ML20129G751
ML20129G751 | |
Person / Time | |
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Issue date: | 09/18/1996 |
From: | NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20129E434 | List: |
References | |
FOIA-96-359 NUDOCS 9610030137 | |
Download: ML20129G751 (7) | |
Text
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FROM: R.M. VENTURA SUBJECT! INDIAN POltE3 NUOLEAR POWER PLANT MEETING MINUTES FOR FIRE PROTECTION (F') 1994 TASK EVALUATIONS DISTRIBUTION / ATTENDEES J.Tarpinan J. Balla M. Ucitra ;
J. Maurer (part time) C.Tes F. Bloise K Ve P. Borer (parttime) K Mavrikis (parttime) '
R. Ventura
^ T. Dougherry S. Munoz I J.Dube L Retzer Plains Office at 1 The following are the Minutes of the subject meeting held in the Whito PM on March 29,1994.
attendees. The T. Dougherty chaired the subject meeting dim @ns with above n tasks necessary to complete in 1994. The attached March by 1994, were re-17,1994 list o allocations, which were previously (1993) agreed upon for completiori - e ,
evaluated.
it was generally agreed upon that the following six (6) of the selected twentl tasks could be futy or partla!!y pr=+poned to 1935.
a Appendix R / Safe Shutdown Analys!s Update (futty) m New Suppression Systems (partfa!!y) l
= Fire Protection Program Plan Update (fully) s Staff Augmentation (partially) a Resolution of Code Deficiencies (fu!!y) a sectric Fire Pump Power Supply (ful!y)
Attached is the revised March 30,1994 Est which reflects the above changes.
3.;
- ~
Excellence Innovation a integrity
- Teamwor$ , . . FACD,5) l c.___ ____.0 :
9610030137 960918
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CA -359 pop
_ _ _ _ . _* _ _ _I
?- April 5,1994 .
IPP 04-102 l
. 1
)
d O&M Budget for ;
it was further agreed that 20% contingency be added to the estimate nie cost of the remaintng tas.ks selected to be cornpleted in 1994, 4
J 11 was also noted that there is a high risk of ornergent work resuhing from the c of the following three (3) 1994 tasks:
o Fire Hazard and Analysts Update
)
o Emergency Battery UQhting (EBL) Testing
- o Update of the Hydraulic Calculations ~
i Modifications resulting from EBLtesting also have the added risk of possibly being outa 4
related. ,
I i
' The following action items were committed to:
l Action tern
' Resoonsible Person
- Pursue bids to InstaD a comrperclef suppression
! J Dube system in the existing IP3 Mministration 1
i Buildirxj by 1994.
Revisethe 21 task evaluatiorstoinclude a clear F. Blotse/J. Balla statement of problem and it9 M@M risk of completing. task in agreed 16T18 frame.
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Page 2 of 2 g" "' g Ev' " -
RV\dec 2\tPP 102 P42: / Or 7 ?! '. ;Q
.o e can an 01 tai w mss e ru - - et m- sss1.ez_ .
to a
,-..~. ;,n ,a ; ., _ .- _ _ -
PnRLIMINARY 1994/1995 BUDGET x12 AAao, a _. Y C4
).' , /. )
OAM Percent m 1W Compiste ss Start
~ 53 & 94_
Task Capital .Up? OK)
No, YA$g O&M N 9M 0 App R/ Safe shedown Analysis Upece p 1
. o&M N M62K 7J 1 2 Phe Hazards Analyris -
N l 90 P
3 SupyiussionEgear Analysis **
I 7
$YN$ 5 W se$inib $ $ $ $ 5OAME M Y$555$9'N$5$ M 38 W?555 Nw seppmulsa sysisms N 7
4a s' E1.Twk nus N
' 4c Taasianmer Waaer Cunds '
N l$10K ' 95 . .
