own staff, but are 23 there any other questions from people while they are here, the 24 Rancho Seco people?
i 25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Just a couple.
.---._,7._
_,...___.__,___,.,,,m,...
r,__.
59 1
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Go ahead.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
The engineering program.
3 In terms of the configuration of the management program, how 4
far back are you looking and to what extent are you looking at 5
modifications that have been made since the plant first went 6
into operation to verify, in fact, that you still meet your 7
FSAR in every respect; and second, to what extent are you 8
looking beyond the FSAR to areas where you may have some 9
vulnerabilities that can contribute to operating difficulties lo even in areas where you may already comply witt what is in the 11 FSAR right now but the FSAR just may be deficient?
12 MR. WARD:
There are several parts to that answer.
(~
13 First, we do have in some instances design basis documents 14 that had been prepared by the engineer or by the NSSS vendor, 15 which are significant documents, not enough to cover a
}
)
16 sufficient number of systems.
The system review process went 17 back to day one and is scheduled also to incorporate a 18 detailed review of all the modification and maintenance 19 history, so that will be incorporated into those programs.
20 We have selected for initial implementation five 21 systems where we will g'o back to bedrock on those systems right from where the calculations started and develop those 22 kind of documents, and that will be an ongoing program. As we 23 24 complete those, we will add other systems to it.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Which five are you
60 o
1 starting with?
2 MR. WARD:
I can't name them all, but they are the 3
key ones, like main feed and auxiliary feed, those systems 4
that we feel are key to the safe operation of the plant.
But 5
those are listed in the restart document, the actual plan.
r 6
COMMISSIGNER ASSELSTINE:
Did I understand you to 7
say that you are not sure you got the complete design basis 8
for the plant at this point?
You are reconstructing it?
9 MR. WARD:
We are reconstructing the design basis.
10 We have gone back to the functional basis of all of the 11 systems, the 33 systems that were mentioned by Jim that are 4
12 safety systems, and then the additional systems that make up
(~
13 the total number of systems in the plant, 78.
Wc are 14 reconstructing those.
I think you will find most of the 15 plants of this vintage are lacking in that regard.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Given the fact that you 17 are just getting' going with the testing program and with the i
18 engineering review, how much confidence should we really put 19 into those estimates, your time schedule for re-start?
I had 20 in mind the Davis-Besse experience, where I think in 21 hindsight, the early estimates were grossly unrealistic, based 22 upon all the things they found when they did the systems i
23 testing work and the engineering design reviews for systems.
24 We found a lot of surprises.
25 MR. WARD:
And I expect to also, Commissioner.
I
61 1
think that you are between a rock and a hard place.
If you 2
schedule to incorporate all the contingencies, then the 3
schedule will take that long.
Parkinson's law works there.
4 You schedule a tight schedule, a reasonable schedule, and I 5
have not scheduled for surprises, so I expect failures during 6.
the test program will affect the schedule.
We will identify 7
things we have to do.
4 8
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Also, and you don't have 9
to do it right now, but could you for those new people that lo you have brought in for the senior management positions, just 11 let us know what their positions were where they came from 12 before they came to you?
('
13 MR. WARD:
Yes.
We are putting a package together 14 now that we intend to submit to your staff and I will send copies to you, that include resumes of all these people.
15 16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Good.
17 MR. WARD:
I would like to mention, just in 18 conclusion though, a couple of things.
First of all, the 19 accident at TMI shocked us all, all of us who have been in the 20 industry for a long period of time.
It showed us that the i
21 operator was key to safe operation.
The incidence at Rancho 22 Seco on December 26th was significant in and of itself, but 23 it brought about a process that is bringing fundamental 24 changes to Rancho Seco.
We are committed to achieving 25 excellence.
We understand a lot of hard work lies ahead of us i
~_
1 o
62 l
1 as we implement the changes that we have outlined to you.
We 2
aren't there yet.
Events constantly remind us of that fact.
3 We are dedicated to success.
Rancho Seco is too 4
important to the District to allow failure.
5 We appreciate your time.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Let me ask a question or 7
two.
I guess I'm a little mystified because it has been the 8
better part of a year now since I was cut and visited the 9
plant.
You weren't there yet, John.
At that time, I recall a 10 couple of things vividly.
One was there was a large 11 multi-volume set of procedures, operating procedures.
I guess 12 the as-built specifications on the plant, many, many technical
("
13 things that were being undertaken, were yet completed, 14 although it was clear there were lots of empty pages in those 15 volumes at that point and the job was unfinished.
16 It seemed like things were on a reasonable track, 17 just as a matter of principle, technically.
I am really l
18 speaking technically now.
19 In a similar vein, I also was led to believe that 20 the quality assurance problem was in hand.
This was last 21 April.
Operations and construction quality control were being 22 moved to a new quality department and the various steps had 23 been taken to deal with overall quality assurance and 24 control.
Yet, now I am hearing today that the assessment was t
i 25 made in May that the QA organization was an orphan and had l
l
e 63 1
done things after the fact and what not.
2 What led you to these kinds of conclusions?
Am I to 3
assume that the technical aspects of this turn around were basically in place and that technically things were headed in 4
the right direction but there were still serious management 5
6 deficiencias at that time?
That is the sense I get from what 7
I am hearing here, because I hear great emphasis on management 8
here and considerably less emphasis on technical matters than 9
I heard last April.
10 Could you comment on that a little bit?
11 MR. WARD:
I think the first thing I did when I came 12 on board in May was I brought aboard a team of experts and we
(~)
13 did a quick and dirty diagnostic of the process.
What we 14 found was an excellent process in place for technical issue 15 identification.
The plant performance and management 16 improvement program was in place and operating and it is 17 excellent.
It is, in my mind, the most outstanding example of 18 how you can go back and really understand what you need to do 19 in a plant.
That was in place, basically technically 20 oriented.
21 What we found, however, was a management attitude 22 that had in the past prevented the identification of problems i
23 and getting anything done on them.
We found that was key.
We 24 found that was such a pervasive problem that it required the 25 involvement of every person on the site.
i
64 1
This make it happen program, while it may sound like 2
mumbo-j umbo, is a significant part of our plan.
Many people 3
were cynical when we instituted that program.
I think there 4
are very few who are cynical today, and most of them are 5
enthusiastic supporters of that attitude change that has taken 6
place.
