IR 05000320/1988003

Insp Rept 50-320/88-03 on 880130-0226.No Unacceptable Conditions Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Defueling Operations,Ler Review & Followup & Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Insp Findings

ML20148G427
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	03/18/1988
From:	Cowgill C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20148G405	List: IR 05000320/1988003 ML20148G400
References
50-320-88-03, 50-320-88-3, NUDOCS 8803290144
Download: ML20148G427 (8)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /88-03 Docket N License N .DPR-73 Priority --

Category C Licensee GPU Nuclear Corporation P. O. Box 480 M_i_ddletown, Pennsylvania 1NH Facility Name: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Inspection At: Middletown,PennsylvanB Inspection Conducted: January 30 - February 26, 1988 Inspectors: R. Conte, Senior Resident Inspector

• T. Moslak, Resident Inspector

• Reportin Inspector Approved By: 6 3f/ffSE C. Cowgill, Ch $ Reactor Projects Section 1A Date Inspection Summary:

Areas Inspected: Routine safety inspection (77 inspection hours) by site inspectors of plant operations, defueling operations, plant housekeeping conditions, shipment of radioactive materials, radioactive resin movements, implementation of radio-logical controls, licensee event report review and follow-up, control of radio-active materials, and licensee action on previous inspection finding Results: No unacceptable conditions were identified.

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DETAILS 1.0 Introduction and Overview 1.1 Licensee Defueling Activities During this reporting period, defueling crews continued to use the drill-ing machinery to drill through the incore instrument guide tubes (IIGT)

in the Lower Core Support Assembly (LCSA) as the first step in disassem-bling the LCSA. Problems in operating the drilling equipment and in removing the sections of drill casing have slowed progres In particular, the low torque, threaded joints of the drill string have been galled and have tightly seized in place, making it difficult to disassemble the drill string. The licensee is presently evaluating new designs for the low torque joints to preclude this proble Drilling engineers are also trying to improve drilling techniques to minimize breaking and excessive wearing away of drill bit teet To date, the following has been cccomplished in disassembling the LCS Fif ty-two IIGT spiders have been drilled out of the upper grid pa Fourteen of fifteen peripheral IIGT's have been drilled through to below the upper flow distributor plat Dye nuts have been installed on thirteen of fif teen peripheral IIGT's. The dye nuts will eventually be used to engage an IIGT removal tool when the IIGT is severed from the lower elliptical ficw distributo Eight of fifteen IIGT have been drilled through to below the IIGT support plat The LCSA cor.sists of a series of five plates in the following sequence (from top to bottom): (1) the grid pad; (2) the upper flow distributor; (3) the grid forging; (4) the incore guide support plate; and, (5) the elliptical flow distributo Subsequent to drilling out and removing the fifteen IIGT's, present plans call for drilling out the forty-eight support posts in the LCS .2 Decontamination / Dose Reduction Activities Efforts continue to remove highly radioactive resin from the "A" and "B" make-up and purification demineralizer vessels. Air sparging equipment was used to stir up the resin chunks in the "A" demineralizer and some success was achieved in sluicing the resin to the Spent Resin Storage Tank No success has yet been achieved with the "B" vesse *

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On February 9, 1988, a hose ruptured when the contents of a Spent Resin Storage Tank was being recirculated in preparation for taking a sample of the material. As a result, about four gallons of water and resin spilled on the floor of the tank room causing that area to be highly contaminated. Until that area is decontaminated, the recirculation sys-tem repaired, and corrective measures implemented, the system will be out of servic Removing thin layers of concrete from reactor building basement walls continue Robots are performing this task. A hydraulic test was con-aucted on a mock-up of the basement block wall to evaluate the effective-ness of leaching out contamination by filling the wall with water. An-alysis of the results of this test are in progres Scabbling, steam vacuuming, and hands-on decontamination continue in the auxiliary and fuel handling building To date, 118 of 143 cubicles have been decontaminated to end point levels, 2.0 Routine Plant Operations Inspections of the facility were conducted to assess compliance with the re-quirements of the Technical Specifications and Recovery Operations Plan in the following areas: licensee review of selected plant parameters for abnormal trends; plant status from a maintenance / modification viewpoint, including plant cleanliness; control of switching and tagging; fire protection; licen-see control of routine and special evolutions, including control room person-nel awareness of these evolutions; control of documents, including logkeeping practices; radiological controls; and, security plan implementatio Inspections of the control room were performed during regular and back shif t hour The Shift Foreman's Log and selected portions of the Control Room Operator's Log were reviewed for the period January 30, 1988, through February 26, 1988. Other logs reviewed during the inspection period included the De-fueling Water Cleanup System Operations Log, Radiological Controls Foraman's Log, and Auxiliary Operator's Daily Log Sheet Operability of components in systems required to be available for response to emergencies was reviewed to verify that they could perform their intended functions. The inspector attended selected licensee planning meetings. Shift staffing for licensed and non-licensed personnel was determined to be adequat No unacceptable conditions were identifie .0 Hose Rupture in Sludge Processing System On February 9, 1988, the licensee notified the resident inspector of a spill

