ML20112E663

Interim Deficiency Rept Re Failure of Borg-Warner 2-inch HPSI Header Isolation Valves.Initially Reported on 850204. Opening Torque Switch Light Bypassed & Valve Yoke Tack Welded to Valve Body

ML20112E663
Person / Time
Site:	Satsop
Issue date:	03/07/1985
From:	Kohler A WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
GO3-85-122, NUDOCS 8503270079
Download: ML20112E663 (4)

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~h!!VED Washington Public Power Supply Syste,m-Box 1223 Elma, Washington 98541 (206)482-4428 I'48 / / ,,

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?Gl3;; y, March 7, 1985 G03-85-122 Docket No. 50-508

( U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V l

Office of Inspection and Enforcement 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 260 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. D. F. Kirsch, Acting Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects

Subject:

NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 3 POTENTIAL 10CFR50.55(e) DEFICIENCY FAILURE OF BORG-WARNER 2" HPSI HEADER ISOLATION VALVES (0/N#56)

On February 4, 1985, the Supply System notified your office of a potential 10CFR50.55(e) deficiency concerning the subject condition. A subsequent Engineering / Licensing evaluation has determined that if the deficiencies remained uncorrected they could have affected adversely the safety of operations of the plant. Therefore, the subject condition is reportable in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).

8503270079 850307 ADOCK 0500 gDR

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Attached is a Supply System approved Interim Report. The report provides a

~ description of the deficiency, analysis of safety implications and corrective actions taken/ planned. To-date, Ebasco has not received adequate information from Combustion Engineering (CE) to fully address the corrective actions.

Upon receipt of the problem resolution from CE and considering available Supply System resources, a final report will be provided to your office.

Should you have any questions or desire further information, please contact me directly.

A. D. Kohler (760)

WNP-3 Program Director cc: J. Adams, NESCO D. Smithpeter, BPA Ebasco, Elma Ebasco, New York E. M. Burton, Pacific Power & Light Company R. D. Hill, Puget Sound Pcwer & Light Company P. Inman, Washington Water Power Company B. D. Withers, Portland General Electric Company Institute of Nuclear Power Operations A. Tuzes, Combustion Engineering Document Control Desk - U. S. NRC

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( e WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 3 ,

.(DOCKET N0. 50-508).

10CFR50.55(e) DEFICIENCY t INTERIM REPORT i

FAILURE OF-BORG-WARNER 2" HPSI HEADER ISOLATION VALVES DESCRIPTION OF THE DEFICIENCY.

Combustion Engineering .(CE) reported problems. encountered during hot functional testing at an -unspecified CE NSSS Unit. The problems concerned l High Pressure Safety ' Injection (HPSI) header isolation valves which permit HPSI pump flow into the. Reactor Coolant . System. .With the HPSI pumps

operating, these valves.would only open a small portion of the full range of travel.:(wherein the-torque trip was bypassed) but would subsequently trip on high torque without' opening further.

Upon investigation, it was . determined that - the torque requirements were

greater than the valve operator spring pack was normally designed to produce.

l The valve operator assembly, however,- was designed for and did withstand all operations. including application of motor stall torque, with the exception that the threaded body-to-bonnet connection unscrewed.

WNP-3 utilizes the CE- System 80 in its design. The CE supplied valves for-

this- application on WNP-3 were - also procurred from Borg-Warner and are

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similar-to the valves which experienced this problem. It can be-assumed that similar failures could occur unless corrective measures are taken. The affected WNP-3 valves are:

CE TAG NO EBASCO TAG N0. LOCATION (ELEV. 381 RAB)

SI-616 2SI-VQ019 SBR Penetration #13 SI-617 2SI-VQ020 SAR Penetration #13 i

SI-626 2SI-VQ016 SBR Penetration #14 l SI-627 2SI-VQ017 SAR Penetration #14

SI-636 2SI-VQ013-SBR Penetration #15 l SI-637 2SI-VQ014 SAR Penetration #15 SI-646 2SI-VQ008 SBR Penetration #16 l SI-647 2SI-VQ009 SAR Penetration #16 L.

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1 ANALYSIS OF THE SAFETY IMPLICATIONS The . problems with these HPSI header isolation valves, if left uncorrected, could reasonably be postulated to adversely affect the safety of the plant, since these valves are active and must open post-LOCA to allow HPSI pump flow into the Reactor Coolant System. This deficiency, therefore, is considered reportable under the criteria of 10CFR50.55(e).

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS When the problems were originally discovered at the unspecified CE NSSS Unit, the following steps were taken:

o The opening torque switch light was bypassed.

o The affected utility elected to tack weld the valve yoke to-the valve body.

It is not known, 'at this time, when CE and the valve- vendor (Borg-Warner) will establish the solution to this problem and the schedule for its resolution. A final report will be prepared as soon as this information is received from CE.

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