ML20247F271
| ML20247F271 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 01/20/1987 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247F042 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-89-2, FOIA-89-A-7 NUDOCS 8905300039 | |
| Download: ML20247F271 (45) | |
Text
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1 UNITED STATES 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
i 4
In the Matter of:
5 INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW 6
(CLOSED MEETING)
(VOLUME II) 7 Region V 1440 Maria Lane Walnut Creek, California 8
g Tuesday, January 20, 1987 10 l
An investigative interview was continued with 33 12 Gregory P. Yuhas at 1:00 p.m.
13 14 Present:
RONALD A. MEEKS 15 16 s
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 N N f
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1:22 p.m.
2 MR. MEEKS:
This is an interview of Greg 3
Yuhas.
A Greg, why don't you identify your position 5
here.
1 MR. YUHAS:
Greg
- Tuhas, Chief Facilities Radiological Protection Section, Region V.
8 MR. MEEKS:
That is of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission?
MR. YUHAS:
Yes.
MR. MEEKS:
As previously agreed upon, this 12 interview is being recorded.
Present at this interview are 13 myself, Ronald A. Meeks, an Investigator with the NRC,0ffice of Investigations Field Office, Region V, as well as Greg 16 Yuhas and the court reporter, Margaret Devers.
16 The subject matter of this interview concerns I7 the management and operations of the liquid effluent release 18 program at Sacramento Municipal Utility District's Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station.
Greg, if you will stand and raise your right 20 21 hand, I will swear you in.
22 Whereupon, 23 GREGORY F. YURAS 24 after having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as 25 f,33,,,,
E
__.---_-._--_-_...----_-_____._--.n.-.-_-.___.._-_w
J l
3 O
MR. MEEKS:
This is a
continuation of an 2
interview which was conducted on January 15th.
Me will 3
continue on and this interview will pick up where we left off last time.
5 Me were identifying areas of review in Greg Yuhas' Inspection Report No.
86-15 which deals with the 7
effluent release program.
And the Inspection Report is 0
dated June 6th, 1986.
On page 19 of the Inspection Report, it states 10 that, beginning in 1983, SMUD initiated a procedure which l'
allowed the frequent transfer of water recovered from the
~
12 liquid radioactive waste treatment systems to the reactor 13 hold up tanks, commonly referred to as RNUTs, R-H-U-Tws, for release to the environment.
15 BY MR. MEEKS:
16 Q
Oreg, how did you obtain this knowledge and II under what conditions?
18 A
The information was brought to my attention --
'8 I don't remember the exact date, which day of the inspection 20
- but, late one afternoon, I asked a Technician about the 21 practice of controlling the counting times and that 22 discussion led to a question as where the Technician thought 23 the source the amount of radioactivity measured during 1985 24 came from.
25 And his response was that he thought it came 1
___w
4 0-from the transfer of water f rom the Domin Storage Tank to the RHUTs.
That was Mark Leiwander, I think is his name.
Check my Inspection Report, here.
Mark Leiwander, Chemistry at,d Radiation Protection Technician; okay.
5 l This information was furnished simply in 6
response to a question of the Technician.
And, after I found the information out, I consulted with the Radiation 8
Protection Manager, Fred Kellies another representative of 8
his ataff: and the Compliance supervisor, Carl Stephenson, 10 who all confirmed that this, in fact, had been the practice,
'l to make those transfers of water.
12 Q
Go over, again, the individuals you talked to.
13 It was Kellie -- Kellie, was it?
j A
Fred Kellie.
15 Q
And Ron Colombo?
16 A
No, Carl Stephenson.
17 Q
Carl Stephenson.
18 A
He is compliance Supervisor.
Q Rights okay, 20 A
Okay; and the Technician
- involved, Mark 21 Leiwander.
And Kellie, of course, also got involvtd in, 22 later on, estimating the amount of water that was 23 transferred.
And, of course, to do that, Gteve Manofsky, Ed 24 Bradley became involved.
It was generally discussed with 25 numerous members of the licensee's organization to develop e
5 1
the information for the Inspection Report.
2 Q
In othe.P
- words, you discussed with these 3
individuals --
]
A That's right.
5 Q
-- you have named?
6 A
That's right.
Q Did you discuss this matter with George
'O Coward?
9 A
No.
George Coward was on leave during the 10 course of the inspection.
11 Q
That's right, I recall that now.
12 Any other individuals in the management of 13 Rancho Seco that you talked to?
A Mell, let's see.
There were numerous managers 15 at the exit interviews: so there were a lot of people there.
16 But the key plcyers were Kellie, Bradley, and Stephenson.
I These are the individuals that provided the copies of the changes in the procedures which allowed the transfer of 19 water to occur.
20 Q
On page 20 of the Inspection Report, you state 21 that, on December 7, 1987, a temporary change to Procedure 22 A-29, Waste Water Disposal System, was implemented which 23 allowed radioactive water to be pumped from the 24 demineralized reactor coolant storage
- tank, through a
temporary conduit, to either RNUT-A or RNUT-B, for ultimate 25
6 i
g release to the environment.
2 What individuals in the licensee's 3
organization have the responsibility to determine if-this 4
condition was an unreviewed safety question, or have the 5
responsibility to conduct an evaluation in order to determine if a
change in Technical Specification is required?
8 A'
These sort of changes are covered by a
8 regulation called 10 CFR 50.89.
In other words, 50.59 10 allows the licensees to make changes to their facilities
'l provided that the result of the change does not involve'an 12 unreviewed safety question or a change to the Technical 13 specification.
I#
The Plant Review Comalttee, based on the 15 licensee's Technical Specifications, is really the group 16 that is supposed to ferret out whether or not a 50.59 change 17 is required.
Now, the licenseo has systems of check sheets 18 and other people who look at this to see whether a change is 19
- required, and may recommend or not.
- But, really, the i
20 Technichi specification 6.8.3.
As really what talks about 21 how you make changes to procedures, who has to initiate 22 them, review, and approve them.
23 And, really, that's what we are talking about 24 in a situation like this.
Q so all changes go through the - what did you 25
7
.g call them, Plant Review Committee?
2 A
PRC, Plant Review Committee.