7 MS. TAYLOR:
I think to get back to Chairman Zech's 8
concern earlier on, when I said it was really important to 9
keep our team in place, I think the back sliding into the old 10 environment would be the most harmful thing that could 11 happen.
As you pointed out, the changes were in people.
The 12 people in place in the right places doing the right thing with 13 the right orientation and that is where it is so difficult to 14 make those changes.
You can make them at the top but by gosh, 4
15 if the troops don't get the message, it doesn't work, so you 16 have to continually reinforce that and you have to keep the 4
17 management team that you get in place there functioning and 18 functioning strongly in order to keep that going.
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I agree.
I guess I am 20 relieved, and I hope I am relieved six months after re-start 21 to hear this sense of great emphasis on management and people 22 that I have heard here was by design and that is in fact where
'23 you saw the greatest need, because my sense of the technical 24 situation, which you now confirm, was one of some comfort 25 almost a year ago, and on the other hand, identifying these
..v.
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65 1
people issues and management issues is one of the most 2
difficult jobs to carry out for anybody, certainly for members 3
of this Commission.
4 If you have identified those problems and have 5
addressed those successfully, then you will have performed an 6
unique service to this utility.
Keep at it.
Thank you.
7 MS. TAYLOR:
Thank you.
We will.
8 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Carr?
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I had one other question 10 for Ann.
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Go ahead.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
When I was out at the
^
t 13 plant last May, at the time, there was some difference of 14 agreement or differing views among members of the Board.
As a 15 member of a multi-member Commission, I certainly can j
16 understand those kinds of situations.
You are trying to run a 17 nuclear power plant and I guess I would be interested in your 18 assessment of the present situation on the Board.
Is 19 everybody pulling in the same general direction and is there 20 dommitment on the part of the Board in support of what John is 21 doing and in terms of a degree of delegation of authority to 22 John and to the management team for the plant, that gives them 23 the authority they need to do the job?
24 MS. TAYLOR:
Yes.
I think there definitely is.
The 25 new member that was elected to the Board, the only new member
66 1
en the Board that was elected in November, has spoken to the 2
fact that he intends for the plant to re-start and he intends 3
to see it re-started properly.
I think that is very important 4
that we have that assurance, so that we have all five Board 5
members in concurrence.
It's the most important and 6
significant thing that we have going on right now in the 7
utility.
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I would just ask John, 9
from your standpoint, your predecessor left over some concern, 10 I think, at least in part, with his relationship with the 11 Board.
Are you comfortable with the current situation and 12 with the attitudes and support of the Board?
13 MR. WARD:
As I am sure Victor Stello, whose sign 14 sits in front of me, would agree with me, there are problems 15 working with a multi-headed chief executive office.
On the 16 other hand, I have received five zero votes from that Board
(
17 every time I have gone to them for money or for support.
They 18 have put their votes where their principles are.
19 I have unique expenditure authority.
My predecessor 20 had a limit of $20,000 on anything he could spend without 21 Board approval.
I have a $1 million limit that they have 22 given me.
I have significant support.
I feel that support.
23 That support for other issues is not as unanimous but for 24 Rancho Seco, the Board lines up solidly behind the program.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
What has this cost so far l
l l
~ - ' ' ~ ~ ~
~ ^ ' ' ~ ~
67 1
and what are your projections on what it is going to cost when 2
you are done?
3 MR. WARD:
We have committed -- this is over and 4
beyond the normal O&M expenditures.
We have programmed, 5
through re-start, some $200 million.
As you noticed, in our 6
priority schedule, that goes on -- our program goes on for 7
several years.
That dollar amount will increase.
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That's a very important 9
point that you have brought up.
I think we all agree that 10 having five bosses, and I can't remember how many you have --
11 MR. WARD:
Five.
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
In the case of SMUD,*I think 13 the entire question of Board governance of a nuclear plant is 14 to some extent on trial here.
It is very important to be 15 brought off correctly.
16 MS. TAYLOR:
I think we will accept that 17 responsibility.
We have also brought in a couple of oversight 18 committees to assure us that John and his people are operating 19 correctly.
I think that is very important.
These are people 20 that have credibility throughout the industry.
They report 21 only to the Board.
They will give us an assessment of how 22 things are going.
23 We have checks and balances.
It is not a question 24 that John is just turned loose, and yet he also does not have l
1 25 to jump every time somebody hollers.
68 1
MR. WARD:
To help in this coordination and in the 2
Board understanding what is going on, we developed a five year 3
business plan, a comprehensive plan, that has in it some 20 4
performance indicators and goals year by year, so the Board 5
will be aware by monthly and quarterly reports exactly where 6
we are.
It won't be the very informal loose kind of 7
relationship as in the past, but a CEO's relationship to the a
8 most significant operation within the District.
9 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
I have some comments but 10 I am going to hold them until I hear from the staff.
11 Ms. Taylor, thank you very much.
Mr. Ward, thank you very 12 auch.
We appreciate it.
13 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Mr. Vollmer, proceed please.
14 MR. VOLLMER:
We will brief.
The Rancho Seco 15 program for upgraded facilities, operations staff, and so 16 forth has, as you know, received considerable staff resources i
17 and management attention over the past year.
18 As a summary, the process for determining the scope 19 and the specific accomplishments or specific actions to be 20 accomplished to date appears to be well-developed and adequate 21 to solve the known problems.
The Staff has performed numerous 22 technical reviews, routine and special inspections, and held a 23 number of management meetings with SMUD and their staff to 24 assure that the program was addressing the important issues 25 and was proceeding on a path that we believe to be important
_~
69 1
to resolve the issues.
4 2
I think the Staff's view at this time, I would summarize that the direction that they are proceeding and the 3
4 commitments they have made are appropriate; however, we think 5
that there have not been enough accomplishments to date to 6
build the requisite confidence in their ability to resume 7
operations.
There's just a lot of work in process.
8 The Staff further, I think, is skeptical about the 9
current schedule that they've shown.
I think you've reflected 10 some of that skepticism in your comments.
And also we were 11 skeptical a bit about their ability to transition quickly into 12 an all-SMUD operating organization.
I think the teamwork is 13 not yet adequate.
14 Several of us met with SMUD a couple weeks ago and 15 looked at their program and looked at the plant, and although 16 there's a lot going on, there's still considerable plant 17 upgrade work, testing, upgrade of drawings, procedural 18 revisions, and training that remain to be done.
