ML050260701
| ML050260701 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/2004 |
| From: | Evans T Constellation Energy Group |
| To: | Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB |
| Conte R | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML041450453 | List: |
| References | |
| ES-D-1 | |
| Download: ML050260701 (187) | |
Text
NRC EXAM w AppendixD Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Nine Mile Point I Scenario No.: NRC-01 Op-Test No.: NRC-01 Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: Low power with the main generator synchronized and loaded to minimum load; ready to place the amplidyne in service.
Turnover: Drywell inerting is complete.. A team is being briefed to inert the Torus per N1-OP-9. Maintenance is establishing a plan to work on 112 containment spray pump. Place the main generator amplidyne in service per N1-OP-31 section E.6.0. Transfer house loads from reserve to normal per N1-OP-30 section E.15.0. Withdraw control rods to continue the power ascension for start of the second FW pump.
112 Containment Spray Pump removed from service. EPR in control.
Event Io f 8 NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
NRC EXAM 7 PC04 M Seismic event, Torus water leak. The crew will blow down when torus water seismic level degrades beyond the capability of torus water makeup.
event ALL PC05 SOP-28, EOP-4, EOP-1, EOP-8 torus leak (10%; 1 min ramp)
PC05 torus leak (35%; 1 min ramp, TUA 6 min 30 Recirc Loop Rupture (1,5%, 10 min ramp, RELATIVE 10 min. until active 25%
FW03A, FWPI 1 Trip FW28B, HPCl Mode Failure To ARP F2-3-3; F1-1-3; Fl-2-3; F4-1-6; F4-2-6 Initiate 12 10 CTOIA, C After containment sprays are placed into service, containment spray pump 111 Cont Spray trips requiring that the other available containment spray pump be placed into Pump Trip BOP 111 (TRUE) SRO service (Containment Spray Pump 112 is removed from service and not available).
vity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES ACTUAL (PER SCENARIO; SEE SECTION D.5.d) ATTRIBUTES
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 5
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 4 (SOP-31.2 EV2) (OP-I F.4 and H.2 EV3)
(ARP, OP-I 1,OP-20 EV 6) (SOP-28 EV7)
- 4. Major transients (1-2) 2
I 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) I 1 I (EOP-8 EV7) I I 7. Critical tasks (2-3) I 2 I I 20f8 NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I , 0 REV.
\.
PLACE THE GENERATOR AMPLIDYNE IN SERVICE, TRANSFER HOUSE LOADS, WITHDRAW CONTROL RODS FOR POWER ASCENSION, EPR OSCILLATIONS, RRP 15 HI TEMP, SEISMIC EVENT WITH LOSS OF PB16A AND TORUS LEAK, FW PUMP # I 1 TRIP WITH HPCl FAILURE, REACTOR COOLANT LEAK IN DW
\
PREPARER P. Ballard/D.Wandschneider DATE 10/07/2004 VAL1DATED Sheehan, M. Bestani, Barr DATE 10/04/2004 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE !d / z I 0PERAT1ONS MANAGER DATE CONFIGURAT1ON CONTROL NA - EXAMINATION SECURITY DATE
..J SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 60 minutes The crew assumes the shift with a reactor startup and power ascension in progress. The main generator is just synchronized to the grid and loaded to minimum load, ready to place the amplidyne in service. Containment Spray Pump 112 removed from service for maintenance.
The SRO will determine there are no additional Technical Specification (TS) implications with Containment Spray Pump 112 inoperable.
The crew will place the amplidyne in service per OP-32 and then transfer house service from reserve to normal per OP-30. When house loads are transferred the crew will continue the power ascension using control rod withdrawal.
After house service is transferred from reserve to normal, and several control rods are withdrawn, the crew will respond to fluctuations in reactor power, reactor pressure, and reactor water level. Plant conditions and annunciators will allow the crew to diagnose the cause is the Electronic Pressure Regulator (EPR) oscillating. The crew will place the Mechanical Pressure Regulator (MPR) in service and manually control reactor pressure and raise the EPR out of the way. The SRO reviews Technical Specifications/CoreOperating Limits Report (COLR) and determines a thermal limit penalty must be taken when power is between 45% and 90% per the COLR.
When pressure control is transferred to the EPR and the SRO has completed the Tech XU' Spec/COLR review, the crew will be required to respond to a Reactor Recirculation Pump (RRP) 15 MG set high temperature that continues to degrade. The crew will be required to 2004 NRC SCENARIO # I Page 1 of 49 November 2004
remove RRP15 from service. The RO must raise reactor power using control rods and/or recirc flow as directed by the Reactor Engineer as RRP 15 is removed from service. The crew will take appropriate actions including those actions to support 4-loop operation.
- J After RRP15 is isolated, a fault develops on powerboard 16A causing it to trip. The crew must diagnose the loss of PB16A. The power loss will result in reduced drywell cooling capability (loss of three drywell cooling fans). Additionally the loss of PB 16A will require the crew to respond to a loss of an instrument air compressor and Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling (RBCLC) pump.
After the crew starts a RBCLC pump and an instrument air compressor, a seismic event will occur resulting in a torus water leak. Because of the lowering torus water level the crew will insert a manual reactor scram. When the reactor is scrammed drywell. The crew must recognize a trip of Feedwater Pump Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) to initiate resulting in a failure of FWP # I 2 to start. The crew must manually control FWP FCV#12 to control reactor water level.
The crew will makeup to the torus and determine that enough makeup is available to stabilize the lowering water level. As containment pressures and temperatures rise the crew will be considering containment spray however this will require securing torus water makeup. Before containment sprays are required, the torus water leak degrades beyond the makeup capacity and torus level lowers requiring an RPV Blowdown. During and after the blowdown the-crew-must maintain RPV water level using high pressure and low pressure systems. This requires overriding core spray injection valves so they can be closed to avoid reactor vessel overfill.
After the blowdown actions are complete, the crew will spray the containment when torus pressure reaches 13 psig. After containment sprays are placed into service, containment spray
-w pump 111 trips requiring that another available containment spray pump be placed into service (Containment Spray Pump 112 is removed from service and not available).
Major Procedures: NI-OP-43A, N1-OP-5, N1-OP-32, N1-OP-31, N1-OP-30, N1-SOP-1.5, N1-SOP-31.2, N1-OP-01, N1-SOP-1, N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-4, N1-EOP-1, N1-EOP-8, EAL MATRIX, TECH SPECS EAL Classification: ALERT per 3.1. I , Failure to maintain Drywell pressure ~ 3 . psig.
5 Termination Criteria: RPV pressure less than 72 psi above torus pressure, RPV level is between 53 to 95 inches and plant conditions are stable and under control per EOP-2 and EOP-4. Containment sprays are in service.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 2 of 49 November 2004
I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: 07
--* ENSURE I 1 RBCLC Pump and I 1 Instrument Air Compressor in service.
ENSURE EPR is in service. MPR set at 926 psig and EPR set at 918 psig ENSURE N1-OP-32, Section E.3.0, Generator Synchronization, is complete through step 3.11 and ENSURE a marked up copy is available for the crew marked up through step 3. I 1 and ready to place amplidyne in service at step 3.12.
ENSURE N1-OP-31, Section E.6.0, is complete.
ENSURE N1-OP-43A is marked up through Step E.5.6 as complete and Steps 5.7.1, 5.7.2, and 5.7.4 complete. Steps 5.7.3 is in progress and Step 5.7.5 is not Complete yet therefore these steps are not signed off.
B. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. CTOI B, Containment Spray Pump Trip 112 (TRUE) (QUEUED)
- b. FW28B, HPCl Mode Failure To Initiate 12 (TRUE) (QUEUED)
- c. TC06, Electrical Pressure Regulator Fails - Oscillates (F3)
- d. RRSE, Recirc Pump 15 MG Slot Temperature Increase (35% ramp 3 min.) (F4)
- e. ED18, AC Power Board Electrical Fault (PB 16 Section A) (TRUE) (F5)
- f. PC05, Seismic Event (remain active 30 seconds) ( W
- g. PC04, Torus Leak (8% ramp 8 minutes) (F6)
- h. PC04, Torus leak (35% ramp 1 minute, relative to F6, TUA is 6 min 30 sec (after the reactor is scrammed) (F7)
- i. RR29 Recirculation Loop Rupture (15%, 13 minute ramp, TUA 1 min) (F7)
- j. RR29 Recirc Loop Rupture (relative)(25%, 1 minute ramp, TUA 10 min) (F7)
- k. FW03A, FW Pump Trip 11 (TRUE)
I. CTOIA, Containment Spray Pump Trip 111 (TRUE)
- 2. Remotes:
- a. None
- 3. Overrides:
Training Composite (as required)
- 4. Annunciators:
Training Annunciator Composite (as required)
C. Equipment Out of Service Containment Spray 112 - Red Clearance 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 3 of 49 November 2004
D. Support Documentation Reactivity Maneuver Request Form Control Rod Sequence Sheets marked off starting at:
-v RWM GROUP 21: BANK iNSRT L/#/T 08 BANK WITHDRAW Ll#/T $2 Starting with control rod 30-47 at position 08.
E. Miscellaneous - process computer LVD assignment 0 A window - D373 B window - B471 0 C window - D320 D window - H478 0 Ewindow -G358 F window - J377 0 G window - C875 Cl Lead examiner or designee must brief candidates with respect to reactivity team expectations since this is a 3 person crew.
0 The crew will have to brief in a secure room prior to the scenario due to the low power startup conditions. The brief could take 30 minutes. This should be done in advance of coming in the simulator.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 4 of 49 November 2004
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
0 Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SSS, ASSS, STA, CSO, CRE)
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
. Shift Supervisor Log (SSS, ASSS, STA) cso Log (CSO)
Lit Control Room Annunciators 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
Evolutions/Gene raI Info rmation/Equipment Status:
Main generator is just synchronized and loaded to minimum load, bypass valves are closed. Main Generator Amplidyne ready to be placed into service.
- I 12 Containment Spray Pump 00s for repair. TS 3.3.7.b (declared inop 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ago).
Control Rod Seauence Sheets RWM GROUP-21, A team is being briefed to inert the Drywell and Torus per N1-OP-9.
LPRM downscale alarms are intermittent due to power conditions.
PART 111: RemarkdPlanned Evolutions:
Maintenance establishing a plan to work on Containment Spray Pump I12.
Place the Main Generator Amplidyne in service per N1-OP-32 Section E.3.0. Section E.3.0 is complete through step 3.1 1.
N1-OP-31, Section E.6.0, is complete.
Transfer house service from reserve to normal per OP-30 E.15.0.
Continue control rod withdrawal for power ascension for starting second FW pump.
PART IV: To be reviewedlaccomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
Review new Clearances (SSS) Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
Shift Crew Composition (SSS/ASSS) 2004 NRC SCENARIO # I Page 5 of 49 November 2004
I Scenario ID# 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I NSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 6 of 49 November 2004
Ill. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
01 Maintain RPV water level above two-thirds core height (-132 inches) using high systems.
BASIS: With an RPV leak, failure of HPCl to initiate results in a loss of high pressure injection. If manual action is not taken to adjust FCV#12, reactor water level will lower below TAF. If the crew performs the EOP-2 actions for blowdown at
-109 inches, by the time reactor pressure lowers to 365 psig which is the pressure at which the core spray IVs open, reactor water level will already be below two-thirds core height before low pressure systems are able to inject. Per the Tech Spec bases for fuel cladding integrity, during the periods when the reactor is shutdown, if the water level should drop below the top of active fuel the ability to cool the core is reduced. This reduction in core cooling capability could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and cladding perforation. The core will be cooled sufficiently to prevent clad melting should the water level be reduced to two-thirds core height.
02 Depressurize the reactor when it is defermined torus water level cannot be maintained above 8 feet.
BASIS: With the loss of Primary Containment approaching, ERVs must be opened before reaching torus water level of 8 feet. At 8 feet the ERV diacharged become uncovered and the ERVs can no longer be used. Opening an ERV below 8 feet will result in a direct discharge to the torus air space and a loss of the pressure suppression function.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 7 of 49 November 2004
B. Performance Objectives:
EVENT PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE Given the plant with the turbine and generator in service, the crew will transfer house service from 01 reserve to normal IAW N 1-0P-30.
Given the plant in a condition to support power ascension to 100% power, the crew will increase 02 station output IAW N 1-0P-43A.
Given the plant in a condition to support power ascension the crew will respond to oscillations of the 03 EPR and place the MPR in control per N1-SOP-31.
Given a Recirculation pump with rising slot temperatures, while the plant is operating at power in 04 five loop operation, the crew will take action to remove the pump from service and continue power ascension with 4 loop operation IAW respective ARPs N1-OP-I.
Given the condition above requiring removal a Recirculation Pump from service, the crew will 05 maintain reactor power using control rod withdrawl and recirculation flow control IAW N1-OP-43A, N1-OP-5, N1-OP-1 Given a loss of powerboard 16A while operating at power the crew will respond to the loss of 06 powerboard and restore loads or otherwise mitigate the impact due to lost loads in accordance with N1-ARP-A4-3-1, Powerboard 16 R-I 041 Trip.
Given a seismic event that occurs while the plant is operating at power the crew will respond to the O7 event and take actions to mitigate the event IAW N1-SOP-28 and ARP H2-1-6 Given the plant operating at power when a Torus leak occurs, the crew will take action for a O7 lowering Torus water level and blowdown the vessel in accordance with N l -EOP-4 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 8 of 49 November 2004
EVENT PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE
.d Given the requirement to defeat the Core Spray IV interlocks, the crew will insert the Core Spray 08 jumpers IAW with EOP-1 Att.4.
Given a leak in the drywell accompanied by a torus leak, the crew will take action necessary to 08 mitigate the accident IAW with EOP-2 and EOP-4.
Given Torus Water level less than 10.5 feet and lowering uncontrollably, the crew will open 3 ERVs 08 per EOP-4 and in accordance with EOP-8 before Torus Water level reaches 8 feet.
Given a High Drywell Temperatures or Torus Pressures the crew will initiate containment spray 08 IAW EOP-1 att. 17 Given a trip of the running Feedwater pump and failure of HPCl mode for the starting Feedwater 09 pump, the crew will take actions necessary to accomplish the manual action for HPCl that did not occur in order to control water level IAW with the ARPs.
Given a trip of a running containment spray, the crew will start an additional pump IAW with EOP-1 10 att. 17 Generic Given the plant in a condition requiring emergency classifications, the crew shall classify the events properly, complete initial notification forms and discuss the bases for the classification in accordance with the emergency plan procedure.
Given the plant or plant system in a condition requiring Technical Specification action, identify the deviation and any required actionshotifications.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 9 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 01& 02: Placing Amplidyne In Service, Transfer House Service from Reserve to Normal, Continue Control Rod Withdrawal INSTRUCTOR A CTIVITIES:
L A Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walk down and briefing.
Allow no more than 5 minutes to walk down panels and perform annunciator checks.
INITIATION POINT: The initiation point for this event is when the SRO directs the crew to main generator amplidyne in service and transfer house loads from reserve to normal. The crew will continue with power ascension by pulling control rods. There are NO instructor activities related to this normal evolution.
0 If asked, acknowledge request to complete Attachment 12 of N1-OP-43A to confirm Auto transfer capability.
SYMPTONS/CUES VISIBLE TO THE CREW:
Not applicable.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page I O of 49 November 2004
EVENT O l & 02: Placing Amplidyne In Service, Transfer House Service from Reserve to Normal, Continue Control Rod Withdrawal 0 Walk down panels prior to assuming shift.
0 Conduct shift turnover brief.
0 Assume the shift.
0 Direct operator to continue N1-OP-32, E.3.0, at step 3.12 to place amplidyne in service.
0 Direct operator to perform N1-OP-30, E.15.0, Transfer House Service from Reserve to Normal.
0 Direct continuing with power ascension by pulling control rods, NI-OP-43A, E.6.0 -
Power Ascension to Rated; N1-OP-05, F . l .O - Control Rod Withdrawl; Rod Sequence Control Sheets.
0 Brief crew on event impact.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 1Iof 49 November 2004
EVENT O l & 02: Placing Amplidyne In Service, Transfer House Service from Reserve to Normal, Continue Control Rod Withdrawal 0 Walk down panels prior to assuming shift.
0 Participate in and ensure understanding of shift turnover brief.
0 Acknowledge direction to contine N1-OP-32, E.3.0, at step 3.12 to place amplidyne in service.
D Acknowledge direction to perform N1-OP-30, E.15.0, Transfer House Service from Reserve to Normal.
0 Acknowledge direction to continuing with power ascension by pulling control rods, NI-OP-43A, E.6.0 - Power Ascension to Rated; N1-OP-05, F . l .O - Control Rod Withdrawl; Rod Sequence Control Sheets.
RO BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 12 of 49 November 2004
EVENT O l & 02: Placing Amplidyne In Service, Transfer House Service from Reserve to Normal, Continue Control Rod Withdrawal BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 13 of 49 November 2004
EVENT O l & 02: Placing Amplidyne In Service, Transfer House Service from Reserve to Normal, Continue Control Rod Withdrawal RO 2004 NRC SCENARIO # I Page 14 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 01& 02: Placing Amplidyne In Service, Transfer House Service from Reserve to Normal, Continue Control Rod Withdrawal 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 15 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 03: EPR Oscillations Instructor Activities:
- INITIATION POINT: When directed by the lead evaluator, insert malfunction:
W TC06, Electrical Pressure Regulator Fails - Oscillates (F3)
(If necessary, - REMOVE AND REINSERT - oscillations continue to get worse if not reinserted.)
