Text

Final Operating Test (Sections a, B, and C) (Folder 3)
	ML21123A241
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	04/19/2021
From:	Brian Fuller; Operations Branch I
To:	Alexander M; Exelon Nuclear Generation Corp
	Fuller B
Shared Package
ML20233A469	List: IR 05000410/2021302; ML21123A189; ML21123A198; ML21123A224; ML21123A241; ML21131A189; ML21133A147; ML21133A242; ML21137A160; ML21137A169; ML21137A240;
References
	EPID L-2021-OLL-0027
	Download: ML21123A241 (440)
	v • d • e

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC RO Admin COO1 Revision: 0.0

Title:

Perform Jet Pump Flow Mismatch Checks IAW N2OSPLOGD001, Attachment 10 Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / Mike Alexander 3/22/21 Validated by: N/A / Don Carr 12/30/20 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 3/26/21 Approximate Duration: 30 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 1 of 21 April 2021

References

1. N2OSPLOGD001, Rev. 02500, Daily Checks Log

2. N2OP29, Rev. 03100, Reactor Recirculation System

3. NUREG 1123 K/A 2.1.18 (3.6)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 2 of 21 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM tests the operators ability to perform daily logs.

b. This JPM is not considered Alternate Path.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. N227700101004, Perform N2OSPLOGD001, Daily Checks

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: N/A N/A LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C)

K/A Statement: 2.1.18 Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, (Add justification statement below records, status boards, and reports.

for K/A's < 3.0)

K/A Importance Rating: RO 3.6 SRO N/A

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 3 of 21 April 2021

5. Recommended Start Location

a. NLC Classroom

6. JPM Setup (if required)

a. Ensure multiple copies of N2OSPLOGD001, Attachment 10 Two Loop Jet Pump Operability Verification are available.

b. Ensure each operator has a calculator.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 4 of 21 April 2021

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 5 of 21 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant is operating at 100% power.

N2OSPLOGD001 is in progress.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), given the data provided on JPM Attachment 1, complete Attachment 10 of N2OSPLOGD001. Summarize your results and document any recommended actions on the provided JPM Worksheet.

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P

Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if STD: Proper communications used.

necessary.

2. Obtains a copy of the reference procedure and review / SAT / UNSAT utilize the correct section of the procedure. P STD: Refers to the provided N2 OSPLOGD001, attachment 10.

Evaluator Note: The attached key shows N2OSPLOGD001 completed as described in JPM steps 338.

3. Records Recirc Pump Speed by checking appropriate SAT / UNSAT choice below:

STD: Recalls form the initial P conditions that reactor power is at 15 Hz (__) (Attachment 10, 100% and determines that the 60 Hz (__) step 1.0) Reactor Recirculation pump speed would be 60Hz and checks the space provided in the procedure for 60Hz.

4. Comparison of Indicated Jet Pump Loop Flows to SAT / UNSAT Predicted Jet Pump Loop Flows by Recirc Flow Control P STD: Reads/reviews and Valve Positions (SR 3.4.3.1.a) (Attachment 10, determines that the step is step 2.0) applicable and placekeeps step.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 6 of 21 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

5. Records Recirc Flow Control Valve (FCV) Positions, as SAT / UNSAT follows: P STD: Reads/reviews and (Attachment 10, determines that the step is step 2.1) applicable and placekeeps step.

6. IF Recirc FCV Positions, as read on 2RCSHC1603A, SAT / UNSAT RECIRC LOOP A FLOW CONTROL, AND 2RCSHC1603B, P STD: Records Recirc FCV Positions RECIRC LOOP B FLOW CONTROL, are less than or equal in Table 101:

(Attachment 10, to 85% for FCV A AND less than or equal to 95% for FCV step 2.1.1) Loop A - 68%

B, THEN records Recirc FCV Positions in Table 10 1.

