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MONTHYEARML22034A3992022-02-16016 February 2022 Enclosure 1 - IP 71130.03 Cy 2021 - IR 8 Baseline Inspection Completion ML22034A3972022-02-16016 February 2022 Enclosure 2 - IP 92707 CY2021 - IR 8 Baseline Inspection Completion ML22034A3952022-02-16016 February 2022 Enclosure 3 - IP 96001 CY2021 - IR 8 Baseline Inspection Completion ML16285A3202016-10-12012 October 2016 ROP PI Frequently Asked Questions (Faqs): 13-04 ML16159A4002016-06-16016 June 2016 Iepra Ror for Point Beach SE Section 3.4 ML16159A4022016-06-16016 June 2016 Fpra Ror for Point Beach SE Section 3.4 ML15261A7492015-09-14014 September 2015 NRC Supplement to NRC Letter - Notification of NRC Inspection and Request for Information Dated May 1, 2015 - NextEra Energy Point Beach Nuclear Plant (Msh) ML16072A0362015-06-0303 June 2015 Receipt of Cd Containing Revised I/O Files from NextEra Point Beach Nuclear Plant Flood Hazard Re-Evaluation Report ML15014A1602015-01-14014 January 2015 Attachment 2 - NRC Working Group Recommendations to Revise the Substantive Cross-Cutting Issue Process ML15014A1532015-01-14014 January 2015 Attachment 1- NEI Comments on NRC Working Group Recommendations to Revise the Substantive Cross-Cutting Issue Process ML14314A5122014-11-13013 November 2014 Enclosure 2 - Frequently Asked Questions (Faqs) Discussed During the October 22 2014 Reactor Oversight Process Public Meeting ML14147A0112014-06-20020 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14149A1532014-05-0101 May 2014 FOIA/PA-2014-0074 - Resp 4 - Partial. Group F (Records Already Publicly Available) ML12056A0522012-03-12012 March 2012 Enclosure 6 - List of Power Reactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status ML1017301232010-06-0909 June 2010 Green Ticket Tritium Releases ML0806704192008-03-0707 March 2008 CDBI Findings ML0732400242007-10-25025 October 2007 Examples of Max Thermal Power License Conditions ML0726203022007-09-28028 September 2007 Amendment to Indemnity Agreement No. B-41, Amendment No. 14 ML0726303192007-09-14014 September 2007 P. Paquin Ltr Amendment to Certificate of Compliance No. 6574 for the Model No. 3-82B Package (TAC L24116)/ Register User List ML0635404332006-12-20020 December 2006 Enclosure 2 - Consent and Hearing Waiver Form - the Nuclear Management Company, LLC ML0634705992006-12-14014 December 2006 Plant Service List ML0627903812006-09-29029 September 2006 Exhibit 26 to Case No. 2-2002-004, Interview Report ML0626801502006-09-22022 September 2006 Escort Ratio for Visitors ML0626503122006-09-0101 September 2006 Liquid Radiation Release Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report (Enclosure) ML0626504142005-11-0303 November 2005 RIII-2005-A-0062 Closure ML0626802782005-08-29029 August 2005 3rd ARB Action Plan RIII-05-A-0062 (Point Beach) ML0626802752005-08-22022 August 2005 2nd ARB Action Plan, RIII-05-A-0062 (Point Beach) ML0626504072005-07-19019 July 2005 Action Request - Corrective Action Program (CAP) ML0626802642005-07-18018 July 2005 Initial ARB Action Plan RIII-05-A-0062 (Point Beach) ML0518603982005-07-15015 July 2005 NRC Actions Under the Reactor Oversight Process for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 ML0518903972005-07-0101 July 2005 Log Entries Report ML0518903962005-07-0101 July 2005 U1R28 Outage Risk Plan Ppg Outage Management ML0518903952005-07-0101 July 2005 U1R28 Add/Delete Log ML0626504032005-06-22022 June 2005 Action Request - Corrective Action Program (CAP) (CAP065250) ML0626503992005-06-10010 June 2005 Action Request - Corrective Action Program (CAP) (CAP065041) ML0626504012005-06-10010 June 2005 Action Request - Corrective Action Program (CAP) (CAP065035) ML0515202282005-05-24024 May 2005 EP FFD Questions Not Asked ML0514700842005-05-24024 May 2005 COLR 28 Replaced with COLR 29 Prior to Vessel Removal. Attach: 04/14/2004 Condition Evaluation 013784. Attach: 04/12/2004 CAP 055612. Attach: Undated Bullet Nose Disconnected & Removed with Head ML0515202262005-05-24024 May 2005 2SI-825B Not Full Open with Handwritten Notations ML0515202242005-05-24024 May 2005 Phone Line Through Containment Hatch While Fuel