19 With that sort of an overview, I will turn to Jack 20 and then Frank to give you their views.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Fine.
Mr. Martin, the Regional 22 Administrator?
l 23 MR. MARTIN:
Yes.
I guess the view that I have of l
24 this, and it's essentially the same as Dick's, is that the i,
i 25 better part of the last year has been spent by SMUD in l
70 1
id0ntifying probicas.
Thic hac elw2yo b3On a prebico in the 2
past, getting the organization to face facts, and it seems to 3
have taken a maddeningly long time -- it's been a whole year 4
now -- to have spent just sifting through the past history and 5
past events to identify what it is that needs to be fixed.
i 6
But that has been what's going on.
1 7
I've watched this very closely.
The Region has been i
8 quite involved.
And our conclusion is, so far, that the 9
problem identification phase has been done well and with 10 integrity.
Not only the identification phase, but the 11 prioritization has been not so much with an eye towards how 12 much time do we have, but what really needs to be done.
i 13 A couple of weeks ago, we had a team out from j
14 Headquarters, Jim Taylor's people, that do these safety system i
15 functional inspections, the same people that looked at Turkey f
16 Point and a few of the others, and they took a slice of five 17 of these systems.
Our methodology was, "Now don't you look at 18 anything SMUD did; you go look at five systems by yourself,"
4 19 and then we'll match up what you find versus what SMUD found i
20 as sort of an independent validation from either SMUD or the i
~
l 21 Region, and they did not find anything that had not already 22 been identified.
4 23 So I feel very good about -- the work items that 24 have been identified are, in fact, comprehensive and go well l
25 beyond the bare minimum.
4 1
71 1
We still, I think, have some arguing to do about the 2
priorities.
I suspect that there is some percentage of them 3
that some will think should be Priority 1, and that's still 4
going on, and I think another couple of weeks or a month or so 4
5' will be required before we're, in fact, satisfied with that.
4 6
The general perspective you should have is the 7
permanent identification phase is finished, and we're still 8
arguing about the prioritization of the work items.
9 The work, on the other hand, to fix this stuff is 10 just barely getting off the ground.
The Engineering Manager
{
11 indicated that about 9d percent of the work packages to 12 perform the improvements have been released.
13 I'm not sure how much confidence we have in that 14 engineering work.
I'm going to look very hard at it.
The 15 team that was out from Headquarters reached in and just 16 grabbed on engineering package out of some 300 and found some l
17 significant difficulties with it.
So whether that's the 18 needle in the haystack or, in fact, that's the haystack, I 19 don't know yet.
20 The test program to be done to validate, in fact, I'
21 that the systems meet all requirements, we have not yet l
22 reviewed.
We've had a contractor that has also looked -- the 23 same contractor that we used for Davis-Besse has looked at it, 24 and has given it favorable remarks, but the test procedures 25 are not yet written, so I'm not sure whether we agree that L
- - - - - - - - - - ~ '
72 1
that test program does everything we want it to or not.
2 That's something that will be taking place in the next month l
3 or so.
1 4
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Jack, it certainly appears 5
that there has been a significant strengthening of the 6
management here, and one hopes identification of these people 7
issues, as I call them.
8 Are you convinced, based on what you've just said, 9
that the overall organization has the technical strength and 10 capability to do what needs to be done and sustain the effort?
11 MR. MARTIN:
No, I'm not.
I'm not convinced yet.
12 I'm not to the contrary either.
I think it's inconclusive.
13 What's happened is that in the past SMUD has had a 14 very strong operating organization, the top people in the 15 company where the main emphasis was operations.
They were 16 hostile to many of the things that we like to emphasize, like 17 engineering, maintenance, and quality assurance, and it 18 eventually caught up with them.
But they were good on 19 operations.
20 Those people are now gone.
It was a mixed 21 blessing.
On the one hand, they were inhibiting any real 22 progress; yet on the other hand, they were, in a sense, the 23 strength of the organization.
24 Now the new organization, it's sort of like 25 assembling an all-star team.
There are people that have come
73 1
from all over the country that are not yet -- had a lot of 2
time to work with each other, not a lot of time to react in 3
operating situations, and how that's going to work, I just 4
don't know.
I think they're going to need time.
i 5
I told or made the comment when Commissioner carr 6
was out there last week that so far all we've been able to 7
measure is this caper with the pressurizer and an incident 8
where some water was drained out of the spent fuel pool a 9
couple of weeks ago.
10 so I think that certainly the prospects are there i
11 for a much stronger organization, but they're just getting 12 started.
i 13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But do you think, to use an I
14 overworked word here, the technical infrastructure has always 15 been there, is there now, or you don't know?
i 16 MR. MARTIN:
No, I think it's there now.
But 17 whether it's going to need some seasoning -- as I look at the j
18 people that came up to the table here, there ao good or better 19 as you see elsewhere.
20 COMMISSICNER BERNTHAL:
I'm not so much thinking of 21 the people at the table, though.
I'm thinking of grabbing an i
l 22 engineering package out, as you say, and asking whether -- not 23 the people at this table, probably not even in this room, but 24 people in the organization further down have the strength and 1
25 capability to pull things off.
I l
,------.c-----w-n,r_,,..
.,,.,n.n..-.
74 1
MR. MARTIN:
I think they do, and that's what we're 2
going to be spending the next couple of months looking at.
And it's sort of hard to believe, sitting where you are, that 3
4 it's been a whole year, and there hasn't been much to look at 5
yet.
But that is, in fact, the case, and we're just now getting the engineering packages to look at, getting the test 6
7 procedures to see if they, in fact, do what they're supposed 8
to do, and be able to observe the people actually doing 9
something out in the field.
10 But I am heartened by the -- I've in the past 11 characterized SMUD as an organization that strives to do the 12 bare minimum.
Certainly the problem identification and the 13 decisions that have been made like installing EFIC, replacing 14 the heater bundles, things like that, are well beyond l
15 minimum.
So so far, so good there.
Whether the next leg of 16 the journey is what we'd like, we'll know better maybe by the 17 time we meet next in a couple or three months.
18 That's all I have.
19 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Frank?
20 MR. MIRAGLIA:
Yes, I'll make a comment or two.
I I
i 21 don't want to beat the same dead horse.
I l
22 I think it is important to note that it has been 23 thirteen months since the event, and when one tries to measure 24 project progress over that time, it doesn't seem like much.