Loop B - 76%

7. IF one OR BOTH Recirc FCV Positions as read on 2RCS SAT / UNSAT HC1603A AND 2RCSHC1603B, are greater than 85% for STD: Reads/Reviews and FCV A AND greater than 95% for FCV B, determines that 2RCSHC1603A THEN obtain Recirc FCV Positions from TARS as follows: P AND 2RCSHC1603B, are less than (Attachment 10, or equal to 85% for FCV A AND less N/A, BOTH Recirc FCV Positions, as read on 2RCS step 2.1.2) than or equal to 95% for FCV B and HC1603A OR 2RCSHC1603B, are less than or equal further determines that step is to 85% for FCV A AND less than or equal to 95% for N/A. Placekeeps step as N/A.

FCV B

8. Records Jet Pump Loop Flows as follows: SAT / UNSAT P

STD: Reads/reviews and (Attachment 10, determines that the step is step 2.2) applicable and placekeeps step.

9. IF flow oscillations on indicators do NOT make an SAT / UNSAT accurate reading difficult, THEN records Summed Jet STD: Utilizes JPM Attachment 1 Pump Loop Flows from Indicators B22R611A, RECIRC data and determines the following:

LOOP 1A SUM JET PMP FLO, AND B22R611B, RECIRC B22R611A, RECIRC LOOP 1A LOOP 1B SUM JET PMP FLO, on 2CEC*PNL602, in the P SUM JET PMP FLO indicates 55 following places: (Attachment 10, mlbm/hr step 2.2.1)

B22R611B, RECIRC LOOP 1B Table 101 SUM JET PMP FLO indicates 54 Table 102 mlbm/hr and records on Table 101 and 10 2.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 7 of 21 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

10. IF flow oscillations on indicators make an accurate SAT / UNSAT reading difficult, THEN performs the following:

STD: Reads/Reviews and P determines that flow oscillations N/A, 2CEC*PNL602 meters were used (Attachment 10, on indicators do not make an step 2.2.2) accurate reading difficult and further determines that step is N/A. Placekeeps step as N/A.

11. Determines the High AND Low Limits for Jet Pump Loop SAT / UNSAT Flows as follows: P STD: Reads/reviews and (Attachment 10, determines that the step is step 2.3) applicable and placekeeps step.

12. IF Recirc Pumps are in slow speed operation, SAT / UNSAT THEN enters the following in Table 101 for the High STD: Reads/Reviews and AND Low Limits: P determines that Recirc Pumps are (Attachment 10, not in slow speed operation and step 2.3.1)

N/A, Recirc Pumps are in high speed operation further determines that step is N/A. Placekeeps step as N/A.

13. IF the Recirc Pumps are in high speed operation, SAT / UNSAT THEN performs the following: P STD: Reads/reviews and (Attachment 10, determines that the step is step 2.3.2) applicable and placekeeps step.

14. Using the Recirc FCV Position for Loop A recorded in SAT / UNSAT Table 101, obtains the Jet Pump Loop Flow High AND STD: Determines Jet Pump Loop Low Limits for Loop A from Figure 101 AND records flow limits for Loop A using Figure them in Table 101 101 curves by plotting 68% on the Xaxis and drawing a vertical line from that point until it intersects P

with all three curve lines. (1.1 JP (Attachment 10, curve defines High Limit, 0.9 JP step 2.3.2.a) curve defines the Low Limit and JP curve defines the Loop A Jet Pump Flow):

High Limit - 57 mlbm/hr (+/-0.5)

Low Limit - 46.5 mlbm/hr (+/-0.5) and records on Table 101.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 8 of 21 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

15. Using the Recirc FCV Position for Loop B recorded in SAT / UNSAT Table 101, obtains the Jet Pump Loop Flow High AND STD: Determines Jet Pump Loop Low Limits for Loop B from Figure 102 AND records flow limits for Loop A using Figure them in Table 101 102 curves by plotting 76% on the Xaxis and drawing a vertical line from that point until it intersects P with all three curve lines. (1.1 JP (Attachment 10, curve defines High Limit, 0.9 JP step 2.3.2.b) curve defines the Low Limit and JP curve defines the Loop A Jet Pump Flow):

High Limit - 57.5 mlbm/hr

(+/-0.5)

Low Limit - 47 mlbm/hr (+/-0.5) and records on Table 101.