- If asked to investigate the EPR failure, acknowledge the request.
- If informed of the EPR failure, acknowledge the report.
Symptons/Cues Visible To The Crew:
- Fluctuations in reactor pressure, reactor power, and reactor water level.
- A2-4-4 TURBINE MECHANICAL PRESS. REG. IN CONTROL Critical Task(s) and Justification:
- NONE 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 16 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 03: EPR Oscillations 0 Acknowledge report of reactor power and reactor pressure oscillations.
0 Recognize/lnterpret/ Diagnose EPR failure.
0 Acknowledge report reactor power changed by more than 2%, SOP-1.5 if required.
0 Direct actions of SOP-1.5 (if required) 0 Direct RO to place the MPR in control per N1-SOP-31.2.
0 Acknowledge report MPR in control per N1-SOP-31.2.
0 Direct RO to adjust the MPR to establish reactor pressure 925-950 psig.
0 Contact I&C Supervisor to investigate the EPR failure.
SOP-1.5 ACTIONS (if required)
Directs the operators to:
0 Monitor LPRMs and APRMs for Thermal Hydraulic Instabilities (THI).
0 For reactor pressure oscillations, check for mis-operation of TCVs, TBVs, EPR, MPR, ERVs, Recirc Flow.
0 Brief crew on event impact.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 17 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 03: EPR Oscillations Time ROIBOP: Applicant Actions Or Behavior L
0 Recognize/report reactor power and reactor pressure oscillations.
0 Acknowledge direction to perform actions of A2-4-4.
A2-4-4 ACTIONS BOP 0 Observe reactor pressure recorders (1075, 1077) and indicators36-31A, 36-32A on F panel.
RO 0 Lower MPR setpoint (MECHANICAL PRESS REG C/Son E panel rotated CW to lower) until MPR is in control (MPR IN CONTROL light ON, A2-4-4 alarmed).
RO 0 Reference SOP 31.2 0 Recognize/Interpret/Diagnosefailure of the EPR.
Ll Acknowledge direction to place the MPR in control per N1-SOP-31.2.
RO 0 If directed, adjust the MPR control pressure as indicated on MPR SETPOINT PSlG digital indicator until reactor pressure is at the pre-transient pressure as determined by Recorder at F panel 0 Refer to N1-OP-31, Section H.3.0 Operation With One Pressure Requlator Inoperable 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 18 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 03: EPR Oscillations 0 Report reactor power changed by more than 2%, SOP-I .5 (if required) 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 19 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 04 & 05 15 MG Set High Temperature Instructor Activities:
- INITIATION POINT: When directed by the lead evaluator, insert malfunction:
\-
RRSE, Recirc Pump 15 MG Slot Temperature Increase (35% ramp 3 min) (F4)
- If asked to investigate the MG Set high temperature, acknowledge the request.
- If directed as A 0 to check MG Set area ventilation and Turbine Bldg track bay and roll door positions, wait one (1) minute then report ventilation lineup is normal.
- If informed of the MG Set high temperature and removal of RRP 15 from service, acknowledge the report.
SymptondCues Visible To The Crew:
- F2-2-5, REACT RECIRC M-G SET 15
- Computer point A I 30 RRMG 15 GEN SLOT TEMP Critical Task(s) and Justification:
- NONE 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 20 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 04 & 05 15 MG Set High Temperature
+
0 Acknowledge report F2-2-5, REACT RECIRC M-G SET 15, in alarm.
Q Direct actions of F2-2-5,REACT RECIRC M-G SET 15.
0 Direct initial response using N1-OP-I, section F.4.0.
0 When SRO determines RR MG set temp cannot be corrected directs removal of RRP 15 from service (4loop operation) per OP-I H.2.0 and H.3.0.
0 Determines that RRP 15 does NOT require isolation.
0 Verifies 4 Loop thermal limits 0 Verifies P/F Map on E Panel updated to 4 Loop requirements.
0 Brief crew on event impact.
0 Reference TS 3.1.7 and determine that it does NOT apply (100% power good) 2004 NRC SCENARIO # I Page 21 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 04 & 05 15 MG Set High Temperature L.
0 Recognizeheport F2-2-5, REACT RECIRC M-G SET 15, in alarm.
0 Perform F2-2-5 actions.
BOP SOP-1.I, EMERGENCY POWER REDUCTION 0 No action 0 Remove RRP 15 from service (4 loop operation) per OP-I H.2.0 and H.3.0.
BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 22 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 04 & 05 15 MG Set High Temperature 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 23 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 06: Loss of PB 16A lnsfrucfor A cfivifies:
- INITIATION POINT: When directed by the lead evaluator, insert malfunction:
.W ED18, AC Power Board Electrical Fault (PB 16 Section A) (TRUE) (F5)
- If directed as A 0 to check PB 16A for faults report that there is a smokey smell near the PB but no other fault indications.
- If asked as EM to check PB 16A for faults acknowledge the request but delay any response.
- Acknowledge all RBCLC heat exchanger are in service if requested.
- Reposition Instrument Air compressor loading switches as directed.
Sympfons/Cues Visible To The Crew:
Annunciators A4-3-1, A4-4-2 and also (but less important) L1-4-5, L4-3-6 Possibly HI-4-1 Until start of RBCLC 13 Critical Task(s) and Jusfificafion:
- NONE 2004 NRC SCENARIO # I Page 24 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 06: Loss of PB 16A L-O Acknowledge report A4-3-1, POWER BOARD 16 R1041 TRIP, in alarm.
c1 Direct actions of A4-3-1, POWER BOARD 16 R1041 TRIP, in alarm.
c1 Acknowledge report A4-4-2, POWER BOARD LOW BUS VOLTAGE, in alarm.
O Direct actions of A4-4-2, POWER BOARD LOW BUS VOLTAGE, in alarm.
O InterpreffDiagnosethe effects of the loss of three drywell coolers on the Primary Containment 0 Directs starting alternate equipment; Air Compressor and RBCLC Pump.
0 Based on reports from the area of PB 16A does NOT authorize re-energizing PB 16A.
0 Brief crew on event impact.
IC-2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 25 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 06: Loss of PB 16A L
0 Recognize/report A4-3-1, POWER BOARD 16 R1041 TRIP, in alarm.
0 Recognize/report A4-4-2, POWER BOARD LOW BUS VOLTAGE, in alarm.
0 Diagnose loss of power to PB 16A caused by tripping of R1041.
0 Starts alternate equipment as directed; Air Compressor, RBCLC Pump.
0 Monitor Primary Containment parameters.
A4-3-1 Actions BOP 0 Confirm alarm on computer point E138, TRIP.
0 Verify tripped R1041.
0 Dispatch an operator or EM to check for faults on PBIGA.
A4-4-2 Actions BOP 0 Confirm alarm on computer point E152, LOW.
0 Determine PB 11 not tripped.
0 Dispatch an operator or EM to check for faults on PB16A.
0 Notifies SRO of report that there is a smokey smell near PBI 6A but no other fault indications.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 26 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 06: Loss of PB 16A
--e-Nl-0P-l lActions BOP 0 Start REC standby pump.
0 Venting IS NOT required.
0 Confirm system pressure AND pump amps indicate system is stable.
P BOP L'
2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 27 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 07: Seismic Event with Torus Water Leak Instructor Acfivifies:
- INlTlATlON PQINT: When directed by the lead evaluator, insert malfunction:
PC05, Seismic Event (remain active 30 seconds)(F6)
PC04, Torus Leak (8% ramp 8 minute) (F6)
- When directed, acknowledge request to walkdown Core Spray; ECs, Batteries 11 & 12, Containment Spray, CRD/FW, EDGs
- If requested, wait 3 minutes and report that water can be heard through the torus watertight door.
Sympfons/Cues Visible To The Crew:
H2-1-6 Seismic Detection Equipment Event K3-3-1 Torus Water Level High-Low Crifical Task(s) and Justification:
NONE
\--
2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 28 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 07: Seismic Event with Torus Water Leak 0 Acknowledge report of Annunciator , H2-1-6 Seismic Detection Equipment Event 0 Direct actions of SOP-28 0 Directs action of, H2-1-6 Seismic Detection Equipment Event 0 When the SRO determines there is a leak from the torus (primary containment) then directs a scram per the Transient Mitigation Guidelines (TMG).
NOTE: The SRO may enter EOP-4 and initiate torus makeup prior to directing a scram if they do not comply with the guidance in or incorrectly apply the guidance in the TMG.
Per TMG 2.4.2.I: When faced with a lowering suppression pool level, a scram should be ordered as soon as possible due to a loss of primary containment and potential loss of suppression pressure.
0 Enter and execute EOP-4, Primary Containment Control (see below).
0 Evaluate EAL Classification (UE 8.4.1 earthquake based on consensus of operators and confirmation) 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 29 of 49 November 2004
~~ ~~
EVENT 07: Seismic Event with Torus Water Leak C'
EMERGENCY EVENT CLASSI FICAT1ON Evaluate EAL matrix for reportability (8.4.1 earthquake based on concensus of operators and confirmation) 0 Brief crew on event.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 30 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 07: Seismic Event with Torus Water Leak
+
0 Recognize H2-1-6SEISMIC DETECTION EQUIPMENT EVENT in alarm.
BOP BOP BOP BOP ALL SRO RO BOP BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 31 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 07: Seismic Event with Torus Water Leak Time ROIBOP: Applicant Actions Or Behavior BOP 0 Identify lowering torus water level 0 Monitor containment parameters Cl Carry out action of EOP-1 Attach 18 RO 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 32 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 07:Seismic Event with Torus Water Leak 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 33 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 07: Seismic Event with Torus Water Leak 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 34 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 08 & 09: Leak In Drywell, FWPII Trip, HPCl Mode Failure to Initiate 12 Instructor Activities:
- INITIATION POINT:
u- When the reactor is scrammed - Insert F7 PC04, Torus leak (35% ramp 1 minute, relative to F6, TUA is 6 min 30 sec after the reactor is scrammed) (F7)
RR29, Recirculation Loop Rupture (15%, 13 minute ramp, TUA 1 min)(F7)
FW03A, FW Pump Trip 11 (TRUE)(F7)
When the operator starts Containment Spray Pump 1II Insert (F8)
CTOIA, Containment Spray Pump Trip 111 (TRUE) (F8)
SvmptonsKues Visible To The Crew:
- K2-4-3, DRYWELL PRESSURE HIGH-LOW alarm clears and then alarms
- L1-4-4, HI DRYWELL TEMP, alarm.
- Rising drywell pressure on panel indicators and process computer indication.
- Rising drywell humidity on panel indicator.
- Lowering reactor water level on panel indicators.
Critical Task(s) and Justification:
L/
01 Maintain RPV water level above two-thirds core height (-132 inches) using high pressure systems.
02 Depressurize the reactor when it is determined torus water level cannot be maintained above 8 feet 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 35 of 49 November 2004
~
~
EVENT 08 & 09: Leak In Drywell, F W P l l Trip, HPCl Mode Failure to Initiate 12 Time SRO: Applibnt Actions Or Behavior 0 Acknowledge report of torus water level continuing to lower.
0 Direct a reactor scram and concurrent entry into SOP-I, Reactor Scram.
0 Acknowledge report of rising Primary Containment pressure.
0 Acknowledge report of Annunciator K2-4-3, DRYWELL PRESSURE HIGH-LOW 0 Enter and execute EOP-2, RPV Control (see below).
0 Re-Enter and execute EOP-4, Primary Containment Control (see below).
0 As torus level lowers will enter and execute EOP-8, RPV Blowdown 0 Direct Spraying the Containment per EOP 1 Attachment 17.
0 Evaluate EAL matrix for reportability (ALERT per 3.1 .IDrywell pressure cannot be maintained less than 3.5 psig)
CT-I 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 36 of 49 November 2004
~~
EVENT 08 & 09: Leak In Drywell, F W P I I Trip, HPCl Mode Failure to Initiate 12 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 37 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 08 & 09: Leak In Drywell, F W P I I Trip, HPCl Mode Failure to Initiate 12 NOTE: The SRO may anticipate RPV blowdown if torus makeup is not successful in stopping the lowering torus water level..
Per TMG 1.2.3.4: Torus level lowering, reactor scrammed, EOP-2 entered, and MSIVs are open. The lineup to add water to the suppression pool is complete and level continues to lower or the leak exceeds the available makeup sources and the leak cannot be isolated.
CT-2 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 38 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 08 & 09: Leak In Drywell, F W P I I Trip, HPCl Mode Failure to Initiate 12 EMERGENCY EVENT CLASSI FICATION 0 Evaluate EAL matrix for reportability (3.1 .IDrywell pressure cannot be maintained less than 3.5 psig) 0 Brief crew on event.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 39 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 08 & 09: Leak In Drywell, F W P I I Trip, HPCl Mode Failure to Initiate 12 0 Report Torus Level still lowering 0 Acknowledge direction/Manuallyinitiate a reactor scram R Place REACTOR Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN 0 Reduce RECIRC MASTER flow to 25 - 43 x 1O6 Ib/hr.
0 Confirm Reactor SCRAM.
0 RESET HPCl if initiation signal is present and FWP 11 or 12 tripped.
R Recognize/ report reactor coolant leak.
0 Report Primary Containment pressure CANNOT be maintained below 3.5 psig.
RPV CONTROL ACTIONS:
0 Acknowledge RPV level be maintained +53 to +95.
0 Recognize FWP 11 Trip 0 Recognize HPCl Failure to Initiate 0 Acknowledge install jumpers to bypass Core Spray IV interlocks (see EOP I Attachment 4 below).
RQ 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 40 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 08 & 09: Leak In Drywell, F W P l l Trip, HPCl Mode Failure to Initiate 12 BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 41 of 49 November 2004
~~~~~~ ~
EVENT 08 & 09: Leak In Drywell, F W P I I Trip, HPCl Mode Failure to Initiate 12 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL ACTIONS:
c3 Acknowledge direction to lockout of all containment spray pumps.
LOCKOUT CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS RO 0 Place Containment Spray Pumps 111, 112, 121, 122 in PTL.
0 Acknowledge direction to install the Core Spray Jumpers RO h d 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 42 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 08 & 09: Leak In Drywell, F W P I I Trip, HPCl Mode Failure to Initiate 12 0 In anticipation of Blowdown acknowledge direction to rapidly depressurize using ECs and main turbine bypass valve.
BOP 0 Open 39-05 EC Condensate Return Isolation Valve 11 0 Open 39-06 EC Condensate Return Isolation Valve 12 0 Open BP valves using the By-Pass Opening Jack 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 43 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 10: Loss of Containment Spray Subsystem lnsfructor Activifies:
- I N I T ~ A T I ~POINT:
N When directed by the lead evaluator, insert malfunction:
.- CTOIA, Containment Spray Pump Trip 111 (TRUE) (F8)
SympfonsKues Visible To The Crew:
- Containment Spray Pump Trip.
Critical Task(s) and Justification:
NONE 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 44 of 49 November 2004
EVENT I O : Loss of Containment Spray Subsystem
.-Ld-0 Acknowledge report of rising Primary Containment pressure and Temperature.
0 Direct Spraying the Containment per EOP 1 Attachment 17.
0 Brief crew on event.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 45 of 49 November 2004
EVENT 10: Loss of Containment Spray Subsystem L-O Report containment parameters as desired by SRO. Report when torus:
0 temperature reaches 150°F.
Cl pressure reaches 13 psig.
0 Acknowledge direction to initiate containment spray.
RQ 0 Monitors drywell pressure and secures containment sprays (place running pumps in PTL) if drywell pressure lowers below 3.5 psig.
0 Lines up low pressure feedwater and ECCS injections systems as needed to maintain RPV water level between 53 and 95 inches.
L-2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 46 of 49 November 2004
V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE (Not required for Annual Operating Exam or NRC Initial Exam)
-. A. After the second caucus, convene the crew in the classroom for a facilitative critique:
- 1. What the crew saw and how they responded to each event?
- 2. Why the crew responded the way they did or their goal?
- 3. What went well during the scenario (STRENGTHS)?
- 4. What the crew could have done better (AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT)?
B. Ensure the expectations in each performance objective are discussed.
C. PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS (Attachment 7), that were not met, should be addressed.
D. Review the Critical Tasks if applicable.
E. At the conclusion, review the strengths and areas for improvement for improvement.
Review video tape if appropriate.
F. Significant comments from the post scenario discussion should be recorded to allow later retrieval and follow-up.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 47 of 49 November 2004
VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events L/
None B. Commitments None VII. LESSONS LEARNED None 2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 48 of 49 November 2004
EVALUATED SCENARIO CHECKLIST
- 1. Additional Information about these checks:
L--
For continuing training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 604 and Appendix D.
For initial training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 301 and Appendix D.
- 2. Qualitative Attributes 4 Realism/Credibility 4 Event Sequencing 4 Simulator Modeling 4 Evaluating Crew Competencies 3.
5 I Total Malfunctions 2 IMalfunctions after EOP Entry I 4 IAbnormal Events I 2 Major Transients
-- 2 1
100 I
EOPsUsed I EOP Contingency Procedures Used Simulator Run Time 30 IEOP Run Time 2 Crew Critical Tasks (if applicable per Attachment 6.)