' of liquid radioactive waste, resulting when a hose ruptured in the sludge processing syste The inspector evaluated licensee response to this incident by interviewing cognizant personnel, reviewing investigative reports, and examining system drawing . - - - -- --

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The inspector established that at approximately 8:50 a.m. on February 9, 1988, the licensee began recirculating the "B" Spent Resin Storage Tank (SRST) in preparation for sampling and analyzing its contents. Very shortly (approxi-mately twenty seconds) af ter the recirculating pump (WDS-FP-2B) was started, the discharge pressure rose very sharply from approximately 45 psi to greater than 125 psi and, subsequently, the pump tripped on low suction pressur Upon inspecting the flow path, operations personnel found that a rubber hose that is part of a flush connection to the system had partially split open at the flush valve (WDS-FV-408) fitting. Also, there was approximately four gallons of radioactive liquid and resin on the floor of the pump room with accompanying high dose rates. Because of the splashed water, an increase in airborne radioactivity concentration was indicated on local monitoring sta-tions (AMS-3) and the access area to the tank room was found to be contamin-ated. Radiological Controls personnel posted the area to restrict access and began decontaminating the affected areas. No increases were observed in the in place plant airborne effluent monitors that would indicate a release to the environmen An incident / event report (IER 88-12) was initiated by plant supervision and a critique was conducted by the personnel involved in the operation to estab-lish the caus The initiating event appears to have been a flow blockage at a check valve (WDS-V-114) downstream from the pump. When the clog occurred, a rapid in-crease in line pressure resulted between the pump and the check valve, pres-surizing a flush connection in this flow path. Upon examining this connection, licensee personnel determined that the two-foot length of one-inch hose was improperly crimped at the fitting of the flush valve (WDS-FV-408) and that the hose was split at the fittin Several immediate actions have been implemented and several long-term correc-tive measures are being evaluated to prevent a recurrence. Immediate actions included assembling, bench testing, and replacing the ruptured flush connec-tio Portions of the recirculation flow path are being flushed to unclog the line and lower radiation levels. When radiation levels are lowered, the check valve (WDS-V-114) will be disassembled to determine the nature of the obstruction and the system relief valve (WDS-FR-2) will be inspected to de-termine if it is functional. Consideration is being given to performing a system in-service leak test prior to resuming operation, changing the operat-ing procedure to increase the mixing time of the resin in the SRST to ensure the resin is sufficiently broken up to prevent clogging the line, and in-stalling a ilush connection to the check valv Through this review, the inspector determined that the licensee initially im-piemented the appropriate radiological cor,trols to limit the spread of con-tamination and to assess the impact of the spill on other plant area The inspector determined that the ruptured flush connection was initially bench (hydrostatically) tested in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory

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Guide 1.143 and was again tested as part of the in-service leak testing pro-gram prior to system turnover to operations. The inspector reviewed the lic-ensee's immediate and long-term corrective actions and determined them to be appropriat The inspector had no further questions on this matte .0 Licensee Event Report (LER) Follow-Up The following LER's and special reports were reviewed. The inspector verified that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, correc-tive actions were appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complete /88-02 - Failure to perform a fire watch when less than the minimum fire detection instrumentation was operabl Special Event Report - Malfunction of a motor-operated valve actuator for a containment isolation valve (OH-V-4A) on October 19, 198 No unacceptable conditions were identifie .0 Radioactive Material Shipments The inspectors observed preparations for transport of a shipment of three rail car-mounted NUPAC-125B casks containing TMI-2 core debri The material was shipped on February 7, 1988, from the TMI site to a U. S. Department of Energy facility in Idaho Falls, Idah The inspector's reviews covered:

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verification of compliance with approved packaging and shipping proce-dures;

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completed shipping papers;

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package labeling and vehicle placarding; and,

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verification of compliance with regulatory limits for radioactive con-tamination and radiation dose rate The inspector's review consisted of observations of shipping canister loading; performance of radiation and contamination surveys; and examination of ship-ping papers, procedures, and vehicle No unacceptable conditions were identifie ,

