ML20133F920
| ML20133F920 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 01/13/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| To: | Holloway W, Oneill J AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133F923 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-96-351, REF-10CFR9.7 SECY-94-242-C, NUDOCS 9701150067 | |
| Download: ML20133F920 (8) | |
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V,s. N ULLt.MH N Luuta i un LvMMissavh NHC F OIA HLOVEbi NUMBE HIS) g%g k FOIA 3 51 y- RESPONSE TYPE j i RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF lriNAL l x1 PARTIAL 5th
/ INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST DATE
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,#N 13 i 7 DOCKE T NUMBER (S)Ilf apphcable) mEQUESTE R '
Mr. J. H. O'Neill, Jr. ATTN: W. R. Holloway PART 1.-AGENCY RECORDS RELEASED OR NOT LOCATED (Seecheckedboxes)
Nm agency records subject to the request have been located.
Ns additional agency records subject to the request have been located.
Requested records are available through another public distribution program. See Comments section.
Agency records subject to the request that are identified in Append;x(es) are already available for public inspection and copying at the NRC Public Document Room. 2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, DC.
Agency records subject to the request that are identified in Appendix (es) K are being made available for public inspection and copying y
et the NRC Public Document Room,2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, DC,in a folder under this FOIA number.
The nonproprietary version of the proposal (s) that you agreed to accept in a telephone conversation with a member of my staf f is now being made available for public inspection and copying at the N RC Public Document Room,2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, DC, in a folder under this FOI A number.
+
Agency records subject to the request that are identified in Appendix (es) may be inspected and r opied at the N RC Local Public Document i Room identified in the Comments section.
Enclosed is information on how you may obtain access to and the charges for copying records located at the NRC Public Document Room,2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, DC.
X Agency records subject to the request are enclosed.
Records subject to the request have been referred to another Federal agency (ies) for review and direct response to you.
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Fees -a You will be billed by the NRC for fees totaling $
You will receive a refund from the N RC in the amount of $
In view of NRC's response to this request, no further action is being taken on appeal letter dated , No.
PART 11. A-INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Certain information in the requested records is being withheld from public disclosure pursuant to the exemptions described in and for the reasons stated X in Pcrt II, B, C, and D. Any released portions of W documents for which only part of the record is being wethheld are being made available for public l Inspection and copying in the NRC Public Doc. Hoom,2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, DC in a folder under this FOI A number.
COMMENTS l l
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The review of additional records subject to your request is Continuing.
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_ b LIGNATU E. DIR E CTOR, VISION OF F DOM Of INFERMXTiON AND PUBLICATIONS SERVICES
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, ,. u ..s 9701150067 970113 PDR FOIA O'NEILL96-351 PDR dRC FORM 464 (Part il (1-91)
e FOIA NUMeERisi DATE RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF R' FORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST FOIA 351 J
(CONTINUATION) 3N l PART 11.8- APPLICABLE EXEMPTIONS L
Records subject to the request that are described in the enclosed Appendix (es) are being withheld in their entirety or in part under the Exemption No.(s) and for the reason (s) given below pursuant to 5 U.S C. 552(b) and 10 CF R 9.17(a) of N RC regulations.
- 1. The withheld information is properly classified pursuant to Executive Order. (Exemption 1)
- 2. The withheld mformation relates solely to the mternal personnel rules and procedures of NRC. (Exemption 2)
I l l3. The withheld information is specifically esempted from public disclosure by statute indicated. (Ememption 3)
Sections 141145 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the disclosure of Restricted Data or Formerly Restncted Data (42 U.S.C. 21612165).
Se'* ion 147 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the disclosure nf Unclassified Safeguards information (42 U.S C. 2167).
I 4. The withheld mformation is a trade secret or commercial of financial information that is bemg withheld for the reason (s) indicated. (Exemption 4)
The information is considered to be confidential busmess (propnetary) mformation The information is considered to be propnetary information pursuant to 10 CFR 2 790(dH1)
The information was submitted a..d received m confidence pursuant to 10 CFR 2 790idH2L l )( l5. The withhelo mformation consists of mteragency or mtraagency records that are not available through discovery dunng litigation (Ezemption 5) Apphcable Pnvilege:
Deliberative Prccess Disclosure of predecisionai information would tend to inhibit the open and frank enchange of ideas essential to the deliberative process Where records are withheld m their enterety, the f
- cts are inentricably mtertwined with the p'vdecisional mformation There also are no reasonably segregable f actual K
,_ portions because the release of the facts would vermit an indirect mQuerb mto the predecisional process of the agency .
Attorney work product privilege iDocuments prepared by an attorney in c ontemplanon of litigation i M Attomey chent privilege. (Confidential communications between an attorney and nis/her chent.)
- 6. The withheld information is enempted from public disclosure because its disclosure would result m a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy (E memption 6)
- 7. The withheld information consists of records compiled for law enforcement purposes and is being withheld for the reasonis} indicated (Exemption 7)
Disclosure could reasonably be expected to mterfere with an enforcement proceedmg because it could reveal the scope, direction, and focus of enforcement efforts, and thus Could possibly allow recipients to take action to shield potential wrongdomg or a violation of NRC requirements from investigators. lE mamption 7 ( A))
Disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal pnvecy. (Exemption 7(C))
} The mf ormation consests of names of individuais and other inf ormaton the destiosure of wh.ch could seasonabt v be emoetted to reveal idenoties of confidential sources. (Exemption 7 (D))
OTHLH t
l l PART 11. C-DENYING OFFICIALS Pursuant to 10 CF R 9 25(bl and or 9 25(c) of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.ssion requidt.ons. +1 has been determ.ned that the mformation withheld is exempt f rom pro-duction or d>sclosure. and that sts production or disclosure is contrary to the pubbc interest. The persons responsitue for the deniat are those officiais identified below as denymg offic.ais and the Director. D< vision of Freedom of information and Pubhcations Services. Of f.ce of Adm.n.stration. for any den'als that may be appealed to the Executive Director for Operations (EDO)
DENYING OFFICIAL Tif LE ' OFFICE RECORDS DENIED APPELLATE OFFICIAL l
EDO SECRETARY IG IJ. Lieberman Director s Office Of Appendix L X tntOrCement I
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( PART ll. D- APPEAL RIGHTS The omnial by each denymg official ident;fied in Part II C may be appealed to the Appellate Official identified there. Any such appeal must be made m writmg within 30 days of receipt of this response, Appeals must be addressed. es appropnate. to the E mecutive Director for Operations. to the Secretary of the r:ommission, of to the inspector General. U S. Nuctear R:gulatory Commission, Washmgton. DC 20555, and should clearly state on the envelope and m the letter that it is an " Appeal from an initial FOl A Decision."
NRC FORM 464 (Part 2) (191) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMfSSION
m _ __ _ _ . _ . - _ _ . _ . - _ _ m _ . . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ .
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Re: FOIA-96-351 APPENDIX K RECORDS BEING RELEASED IN THEIR ENTIRETY MQ2 DATE DESCRIPTION /(PAGE COUNT)
- 1. Undated Salem restart meeting questions (1 page) i
- 2. Undated Review of AITs at Salem 1&2 (4 pages)
- 3. Undated Recommended Actions PGE&G/NRC/Other Actions (2 pages) ,
)
- 4. Undated Drawings (7 pages)
- 5. Undated Exit Meeting PSE&G and NRC Augmented Inspection Team Turbine Generator Failure .
Event 11/9/91 (29 " ages)
- 6. Undated SAP comments for 12/11 Meeting (1 page)
- 7. Undated Attachment 1, Salem Generating Station
" Review of Current Safety Performance in Selected Areas of Concern" w/ attached Rev.1 of Salem SIT Findings (4/26 - 5/12) Summary of Negatives (4 pages)
- 8. Undated Draft Salem Assessment Plan which includes the Salem Assessment Schedule (Summer 1994)
(5 pages)
- 9. Undated Draft letter to R. Dowling from W. Russell (2 Pages)
- 10. Undated Memo to E. Wenzinger from S. Morris,
Subject:
Common root causes of recent significant events at Salem Generating Station with attached PSE&G Management Assecsment of the 4/7/94 reactor trip (16 pages)
- 11. Undated NRC Official Record Copy Ltr to PSE&G -
Steven Miltenberger - Notice of Violation and Imposition of Civil Penalty 272/94-80; 50-311/94 (16 pgs)
- 12. 11/14/91 " Preliminary Sequence of Events..." (2 pages)
- 13. 11/21/91 PSE&G News Release (2 pages)
- 14. 01/07/92 Inspection report 50-311/91-81 with annotations (23 pages)
Re: FOIA-96-351 APPENDIX K (continued)
RECORDS BEING RELEASED IN THEIR ENTIRETY HQ1 DATE DESCRIPTIOW/(PAGE COUNT)
- 15. 02/25/92 Memo for T. Martin from J. Partlow,
Subject:
R-I Request for NRR Evaluation of Generic l Issues Relating to the Salem Unit 2. Turbine Overspeed Event (TAC NO. M82696) (2 pages)
- 16. 05/13/92 Letter to Senator J. Biden from I. Selin with enclosures (EA 94-112) (7 pages) ;
- 17. 12/15/92 Memo to C. Hehl, et al., from T. Martin,
Subject:
Augmented Inspection Team Charter for Review of the December 13, 1992, Annunciator System Failure at Salem 2 (5 pages) l 4
- 18. 12/31/92 Salem AIT Debrief (1 page) l l
- 19. 02/02/93 Memorandum to B. Boger, Director, Division of Reactor Controls and Human Factors from J.