3 Q
And then, collectively, they will decided if 4
it's an unreviewed safety question or not?
5 A
- Well, someone might make a recommendation, 6
they do a, might do an evaluation, that says that this what is called a 50.59 evaluation.
The results of that may 0
conclude that this is not an unreviewed safety question, it 8
does not involve Technical specification change, and all 10 they have to do is update the FSAR, in which case the PRC, then, just reviews the results of this evaluation.
12 And, if they agree with it, then fine, they 13 don't have to change the TECSPECS or get a license che.nge or something like that; they can go ahead and make their change 15 to their procedure or their way of doing business or their 16 system.
'I But there's many people involved in changes to 18 facilities, the idea being that, if cnt person makes a
'9 mistake, he would be caught by the other people in the 20
,,yg,,p,,,,,,,
Q What kind of evaluation was done to determine 21 22 whether an unreviewed safety question existed or not on the 23 modification of transferring water from DRCST tank to RHUT 24 tank.
25 A
I think dif ferent levels of review were done l
l
\\
l.
8 at different times.
Let's see.here -- we make a point in 2
the Inspection Report, on page 20,. about the change that 3
took place on January 6, 1986, which was one of these repeat changes.
I think that this was the third time that the 5
Procedure A-10 had been changed to allow pumping. of this 6
water.
And, in that case, they did not follow the B
TECSPECS in that the Plant Review Committee did not review 8
the proposed change.
An evaluation was performed, called a 10 59 Screening
- document, and this screening document was apparently prepared by W. Ophoff, U-p-h-o-f-f.
And it was -
12 got a
second-level review of screening by a
group 13 Supervisor, and I don't really know the name - can'.t read
'4 the name very well there --
but it might be Herronomous 15 (phonetic) -- at that time that it was done.
I can't tell 16 for sure from the handwriting.
'I Q
Bow do you spell Harronomous?
18 A
I don't know.
Q Okay.
But along the lines of H-e-r- --
20 A
something like that.
l Q
- -r-o-n-o-a-o-u- -- okay.
- 2 A
You can see the penmanship is such that it is 23 not easy to read -- or the printing.
It might be the copy 24 or something.
25 The botton line is, the 50.59 screening
9 process for this particular change, which was a repetitive 2
example of other changes to pump water from T-621 to T-950, 3
the individual checked box "No",
which states that the 4
proposed change to the facility operating philosophy as 5
described in the USAR.
And he checks "No" that it doesn't 6
involve nuclear safety and "No" that it doesn't involve unreviewed safety questions, "No" that it doesn't involve a 8
TECSPEC change, et cetera.
9 The problem here, on this, as an example, the 10 way they were doing business, after that first screening
~
l' process was signed off by Mr. Uphoff and approved by his 12 Group Supervisor, it went to, it looks like, Mr. Colombo on what is called a Procedure Change Approval form.
And that k
14 form does not have any indications that it was reviewed by 15 the Plant Review Committee required.
The box indicating yes 16 was not checked and the box indicating no was not checked.
I The bottom line is, this change to procedure was made and it was not reviewed by the PRC.
It was 19 subsequently reviewed and approved by Mr. Colombo, who is 20 the Plant Review Committee Chairman, and he recommended 21 approval of it.
It was then approved by the Plant 22 Superintendent and implemented.
23 The issue --
Q Who was the Plant Superintendent at that time?
24 25 A
Steve Redeker, it looks like.
10 l
Q Okay.
2 A
The issue is, that the Plant Technical 3
Specification 6.8.3.
states that, - " Temporary changes to 4
procedures to 6.8.1.
above may be made provided (a), the 5
intent of the original procedure is not altered; (b), the 6
change is approved by two members of the plant management 7
- staff, at least one of whom holds a
Senior Reactor 0
operator's License on the affacted unit; and (c), the change l
1s documented, reviewed by the PRC, and approved by the Plant Superintendent within seven days of laplementation."
l' The licensee interpreted their Technical 12 Specifications in a manner which I do not believe was 13 consistent with the wording in the TECSPECS, in tha,t they were not forwarding there changes to the PRC review.
15
- Instead, one individual, Mr.
Colombo, would look at the 16 screening check sheet and, if it was agreed upon by the two I
individuals involved, he would then sign it off as being IO okay and forward it to the Plant Superintendent for approval.
20 Q
Could we get a
copy of this particular 21 Procedure Change Approval form?
22 A
Sure.
I 23 Q
We haven't received a copy of that yet; have 24 we?
I don't think so.
25 A
We'll just mark that as question 20; right?
l
11 I
Q Forty-one.
2 A
For.ty-one.
Now, if you are asking historically, way back 4
in 19 -- was the first time we did this -
,' e 2.
Let me check my records here and tell you what they did in '82.
6 (After a pause.)
7 I see that there was a Rev. 14, a temporary 8
change in 1985, which allowed a transfer of water between the RRUT tanks and the hot well.
In 1984, there was a 10 temporary change which allowed processing slightly 11 radioactive contaminated water through temporary 12 domineralizers -- prevents either the regen hold up tank by 13 either circulation flow or bypassing RRUT to one other: RHUT.
That as another example of a change that was made to it.
15 Q
These are all under Procedure A-10: was it?
16 A
Nos some of them were A-29, Maste Water 17 Disposal system.
'8 Q
But the one that you were reading from when 19 you answered previously?
20 A
That's A-10.
21 Q
Yes: okay.
A That may be the only copy I
have of the 22 23 changes to A-10; but A-10 was originally changed way back 24 82.
And I will.look over in this file.
Q So the procedures call for an automatic review 25
.....a
12 d
by the Plant Review Committee?
A That's right.
Q And, if that isn't done, then the Chairman of the Plant Review Committee has to sign off of,the one form; 5
right?
6 where is that A
The problem is that they form; where did it go?
g.'
8 The one A-10 Procedure form?
A Yeah.
10 (Document proffered.)
MR. MEEKS:
I am looking at here the Procedu're
'l
~
12 Change Approval form, the one referred to by Greg Yuhas in 13 his previous -- well, in this reply we are talking.about,
'4 which he indicated it was not checked, yes or no, that the 15 modification has been reviewed by the Plant Review 16 Committee.