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6.0 Surveillance Activities Control Room Emercency Air Cleanup System l On February 9, 1988, the licensee performed surveillance testing of the Con-trol Room Emergency Air Cleanup System. Testing to determine system oper-ability is required per Technical Specifications (TS) Sections 4.7.1.c, 4.7.7.1.e.1 and e.3 and is required to be performed at least every eighteen months. The inspector reviewed the completed surveillance procedure (4210-SUR-3826.05) and supporting test data. From this review, the ir,spector de-termined that the testing frequency and acceptance criteria conformed with the TS requirements. The inspector also determined that the procedure was properly reviewed / approved by the appropriate departments within the licensee organization, that an hourly fire watch was posted when the Fire Suppression System was secured to the ventilation system, and that deficiencies identified during testing were adequately resolved. Through discussions with licensee representatives and review of supporting documentation, the inspector con-cluded that the in place testing accepta<ce criteria and carbon sampling /

analysis were in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 197 Ir summary, the on-site testing consisted of testing of the High Efficiency Particulate Absolute (HEPA) filters using dioctylphthalate (00P) aerosol, testing of the charcoal filter bank using Freon-11, observing differential pressure drops across the filter banks and flow rate through the banks, and verifying that the control room can be maintained at a positive pressure with respect to the outside atmospher A representative sample of carbon from the charcoal banks was obtained and sent off site for laboratory analysis to determine its penetration using methyl iodid The results of this analysis indicated the carbon was accept-able for us The only deficiency identified during the test was that one bank of HEPA fil-l

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ters (AH-F-29) did not satisfactoriiy pass the DOP testing. As a result, the filters were replaced and the system was successfully re-teste No unacceptable conditions were identifie .0 Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items 7.1 (Closed) Inspector Follow Items (320/85-01-02): Turnover of Pre-1043 File, and (320/85-01-03): Review Test Data for ECM's in Pre-1043 File Immediately after the accident that occurred on March 28, 1979, the need for timely installation and operation of new plant systems resulted in plant modifications not formally being turned over to the Site Operations Department or being administratively closed ou To correct this situation, the licensee established a staff within the Plant Engineering Department that was dedicated to effect the disposition of approximately 484 Engineering Change Memoranda (ECM) that were gene-

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rated during the period March 1979 through February 1981. Their task has been designated as the turnover of the "Pre-1043 File." The Pre-1043 File consists of those ECM's which were issued prior to the implementa-tion of Administrative Procedure (AP) 1043, "Work Authorization Proce-dure," and were not turned over per AP 1043 or the most current turnover procedure, 4000-ADM-7350.0 The task of providing a fir.al disposition for these outstanding ECM's began on February 1, 1985, and was completed in 1987. A Special Operation Procedure (SOP), 4210-1212-84-334, was implemented defining the methods and guidelines to be used for turning out the ECM's in the Pre-1043 Fil The inspector reviewed the associated procedures and examined selected portions of the documentatio From this examination, the intpector de-termined that the turnover packages contained the review and approval signoffs by the appropriate level of plant management and the cognizant engineers and determined that the selected packages contained the re-quired documentation including the Turnover Notice, Closecut Checklist, Walkdown Report (where applicable), Incomplete Work List, Switching Or-ders, and Tie-In Authorization The inspector also determined that the packages contained the associated testing data, where applicable, and that this data was reviewed and approved by the appropriate departmental manager The inspector had no further questions on this matte .2 (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (320/86-05-02): Failure of Center Point Grapple Through discussions with licensee personnel and review of the supporting documentation, the inspector determined that the modification that was made to the canister grapple tool handle per Unit Work Instruction (UWI)

4370-3255-86-R338 in May 1986 has successfully precluded premature dis-engagements of the too The inspector had no further questions on this item, 7.3 (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (320/86-10-03): Radiological Cantrols Audit Procedures and Training The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedure for conducting internal assessments of activities performed by the Radiological Controls Depart-ment (9200-ADM-1201.09), materials used in training radiological engi-neers to perform internal assessments / audits more effectively, and schedules of audits to be performed by the Radiological Controls Depart-ment in 1988. From this review and through discussions with licensee representatives, the inspector determined that the licensee has estab-lished an internal review program of sufficient depth to ensure a thor-ough evaluation of the adequacy and consistency of implementation of the ALARA program.

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8.0 Inspector Follow Items Matters that require further review and evaluation by the inspectors. Open items are used to document, track, and ensure adequate follow-up on mttters of concern to the inspector. Open items are addressed in paragraph .0 Exit Interview The inspector met periodically with licensee representatives to discuss in-spection findings. On February 26, 1988, the site inspectors summarized the inspection findings in a meeting with the following personnel:

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J. Byrne, Manager, TMI-2 Licensing

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S. Levin, Defueling Director

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W. Potts, Site Operations Director

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D. Turner, Director, Radiological Controls, TMI-2

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