Wermiel, Chief Instrumentation and controls Branch, DRCHF - Emergency Action Level Regarding Loss of Annunciation - (25 pgs)
- 20. 02/04/93 Memorandum to J. Sniezek, from T. Murely and E. Jordan - Delcaration of Alert for Loss of Annunciators - (5 pgs)
- 21. 02/09/93 Note to E. McCabe, K. Barr, J. McCormick-Barger, B. Murray, B. Pate, from F. Kantor, NRR - Loss of Annunicators - (6 pgs)
- 22. 04/11/94 Sequence of Events (2 pages)
- 23. 04/12/94 Handwritten notes (1 page)
- 24. 05/05/94 E-mail from J. White to M. Bridgers
Subject:
JRW1 (1 page)
- 25. 05/06/94 Letter to Senator Biden from I. Selin (EA 94-112) (1 page)
- 26. 05/09/94 Slides: Commission Meeting Salem 4/7/94 Event Presented by T. Martin (14 pages)
Re: FOIA-96-351 APPENDIX K (continued)
RECORDS BEING RELEASED IN THEIR ENTIRETY NQ2 DATE DESCRIPTION /(PAGE COUNT)
- 27. 05/10/94 Memo for J. Taylor from T. Martin
Subject:
Salem 1 Augmented Inspection Team (AIT)
Findings (1 page) with attachments 1.
Preliminary Salem 4/7/94 Event AIT Findings (11 pages) 2. Viewgraphs from 4/26/94 Inspection Exit Meeting (21 pages)
- 28. 06/24/94 E-mail from R. Cooper to T. Martin,
Subject:
)
Bagman trip - Salem pilot inspection (1 page) 1
- 29. 06/24/94 Memo to Commissioners from J. Taylor, EDOSubj: Conducting Open Enforcement Conference with Salem 94-112) (2 pages)
- 30. 10/05/94 Memo to J. Taylor from J. Hoyle,
Subject:
SECY-94-242 - Proposed $500,000 Civil Penalty to Public Service Electric & Gas Company Concerning Violations at Salem Unit 1 (EA 94-112) (1 page)
- 32. 11/22/94 Memo to T. T. Martin from B. R. Letts,
Subject:
Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2: Alleged Harassment, Intimidation, and Discrimination (Case No 1-93-021S) (1 page)
- 33. 01/95- Salem Unit 1 - Mech Maint ist Level (1st 05/95 line) Supervisors w/ attached organization charts (3 pages)
- 34. 01/03- Salem Unit 2 Mech Maint (4 pages) 05/01/95
- 35. 05/10/95 Salem SIT Observation Rev. 2, Rev. 1, Rev. 0 (25 pages)
- 36. 07/06/95 Memo to J. Linville from T. Martin,
Subject:
Salem Assessment Panel Charter (3 pages)
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l Re: POIA-96-351 i i
APPENDIX E (continLc4) l RECORDS BEING RELEASED IN THEIR ENTIRETY !
l MQ2 DATE DESCRIPTION /(PAGE COUNT) 1
- 37. 10/26/95 Salem Inspection Program with attached 8/2/95
! Salem Assessment Panel Meeting (7 pages) i
- 38. 11/14/95 Salem Assessment Panel Meeting (2 pages)
- 39. 01/12/96 Salem Restart Equipment Issues (7 pages)
- 41. 06/12/96 E-mail to JTW1 from L. Nicholson re:
i Commitments restart item
- 42. 06/12/96 E-mail to JTW1, LEN from A. Blough re:
Commitments restart item-reply (1 page)
- 43. 06/21/96 E-mail to SAP from G. Barber re: Salem RAP-
, Revision 1 with attachment (6 pages)
- 45. 06/25/96 E-mail to SAP from G. Barber re: Restart item closecut status (1 page) a 46. 07/22/96 E-mail to SAP from R. Depriest re: Action
- item matrix with attachment (11 pages)
- integrity-forwarded-forwarded-reply-reply (1 l page)
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1
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- 49. 09/05/96 E-mail to Branch 3, ALD1 from L. Nicholson !
re: State interfact (1 page) j
- 50. 09/05/96 E-mail to LEN from R. Cooper re: state Interface-reply (1 page)
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l Re: FOIA-96-351 APPENDIX K i (continued)
RECORDS BEING RELEASED IN THEIR ENTIRETY I h DATE DESCRIPTION /(PAGE COUNT)
Nicholson re: Next SAP mtg (1 page)
- 52. 09/06/96 E-mail to CSM, ADL1, EMK, WHR, LNO, etc. from L. Nicholson with attachment (7 pages) i l
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j Re: FOIA-96-351 APPENDIX L RECORDS BEING WITHHELD IN PART MQt DATE DESCRIPTION /(PAGE COUNT)/ EXEMPTIONS
- 1. 11/04/94 Memo to T. Martin, from J. Fitzgerald,
Subject:
Salem Generating Station, Alleged Harassment, Intimidation, and Discrimination (Case 1-93-021R), with OE cover sheet (dated 11/8) with handwritten notes (1 page) EX. 5
- 2. 02/23/96 Fax from R. Matakas to D. Rosano, subject:
Confidential material, (EA 96-064) (3 sages)
EX. 5 l
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SHAw, PITTMAN, PoTTs & TROWBRIDGE l
.....-,.__.._oo-.
2300 N STREET. N.W.
WASHINGTON. D.C.20037-1128 (202) 663-8000 (202$-e007
)
i m u w.o neitt.sa.e.c. FOINPA REQUEST
^
"~ Case No. %-MI August 30,1996 Date Rec'd: 4 %
Action Oft: 1 Director, Division of Freedom of Related Case: l Information & Publications Services l Office of Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Two White Flint North Building 11545 Rockville Pike Rockville,MD 20852 Re: Freedom ofInformation Act Request Regarding the Salem Generating Station, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311
Dear Sir or Madam:
This is a Freedom ofInformation Act request pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Q 552(a)(3) and 10 C.F.R. 9.23. We request that you make available to Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge the documents responsive to the attached Request for Production of Documents. These documents need to be made available as soon as possible to support depositions in an accelerated legal action. In order to expedite production of the documents, we have deliberately ~ tailored this request to be narrow in scope and straightforward in the type of . j documents requested. We have already obtained copies of relevant documents presently available at the N.R.C. Public Documents Room and they need not be produced again in response to this request. Of course, we agree to bear the cost of this request as per 10 C.F.R.
(( 9.23(b)(4),9.33,9.39, and 9.40, and we authorize you to respond to this request piecemeal as documents become available. Please contact me at (202)663-8148, or William Hollaway at (202)663-8294, at your convenience if you have any questions regarding this request. l 1
l Please direct your response, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 9.27, to:
William R. Hollaway, Ph.D. f Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge i 2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037-1128 )
I I (202)663-8294 Fax: (202)663-8007 0i,c n,,2 /_ n n ifn v ." J i "
[f )
- SHAW, PITTMAN, PoTTs & TROWBRIDGE a pantmansme enctuosmo enorsseionat coneonarious I
Director, Division of Freedom ofInformation and Publications Services j August 30,1996 l Page 2 l
l Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. !
l Sin rely, ,
John . O'Neill, Jr. l I
f Attachment 34sl01 Ol / DOCEDCI e
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i
I v1A Request, Aug. 30,1996 I .
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS L DIRECTIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS
- 1. The term "NRC" means the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, all offices and/or branches thereof specifically including, but not limited to, headquarters in Rockville, Maryland and the Region I office in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, and also in- )
cludes all employees, consultants, agents, and representatives to the maximum extent per- i mitted by 10 C.F.R. Q 9.3, unless otherwise indicated by the request.
- 2. The term " Salem" means one or both units of the Salem Generating Station located in Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey and operated by the Public Service Electric and Gas Company. i
- 3. The term "S AP" means the Salem Assessment Panel that was developed in 1995 specifi- ;
cally to review Salcm Generating Station on an ongoing basis, including all members and supervisors thereof. i 1
- 4. The term "PSE&G" refers the operator of Salem, Public Service Electric and Gas I Company.
- 5. The term "PECO Energy" refers to PECO Energy Company, formerly known as Philadel-phia Electric Company. .
- 6. The term "Delmarva" refers to Delmarva Power & Light Company.
- 7. The term " Atlantic Electric" refers to Atlantic City Electric Company. ,
- 8. The term "SALP" means the Strategic Assessment of Licensee Performance, a compre-hensive review of plant performance, performed for each plant on an 18-month cycle. The most recent SALP review for Salem was issued on January 3,1995.
- 9. The term " Enforcement Action" means a civil penalty levied by the NRC against the licen-sees of Salem pursuant to single or multiple violations at Salem. The most recent En-forcement Action regarding Salem was issued on October 16,1995.
- 10. The term "AIT" means the Augmented Inspection Teams that performed investigations of Salem in 1992,1993, and 1994, including all members and supervisors thereof.
- 11. The term " SIT" means the Special Inspection Team that performed an investigation of Sa-lem in 1995, including all members and supervisors thereof.