4.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #I Page 49 of 49 November 2004
NRC EXAM L--' Amendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 - N The crew will perform Nl-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test, quarterly surveillance on the EC Loop I 1 IVs SRo per Section 8.1. After several valves are tested one valve will fail to indicate full open (dual indication). ST-Q4, Tech Specs DER-NM-2004-2578, Valve Failed To Indica& Open When Stroke Timed 2 ECOGA, C The crew will respond to ECI 1 vent radiation monitor alarms and Emergency Condenser diagnose that a tube leak exists. The crew will isolate ECI 1 to stop the Tube Leak release.
111 (100%;
ARP KI-1-2, EAL MATRIX, Tech Specs, OP-I3 H.lO.O
--., ramp 5 minutes) 3 MS08, C The crew will respond to a failure of the steam supply to the second Second stage reheater. The unbalanced condition requires isolating second Stage Reheaters stage reheaters.
SRO 112 Steam Supply ARPA2-3-5, SOP-1.1, OP-41 H.7.0 Closes 4 TU02, Main R The unbalanced condition on the main turbine results in turbine Turbine Hi vibration. If power is not lowered in response to the turbine vibration, it Vibration Ro will be lowered to 80% to allow isolation of the second stage reheaters.
Bearing #5 SRO and #6 SOP-37. I (53%; no TU02, Main 5 Turbine Hi M The main turbine vibration degrades. Because of the rising turbine Vib Bearing vibration, the crew will insert a manual reactor scram and trip the main
- 5 and #6 ALL turbine.
(90%; no ramp) SOP-I, SOP-31.3 t-3of8 NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
NRC EXAM RP05A,B M ATWS. When the crew scrams the reactor control rods fail to insert RPS A/B requiring actions for an ATWS with power about 25%. Crew will be failure to ALL able to manually insert control rods using RMCS. Manual scrams will scram be successful in inserting control rods but repetitive scrams will be RP09 required.
ARVATWS air header N I -SO P-I, N 1-EOP-2, N I-0P-3, N 1-EOP-4, N I -EOP-I exhaust port blocked PRA: Execufe EOP-3.1.
RD33A-E Control Rod Bank Block 1 2, 3.4, 5 I
Position 48,24,48, 24,48 MCOl , Main C Loss of main condenser vacuum. Loss of main condenser as a heat Condenser Air In- sink. Challenge HCTL.
Leakage ALL (100%; N I-EOP-3 ramp 2 minutes)
LPOINB C The crew will be required to respond to a failure of the liquid poison LP11/ I 2 pump to continue to run once started. Shortly after one LP pump is pump trip BOP started (1-2 seconds) it will trip requiring the crew to start the other pump.
Nl-OP-72; H.1.0 PRA: lnjecf poison solution info fhe reactor vessel.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor I TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES (PER SCENARIO; SEE SECTION D.5.d)
I 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) I 5 I I I 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) I 2 I I
(SOP-31.IEV 4)
I 4. Major transients (1-2) I 2 I I I 5. EOPs enteredlrequiring substantive actions (1-2) I 2 I (EOP-3 EV6/7) (EOP-4 EV6R) I I 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) I 1 I (EOP-3.1 EV6) ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ ~
~~
I
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 3 i.-
4of8 NUREG-I 021, Draft Revision 9
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2, REV. 0 Nl-ST-Q4 OPERABILITY TEST ON EMERGENCY CONDENSER (EC) LOOP 11 ISOLATION VALVES, EMERGENCY CONDENSER (EC)11 TUBE LEAK, LOSS OF 2nd STAGE REHEAT WITH TURBINE VIBRATION, INCREASED VIBRATION WITH LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM, ATWS, LIQUID POISON FAILURE FOR FIRST SYSTEM INITIATED PREPARER P. Ballard/D.Wandschneider DATE 10/08/2004 VALIDATED Meier, RabalaiMalker, DATE 08/04/2004 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING 0PERATlONS MANAGER DATE CONFIGURAT1ON CONTROL NA - EXAMINATION SECURITY DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 60 minutes The crew assumes the shift with the plant operating at rated conditions and Containment Spray Pump 112 removed from service for maintenance. The crew will perform Nl-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test, on the Emergency Condenser (EC) Loop 11 Isolation Valves (IVs) per Section 8.1. This test consists of stoke time tests and when the third valve is tested (05-11, EMERG COND VENT ISOLATION VALVE 112) its open to close stroke test is acceptable but its close to open stroke test will fail to indicate full open (dual indication) because of a defective limit switch. In addition to the TS LCO for performing the surveillance, the SRO must assess the TS for a failed EC vent to the torus.
When the surveillance on the EC Loop 11 IVs is addressed, the crew will respond to ECI 1 vent radiation monitor alarms and determine based on confirmed alarms and rising shell water level that a tube leak exists. The crew will isolate ECI 1 to stop the release. The SRO reviews Tech Specs and determines with ECI 1 inoperable Tech Spec 3.1-3.b applies. ECI 1 must be restored to operable within 7 days and the makeup level control valve and motor operated isolation valves for EC12 are tested immediately and daily thereafter. However, with a confirmed EC Tube Leak a plant shutdown is required. SRO should also assess EPIP-EPP-01, Attachment 1, EAL Matrix and determine the effluent monitoring threshold has not been reached by referencing Category 5.1.I, 5.1.2 and Table 3. The SRO should assess EOP entry conditions for EOP-5, Secondary Containment Control and EOP-6, Radioactivty Release L. Control and determine entry is not required.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 1 of 41 November 2004
When EC Loop 11 is isolated and related actions are complete, the crew will respond to a failure of the steam supply to the second stage reheater which results in an unbalanced w condition on the main turbine and a turbine high vibration condition. This will require lowering power to 80% and isolating second stage reheaters. When the second stage reheaters are isolated the main turbine vibration condition degrades. The crew will insert a manual reactor scram and trip the main turbine.
When the crew inserts a reactor scram, many control rods fail to insert. Because of the degradation of the main condenser vacuum, the main condenser will only be available as a heat sink for a short period of time after the scram before the MSlVs close. The crew will terminate and prevent injection to lower reactor water level and suppress reactor power. When the main condenser is lost as a heat sink, the crew will maintain reactor pressure using the ERVs and the available emergency condenser and will place torus cooling in service. Because of the rising torus water temperature the crew will inject Liquid Poison (LP). When the first Liquid Poison Pump is started, it will trip approximately two (2) seconds later requiring recognition of its failure and starting the other LP Pump. The SRO will direct the actions of EOP-3 and EOP-4 including alternate control rod insertion per EOP-3.1. The crew will be able to insert control rods using the Reactor Manual Control System (RMCS) and manual reactor scrams will be successful in inserting some rods. When reactor water level injection has been terminated and prevented, LP injected, torus cooling placed in service, and control rods are being inserted using RMCS, all contributing to remaining within the HCTL, the scenario will be terminated. If actions are not timely the SRO may be required to reduce the pressure control band to remain within the heat capacity temperature limit.
Major Procedures:
b EAL Classification: EAL 2.2.2: SITE AREA EMERGENCY Termination Criteria: All control rods inserted, EOP-3 exited, EOP-2 entered and crew directed to restore reactor water level restored to 53-95.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 2 of 41 November 2004
I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC25 u
B. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. ECOGA, Emergency Condenser Tube Leak 111 (100%; ramp 5 minutes) (F3)
- b. MS08, Second Stage Reheaters 112 Steam Supply Valve Closes (TRUE) (F5)
- c. TU02, Main Turbine High Vibration Bearing #5 and #6 (53%; no ramp) (F5)
- d. TU02, Main Turbine High Vibration Bearing #5 and #6 (90%; no ramp) ( W NOTE: TU02 (F6) is a relative of TU02 (F5)
- e. MCOI, Main Condenser Air In-Leakage (100%; ramp 4 minutes) (F6)
- f. LPOIA, Liquid Poison Pump Trip 11 (TRUE) (F7)
- g. LPOIB, Liquid Poison Pump Trip 12 (TRUE) (F8)
- h. RD33A, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 1 (36.000) (QUEUED)
- i. RD33B, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 2 (18.000) (QUEUED)
- j. RD33C, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 3 (40.000) (QUEUED)
- k. RD33D, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 4 (20.000) (QUEUED)
- 1. RD33E, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 5 (38.000) (QUEUED)
- 2. Remotes:
- a. FW24, Removal of HPCl Fuses F08/F09 (PULL) (F9)
- 3. Overrides:
- a. 09DS300-LO-G-025-15 (K-9panel pg 18 of 19) EC Vent Isolation Vlv 112 green (on) (F4)
Training Composite (as required)
- 4. Annunciators:
Training Annunciator Composite (as required)
C. Equipment Out of Service Containment Spray I12 - Red Clearance D. Support Documentation None E. Miscellaneous None 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 3 of 41 November 2004
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
0 Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SSS, ASSS, STA, CSO, CRE)
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
0 Shift Supervisor Log (SSS, ASSS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SSS, ASSS, STA) 0 Lit Control Room Annunciators 0 Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
0 Reactor Power = 100% 0 Loadline = 103%
0 #I 12 Containment Spray Pump 00s for repair. TS 3.3.7.b (day 1 of 15 day LCO).
0 Perform N l -ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test, for EC Looo 11 IVs oer Section 8.1.
PART 111: RemarkslPlanned Evolutions:
Maintenance continues to work on Containment Sr,rav Pumr, # I 12.
PART IV: To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
Review new Clearances (SSS) Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SSWASSS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME sss CRE/OATC 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 4 of 41 November 2004
Scenario ID# 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 VSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other Options?
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 5 of 41 November 2004
Ill. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
v 01 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power generation and Torus water temperature approaching I IOOF, the crew will utilize Boron injection, Torus cooling, control rod insertion, and RPVpressure control to preclude violation of the HCTL in accordance with EOP-3.
BASIS: Improper performance or omission of these actions contributes to violation of the HCTL.
02 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power above 6% or unknown and RPV water level above -41 inches, terminate and prevent all injection except Boron and CRD in accordance with EOP-I, Aft. 24, WITHIN FIVE (5) MINUTES OR THE CONDITIONS BEING MET.
NOTE: The five (5) minute time starts when the MSlVs close following the reactor scram.
Per the PRA insights, for ATWS scenarios including the loss of the main condenser as a heat sink, the power generated into the core is relieved to the suppression pool. This reduces the time frame for accomplishing important operator actions to reduce power production and mitigate the sequence by initiating liquid poison. It is assumed that the immediate actuation of liquid poison is considered inadequate to avoid exceeding the HCTL. Because of the high rate of heat addition to the containment it is judged that the operator has no more than 5 minutes to reduce core power by implementing the level/power control procedure, and avoid reaching HCTL. Therefore, the operator must lower RPV water level to reduce the power generated in the core within 5 minutes.
03 Given reactor water level intentionally lowered per EOP-3, the crew will utilize preferred injection sources to maintain RPV water level above -709 inches (corrected) when either reactor power is <6% or all ERVs will remain closed with Drywell pressure <3.5psig or vessel level is at the top of active fuel -84 (corrected).
BASIS: Improper performance or omission of these actions contributes to degradation to a barrier to fission product release by challenging the fuel cladding integrity. If the crew is unable to establish and maintain level above -1 09 inches (corrected) then EOP-3 requires a blowdown. By the time reactor pressure lowers to 365 psig which is the pressure at which the core spray IVs open, reactor water level will already be below two-thirds core height (-132 inches) before low pressure systems are able to inject. Per the Tech Spec bases for fuel cladding integrity, during the periods when the reactor is shutdown, if the water level should drop below the top of active fuel the ability to cool the core is reduced. This reduction in core cooling capability could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and cladding perforation. The core will be cooled sufficiently to prevent clad melting should the water level be reduced to two-thirds core height.
\--
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 6 of 41 November 2004
B. Performance Objectives:
EVENT PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE
>-d 01 Given a quarterly surveillance for Reactor Coolant Isolation Valves, the crew will recognize the failure of a valve to operate correctly IAW NI-ST-Q4.
02 Given a valid EC vent radiation monitor alarm, the crew will respond IAW the ARPs, N1-OP-13.
Given the plant in a condition requiring emergency classifications, the crew shall classify the events properly, complete initial notification forms and discuss the bases for the classification in accordance with the emergency plan procedure.
03 Given a failure of the steam supply to the second stage reheater, the crew will respond to the unbalanced condition IAW N1-OP-41.
04 & 05 Given a high main turbine bearing vibration, the crew will take actions necessary to protect the turbine IAW with N1-OP-31, N1-SOP-31.1 and N1-SOP-I.
06 & 07 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power generation the crew insert control rods using the RMCS and repetitive scrams IAW N1-EOP-3 and N1-EOP-3.1 L
Given an ATWS condition accompanied by a loss of the Main Condenser, the crew recognize the Challenge to HCTL and Inject liquid poison IAW N1-OP-I 2 08 Given a Trip of a liquid poison pump, the crew will recognize the trip and start the second pump IAW N1-0P-I 2 Generic Given the plant in a condition requiring emergency classifications, the crew shall classify the events properly, complete initial notification forms and discuss the bases for the classification in accordance with the emergency plan procedure.
Given the plant or plant system in a condition requiring Technical Specification action, identify the deviation and any required actionshotifications.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 7 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 01 : N1-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test, for EC Loop I 1 IVs per Section 8.1.
Instructor Activities:
.d
- Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walk down and briefing. Allow up to 5 minutes to walk down panels and perform annunciator checks.
- Ensure the following is activated:
- When 05-11 is closed, override open indication EC VENT ISOL VLV 112 green (F4)
- INITIATlON POINT:The initiation point for this event is when the EC VENT ISOL VLV 112 is stroked shut and receives its closed indication.
- If asked as the FIN team or as Maintenance to investigate, wait three (3) minute then report it appears that the limit switch is damaged.
S ymptons/Cues Visible To The Crew:
- NOT APPLICABLE Critical Task(s) and Justification:
- NONE
\-
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 8 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 01 : Nl-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test, for EC Loop 11 IVs per Section 8.1, 0 Walk down panels prior to assuming shift.
Q Conduct shift turnover brief.
0 Assume the shift.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 9 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 01 : N1-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test, Time SRO: Applicant Actions Or Behavior
.~
LJ 0 Brief crew on impact.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 10 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 01 : N1-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test, for EC Loop 1IIVs per Section 8.1.
0 Walk down panels prior to assuming shift.
0 Participate in and ensure understanding of shift turnover brief.
BOP NOTE: Per Test Methods 4.15 ;Stroke times are measured to at least a tenth of a second for stroke times of 10 seconds or less. Full stroke times of longer than 10 seconds are measured to at least the nearest second. Full stroke time is that interval from the initiation of the actuating signal to the end of the actuating cycle indication.
NOTE: Per Test Methods 4.1.8; Valve position indication is demonstrated in the open to close direction by observing a red light only, THEN a red and green light lit, THEN only a green light lit. Satisfactory valve position indication is demonstrated in the close to open direction, by observing a green light only, THEN a green and red light lit, THEN only a red light lit.
NOTE: Per Test Methods 4.1.11; Independent verification may be performed after the completion of Section 8.1, except those marked by an asterisk (*). Those marked by an asterisk must be performed in the order they appear in the test.
(See next page for valve test steps) 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 11 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 01 : N1-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test,
'v NOTE: F I 2 and F I 7 are expected alarms during the test.
BOP BOP BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 12 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 02: Emergency Condenser I 1 Tube Leak Instrucfor Activities:
- INITIATION POINT: When directed by the lead evaluator, insert malfunction:
u ECOGA, Emergency Condenser Tube Leak 111 (100%; ramp 5 minutes) (F3)
- If asked as Chemistry to perform sampling and/or EC Effluent Dose Assessment, acknowledge the request.
- If informed of the EC tube leak, acknowledge the report.
- IF asked as RP to evaluate dose rates on 340 el RB, wait one (1) minute and report highly elevated dose rates are observed in the area.
SympfonsKues Visible To The Crew:
- K1-1-2, EMER COND VENT 11 RAD MONITOR, alarms.
- EMERG COND RMON 111 and EMERG COND RMON 112 on J panel in alarm and radiation levels rising.
- NOTE: If ECI 1 is not isolated based on confirmed radiation levels and rising shell water level, then EMER COND 111-112 LEVEL HIGH-LOW, will alarm on high level in approximately five (5) minutes.
Critical Task(sj and Justification:
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 13 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 02: Emergency Condenser 11 Tube Leak 0 Acknowledge report K1-1-2, EMER COND VENT II RAD MONITOR, in alarm.
0 Direct actions of K1-1-2, EMER COND VENT 11 RAD MONITOR.
CI Diagnose ECI 1 tube leak (rising EC vent radiation levels and rising EC water level).
0 Direct EC 11 be isolated.
SHUTDOWN DETERMINATION 0 Request Chemistry to perform sampling AND EC Effluent Dose Assessment 0 IF an EC tube leak is confirmed perform shutdown actions in accordance N1-OP-13 H.IO.0 CZI Brief crew on event impact.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 14 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 02: Emergency Condenser 11 Tube Leak L-O Recognize/report K1-1-2, EMER COND VENT 11 RAD MONITOR, in alarm.