OAM 6 Phe Pre plam Rev 7 FP Eeglasering Ads Devch;r
'OAM N El 75 spotaf A/E Name 05ios 4t,; .;
N 'A110K 0 CAM 10 UpdateHydraalio Cales N h140K 90 O&M 11 NFPA Code Come Walk 4ewas N 350K 0 Uposes of 1990 PPAM SSD C4k & Campoons 1.las O&M P $A y
Otasuk of Review at * :, - of Mads on SSD MGity)
V '$3101 40 P HEMYC Wrap ElTos#
C&M 7
o&M Y h120K 35
,, 1 to k hadsr.t+ seats
/ Y 25tX so 7 o&M la Emerasesy Bauery1.isbiing hones * .
7 Pis1d Enginsabs 54sK *
- Denism Suppen $10K 1
FP 7pgramPlaa UMe pan of Sinff A&
A C&M N g 0 11A Y $25K S0' celeTummel.Smek & Hat cas A 'ysis CAM 27 i O&M YIN sauvK SO _
Add'1 1 staff Assnessation
' CAM N l sddC 25 2 A/E Home cHies suppost Tads, i O&M Y siMeit le S
EBLMods Resoning ime andan 81sskoosTandng 8125K 0 CAM N
- 4 Resolmion of code Rataaed n-a u . Mode /prosa N $50K 30 Elmario N Wr 7 pear $wpply O&M
$ i 240E O4M ,
$p$250K carnal th4901C -,
TOTAL f.Gisi
- 1. Task would ses $500K if tbo aonlysis is dens down to the subounponent1sv 1.
~ "' Ces includes 19M NFS kug11sden east for ENG 334 HEMYC WayOdarinits hard Aspair sad she total aca Oneluding Wha) for asparara NEMYC Wap4(arlaita Board Med 934373 PBAR. '
- 3. %fs task boludes snocisand work for surreas asashnases.
- 4. As addhmal $125K la enimaisd for 1995. Tbc 4elay of pans of this insk from 1994 to 1995 may invehe T. We Aasm.M Pnsed. pd 0F38449:33 F/ Gj GF Ft.CES)
Edl W *as*S Su3 IJd M N EE:T1 566T M PO*d DN3 OdM do 01
d ._.
~' e i
, GO *.d ~Rfl.01.. ,,-............., .
- PREUMINARY i994/1995 BUlXist i '
' Last Revised March 30,1994
- o&M teesse ges4 ses n start ra-ri es
); CAP -Up1 95 & M gK) gx}
7k s250cc i
Ns. TA$g o&M N e '!
App m/ saksh An.1y is upanic C&M' N 45 3142K j y 1 PirsMassais Analysu
! ! 2 N go 3 " .. " Effac88 Am%'is ..
f t WM 9 " nids W 2 7 d V F #o&M54 5 ? N 0 ! 5 14s2szIMJMYMi R 20 l I
312sK l
.i 7 Newsuppsesskrasyamme N 4R S' E1. Tub *mr. SWs N 1 7 $1cK
- C Tae.eksesorWoest C..S .O&M N 95 j
6 Fase W Rev N 75 ggi .
i -
O&M 7 FP Enshessfas 6kle C- ' . ,,."4
} - part etNn m ota.e s. N 0 3110K OAM l Updals!!W-Ik Cska 314cx 10 OAM N 30 l
11 NFFA Code Cam;a'~= W+M 0 $5tE l OEM Y 5 UP of 1990 FFRM 55D CsNe & Cearpoaent Lhts P Otesuk of Ra'.cw of!=pect et Mods on $sD capability) g cam Y 40 SifOK P 1 NEMYC Wine Elfart" 512cK CAM Y '
95 10 Piec an.sice Perucretane sc Is ssex g o&M. Y s0 a s 7 1: ' Emcescoey sancry Lis)skss4Iauas K f
7 Pi.u rap ~+s o l
? ,
Design *'ig+r. 310K
'-N CAM N 0 g -
1 21A FP Program Fisa U,+a- pan of saff Af
$32X l OAM Y $0 1
27 Cabis *P.==f- Sanks & Hot Gas Analyak 10X so $465K
^-
OeM YlN AJd*1 1 Aieff A.,; is s6er l Oau w 2 A/E m e one s.,,.4 Y 10 32SoK l 7,,, CAM -~
3 EBL Mu Raso&g 6am Sel- 3'--N 7asting 0 $125E $125K l o&M N 4 me suoi .r e_' =
- 4" pgfc* -t . Mode /p!Dg 15cr Ic i oau N rJecide stro pmsy hywse supply
! 3 $2017E $51oK sor
' o&M $25ax CAPTIAL m.m . , =
TOTAL 1
UGIE' j
- 1. Task would cost $300K If the analysis is sk4e down to tbs sutcompoacetlevsk
- 2. Cost lacludes 1994 NPS fa==ht6 su.t fus Utic 534 IIEMYC Wrap /
- 3. '1%s taak *mcludca sanoeisted inerk art surress temadormers.