And then it was signed down below as being
'7 reviewed by the Plant haview CoLuittee Chairman, R.
W.
18 Colombo.
BY MR. MEEKS:
20 Q
So, do I understand that Colombo is signing 21 or, what do you understand Colombo's signature this 22 signifies here?
23 A
That he -- what Colombo told me was that what 24 he does is that he reviews this checklist to make sure the P5 checklist is properly executed and signed off.
And, if the
13 1
screening, 50.59 screening, he agrees with the conclusions 2
of the two individuals, that is the preparer and the second-3 level review, then he merely goes ahead and signs off as reviewed by and recommends approval.
0 Apparently, at some point in
- time, the 6
licensee decided that they were overwhelmed with work by the Plant Review Committee so they made a decision that, for 8
certain categories of procedure changes, that they would not submit them to the PRC for review.
10 Q
What category was that?
11 A
I believe they were talking about temporary 12 changes of non-intent.
In other words, a non-intent change.
13 An example of a non-intent change would be, if there were typographical errors or some minor thing in the procedure 15 that really didn't change the intent of the procedure, they 16 wou2d go ahead and do it thst way.
'7 I
point out that their Technical l
Specifications does not addreac that technique of doing business.
Some of the newer Technical Specification allow 20 non-intent changes to be made and approved without PRC 21 approval, Plant Review Committee approval.
22 Q
Rut that doesn't apply in this case 23 whatsoever?
24 A
It doesn't apply in this case for two reasons:
25 their TECSPECS don't ellow it, secondly, in my opinion,
- one,
i 14 the changing of Procedure A-10 ' to allow the transfer of 2
water from the waste water side -- that is, the radioactive 3
water side -- to the secondary water side was, in fact, an intent change in the procedure.
If you read the Final Safety Analysis Report, 6
it does not describe that as the way of doing business.
Therefore, if you change your procedure to allow that, 8
you've really changed the intent of this Procedure A-10, O
which is the procedure that talks about the domin reactor coolant storage tank systems okay?
So, in either case, for this procedure to have 12 been done in a manner consistent with t o CFR 50.59, it
'3 should have gone through the Plant Review process -. Review Committee -- approval process.
15 Q
So Colombo's signature is there.
What does 16 that signify to you?
And let me answer that --
'I Does that signify to you that Colombo is 18 assuming the responsibility of the Plant Review Committee, as far us signing off there, even though it's wrong?
20 A
That's right.
What it is doing is it's saying 21 that the Plant Review Committee or the Chairman can either 22 review a procedure or not review a procedure, based on his 23 discretion, his evaluation of it.
24 Q
And none of their procedures allow for that?
25 A
No.
Their procedures may allow for it; but
_--m-15 their Technical Specifications don't.
There's a difference.
'Q In this particular instances, their procedure 3
didn't allow for it: did it?-
A Their administrative procedures, would allow 5
for Mr.
Colombo to do this.
They had developed this 6
- practice, apparently, based on discussions with NRC representatives at some period in time before the 8
inspection,,they said 1984 or something like that, that they-9 had discussed the matter with the Resident ' Inspector and i
10 with, perhaps, other NRC Inspectors, about could they make 11 intent changes without a PRC reviewed approval.
From those 12 discussions, they got the impression they could do what they 13 are doing.
14 In fact, I believe that they formalized that 15 into a Procedure somewhere.
16 But, the point is, that is not an acceptable I
may of doing business.
If you want your procedures to be changed in a manner other than described by your Technical Specifications, you should submit a TECSPEC change.
20 Now, what they were doing, if it had been 21 submitted as a TECSPEC change, the NRC probably would find 22 it acceptable, as they have had to find it acceptable in 23 other facilities like San onofre.
24 Q
So, the individual that does the screening, he 25 makes the determination whether it's an unreviewed safety 8
I
\\
16 question or not and then his determination is reviewed by I
the Plant Review Committee?
3 A
No.
The way the system was working, the individual does the 50.59 screening; his Gro,up Supervisor 5
then reviews it, or it could be a PRC acaber reviews it; 6
they complete the fora; then they give the form to -- in 7
this case it was colombo who reviewed that the forms were i
8
- correct, agreed with their conclusion, and made recommendation of approval.
10 It is then forwarded to the Plant
~
Il Superintendent who, by TECSPEC, has to either approve. or 12 disapprove the procedure.
13 In this particular case, the procedure was 14 approved by Mr. Redeker on January 6th, 1986.
15 Q
Did you talk to Mr.
Redeker about this 16 particular fore here that was approved, this modification II that was approved?
A No, I don't believe that I did.
19 Q
The last paragraph on page 20 of the 20 Inspection Report states that, "On January 6th, 1986..."
I I think that is what we are talking about here -- no, it's 22 not.
23 A
That's a different procedure.
24 January 6th, 1986, yeah, that's right.
No, 25 that's right, the same procedure; excuse me.
.--__-..-_..---.-_-_O
17 Q
The last paragraph on page 20 of the 2
Inspection Reports states that, "On January 6th, 1986, a temporary change to Procedure A-10, Demineralized Reactor Coolant Storage
- System, was implemented which allowed 5
radioactive water to be pumped from the DRCST tank or 6
Tank T-621 -- to the RNUTs for ultimate off-site release."
Explain the conditions which allow temporary 0
changes to the Demineralized Reactor Coolant Storage System 9
in accordance with Procedure A-10.
And, actually, you've 10 just gone through that in your last -- in answering the last question.
12 A
I think we just covered that.
13 Q
Wow, concerning the TECSPEC in Procedure A-10, their procedure, as it was written when you reviewed it, 15 there was nothing in there that conflicted with the TECSPECS 16 and vice
- versa, as far as conflicting information or contrasting directions in the procedure?
not the TECSPECS.
The botton A
Well, the line is that they did not do the 50.59 review.
Because, had 20 they done that, they would have found that they would have 21 the Safety Analysis Report; had to have made changes 22 Because this was definitely a change in intent of the okay.
23 system as described in the USAR.
they didn't have a 50.59 is 24 So.what did 25 what it boils down to, t
]
i f
is Now, they also didn't have it reviewed by the PRC, that's the key point.
The screening process didn't quite meet what the TECSPEC required them to do.
