ML20115J920

Final Deficiency Rept Re Brown Boveri Voltage Balance Relays W/Excessive Operating Time.Initially Reported on 850227. Relays Removed from Control Panels & Returned to Vendor for Replacements.Item Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e)

ML20115J920
Person / Time
Site:	Satsop
Issue date:	04/01/1985
From:	Kohler A WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
GO3-85-179, NUDOCS 8504240155
Download: ML20115J920 (2)

Text

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Washington Public Power Supply System Box 1223 Elma, Washington 98541 (206) 482-4428? jrf g April 1, 1985 Do G03-85-179 Docket No. 50-508 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V Office of Inspection and Enforcement 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 260 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. D. F. Kirsch, Acting Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects

Subject:

NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 3 P0TENTIAL 10 CFR 50.55(e) DEFICIENCY VOLTAGE BALANCE RELAYS; EXCESSIVE OPERATING TIME (D/N #57)

On February 27, 1985, the Supply System notified your office of a potential 10 CFR 50.55(e) deficiency concerning the subject condition. A subsequent Engineering / Licensing evaluation has determined that if the deficiencies remained uncorrected they would not have affected adversely the safety of operations of the plant. Therefore, the subject condition'is not reportable l

per 10 CFR 50.55(e).

Attached is a Supply System approved Final Report. The report provides a description of the deficiency, analysis of safety implications and corrective actions taken. Should you have any questions or desire further information, please contact me directly.

Ych!n ,

f A. ohler (760)

NP-3 Program Director cc: Mr. J. A. Adams, NESCO Mr. D. Smithpeter, BPA Mr. W. L. Bryan, Washington Water Power Company Mr. R. V. Myers, Puget Sound Power & Light Corapany Mr. W. L. Weislogel, Pacific Power & Light Ccmpany Mr. B. D. Withers, Portland General Electric Company Mr. J. R. Lewis, Bonneville Power Administration Ebasco, Elma Document Control Desk - V. S. NRC 8504240155 850401

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. WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 3 (DOCKET 50-508)

P0TENTIAL 10 CFR 50.55(e) DEFICIENCY FINAL REPORT VOLTAGE BALANCE RELAIS: EXCESSIVE OPERATING TIME (D/N #57)

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY-BBC Brown Boveri, Inc. has notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of a potential problem with BBC Voltage Balance Relays (ITE-60). The Supply System was identified as an end user of the subject relays. Two relays of this type were supplied by Beloit Power and are installed in the WNP-3 Emergency Diesel General Co7 trol Panels SA and SB.

The ITE-60 voltage balance relay is a voltage comparison relay. It is utilized to detect the failure of a potential transformer and to block the

operation of various other protective relays used in the protection of the ,

generator. The published specification indicates a 10 millisecond relay j

. operating time upon the complete loss of one input voltage source. Startup l testing at Hope Creek Generating Station revealed a 40 millisecond '

operating time. Since the relays are used to block other protective devices, the 40 millisecond operating time may be too slow to provide proper blocking. This condition could only occur after the failure of a patential transformer. :f both conditions exist, this could lead to the shutdown of a diesel generator. ,

ANALYSIS OF THE SAFETY IMPLICATIONS Upon loss of a potential transformer input, the IM-60 relay operates to block the tripping output of three (3) other relays. They are: 1) Loss of Field Relay (Westinghouse Type KLF); 2) Reverse Power Relay (Westinghouse Type CRN-1); and 3) Voltage Controlled Overcurrent Relay (Hestinghouse Type COV-8). The KLF incorporates a 250 millisecond delay on dropout prior to energization of its trip coil. This is more than adequate to provide proper coordination with a 40 or 50 millisecond operating time of the ITE-60. The operating time of the CRN-1 and the' COV-8 are in the order of several seconds, which assures proper coordination. In addition, the tripping actions of the KLF, CRN-1 and COV-8 are blocked by other relays when the Diesel Generator is operating concurrently with any one or more of the following systems: Safety Injection, Containment Spray, Containment Isolation, arid /or Emergency Feedwater Actuation.

If the excessive operating time of the ITE-60 were to remain uncorrected, it would have no impact on the ability of the Diesel Generator to perform its safety function as required during a safe shutdown. Therefore, this deficiency is not significant and not reportable per 10 CFR 50.55(e).

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The two' relays in question have been removed from the control panels dd returned to the vendor for replacement with relays which will perform within the specificatiort requirements.

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