- 4. The delay of pans of this task from 1994 to 1995 may bevolve anos rial.
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! REPORT OF INTERVIEW WITH l ALAN ETTLINGER On May 17 and June I, 1995, ETTLINGER was interviewed by the reporting invest.igator. The interview was conducted under oath NYPAat attorney the New ArmyYork Power LEVINE ;
Authority (NYPA), 123 Main Street, White Plains, NY.LEVINE stated that she l represented ETTLINGER during the interview. ETTLINGER l represented NYPA and ETTLINGER in his capacity as a NYPA employee.
~
stated that he asked LEVINE to sit in on the interview, and was under no' ETTLINGER understood that pressure from his management to have LEVINE there.he had the right to that it was his-desire to have her thea. ETTLINGER provided the following !
information.
l ver icense number' '
' orn on His home ' n /1 is He is His social se num er / V' I te' phone numb hwitha e or"o l He graduated from i try Unive sity (CUNY) in Science in Mechanical Engineering'. In lhe gradua fFom the NY In Polytechnic Institute with a Master of tence in Mechanical Engineering.
1982 he graduated from NY University with a Master of Business Administration degree.
In May 1982'ETTLINGER was hired by NYPA. From 1990 until October 1994, heHewas the Manager of Configuration Management and Engineering Programs (CNEP). ETTLINGER is currently the Fire Protection (FP) Program Project Coordinator.
said that CMEP was abolished in a NYPA reorganization, and its functions were moved to the James A. Fitzpatrick (JAF) and Indian Point 3 (IP3) Nuclear Power Plants. To the best of his knowledge, none of the employees in CHEP lost theirjobs.
While he was the manager of CMEP, Ulrich WITTE, Manager, Configuration
.E I Management, reported to him, and was respon'sible for the development of the ]
u ts NYPA design basis documents (DBDs). Included in that was the development of 53 the FP DBD. They were to collect all design basis docs, and issue the DBD, % 15 and resolve any issues that came out of it. ETTLINGER said that the Safe =@
Shutdown Analysis is a separate document'and descriDed it as a licensee's gj "c compliance strategy with 10 CFR Appendix R. ETTLINGER added 'that a DBD should g 4 not change over time, but the safe shut down analysis may change. e li %
ETTLINGER does not know why Ken VEHSTEDT was transferred from the NYPA White a2 il ETTLINGER did know that VEHSTEDT was working at y5g)
Plains Office (WPO) to IP3.
~IP3 for Joe DUBE, IP3 FP Manager. ETTLINGER said that there was a transfer of - S W the FP design authority to DUBE from Frank BLOISE's Nuclear. Engineer ggg, group. ETTLINGER was told that Paul BORER (former Vice President of Nuclear Engineering) approved that transfer. ETTLINGER said that Gus MAVRIKIS (former .e .e3 #M5:s Director of Nuclear Engineering) and BLOISE did not agree with the design He added authority being transferred from WPO to IP3 unhr VEHSTEDT and DUBE.
that there was no question that MAVRIKIS and GLOISE were upset with the decision.
ETTLINGER said that he was informed by WITTE that there were problems that arose out of the Deficiency Evaluation Reports (DERs) and Design Deficiency EXH E CASE NO. 1-95-019' pace l _0F_h.duq _
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ETTLINGER specifically recalls D00Is 10 and 14 because he Open Items (DD01s). l was involved in their close out, but he did not get involved in the day to day resolution. WITTE was managing the day to day work on activities of that He was told by WITTE that he and TARPINIAN were having probl' ems those issues. i with VE:iSTEDT and other IP3 personnel in getting the D00!s issued. ETTLINGER I described that as an abnormal occurrence because there usually isn't any i
difficulty in getting them issued. ETTLINGER said that the process should not :
have been that difficult. ETTLINGER believed that part of the problem was the l personality differences between TARPINIAN, Andrew BARTLIK (FP Engineer), and J
VENSTEDT.