FOIA Request, Aug. 30,1996
- 12. The term "PA" means the comprehensive Performance Assessment evaluation of Salem performed in July-August,1995 to aid in focusing future NRC inspection resources at Salem.
l
- 13. The term " Confirmatory Action Letter" means the letter from the NRC to PSE&G on June 9,1995 confirming PSE&G commitments to take specific actions prior to the restart of Salem and confirming that failure to take these actions may result in enforcement action.
IL DOCUMENTS REQUESTED
- 1. All documents concerning the NRC's Salem Assessment Panel (" SAP") established on August 2,1995, especially including but not limited to:
- a. All internal NRC discussions concerning the formation and purpose of the SAP;
- b. Transcripts, meeting minutes, summaries, and handouts of all meetings of the SAP;
- c. Lists of attendees at all meetings of the S AP;
- d. All materials presented to the SAP;
- e. All notes taken during presentations and meetings of the SAP;
- f. All reports or memoranda of the SAP; l
- g. All reports or memoranda written by any members of the SAP concerning Salem. ,
- 2. All documents concerning the NRC's Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance
("S ALP") reviews of Salem from 1990 through the present, especially including but not limited to:
- a. Transcripts, meeting minutes, summaries, and handouts of all NRC meetings on the Salem SALP reports;
- b. Lists of attendees at all meetings on the Salem SALP reports;
- c. Variances, differences or changes between consecutive Salem S ALP repons;
- d. Internal NRC discussions about interim drafts of the Salem SALP reports;
- e. Internal NRC discussions about final drafts of the Salem SALP reports; FOIA Request, Aug. 30,1996
- f. Internal NRC discussions about variances, differences or changes between interim reports and the final Salem SALP reports;
- g. The basis for each of the findings in the Salem SALP reports; i
- h. Region fs knowledge ofissues raised in the Salem SALP reports;
- i. Region I's knowledge of PSE&G's plans to address issues raised in the various Sa-lem SALP reports;-
- j. Internal Region I discussions concermng the findings and conclusions expressed in [
the Salem SALP reports;
- k. Whether NRC or Region I ever expressed any concerns about poor or declining performance or the like to PSE&G related to the Salem SALP reports;
- 1. Communications between NRC and Region I personnel concerning consistencies or inconsistencies between the various Salem SALP reports;
- m. All documents setting forth or discussing the deliberations and considerations of the SALP boards reviewing Salem performance from 1990 to the present;
- n. To the extent not covered by previous requests, all other documents regarding the Salem SALP reports.
- 3. All documents concerning potential and actual NRC enforcement actions regarding Salem from 1990 to the present, including but not limited to:
- a. Transcripts, meeting minutes, summaries, and handouts from all Enforcement Con-ferences concerning Salem between NRC and PSE&G, including but not limited to meetings on Febmary 2,1992; April 9,1992; April 6,1993; February 1,1994; July 28,1994; February 10,1995; Jane 1,1995; June 23,1995; July 13,1995; and July 28,1995;
- b. Lists of attendees at all Enforcement Conferences concerning Salem between NRC and PSE&G;-
- c. Transcripts, meeting minutes, summaries, and handouts from all integial NRC meetings concerning enforcement actions regarding Salem;
- d. Lists of attendees at all internal NRC meetings concerning enforcement actions re-garding Salem;
- e. Communications with PSE&G concerning potential and actual NRC enforcement actions regarding Salem;
__._ ___ _ _._.. ___.._.... _ __ _ _.._.. _ _ _ _ -_ __ _ ___.~.
1 FuA Request, Aug. 30,1996 l i
- f. Communications with others concerning potential and actual NRC enforcement '
actions regarding Salem, especially including but not limited to PECO Energy, Delmarva, and Atlantic Electric; 1
- g. Internal NRC discussions concerning potential NRC enforcement actions regarding l Salem;
- h. Internal NRC discussions concerning actual NRC enforcement actions regarding I Salem, including but not limited to the $50,000 civil penalty issued March 9,1994; the $500,000 civil penalty issued October 5,1994; $80,000 civil penalty issued April 11,1995; and the $600,000 civil penalty issued October 16,1995;-
- i. The basis and rationale for taking each of the enforcement actions regarding Salem;
- j. Internal NRC discussions about drafts of the enforcement actions regarding Salem;
- k. Internal NRC discussions concerning the findings and conclusions expressed in the enforcement actions regarding Salem;
- 1. Internal NRC discussions concerning PSE&G's responses to each of the enforce-ment actions regarding Salem;
- 4. All documents concerning meetings between the NRC and PSE&G management or Board of Directors concerning the performance of Salem from 1990 to the present, including but not limited to:
- a. Transcripts, meeting minutes, summaries, and handouts from all meetings, includ-
,ing but not limited to meetings on June 25,1992; July 1,1992; October 10,1992; July 16,1993; July 18,1993; August 6,1993; May 7,1994; March 20,1995; March 21,1995; April 3,1995; June 5,1995; and May 24,1996;
- b. Lists of attendees at all such meetings;
- c. Communications with PSE&G concerning such meetings;
- d. Communications with others concerning such meetings, especially including but not limited to PECO Energy, Delmarva, and Atlantic Electric;
- e. Internal NRC discussions concerning such meetings.
- 5. All documents concerning the NRC Augmented Inspection Team ("AIT") investigations ,
ofincidents at Salem from November 11-December 3,1991; December 14-23,1992; June l 5-28,1993; and around April 1994, including but not limited to: l i
FOIA Request, Aug. 30,1996 d
- a. Transcripts, meeting minutes, summaries, and handouts from all AIT meetings re- l garding Salem; l
. b. Lists of attendees at all AIT meetings regarding Salem;
- c. Communications with PSE&G concerning the AIT investigations at Salem and AIT meetings regarding Salem; l 1
- d. Communications with others concerning the AIT investigations at Salem and AIT I meetings regarding Salem, especially including but not limited to PECO Energy, Delmarva, and Atlantic Electric;
~
- e. Internal NRC discussions concerning the AIT meetings regarding Salem;
- f. The reasons why the NRC decided to do the AIT investigations at Salem. ;
l g, The basis for each of the findings in the AIT reports ofinvestigations at Salem;
- h. Notes taken by inspectors during and after the AIT investigations at Salem;
- i. Internal NRC discussions about interim drafts of the AIT reports ofinvestigations at Salem;
- j. Internal NRC discussions about final drafts of the AIT reports ofinvestigations at ,
Salem;
- k. Internal NRC discussions concerning the findings and conclusions expressed in the
. AIT reports ofinvestigations at Salem.
- 6. All documents concerning the NRC Special Inspection Team (" SIT") review of Salem per-formance from March 26-May 12,1995, including but not limited to:
- a. Transcripts, meeting minutes, summaries, and handouts from all SIT meetings re-garding Salem;
- b. Lists of attendees at all SIT meetings regarding Salem;
- c. Communications with PSE&G concerning the SIT investigation at Salem and SIT meetings regarding Salem;
- d. Communications with others concerning the SIT investigation at Salem and SIT meetings regarding Salem, especially including but not limited to PECO Energy, Delmarva, and Atlantic Electric;
- e. Internal NRC discussions concerning the SIT meetings regarding Salem;
FOIA Request, Aug. 30,1996
- f. The reasons why the NRC decided to perform the SIT investigation at Salem;
- g. The basis for each of the findings in the SIT report regading Salem;
- h. Notes taken by inspectors during the SIT investigation at Salem;
- i. Internal NRC discussions about interim drafts of the SIT repon regarding Salem;
- j. Internal NRC discussions about final drafts of the SIT repon regarding Salem;
- k. Internal NRC discussions concerning the findings and conclusions expressed in the SIT report regarding Salem.
- 7. All documents concerning the NRC's Performance Assessment ("PA") review of Salem from July I l-August 25,1994, including but not limited to:
- a. Transcripts, meeting minutes, summaries, and handouts from all meetings concern-ing the PA review regarding Salem;
- b. Lists of attendees at all meetings concerning the PA review regarding Salem;
regarding Salem, especially including but not limited to PECO Energy, Delmarva, (
and Atlantic Electric; l
- e. Internal NRC discussions concerning the PA review meeting regarding Salem; ,
I
- f. The reasons why the NRC decided to do a PA review regarding Salem;
- g. The basis for each of the findings in the report regarding the PA review regarding Salem;
- h. Notes taken during the PA review regarding Salem;
- i. Internal NRC discussions about interim drafts of the PA review repc.. regarding Salem; ;
- j. Internal NRC discussions about final drafts of the PA review report regarding Salem;
- k. Internal NRC discussions concerning the findings and conclusions expressed in the PA review report regarding Salem.
. . . . . . . _ . . _ . . . _ . ~ _ __. . _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ . - _ ._ .- _. _ _ . _ . _ . . _ .. _____. . _. .
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.- FOIA Request, Aug. 30,1996 l
j 8. All documents concerning the Confirmatory Action Letter of June 9,1995 (CAL No. l i 1-95-009), including but not limited to: !