Q And, if you were sitting on that, Plant Review 5
Committee and reviewed this temporary modification, why 6
would you have considered it to be an unreviewed safety question?
8 A.'
No; it wouldn't have been an unreviewed safety 8
question.
What it would have required is them to change the 10 updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
Because, remember,
'l in the FSAR, it says they are not going to dump any 12 radioactive liquids.
This constitutes dumping of 13 radioactive 11gulds.
I#
So they would have had to change the USAR.
15 They wouldn't
- have, necessarily, even needed a TECSPEC' 16 change; although they should have because, to have done this II
- right, what they should have done was changed other 18 procedures that says, "We are going to sample this tank IE before we pump it over to the RRUT so thet we can detect the 20 aucunt of activity in it and calculate the dose to make sure 21 we comply with all of our dose objectives of the Technical 22 Specifications.
23 That's what the PRC should have done; they 24 should have said, " Hey, wait a minute; we are not going to 25 approve Procedure A-10 until we change the other procedures I
l 19 1
to make sure that we comply with our TECSPEC requirements.
2 That's what the PRC should have found.
They should have been smet t enough, in their 4
collective knowledge, to recognize this, quote, " temporary change" could give them a problem in terms of meeting their
~
off-site dose limits.
Q With respect to this temporary modification, 8
who was in the licensee's organization that brought this to 9
your attention?
10 A
These came as a result of questions when I
'l tried to track down the source and I asked for copies of all 12 the changes from the Compliance and Configuration control 13 people.
This was Carl Stephenson that provided the, copies of the change notices.
15 And some of the others, I just went to the 16 docket file and sat thera and went through the docket clerk I
f and asked 1:er to make u copies of theate changes to these
'8 procedures, A-29, A-10, and some of the other ones.
- But, basically, the sources of information 20 were the licensee's own docket files and discussions with 21 Fred Kellie and Carl Stephenson.
22 Q
Are there any provisions, other than a 10 CFR 23 50.59 review that requires notification to NRC that 24 temporary modifications to accepted FSAR configurations are 25 being contemplated or have been made?
)
to I
A Not contemplated.
Technical Specification 6.9.3. would seem to require that changes to the facility be 3
reported in monthly reports.
Q What monthly reports are you talking about?
5 A
The monthly reports required by Technical j
8 Specification 6.9. -- let me look it up here -- let's see --
TECSPEC 6.9.3.,
Monthly Reports, states 8
" Routine reports of monthly statistics, including 8
narrative summary of operating and shutdown 10 experience of lifts of the primary system safety
~
l' valves for-EMOVs, of major safety-related 12 maintenance, and tabulations of facility changes,
'3 tests or experiments, required pursuant to 10 CFR 50.50(b), shall be submitted on a monthly basis to 15 the office of Management Information and Program 10
- Control, USNRC, Washington, D.C.
- 20555, with a j
'7 copy to the Regional Office, postmarited na later than the 15th day of each month fellowing the l
'8 calendar month covered by the Report."
20 Q
so this particular procedure or requirement is 21 what requires a 50.59 review to be reported to NRC7 22 A
That's right.
That's correct.
It's really 23 the TECSPEC that causes you to make these listings of 50.59 24 Reports.
25 Q
Yeah, okay.
On page 21 of your Inspection
21 4
Report', on paragraph 4, information is provided indicating 2
that the connection of a non-quality-class temporary piping 3
system, with no automatic isolation capability to the class-4 I demineralized reactor coolant storage tank, raised the 5
questions as to whether the licensee had performed a weekly surveillance on this tank to determine that the activity was less than the ten-curie limit required by Technical 8
Specification 3.17.3.
9 Who was the individual in the licensee 10 organization that indicated the surveillance had not been 11 performed?
12 A
Fred Kellie, I believe.
This resulted in a 13 series of phone calls.
I think Fred Kellie was the. person that confirmed when I asked for the data on these other 15 tanks, he said they hadn't been performing them.
16 I think Carl Stephenson was another individual I
that I had called and asked, "Do you have data to show that these things were never about ten curies or did you have 19 samples to prove it?"
'O So it was discussetl with those two people.
21 Q
With respect to the information in paragraph 3 22 on page 22 of the Inspection Report, concerning procedures, 23 please identify -- who was the licensee representati=res you 24 spoke with concerning the temporary modifications made from 25 March 30th, 1983 to January 6th, 19867 f
l
_-_-_-___-_._.---u-
_ - - - - _ _ _ -. _ - _ _ _ - - - ~. - '
22 A
- Again, that would have been Carl Stephenson and Fred Kellie, primarily.
Other people might have been 3
involved in the discussions; but those are the key players.
Q And the records you reviewed, onee again, were 5
-- why don't you just go over that one more time.
6 A
I was looking at the changes made to Procedures A-10 and Procedure --
0 Q
A-297 9
A-29, which is Waste Water Disposal System.
A 10 Those are the key procedure changes.
And changes to Procedure AP.305-13 (sic);
the title is 11 12 Environmental Releases of Liquid Radioactivity.
I think we 13 discussed that earlier in response to some questions.,
'd And you obtained -- a good many of these would Q
15 just go into the docket file, in looking through --
16 A
Right, just looking through the change history
'7 for each one of the procedures and see when different
'O revisions had been made and how they had been approved, who 19 had signed them off, that sort of thing.
Q
- Okay, Regarding AP.2, Revision 21, A
20 j
21 Procedure For Review Approval and Maintenance of Procedures.
Did you talk to any NRC Resident or Senior 22 23 Resident concerning any conversations he had with any 24 licensee representatives concerning the review of non-intent 25 changes to procedures?
23 1
A I seem to recall talking to Glen Perez; and I 2
believe I talked to Jim Eckhardt, who was the previous WRC Senior Resident Inspector that the licensee was referring to 4
initially when we talked about intent changes.,.
5 And, as I recall, both individuals said they 6
remember it being discussed with them; but neither one of them said they ever gave anything what might be akin to 8
permission to go ahead and change their way of doing 8
business.
10 As I
recall those discussions with the l'
Resident Inspectors, is; yeah, they agreed that, if somebody 12 were to want to do that, the NRC would find it acceptable.