0 Recognizelreport rising water level in ECI 1.
0 Diagnose ECI 1 tube leak (rising EC vent radiation levels and rising EC water level).
0 Acknowledge direction to perform actions of K1-1-2.
BOP 0 Reference N1-OP-13, H.lO.O N1-OP-13, H.1O.O ACTIONS RO 0 IF an EC Tube Leak is confirmed, THEN initiate normal shutdown in accordance with N1-OP-43C.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 15 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 03 & 4: Second Stage Reheat Loss I Main Turbine Vibration Instructor Activities:
- INITIATION POINT: When directed by the lead evaluator, insert malfunction:
u MS08, Second Stage Reheaters 112 Steam Supply Valve Closes (TRUE) (F5)
TU02, Main Turbine High Vibration Bearing #5 and #6 (53%; no ramp) (F5)
- If asked as maintenance or WEC to investigate, acknowledge the request.
- If reports to management personnel are received, acknowledge the reports.
Symptons/Cues Visible To The Crew:
- A2-3-5, TURBINE SUPERVISORY SYSTEM, in alarm.
- Computer points B444 (BRG #5) and B445 (BRG #6) in alarm
- ARP A2-3-5 directs investigation of the reheater system alignment and to equalize heating to both sides of the LP turbine if unbalanced.
Critical Task(s) and Justification:
- NONE 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page I 6 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 03 & 4: Second Stage Reheat Loss I Main Turbine Vibration 0 Acknowledge report A2-3-5, TURBINE SUPERVISORY SYSTEM, in alarm.
0 Acknowledge report that process computer alarms and vibration recorder show vibration indicated on bearing #5 and #6.
0 Direct actions of A2-3-5, TURBINE SUPERVISORY SYSTEM.
0 Diagnose cause is closure of Second Stage Reheaters 112 Steam Supply Valve.
0 Direct a power reduction per SOP-1.I, Emergency Power Reduction.
S O P 4 .I, Emergency Power Reduction 0 Direct a power reduction to at least 80% or lower using recirc flow.
0 Brief crew on event impact.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 17 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 03 & 4: Second Stage Reheat Loss I Main Turbine Vibration 0 Recognize/report A2-3-5, TURBINE SUPERVISORY SYSTEM, in alarm.
0 Recognize/report process computer alarms and vibration recorder shows vibration for bearing #5 and #6 at approximately 8.5 mils.
0 Acknowledge direction to perform action of A2-3-5.
0 Diagnose cause is closure of Second Stage Reheaters 112 Steam Supply Valve.
RO RO BOP BOP BOP BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 18 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 03 & 4: Second Stage Reheat Loss I Main Turbine Vibration v
0 Report 2"d stage reheaters removed from service.
0 Monitor turbine vibration for degrading or improving conditions.
RO 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page I 9 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 05: Lowering Main Condenser Vacuum / Turbine Vibration Degrades Instructor A ctivifies:
- INITIATION POINT: When directed by the lead evaluator, insert malfunction:
\---
TU02, Main Turbine High Vibration Bearing #5 and #6 (goo/,; no ramp)
MCOI, Main Condenser Air ln-Leakage (100%; ramp 4 minutes)
- If asked as maintenance or WEC to investigate, acknowledge the request.
If reports to management personnel are received, acknowledge the reports.
- After Scram is reset the first time DELETE malfunctions RD 33A & RD 33D.
- After Scram is reset the second time DELETE malfunctions RD 33B, RD 33C, RD 33E allowing the remainder of the rods to insert.
SymptondCues Visible To The Crew:
- Computer points 6444 (BRG #5) and B445 (BRG #6) vibration degrading.
- Turbine vibration recorder BRG #5 and BRG #6 vibration degrading.
- Per ARP A2-3-5: 12 mils require immediate trip.
- Lowering main condenser vacuum indicator on the process computer.
Critical Task(s) and Justification:
- NONE 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 20 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 05: Lowering Main Condenser Vacuum I Turbine Vibration Degrades h-0 Acknowledge report vibration is rising and vacuum is lowering; 12 mils require immediate removal of the turbine from service.
0 Direct a reactor scram and entry into SOP-1, Reactor Scram.
0 Direct a turbine trip and entry into SOP-31.I, Turbine Trip.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 21 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 05: Lowering Main Condenser Vacuum / Turbine Vibration Degrades
\ >
Time RO/BOP: Applicant Actions Or Behavior W
0 Recognize/report vibration is rising and vacuum is lowering; 12 mils require immediate removal of the turbine from service.
0 Acknowledge direction to scram the reactor (SOP-I, Reactor Scram: see below)
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 22 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 05: Lowering Main Condenser Vacuum I Turbine Vibration Degrades
.+-
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 23 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 06 & 07 : ATWS and Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum Instructor Activities:
- Ensure following are QUEUED
'v RD33A, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 1 (48.000) (QUEUED)
RD33B, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 2 (24.000) (QUEUED)
RD33C, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 3 (48.000) (QUEUED)
RD33D, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 4 (24.000) (QUEUED)
RD33E, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 5 (48.000) (QUEUED)
- INITIATION POINT: There is no initiation point for the ATWS (preset conditions).
- OVERRlDE POINT: if requested to remove HPCl fuses, wait one (1) minute then insert the following override, and then report HPCl fuses removed:
FW24, Removal of HPCl Fuses F08/F09 (PULL) (F9)
- OVERRIDE POINT: if requested to remove RPS fuses, wait four (4) minutes then insert the following remotes, and then report RPS fuses removed:
RP05-RP14 (NOTRIGGER)
- OVERRIDE POINT: if requested to vent the scram air header, wait fifteen (15) minutes and then insert the following malfunction, and then report scram air header is venting.
RD34 (loo%, ramp is 15 minutes) (NOTRIGGER)
- If reports to management personnel are received, acknowledge the reports.
Symptons/Cues Visible To The Crew:
-\-= - Full core display numeric positions indicate 24 or 48 for most control rods.
- Indicated reactor power is approximately 30%.
- Lowering main condenser vacuum indicator on the process computer.
Critical Task(s) and Justification:
01 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power generation and Torus water temperature approaching 77OoF, the crew will utilize Boron injection, Torus cooling, control rod insertion, deliberately lowering reactor water level, and RPVpressure control to preclude violation of the HCTL in accordance With EOP-3.
02 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power above 6% or unknown and RPV water level above -41 inches, terminate and prevent all injection except Boron and CRD in accordance with EOP-7, Aft. 24, WITHIN FIVE (5) MINUTES OR THE CONDITIONS BEING MET.
NOTE: The five (5) minute time starts when the MSlVs close following the reactor scram.
03 Given reactor water level intentionally lowered per EOP-3, the crew will utilize preferred injection sources to maintain RPV water level above -709 inches when either reactor power is <6% or all ERVs will remain closed with Drywell pressure <3.5 psig or vessel level is at the top of active fuel (-84'3.
'L 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 24 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 06 & 07 : ATWS and Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum Time SRO: Appliknt Actions Or Behavior 0 Acknowledge report control rods failed to insert (ATWS).
0 Enter EOP-2, RPV Control (see below) then exit and go to EOP-3, Failure to Scram (see below).
0 Enter and execute EOP-4, Primary Containment Control when torus temp reaches 85°F (see below).
EOP-2, RPV CONTROL 0 Answer all rods in to at least 0 4 NO.
0 Answer will the reactor stay shutdown without boron NO.
0 Exit EOP-2 and Enter EOP-3 (see below) 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 25 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 06 & 07 : ATWS and Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 26 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 06 & 07 : ATWS and Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum EXIT FROM EOP-3 0 If all rods in then:
0 Direct stopping LP injection.
0 Exit EOP-3 and Enter EOP-2 (see below).
EOP-2, RPV CONTROL 0 Direct restoring level to +53 to +95using Cond/FW and CRD.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 27 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 06 & 07 : ATWS and Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum EMERGENCY EVENT CLASSIFICATION 0 Evaluate EAL matrix for reportability (initially ALERT per 2.2.1 and based on inability to insert control rods with manual reactor scrams then SITE AREA EMERGENCY per2.2.2.)
c1 Brief crew on event.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 28 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 06 & 07 : ATWS and Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum 0 Recognize/ report all control rods not inserted: ATWS.
0 When directed bypass ADS and report ADS bypassed.
ADS INHIBIT BOP 0 Place ADS CH 11 keylock to BYPASS.
0 Place ADS CH 121 keylock to BYPASS.
0 When directed prevent Core Spray injection per EOP-1, Attachment 4.
RQ 0 Verify containment isolations per SOP-40.2 when RPV level reaches low-low level
(+5)or main condenser vacuum reaches 7 in hg.
0 If directed install MSlV jumpers per EOP-1, Attachment 2 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 29 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 06 & 07 : ATWS and Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum RO 0 When directed terminate and prevent injection using EOP-1, Attachment 24.
CT-2 L- BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 30 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 06 & 07 : ATWS and Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum 0 Inform SRO when level reaches target level (-41 corrected) as directed by SRO.
0 Inform SRO when power ~ 6 % RPV level reaches TAF (-84 inches corected).
0 When directed establish injection and maintain level between -1 0 9 (corrected) and corrected level it was lowered to using Cond/FW.
0 Monitor and report if 600 gallons boron injected (800 gallons in LP tank).
D Monitor and report if all rods inserted to 04.
D When directed to restore level to +53 to + 9 5 using CondlFW see actions above.
+-
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 31 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 06 & 07 : ATWS and Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum
'W' 0 When directed initiate ARI.
BOP 0 Depress MANUAL ARI pushbutton
~
c1 When directed trip RRP 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15.
BOP 0 Place REACTOR RP MOTOR 11 (12) (13) (14) (15) MG SET control switches to STOP.
0 When directed perform EOP-3.1, Section 3 (driving rods) and 4 (manual scrams).
RO 0 Verify a CRD Pump running.
0 Reactor Mode Switch to REFUEL.
Both SECTION 3 uire the following actions DEFEAT ARI 0 Place ARI OVERRIDE switch in OVERRIDE.
INSERT RPS SCRAM PASS JUMPERS EOP toolbox at SM desk.
mpers at EOP ISOLATION BYP en I N l A a n d INIB):
0 RELAY 11K51B 0 Jumper 6: BYPAS TO RELAY 11K52B 0 Jumper 12: BYPASS RELA 0 RELAY 11K51B RESET SCRAM L- 0 Depress Ch 11 and 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 32 of 41 November 2004
~ ~~~ ~~ -~ -
EVENT 06 & 07 : ATWS and Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum 0 Monitor and report when torus temperature reaches 85°F.
0 When directed to inject liquid poison (Go to event 06, LP Pump Trip).
0 Monitor and report when all rods inserted to 04.
0 When directed to stop liquid poison injection.
STOP LIQUID POISON INJECTION (OP-12 G.0)
BOP 0 Place keylock switch to OFF.
0 Confirm GREEN LIGHT ON and RED LIGHT OFF for pump started.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 33 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 06 & 07 : ATWS and Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum 0 When directed place containment spray pumps 111, 112, 121, 122 in PTL.
LOCKOUT CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS BOP 0 Place Containment Spray Pumps 111, 121, 121, 122 in PTL.
0 When directed to prevent Core Spray injection:
RO 0 Report containment parameters as desired by SRO: drywell and torus pressures and temperatures. Report when torus temperature reaches 85°F.
0 When directed to initiate torus cooling.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 34 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 06 & 07 : ATWS and Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 35 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 08: LP Pump Trip Instructor Activities:
- INITfATION POINT: When Liquid Poison is started, two (2) seconds later insert the
'v' applicable malfunction below to trip the pump that was started. If the other pump is started, do not trip it.
IF SYS 11 initially started, then (F7): LPOIA, LP Pump Trip I 1 (TRUE)
IF SYS 12 initially started, then (F8): LPOIB, LP Pump Trip 12 (TRUE)
SvmptondCues Visible To The Crew:
- RED LIGHT goes out and GREEN LIGHT turns ON.
- Pump discharge pressure lowers to zero.
- Pump amps for pump started lowers to zero.
Critical Task(s) and Justification:
01 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power generation and Torus water temperature approaching 7 70°f, the crew will utilize Boron injection, Torus cooling, control rod insertion, deliberately lowering reactor water level, and RPVpressure control to preclude violation o f the HCTL in accordance with EOP-3.
BASIS: Improper performance or omission of these actions contributes to violation of the HCTL.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 36 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 08: LP Pump Trip 0 BEFORE Torus water temperature reaches 1IOOF, direct inject liquid poison.
0 When informed of LP Pump failure, ensure opposite system started and injection is successful.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 37 of 41 November 2004
EVENT 08: LP Pump Trip 0 When directed inject liquid poison.
BOP 7.
J 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 38 of 41 November 2004
V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE (Not required for Annual Operating Exam or NRC Initial Exam)
.W' A. After the second caucus, convene the crew in the classroom for a facilitative critique:
- 1. What the crew saw and how they responded to each event?
- 2. Why the crew responded the way they did or their goal?
- 3. What went well during the scenario (STRENGTHS)?
- 4. What the crew could have done better (AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT)?
B. Ensure the expectations in each performance objective are discussed.
C. PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS (Attachment 7), that were not met, should be addressed.
D. Review the Critical Tasks if applicable.
E. At the conclusion, review the strengths and areas for improvement for improvement.
Review video tape if appropriate.
F. Significant comments from the post scenario discussion should be recorded to allow later retrieval and follow-up.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 39 of 41 November 2004
VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events DER-NM-2004-2578, Valve Failed To Indicate Full Open During Stroke Time Test.
B. Commitments None VII. LESSONS LEARNED None 2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 40 of 41 November 2004
EVALUATED SCENARIO CHECKLIST Additional Information about these checks:
For continuing training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 604 and Appendix D.
For initial training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 301 and Appendix D.
2.
J Realism/Credibility J Event Sequencing J Simulator Modeling J Evaluating Crew Competencies 3.
5 Total Malfunctions 2 Malfunctions after EOP Entry 3 Abnormal Events 2 Major Transients 2 EOPsUsed I EOP Contingency Procedures Used 60 Simulator Run Time 30 EOP Run Time 3 Crew Critical Tasks (if applicable per Attachment 6.)
- 4. Developmental Checks:
Does every event have either a Critical Task(s) or Performance Objective?
Is Criteria given for sequencing to subsequent events?
Is termination criteria clear and unambiguous?
Does termination criteria allow verification that all CT, PO standards are met?
2004 NRC SCENARIO #2 Page 41 of 41 November 2004
NRC EXAM Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 i/
Facility: Nine Mile Point 1 Scenario No.: NRC-03 Op-Test No.: NRC-01 Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: 100% power.
Turnover: N1 -ST-M4B, Emergency Diesel Generator 103 AND PB 103 Operability Test, completed satisfactory last shift. Substitute Reactor Building Ventilation Supply and Exhaust Fans from system 12 to system 11.
Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 - N Substitute Reactor Building Ventilation Supply and Exhaust Fans from system 12 to system 11.
BOP OP-10 F.3.2, F.1.0, and F.2.0.
2 HVOlA, RB C Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 11 trips and exhaust fan 12 will not start.
Exhaust Fan Trip 11 Start RBEVS in response to a degraded Reactor Building negative (TRUE) pressure (0 psig).
R.B. ARP Ll-3-4, L1-1-5, EOP-5, OP-10 H.1.0, Tech Specs Exhaust Fan 12 &
Outlet Damper 3 FW37,13 C The crew will respond to FCV 13 oscillations. Later in the scenario the FCV Oscillation ALL crew will be required to manually adjust 13 FCV to maintain RPV level (50%; below the high level trip when reactor power is lowered.
ramp = 1 minute) SOP-16.7, OP-16; F.6.0 4 EG 11, C The crew will respond to a power grid transient with 115KV voltage and 345KV Power Grid frequency degraded. This includes EDGlO3 and dead bus transfer to Transient energize PB103.
(FINAL VALUE: ARP A6-2-6, A6-3-3, SOP-33.A.3, Multiple Tech Specs, OP-45; E.3.0 338; no ramp)
Generator Cooling temperatures within limits. When reactor power is lowered the Fan Leads Ro SRO temperatures stabilize then lower.
Trlp (Final value: 50, ARP A7-3-5, SOP-1.3, OP-32; H.4.0 1 minute)
.-\' 5 of 8 NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
NRC EXAM EG 11, M When the power reduction has been made, the grid conditions degrade 345KV Power Grid requiring removal of the main generator from service because of the Transient ALL low frequency.
(FINAL VALUE: SOP-33.A.3 (continued), SOP-1 328; 1 min ED01B C Loss of offsite power.
Loss of 115KV ALL SOER 99-1; Loss of Grid South Oswego -
Line 1 SOER 03-1; Emergency Power Reliability EDOlA NMP LER: Loss of grid (Summer 2003)
Loss of 115KV Nl-SOP-33A.1, EOP-2, EAL Matrix JAF-Line 4 DGOlA, EDGlO2 fail to start and cannot be started, PB102 loss.
Diesel Generator 102 Failure to Start a RR29, Recirc LooPRuPt-(12%;
1 M ALL 1 Reactor coolant leak.
EOP-2, EOP-4, EAL Matrix, EOP-I, EOP-8 9 C Core Spray injection valves fail to automatically open and must be manually opened to restore and maintain RPV level above TAF BOP following the RPV blowdown.