I j a. Communications with PSE&G concerning the Confirmatory Action Letter; j
- b. Communications with others concerning the Confirmatory Action Letter, espe-i- cially including but not limited to PECO Energy, Delmarva, and Atlantic Electric; a
i j c. Internal NRC discussions conceming the Confirmatory Action Letter; l d. Discussions with Region I concerning non-final drafts of the Confirmatory Action
] , Letter; i
i e. Discussions with Region I concerning final drafts of the Confirmatory Action Letter;
- f. Region I's knowledge of the issues raised in the Confirmatory Action Letter; f.
f g. Region I's knowledge of PSE&G's plans to address issues raised in the Confirma-
{ tory Action Letter.
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- - ~ ~ - ~ ~ - -
SALEM RESTART MEETING QUESTIONS 1*
IS SALEM 1 READY TO RESTART 7 VHY?
2*
ARE ALL REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED?
77 VHY HAVEN'T PREVIOUS CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BEEN EFFECTIVE IN PREVEN ANY OF THE PREVIOUS SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AT SALEM 7 Cswmenuny
[11/91 AIT-TURBINE,12/92 AIT-ANNUNCIATOR,5/93 AIT CONTROL RODS]
Th YOUR PREVIOUS " COMPREHENSIVE PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT TEAM" (CPAT]
IDENTIFIED MANAGEMENT, EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURE PROBLEMS. HAS THIS EVENT
' We 44 DISCLOSED ADDITIONAL DEFICIENCIES? DOES THIS EVENT CHANGE THE PRIOR Tile CPATIDENTIFIED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS?
% RESTART ISSUES YOU HAVE IDENTIFIED TO DATE HAVE INCLUDED OPERATOR, HARDWARE gue g AND PROCEDURE IMPROVEMENTS. HAVE YOU IDENTIFIED ANY MANAGEMENT OR SUPERVISORY ISSUES REQUIRING EITHER SHORT OR LONG TERM CORRECTIVE 6*
OPERATORS MADE AN NUMBER OF ERRORS DURING THIS EVENT. WHAT ACTIONS HA BEEN TAKEN TO IMPROVE OPERATOR PERFORMANCE 7
} [Y9 EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS VERE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS EVENT,IF NOT PART
. .mw
- OF THE ROOT CAUSE. SOME OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED HAVE BEEN AROUND FOR
AVHILE, SOME FOR YEARS. HAVE YOU LOOKED TO SEE VHAT OTHER PROBLEMS EXIST AT
/ g3 SALEM THAT HAVE BEEN "VORKED AROUND"? WHAT HAS BEEN DONE TO IDENTIFY AND CORRECT THESE PRIOR TO START UP OF UNIT 17 VHY IS IT ACCEPTABLE TO NOT CORRECT SOME OF THESEISSUES PRIOR TO START UP7 l
e.g.: RESET-VINDUP STEAM FLOV INSTRUMENT SENSITIVITY TO PRESSURE PULSES l STEAM FLOW TRIP CIRCUIT SENSITIVITY TO ELECTRICAL NOISE. I STEAM FLOW INSTRUMENT CALIBRAITON DRIFT l STEAM FLOV LOGIC
- INPUT RELAY " CHATTERING" ;
REACTOR CONTROL CIRCUIT PROBLEMS GRASS INTRUSION '
7 [ WHEN VILL CHANGES MADE TO UNIT 1 BE COMPLETED ON UNIT 27 VHY IS IT OK TO WAIT g9 TO PERFORM THE MODIFICATIONS AT UNIT 27 9*
HAVE UNITS?NEEDED PROCEDURE CHANGES IDENTIFIED BY THIS EVENT BEEN MADE FOR BOTH 10* VHAT DO YOU PLAN TO DO TO ADDRESS THE GRASS INTRUSION PROBLEM, SHORT AND LONG TERM?
11*
VHAT ACTIONS WILL YOU TAKE TO VERIFY THE EFFECTIVENESS OF YOUR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS?
\ ;
/ .
3
REVIEW OF AITs AT SALEM 1&2 foot-c*'***
pfM -
o Unit 2. November 9.1991: Turbine overspeed event during conduct of ,,
routine turbine testing. Turbine damaged and generator damaged by hydrogen and oil fed fire that occurred.
o Unit 2. December 13.1992: Control room overhead annunciator system out of service for 90 minutes before discovery by control room operators.
o Unit 2. May and June.1993: Multiple failures of rod control system during startup following the unit's seventh refueling outage.
o Unit 1. April 7.1994: Reactor scram with multiple safety igiection actuations complicated by anomalous equipment responses.
t
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REGIONAL RESPONSE TO UNIT 1 TRIP & AIT IMPLEMENTATION g5 9' 9 f6
' # y/b"1 o PSE&G calls resident staff on 4/7/94, and informs them of unit trip. SRI A responds to control room (CR) at 1115. Continuous resident coverage in the CR until arrival of AIT on the morning of 4/8/94. 1 j.T h ,
,h*f,A. pf 6 9' o Resident staff informs NRC of situation from phone line in CR. PSE&G declares g j; Unusual Event at 1100 and later declares an Alert at 1316. ~ Region I activates k..JM ,
response center in monitoring mode at 1300; PSE&G terminates Alert at 2020.
' g/M o Following discussions between Bill Kane, Region I DRA, and headquarters managers (NRR and AEOD), decision made to send an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) to the site to investigate this event.
o AIT initiated in accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.3, NRC Incident Investigation Program, and NRC Manual Chapter 0325, Augmented Inspection Team. .
t r
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- - . -- . . - - - . - - . . - . - - - - . - - . - - . . - . - _ = - -
O O AIT INSPECTION AND FOLLOWUP ACTIVITIFR ;
o Y
AIT arrived on site 4/8/94 and completed on-site inspection activities on 4/15/94 2 ,
, t> * '
o AIT leader maintains daily contact with Region I and IIeadquarters managers on AIT status, team findings and their significance, and PSE&G's activities and findings. '
o AIT post-site activities conducted in Region I: investigation documentation, data ,
analysis, and report preparation.
o AIT preliminary findings presented to PSE&G at public exit meeting held on 4/26/94 at the Salem Processing Center, near the Salem facility.
o Resident staff performs inspection for restart issues identified by the AIT.
o Region I managers brief Senator Biden's staff on 5/5/94 about this event and other issues related to PSE&G's operation of the Salem units.
I o Public meeting held on 5/6/94 at the Salem Processing Center, so PSE&G could present their !
findings and corrective actions for this event, and to explain their readiness for plant restart.
o Commissioner briefing conducted on 5/9/94.
t o AIT report to be issued by end of May,1994. e, !
WT'
?
MAJOR ACTIONS TAKEN PER NRC MANUAL CHAPTER 0325 1 4 y' A y' o Per 05.02.a., AIT initiated because[ multiple failures in safety systems during the event and possible operator errors.
o Per 03.02.d., AIT Team Leader selected; Bob Summers, Project Engineer, Division of Reactor Projects, Region I. Other team members from Region I, and Headquarters '
specialists, assigned to the AIT.
o Per 03.02.f., AIT Charter developed and issued on 4/8/94. Charter stated basis for performing the AIT and team was assigned the following major objectives:
- Conduct a thorough review of the scram and loss of the pressurizer steam bubble
- Assess the operators' actions prior to and following the scram
- Develop a sequence of events and causal factors for the plant's and operators' responses and l human factors associated with the event and compare expected to actual plant response !
- Review PSE&G's event classification and notifications for appropriate responses !
- Examine the equipment failures and identify any associated root causes 4 o Per 03.02.h., Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 1-94-005 issued on 4/8/94. In the CAL, PSE&G agreed to coordinate certain activities with the AIT leader, to make various equipment, documentation and personnel available to the AIT, and gain :
agreement of the Regional Administrator prior to commencing any plant startup.
6 i
i s'
1 l
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS PSFAG REVIEW AND AMEND CONTROLS FOR COMMITMENT TRACKING SYSTEM TO ASSURE COMMITMENTS ARE EXECUTED AS INTENDED ESTABLISH CM AND PM PROGRAM FOR SOLENOIDS ESTABLISH SURVEILLANCE TEST THAT HYDRAULICALLY AND ELECTRICALLY VERIFIES VALVE FUNCTION FOR EACH UNIT REVIEW AND REVISE FRONT STANDARD TEST SUCH THAT THE FOUR TRIP AND ONE SOLENOID TRIP ARE NOT BYPASSED AT THE SAME TIME REVIEW RISK ASSESSMENT FOR FREQUENT TRIP TESTING IMPROVE TRIP INSTRUMENTATION RELATIVE TO CONFIGURATION, INDICATION OF TRIP DEMAND, CALIBRATION OF INSTRUMENTS, INDICATION OF ROTOR SPEED, AND LABELLING OF INSTRUMENTS l AMEND TS 3/4.3.4 FOR CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION BETTERMENT REVIEW AND EVALUATE OPERATING PHILOSOPHY, COMMUNICATIONS, TRAINING, AND ATITTUDE THAT WOULD ALLOW OPERATORS AND MANAGERS TO DISREGARD OR FAIL TO COMPLETE REQUIRED OPERATING PROCEDURES.
TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AS NECESSARY.
SUBJECT FRONT STANDARD TEST PROCEDURE FOR PROCEDURE UPGRADE BEFORE NEXT EXECUTION ANALYSIS PROCEDURE AND TEST METHOD RELATIVE TO HUMAN FACTOR CONSIDERATIONS REVIEW POLICY AND INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE TO SENIOR SHIFT SUPERVISOR ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN TESTS.