ETTLINGER recalls meeting one on'one with DUBE, and DUBE proposed that the i money budgeted for the 1994 work on the FP Safe Shutdown Analysis should be used to resolve other FP issues. ETTLINGER said that he did not agree with r
DUBE's proposition because he believed the analysis had to be done, and that l
any outstanding FP issues could be resolved by completing it. ETTLINGER said ;
- that NYPA senior management had previously approved of the analysis. !
ETTLINGER said that meeting was not adve.he rsarial and
. He added DUBE that have there was a prettyongood no resolution DUBE'srelationship l' proposal, but his (ETTLINGER's) group continued working on the Safe Shutdown '
Analysis.
i ETTLINGER was informed by WITTE that VEHSTEDT, KLEIN and Roger LAURACELLA !
believed that the Safe Shutdown Analysis did not need to be done, and that if !
it were done, VEHSTEDT wanted it deferred from 1994 until 1995. ETTLINGER !
believed that if it was deferred, TARPINIAN and another contractor, Jim STRAUSSER, would have lost their contractor jobs at NYPA, but would have been l rehired when the work began. ETTLINGER said that he has seen no evidence that l' would lead him to believe that VEHSTEDT, KLEIN,' or LAURACELLA wanted it >
deferred because they wanted TARPINIAN to lose his contract with NYPA.
i ETTLINGER recalls that after he became the FP Project Coordinator, he and l VEHSTEDT had discussions wherein VEHSTEDT expressed his opinion that peop1e were not looking at the 1984 Appendix R (safe shutdown) analysis correctly. l VEHSTEDT told him tnat if people looked carefully enough in the IP3 " vault,"
the documents would be located that would answer the issues that were being raised. ETTLINGER said that the documentation that VEHSTEDT spoke of was not
- in the " vault." ETTLINGER offered as an example, where VEHSTEDT and KLEIN told him that a safety analysis existed, and that it was located in the " vault."
ETTLINGER said that he went to the vault himself, and looked, but could not find the analysis. ETTLINGER said that from his standpoint, if a document can't be' located, it does not exist.
As a result of the problems in getting the FP issues resolved, ETTLINGER met with NYPA's Chief Nuclear Officer, William CAHILL, the IP3 Resident Manager, Les HILL, and NYPA's Vice President of Nuclear Engineering, Tom DOUGHERTY.
That resulted in ETTLINGER being named the FP Coordinator and head of the Task Force (TF), and being given the complete authority to do what had to be done to resolve the FP problems. ETTLINGER developed a procedure which identified a formal process to resolve the issues, which eventually numbered fifty eight.
Consultants were brought in to assist in the resolution. They reviewed every issue, and had the final say on whether to approve or reject the resolution. -
Case No. 1-95-019 2 msn//
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ETTLINGER said that if there was a differing professional opinion (DPO) on an issue, this process created a method for it to be resolved. .
ETTLINGER said that HILL decided to not include'VEHSTEDT in the FP task force, and that he agreed with that. decision. HILL told him he believed that if VEHSTEDT were included a the TF, it would cause problems between VEHSTEDT and BARTLIK, and would negatively impact the resolution of the issues. .
ETTLINGER was also interviewed regarding allegations that TARPINIAN was harassed and discriminated against because of his work on FP issues.
ETTLINGER said that TARPINIAN worked directly,for.WITTE. ETTLINGER did not know TARPINIAN before TARPINIAN was hired as a contractor by NYPA in 1992 to work on the James A. Fitzpatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant and IP3 FP DBDs.
TARPINIAN worked first on the JAF DBD, and ETTLINGER is not aware of TARPINIAN experiencing problems similar to those h.e experienced on the IP3 DBD work.