,* (N)orm , (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor II TARGET QUANTITATIVEATTRIBUTES (PER SCENARIO; SEE SECTION D.5.d)
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) I 5 I I 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) I 2 I 1 4 1
~~~ ~~
I 3. Abnormal events (2-4)
- 4. Major transients (1-2) 2 (ARP, OP-10 N 2 ) (SOP-16.1 N 3 ) (SOP-33.A.3 EV 4)
(SOP-33A.l EV7a)
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2 6 of 8 NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3, REV. 0 b
SWAP REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION FANS, LOSS OF REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION, # I 3 FEEDWATER FCV OSCILLATIONS, MAJOR GRID DISTURBANCE, LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND EDG102, REACTOR COOLANT LEAK, CORE SPRAY INJECTION VALVES FAIL TO AUTO OPEN PREPARER P. Ballard/D.Wandschneider DATE 10/11E004 VAL IDATED Craiq, Alfieri, fi DATE 08/25/2004 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE /o 121[a(!
OPERATlONS MANAGER NA - EXAMINATION SECURITY DATE CONFIGURATION CONTROL NA - EXAMINATION SECURITY DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 60 minutes The crew assumes the shift with the plant operating at rated conditions. NI-ST-M4B, EDG 103 and PB 103 Operability Test, were completed two (2) hours ago by the last shift.
The crew will change the Reactor Building (RB) ventilation lineup from # I 2 exhaust and supply fans running to # I 1 supply and exhaust fans running. SRO determines Technical Specifications (TS) for RB isolation valves is met.
When the RB ventilation lineup has been changed, # I 1 RB exhaust fan trips. The crew will diagnose the fan trip and a positive RB pressure. When the crew attempts to restart # I 2 RB exhaust fan, it fails to start. The crew will start the Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System (RBEVS) to restore a negative RB pressure. Entry into N1-EOP-5, Secondary Containment Control is required. SRO determines the secondary containment TS is still satisfied.
When RBEVS is started and RB ventilation is isolated, the crew will respond to # I 3 Feedwater Flow Control Valve oscillations. The resultant oscillations require entry into SOP-I 6.1, Feedwater Failures. The crew will transfer # I 3 Feedwater FCV to manual to terminate the oscillation. With #I 3 Feedwater FCV in manual, the crew will place # I 1 Feedwater FCV into automatic. This requires taking manual control of the master feedwater level controller while L' the FCV alignment is made and then returning the master feedwater level controller to automatic control.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page Iof 46 November 2004
SCENARIO
SUMMARY
(continued)
When the down power is required later in the scenario, the crew will be required to adjust # I 3 L FCV in manual to maintain reactor water level to avoid a reactor scram.
When feedwater level control is corrected, a grid disturbance occurs requiring the crew enter N1-SOP-33.A.3 and perform the actions for voltage < I 14Kv. The crew is expected to reduce reactor power, but may maintain reactor power at the current power level because of the event (chance of making grid less stable) and dispatch personnel to investigate. This includes starting EDG103 for degraded 115Kv. This is a dead bus transfer with numerous TS LCO entries that apply until the power transfer is complete. The SRO will determine both offsite circuits are inoperable and enter the actions of TS 3.6.3.e(2), which requires EDGI 03 be started and one line be available within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to meet the TS action.
When EDG103 is powering PB103, an isophase bus duct high temperature alarm will be received if the crew has not already lowered reactor power in response to the grid disturbance.
The crew will be required to lower reactor power to maintain isophase bus duct temperature below 125°C. When reactor power has been lowered to 90% or lower, the alarm will clear and field reports will confirm lowering temperatures.
When the actions for the grid disturbance have been taken or the crew has lowered reactor power in response to the high isophase bus duct temperatures, main turbine vibration will increase and frequency will approach 58 hz requiring removal of the main generator from service. Approximately one (1) minute after the reactor is scrammed, offsite power will be lost and EDG102 fails to start and cannot be started. The crew will enter SOP-33A.1 and perform the actions for a loss of 115KV power.
The transient also causes a reactor coolant leak to develop in the drywell. The crew will enter
\--.. the EOPs to control containment parameters and reactor water level. Because of the loss of high-pressure injection the crew will be required to blowdown and use low-pressure systems (Core Spray) to restore and maintain reactor water level above TAF. The crew must manually open Core Spray System 12 injection valves to establish low-pressure injection. Core Spray System 11 is not available because of the EDGI 02 failure and PB102 loss. When the crew has restored and maintained reactor water level above TAF and containment spray has been initiated, the scenario may be terminated.
Major Procedures: OP-IO, EOP-5, SOP-16.1, SOP-33.A.3, OP-45, SOP-I .3, OP-32, SOP-I, SOP-33A.1, EOP-2, EOP-4, EOP-1, EOP-8, EAL Matrix.
EAL Classification: EAL 2.1.2, Site Area Emergency, RPV level cannot be maintained >-84 inches (TAF).
Termination Criteria: Reactor water level restored and maintained above TAF and containment spray has been initiated.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 2 of 46 November 2004
I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC25
.- ENSURE CRD Pump 71 in service and 12 CRD Pump is off.
Ensure RPS UPS 762 irouble alarm (A3-1-2) reset.
Place I 1 RBCLC Pump in service and 12 RBCLC is OK Ensure RE3 Vent Supply and Exhaust Fans system 12 are running in FAST speed.
B. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. HVOIA, Reactor Building Exhaust Fan Trip 11 (TRUE) (F3)
- b. FW37, 13 FCV Oscillations (50%; ramp time = Iminute) (F4)
- d. EG16, Generator Cooling Fan Leads Trlp (FINAL VALUE: TRUE) (F6)
- e. EGI 1, 345KV Power Grid Transient (FINAL VALUE: 328; 1 minute) (F7) ke this relative io E l ? {FS)
- f. TU02, Main Turbine High Vibration (FINAL VALUE: 65%; 2 minute ramp) (F7)
- g. EDOIA, Loss of Offsite 115KV Power, JAF-Line 4 (TRUE) (F8)
- h. ED018, Loss of Offsite 115KV Power, South Oswego - Line 1 (TRUE) (Fa)
- i. RR29, Recirculation Loop Rupture (20%; ramp time = I O minutes) (F9)
- j. DGOIA, Diesel Generator 102 Failure to Start (TRUE) (QUEUED)
- 2. Remotes:
- a. None
- 3. Overrides:
- a. R.B. Exhaust Fan 12 & Outlet Damper (POS-I) (F3)
(SWITCH) I lS054-Di-046-IZ Locafe on L-I7 page 8 of IO.
NOTE: jumper overrides located on N-72
C. 12BNJ117 - EOP JUMPER FOR CS VALVE (IN) (QUEUED)
- 4. Annunciators:
L1-29, Fuel Pool Annunciator Block.
C. Equipment Out of Service None D. Support Documentation None E. Miscellaneous None 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 3 of 46 November 2004
F. Surrogate SRO Briefing When required to start RBEVS for loss of reactor building ventilation, direct start of 11 RBEVS.
When FCV#13 oscillation occurs, ensure direct placing 11 FWP FCV in AUTO with 13 FWP FCV in MANUAL per N1-OP-16, F.6.0.
For initial grid voltage/frequency degradation, when conditions are stable and monitoring per N1-SOP-33.A.3, if candidates have not performed ARP A6-3-3, then direct performance. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump 11 is in service.
For the reacitivity change, when isophase bus duct cooling high temperature is received, direct an emergency power reduction to 90%. This will terminate the temperature increase and isophase temperatures will start to lower.
When conditions are stable following the loss of offsite power, ensure entry into N I -
SOP-33A.1 is directed.
Ensure candidates make the determination that the Core Spray IVs fail to open before providing direction to open the valves manually.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 4 of 46 November 2004
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
0 Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SSS, ASSS, STA, CSO, CRE)
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
0 Shift Supervisor Log (SSS, ASSS, STA) Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) LCO Status (SSS, ASSS, STA)
Lit Control Room Annunciators 0 Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Reactor Power = 100% 0 Loadline = 103%
NI-ST-M4B, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 103 AND PB 103 OPERABILITY TEST, completed by the last shift.
PART III: Remarks/PIa nned Evolutions:
Swap Reactor Building Ventilation Supply and Exhaust Fans per N1-OP-I 0.
PART IV: To be reviewedlaccomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
0 Review new Clearances (SSS) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SSS/ASSS) 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 5 of 46 November 2004
I Scenario ID# 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What we did? Why? (Goals) Other Options?
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 6 of 46 November 2004
Ill. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
01 Depressurize the reactor and use low pressure systems to restore and maintain reactor water level above TAF.
BASIS: With the loss of high pressure injection systems concurrent with the reactor coolant leak, a blowdown is required to reduce reactor pressure to below the shutoff head for the available Core Spray Pumps. This pressure reduction permits Core Spray System injection and restoration and maintenance of reactor water level above TAF.
02 Open Core Spray injection valves upon failure of the valves to automatically open when reactor pressure reaches 365 psig.
BASIS FOR CT-2.0: Failure to manually open Core Spray injection valves which fail to automatically open will result in extended time below TAF and subsequently time below two-thirds core coverage (-132 inches) until alternate injection systems can be aligned and made available for injection jeopardizing fuel cladding integrity.
Because of the basis for the depressurization (to depressurize and use low pressure systems to restore reactor water level) the priority action is to open 3 ERVs and monitor the depressurization to ensure that the core spray injection valves open when reactor pressure lowers to 365 pisg.
NOTE: THE CREW MUST RECOGNIZE THE FAILURE OF THE CORE SPRAY IVS TO OPEN AND INITIATE ACTION TO MANUALLY OPEN THE VALVES WITHIN ONE (1) MINUTE OF REACTOR PRESSURE LOWERING TO 365 PSlG TO MEET THIS CRITICAL TASK. Time starts when reactor pressure reaches 365 psig and time stops when either Core Spray IV is given an open demand.
There is a related time in the FSAR accident analysis (Vll-7). This time requires that these valves (Core Spray IVs) shall be fully open within 22 seconds (valve stroke time) after the signal is given to assure that, under accident conditions, the total delay in achieving full core spray flow is less than 37 seconds. Considering the actions expected of the crew under these conditions (anticipate the automatic opening, recognize the failure, use multiple indications to confirm 365 psig is achieved and that the valves are not opening, the communications between the RO and the SRO that the failure occurred and the subsequent direction/action to open the valves) it is determined that ONE (1) MINUTE is adequate time to recognize the failure and perform appropriate communications and actions to initiate valve opening commands.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 7 of 46 November 2004
B. Performance Objectives:
EVENT PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE 01 Given a condition requiring substitution of the running Reactor Building Ventilation Supply and Exhaust Fans, the crew will shift fans IAW N1-OP-I 0.
02 Given a degradation of the Reactor Building Ventilation Supply and Exhaust Fans, the crew will recognize the condition, enter EOP - 5 and start running Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System IAW N1-OP-I 0.
03 Given problems with the # I 3 Feedwater FCV, the crew will recognize the condition and take actions IAW N1-OP-16 and SOP 16.1.
04 Given instability problems with the Grid, the crew will recognize the degraded conditions of voltage and frequency and respond IAW the ARPs and N1-SOP-33.
Given instability problems with the Grid, the crew will respond with a dead bus transfer of PB103 to Emergency Diesel Generator 103 IAW N1-OP-45.
05 Given rising lsophase bus duct temperatures, the crew will respond by lowering power in order to lower and stabilize temperatures IAW N1-SOP-I .3, N1-OP-32.
06 As a result of continued Grid degradation, the crew will be required to remove the main generator from service IAW N1-SOP-33, N1-SOP-I .
07 Given a loss of 115KV with a failure of 102 Emergency Diesel Generator to start, the crew will respond IAW N1-SOP-33A.1 and N1-EOP-2.
08 Given a Reactor Coolant Leak, the crew will take actions IAW NI-EOP-1, 2, 4, 8 09 Given a failure of the Core Spray injection valves to automatically open, the crew will recognize the failure and manually open the valves IAW with N1-EOP-I.
Generic Given the plant in a condition requiring emergency classifications, the crew shall classify the events properly, complete initial notification forms and discuss the bases for the classification in accordance with the emergency plan procedure.
Given the plant or plant system in a condition requiring Technical Specification action, identify the deviation and any required actionshotifications.
L-2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 8 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 01 : Substitution of Reactor Building Ventilation Supply and Exhaust Fans per N1-OP-IO.
Instructor Activities:
--..--- - Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walk down and briefing. Allow up to 5 minutes to walk down panels and perform annunciator checks.
- INITIATION POINT: The initiation point for this event is when the SRO directs the normal evolution to be performed. There are NO instructor activities related to this normal evolution.
- If contacted as the A 0 to set TC-202-13 to minimum setting (RB SUPPLY VENT HEATERS CONTROL SWITCH), report duct heaters are not in service. TC-202-13 is at the minimum setting.
Symptons/Cues Visible To The Crew:
- NOT APPLICABLE Critical Task(s) and Justification:
- NONE 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 9 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 01 : Substitution of Reactor Building Ventilation Supply and Exhaust Fans per N1-OP-l O.
c1 Walk down panels prior to assuming shift.
0 Conduct shift turnover brief.
0 Assume the shift 0 Brief crew on impact.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page I O of 46 November 2004
EVENT 01 : Substitution of Reactor Building Ventilation Supply and Exhaust Fans per N I -0P-IO.
0 Walk down panels prior to assuming shift.
0 Participate in and ensure understanding of shift turnover brief.
N1-0P-I 0: Getting Started BOP c3 Obtain SRO permission to perform N?-OP-IO,Substitution of Exhaust and Supply Fans, per sections F.3.2, F.1.O, and F.2.0.
0 Notify SRO to inform Chemistry of ventilation lineup changes being made.
BOP BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 11 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 01: Substitution of Reactor Building Ventilation Supply and Exhaust Fans per N1-OP-IO.
BOP L-BOP 0 Reports supply and exhaust fans substituted per Nl-OP-l O.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page I 2 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 02: Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Fan#l1 trip and Exhaust Fan # I 2 cannot be started.
Instructor Activities:
- Ensure OVERRIDE R.B. Exhaust Fan 12 & Outlet Damper (POS-I) (FI) assigned to same Trigger (F3) as malfunction HVOIA, Reactor Building Exhaust Fan Trip 11.
- INlTlATlQN POINT: When directed by the lead examiner, insert the following malfunction:
HVOIA, Reactor Building Exhaust Fan Trip 11 (TRUE) (F3)
SvmptonsKues Visible To The Crew:
- L1-3-4, REACT BLDG/ATM DlFF PRESS
- L1-1-5, RB VENT EXH FAN 11- 12 TRIP - VIB
- Observe RB Exhaust Fan 11 is tripped.
Critical Task(s) and Justification:
- None
-+.-
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page I 3 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 02: Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Fan#ll trip and Exhaust Fan # I 2 cannot be started.
0 Acknowledge report L1-3-4, REACT BLDG/ATM DlFF PRESS, in alarm.
0 Acknowledge report L1-1-5, RB VENT EXH FAN 11- 12 TRIP - VIB, in alarm.
0 Acknowledge report exhaust fan I 1 tripped.
0 Direct start of Exhaust Fan 12.
0 Direct actions of L1-3-4 and L1-1-5 to be performed.
0 Diagnose reactor building negative pressure is degraded low.
0 Recognize entry condition for EOP-5, Secondary Containment Control.
EOP-5 0 Determine no emergency exists (activation of emergency plan not required).
0 Per SC-3, ensure RBEVS started and RB ventilation isolated.
P 0 Brief crew on event impact.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 14 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 02: Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Fan#l I trip and Exhaust Fan # I 2 cannot be started.
L-O Recognize/report L1-3-4, REACT BLDG/ATM DlFF PRESS, in alarm.
0 Recognize/report L1-1-5, RB VENT EXH FAN 11- 12 TRIP - VIB, in alarm.
O Recognizelreportexhaust fan 11 tripped.
Acknowledge direction to perform actions of L1-3-4, L1-1-5.
RO BOP L1-3-4 ACTIONS RO 0 Confirm computer point 0313 in alarm.
BOP 0 Monitor D/P for entry into EOP-5.
0 Inform SRO D/P is zero.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 15 of 46 November 2004
~~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~~
EVENT 02: Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Fan#ll trip and Exhaust Fan # I 2 cannot be started.
u 0 Reference N1-OP-10, H.I.O.
BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 16 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 02: Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Fan#l I trip and Exhaust Fan # I 2 cannot be started.
BOP 0 Report RBEVS in service and reactor building ventilation isolated.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 17 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 03: Feedwater FCV 13 Oscillation Instructor Activities:
- INITIATiON POINT: When directed by the lead evaluator, insert malfunction:
b FW37, 13 FCV Oscillations (50%; ramp time = 1 minute) (F4)
- If asked as maintenance to investigate, acknowledge the request.
- If reports to management personnel are received, acknowledge the reports.
SymptonsKues Visible To The Crew:
- Feed Pump 13 indications oscillating.
- Feed Pump 13 flow controller oscillating.
- Master Feedwater Controller is oscillating.
Critical Task(s) and Justification:
- NONE 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page I 8 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 03: Feedwater FCV 13 Oscillation 0 Acknowledge report 13 FWP indications and FCV controller oscillating.
0 Diagnose 13 FWP FCV controller failed in automatic.
0 Direct placing operating FWP FCV in AUTO with 13 FWP FCV in MANUAL per OP-16.
SOP-16.1, FW System Failures 0 Determine problem with FWLC.