25 But as an instance, the EFIC decision, to install
75 1
EFIC, wasn't made until late summer, and that's an important l
2 thing to recognize, and they have a lot to do.
I think we 3
like what we see in the start-up test program with respect to 4
how they're identifying what functions need to be tested.
As 5
Jack said, whether the procedures that they're writing, we 6
will agree that those are the appropriate ones, remains to be 7
seen.
8 I think they have a lot on their plate, and the 9
concern really is on the follow-through and the implementation 10 of the programs they have in place.
But there has been that l
11 change in some of the decision-making processes, as Jack said, 12 with EFIC, with the replacement of the heater bundles.
They
~
13 could have tried to get by with something less than that --
14 the retubing of the steam generators, other indications.
And 15 those decisions weren't made until late summer, and so it took time from December to that time to at least put a concept of 16 l
17 what the program should look like together.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Why did it take so long?
i 19 Would you attribute that to the uncertainty at the very top to 20 the question of Board support for some of these major 21 changes?
What's the reason?
22 MR. MIRAGLIA:
Well, I think there was a time from 23 the time of the incident until the next General Manager went in -- I'm not quite sure what the timing of that was, but it 24
'I 25 was on the order of months.
r
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76 1
Wo had cur firct COctingo in Fcbruary, and bnocd on 2
that, we were pushing in directions of what are the restart 3
items, what are you going to fix and what aren't you going to 4
fix.
And there were a number of interesting discussions at 5
the facility regarding what they were going to fix and what 6
they thought they would not fix.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But where were those 8
decisions being made?
Was it the people at the very top in 9
the plant management at the time, or was that an interaction 10 with the Board?
Or maybe we should ask the utility.
11 MR. MIRAGLIA:
My gut reaction is, it is -- I think 12 the need for a change and a new management team had been 13 identified, and they only had one individual at that time, and 14 it took time to inculcate that down to the staff, to say, 15 "We're going to make this process work, and we're really truly 16 going te get that change."
And I think that attitude took 17 time to change.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes, I was really referring 19 to a couple of these major hardware decisions, though, 20 resleeving the steam generator tubes and the EFIC system.
21 That was sort of waiting for this management team to assemble 22 itself as well or --
23 MR. MIRAGLIA:
Well, you know, earlier the change to 24 the ICS was, we'll make the improvements in the ICS and make t e l
25 the Rancho ICS much like the other B&W ICSs, which would not
77' 1
hevo rosponded severely, and the engineering would indicate 2
time.
In other words, restart the plant sooner, rather than i
3 wait to try and get the engineering done.
And I'm not quite 4
sure what goes into making those decisions and where those 5
decisions were made.
6 MR. MARTIN:
I think it's symptomatic of the change 7
in personnel in the organization, where a couple of years 8
ago, the approach would be to kind of feel out what's the bare minimum we'd accept, and then that's what we'll do, as opposed 9
to sit down and develop the alternatives and look at the thing 10 11 sensibly and decide what we want to do.
And that's been a 12 process that's been going on in the last year and somewhere 13 towards the end of the summer.
14 To my knowledge, there wasn't a whole lot of, "What 15 do you think we ought to do," that went into those decisions.
16 It was more, "Here's what we're going to do," and everybody 17 here was, of course, pleased.
18 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Mr. Vollmer, anything else?
19 MR. VOLLMER:
No, sir.
I 20 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Questions from the 21 Commissioners?
Commissioner Asselstine?
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Just two.
How would you 23 compare the competence of the team, the responsiveness, the 24 depth and scope of the program for what Rancho Seco is doing 25 and compare that with what Davis-Besse did?
Speed in getting
78 l
1 off the ground, the whole nine yards.
You have been through 2
both of them, or you've been through one.
3 MR. MIRAGLIA:
T've been through both of them, and 4
I'll take a crack at that.
5 I think the speed in getting off the ground 6
certainly wasn't there.
As far as the individual --
7 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
It wasn't there, you say, in the 8
case of Rancho Seco?
9 MR. MIRAGLIA:
It took Rancho Seco a lot longer to 10 get the program together and get it moving.
If we look at 11 Davis-Besse, it was the June 9th event, and they were in by 12 the and of August, early September, before the Commission 13 saying, "Here's our plan."
They had a very ambitious 14 schedule, as Commissioner Asselstine pointed out, but they had 15 the elements of the programs to identify the problems and 16 identified and underway.
17 It certainly has taken Rancho longer than that.
18 Certainly the management changes and the degree of management 19 changes have been as substantive here as at Davis-Besse, and 20 again, it's taken them a little longer to get some of that 21 talent on board.
And I think in some of their very early 22 meetings with the Commission in Davis-Besse, some of the new 23 managers were on board, and others were in the pipeline.
24 As far as the scope of the program, I think Rancho 25 has followed Davis-Besse in the test review program, and the
-~
79 1
comprehensiveness and the scope of the program seem to be 2
comparable, if not in some areas in more depth, in asking the 3
right kinds of questions.
I think they've learned from the 4
process that Davis-Besse used.
5 One thing that the utility hasn't mentioned, they're 6
doing the MOVATS on all their motor-operated valves, just like 7
Davis-Besse is, and has learned from that experience and, you 8
know, is doing that thing in a quicker timeframe and faster 9
and have learned from that kind of experience.
10 So I think overall timewise, I would say they were 11 slower getting off the ground.
I think what we see to date is 12 the programs; we think they're comprehensive enough, and what 13 remains to be seem is, is the implementation and 14 follow-through going to be there as it was in Davis-Besse, and 15 that's what Jack and the rest of us are saying:
We have to 16 wait and see some more.
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
My last question.
18 I understand Region V will pretty much stay the same and be on 19 top of it, but I've got a concern, since we're talking about organizations and reorganizations on our side of the house, in 20 1
NRR we've h"ad the group of people that have lived through the 21 22 Davis-Besse experience and now have started off on this one, 23 and that organization now is going to be changed.
24 Who is going to be riding herd on this project?
Is
(
25 it going to be the same group of people that have started it
80 1
and that went through the whole Davis-Besse experience, cut 2
their teeth on that one, or is that sort of our the window?
3 MR. MIRAGLIA:
No, I think there might be some 4
changes, Commissioner, certainly with respect to the project's 5
organization.
Our intent would be to keep the project 6
management functions intact.