ETTLINGER said that.TARPINIAN is a good, and conscientious worker, who is not unreasonable in trying to get issues resolve.. d ETTLINGER said that TARPINIAN informed him that Ebasco (now Raytheon) employee Walter WITTICH had inquired about who TARPINIAN was, and stated that TARPINIAN needed to be brought 'under control. ETTLINGER does not recall the date when TARPINIAN first told him this. ETTLINGER said that TARPINIAN did not say that he viewed the incident as a threat to his job, but TARPINIAN was upset, and he (ETTLINGER) believes that TARPINIAN felt it was a threat. ETTLINGER said that TARPINIAN may have told him that he didn't want to lose his job at NYPA.
ETTLINGER told TARPINIAN that he didn't have to worry about that, and that he did not view it as a threat to TARPINIAN. ETTLINGER explained that he told TARPINIAN that he was the person who had the authority to terminate TARPINIAN, and he hr.d no intention of doing that. TARPINIAN asked him if he wanted him to back off on his work, and ETTLINGER told him that he (TARPINIAN) wasn't being paid to back off. ETTLINGER told TARPINIAN that he was to continue doing his job, and that if anyone had a problem with that, they should come to see him (ETTLINGER). As a result of TARPINIAN's concern, he met with TARPINIAN and TARPINIAN's supervisor, Rocco CAMPANELLA, Cataract Corporation.
During the meeting, TARPINIAN expressed his concern over losing his job, and -
CAMPANELLA was concerned about his company losing a contract at NYPh. He .
. believes that CAMPANELLA asked him if TARPINIAN was performing his job well.
He told CAMPANELLA th~at TARPINIAN was doing his job well, and assured him that~
Cataract had no reason to worry about losing the contract. ,'
ETTLINGER said that he was not at the March 29, 1994, meeting where VEHSTEDT patted TARPINIAN on the shoulder, and told him "see you later pal." ETTLINGER did not find out about this incident until after he became the FP Program
- Coordinator in October 1994. ETTLINGER said that TARPINIAN viewed the statement as a threat to his job. ETTLINGER believes that TARPINIAN told him that he thought that VEHSTEDT was going to try to have him laid off.
ETTLINGER said that he assured TARPINIAN that was not going to happen, and that he was satisfied with'his work. ETTLINGER said that he reminded TARPINIAN of his earlier reassurance to him that he was not going to fire him.
ETTLINGER said that when he sat down with TARPINIAN, he told TARPINIAN that what VEHSTEDT said may not have been intended as a threat. ETTLINGER said that based on wha,t he knows of the incident, and although things might. point ,
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Case No. 1-95-019 PAGE_ 0F PAGE(S)
i to it, he believes that it was not a threatening statement by' VENSTEDT, because getting rid of TARPINIAN would not have taken care of the problems that VEHSTEDT was having with BARTLIK on the FP issues. ETTLINGER is unaware of VEHSTEDT taking ,any actions that would cause TARPINIAN to lose his job at NYPA.
ETTLINGER said that he has known VEHSTEDT since 1986.* He described VEHSTEDT '
as sincere, although his actions can be misinterpreted. VENSTEDT's style is that he will do what he wants to-do, and won't do something just to please I someone else~. VEHSTEDT is opinionated, and if he believes he is right on an issue, it will take a lot to. convince him that he is wrong. ETTLINGER said that VEHSTEDT has admitted to him in the past that he was wrong on an issue, but not on'any FP issues. ETTLINGER said that, at times, VENSTEDT has been short and abrupt with him, but he never took it personally. VEHSTEDT has told him that he believes that TARPINIAN does what BARTLIK tells him to do. '
ETTLINGER said that Hugh GILMARTIN (who filled ETTLINGER's old position) did not ask him for TARPINIAN's and STRAUSSER's resumes, and does not know if GILMARTIN conducted an investigation into TARPINIAN's and STRAUSSER's backgrounds. .
Regarding Steve WILKIE's conversation with TARP!NIAN about the Robert POLLARD letter to CAHILL, ETTLINGER said that TARPINIAN informed him of the conversation shortly after it occurred. TARPINIAN was concemed with why WILKIE asked him about the letter, but TARP!NIAN did not tell him that he viewed it as harassment. During that conversation, TARPINIAN infomed him that he feared that if his name was linked with contacting POLLARD, he would be " blacklisted" from further work in the nuclear power industry. ETTLINGER -
said that he reassured TARPINIAN that he had a job at NYPA under his current contract.