13 But those individuals understood that the acceptability would be found in manner of a TECSPEC change, not on them 15 for any permission that was okay to do what they wanted to 16 do.
17 Q
What is the specific guidance in INE Circular 18 No.80-187 Is that the right one,80-187 l
A 20-18.
Q Yes, which assists licensee management in the 20 establishment, implementation, and maintenance of 21 22 procedures.
23 A
The title of that has to do with 50.59s; and 24 it tells licensees, for Radioactive Waste Treataant Systems, 25 that they are required to perform 50.59 evaluations; and it l
I..
\\
24 gives them guidance on how to go about doing it.
I don't know if I have a copy of that around 3
here for you or not.
( Af ter a pause. )
You are testing my 4
primitive filing system here.
5 (Document proffered.)
6 Q
Okay; Mr. Yuhas has furnished me with a copy of the INE Circular No. 80-18, dated August 22nd, 1980.
It 0
is entitled 10 CFR 50.59 Safe'ty Evaluations for Changes to Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems.
10
- And, essentially, and reviewing this very
'l
- briefly, the circular 80-18 provides additional criteria 12 that the licensee can use to help evaluate the conditions of 13 an unreviewed safety question.
And it concludes by stating:
15
.' Fo r any change in a facility radioactive waste 16 system as described in the Safety Analysis Report, 17 a safety evaluation is required in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.
In this safety evaluation and the
'8 unreviewed safety question determination, the 20 evaluation criteria presented in Circular 80-18 21 should be used.
If the proposed modification 22 represents a
departure from this evaluation 23 criteria, then the licensee is instructed to make 24 sure the proposal should be modified to meet the 25 intent of the criteria, or the' evaluation must
25 present. sufficient analysis to demonstrate the acceptability of the departure, or they must 3
receive Commission approval prior to implementing the modification."
5 Thank you, Oreg.
6 A
You are welcome.
7 Q
I would like to get a copy of that.
8 A
Ch, you would?
8 Q
Yes, while it is there handy.
10
- Greg, who are the individuals in the l'
licensee's organization that had specific responsibility to
~
12 assure that procedures are properly implemented and 13 maintained with respect to releases from the DRCST tank to the RHUT tank?
15 A
- Well, there are several key people.
16 obviously, the operations managensnt, that would be the I
Plant Superintendent, or equivalent, has the ultimate
'O responsibility.
The Manager of Radiation Protection and
)
20 Chemistry has a responsibility to make sure that the samples 21 are taken and that the amount of activity is considered when 22 l
it's transferred T-621 to T-950.
l 23 And then the corporate people had a
24 responsibility to evaluate the environmental impact as a 25 result of those transfers.
I
26 1
So it boils down to the same cast of,
2 characters, that is, the Operations management responsible 3
for actually transferring the water, the Chem and HP to take the samples, collect the data, and provide.them to the 5
corporate people to make the assessment of the environmental 6
significance as a result of these releases.
7 Q
When you refer to the corporate people, are 8
you referring the the Nuclear Engineering organization?
A At that point of time, yes, it was the Nuclear 10 Engineering organization under Ed Bradley that would have 11 been responsible for making the dose assessment.
12 Q
And Bradley's supervisor was the Manager of 13 Nuclear Engineering, Roger Powers?
A That's correct.
15 Q
And Power's supervisor was Rodriguez --
16 A
Right.
17 Q
-- the Manager of Nuclear?
18 A
Right.
Both Coward and Powers would have been I
reporting to Rodriguez during this period of time.
20' Regarding the Semi-annual Radioactive Effluent Q
21 Relesse Report dated March 3rd, 1986, which is menticned on 22 page 25 of the Inspection Report, what is your knowledge of specific individuals of the licensee management who were 23 24 aware that the LT;D values, the counting times, and the CEP 25 data brought into question compliance with Appendix I at the l
i
~
K 21 same time that -- during this period of March 3rd, 19867 A
okay.
Clearly, Bradley was aware of it.
Ris 3
December memorandum should have caused all sorts of people in the licensee's organization to be aware of the problem.
5 In particular, Kellis had received a copy of 6
Bradley's Draft Study on LLD.
Kellie and his subordinate, Manofsky, had received the CEP data in February of
'86.
You 8
- know, there was innumerable representatives of the line 9
management that were involved in the issued in December, January -- in December,
'85, January
'86, when Dave Mixa l'
brought to the licensee's attention this issue of whether or 12 not they should have changed accounting times.
That 13
- Bradley, then, carried that ball to Powers;
, Powers 5
14 supposedly took it to Rodriguez; Rodriguez took it to 15 Coward; Coward took it back down to Kellie, 16 And that same cast of characters was involved
'7 in the review of the Semi-annual Effluent Release Report
'8 I
which was submitted in -- on March 30,
'86.
So, c;ertainly, there were a ~. of people who knew the issue was a point of contention.
And most of those same people knew that there 20 had been at least two f,nstances of when isotopes which were 21 identified were not reported during the period of 1985.
23 I would point out that those instances which 24 were documented in the Inspection Report should have been 25 covered by the first half calendar year 1985 Seal-annual
28 Effluent Release Report, which was submitted, as I recall, in September of 1985; okay?
3 Q
Well, January through June; is that --
'A Right.
5 Q
-- what period that covers?
6 A
Right.
Q Yes.
8 A
And that report would have been dated, like --
'8 Q
September.
O A
September something of it was late September 26th of 1985.
So that report, again, makes a 12 point in terms of the amount of curies discharged on 13 it makes the statement that no release Table II(a) containing detectable fission or activation products were 15 made through the period of January through June of 1985.
16 And, at the;t particular report, again, it was
'7 reviewed by people like Fred Kellie, other folks at the
'O site, Ed Bradley was probably preparer of this report; and certainly, the report was signed -- the transmittal letters 20 was signed by Mr. Rodriguez.
21 So, the issue of who saw these reports and who 22 had knowledge of what was really going on during that period 23 of time was quite widespread within the licensee's 24 organization.
It's not just limited to one or two people.
25 Q
With respect to the information on page 27 of
29 the Inspection
- Report, who was the Acting Chemistry 2
Supervisor and who are the SCRAs referred to in the second 3
paragraph, under Communications?
