ML20217N589

Refers to NRC Investigations 1-96-024 & 1-96-031 Conducted by OI Re Allegations of Deliberate Posting of Inaccurate Info in Safeguards Event Logbook & Discrimination by Wackenhut Staff.Decided to Await Issuance of DOL Decision

ML20217N589
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	04/24/1998
From:	Miller H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Keiser H Public Service Enterprise Group
Shared Package
ML20217N554	List: ML20217N549 ML20217N589 ML20217N622
References
EA-97-351, EA-97-422, NUDOCS 9805050379
Download: ML20217N589 (4)

Text

.

t UNITED STATES

1. [ S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION U " REGION I 475 ALLENDALE ROAD KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1416 April 24,1998 EAs97-351 J 97-422 l

l Mr. Harold W. Keiser i

Executive Vice President l Nuclear Business Unit l Public Service Electric and Gas Company l

' Post Office Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

SUBJECT:

NOTICE OF VIOLATION I (NRC Office of Investigations Nos. 1-96-024 and 1-96-031)

Dear Mr. Keiser:

i This letter refers to the two subject NRC investigations conducted by the.NRC Office of  ;

investigations (01), the results of which were sent to you on October 1,1997. 01 investigation No. 1-96024, the synopsis of which was sent to you with the October 1,1997 letter, found that inaccurate information regarding the posting of compensatory measures was i

recorded in the Safeguards Event Log, and that, at a minimum, the deliberate' actions of two l Wackenhut personnel caused this documentation inaccuracy. 01 investigation No. 1-96-024, a redacted version of which was also sent to you on October 1,1997, found that a contract securtty officer employed by Wackenhut at Salem / Hope Creek was discriminated against for raising safety concerns. A DOL Area Director (AD) had similarly found discrimination, as did l a DOL Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in a Recommended Decision and Order issued on January 22,1998. Predecisional enforcement conferences were conducted with Mr. L Storz and other members of your staff on December 9,1997, to discuss the violations, their causes, and your corrective actions.

l Based on the information developed during the investigations, and the information provided during the December 9,1997, conference, the NRC has decided, with respect to the discrimination issue, to await issuance of the DOL Secretary of Labor's Administrative Review Board (ARB) decision prior to making a final enforcement decision, as noted in a ' letter from James Lieberman, NRC Director of Enforcement, on March 20,1998.. With respect to the falsification issue, one violation of NRC requirements is being cited. The' violation is described in detail in the enclosed Notice of Violation and involves inaccurate security records created by two Wackenhut security personnel indicating that compensatory measures were in place within the required time (10 minutes) following the failure of the security computer in May 1996. Specifically, a security officer did not arrive at a certain post for 18 minutes after the l computer failed, yet the record (Safeguards Event Log) created by a Systems Operations l Supervisor, based on information received from a CAS/SAS operator, indicated that the officer arrived at the location within the allotted 10 minutes. The failure to respond within 10 minutes is a security event that licensee procedures require to be recorded in the Safeguard Event Log. You previously investigated this matter and confirmed that the timeliness l requirements were not met and that the record was inaccurate.

9905050379 990424 f gDR ADOCK 05000272 PDR i

Public Service Electric and 2 Gas Company These actions by the Systems Operations Supervisor, and the CAS/SAS operator constitute a willful violation of NRC requirements. Based on a careful review of the Ol report, and the details discussed at the predecisional enforcement conference, the NRC has concluded that ,

individuals involved had information that the area was not posted within 10 minutes. This 1 determination was based on the fact that the Systems Operations Supervisor was approached by other security personnel and told that compensatory assignments may not have been met within 10 minutes, and he attempted to verify that information by making a call to the CAS/SAS operator. Assuming the CAS/SAS operator provided accurate information (the CAS/SAS operator informed the Systems Operations Supervisor that the posting had been completed within the required 10 minutes), he did not resolve the difference. Also, the CAS/SAS operator was informed by the secunty officer as to when the officer actually arrived at the post and this time was not within the required 10 minutes. Therefore, their actions are considered willful within the context of the NRC Enforcement Policy, and this constitutes a significant regulatory concern. The NRC has previously issued documents emphasizing the importance of maintaining complete and accurate records of activities performed, such as in NRC Infesr,4k,n Notice 92-30 issued on Apdl 23,1992, and NRC Generic Letter 93 03 issued on October 20,1993. Those documents describe similar occurrences of records being falsified at other facilities.

At the predecisional enforcement conference, you admitted that the records were inaccurate, but you stated that you were unable to conclude that the actions were willful. Rather, you attributed the violation to a failure of security leadership which resulted in a cultural decline within the secudty organization. While the failure of security leadership likely contributed to this violation, the NRC maintains that the violation was willful for the reasons discussed above. Therefore, given the significance of willful violations of NRC requirements, the violation is classified at Severity Level 111 in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600 (Enforcement Policy).

In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $66,000is considered for a Severity Levellif violation. Because PSE&G has been the subject of escalated enforcement action in the past two years', the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Ident/flestbn and Comset/ve Acdon in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. In this case, credit is warranted for both factors because the inaccurate information was identified by your stcff and prompt and comprehensive corrective actions were taken thereafter. Those corrective actions included, but were not limited to: (1) changes in the security management organization at the facility, including new supervision; (2) briefing of the security officers regarding expectations; (3) revision of procedures; (4) discussions with the individuals involved in this event regarding management expectations on posting and logging requirements, and the seriousness of recording inaccurate information; and (6) other actions, including communication of the Eir,,kg:: Concems Program and the Corrective Action Program, to improve the climate and culture within the security organization.

' For example, on December 11,1996, two civil penalties were issued to PSE&G, which consisted of (1) a $100,000 civil penalty for violations of security requirements (

Reference:

EA 96-344), and (2) a $80,000 civil penalty for violations invoMng discrimination of individuals who engaged in protected activities (

Reference:

EA 96-177)

)

I 1

4 Public Service Electric and 3 Gas Company Therefore, to emphasize the importance of prompt identification and correction of problems at the facility, I have been authorized, after consultation with, the Director, Office of

- Enforcement, not to propose e civil penalty in this case.

Although the NRC has decided, with respect to the discrimination matter, to await issuance of the DOL Secretary of Labor ARB decision, you should ensure that all of your management and supervisors understand the need for, and encourage, staff to bring forth concems when they exist, and also understand the importance of not taking any retaliatory action against individuals for bringing forth safety concems.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructicos specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with 1

' regulatory requirements. ,

in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its

. enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

Sincerely,

~f

)

Hul rt J. Miller p Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-272;50-311;50-354 License Nos. DPR-70; DPR-15; NPF-57

Enclosure:

Notice of Violation

)

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Public Service Electric and 4 Gas Company cc w/ encl:

L. Storz, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations E. Simpson, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering E. Salowitz, Director - Nuclear Business Support A. Kirby, lil, External Operations - Nuclear, Delmarva Power & Light Co.

C. Bakken, General Manager - Salem Operations M. Bezilla, General Manager - Hope Creek Operations J. McMahon, Director - OA/ Nuclear Training / Emergency Preparedness D. Powell, Manager, Licensing and Regulation R. Kankus, Joint Owner Affairs A. Tapert, Program Administrator M. Wettertiahn, Esquire J. Keenan, Esquire J. Isabella, Manager, Joint Generation Atlantic Electric Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate W. Conklin, Public Safety Consultant, Lower Alloways Creek Township Public Service Commission of Maryland State of New Jersey State of Delaware .

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