0 Direct placing 13 FCV in manual.
c1 Brief crew on event impact.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page I 9 of 46 November 2004
~~ ~~ ~ ~~
EVENT 03: Feedwater FCV 13 Oscillation icant Actions Or Behavior
,U 0 Recognize/report report reactor power is oscillating.
0 Recognize/report 13 FWP indications and FCV controller oscillating.
0 Acknowledge entry into SOP-I 6.1 SOP-I 6.1, FW Failures BOP 0 Determine 13 FWP FCV failed in automatic.
0 Place 13 FWP FCV in MANUAL.
P 0 Acknowledge direction to place operating FWP FCV in AUTO with 13 FWP FCV in MANUAL.
BOP BOP BOP BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 20 of 46 November 2004
~~ ~~
EVENT 03: Feedwater FCV 13 Oscillation RO BQP BOP RO RQ RO RO 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 21 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 04: Major Grid Disturbance lnsfrucfor Activities:
- INlTlATlON POINT: When directed by the lead evaluator, insert malfunction:
u EG 11, 345KV Power Grid Transient (FINAL VALUE: 338; no ramp) (F5)
NOTE: Set to 338 = 58.8 hz and 113.6 volts
- If asked as power control, inform Unit Ithere is a system-wide disturbance and it is being investigated. Peaking units are being started and you expect to recover from the problem within one (1) hour. Maintain power at the current power level and avoid power changes.
The load flow computer is not available.
- If reports to management personnel are received, acknowledge the reports.
- If asked, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump 11 is running.
- If report to Fitzpatrick, acknowledge the report. Report Fitzpatrick is experiencing the grid disturbance: frequency at 58.8, voltage at 113.6 volts.
Sympfons/Cues Visible To The Crew:
- A6-3-3,345 KV SYS FREQUENCY HIGH-LOW
- A6-2-6, 345 KV BUS VOLTAGE HIGH-LOW
- A8-1-3,115 KV BUS LOW VOLTAGE
- FREQUENCY at 58.8 hz
- VOLTAGE at 113.6 v
- Computer points F432, F433, F434 indicate 113.6 volts W
Crifical Task(s) and Justification:
- NONE 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 22 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 04: Major Grid Disturbance u
0 Acknowledge report of following alarms and indications:
A6-3-3,345 KV SYS FREQUENCY HIGH-LOW A6-2-6,345 KV BUS VOLTAGE HIGH-LOW A8-1-3,115 KV BUS LOW VOLTAGE FREQUENCY at 58.8 hz, VOLTAGE at I 13.6 v Computer points F432, F433, F434 indicate 113.6 volts 0 Direct entry into SOP-33.A.3, Major Grid Disturbances.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 23 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 04: Major Grid Disturbance
~~
0 Brief crew on event impact.
V' 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 24 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 04: Major Grid Disturbance i,
CI Acknowledge report of following alarms and indications:
A6-3-3, 345 KV SYS FREQUENCY HIGH-LOW A6-2-6, 345 KV BUS VOLTAGE HIGH-LOW A8-1-3,115 KV BUS LOW VOLTAGE FREQUENCY at 58.8 hz, VOLTAGE at 113.6 v Computer points F432, F433, F434 indicate 113.6 volts 0 Acknowledge entry into SOP-33.A.3, Major Grid Disturbances (see below).
0 Perform A6-3-3, A6-2-6 actions. Reference A8-1-3.
A6-2-6 ACTIONS RO 0 Monitor BUCWBOOST meter and 345 kv recorder.
RO 0 Determine condition is normal; isolation of amplidyne under load conditions is not required.
BOP RQ BOP RO RQ BOP RO 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 25 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 04: Major Grid Disturbance BOP L-2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 26 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 05: lsophase Bus Duct Cooling High Temperature
- INITIATION POINT: After the crew has responded to the grid disturbance and EDG103 is started and loaded, and as directed by the lead evaluator, insert malfunction:
EG16, Generator Cooling Fan Leads Trlp (FINAL VALUE: TRUE) (F6)
.J
- If asked to report isophase bus duct temperatures, wait one (1) minute and then report temperatures are 116°C and rising.
- If asked to check isophase fan in service and TBCLC aligned to isophase cooler, report system is operating normally.
- After reactor power has been lowered and if lowered to at least 90%, and asked to report isophase bus duct temperatures, wait one (1) minute and then report temperatures are 115°C and lowering slowly.
Svmptons/Cues Visible To The Crew:
- A7-3-5, GEN LEADS HIGH TEMP.
- Computer point D177, AIR TEMP PHASE 1&3 t i.
- Field reports of elevated temperatures approaching 125°C.
Critical Task(s) and Justification:
- NONE 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 27 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 05: lsophase Bus Duct Cooling High Temperature W
0 Acknowledge report of alarm A7-3-5, GEN LEADS HIGH TEMP.
R Direct a power reduction to maintain isophase bus duct temperature below 125°C.
SOP-I .3, Emergency Power Reduction 0 Direct a reduction in recirc flow to a new target reactor power level. This determination is based on the reports from the field.
0 Brief crew on impact of event.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 28 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 05: lsophase Bus Duct Cooling High Temperature b
0 Recognize/report alarm A7-3-5, GEN LEADS HIGH TEMP.
0 Acknowledge report to reduce reactor power as determined by the SRO.
0 Acknowledge direction to perform actions of A7-3-5, GEN LEADS HIGH TEMP.
BOP RO BOP RO BOP BOP SOP-I .3, Emergency Power Reduction RO 0 Reduce recirc flow to a new target reactor power level as directed by the SRO. This determination is based on the reports from the field.
0 Brief crew on impact of event.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 29 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 06: Grid Frequency Degrades
- Ensure this malfunction (EGI I ) is relative to the previous EG1I malfunction entered.
- INITlATlON POINT:After the crew has responded to the grid disturbance with EDG103 w started and loaded and LOCKOUT 86-17 reset, and the isophase bus duct high temperature alarm has been initiated to provide a power reduction for the evaluators to observe, and as directed by the lead evaluator, insert malfunction:
EG 11, 345KV Power Grid Transient (FINAL VALUE: 328; I minute ramp) (F7)
TU02, Main Turbine High Vibration (FINAL VALUE: 65%; 2 minute ramp) (F7)
- Call as power control and ask what NMPI is doing. Have degrading grid conditions.
SympfonsKues Visible To The Crew:
- FREQUENCY slowly lowers to 58.1 Hz and continues to lower below 58 Hz.
- A2-3-5, TURBINE SUPERVISORY SYSTEM Critical Task(s) and Jusfificafion:
- NONE 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 30 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 06: Grid Frequency Degrades
\
0 Acknowledge report FREQUENCY is lowering; 58 hz requires removal of the main generator from service.
0 Direct a turbine trip per SOP-31.I, Turbine Trip.
SOP-33A.3 (Frequency variation is >I .9 Hz) 0 Direct a turbine trip per SOP-31.I.
0 Direct a reactor scram and concurrent entry into SOP-I, Reactor Scram.
0 Acknowledge report of loss of offsite power and only EDG103 started and loaded.
0 Direct entry into SOP-33A.1, Loss of 115KV (see event 07: loss of offsite power) 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 31 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 06: Grid Frequency Degrades W
0 RecognizeheportFREQUENCY is lowering; 58.1 hz requires removal of the main generator from service.
0 Acknowledge direction to scram the reactor (SOP-1, Reactor Scram: see below)
RO 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 32 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 06: Grid Frequency Degrades BOP RO BOP 0 Recognize/report loss of offsite power and only EDG103 started and loaded.
\-
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 33 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 07: Loss of Off Site Power
- Ensure malfunction DGOIA, Diesel Generator 102 Failure to Start (TRUE) (QUEUED)
- INITIATION POINT: When the reactor mode switch is placed to shutdown or a reactor k
scram occurs, WAIT ONE (f) MlNUTE and then insert malfunctions: :
EDOIA, Loss of Offsite 115KV Power, JAF-Line 4 (TRUE) (F8)
ED01B, Loss of Offsite 115KV Power, South Oswego - Line 1 (TRUE) (F8)
- If directed as A 0 to restore I&C Bus 130, wait Two (2) minutes, perform Remote Functions as follows: ED12, I&C Bus 130 Normal Power Breaker, to open, wait 5 seconds and then ED 13, I&C Bus 130 Alternate Power Breaker to close. Then call and report I&C Bus 130 is restored.
Svmptons/Cues Visible To The Crew:
- Loss of Line #I.
- Loss of Line #4.
- Supply Breakers 1012 and 1013 tripped.
- EDG103 started and loaded. PB103 powered by EDG103.
- EDG102 not started. PB102 not powered.
Critical Task(s) and Justification:
- None.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 34 of 46 November 2004 8
EVENT 07: Loss of Off Site Power Cl Acknowledge report of loss of offsite power and only EDGlO3 started and loaded.
Cl Direct entry into SOP-33A.1, Loss of 115KV.
Cl Enter and execute EOP-2, RPV Control (see Event 08, Reactor Coolant Leak)
EMERGENCY ENT CLASSIFICATION 0 Evaluate EAL matrix for reportability {ALERT per 6.1.3 after 15 minutes) 0 Brief crew on event.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 35 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 07: Loss of Off Site Power L-O Recognize/report of loss of offsite power and only EDGI 03 started and loaded.
Acknowledge entry into SOP-33A.1, Loss of 115KV.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 36 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 08 & 09: Reactor Coolant Leak / Core Spray Injection Valves Fail to Open
- Ensure following malfunctions:
12BNJll6 - EOP JUMPER FOR CS VALVE (IN) (Q UEUED) 12BNJ117 - EOP JUMPER FOR CS VALVE (IN) (Q UEUED) 12BNJll8 - EOP JUMPER FOR CS VALVE (IN) (Q UEUED) 12BNJ123 - EOP JUMPER FOR CS VALVE (IN) (Q UEUED) 12BNJ124 - EOP JUMPER FOR CS VALVE (IN) (Q UEUED) 12BNJ125 - EOP JUMPER FOR CS VALVE (IN) (Q UEUED)
- INITIATION POINT: When SOP-33A.1 is entered and (PATH C) determined to be taken or when directed by the lead evaluator, insert the following malfunction:
RR29, Recirculation Loop Rupture (12%; ramp time = 10 minutes) (F9)
SymptonsiCues Visible To The Crew:
- K2-4-3, DRYWELL PRESSURE HIGH-LOW alarm.
- L1-4-4, HI DRYWELL TEMP, alarm.
- Rising drywell pressure on panel indicators and process computer indication.
- Rising drywell humidity on panel indicator.
- Lowering reactor water level on panel indicators.
- For Core Spray Injection Valves 49-09 and 49-10 failure to open: Valves are observed to remain in the closed position when reactor pressure lowers to 365 psig.
Critical Taskts)and Justification:
01 Depressurize the reactor and use low pressure systems to restore and maintain reactor water level above TAF.
BASIS: With the loss of high pressure injection systems concurrent with the reactor coolant leak, a blowdown is required to reduce reactor pressure to below the shutoff head for the available Core Spray Pumps. This pressure reduction permits Core Spray System injection and restoration and maintenance of reactor water level above TAF.
02 Open Core Spray injection valves upon failure of the valves to automatically open when reactor pressure reaches 365 psig.
BASIS FOR CT-2.0: Failure to manually open Core Spray injection valves which fail to automatically open will result in extended time below TAF and subsequently time below two-thirds core coverage (-132 inches) until alternate injection systems can be aligned and made available for injection jeopardizing fuel cladding integrity.
Because of the basis for the depressurization (to depressurize and use low pressure systems to restore reactor water level) the priority action is to open 3 ERVs and monitor the depressurization to ensure that the core spray injection valves open when reactor pressure lowers to 365 pisg.
NOTE: THE CREW MUST RECOGNIZE THE FAILURE OF THE CORE SPRAY IVS TO OPEN AND INITIATE ACTION TO MANUALLY OPEN THE VALVES WITHIN ONE (1) MINUTE OF REACTOR PRESSURE LOWERING TO 365 PSlG TO MEET THIS CRITICAL TASK. Time starts when reactor pressure reaches 365 psig and time stops when either Core Spray IV is given an open demand.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 37 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 08 & 09: Reactor Coolant Leak I Core Spray Injection Valves Fail to Open
- Ensure following malfunctions:
12BNJ116 - EOP JUMPER FOR CS VALVE (IN) j QUEUED) 12BNJ117 - EOP JUMPER FOR CS VALVE (!N) (QUEUED) i, 12BNJ118- EOP JUMPER FOR CSVALVE (iN) (QUEUED) 12BNJ123 - EOP JUMPER FOR CS VALVE (IN) (QUEU ED) 12BNJ124 - EOP JUMPER FOR CS VALVE (IN) (QUEUED) 12BNJ125 - EOP JUMPER FOR CS VALVE (IN) (QUEUED)
- INITIATION POINT: When SOP-33A.1 is entered and (PATH C) determined to be taken or when directed by the lead evaluator, insert the following malfunction:
RR29, Recirculation Loop Rupture (12%; ramp time = I O minutes) (F9)
Symptons/Cues Visible To The Crew:
- K2-4-3, DRYWELL PRESSURE HIGH-LOW alarm.
- L1-4-4, HI DRYWELL TEMP, alarm.
- Rising drywell pressure on panel indicators and process computer indication.
- Rising drywell humidity on panel indicator.
- Lowering reactor water level on panel indicators.
- For Core Spray Injection Valves 49-09 and 49-10 failure to open: Valves are observed to remain in the closed position when reactor pressure lowers to 365 psig.
Critical Task(s) and Justification:
01 Depressurize the reactor and use low pressure systems to restore and maintain reactor water level above TAF.
BASIS: With the loss of high pressure injection systems concurrent with the reactor coolant leak, a blowdown is required to reduce reactor pressure to below the shutoff head for the available Core Spray Pumps. This pressure reduction permits Core Spray System injection and restoration and maintenance of reactor water level above TAF.
02 Open Core Spray injection valves upon failure of the valves to automatically open when reactor pressure reaches 365 psig.
BASIS FOR CT-2.0: Failure to manually open Core Spray injection valves which fail to automatically open will result in extended time below TAF and subsequently time below two-thirds core coverage (-132 inches) until alternate injection systems can be aligned and made available for injection jeopardizing fuel cladding integrity.
Because of the basis for the depressurization (to depressurize and use low pressure systems to restore reactor water level) the priority action is to open 3 ERVs and monitor the depressurizationto ensure that the core spray injection valves open when reactor pressure lowers to 365 pisg.
NOTE: THE CREW MUST RECOGNIZE THE FAILURE OF THE CORE SPRAY IVS TO OPEN AND INITIATE ACTION TO MANUALLY OPEN THE VALVES WITHIN TWENTY (20) SECONDS OF REACTOR PRESSURE LOWERING TO 365 PSlG TO MEET THIS CRITICAL TASK. Time starts when reactor pressure reaches 365 psig and time stops when either Core Spray IV is given an open demand.
c 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 37 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 08 & 09: Reactor Coolant Leak / Core Spray Injection Valves Fail to Open 0 Acknowledge report of reactor coolant leak.
0 Enter and execute EOP-2, RPV Control (see below).
0 Enter and execute EOP-4, Primary Containment Control (see below).
0 Evaluate EAL matrix for reportability (SITE AREA EMERGENCY per 2.1.2).
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 38 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 08 & 09: Reactor Coolant Leak / Core Spray Injection Valves Fail to Open
-4, 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 39 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 08 & 09: Reactor Coolant Leak / Core Spray Injection Valves Fail to Open EMERGENCY EVENT CLASSIFICATION 0 Evaluate EAL matrix for reportability (SITE AREA EMERGENCY per 2.1.2.)
0 Brief crew on event.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 40 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 08 & 09: Reactor Coolant Leak / Core Spray Injection Valves Fail to Open
\/ 0 Recognize/ report reactor coolant leak.
RPV CONTROL ACTIONS:
0 Acknowledge RPV level be maintained +53to +95.
0 Acknowledge install jumpers to bypass Core Spray IV interlocks (see EOP Attachment 4 below).
BOP CT-2 0 Report RPV level CANNOT be maintained above + 5 3 (see scram actions for level control actions).
0 Acknowledge level be maintained above -84 (TAF) and approval to use alternate injection systems. Direct A 0 to perform EOP 1 Attachment 12 or 13 and 19 (see below).
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 41 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 08 & 09: Reactor Coolant Leak / Core Spray Injection Valves Fail to Open RO BOP BOP BOP RO RQ 0 Acknowledge RPV level cannot be maintained >-84 (TAF) and RPV Blowdown required (see below).
BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 42 of 46 November 2004
EVENT 08 & 09: Reactor Coolant Leak / Core Spray Injection Valves Fail to Open BOP RO RO PRlMAR Y CONTAINMENT CONTROL ACTIONS:
0 Acknowledge direction to lockout of all containment spray pumps.
0 Report containment parameters as desired by SRO: drywell and torus pressures and temperatures. Report when torus pressure reaches 13 psig.
D Acknowledge direction to initiate containment spray.
BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 43 of 46 November 2004
V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE (Not required for Annual Operating Exam or NRC Initial Exam)
A. After the second caucus, convene the crew in the classroom for a facilitative critique:
- 1. What the crew saw and how they responded to each event?
- 2. Why the crew responded the way they did or their goal?