REVIEW PROCEDURES RELATIVE TO FIRE MITIGATION AS REGARDS CONTROL OF MATERIALS (OIL) THAT MAY CONTRIBUTE TO FIRE IN PROGRESS ASSESS PROGRAM FOR OPERATING EVENTS OCCURRENCES AND THE METHOD AND PRIORITY USED TO INCORPORATE THOSE EXPERIENCES INTO PLANT 4
OPERATIONS I
h .
NRC i REVIEW AGENCY FOCUS ON SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS, STRUCTURES, AND )
COMPONENTS AND HOW IT DIRECTS THE ACTIVITIES AND ATTENTION OF LICENSEE PROGRAMS VS. BALANCE OF PLANT ACTIVITIES THAT MAY DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY AFFECT REACTOR PLANT CONTROL AND SYSTEMS.
(TURBINE TRIP CAUSING REACTOR TRIP)
ESTABLISH BETTER UNDERSTANDING AND EXPERTISE IN TURBINE GENERATOR SYSTEMS REVIEW STANDARD REVIEW PLAN FOR TURBINE MISSILE GENERATION FOR CONSIDERATION OF PROBABILISTIC DETERMINATION VS. DETERMINISTIC APPROACH.
REVIEW CONSTRUCTION AND INTENT OF TS 3/4.3.4. REVISE ACCORDINGLY.
CONSIDER ESTABLISHING REPORTABILITY CRITERIA AND INCREASED NRC REGULATORY ATTENTION (LICENSING AND INSPECTION ACTIVITIES) TO NON- i SAFETY RELATED EVENTS AND CAUSES THAT HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO l AFFECT NUCLEAR SAFETY.
DEVELOP INFORMATION NOTICE ON THIS OCCURRIiNCE l
OTHER ACTIONS !
CONSIDER ENFORCMENT ACTIONS RELATIVE TO OPERATOR AND MANAGERS FAILING TO ADHERE TO TURBINE START-UP PROCEDURE 10/21/91, i I
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P/ M g&p&~ s- y& sx EXIT MEETING PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC
- AND GAS COMPANY 1
- AND NRC AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM NRC INSPECTION NO. 50-311/91-81
- SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2
- TURBINE GENERATOR 1 FAILURE EVENT NOVEMBER 9,1991 i
I 1
~'
SLIDE 2 4 .
- 1. NRC INCIDE T/ ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION EFFORTS l l
- 1. INCIDEN NVESTIGATION TEAM - IIT SIGNIFICAN SNTS (operations, radiological releases, major ;
deficiencies, uniq )
TEAM LEADER - S IOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE STAFF IS UNASSOCIAT WITH THE FACILITY
- 2. AUGMENTED INSPECTION AM - AIT EVENTS HAVING LESS SAFETY ONCERN THAN IIT (generic implications, unknown or com licate probable cause, i difficult to understand) l TEAM LEADER - BRANCH OR SECTIO CHIEF STAFF MAY BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE CILITY !
l 4
SLIDE 3 l
1 i I i 2. AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM - PURPOSE AND SCOPE
- 1. CHARTER i
- 1. DETERMINE: CIRCUMSTANCES, SEQUENCE OF 4
EVENTS REVIEW: TEST PROCEDURE, FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF T-G PROTECTION SYSTEMS DETERMINE (if possible):
ROOT CAUSE(S), GENERIC 1 dPLICATIONS
! 2. EVALUATE:PSE&G ACTIONS RELATIVE TO EMERGENCY PLAN, OPERATOR / STAFF RESPONSE, ,
! FIRE PROTECTION, MANAGEMENT RESPONSE, i NOTIFICATION AND REPORTABILITY
}
l <
l 4
i
!I ~ SLIDE 4 s
1 ;
I
- 3. EVALUATE: PLANT SYSTEM AVAILABILITY, SAFETY SYSTEM IMPACT, PLANT STABILITY AND ;
SHUTDOWN, ANALYSIS OF EVENT, CORRECTIVE l, ACTIONS, DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, REPAIR l, SCHEDULE.
l
- 4. REVIEW: MISSILE HAZARD WITHIN DESIGN BASIS i ENVELOPE i
- 5. DETERMINE OTHER GENERIC ISSUES (if any) i 1
i l
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i l
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SLIDE 5 1
I
STEVE BARR - RESIDENT INSPECTOR (SALEM)
DRP, RI DAVID SILK - SENIOR OPERATIONS ENGINEER DRS,RI
. ROY MATHEWS - SENIOR ENGINEERING SPECIALIST DRS,RI l
JOHN TSAO - SENIOR MATERIALS ENGINEER, NRR l
STEVE JONES - REACTOR SYSTEMS ENGINEER, NRR TECHNICAL / ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT:
ROBERT SCHAAF - REACTOR ENGINEER INTERN, DRP, RI TEAM LEADER:
JOHN WHITE - CHIEF, REACTOR PROJECTS SECTION 2A i
f
'~
SLIDE 6 r r h Oy -
1
/ /
G a
- 3. EVENT DESCRIPTION l
- 1.
SUMMARY
9 NOVEMBER 9,1991 - SALEM 2 AT 100% POWER; 11:21 A.M., EXPLOSION AND FIRE SUSTAINED AT GENERATOR; PROJECTILES EJECTED FROM LP TURBINE UNIT; i
11:21 A.M., REACTOR TRIPPED PER DESIGN; FIRE CONTROLLED AND EXTINGUISHED RAPIDLY; I
i
SLIDE 7 t l NO DAMAGE TO REACTOR SAFETY SYSTEMS OR l CONTAINMENT BUILDING; NO PERSONNEL INJURIES; 11:40 A.M. UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED - FIRE 12:40 P.M. ALERT DECLARED - POTENTIAL SAFETY SYSTEM DAMAGE DUE TO PROJECTILES (de-escalated) I 2:40 P.M. UNUSUAL EVENT TERMINATED OFF-SITE NOTIFICATIONS MADE 1:00 - 2:00 P.M. NRC RESIDENT. STAFF RESPONDED TO SITE 11/9/91 FOR PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT AND SAFETY REVIEW I
l l
l
~ ~
SLIDE 8 i I
l SEVERE DAMAGE INCLUDED: LP 22 TURBINE, GENERATOR UNIT, 22 CONDENSER, AND ASSOCIATED SUPPORT STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS; LESSER DAMAGE TO ADJACENT COMPONENTS, STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND AREAS IN THE TURBINE BUILDING (HP TURBINE, LP 21, LP23,21 AND 23 CONDENSER, HOTWELLS, EXCITER, INTERPHASE BUSES, GENERATOR CONTROL / MONITORING EQUIPMENT, AUXILIARY AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FOR TURBINE AND GENERATOR)
REACTOR STABILIZED 11/9, HOT SHUTDOWN 11/10, COLD SHUT DOWN 11/11, ESTABLISHED NORMALLY 4
SLIDE 9 1
1 l
l
- 2. PRIMARY SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (
SUMMARY
)
TIME PRIMARY EVENT OTHER )
EVENTS / COMMENTS 0630 RETURN FROM 80% PREVIOUS SOLAR MAGNETIC DISTURBANCE 1100 3 OPERATORS AUTO-STOP TRIP gbf INITIATE TURBINE MECHANISM r TESTING BYPASSED (13 trip functions) 1121 3 LOW AUTO-STOP INTERFACE OPENS TO OIL PRESSURE RELEASE TRIP FLUID i
1121/0 SEC REACTOR TRIP AST-20, RTB A (bypassed);
ET-20, RTB B; OUTPUT BKR :
EXPECTED TO OPEN IN 30 SEC.
SLIDE 10.
i I
i
- 1 TIME PRIMARY EVENT OTHER I
, EVENTS / COMMENTS 4
1121/0 SEC TURBINE STOP CONFIRMED BY LOAD
! VALVES CLOSE DISPATCHER EVENT i LOG (within 1 sec);
TURBINE ISOLATED i FROM STEAM; ONE
. OPERATOR HEARD NOISE; PRESUME STEAM DUMPS OPEN j TO LOWER Tave TO I
! 547 i
l 1121/l.5 SEC AUTO-STOP OIL INTERFACE CLOSES, l PRESSURE RESETS TRIP FLUID
, (test in progess) REPRESSURIZES TO
- INITIATE OPENING OF
! STOP VALVES, l CONTROL VALVES, REHEAT STOP i VALVES, AND
- INTERCEPT VALVES
,' DUE TO APPARENT i FAILURE OF ET-20
- (AST-20 remains j bypassed due to test in l progress) j a
i e
i i
4 i
4 e
- . - , , + . - . , , e
~
SLIDE 11 l
TIME PRIMARY EVENT OTHER EVENTS / COMMENTS 1122 STEAM DUMPS CLOSE DUE TO LOW Tave 1122/27 SEC GENERATOR OUTPUT TURBINE UNLOADED BKRS OPEN 1122/39 SEC TURBINE STOP STEAM RE-ADMITTED VALVES BEGINNING TO TURBINE; CVs l TO INDICATE AS MAY BE SLOW OPEN CLOSING IN RESPONSE TO EHC ;
DUE TO LOSS OF !