16. Compares the actual Loop A AND Loop B Jet Pump Flows *PASS / FAIL to the respective Loop High AND Low Limits, as recorded STD: Reviews the data recorded in in Table 101, AND indicates below whether the actual Table 101 and determines that the values fall within the Limits: recorded values as a function of RCSFCV position are within the P

allowable limits for both loops and Yes No (Attachment 10, checks Yes for both Loop A and B Loop A: (__) (__) step 2.4) in the space provided in the Loop B: (__) (__) procedure step.

Failure = Yes checked for both Loop A & B in the space provided in the procedure step not achieved.

17. Comparison of Indicated Jet Pump Loop Flows to SAT / UNSAT Predicted Jet Pump Loop Flows by Recirc Loop Drive P STD: Reads/reviews and Flows (TS SR 3.4.3.1.b) (Attachment 10, determines that the step is step 3.0) applicable and placekeeps step.

18. Verifies the Jet Pump Loop Flows have been recorded in SAT / UNSAT Table 102 P STD: Recalls that this was (Attachment 10, performed in step 2.2.2.b & d and step 3.1) verifies the data is written in table 102.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 9 of 21 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

19. Obtains Recirc Loop Drive Flows as follows SAT / UNSAT P

STD: Reads/reviews and (Attachment 10, determines that the step is step 3.2) applicable and placekeeps step.

20. IF flow oscillations on recorder do NOT make an SAT / UNSAT accurate reading difficult, THEN records Recirc Loop STD: Utilizes provided JPM Drive Flows from recorder B35R614, RECIRC FLOW Attachment 1 data and determines LOOP B/FLOW LOOP A, on 2CEC*PNL602, in Table 102. that flow oscillations on indicators do not make an accurate reading P difficult and the determines the (Attachment 10, following:

step 3.2.1)

B35R614, RECIRC FLOW LOOP B indicates 42,000 gpm B35R614, RECIRC FLOW LOOP A indicates 41,000 gpm and records on Table 102.

21. IF flow oscillations on recorder makes an accurate SAT / UNSAT reading difficult, THEN performs the following:

STD: Reads/Reviews and P determines that flow oscillations N/A, 2CEC*PNL602 recorder was used (Attachment 10, on indicators do not make an step 3.2.2) accurate reading difficult and further determines that step is N/A. Placekeeps step as N/A.

22. Determines the High AND Low Limits for Jet Pump Loop SAT / UNSAT Flow as follows: P STD: Reads/reviews and (Attachment 10, determines that the step is step 3.3) applicable and placekeeps step.

23. For High Speed Pump Operation, perform 3.3.1 and SAT / UNSAT P

3.3.2.

(Attachment 10, STD: Reads/reviews and step 3.3, first determines that the step is bullet) applicable and placekeeps step.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 10 of 21 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

24. For Low Speed Pump Operation, perform 3.3.3 and SAT / UNSAT 3.3.4. P STD: Reads/reviews and (Attachment 10, determines that the step is not step 3.3, second applicable and placekeeps the step bullet) as evaluated.

25. Using the Recirc Loop A Drive Flow recorded in Table 10 SAT / UNSAT 2, obtains the Jet Pump Loop Flow High AND Low Limits STD: Determines Jet Pump Loop for Loop A from Figure 103 AND record them in Table flow limits for Loop A using Figure 102 103 curves by plotting 42,000 gpm on the Xaxis and drawing a vertical line from that point until it P intersects with all three curve lines.

(Attachment 10, (1.1 JP curve defines High Limit, 0.9 step 3.3.1) JP curve defines the Low Limit and JP curve defines the Loop A Jet Pump Flow):

High Limit - 57 mlbm/hr (+/-1.0)

Low Limit - 46 mlbm/hr (+/-1.0) and records on Table 102.

26. Using the Recirc Loop B Drive Flow recorded in Table 10 SAT / UNSAT 2, obtains the Jet Pump Loop Flow High AND Low Limits STD: Determines Jet Pump Loop for Loop B from Figure 104 AND record them in Table flow limits for Loop B using Figure 102 104 curves by plotting 41,000 gpm on the Xaxis and drawing a vertical line from that point until it P intersects with all three curve lines.