ETTLINGER said that he and DOUGHERTY met with WILKIE to get his side of the story, and based on what WILKIE told them, he felt that there was no intent by WILKIE to harass TARPINIAN. He and DOUGHERTY also met with TARPINIAN to discuss the incident. TARPINIAN was concerned with the incident, but did not feel that it was WILKIE's intent to harass him. TARPINIAN told them that he didn't want WILKIE to lose his job over the incident.
ETTLINGER was also interviewed regarding WITTE's allegation that he received a -
poor performance review and was demoted because he and his group identified and pursued the FP issubs. WITTE was hired by NYPA in November 1991, and ETTLINGER was WITTE's supervisor until October 1994, when GILMARTIN became WITTE's supervisor. ETTLINGER said that WITTE was removed from his position as the Manager of Configuration Management in December 1994, as a result of a NYPA reorganization and downsizing,,.and his documented poor job perfomance ETTLINGER said that in 1993, all but the FP DBD was taken away from WITTE and given to Navine MATHER. That work was taken away from WITTE, mainly because of a personality conflict that existed between WITTE and MATHER. ETTLINGER viewed WITTE as the problem, because MATHER was producing results on the work that he was given, and WITTE was not. Also, WITTE was experiencing problems on other issues with other people. This led ETTLINGER to tell WITTE of his i intent to take away from him all but the FP DBD work. WITTE strongly objected Case No. 1-95-019 4 '
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4 to that, and told him that he was making a big mistake. ETTLINGER told WITTE that they would see what happened and gave WITTE approximately one month.to '
improve his perforisance. ,WITTE's performance did not improve.
and rated him as 1 ETTLINGER
'Does Not Meet wrote WITTE's Expectations" (DNME).1992ETTLINGER perfonnance said review that (' attached)WITTE did not o to the rating or the contents of the review. ETTLINGER added that during that j
< review period, WITTE was not working on FP issues, except for some work on the :
JAF DBD, or on any real safety issues. He said that WITTE was'mainly working on procedure revisions. During that revier period, WITTE did not raise any l safety issues, nor did he claim that he was being harassed or discriminated against in any way. .
INVESTIGATOR'SNOTE: In the Reviewee Comments section of the review, .
WITTE wrote, " Alan: as per our discussion, I will make adjustments in sw management style. I would like to reaffiru ey desire to have frequent l
, (monthly) feedback from you as well as others such as S. Zu11a on progress towards these changes."
ETTLINGER said that on March 8, 1993 (attached), and May 13,'1993 (attached),
he met with WITTE to discuss his job performance. In addition to that, WITTE received a mid cycle performance review in August 1993. That overall rating was ' Meets Expectations", with a DNME for not meeting schedules. WITTE received another performance review for the August through December 1993 time period. That overall rating was " Meets Expectations." WITTE received DNME's in the " Meets . Schedules," " Planning and Resource Management," and " Issues Status Reports" areas. ETTtINGER pointed out on that review that WITTE did not meet two (" Complete CM Reference manual" and ' Complete IP3 ECRIS") out of the four areas of work that were to be completed by the end of 1993.
WITTE's 1994 performance review (attached) showed that WITTE received a DNME in eleven of the fourteen rated areas, with an overall rating of DNME.
ETTLINGER said that since he supervised WITTE for ten out of the twelve month
' rating period, he wrote the draft review. GILMARTIN reviewed the draft, and agreed with its contents. DOUGHERTY concurred in the review, but WITTE.would not sign it. ETTLINGER said that WITTE initially refused to meet with him and GILMARTIN to discuss the review, but eventually WITTE met with them to discuss it.
ETTLINGER opined that it is curious that WITTE did not begin alleginii that he was being harassed for raising safety issues until after de received his 1994 review. ETTLINGER reviewed the 1994 review, and pointed out that FP is not mentioned at all. ETTLINGER said that throughout the 1994 review period, he counselled WITTE on the need to improve his performance. ETTLINGER'said that Leri STEINMETZ, of the NYPA personnel department, met with him as a result of WITTE's allegation. STEINMETZ reviewed the 1994 performance review with him, and concluded that the DNME rating was justified.