- 3. What went well during the scenario (STRENGTHS)?
- 4. What the crew could have done better (AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT)?
B. Ensure the expectations in each performance objective are discussed.
C. PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS (Attachment 7), that were not met, should be addressed.
D. Review the Critical Tasks if applicable.
E. At the conclusion, review the strengths and areas for improvement for improvement.
Review video tape if appropriate.
F. Significant comments from the post scenario discussion should be recorded to allow later retrieval and follow-up.
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 44 of 46 November 2004
VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events w SOER 99-1, Loss of Grid SOER 03-1, Emergency Power Reliability B. Commitments None VII. LESSONS LEARNED None 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 45 of 46 November 2004
EVALUATED SCENARIO CHECKLIST
- 1. Additional Information about these checks:
.L*'
For continuing training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 604 and Appendix D.
For initial training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 301 and Appendix D.
2.
J Realism/Credibility J Event Sequencing J Simulator Modeling J Evaluating Crew Competencies 3.
7 Total Malfunctions 3 Malfunctions after EOP Entry 3 Abnormal Events 1 Major Transients 2 EOPsUsed 1 EOP Contingency Procedures Used Lc' 60 Simulator Run Time 30 EOP Run Time I
2 Crew Critical Tasks (if applicable per Attachment 6.)
- 4. Developmental Checks:
Does every event have either a Critical Task(s) or Performance Objective?
Is Criteria given for sequencing to subsequent events?
Is termination criteria clear and unambiguous?
Does termination criteria allow verification that all CT, PO standards are met?
2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 Page 46 of 46 November 2004
NRC EXAM LJ AppendixD Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Nine Mile Point 1 Scenario No.: NRC-04 (ALT) Op-Test No.: NRC-01 Examiners: 0perators :
Initial Conditions: 100% power.
Turnover: Need to perform Monthly performance of N1 -ST:M8, RBEVS Operability Test.
122 Containment Spray Pump removed from service. EPR in control.
I Event No. I Malf.
No. 1 Event Type* I Event Description 1 11M40,11 N Nl-ST-M8, RBEVS Operability Test is scheduled for its monthly RBEVS Train flow performance. During the test, when the RBEVS fan is started, the fan meter BOP flow indicator will fail downscale and the train must be declared downscale SRO inoperable. The SRO must makea T.S. determination.
11-M040-AO-053, NI-ST-M8, Tech Specs Set at 0.0.
2a RPOl B, C Loss of Reactor Trip Bus 141. The crew will enter and Reactor Trip Bus restore power to the bus, then the scram may be reset. The SRO must MG Set RO make a TS determination.
Trips (141) SRO (TRUE) N1-OP-05, Nl-OP-16, Nl-OP-48 , Tech Specs 2b RD06, Rod C A single control rod scram occurs with the power loss. When control 22-19 Fail Scrammed rod 22-19 scrams its CRD Mechanism becomes stuck at position 06.
10Sec TD RO The crew must take the actions for a stuck control rod to be able to (TRUE) SRO insert this control rod to position 00. The SRO must makea TS Override determination.
for control rod 22-19 N1-OP-05, Nl-OP-16, NI-OP-48, Tech Specs position . .
02.
I I
, 5:j ~
3 RXOI, Fuel R A small fuel leak will develop from the abnormal rod pattern. Rising Clad Fail - reactor coolant activity levels will require entry into the Emergency Plan RO and an Emergency Power Reduction.
10% Ramp
- 5 minutes, SRO TUA - 1 Min. I EAL Matrix, EPI f -EPP-l8, Nl-SOP-1. I, NISOP-25.2
/ ED04,AC Pnwer I C The trip of PB 11 will cause a trip of RRPs 11 and 12.
Nl-SOP-30.1, Nl-SOP-1.3, Tech Specs, NISOP-I U
?of8 NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
NRC
. . -~EXAM 5 ECOGA, EC C A Dipina rupture will occur in EC LOOP11. The crew will take action is Tube Leak isdlite The affected EC but the steam isolation mlves fail to fully close.
111 RO EC08A, EC BOP STM IV SRO Nl-SOP-?.I , Nl-SOP-I, 111 Fail to Close =
80%
EC08B, EC STM IV 112 Fail to Close =
80%
RD33E, C Abank of control rods will fail to fully insert requiring the crew to Control perform actions to manually insert control rods.
Rod Bank RO 5, Insert Fail SRO NI-EOP-2, Nl-EOP-3, NI-EOP-4; Att. 2 and 4, NI-OP-12, H. 1.0 and position (48) G.0 ED26, Failure of PB 11 to Auto Transfer (TRUE)
M Rising reactor coolant activity and radiation levels will require a reactor Clad Fail 100% ALL scram because of the unisolable leak and rising radiation levels.
Ramp - 15 Subsequently at RPV blowdown will be required. When EOP-8 is minutes entered the crew must enter the path for all control rods not inserted.
This will require the crew to terminate and prevent injection prior to emergency depressurization.
N I-EOP-8, EAL Mafrix (N)ormi (R)eacl ity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor I TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES (PER SCENARIO; SEE SECTION D.5.d) I A l?:ES I
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 5
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 1
- 4. Major transients (1-2) 1
I 7. Critical tasks (2-3) I 2 I I NUREG-I021, Draft Revision 9 Y
8of8
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2004 NRC SCENARIO, ALTERNATE, REV. 0 u
PERFORM NI-ST-M8, REACTOR BUILDING EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM, SYSTEM OPERABILITY TEST, LOSS OF BUS 141, INADVERTENT SINGLE ROD SCRAM, FUEL FAILURE, EMERGENCY CONDENSER PIPING RUPTURE, FAILURE OF PB 11 TO AUTO TRANSFER PREPARER P. Ballard/D.Wandschneider DATE 08/24/2004 VALIDATED Mancuso, SpStxe, Tracz DATE 08/28/2004 f
GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE / a / L ,/6y 0PERATlONS f MANAGER NA - EXAMINATION SECURITY DATE CONFIGURAT1ON CONTROL NA - EXAMINATION SECURITY DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 60 minutes The crew assumes the shift with the plant operating at rated conditions. Nl-ST-M8, Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System (RBEVS) Operability Test is scheduled for its monthly performance. During the test, when the RBEVS fan is started, the fan flow indicator will fail downscale and the train must be declared inoperable. The SRO must make a Technical Specifications (T.S.) determination.
After the T. S. determination is made the crew must respond to a loss of Reactor Trip Bus 141 and a coincident single control rod scram. When control rod 22-19 scrams its CRD Mechanism becomes stuck with the control rod at position 06. The control rod may be inserted with increased drive water pressure. This requires declaring the control rod inoperable. After a local operator has been dispatched to restore alternate power to the bus and the power is has been restored, the scram may be reset. Once the scram has been reset, the control rod may be inserted using RMCS. The crew must lower power, asses recovering the control rod and the SRO must make a T.S. determination.
A small fuel leak will develop from the abnormal rod pattern. Rising reactor coolant activity levels will require entry into the Emergency Plan and entry into EPIP-EPP-18, Activation and
_- Direction of the Emergency Plans and N1-SOP-1. I , Emergency Power Reduction.
--.../ Per N1-SOP-1.I the crew will transfer normal house service to the reserve transformers. When the transfer is made both PB 11 supply breakers will trip. The crew will enter N1-SOP-30.1 and 2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 1 of 42 November 2004
recover PB 11. The trip of PB 11 will cause a trip of Reactor Recirculation Pumps (RRPs) 11 and 12, this will result in entry into the restricted area of the Power to Flow map and the reactor should be manually scrammed.
L-When the reactor is scrammed (If the crew does NOT scram the reactor this malfunction will require a reactor scram) a piping rupture will occur in Emergency Condenser (EC) Loop 11.
The steam isolation valves will only close to an intermediate position. With the primary system discharging into the reactor building and the failure of the isolation valves the crew must insert a manual scram.
Following the scram a bank of control rods will fail to fully insert requiring the crew to enter EOP-3, Failure to Scram. With a bank of control rods stuck out of the core the SRO must direct boron injection. Additionally, if PBI 1 was not transferred previously, PB 11 will fail to automatically transfer when the turbine trips and must be manually transferred.
Rising reactor coolant activity and radiation levels and the un-isolated leak will require a blowdown per EOP-8, RPV Blowdown. When EOP-8 is entered the crew must enter the path for all control rods not inserted to at least position 04. This will require the crew to terminate and prevent injection prior to emergency depressurization.
When the crew has depressurized the reactor thereby stopping the release, and have recovered RPV parameters and all control rods inserted, the scenario may be terminated.
Major Procedures: Nl-ST-M8, N1-SOP-40.1, N1-OP-5, N1-OP-48, N1-OP-16, Nl-SOP-1 .I EAL Matrix, EPIP-EPP-18, N1-OP-30, SOP-1, SOP-5, EOP-6, EOP-2, EOP-3, EOP-1, EOP-8.
EAL Classification: General Emergency per 3.4.2 L/,
Termination Criteria: Release terminated by depressurizingthe RPV, all control rods inserted, EOP-3 exited, EOP-2 entered and crew directed to restore reactor water level restored to 53-95.
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 2 of 42 November 2004
I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC25 l-./ B. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. EC08A, EC STM IV 111 Fail to Close = 80% (QUEUED)
- b. EC08B, EC STM IV 112 Fail to Close = 80% (QUEUED)
C. ED26, Failure of PB 11 to Auto Transfer (TRUE) (QUEUED)
- d. RD33E, Control Rod Bank 5, Insert Fail position (48) (QUEUED)
- e. RPOI B, Reactor Trip Bus MG Set Trips (141) (TRUE) (F3)
- f. RD06, Rod 22-19 Failure - Scrammed (IO Sec. TD) (TRUE) (F3) g- RD46 2219 pos 06 Single Rod Insert Fail Position TUA - 10 sec (F3)
- h. RXOI, Fuel Cladding Failure - 10% Ramp - 5 minutes, TUA - 1 Min. (F3)
- i. RXOl (relative), Fuel Cladding Failure - 20% Ramp - 5 minutes (F4)
- j. ECOGA, Emergency Condenser Tube Leak 111 - 50% Ramp 1minute (F5)
- k. ED04, AC Power Board Electrical Fault (PBI I ) , clears in 3 secs (F6)
I. RXOI , Fuel Cladding Failure - 100% Ramp - 15 minutes (F9)
- 2. Remotes:
- a. RP02, Rx Trip Bus 141 Pwr Source (MAINT)
- b. MS05, FWHTR String 12 Reset (TUA = 1 min)
- 3. Overrides:
- a. 11M40, 11 RBEVS Train flow meter downscale (L Panel Page 7of 8) 11-M040-AO-053, Set at 0.0. (QUEUED)
- b. 9DS213, Cleanup Pump Aux Suction Valve 1 (G) (OFF) (ACTIVE)
- c. 9DS214, Cleanup Pump Aux Suction Valve 1 (R) (OFF) (ACTIVE)
- 4. Annunciators:
Training Annunciator Composite (as required)
C. Equipment Out of Service NONE.
D. Support Documentation
- a. NI-ST-M8, Rx Bldg Emergency Ventilation System Operability Test marked up through step 7.3.
SETUP CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE 2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 3 of 42 November 2004
SETUP CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE E. Miscellaneous
.-- Ensure RB Ventilation Supply and Exhaust Fans 12 operating Ensure Turbine Building Ventilation Supply and Exhaust Fans 12 operating A
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 4 of 42 November 2004
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
0 Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SSS, ASSS, STA, CSO, CRE)
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
0 Shift Supervisor Log (SSS, ASSS, STA) Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SSS, ASSS, STA)
Lit Control Room Annunciators Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
0 Reactor Power = 100% 0 Loadline = 103%
ii PART 111: RemarkslPlanned Evolutions:
Monthly performance of N I-ST-M8, Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System RBEVS Operability Test.
~~
PART IV: To be reviewedlaccomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
Review new Clearances (SSS) Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
Shift Crew Composition (SSS/ASSS) 2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 5 of 42 November 2004
I Scenario ID# 2004 NRC SCENARIO #3 I NSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other Options?
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 6 of 42 November 2004
Ill. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
01 Given an un-isolatable primary system leak with indications of fuel failure the crew will enter EOP-8 and emergency depressurize the reactor.
BASIS: Emergency depressurization is required to stop the radioactive discharge from the reactor through the tube leak in the Emergency Condenser. Emergency depressurization is the only method available to remove the driving force (reactor pressure) behind the discharge.
02 Given a condition where all control rods are NOT inserted to a least position 04, the crew will manually insert control rods to at least position 04.
BASIS: Improper performance or omission of these actions contributes to degradation to a barrier to fission product release by further challenging the fuel cladding integrity.
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 7 of 42 November 2004
~~ ~~
B. Performance Objectives:
EVENT PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE 01 Given a monthly operability test for Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System, the crew will recognize an inoperable condition and take action IAW with N 1-ST-M8 and Technical Specifications.
02 Given a loss of Reactor Trip Bus 141, the crew will transfer power to the alternate power source IAW N1-OP-48.
Given a loss of Reactor Trip Bus 141, the crew will respond to a loss of Feedwater Heating IAW N I -
OP-I 6 .
Given a single rod scram, the crew will respond to a mispositioned rod IAW with N1-OP-5.
03 Given a small fuel leak, the crew will respond to rising reactor coolant activity levels IAW NI-SOP-1.1, and 25.1 04 Given a condition requiring transfer of house service and subsequent supply breaker trip, the crew will take action IAW N1-SOP-30.
Given a loss of 2 Reactor Recirculation pumps and subsequent entry into the restricted zone, the crew will take actions IAW with N1-SOP-I, 2.
05 Given an Emergency Condenser tube leak, the crew will take actions to mitigate the release IAW N1-SOP-1, 1.1 06 Given a failure of the all the control rods to insert following a scram condition, the crew will enter and execute N1-EOP-3.
07 Given coolant activity level that require a blowdown with control rods NOT inserted, the crew will terminate and prevent prior to emergency depressurization IAW N1-EOP-8 2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 8 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 01 : Monthly performance of N1-ST-M8, RBEVS Operability Test
- Instructor Activities:
- Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walk down and briefing. Allow up to 5 minutes to walk down panels and perform annunciator checks.
- INITlATfON PQINT: The initiation point for this event is when the SRO directs the performance of Monthly performance of N1-ST-M8, RBEVS Operability Test. There are NO instructor activities related to this normal evolution.
- If contacted as the A 0 report that RBEVS Fan appears to have a higher noise level than it usually has.
- If asked when EVS fan 11 starts, respond 202 10 kw heater red light is on and green light is off.
- When EVS fan 11 is SD, if asked respond 202 10 kw heater red light is off and green light is on.
SvmptonsKues Visible To The Crew:
- EMER VENT FLOW indicator 202-49B remains downscale after RBEVS Fan is started.
Critical Task(s) and Justification:
- NONE 2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 9 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 01 : Monthly performance of Nl-ST-M8, RBEVS Operability Test SRO:Applicant Actions Or Behavior 0 Walk down panels prior to assuming shift.
0 Conduct shift turnover brief.
0 Assume the shift TECH SPEC DETERMINATION.
0 Recognize Tech Spec entry.
0 Locates Tech Spec 3.4.4.e.
0 Determines a 7 day LCO exists 0 Verifies the operability of redundant equipment.
0 Contacts plant supervision and notifies them of the instrument failure.
0 Contacts FIN Team or maintenance and requests assistance.
0 Brief crew on impact.
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page I O of 42 November 2004
~~ ~~~~~~ ~ ~~ __ -~ ~~ ~~
EVENT 01: Monthly performance of Nl-ST-M8, RBEVS Operability Test b
0 Walk down panels prior to assuming shift.
0 Participate in and ensure understanding of shift turnover brief.
NI-ST-M8: Getting Started BOP 0 Obtain SRO permission to perform Nl-ST-M8, RBEVS Operability Test.
0 Reviews procedure.
BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 11 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 01 : Monthly performance of NI-ST-M8, RBEVS Operability Test BOP L-.
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page I 2 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 02: Reactor Trip Bus Motor Generator 141 Trips with single rod scram.
Instructor Activities:
L/ - INlTlATlON POINT: When directed by the lead examiner, insert the following malfunction:
RPOI B, Reactor Trip Bus MG Set Trips (141) (TRUE) (F3)
RD06 Rod 22-19 Failure - Scrammed (IO Sec. TD) (F3)
RD46 2219 pos 06 Single Rod Insert Fail Position TUA - 10 sec (F3)
AFTER SCRAM IS RESET REMOVE THE FOLLOWING MALFUNCTIONS RD06 Rod 22-19 Failure - Scrammed THEN RD46 2219 pos 06 Single Rod Insert Fail Position
- Role Play: when directed to investigate, as NAO, report supply breaker to the Reactor Trip Bus MG Set Motor thermal overload relay 49 has opened. No fault of the Trip Bus.
- Role Play: As Reactor Engineer when first notified that control rod 22-19 is at position 06 due to an individual rod scram suggest that reactor power be immediately lowered to 90% with recirculation flow while you run a check of core parameters.
- Role Play: WHEN ASKED for a GAP-OPS-05, Attachment 1, REACTIVITY MANEUVER REQUEST FORM, tell the control room you will write it up after you determine the control rod manipulations required.
- Role Play: IF ASKED as Reactor Engineer to determine if specification 3.1. l a (Shutdown Margin) is met within six (6) hours state you will start it immediately.