The technical organization will 7
be reporting to another technical arm, rather than being in 8
one division, but, I mean, I think the technical strength and 9
the talent and the people who have worked on both programs 10 would be there.
11 We're bringing some of the I&E talent into NRR 12 that's going to be doing -- as Jack indicated, we did a
~
13 systems inspection, special systems inspection, in concert to 14 complement what we're doing in the test review program.
15 I think the people will be there, and perhaps the 16 reporting chain will be a little different.
I think the team 17 is going to be there.
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
One last question:
What's 19 your sense of the design-basis issue, the full configuration 20 management issue, right now on Rancho, and what are you 21 looking for?
Do you want them to reestablish the design r
basis, so that at least they understand what the design basis 22 23 of the plant is before they restart it and verify that, in 24 fact, the plant meets it?
Is that one of the things that 25 you're going to be interested in finding?
l
81 1
MR. MIRAGLIA:
I think they've done that in the 2
context of the start-up and test review program.
They're 3
going -- they're saying, "What should the functions be," the 4
design basis, and they've done that.
5 What hasn't been done is pulling it all together and 6
documenting it in a neat kind of way for those kinds of 7
systems, and I think that's what Mr. Ward was alluding to in 8
the longer-term configuration management, is to get that and 9
get it all into the updated FSAR and things of that nature.
10 So that start-up test program goes back to that 11 basic document.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
Would you agree 13 with Mr. Ward's assessment that for virtually every plant of 14 this vintage, that they're in about the usual situation in 15 terms of not having a well-defined and well-understood design 16 basis for the plant?
17 MR. MIRAGLIA:
I think we've got samples where that 18 would be going in both directions.
In some cases, it would 19 say, if you look at Rancho, they haven't really identified any 20 outliers based on what they've done, as far as real design 21 problems, going back to design basis.
22 We were here a few weeks ago talking about 23 Palisades.
There have been indications with respect to Turkey 24 Point.
Davis-Besse didn't have that many, as far as going i
25 back to design basis kinds of questions.
82 1
So I think we've had indications on both sides, and 2
I don't know if I would have enough to make a generalization 3
from where I've been.
4 MR. MARTIN:
I've done a sample in our Region out of 5
two older plants.
That's two out of two.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
They don't have'it.
7 MR. MARTIN:
Well, they find it hard to pull 8
together, the utility itself, where are all the calculations 9
and other information that support all this stuff.
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
It strikes me, you 11 have two questions.
One is, is the basis there?
The other 12 is, when you review it, are there real problems?
13 MR. MIRAGLIA:
I was addressing the latter questions 14 more than --
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
How about the former?
16 MR. MIRAGLIA:
Yes, I think that would be true, and 17 I think that might reflect the point that early in the 18 process, it was essentially turnkey operations with vendors, 19 and perhaps the involvement of the utility on some of those 20 things was perhaps not what it should be and what we would 21 expect it to be today.
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's all I have.
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Mr. Bernthal?
24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I,have nothing.
i 25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Mr. Carr?
,-,y--
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83 1
COMMISSIONER CARR:
I have nothing.
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Just one quick point.
First of all, 3
comparing Davis-Besse and Rancho Seco and the management 4
changes, I think it should be pointed out that, as I recall at 5
Davis-Besse, they had already -- senior management had already 6
made some decisions on changing personnel prior to their 7
incident, so it probably did give them a chance to get moving 8
a bit faster than the Rancho Seco.
9 Let me just say a couple of things.
First of all, 10 it sounds to me like the Rancho Seco is good.
They've come a 11 long way, it would appear.
I think we're looking for 12 results.
Results are what count.
13 I think you've done a good job in identifying the 14 issues, it sounds like, and making up comprehensive programs.
15 But implementation of the programs is what we're looking for 16 and confidence that that implementation is showing results in 17 what you expected.
18 I believe we can't overemphasize the importance of 19 the transition to a permanent staff.
I recognize you're doing 20 that, and you've come a long way, and you've got a ways to 21 go.
But it's really important, I believe, from the Commission's standpoint, to have the competency, that you do 22 23 have in place a permanent staff and one that is strong.
24 It sounds like from Mr. Martin that there has been 25 an attitude change, perhaps, at Rancho Seco, which is
84 l
1 important, I think, to go for excellence rather than the 2
minimum, and I commend the Board for the support, Mr. Taylor, 3
that that obviously reflects, and I would encourage the Board 4
to continue that support.
5 Mr. Ward has a great challenge, and we're going to 6
he watching it very closely.,102at we have to get, I believe, 7
is the confidence that the good programs and the good 8
intentions are paying off.
In other words, we really need to 9
see results.
So as far as I'm concerned --
and I think I 10 probably speak for my fellow commissioners when I say that 11 we'd expect to see you back here again before you restart --
12 and in the meantime, continue to work those priorities.
13 I, too, am a little concerned, and I recognize you 14 haven't settled for sure on your Priority 1, 2,
and 3 program, 15 but I think that you ought to work very cl,osely with the 16 Region V people and our Headquarters Staff on some of those 17 decisions, perhaps at least convince them that you can put off 18 some of those things.
I would feel better if you'd finish all 19 of them before you restart, myself, but there may be 20 reasonable decisions made to postpone some of them, but it 21 seems to me that if there's any doubt, we should finish those 22 items before restart.
23 In any case, there's a long way to go.
I think your 24 schedule is optimistic, my personal assessment.
I agree, 25 though, that your commitment to do it right and to delay the
O 85 1
schedule, as I understand, Mr. Ward, you inferred would be 2
what you'd do, rather than trying to meet the schedule, I 3
think that's very important, and I hope Region V will watch 4
that closely.
5 So there's a way to go at Rancho Seco.
It looks 6
like the programs are good, bu't we want to see results.
7 Are there any other comments from my fellow 8
Commissioner's?
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Lando, I would just say 10 something to your comments on the schedule, and I wcald 11 suggest that we not wait until right before restart, but given 12 what I think is likely to be a fairly prolonged effort here, 13 that in the next three or four. months down the road, we get 14 together again and get a better sense for whether the kinds of 15 programs.that sound good and look good on paper are, in fact, 16 yielding the kinds of results that we expect, so that we sort 17 of get a mid-term report as we go through.
18 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Well, I would ask Region V to give 19 us such a recommendation as we proceed a little further.