ETTLINGER then discussed the NYPA reorganization and downsizing. ETTLINGER 4 said that, as a result of that, the Configuration Management group disappeared, and many of its functions were moved to IP3 or JAF. Previously, there were three supervisors reporting to him. The reorganization eliminated Case No. I-95-019 5 n.H ,
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the Manager of Configuration Management position. ETTLINGER said that WITTE iras not chosen to be one of the two other manager! 6ecause of his poor job performance.
ETTLINGER was also interviewed concerning miiegations that BARTLIK was harassed and discriminated against because he identified and pursued FP deficiencies at IP3. ETTLINGER said that he became BARTLIK's supervisor after .
BLOISE wrote a draft's that BLOISE and MAVRIKIS wrote ETTLINGER understand the review. aid cy ETTLINGER was shown a document written by BARTLIK, in which BARTLIK wrote that during a meeting, Carl JESSEN (IP3 Technical Special.ist) referred to him as "scumbag Bartlik." ETTLINGER had not previously seen the document, nor had he heard of the alleged incident. ETTLINGER was also shown a document in which 8ARTLIK's technical issues are referred to as "Bartlikisms." ETTLINGER had not previously seen the document.
ETTLINGER said that BARTLIK and TARPINIAN see " eye to eye" on every FP issue, and thought that was odd. ETTLINGER has not personally seen TARPINIAN or BARTLIK being harassed by VEHSTEDT, but he has seen VEHSTEDT and BARTLIK screaming at each other about the FP issues. ETTLINGER said that BARTLIK and VEHSTEDT have the same opinions about each other, and they feel each other is "usel ess. " ETTLINGER added that, "they really hate each other's guts."
, ETTLINGER offered that he travelled to Baltimore Gas & Electric (BG&E) to review their FP program in an effort to improve NYPA's program. While at BG&E, ETTLINGER said that he was told by Cliff SINOPOLI (phonetic) that BARTLIK had encountered similar problems at the North Anna Nuclear Power Plant and at one of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) plants. It is ETTLINGER's and others' opinion at NYPA that it is BARTLIK's philosophy that it is his job i
to raise issues and not to resolve them. ETTLINGER explained that BARTLIK l defines a concern that he has, and when that concern is resolved, BARTLIK brings up a different part of the same concern.
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1 ETTLINGER added that he learned that by going to other plants and to NYPA contractor EPM, that nuclear utilities were smart'r enow than they~were when Appendix R first came out. He said that EPM (a contract company) put together IP3's first Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis in 1984 with' VEHSTEDT's and KLEIN's assistance. He said that there is no question that the analysis was not kept up to date as it should have been. ETTLINGER opined that the personality problems that exist between VEHSTEDT, KLEIN, LAURACELLA, and BARTLIK and TARPINIAN, resulted from VEHSTEDT and KLEIN overseeing the original IP3 Safe Shutdown Analysis. ETTLINGER opines that VEHSTEDT and KLEIN felt that since they were involved in the original work, they knew more than anyone else about it, and that they were the best ones to answer any questions regarding it. ETTLINGER said that there were problems with the 1984 analysis, in that it did not include things that it should have by today's standards. He '
added that NYPA is not alone in that deficiency, and the inadequacy was not intentional on NYPA's part. He added that for the most part, the probless' l with the analysis resulted from a lack of documentation.
ETTLINGER said that the revised compliance summary for the Safe Shutdown Analysis was provided to the NRC in February 1995, and it was accepted. The Case No. 1-95-019 6 sen i l
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final Appendix R analysis was submitted by EPM to NYPA in early May 1995, and needs to reviewed before it is signed by NYPA. ETTLINGER stated that NYPA did ,
not com;t to the NRC to have the safe shutdown analysis completed prior to the IP3 restart, but it was an internal start up comitment.
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1 Jeffrey A. Teator, Investigator l Office of Investigations Field Office, F i gich 'I [ ;
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Case No. 1-95-019 ,
die.i PA3$ C b PAGQS)