- Role Play: As NAO report that Rx Trip Bus 141 is transferred (F7)and % scram and FW heaters may be reset (F8)
- Role Play: As electrical maintenance, report ground on PBI 3B bus bar.
- REMOTE FUNCTIONS:
RP02, Rx Trip Bus 141 Pwr Source (MAINT). (F7)
This normally would take approximately 20 minutes-will use time compression.
MS05, FWHTR String 12 Reset (F8)
Reset Control Rod Drift (remote RD07)
L - continued on next page -
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 13 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 02: Reactor Trip Bus Motor Generator 141 Trips with single rod scram.
- continued from previous page-Svmptons/Cues Visible To The Crew:
L-CRD accumulator light for control rod 22-19 energizes.
CRD scram light for control rod 22-19 energizes.
Scram Solenoid lights for RTS B de-energize.
F3-2-5, CRD ACCUMULATOR LEVEL HIGH PRESS LOW F4-3-2, RX. TRIP BUS M-G SET 141 TROUBLE F3-2-6, CONTROL ROD DRIFT F4-3-8, RPS CH 12 MAN REACTOR TRIP F4-2-8, RPS CH 12 AUTO REACTOR TRIP Critical Task(s) and Justification:
- None
- L e -
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 14 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 02: Reactor Trip Bus Motor Generator 141 Trips with single rod scram.
0 Acknowledge report of following alarms and indications:
- CRD accum light for control rod 22-19 energizes.
- CRD scram light for control rod 22-19 energizes.
- Scram Solenoid lights for RPS B de-energize.
- F3-2-5, CRD ACCUMULATOR LEVEL HIGH PRESS LOW
- F4-3-2, RX. TRIP BUS M-G SET 141 TROUBLE
- F3-2-6, CONTROL ROD DRIFT
- F4-3-8, RPS CH 12 MAN REACTOR TRIP
- F4-2-8, RPS CH 12 AUTO REACTOR TRIP
- Control Rod 22-19 position indication is at position 02.
0 Enter N1-SOP-I 6.1 Feedwater System Failures Cl Dispatch operator/Electrical Maintenance to investigate loss of RX. Trip Bus M-G Set 141.
0 Enter N1-OP-5 Control Rod Drive System, Section H.9, Control Rod(s)
Mispositioned or double notched.
0 Determine I & C Bus 130A is available, then dispatch an operator to perform a dead bus transfer per N1-OP-48.
0 Confirm Unit parameters are normal and direct resetting the scram.
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 15 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 02: Reactor Trip Bus Motor Generator 141 Trips with single rod scram.
0 Directs RO to attempt moving control rod 22-19 with the CRD system using the EMERGENCY ROD IN switch per F3-2-6.
0 Brief crew on event impact.
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 16 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 02: Reactor Trip Bus Motor Generator 141 Trips with single rod scram.
~\,
RO 0 Recognize/Report the following alarms and indications:
- CRD accum light for control rod 22-19 energizes.
- CRD scram light for control rod 22-19 energizes.
- Scram Solenoid lights for RPS B de-energize.
- F3-2-5, CRD ACCUMULATOR LEVEL HIGH PRESS LOW
- F4-3-2, RX. TRIP BUS M-G SET 141 TROUBLE
- F3-2-6, CONTROL ROD DRIFT
- F4-3-8, RPS CH 12 MAN REACTOR TRIP
- F4-2-8, RPS CH 12 AUTO REACTOR TRIP
- Control Rod 22-19 position indication is at position 06.
RO 0 Determines I & C Bus 130A is available 0 Directs an operator to determine the status of MG Set 141.
0 Directs an operator to perform a dead bus transfer per N1-OP-48 RO F4-2-8 ACTIONS 0 Determines RPS Channel 11 sensors are normal.
0 When power is restored resets RPS Channel 12 trip.
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page I 7 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 02: Reactor Trip Bus Motor Generator 141 Trips with single rod scram.
-4 0 Enters N1-OP-16.1, Feedwater System Failures from F4-3-2, RX. TRIP BUS M-G SET 141 TROUBLE.
RO RO POWER REDUCTION 0 Reduce recirc flow using Master Recirc Flow Control.
W 2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 18 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 03: Fuel Failure/Off-Gas Radiation Monitor Annunciator Instructor Activities:
- No activities are required for the fuel failure, that malfunction begins when control rod 22-19
-w scrammed and is on a ramp.
- RXOI, Fuel Cladding Failure - 10% Ramp - 5 minutes, TUA - 1 Min. (F3)
- After Emerg Power Reduction, Insert
- RXOI , Fuel Cladding Failure - 20% Ramp - 5 minutes (F4)
- If the operators attempt to manually transfer house loads to the reserve transformer insert following fault when breaker R113 is opened. NOTE this fault will automaticallyclear in 3 seconds allowing the operator to recover the bus.
- ED04, AC Power Board Electrical Fault (PBI I), clears in 3 secs (F6)
- Role Play: If reports to management personnel are received, acknowledge the reports.
- Role Play: When directed as Chemistry to sample off-gas and reactor coolant for gross activity report back in 1 minute that reactor coolant gross activity is 34 pCi/gm I 13' equivalent and confirmation of fuel leak. If further samples are requested, report every six (6) minutes increasing the number by two (2) each time, i.e. 64 pCi/gm, 128 pCi/gm, etc.
Svmptons/Cues Visible To The Crew:
Annunciator H I 7, OFF GAS HIGH RADIATION Rising off-gas radiation levels on RAM-RN12A and 12B.
Critical Task(s1 and Justification:
- NONE 2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page I 9 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 03: Fuel FailureIOff-Gas Radiation Monitor Annunciator 0 Acknowledge report of off-gas high radiation annunciator.
0 Enter N1-SOP-25.2 Fuel Failure/HighActivity 0 Implements EPIP-EPP-18, Activation and Direction of the Emergency Plans, Attachment 1 SM/ED CHECKLIST.
0 Brief crew on event impact.
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 20 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 03: Fuel Failure/Off-Gas Radiation Monitor Annunciator v
0 Recognizeheport HI-1-7, OFF GAS HIGH RADIATION, in alarm.
RO 0 When directed, lower reactor power using recirculation flow in accordance with N I -
SOP-I . I , Emergency Power Reduction.
ii N1-SOP-I .IACTIONS BOP 0 Transfers House Service to the Reserve Bus per N1-OP-30, Section G RO 0 Lower recirculation flow using the RECIRC MASTER Controller to the top of the Restricted Zone (5 43 Mlb/hr, -65% power).
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 21 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 03: Fuel Failure/Off-Gas Radiation Monitor Annunciator BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 22 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 04: Loss of PB I 1 Instructor Activities:
- INITIATION POINT: Upon completion of Emergency Power Reduction, Insert F-6.
u Malfunctions:
- a. ED04, AC Power Board Electrical Fault (PBI I), clears in 3 secs (F6)
OTHER WISE THE MALFUNCTION BELOW WILL OCCUR AUTOMATICALLY:
- b. ED26, Failure of PB 11 to Auto Transfer (TRUE) (QUEUED)
- Role Play: If sent to inspect PB 11 or Breakers R112 and R113, report there are NO indications of a fault on the PB or the breakers.
SymptonsKues Visible To The Crew:
- Annunciators: A4-1-1, POWER BOARD 11 R113 TRIP and A4-1-2, POWER BOARD I 1 R112 TRIP Critical Task(s) and Justification:
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 23 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 04: Loss of PB 11 L4-,
0 Acknowledge report of following alarms and indications:
0 A4-1-1, POWER BOARD 1 I R113 TRIP 0 A4-1-2, POWER BOARD I 1 R112 TRIP 0 Loss of power to PB 11 0 Direct entry into N1-SOP-30.1, Loss of Power Board 11.
0 Recognize/Diagnose the trip of Reactor Recirc Pumps I 1 and 12 0 Enters N1-SOP-1.3 Recirc Pump Trip at Power TECH SPEC DETERMINATION 0 Insufficient time to make a determination at this time 0 Brief crew on event impact.
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 24 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 04: Loss of PB I 1 L- 0 Recognize/Report the following alarms and indications:
O A4-1-1, POWER BOARD 11 R113 TRIP 0 A4-1-2, POWER BOARD I 1 R112 TRIP O Loss of power to PB 11 0 Per direction and ARP-A4 enter N1 -SOP-30.1, Loss of Power Board 11.
BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 25 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 04: Loss of PB 11 0 When directed enters N1-SOP-01, Reactor Scram RO BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 26 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 05: Piping Rupture in EC Loop 11
- INITXATTON POINT: When the scram occurs insert the following:
W ECOGA, Emergency Condenser Tube Leak 111 (F5)
RXOl , Fuel Cladding Failure - 100% Ramp - 15 minutes (F9)
EC08A EC STM IV 111 Fail to Close = 80% (QUEUED)
EC08B EC STM IV 112 Fail to Close = 80% (QUEUED)
RD33E, Control Rod Bank 5, Insert Fail position (48) (QUEUED)
- Role Play: Continue as Chemistry to sample off-gas and reactor coolant for gross activity report every nine (6) minutes increasing the number by two (2) each time, Le. 64 pCi/gm, 128 pCi/gm, etc.
- Role Play: When requested as RP to check dose rates at the EC piping above elevation 340 respond that you will send a Tech up right away. If called back report that you have not heard back from the Tech and that you will try to contact the Tech.
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 27 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 05: Piping Rupture in EC Loop I 1 L'
0 Acknowledges report of annunciator, K-I 4, EC Rad Monitors.
0 Directs crew to obtain a radiation value from RE-RN04B-4.
0 Directs the isolation of 12 EC.
SOP-I . I , Emergency Power Reduction 0 Direct a reduction in recirc flow to a new target reactor power level. This determination is based on the reports from the field.
0 Declares a Site Area Emergency (Loss of Primary Containment Integrity, with a leakage path). EAL 3.4.1 Request Shift Chem Tech assess EC effluent dose IAW Tech Specs and ODCM.
0 Directs a reactor scram 0 Brief crew on impact of event.
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 28 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 05: Piping Rupture in EC Loop I 1 0 Reportshesponds to annunciator K-1-1-4, EC Rad Monitors.
0 Confirms alarm on computer printout.
0 Confirms radiation levels on J Panel.
0 Notifies crew of radiation levels on RE-RN04B-4 0 Places control switch for 39-08R in CLOSE.
0 Diagnoses failure of 39-08R to fully close.
0 Places control switch for 39-10R in CLOSE.
0 Diagnoses failure of 39-10R to fully close 0 Report failure of steam IVs.
0 Notifies RP to check dose rates at the EC piping above elevation 340.
0 When directed enters N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram RO RO BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 29 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 06: ATWS - Failure of one bank of rods to insert.
- ADJUST POINT: this malfunction was already cued, no simulator actions are required.
L RD33E, Control Rod Bank 5, Insert Fail position (48) (QUEUED)
Critical Task(s) and Justification:
02 Given a condition where all control rods are NOT inserted to a least position 04, the crew will manually insert control rods to at least position 04.
BASIS: Improper performance or omission of these actions contributes to degradation to a barrier to fission product release by further challenging the fuel cladding integrity.
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 30 of 42 November 2004
ATWS - Failure of one bank of rods to insert.
licant Actions Or Behavior L-O Acknowledge report control rods failed to insert (ATWS).
0 Enter EOP-2, RPV Control (see below) then exit and go to EOP-3,Failure to Scram (see below).
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 31 of 42 November 2004
ATWS - Failure of one bank of rods to insert.
EXIT FROM EOP-3 0 If all rods in then:
0 Direct stopping LP injection.
0 Exit EOP-3 and Enter EOP-2 (see below).
EOP-2, RPV CONTROL 0 Direct maintaining RPV water level to +53 to +95using Cond/FW and CRD.
0 Brief crew on event.
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 32 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 06: ATWS - Failure of one bank of rods to insert.
C' 0 Recognize/ report all control rods not inserted: ATWS.
0 When directed bypass ADS and report ADS bypassed.
0 Inform SRO that reactor power ~ 6 % .
BOP ADS INHIBIT 0 Place ADS CH 11 keylock to BY 0 Place ADS CH 121 keylock to BYPASS.
c1 When directed prevent Core Spray injection per EOP-1, Attachment 4.
BOP c1 Verify containment isolations per SOP-40.2.
c1 If directed install MSlV jumpers per EOP-1, Attachment 2.
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 33 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 06: ATWS - Failure of one bank of rods to insert.
0 Monitor and report if 600 gallons boron injected (800 gallons in LP tank).
0 Monitor and report if all rods inserted to 04.
When directed initiate ARI.
BOP 0 Depress MANUAL ARI pushbutton 0 When directed perform EOP-3.1, Section 3 (driving rods) and 4 (manual scrams).
0 Reactor Mode Switch to RO Both SECTION 3 quire the following actions DEFEAT ARI 0 Place ARI OVERRID RIDE.
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 34 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 06: ATWS - Failure of one bank of rods to insert.
v RT RPS SCRAM YPASS JUMPE 0 Obtain tools and EOP toolbox at SM desk.
ers at EOP ISOLATIO between 1N1A and 1N I B 1K7 TO REL AY 11K8TORELAY 11 LAY 12K7 TO RELAY 11 RELAY 12K8 TO RELAY 12K5 CT-2 RO 2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 35 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 06: ATWS - Failure of one bank of rods to insert.
0 When directed to inject liquid poison (Go to event 06, LP Pump Trip).
BOP 0 Monitor and report when all rods inserted to 04.
0 When directed to stop liquid poison injection.
BOP STOP LIQUID POISON INJECTION (OP-12 G.0) 0 Place keylock switch to OFF.
0 Confirm GREEN LIGHT ON and RED LIGHT OFF for pump started.
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EVENT 07: Gross Fuel Failure goes to General Emergency
- INITIATION POINT: This condition results from the continued degradation of the fuel from the previously inserted malfunction. When Chemistry notifies the Control Room that reactor coolant activity is approaching >300 pCi/gm 1 13 equivalent the SRO must anticipate the offsite release rate reaching the Emergency Plan General Emergency level and in accordance with N 1-EOP-6 RPV direct a blowdown.
RXOl, Fuel Cladding Failure - 100% Ramp - 15 minutes (F9)
- Role Play: Continue as Chemistry to sample off-gas and reactor coolant for gross activity report every six (6) minutes increasing the number by two (2) each time, i.e. 64 iCi/gm, 128 pCi/gm, etc.
- As Chemistry, call and state that external exposure rate is 750 mrem/Hr TEDE.
Critical Taskfs) and Justification:
01 Given an un-isolatable primary system leak with indications of fuel failure the crew will enter EOP-8 and emergency depressurize the reactor.
BASIS: Emergency depressurization is required to stop the radioactive discharge from the reactor through the tube leak in the Emergency Condenser. Emergency depressurization is the only method available to remove the driving force (reactor pressure) behind the discharge.
i--
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EVENT 07: Gross Fuel Failure goes to General Emergency 0 Evaluate EAL matrix and determine the rising reactor coolant activity with the un-isolated EC leak will require declaring a General Emergency per section 3.4.2 of EPIP-EPP-01 Emergency Action Level Matrix.
0 Per N1-EOP-6 Direct entering N1-EOP-8 and blowing down.
EMERGENCY EVENT CLASSIFICATION 0 Evaluate EAL matrix for reportability (Based on latest chemistry report) a General Emergency per section 3.4.2.
0 Brief crew on event.
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 38 of 42 November 2004
EVENT 07: Gross Fuel Failure goes to General Emergency 0 Recognize/ report reactor coolant leak.
CT-I BOP 2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 39 of 42 November 2004
V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE Exam)
A. After the second caucus, convene the crew in the classroom for a facilitative critique:
- 1. What the crew saw and how they responded to each event?
- 2. Why the crew responded the way they did or their goal?
- 3. What went well during the scenario (STRENGTHS)?
- 4. What the crew could have done better (AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT)?
B. Ensure the expectations in each performance objective are discussed.
C. PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS (Attachment 7), that were not met, should be addressed.
D. Review the Critical Tasks if applicable.
E. At the conclusion, review the strengths and areas for improvement for improvement.
Review video tape if appropriate.
F. Significant comments from the post scenario discussion should be recorded to allow later retrieval and follow-up.
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 40 of 42 November 2004
VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events L' None
- 6. Commitments None VII. LESSONS LEARNED None 2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 41 of 42 November 2004
EVALUATED SCENARIO CHECKLIST
- 1. Additional information about these checks:
For continuing training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 604 and Appendix D.
For initial training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 301 and Appendix D.
- 2. QuaIitative Att r i butes I RealismlCredibility J 1 Event Sequencing 4 Simulator Modeling J Evaluating Crew Competencies 3.
I Malfunctions after EOP Entry I
2 2 Abnormal Events 1 Major Transients 3 EOPsUsed 2 IEOP Contingency Procedures Used I
L-50 Simulator Run Time 30 EOP Run Time 3 ICrew Critical Tasks (if applicable per Attachment 6.)
- 4. Developmental Checks:
Does every event have either a Critical Task(s) or Performance Objective?
Is Criteria given for sequencing to subsequent events?
Is termination criteria clear and unambiguous?
Does termination criteria allow verification that all CT, PO standards are met?
2004 NRC SCENARIO ALTERNATE Page 42 of 42 November 2004