A The Acting Chemistry Supervisor was Roger I
5 Miller who had been the Chemistry and Radiation Protection 6
Superintendent during the first half of 19E5.
The SCRAs involved were Bill Wilson and Steve 0
Manofsky.
8 Q
Who was the operational official in the 10 licensee's organization responsible for the September 27, 1984 Special Report 84-077 12 A
84-07 was submitted by Mr. Rodriguez; but let 13 me confirm it in my notes here.
I will find the Special Report.
( Af ter a pause. )
Okay; Special Report 84-07 was 15 signed by R.
J.
Rodriguez.
The title, at that time, was 16 Executive Director Nuclear.
And that was dated September 27, 1984, R.J.R.84-425.
Q Who was responsible for preparing that, then, of all of the inforneation in there?
20 Have you had occasion to research that?
21 A
I believe this information was prepared at 22 what's called Uptown and Corporate Office.
That would have 23 been Powers, Kielman, Rodriguez, Dietrich, those people.
Q And then they would have drawn on the 24 25 resources at Rancho Seco to input the information.
But they
30 coordinated the input of the information?
2 A
That's right.
And the problem, as discussed 3
in the Inspection Report, is that the players in the organization responsible for implementing these commitments 5
were not given the final product and told, " Hey, here is 6
what we committed to; how are you going to do it?"
or 7
develop, you know, "Your assignment, Mr. Kellie,.is with 8
respect to Roman numeral VII of the Commitment Letter; you 8
come to me with your procedures of how you are going to meet 10 this."
Individuals maintained that they were not 12 familiarized with these commitments until I brought it to 13 their attention.
Q If you were to determine who actually wrote 15 that document, or oversaw the actual putting together of the 16 information, how would you go about determining that?
A Well, at that particular point in time, I am 18 not sure what kind of currents chain the utility had in 19 place; but it was clear that the review process was not done 20 very formally, as opposed to having, on the bottom of the f
21 cover sheet, a record which indicates who prepared it and each individual that reviewed it and the date reviewed.
23 I don't believe that the licensee, at this 24 particular point in time, will have a good record which will 25 show you who prepared the document and then who reviewed or
31 1
concurred on it.
It would be nice if they did; but I'm not so sure they do.
Q on page 27 of the Inspection Report, it is 5
stated that the Regulatory Compliance Supervisor, who is 6
- Colombo, indicated that he and others involved in 7
implementing the Appendix I Technical Specification changes 8
were aware that the LLDs were not adequate to assure 8
compliance with the dose limits of Technical Specification 3.17.2
'I Who were the other individuals referred to by 12 Colombo on,this LLD issue?
A Well, I want to point out first that,.in the that's the Enforcement Conference, Mr.
Colombo 15 the Enforcement Conference held on June
- 20th, 1986 16 Supervisor of Regulatory Compliance stated that he did not II know that 'the numerical lower limit of detection limit, IO presented in
- TECSPECS, would not meet the 10 CFR 50 Appendix I criteria.
So he took issue with that statement 20 in the Report.
21 However, you know, he was the one that told me 22 that "not" had been placed in there deliberately and that 23 check sheets had been developed to make sure that the "not" was in there..
He did not identify
- who, in their 24 25 organization, knew that that would not be adequate.
i
..m._
l-32-subsequent discussions, the licensee has stated
- that, generically, the word "not" was in there j
3 because they knew that the site was not designed to meet 4
Appendix I criteria.
5 Q
Concerning this Supervising. Health Physicist awareness of the LLD Appendix I issue in early 1985, what is.
1 your knowledge concerning the supervising Health Physicist's 8
efforts to raise this
- issue, at that
- time, to his 8
supervisors?
10 A
Well, I think the key to this whole thing is 11 if I can find a copy of it Mr. Bradley's memorandum i
around here and speak from that.
)
12 13 In response to the
- question, Brydley's December 16th, 1985 memorandum to R.
L.
Powers is probably 15 the best statement as to who knew there was a problem with LLD, on the second page of that memorandum.
)
16 It is most important;
- and, I
- think, the
'O center of the whole effort here hinges on this paragraph.
19 And I
want to quote the paragraph because it's very 20 important.
What Mr. Bradley says is:
21 "Although these preliminary calculations indicate 22 that the District is still operating Rancho seco 23 within the design objectives of 10 CPR 50 24 Appendix I (three millires whole
- body, ten 25 millirem organ), the margin is small.
The Draft l
33 LLD Study of July, 1985, that is currently out for 2
review, also indicates the design objectives of 10 3
CFR 50 Appendix I may be approached using current 4
rad chenrad detection capability.
Many questions 5
come to mind that should be addressed before any 6
firm conclusions can be drawn.
Some of the questions and possible investigations include...".
8 And he goes on to outline a
detail 9
investigation approach.
And then, on page 3,
the last 10 paragraph, is a lengthy dissertation as to how he became aware of that and who he communicated it with.
12 And the bottom line is -- and I will read this 13 half a paragraph because I think it's very important;.
Mr.
Bradley says:
15 "I became aware of a potential LLD and 10 CFR 50 16 Appendix I problem while attending the mid-year
'7 Topical Symposium of of the Realth Physics Society
'O on 2 environmental Radiation, January 6 to 10, 1985, during some informal discussions with NRC staff 20 related to the Lawrence Livermore National Lab and 21 Oakridge hetlonal Lab environmental studies 22 l
downstream from Rancho Seco.
Discussions led to 23 an awareness that Rancho Seco Liquid Effluent 24 Pathway was in a very unique environmental setting 25 and that, because of the uniqueness, many of the
34 standard plan assumptions used by both the NRC and 2
the District were no longer justified.
The liquid offluent LLD values quickly came to mind as one 4
assumption that warranted further investigation.
1 felt that it was my professional responsibility 6
to !,ndicate the LLD study was on the District's behalf to demonstrate to the NRC that the District 8
was taking the initiative in investigating this 8
issue and to reduce or negate any civil penalty, if any enforcement actions were later imposed.
I
~
l' recall that you were less than enthusiastic when I 12 told you that I was performing this study; but, as 13 long as it did not interfere with all my other work, I could continue.