LOAD TURBINE BEGINS TO BOTH REDUNDANT OVERSPEED BEYOND OPC VALVES (OPC-1, 103 % OPC-2) APPARENTLY FAIL TO FUNCTION TO CLOSE CVs AND IVs TO PREVENT OVERSPEED CONDITION
- SLIDE 12 a
i :
1 l I
L TIME PRIMARY EVENT OTHER
( EVENTS /COMMEN13 1122 TURBINE STOP OPERATORS HEAR
) VALVES CONTINUE INCREASING NOISE
- TO FLUTTER OPEN FROM TURBINE, EXPERIENCE
- VIBRATION, SEE FIRE
- FROM GENERATOR,
[ SEE PROJECTILES i FROM TURBINE; )
i ALARMS IN CR: H/W
! HI-LEVEL, ROTOR
} THRUST AND VIBRATION, - l GENERATOR i PROTECTIVE RELAYS l ACTIVATE (probably j due to damage) i 1123/73 SEC THE OPERATOR 3 AUTO-STOP LOW RETURNS TEST LEVER OIL PRESSURE
] TO NORMAL; MOVES SIGNALS, INTERFACE TURBINE TRIP LEVER VALVE OPENS; TRIP i TO TRIP; EVACUATES FLUID DUMPED; STOP VALVES CLOSE; TURBINE ISOLATED j FROM STEAM i
i l
1 l
}
~
SLIDE 13 j 3. OPERATOR ACTIONS REACTOR CONTROL WAS MAINTAINED IN ACCORDANCE ja WITH EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR TRIPS AUTOMATIC POWER TRANSFER TO THE AUXILIARY BUS :
OCCURRED NORMALLY I 1
OPERATORS INITIATED MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION
{; COOLDOWN ESTABLISHED BY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER j PUMPS AND ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP 1
CONDENSATE SYSTEM ISOLATED TO PREVENT INCREASED CHLORIDE INTRUSION i, THE OPERATIONS PERSONNEL WERE EFFECTIVE IN i- IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES FOR STABILIZING THE
- REACTOR AFTER THE TRIP, AND BRINGING.THE UNIT TO A SAFE SHUTDOWN WITHOUT INCIDENT. ALL SAFETY I RELATED SYSTEMS FUNCTIONED OR WERE AVAILABLE j ALL SAFETY SYSTEMS FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED; RPS, CONTROL RODS, NIs, NO SAFETY INJECTION, AFW, MS-10s EVENT CLASSIFICATION WAS APPROPRIATE; NOTIFICATIONS AND REPORTABILITY WAS APPROPRIATE l
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SLIDE 14 i
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l 4. FIRE PROTECTION ACTIONS ALL AUTOMATIC FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED AND WERE INSTRUMENTAL l IN INITIATING FIRE CONTROL THE ON-SITE FIRE BRIGADE RESPONDED RAPIDLY, EFFECTIVELY ESTABLISHED CONTROL OF THE SCENE, VERIFIED THAT PERSONNEL WERE NOT INJURED, CONTROLLED REFLASHES, MITIGATED DAMAGE BY l SECURING OIL PUMPS, VERIFIED THAT THE HYDROGEN I SYSTEM WAS EFFECTIVELY ISOLATED
! l THE ACTIONS OF THE SITE FIRE BRIGADE DEMONSTRATED EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, ;
AND LEADERSHIP i
I SLIDE 15
- 5. MANAGEMENT RESPONSE SENIOR SITE AND CORPORATE MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL RESPONDED RAPIDLY TO ASCERTAIN i
SAFETY IMPACT, DAMAGE, AND OVERSEE AMELIORATION AND ACCIDENT MITIGATION EFFORTS PROVIDED FOR DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE NRC
- REGIONAL OFFICE TO ASSURE NRC WAS FULLY 4
INFORMED OF THE EVENT AND LICENSEE FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS T
4 INITIATED ACTIONS TO COMPREHENSIVELY REVIEW AND EVALUATE THE EVENT BY THE TIMELY ESTABLISHMENT OF A SITE EVENT REVIEW TEAM (SERT)
INITIATED ACTIONS TO CONTROL THE SCENE AND PROTECT EVIDENCE AND CONFIGURATION FOR SUBSEQUENT REVIEW AND EVALUATION PROVIDED FOR SUFFICIENT RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL TO PLAN, ORGANIZE, CONTROL, AND DIRECT RECOVERY OPERATIONS ASSURED THAT PERSONNEL, RESOURCES AND i INFORMATION WERE MADE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST THE NRC AIT, AND THAT THE AIT WAS KEPT INFORMED OF ALL LICENSEE ACTIONS AND ACTIVITIES RELATIVE TO THE EVENT 4
.. . . - ~ - . - =. - - -.___ . - - . . - . - - . - _ . - - . .. . .- .... .-
SLIDE 16 l
- 6. TURBINE MISSILE GENERATION l
J-REGULATORY GUIDE 1.115 (REV 1) RECOMMENDS THAT THE PROBABILITY OF SAFETY SYSTEMS DAMAGE FROM TURBINE PROJECTILES BE MAINTAINED TO LESS THAT j 1/1000 PER TURBINE YEAR (CURRENTLY REVISED TO 1/10000 PER TURBINE YEAR) FOR UNFAVORABLY ORIENTED TURBINES)
SALEM-2 SER (NUREG 0995) INDICATES THAT THE
! PROBABILITY FOR TURBINE PROJECTILES AFFECTING j SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS IS 1.1/10000 PER TURBINE l YEAR. FACTORS INCLUDE INCREASED INSPECTION, j MAINTENANCE, AND TESTING TO REDUCE PROBABILITY
- ' OF TURBINE FAILURE, DEGRADED VALVE PERFORMANCE, AND OTHER MATERIAL DEFECTS.
REQUIREMENTS CONVEYED IN TECHNICAL
! SPECIFICATIONS.
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6 4
SLIDE 17 4
WESTINGHOUSE ANALYSIS FOR UNIT 2 BASED ON DETERMINISTIC APPROACH, NOT PROBABILISTIC.
(PROBABILISTIC APPROACH WAS NOT REQUIRED BY NRC). THE ANALYSIS FOCUSED ON FAILURE OF DISCS, NOT BLADES, AS THE PRIMARY PROJECTILE. PURPOSE WAS TO ESTABLISH INSPECTION INTERVALS AND POTENTIAL WEAKNESSES IN TURBINE ROTATING COMPONENTS.
RELIABLE OVERSPEED PROTECTION WAS CONSIDERED AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE ANALYSIS FOR ESTABLISHING RISK FOR TURBINE GENERATED MISSILES AND INSPECTION FREQUENCY.
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SLIDE 18 i
- LP 22 WAS REFURBISHED IN 1985, COMPREHENSIVLELY INSPECTED IN 1988, AND RESCHEDULE FOR INSPECTION IN 1992. IN 1988 CRACKS WERE REPAIRED, FLOW GUIDE 1
BOLTS REPLACED, AND EXTENSIVE NDE PERFORMED.
i RECOMMENDED INSPECTION FREQUENCY WAS 5 YEARS.
, ACTUAL INSPECTIONS HAVE BEEN OCCURING WITHIN 3
- YEARS.
1 LP CASING IS CONSTRUCTED FROM LOW ALLOY CARBON STEEL PLATE (1.25 INCHES), NOT PRIMARILY DESIGNED TO CONTAIN TUBINE GENERATED MISSILES WITH THE EXCEI7FION OF APPARENT FAILURE TO MAINTAIN THE RELIABILITY OF THE OVERSPEED PROTECTIVE DEVICES, THE OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, AND INSPECTION OF THE THE TURBINE APPEAR TO BE WITHIN THE DESIGN BASES OF THE CURRENT SAFETY j ANALYSIS REPORT.
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- SLIDE 19 i
! 7. SITE EVENT REVIEW TEAM EFFORTS SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO ACCIDENT AND EVENT REVIEW DEFINED BY PROCEDURE:
CHANGE ANALYSIS, j ENERGY / BARRIER / TARGET ANALYSIS,
. EVENT AND CAUSAL FACTOR CHARTING
,! PERSONNEL TRAINED IN ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS DIRECTED AND CONTROLLED BY SENIOR AND l EXPERIENCED MANAGER l FULL UTILIZATION OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERS AS TECHNICAL CONSULTANTS OR MEMBERS OF THE SERT i
ESTABLISHMENT OF WELL PLANNED AND DEVELOPED STRATEGY TO RE-CREATE THE EVENT (TROUBLE-SHOOT)IN ORDER TO TEST SYSTEMS AND CONFIRM i
FAILURE MODES
$ KEFT THE NRC AIT INFORMED OF FINDINGS AND
. EVALUATIONS d
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' SLIDE 20 i
a 5
- 4. PRECURSOR EVENTS
- 1. PREVIOUS SIMILAR OCCURRENCES 4/6/85 GINNA (NY), PWR, WESTINGHOUSE T-G TURBINE FAILED TO TRIP AUTOMATICALLY FOLLOWING j- REACTOR TRIP DUE TO . MECHANICAL BINDING OF THE t
SOLENOID TRIP VALVE 2/28/88 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 (FL), PWR, WESTINGHOUSE T-G i
TURBINE FAILED TO TRIP AUTOMATICALLY FOLLOWING REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FAULTY SOLENOID TRIP VALVE 8/31/88 i
SALEM 1 (NJ), PWR, WESTINGHOUSE T-G DURING TURBINE MECHANICAL TRIP TESTING,
- REACTOR AND TURBINE TRIP OCCURRED DUE TO LOW i
AUTO-STOP OIL PRESSURE CAUSED BY A CLOGGED 4
ORIFICE Included for information. Low auto-stop oil pressure also occured 11/9/91 at Salem-2.