20 MR. MARTIN:
I would strongly agree with that, and I 21 think probably in another month or two, I will make a 22 recommendation on what might be an appropriate time.
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Okay, fine.
There's no reason they 24 couldn't come back for another session like this to say where 25 the results --
m
86 1
MR. MARTIN:
Exactly.
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
-- and then we could have a later 3
meeting for restart, and if that seems appropriate, 4
Mr. Martin, we'll expect you to address that in a 5
recommendation.
6 Are there any other comments?
7 COMMISSIdNER ASSELSTINE:
No.
8 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Thank you very much.
We 9
are adjourned.
10
[Whereupon, at 4:30 o' clock, p.m., the Commission 11 meeting was adjourned.]
12
(
14 15 16 i
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 l
24 25 7
o
.---m
1 I.
2 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 3
4 This is to cert'ify that the attached events of a 5
meeting of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission entitled:
6 7
TITLE OF MEETING:
Status Briefing on Rancho Seco (Public Meeting) 8 PIACE OF MEETING:
Washington, D.C.
9 DATE OF MEETING:
Wednesday, January 28, 1987 10 11 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 12 transcript thereof for the file of the Commission taken 13 stenographically by me, thereafter reduced to typewriting by 14 me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and 15 that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the 16 foregoing events.
17 18
- fD a'r$-
/r/
Y---------
19 Suzanne F. Young 20 21 22 Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.
23 24 25 1
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EFFECT!VENESS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIONS: ZION
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- 1. CONTN.E NORMAL ACTMTY 7o
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~
- 2. BAN 9-E M 70
- 3. START EVACUATION 1 FR AFTER FELEASE 4, START EVACUA110N.5 FRS BEFCFE REL 60 N ALA CASES PEFOONS ARE REKCATED FROM CONTMTED M4FAS 6 FRS FMOM REEASE 50 2
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DISTANCE FROM REACTOR o
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REPORT IS BEING CIRCllLATED FOR PUBLIC COMMENT n
TilERE ARE KNOWN AREAS WHERE IMPROVEMENT IS NEEDED o
EXTERNAL EVENTS WILL PE CONSIDERED ON.THREE PLANTS DURING THE COMMENT PERIOD Tills COULD ALTER RESULTS o
FAllt!RE DA.TA llSED IS LARGELY GENERIC, PLANT-PERFORMANCE IS DFPENDENT DN EFFECTIVENESS OF PLANT MANAGEMENT.
o USE OF THIS DRAFT REPORT FOR REGULATORY DECISIONS BEFORE PEER REVIEW AND PilBLIC COMMENT ARE COMPLETED RE0 VIRES A FULL llNDERSTANDING OF THE LIMITATI0PS AND SHOULD BE DONE WITH CAUTION l
f 1
a 39 e
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FilTUPE WORK i
RECEIVE, ANALYZE, AND RESPOND TO PUBLIC COMPENTS (150 DAY COMMENT PERIOD)
I o
do PERFORM EXTERNAL EVENT ANALYSIS ON TWO PLANTS o
COMPLETE LASALLE STUDY BY SPRING 87 INCORPOPATE NEW EXPERIMENTAL INFORMATION, IF NECESSARY o
PERF0PM EXPANDED ANALYSES TO StlPPORT EXPERT JUDGPENT.
PODIFY RESULTS IF o
NECESSARY o
FINAL REPORT ISSUED JANUARY 1988 f
4
e PANCHO SECO PROGRESS REPORT niter 0lS MEETINGS BEIVEFN SRID AND NRC STAFF SINCE DECEFBER 26,1985 EVFFT,
- SIX AT MANAG9ENT LEVF.L ON OVFRALL EFUD ACTION PLAN
- VARIED WOPKING GP0llPS (EFIC, SPDS, SYSTFF. REVIEW & TEST, ICS/NN.I, PROGRAFi% TIC)
PROGRAM FOR DETERMINING SCOPE 8 PRIORITIZATION FOR RESTART APPEAPS SATISFACT0PY SFUD'S DECEMP>ER 15,1986 RESTART PEPORT llNDER REVIEW
- CONCERNS REGARDING PROGPAft% TIC IMPLBDrTATION f
e
s RANCHO SECO PERFORMANCF IMPROVEMENT
- IMPROVEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS - Sound PROCESS
- APPROVED, WELL PLAfiflED AND MAFAGED
- COMPREHEtlSIVE SCOPE OF REVIEW
- ABOUT 5,000 TOTAL RECOMMENDATInNS
- RECOMMFFDATION PRiORTTIZATION
- CRITERIA ESTABLISHED
- SOUND PROCESS
- PPIOPITIZED ADE0tIATELY
- SYSTEM TESTING - HAS NOT BEGUf!
W l
7
27MMN SCHEDULING NOTES TITLE:
STATUS BRIEFING ON RANCHO SECO SCHEDULED:
2:30 P.M., WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 1987 (OPEN)
DURATION:
APPROX 1-1/2'ERS
~
LICENSEE SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 45 MINS AGENDA:
- INTRODUCTION JOHN WARD, DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER OF NUCLEAR
- BOARD OF DIRECTORS ANN TAYLOR
- MAINTENANCE DAVID ARMY, MAINTENANCE MANAGER
- SYSTEMS REVIEW AND TEST JAMES FIELD SYSTEMS REVIEW AND TEST PROGRAM DIRECTOR
- OPERATOR READINESS ROBERT CROLEY, PLANT MANAGER
- ENGINEERING ACTIVITIES GREGG CRANSTON, MANAGER OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- MANAGEMENT TRANSITION JOHN WARD, DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER OF NUCLEAR
- SCHEDULE JAMES SHETLER, IMPLEMENTATION MANAGER
- CUALITY PROGRAMS STU KNIGHT, OUALITY ASSURANCE MANAGER REGION V 5 MINS
- JACK MARTIN
- DENNIS KIRSCH
- ROSS SCARANO NRR S MINS
- FRANK MIRAGLIA
~
- RICHARD VOLLMER
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ADVANCED COPY TO:
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L-l 3-3:
SECf Correspondence & Records Branch 3i FROM:
3:
3-3:
Attached are copies of a Comission meeting transcript and related meeting a!.
document (s). They are being forwarded for entry on the Daily Accession List and 3jj' placement in the Public Document Room. No other distribution is requested or 3ll required.