Movement in Progress ML0515202232005-05-24024 May 2005 Loss of SFP Cooling Due to Breaker Miss Alignment ML0515202212005-05-24024 May 2005 2SI-825B Not Full Open with Handwritten Notations ML0515202192005-05-24024 May 2005 U1R28 Interim Exit Meeting Notes ML0515202182005-05-24024 May 2005 Tsac Not Entered When Source Range Audible Count Rate Removed from Service ML0515202072005-05-24024 May 2005 Questions for Followup Based on Last Outage ISI Summary Report ML0514700772005-05-24024 May 2005 Refuel Outage 1R28 Resident Inspector Coverage ML0514700822005-05-24024 May 2005 Mikes 2004-03 IR Section Write Ups, 2T-34A Accumulator Level Indication ML0515201472005-05-24024 May 2005 Phone Line Through Containment Hatch While Fuel Movement in Progress ML0515202132005-05-24024 May 2005 Inservice Inspection Document Request ML0515201492005-05-24024 May 2005 Transient Combustible Materials in Containment & Turbine Building Without Administrative Controls 2022-02-16
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POINT BEACH RED FINDING FOR POTENTIAL LOSS OF ALL AFW The Point Beach Nuclear Plant's probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) staff identified a vulnerability associated with auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) recirculation valves. The PRA staff identified the vulnerability while updating the Point Beach PRA model for internal events (a voluntary initiative). The recirculation valves are air operated valves which fail closed upon a loss of instrument air. Consequently, in certain transients, such as a loss of instrument air, a loss of off-site power, a loss of service water, or a seismic event, the flow path via the recirculation lines would be lost due to the recirculation valves failing closed upon a loss of instrument air. Closure of the recirculation valves could result in pump failure under low flow conditions, such as when AFW flow was throttled back by the operators to control steam generator level or mitigate reactor coolant system (RCS) overcooling. The potential common mode failure of AFW pumps, reported by the licensee on November 29, 2001, met the NRC Management Directive 8.3, "NRC Incident Investigation Program," threshold for a Special Inspection in that the potential common mode failure could have led to a loss of safety function.
Region Ill conducted a Special Inspection and the results were documented in inspection report 50-266/01-17(DRS); 50-301101-17(DRS). The outcome of the inspection was one preliminary Red finding and two violations. One violation was for inadequate procedures and the second was for inadequate corrective actions.
A common mode failure of the AFW pumps would result in substantially reduced mitigation capability for safely shutting down the plant in response to certain transients. Decay heat removal capability using steam generators would be adversely affected and other means of decay heat removal may not be available. The significance of the potential loss of all AFW on loss of instrument air was determined to be high largely due to the relatively high initiating event frequencies associated with the involved transients and the high likelihood of improper operator actions due to procedural inadequacies. Region III, OE, and IIPB discussed the issue at a SERP panel on February 21, 2002, and came to the consensus that the finding was appropriately characterized as being of high.safety significance (Red) and that the appropriate approach was to adhere to the current 'policies and issue the preliminary Red finding associated with the operator actions issues. On April 29, 2002, Region III held a Regulatory Conference with the NMC on this issue. At the Regulatory Conference the licensee agreed with the Red risk characterization for the finding, agreed with the violation for inadequate procedures, and denied the violation for inadequate corrective actions (they did not believe that it was reasonable to have identified the issue earlier). They also made their case for the Red finding to be considered an old design issue_(ODI).
Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Informatlon 0 Act, exe ption,___ _
FOIA- *Qc*-C/