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'I' SLIDE 21 9/10/90 SALEM 1 REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FEEDW.'TER TRANSIENT CAUSED BY UNARRESTED TURBINE OVERSPEED. OPC SOLENOID VALVES WOTJLD NOT FUNCTION DUE TO MECHANICAL BINDING.
9/26/90 GINNA REACTOR TRIP DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR, BUT TURBINE EMERGENCY TRIP SOLENOID FAILED TO FUNCTION DUE TO MECHANICAL BINDING.
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' SLIDE 22 l
l 10/21/91 l SALEM 2 (NJ), PWR, WESTINGHOUSE T-G DURING TURBINE GENERATOR START-UP THE OPC FUNCTION WAS REQUIRED TO BE TESTED BY OPERATING PROCEDURE DESIGNED TO VERIFY PROPER OPC OPERATION BY EFFECTING CLOSURE OF THE INTERCEPT VALVES WHEN THE OPC TEST SWITCH WAS ACTIVATED. THE INTERCEPT VALVES DID NOT CLOSE, INDICATING A POSSIBLE MALFUNCTION OF THE OPC SOLENOIDS. THE TEST RESULT WAS DISREGARDED DUE TO MISCONCEPTION BY LICENSED OPERATING PERSONNEL AND MANAGEMENT. CONSEQUENTLY, THE UNIT WAS ALLOWED TO START WITHOUT THE OPC PROBLEM PROPERLY DIAGNOSED AND RESOLVED.
1 .
SLIDE 23
- 2. POSSIBLE PRECURSORS CONSIDERED (No pertinence established) 1 SOLAR MAGNETIC DISTURBANCES INCREASED HYDROGEN CONSUMPTION FOR THE UNIT 2 GENERATOR DUE TO SEAL LEAKAGE l
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SUDE 24
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- 5. NRC FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS i
- 1. PROXIMATE CAUSE OF OVERSPEED (CONFIRMED BY LICENSEE) i EMERGENCY TRIP SOLENOID VALVE (ET-20) FAILED TO FUNCTION (FAILURE MECHANISM TO BE DETERMINED ON EXAMINATIONJ BOTH REDUNDANT OVERSPEED PROTECTION CONTROL SOLENOID VALVES (OPC-1, OPC-2) FAILED TO FUNCTION (FAILURE MECHANISM TO BE DETERMINED ON EXAMINATION) i
. _ . . _ ~ . - - - -. - _ .. . . - . . - - . - . . - . . - . - - . .-
SLIDE 25 e
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- 2. PROXIMATE CAUSE OF FIRE IN GENERATOR WHILE NOT CONCLUSIVE, SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND OTHER EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THE FIRE WAS I LIKELY THE RESULT OF SEVERE VIBRATION CAUSED BY i
THE OVERSPEED OF THE TURBINE. THE VIBRATION RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO THE HYDROGEN SEALS AND 1 SEAL OIL SYSTEMS, ALLOWING THE RELEASE OF
, FLAMABLE CONCENTRATIONS OF HYDROGEN AND OIL.
1 A SPARK OR OTHER HEAT SOURCE LIKELY CAUSED IGNITION (THERE WAS INDICATION OF ARC OR FRICTION WELDING ON GENERATOR BEARINGS AND END BELLS).
ONCE IGNITED, THE SEAL OIL PnOVIDED FUEL TO THE FIRE UNTIL EXTINGUISHED OR ISOLATED. j 1
SLIDE 26
- 2. CONTRIBUTING CAUSAL FACTORS
- NO RECURRING PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM SPECIFICALLY IMPLEMENTED OR I RECOMMMEDED FOR SOLENOID VALVES EFFECTING
! TURBINE TRIP OR OVERSPEED CONTROL.
i SURVEILLANCE AND OPERATIONAL TESTING OF TRIP 2
PERFORMANCE AND OVERSPEED DOES NOT
! SPECIFICALLY VERIFY THE PROPER HYDRAULIC 2
FUNCTIONING OF EACH SOLENOID VALVE, INDEPENDENTLY.
! THE PERIODIC TESTING OF THE MECHANICAL TRIP FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY REMOVES 13 POSSIBLE TRIP i
SIGNALS OR EVENTS WHILE THE TEST IS BEING
- PERFORMED, WITHOUT ANY WAY TO VERIFY THAT THE
! BALANCE OF THE TRIP AND CONTROL DEVICES l (INCLUDING OVERSPEED) ARE FUNCTIONAL.
- . . - . - . ~ . _ . . -- _. - . - . - - - . . - - . - . . - . _ _ - . - - - .
1 SLIDE 27 l
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ll INFORMATION CONCERNING PREVIOUS COMPONENT FAILURES HAS NOT BEEN GENERALLY REGARDED BY
< CHARACTERIZED OR DISSEMINATED.
T-G COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS ARE NOT REGARDED AS NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED, BUT RATHER BALANCE OF PLANT. CONSEQUENTLY, LITTLE NRC REGULATORY 3 ATTENTION OR PRIORITY HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO THIS AREA. NO INFORMATION NOTICES OR GENERIC 3
COMMUNICATIONS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED.
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SLIDE 28 {
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THE EXISTING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS 3/4.3.4) IS !
POORLY CONSTRUCTED SUCH THAT INTENT IS l l
UNCLEAR: l ONLY SPECIFIES ONE OVERSPEED SYSTEM TO BE OPERABLE (ALLOWING THE INTERPRETATION THAT MECHANICAL OVERSPEED IS SUFFICIENT SUCH THAT OPC AND ET SOLENOID OPERABILITY
' COULD BE IGNORED);
THE ACTION AND SURVEILLANCE STATEMENTS I
FOCUS ON THE OPERABILITY OF THE STEAM VALVES AS THE INDICATOR OF OVERSPEED FUNCTION, AND ON THE OPERABILITY OF ONLY A SINGLE OVERSPEED SYSTEM.
THE STANDARD REVIEW PLAN GENERALLY ASSUMES THE AVAILABLITY OF THREE DIVERSE AND REDU.NDANT OVERSPEED PROTECTION DEVICES (OPC, MECHANICAL,
! AND EMERGENCY TRIP). SALEM-2 IS DESIGNED WITH ONLY TWO. EMERGENCY TRIP IS NOT INDEPENDENTLY ACTUATED FOR OVERSPEED CONDITIONS. l l
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. - .... - - - ~.- - _ - . - - -_ . - _ - . -
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SLIDE 29 J
LICENSEE FAILURE TO REACT IN A TIMELY MANNER TO SALEM-1 SOLENOID FAILURES BY EFFECTIVELY VERIFING THE OPERABILITY OF, OR REPLACING DEVICES IN SALEM-2 IN ACCORDANCE WITH LER COMMITMENT. (5/91 OUTAGE)
FAILURE OF OPERATORS AND MANAGERS TO 1 RECOGNIZE AND FOLLOW PROCEDURES; AND EFFECT l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WHEN IT WAS APPARENT THAT i
THE OPC WAS NOT FUNCTIONING AS DESIGNED BASED ON START-UP TESTING IN 10/91.
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SAP COMMENTS FOR 12/11 MEETING -
OVERALL: Plan is, comprehensive, with good thance at effect'ing performance improvement. Plan does not contain specific hardware issues, rather these are contained in the System Readiness Review items.
Plan does not have many performance indicators for culture change.
Not clear how they,are to verify plant is operated within design and licensing basis.
Corrective actions for EP deficiencies missing.
Not clear what Appendix E of plan, "Other Restart Considerations,"
means.
I. HUMAN PERFORMANCE, SELF-ASSESSMENT & CORRECTIVE ACTION Procedure adherence improvement in plan as standards, but not highlighted.
Corrective action process has historically been oriented toward operator actions, procedure changes and training viec pe.cmanent fixes. Not clear how this attitude will be changed.
Plan not specific on extent of industry experience review (OEF).
Plan implies agent & peer observer program to be 1 time program?
Extent of root cause training to be conducted before restart not clear.
'II .
OPERATIONS Not real strong performance indicators, more quantity oriented than quality.
Need more specifics on tagging upgrade. Have they conducted root cause for why previous attempts to correct tagging failed?
Unclear the extent of control room upgrades prior to restart. 1 i
Need assurance that overhead annunciator problems resolved.
I III. EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY Comprehensive, no real issues.
IV. MAINTENANCE / WORK CONTROL Plan objectives has no clear, obvious connection between improving work control and improving safety.
V. ENGINEERING Comprehensive, no issues at this time.
VI. TRAINING
. Comprehensive relative to operations, NRC review pending.