I felt it quite ironic 15 that the District could allocate rescurces for an 16 excess of 100 individuals for issues related to 10 II CFR 50 Appendix R, yet I could not be provided the
'8 resources for one individual to address issues to 10 CFR 50 Appendix I.
As a result of the time and 20 resource constraints, the Draft LLD Study was not 21 complete until
- July, 1985, at which time I
22 provided you a copy for your review.
After 23 subsequent discussions with you and R.
J.
Rodriguez, I
indicated that I
would withhold 24 25 issuing the Final. Study until such time that
l.
35 Rancho Seco was back on the line.
When startup 2
became so prolonged,.I felt it was no longer in 3
the District's best interest to hold up the study any longer, so I distributed the Draft LLD Study 5
for review and comment on October,1985.
6 I discussed this paragraph with Mr. Bradley; and his point was that he had brought it to his supervisor's 8
in January, attention early in December excuse me 8
February, March, April time frame of 1985.
And he is indicating, right
- here, that Powers discussed it with Il Rodriguez and there were some sort of settlement negotiated, 12 that they would not do anything about it until the unit came 13 back on the line.
And, in fact, the text of this memoranda seems 15 to indicate that there was some deliberate effort to not get 16 this done and that they were aware that there was possible escalated enforcement actions on this LLD issue, certainly l0 in December of 1985, when this memoranda went through the I
chain of command.
So, you know, the focus of this careless 20 disregard thing has got to conter around this particular 21 22 memoranda, its truthfulness, and what the people in the 23 licensee's management chain understood.
24 The fact that Bradley was putting in writing back early in the
- year, long before this 25 that t
J
36 manipulation of counting times ever occurred, that people within the organization knew that they had a problem with lower limit of detection.
And the question that I would ask was:
Were j
5 the pecole who made the decision to not identify the peaks 6
which were seen in March and June of '85 knowledgeable that j
7 failure to $dentify these could lead to a deliberate under-8 reporting of the environmental impact of these releases?
9 In other words, Nuclear Engineering seems to 10 have been clearly aware that there was a problem: with the 11 adequacy of the LLD.
Yet the plant staff is saying, "Oh, 12 heck no; we didn't know there was any problem there.
We 13 just went ahead and made our releases; we didn',t care 5
14 anything about dose."
15 So it's a very important issue, in my mind, 16 whether we are talking just about a communication problem,
'I that is, a management issue, or whether or not there was 18 some conscious effort on the part of people in positions of, 19 authority to deliberately not address the technical point 20 raised by a staff member because they suspected the outcome I
could have created an adverse impact on re-start.
22 And I think this memorandum from Bradley is a 23 key data point that needs to be addressed.
24 Q
Thank you.
On page 28 of your Inspection 25 Report, you state that technicians expressed their concern,
r 37 to their supervisors, that the adjustaent of counting time 2
obscured the presence of radioactive material.
Who were these technicians and aho were their 4
supervisors?
5 A
- Well, the technicians involved were people like Dave Mixa; apparently, a guy name Rob Williams, who I 7
did not have the opportunity to interview; Mr. Le1 wander; 8
Partridge; perhaps, Hampton; and others.
They brought their concerns to the first-line supervisors who would have been 10 Mr. Wilson, Mr. Manofsky, and Fred Kellie.
And I understand that Kellie discussed the 12 issue of LLDs and how to deal with it with Mr. Coward.
13 So, again, the key people that I saw, in terms of conducting the Inspection Report, were Dave Mixa, who 15 felt very strongly about it Mr. Le1 wander; Mr. Wilson; and 16 Manofsky; and
- Kellie, who all explained what their II activation was in making their decision.
So, again, the key people that I saw, in terms 19 of conducting the Inspection Report, were Dave Mixa, who 20 felt very strongly about it; Mr. Leiwander; Mr. Wilson; and Manofsky; and
- Kellie, who all explained what their activation was in making their decision.
23 So, from an interview point of view, those are 24 tha key players.
I think the questions that I
asked 25 were: Do you understand what LLD means?
Do you understand m.m._..-......
1 38 1
why you are making the measurements?
Why were you concerned 2
enough to put an entry in the log book?
3 And the technicians generally
- said, "We 4
I understand why we are making the measurements! we know it 5
has impact on dose; and we thought it was wrong.
- However, Wilson, Manofsky, and Kellie all told us, 'You guys, all you i
7 have to worry about is:
Are we complying with the TECSPEC 8
number?
Don't worry about anything else.
Are we meeting 8
the TECSPEC7'"
And they told the techs, " Hey, as long as we meet the TECSPEC, that's what counts.*
~
'l And, based on that, the techs were directed to 12 make these counts for 1,000 seconds.
13
- However, in the Inspection Report, you will also
- note, even after they were directed by their 15 supervisors to shorten the count
- time, during
- 1985, 16 something like 60 percent or 70 percent of the time, the techs continued to count for 2,000 seconds or longer which indicates the techs were acting very responsibly, that they knew they had to look hard for this activity.
20 MR. MEEKS:
Greg, that's all the questions I have for you right now.
I appreciate your time in answering 22 my questions of the various aspectc of your Inspection 23 Report.
24 Is there anything else before we close here?
25 Is there anything else you wish to add for the
.-_.-----_._-------___--.__--__---Q
I 39 record?
2 MR. YUHAS:
Yeah. I want to make it clear that the focus of this Special Inspection was to establish the 4
technical facts with respect to the licensee's management of 5
liquid effluents during calendar year
- 1985, paying 6
particular attention to the licensee's history of their failure to manage liquid effluents during the period of 1980 8
through 1984 and in terms of meeting their commitments with 8
respect to their special Report 84-07.
10 What the Inspection found was that there was
'l numerous examples of failure to meet regulatory requirements 12 and commitments during 1985.
In those instances where
'3 individuals offered a statement of their motivation, the Inspection Report repeated the individual's statement of 15 motivation.
16 What the Inspection Report did not do was take statements from key individuals such as Mr. Coward, such as Mr. Rodriguez, and Mr. Powers, and Mr. Kielman under oath or affirmation pursuant to U.
S.