(Attachment 10, (1.1 JP curve defines High Limit, 0.9 step 3.3.2) JP curve defines the Low Limit and JP curve defines the Loop A Jet Pump Flow):

High Limit - 55 mlbm/hr (+/-1.0)

Low Limit - 45 mlbm/hr (+/-1.0) and records on Table 102.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 11 of 21 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

27. Using the Recirc Loop A Drive Flow recorded in Table 10 SAT / UNSAT 2, calculate the Jet Pump Loop Flow High AND Low STD: Reads/Reviews and Limits for Loop A using the following equation AND P determines that the Recirc Pumps (Attachment 10, records them in Table 102 in High Speed Operation and step 3.3.3) further determines that step is N/A, Recirc Pumps in High Speed Operation N/A. Placekeeps step as N/A.

28. Using the Recirc Loop B Drive Flow recorded in Table 10 SAT / UNSAT 2, calculates the Jet Pump Loop Flow High AND Low STD: Reads/Reviews and Limits for Loop B using the following equation AND P determines that the Recirc Pumps (Attachment 10, record them in Table 102 in High Speed Operation and step 3.3.4) further determines that step is N/A, Recirc Pumps in High Speed Operation N/A. Placekeeps step as N/A.

29. Compares the actual Loop A AND Loop B Jet Pump Flows *PASS / FAIL to the respective Loop High AND Low Limits, as recorded STD: Reviews the data recorded in in Table 102, AND indicates below whether the actual Table 102 and determines that the values fall within the Limits: recorded values as a function of RCS loop drive flow are within the P

allowable limits for both loops and Yes No (Attachment 10, checks Yes for both Loop A and B Loop A: (__) (__) step 3.4) in the space provided in the Loop B: (__) (__) procedure step.

Failure = Yes checked for both Loop A & B in the space provided in the procedure step not achieved.

30. Comparison of Individual Jet Pumps P to Average Jet SAT / UNSAT Pump Loop P (TS SR 3.4.3.1.c) P STD: Reads/reviews and (Attachment 10, determines that the step is step 4.0) applicable and placekeeps step.

Due to cracking in the Jet Pump #6 sensing line (reference CR2008002793), the potential for failure of the sensing line exists. If the Jet Pump #6 sensing line fails such that it reads downcomer pressure, its D/P reading will show a step jump of approximately 8% to 9% above Procedure Note:

its baseline and the indicated loop flow and core flow will increase. Jet Pump #5 D/P and generator output will not change. Should the step jump in Jet Pump #6 be observed, in addition to following the guidance in N2OP29, an IR shall be initiated.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 12 of 21 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

31. Records value for each Jet Pump P in Loop A, as read SAT / UNSAT on computer points NSSFA102 to NSSFA111, in Table 10 STD: Utilizes provided JPM

3. Attachment 1 Computer Point P Indications for Loop A Jet Pump (Attachment 10, Flows (Jet Pump P) data and step 4.1) records data in the appropriate location of Computer Points column on Table 103 (75100%

Power) table.

For the following JPM step, reasonable error may be expected based on use of significant Evaluator Note:

digits.

32. Calculates Loop A Average Jet Pump P for AND records SAT / UNSAT in Table 103.

STD: Adds up all Jet Pump Flows (Jet Pump P) data that was recorded in Table 103 (75%100%

P Power) in the previous step and (Attachment 10, divides by 10. Calculates Loop A step 4.2) average Jet Pump P value of

~5.65 and records in Table 103 (75%100% Power) in the Total location in the Computer Points column.

For the following JPM step, reasonable error may be expected based on use of significant Evaluator Note:

digits.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 13 of 21 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

33. Divides each Loop A Jet Pump P by Loop A Average Jet SAT / UNSAT Pump P AND records the resulting Individual to STD: Utilizes provided JPM Average P Ratios in Table 103 Attachment 1 Computer Point Indications for Jet Pump Flows (Jet Pump P) data and for each Loop A jet pump, divides the provided jet pump computer point data by the average Loop A Jet Pump P value calculated in the previous step

(~5.65) and obtains the following data:

P Jet Pump 1 = 1.04 (Attachment 10, Jet Pump 2 = 0.87 step 4.3) Jet Pump 3 = 0.96 Jet Pump 4 = 0.96 Jet Pump 5 = 1.11 Jet Pump 6 = 1.16 Jet Pump 7 = 0.96 Jet Pump 8 = 0.96 Jet Pump 9 = 0.96 Jet Pump 10 = 1.01 and records data in the appropriate location of Individual to Average P Ratio column on Table 103 (75100% Power) table.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 14 of 21 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