Meeting
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ACTION PLAN j p ; Mr
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$ha.shd73 IMPROVEMENT STATUS REPORT PRESENTED TO NRC COMMISSIONERS J AN 28, 1987
$SMUD SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
( 2527 )
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT RANCHO SECO/NRC COMMISSIONERS MEEBNG AGENDA - JANUARY 28,1987
)
i JOHN E. WARD RANCHO SECO ACTION PLAN Deputy General Manager, Nuclear FOR PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT ANN TAYLOR BOARD COMMITMENT
- Member, SMUD Board of Directors STU KNIGHT QUALITY PROGRAMS Manager. Quality Assurance l
DAVE ARMY MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS l
Nuclear Maintenance Manager JIM FIELD SYSTEM REVIEW & TEST PROGRAM l
System Review & ~
i Test Program Director GREG CRANSTON ENGINEERING ACTIVITIES Manager, Nuclear Engineering 808 CROLEY OPERATOR READINESS Manager, Nuclear Plant i
JOHN WARD MANAGEMENT TRANSIT 10N JIM SHETLER SCHEDULE Manager, Implementation I
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STATUS REPORT 1
PRESENTED TO NRC COMMISSIONERS J AN 28, 1987
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SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT RANCHO-SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
~
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( 2419 )
OBJECTIVES a
DEMONSTRATE ISSUE AWARENESS i
a DISCUSS CORRECTIVE PROGRAMS m
OUTLINE PROOF TEST FOR:
- MATERIAL READINESS
- OPERATOR READINESS 1
m DISCUSS MANAGEMENT UPGRADE i
ff f &
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( 2420 )
MAJOR ISSUES IDENTIFIED l
DEGRADED MATERIAL / EQUIPMENT STATUS a
1 m
INADEQUATE OPERABNG PROCEDURES a
DEFICIENT TRAINING PROGRAMS a
INEFFECTIVE WORK CONTROL PROCESSES a
DESIGN DEFICIENCIES a
LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY
~
a CULTURE OF RATIONALIZATION a
PERVASIVE MANAGEMENT BREAKDOWN a
NO LEADERSHIP o
um su uma ams uns
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( 2421 )
i i
i LESSONS LEARNED I
a TMI-2 i
-- IMPORTANCE OF THE OPERATOR l
i l
m RANCHO SECO 1
l
- EXCELLENCE REQUIRES COMMITMENT l
1 l
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( 2422 )
ISSUE IDENTIFICATION m
PLANT PERFORMANCE AND MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (PP & MIP)
- SYSTEMATIC EVALUABON PROGRAM l
- TWO-LEVEL RESULTS REVIEW
- CONSOLIDATION OF RESULTS BY SYSTEM
- SYSTEM REVIEW
PLANT PERFORMANCE &
c '8o7 )
MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM LONG TERM VERIFICATION &
N OPERATOR PROCEDURE VALIDABON F)
TRAINING &
RETUNING UPGRADE I
O O
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OPERATIONAL g
READINESS uoos / SYSTEM PAG TESTING O
,__cs) PROGRAM l
m,u s a
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RRRB DETERMINISTIC BWOG DEC 26 U
OR FAILURE INTERVIEWS INPUT INCIDENT OUP ANALYSIS
( 1800 )
4 RESTART PRIORITIES /SCFEDULE CYCLE 8 1986 RESTART REFUELING OUTAGE 1989
\\/
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V
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PRIORITY ONE I
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PRIORITY TWO i
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PRIORITY THREE I
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l ASSURE PLANT WILL REDUCE TRIPS AND lMPLEMENT PROGRAMMATIC l IMPROVE REUABlulY l
l RETURN TO A KNOWN l
CHALLENGES TO l MANAGEMENT /INFORMAllON SAFE STATE AFTER SAFETY SYSTEMS l
A TRIP l
l SYSTEMS l
l l
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( 2424 )
l CUL-URAL CHANGE l
"MAKE IT HAPPEN" PROGRAM a
i a
COMMITMENT i
PROBLEM OWNERSHIP
-l ACCOUNTABILITY l
i f
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FROM TOWARDS NONCOMMITMENT COMMITMENT 1
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...("I'LL TRY")
...("DIDN'T H APPEN
... I'LL H ANDLE TH AT" ON MY SHIFT")
i l
...("NOBODY TOLD ME")
... I'LL MAKE SURE I GET NOTIFIED"
...("I DON'T KNOW)
... I'LL HANDLE IT BY (WHEN) "
( 2425 )
CULTURAL CHANGE 1
m 1000 RANCHO SECO EMPLOYEES INVOLVED
- 240 WORK GROUPS SUPERVISOR PLUS DIRECT REPORTS
- 12 TRAINED FACILITATORS a
WILL REMAIN AS AN ONGOING PROGRAM i
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MAY,1986 CONDITION:
THE QUAbTY ASSURANCE ORGANIZATION FUNCTIONING AS AN AUDIT GROUP.
REACTIVE, AFTER-THE-FACT AND 'AN ORPHAN ORGANIZATION.