Code of Justice Title XVIII, 20 where hard questions such as:
When did Mr. Bradley tell you i
21
- that, in his professional
- opinion, the Technical 22 Specification LLD limits were not adequate to assure 23 compliance with Appendix I were met?
24 Statements such as, in response to Mr.
25 Bradley's statement in his December, 1985 memo:
Is it true
40
)
l 1
that you told him not to circulate his Draft Report until 2
the unit was started up again?
3 Statements like, in terms of review of the Inspection Report in review,of the Semi-excuse me l
l 5
annual Effluent Release Reports which were submitted:
Did you know at the time that you submitted those that isotopes which had been identified were not being reported?
8 Those kinds of questions, in my opinion, are 9
all very important to determine the extent of motivation for 10 the non-compliances which were identified in the Report.
11 And, because of availability of key management 12 officials and the fact that I felt it would be, perhaps, 13 inappropriate to ask those kinds of questions witho,ut the formality of OI involvement and putting an individual under 15 oath, that this matter is still under investigation.
16 It's my own personal opinion that we had a II major breakdown in management of liquid effluents during 18 1985 because of technical knowledge of this fairly new 19 requirement, people at the plant staff.
In other words, 20 they were not highly skilled in Appendix I or 40 CFR 190 or I
the science, for instance, of what they were actually doing.
But other people in the Utility's organization 23 knew there was a
problem.
And this failure of the 24 management systems to assure that commitments were carried 25 out and met is rather obvious through the Inspection Report.
3
41 I
I think the focus of the effort now has to be:
2 Was there a willing, deliberate attempt to not face the 3
facts by Utility management; and was there some reason for them not to face the facts,
.f. e., re-start of the unit or 5
the political commitment because they had told the public 6
they were not going to release any more radioactive materials?
8 What we are looking at here is not a safety 9
issue; it's an issue of, it presents a window to look at the 10 way Utility was managing its responsibilities and whether or
'l not the people that were involved in this were really 12 exercising their responsibilities
- properly, number one; 13 number two, were they just not knowledgeable of what they were doing; or, number three, were they knowledgeable and 15 were they deliberately not carrying out their 16 responsibilities in accordance with the regulatory requirements.
So, understand that the thrust of the 19 Inspection Report was merely to capture chapter and verse of 20 the regulatory requirements and does not go into these key 21 players of what they knew when and are they willing to say 22 their motivations at particular points in time, and why 23 actions weren't taken.
24 So it is my hope that your efforts will focus 25 in on the key players.
And the key players, as I see them, f
42 are the technie tans who say they knew something was wrong; Mr.
- Wilson, Manofsky, and
- Kellie, being the first-line 3
people at the site who told the technicians it was okay to do what they were doing; Mr.
Coward who,- supposedly, 5
discussed the issue with Mr. Kellie and reached a conclusion that it was all right to do what' they were going to do; certainly Mr. Bradley and what he told Mr. Powers; and, 8
possibly,' Mr. Rodriguez, as to his opinion what was proper back during 1985 and then, again, in the fall, December, 1985, and, after that, into early 1986; and then, of course, l'
the relationship between Mr. Powers and Mr. Rodriguez and 12 Mr. Coward as to what the corporate position was going to be 13 on this matter.
so there's some hard questions yet to be 15 asked.
And we are looking forward to the successful 16 documentation of the responses.
I BY MR. MEEKS:
18 Q
What was Kielman's title und responsibility?
A Kielman was the previous Manager of Nuclear 20 Engineering during parts of 1985; and Mr. Powers reported to 21 Mr. Kielman.
And then Kielman reported to Rodriguez, 22 The other key player in all of
- this, of 23 course, was Mr. Dietrich, who was involved in licensing and 24 the Original implementation of the Appendix I TECSPECS.
25 Q
Concerning your statement on safety impact, 1
O
43 I don't know if this is a question or a certainly certainly the statement; we'll find out when I finish 3
intent of a licensee executive to deal fairly and honestly with regulations administered by NRC does hav,e an ultimate 5
impact on safety issues.
Can you comment on that?
A I agree.
That's this window that we are 8
talking about, is how does this Inspection Report give us an 9
idea of how the Utility operates, generally.
10 When I say about safety, what I'm talking
'I about is the dose of 3.89 millirem is not a public health 12 and safety. threat.
It is an issue of the formality of 13 operations.
It is merely a threshold that says, " Hey, Mr.
Utility Executive, you are releasing more than we had 15 planned for you to releases you have a responsibility to 16 tell us that you are doing that, number one.
And, number i
II two, propose some actions to bring it into compliance with 18 our design objectives."
That means we are not talking about a major 20 safety issue.
They might have come in and told us, " Hey, 21 we're releasing five millires; and it will be two more 22 quarters before we get it fixed."
And the NRC might have 23 found that totally acceptable.
24 But that's not the issue here.
The issue is:
25 Hey, Mr. Utility, did you know you were doing this?
Did you 4
44 1
understand what you were doing?
And how come you didn't i
2 come forward and tell us that you were at this particular threshold and meet your TECSPEC requirements?
l So, when I say nucienr safety, threat,
I as 5
talking about nuclear safety in teras of release of radioactive anterial and its impact on public health and 7
safety.
Whereas, you are talking about nuclear safety as to 8
whether or not this licensee is credible overall.
And, if he's doing this kind of stuff in the area of the effluents, 10 is he doing it in some other area where the NRC depends upon l
11 his word, his candidness, and his truthfulness in their 12 negotiations with the Utility?
13 MR. MEEKS:
Thank you, Greg.
MR. YUHAS:
You are welcome.
15 (Mhereupon, at 3:20 p.m.,
the interview was 16 concluded.)
17 l
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 1
25 1
1
7, 1
45 1
CERTIFICATE 2
3 This is to certify that the attached 4
proceedings before the:
5 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF:
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW (CLOSED MEETING) 0 DOCKET NO:
MONE 9
DATE:
JANUARY 20, 1987 0
PLACE:
WALNUT CREEK, CALIFORNIA
'I were had as therein appears, and that this is the original 12 transcript thereof for the files of TRE COMMISSION 13
\\
14 15 i
16 17 M'h 18
_t MARG ftET DEVERS 39 Off cial Reporter
)
20 21 22 23 24 25 j
t T'
i m%
_