34. For ALL Jet Pumps in Loop A, compares each Jet Pumps *PASS / FAIL Individual to Average P Ratio to the Limits given in STD: Reviews the data in Table 10 Table 103 AND indicates below whether the actual 3 and determines that Jet Pumps 1 values are within the Limits: 10 are all within limits and checks Yes for Jet Pumps 1 - 10 in the space provided in the procedure Jet Pump Yes No step.

1 (__) (__) Failure = Yes checked for all Loop 2 (__) (__) A Jet Pumps in the space provided P in the procedure step not achieved.

3 (__) (__) (Attachment 10, step 4.4) 4 (__) (__)

5 (__) (__)

6 (__) (__)

7 (__) (__)

8 (__) (__)

9 (__) (__)

10 (__) (__)

35. Records value for each Jet Pump P in Loop B, as read SAT / UNSAT on computer points NSSFA112 to NSSFA121, on Table STD: Utilizes provided JPM 103. Attachment 1 Computer Point P Indications for Loop B Jet Pump (Attachment 10, Flows (Jet Pump P) data and step 4.5) records data in the appropriate location of Computer Points column on Table 103 (75100%

Power) table.

For the following JPM step, reasonable error may be expected based on use of significant Evaluator Note:

digits.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 15 of 21 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

36. Calculate Loop B Average Jet Pump P for AND record SAT / UNSAT on Table 103.

STD: Adds up all Jet Pump Flows (Jet Pump P) data that was recorded in Table 103 (75%100%

P Power) in the previous step and (Attachment 10, divides by 10. Calculates Loop B step 4.6) average Jet Pump P value of

~5.39 and records in Table 103 (75%100% Power) in the Total location in the Computer Points column.

For the following JPM step, reasonable error may be expected based on use of significant Evaluator Note:

digits.

37. Divides each Loop B Jet Pump P by Loop B Average Jet SAT / UNSAT Pump P AND records the resulting Individual to STD: Utilizes provided JPM Average P Ratios in Table 103. Attachment 1 Computer Point Indications for Jet Pump Flows (Jet Pump P) data and for each Loop B jet pump, divides the provided jet pump computer point data by the average Loop B Jet Pump P value calculated in the previous step

(~5.39) and obtains the following data:

P Jet Pump 11 = 1.04 (Attachment 10, Jet Pump 12 = 0.98 step 4.7) Jet Pump 13 = 0.76 Jet Pump 14 = 0.96 Jet Pump 15 = 1.11 Jet Pump 16 = 1.16 Jet Pump 17 = 1.04 Jet Pump 18 = 0.98 Jet Pump 19 = 1.01 Jet Pump 20 = 0.96 and records data in the appropriate location of Individual to Average P Ratio column on Table 103 (75100% Power) table.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 16 of 21 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

38. For ALL Jet Pumps in Loop A, compares each Jet Pumps *PASS / FAIL Individual to Average P Ratio to the Limits given in STD: Reviews the data in Table 10 Table 103 AND indicates below whether the actual 3 and determines that Jet Pumps values are within the Limits: 11, 12 and 14 20 are all within limits and Jet Pump 13 is NOT within limits and checks Yes for Jet Pump Yes No Jet Pumps 11, 12 and 14 - 20 and 11 (__) (__) No for Jet Pump 13 in the space provided in the procedure step.

12 (__) (__)

P Failure = Yes checked for Jet 13 (__) (__) (Attachment 10, Pumps 11, 12 and 14 - 20 and step 4.8) No for Jet Pump 13 in the space 14 (__) (__)

provided in the procedure step not 15 (__) (__) achieved.

16 (__) (__)

17 (__) (__)

18 (__) (__)

19 (__) (__)

20 (__) (__)

39. Informs US / SM that Jet Pump 13 is not within the limits SAT / UNSAT of Table 103 STD: US/SM INFORMED TO TAKE P

ACTIONS FOR Jet Pump 13. Proper Cue: As US / SM, inform candidate that appropriate Communications Used.

actions will be taken for Jet pump 13.