l 1
~
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l C 2411 )
l
-QA ACTIONS-l MAY THRU DEC,1986 i
i a
REORGANIZATION m
SOURCE INSPECTION s
INSPECTION PLANNING a
QCl-12 PROCESS a
MATERIAL CONTROL m
NRC OPEN ITEM REVIEW a
PROCEDURE REVISIONS e
PM PROGRAM i
l u
PROCUREMENT REVIEW m
CLASS 1, EQ & CLASS 11 l
I i
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( 2412 ]
1 QA ACTIONS TO BE COMPLETED a
QA POLICY MANUAL REVISION a
IMPROVE QA PRESENCE n
RECRUIT PERMANENT MANAGER &
QE SUPERVISOR a
STRENGTHEN AUDIT PROGRAM a
REPLACE CONTRACTORS WITH PERMANENT PERSONNEL m
QCl-12 PRIORITY I CLOSURES
i l
( 2413 )
CU RREN T STATJS CURRENTLY MOVING RAPIDLY FROM A
1 REACTIVE TO A PROACTIVE MEMBER OF THE RANCHO SECO RESTART TEAM
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( 2504 )
PAST PROGRAMMATIC ISSUES m
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES PROCEDURES INADEQUATE, OVERLAPPING AND CONFLICTING n
a WORK CONTROLS UNDERDEVELOPED AND UNDERUTILIZED PRJEVENTIVE MAINTENANCE WEAK AND ACTIVITIES LIMITED a
a TRAINING PROGRAM INACTIVE a
PLANT OPERATIONAL RECORD INDICATED DIRECT RELATIONSHIP TO THE ABOVE
l
( 2505 )
PAST TECHNICAL ISSUES a
MAINTENANCE WORK STANDARDS & PRACTICES 4
m TECHNICAL PROCEDURES e
IMPROPER CONTROL OF CALIBRATED TOOLS l
m PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE OF NON-SAFETY 1
RELATED EQUIPMENT a
WELDING PROGRAM i
s QUALITY INVOLVEMENT l
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mas aus mem-mus-ami imm-( 2507 )
1986 PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS a NUCLEAR MAINTENANCE DIVISION ESTABLISHED a PROCEDURAL HIERARCHY FOR NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ESTABLISHED a SPECIFIC MAINTENANCE DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES IDENTIFIED
= INPO REVIEW OF NEW PM ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE s SUPERINTENDENTS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN INPO ACCREDITATION a CENTRAL MAINTENANCE PLANNING GROUP ESTABLISHED
==
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1986 TECHilCAL IMPROVEUENTS a
CONTROL OF MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES APPROVED 1
l u
NEW SITEWIDE TECHNICAL i
PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE a
CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT IN PLACE a
CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF PM TASKS
]
INCLUDES NON-SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT m
WELDING MANUAL ESTABLISHED a
QUALITY INVOLVED IN MAINTENANCE PRE-PLANNING l
mini uma uma mai amm uma um amm un uma man sus mum uma um aus man uma man l
( 2503 )
i REMAINING ACTIONS j
n IMPLEMENTATION OF ADMINISTRATION CONTROLS 1
n EXPANSION AND REFINEMENT OF PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM n CONTINUE CULTURAL CHANGES l
n IMPROVE UPON COMPUTERIZED WORK CONTROLS n IMPROVE WORK CONTROLS AND FOLLOW-UP I
n CONTINUE ORGANIZATIONAL INTERFACE IMPROVEMENTS h
sus mut sum um uma num uma man m
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( 23BB )
MAINTEN ANCE BACKLOG in CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE (1/5/87)
RESTART PRIORITY.
.906 POWER BLOCK REQ OUTAGE.
.280 Restart Total 1186 POWER BLOCK NON OUTAGE.
.873 NON POWER BLOCK.
.476 Non Restart Total 1349 r1 PREVENTIVE.MAINTEN ANCE GOAL IS TO BE CURRENT AT RESTART
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( 2365 )
j 3 PHASES 1
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ISSUE IDENTIFICATION I
a DEFINE "GET WELL" PROGRAMS FOR l
1 ALL PLANT SYSTEMS a
TEST KEY PLANT SYSTEMS l
l
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i ISSUE IDENTIFICATION i
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( 2370 )
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( 2371 )
SUMMARY
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LOOKS AT ALL 78 PLANT SYSTEMS a
CREATES PRIORITIZED WORK PLAN FOR LONGTERM SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS m
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( 2414 )
NUCLEAR DESIGN ENGINEERING CONCEPT m COOPERATION & COORDINATION
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( 2415 )
KEY ACCOMPLISHMENT AND PROGRAMS a
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CENTRALIZED CONFIGURATION CONTROL PROGRAM DESIGNATED MANAGER a
IMPLEMENTED ENGINEERING ACTION TRACKING SYSTEM INCORPORATED INTO PLANT DRAWINGS 5,000 DCN a
BACKLOG m
INITIATED FIELD PROBLEM REPORT AND ENGINEERING ACTION REQUEST PROGRAMS a
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( 2416 )
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( 2386 )
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( 2387 )
OPERATONS ENHANCEMENTS a
INSELL PLANT OWNERSHIP INTO OPERATORS a
OPERATIONS ADVISOR PROGRAM BEFORE RESTART a
EQUIPMENT STARJS CONTROL IMPROVEMENTS a
CONSIDER EXPERIENCE LEVELS IN CONDUCTING PLANT EVOLUBONS a
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I OPERABONS ENHANCEMENTS m
THREE NEW FUNCTIONAL HEADS a
STAFFING LEVEL OF 96 14 SRO's 16 RO's 43 NON-UCENSED OPERATORS a
TRAINING
- EXPANDED CLASSROOM TRAINING / INCREASED SIMULATOR TRAINING
- INCREASED EMPHASIS ON NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS, DIAGNOSTICS, COMMAND &. CONTROL
- TESTING PROGRAM
- RANCHO SECO SIMULATOR TO BE FUNC110NAL 1989 m
UPGRADED PROCEDURES
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( 2427 )
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OPERATIONS MANAGER FROM CRYSTAL RIVER l
m MAINTENANCE MANAGER FROM INDIAN POINT a
TRAINING MANAGER FROM WOLF CREEK a
NUCLEAR PROJECTS MANAGER FROM DUANE ARNOLD m
ENGINEERING MANAGER FROM BECHTEL i
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RECRUITMENT EFFORTS UNDERWAY a
NUCLEAR LICENSING MANAGER a
QUALITY ASSURANCE MANAGER a
ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER, NUCLEAR OPERATIONS l,
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C 2430 )
MANAGEMENT TRANSITION SCHEDULE a
MARCH 31,1987*
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- ALL SMUD DEPARTMENT MANAGERS IN PLACE ALL SMUD DIRECTORS IN PLACE i
- AGM NUCLEAR OPERATIONS APP 0lNTED i
- AGM NUCLEAR SUPPORT APP 0lNTED m
JULY 1,1987
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- BEGIN EXECUTIVE SEARCH FOR DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER, NUCLEAR i
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- Civil Service processes and Candidate availability may offect this date.
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{ 2379 )
di SCHEDULING PROCESS AND CONTROL aPROCESS
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C 2380 )
ACCOMPLISHMENTS TO DATE m EFIC INSTALLAT10Nm50% COMPLETE a TD1 DIESELS TESTING / TEARDOWN m OTSG SLEEVING COMPLETE mm90% RESTART DESIGN PACKAGES ISSUED u m30% RESTART DESIGN PACKAGES CONSTRUCTED l
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C 2383 )
RANCHO SECO RESTART SCHEDULE OVERVIEW 1986 1987 NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG 111 Ill 111 III til 111 til Ill Ill m l
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