- _ - - - . - . . - . - - . - ~ - . - . . - . - . - . . - . - . - - -.-.__.- - .-
ATTACMENT 1 ,
Salen Generatina Station Review of Current Safety Performance in Selected Areas of Concern The ceneral ob.iective of this SIT is to:
e assess the licensee's effectiveness at problem identification, l prioritizing and conducting work on plant equipment
- e assess the licensee's management oversight programs and performance
! indicators used by management to assess current performance
! for the purpose of improving the reliability of equipment and the material condition of the plant so as to decrease challenges to safe plant operation.
The specific ob.iectives of this SIT are to assess the following activities from a safety perspective:
- The current effectiveness of licensee programs for problem identification and root cause determinations. This will include plant tours, reviews of equipment history records and interviews with working level personnel.
- The licensee's day-to-day programs in the areas of work prioritization, planning, scheduling and controls. This will cover the day-to-day mechanism for determining what plant deficiencies from various reporting processes are to be addressed and how work is integrated into plant operations from a safety perspective.
- The adequacy of operability determinations, including an assessment of performing such determination; when needed and the ,
extent of engineering involvement. j
- Steps being taken to reduce operational work-arounds.
- The effectiveness of preventive and corrective maintenance. .
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- The effectiveness of management oversight programs and performance indicators used by management to assess current performance.
This inspection will be conducted over approximately a four week period and the number of team members involved in inspection activities at any one time will typically be three or less, so as to minimize the impact on the licensee ]
of this inspection. 1 l
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- SALEM SIT FINDINGS (4/26 - 5/12) ,
Rev 1
SUMMARY
OF NEGATIVES OPE _RAB_I_LITY_
OD weaknesses 125 v batt chgr / battery seal not in FSAR, so OK 22RHR rm cooler fan non qual motor,_OK, redundant trai g erratic stm flo chan/tried to fix/use other channel faulty bkr RCS samp valves / valves fail in safe closed pos???
BOP ODs gave as justification, pri plt trips, BOP challeng ?
SRosnoformaltrainingonoperabili_ty/ [fgceduc. fa f/t>Y Large number of ODs due to equipment concerns OD focus of "-lustifyina" continued operation contributes to large backlog of plant work CONFIGURATION CONTROL Over 50 irs from the _ Dast month on plt dwqs, component
' labeling and the computerized tagging system IR negative trend info on P& ids goes back months but no initiative has been taken to have engineers scope the extent of the problem on a selected system or two.
Configuration control identified as priority last summer SAFETY TAGGING m
New tagging office implemented - but, tagging errors continue gse of safety tags for admin purposes as recognized 4/27 as a mgmt error which sets people up for failure -
slow to resolve COMMUNICATIONS Priorities not presented clearly or consistently at the beginning and end of mtgs Priorities not consistent between 6:30AM, 8:00AM, 8:30 AM and 1:00 PM g
.,o, ,
g;,.c.L.cJu4;_b,lo $9 YO W Nfd
,aswtue co m a k s oFcyad M 2 i Individual job info sometimes poorly communicated eg 28v batt WORK PLANNING AND SCHEDULING
-PMs/STs tasks not always sched to be perf before due date i l
-Sponsored work policy not clearly defined / understood 1
-Changes to Safety Tag Ctr/ Work Ctrl Ctr not clearly def l
-Can non-tagged work bypass on-shift SS?
-Work pkgs / improving thru feedback, but need better planning I to avoid problems like late ident of need for tags, and l improper use of troubleshooting procedures
-Better sched needed tc avoid recent running too many EDGs MAINTENANCE b/t- kw u ed dow d la i-
-Recategorizing some work-arounds ne plant betterment items detracts from attempts to be an Ops led station y -Salem appears to be just starting to use equipment failure ,
rates to focus on how to improve the corrective maintenance j hqFAg\ performance through analysis of failure rate data to identify needed changes in maintenance practices / engineering fixes 1 i
1# -BO problems corrected on a piece meal basis, broader effort would reduce equip down time
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PROBLEM IDENT AND ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATIONS g/8
-Recent root causes reviewed were adequate, wide variation in quality.
-A few root cause levels assigned recently were too low
-There's roughly nna person-yrs worth nf root _cause work associated with the irs generated in the cast __ month by our calculations and they don't appear to be staying ahead of the N
(Os) h !C- % fe .wj fxe cfje c/a h MANAGEMENT SAFETY PERSPECTIVE AND PIS NEED STRENGTHENING
_ Station mgmt morn _ing meeting needs more_ safety,fo.cu_s/
-8AM mtg, agrs didn't know LCO times, parts status, etc
s ..
1h e.sf c5 ktY us k' f c'C u b Tsv Deevs 3% ocused Footnote: Several on the station mgmt team,are '*-measurements featu on w M"da.
rela'tively new 1
to their positions hc, vs o .J ffoddC b ciJ v= i
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Salem Assessment Plan i
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4 Salem j 1
DRAFT SALEM ASSESSMENT PLAN l i Objectives:
I
- 1. To perform an integrated review and assessment of the Salem NPS safety
- performance history.
- 2. To develop a site assessment plan and perform a site assessment to i validate the performance insights that were developed during the review.
l 3. To develop a customized inspection plan to be implemented during the ~
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upcoming SALP period.
4 Detailed Assessment Plan:
(
Reference:
Guide to the Customized Inspection Program)
- 1. ProDosed Team Composition: __
- a. Team Leader: 565 l
- Special Inspection Branch or Region I (to be determined) f t
god b_. !
- b. Team Members:
NRR section chief (IRCB)
- NRR Salem Project Manager 2-3 managers and inspectors froml Region I } jo b 8.T 4
- NRR IRCB operations engineer
- 2. Review: (4 weeks) i a. The following documents will be compiled and reviewed:
- 1992, 1993, 1994 NRC Inspection Reports
- Plant Performance Review results
- SALP reports and history
- Enforcement history and trends
- SMM information
- LERs from 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994
- Performance indicators . . .
- Human Factors Information System
- Allegations
- NPRDS data
"
- MIPS printouts 4 b. A contractor (0RNL) will analyze LERs for 1991, 1992, and 1993 to identify events of high safety significance or events that indicate negative performance, e.g., repetitive failures.
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Salem ,
- c. The following documents will be requested from the licensee and reviewed upon receipt: ;
- Licensee self assessments and results for 1992, 1993, 1994 l
- Licensee performance indicators for 1992, 1993, 1994
- Condition report one-liners for 1992, 1993, 1994 l
- Formal root cause evaluations for 1992, 1993, 1994 i a Maintenance work request (MWR) one-liners for 1992, 1993, 1994
- MWR distribution by system-
- Engineering work request (EWR) one-liners for 1992, 1993, 1994 l
- Annual results and data reports; 50.59s procedure changes for
- 1992, 1993 l
- Licensee procedures for the condition reporting process, MWR process, and EWR process -
- Selected ASME Section XI pump and valve testing data printouts
- Other documents as necessary from review
- d. The following documents will be reviewed on site:
- INP0 plant evaluation reports (last two)
- e. NRR (SPSB) will analyze the licensee's IPE to identify the most risk significant systems and components,
- f. The assessment team will use IPE information in preparing a risk data matrix. The risk data matrix displays significant licensee I issues and their associated root causes by plant system and safety significance. The assessment team will forward certain items from the risk data matrix to SPSB to perform a PP.A analysis (ASP).
- g. At the completion of items a through f, the assessment team will develop a Preliminary Performance Assessment / Inspection Planning Tree. The team will record the results of its review for each '
element, indicating specific areas for onsite review, in a document that will be provided to the licensee 1-2 weeks before the site ;
assessment.
- 2. Site Assessment: (2 weeks)
- a. The assessment team will perform the site assessment visit in accordance with the guide.
- b. Theassessmentteamwillconductapreliminaryexitmeetinfwiththe licensee.
- 3. Customized Insoection Plan: (2-4 weeks)
- a. The assessment team will develop an assessment report and a Final
'- Performance Assessment / Inspection Planning Tree that will be issued to the licensee.
l i Salem !
- b. The assessment team will translate the findings from items 1 and 2 into specific inspection goals and requirements in accordance with the guide.
- c. The region will incorporate the assessment team's inspection recommendations into a customized inspection plan for the upcoming SALP cycle.
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0 Salem .
Salem Assessment Schedule (Summer 1994)
Item Responsible Approximate No. Activity Organization Duration
- 1. Comprehensive Review 4 weeks Proposed dates: (later) 1.a Compile / review NRC documentation Team Leader ,
1.b Contract for LER analysis - ORNL NRR/IRCB 1.c Compile / review licensee Team Leader documentation 1.d Review INP0 Plant Evaluation Report Team Leader 1.e Analyze licensee IPE NRR/SPSB 1.f Prepare risk data matrix Team Leader NRR/SPSB 1.g Develop Preliminary Performance Team Leader Assessment / Inspection Planning Tree and summary. Provide summary to licensee 1-2 weeks before site assessment
- 2. Site Assessment 2 weeks ;y,ty Proposed 7 dates: (later) L -
J 2.a Perform site assessment visit Team Leader 2.b Conduct preliminary exit meeting Team Leader
- 3. Customized Inspection Plan 3 weeks Proposed dates: (later)
~~
3.a Develop final Performance Team Leader Assessment / Inspection Planning Tree and report 3.b Translate the findings into Team Leader inspection requirements 3.c Develop customized inspection plan Region
.