TASK STANDARD Attachment 10 of N2OSPLOGD001 complete. Jet pump number 13 differential pressure is identified outside of allowable limits.

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 17 of 21 April 2021

Evaluators Answer Key Do not Provide to Candidate Record your results below:

Name:

Summary of Data Evaluation:

Actual Loop A and Loop B jet pump flows are within limits of Table 101 Actual Loop A and Loop B jet pump flows are within limits of Table 102 Loop A Jet Pumps are within limits of Table 103 Loop B Jet Pump 13 is NOT within specified limits of Table 103. All other jet pumps are within Table 103 limits (or similar wording)

Summary of Recommended Actions Report findings/results to the US/SM. (or similar wording)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 18 of 21 April 2021

RO JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant is operating at 100% power.

N2OSPLOGD001 is in progress.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), given the data provided on JPM Attachment 1, complete Attachment 10 of N2OSPLOGD001. Summarize your results and document any recommended actions on the provided JPM Worksheet.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 19 of 21 April 2021

JPM Attachment 1: N2OSPLOGD001 Data Sheet Provide to Applicant Item # Description Value 1 2RCSHC1603A, RECIRC LOOP A FLOW 68%

CONTROL 2 2RCSHC1603B, RECIRC LOOP B FLOW 76%

CONTROL 3 B22R611A, RECIRC LOOP 1A SUM JET 52 Mlbm/Hr PMP FLO (Flow Oscillations Minimal) 4 B22R611B, RECIRC LOOP 1B SUM JET 51 Mlbm/Hr PMP FLO (Flow Oscillations Minimal) 5 B35R614 RECIRC FLOW LOOP A 42.0 Kgpm (Flow Oscillations Minimal) 6 B35R614 RECIRC FLOW LOOP B 41.0 Kgpm (Flow Oscillations Minimal) 7 Computer Point Indications for Jet Pump Flows Loop A Loop B Jet pump 1 5.85 Jet pump 11 5.58 Jet pump 2 4.90 Jet pump 12 5.30 Jet pump 3 5.44 Jet pump 13 4.08 Jet pump 4 5.44 Jet pump 14 5.17 Jet pump 5 6.26 Jet pump 15 5.98 Jet pump 6 6.53 Jet pump 16 6.26 Jet pump 7 5.44 Jet pump 17 5.58 Jet pump 8 5.44 Jet pump 18 5.30 Jet pump 9 5.44 Jet pump 19 5.44 Jet pump 10 5.71 Jet pump 20 5.17 NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 20 of 21 April 2021

JPM Worksheet Provide to Applicant Record your results below:

Name:

Summary of Data Evaluation:

Summary of Recommended Actions NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO1 Page 21 of 21 April 2021

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC RO Admin COO2 Revision: 0.0

Title:

Perform N2RESP001, Core Operating Limits Verification Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / Mike Alexander 03/22/21 Validated by: N/A / Damon Walsh 3/17/21 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 3/26/21 Approximate Duration: 25 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO2 Page 1 of 15 April 2021

References

1. N2RESP001, Rev. 00100, Core Operating Limits Verification

2. NUREG 1123 K/A 2.1.7 (4.4)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO2 Page 2 of 15 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM tests the operators ability to use and comply with the facilitys procedures and control room computer printouts. The applicant will perform N2RESP001 up to and including evaluation of APRM calibration data using provided 3D Monicore data.

b. This JPM is not considered Alternate Path.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. NSOPS01007, Perform or support performance of system surveillances

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: N/A N/A LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C) 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make K/A Statement: operational judgements based on operating (Add justification statement below characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument for K/A's < 3.0) interpretation.

K/A Importance Rating: RO 4.4 SRO N/A

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO2 Page 3 of 15 April 2021

5. Recommended Start Location

a. Unit #2 Simulator

6. JPM Setup (if required)

a. Provide calculators.

b. Copy of N2RESP001 filled out up to and including step 5.3

c. Provide two 3D Monicore handouts one from 0600 and one from 0700 with the 0700 Core MWD/sT incremented by 0.9 MWD/sT (Add 0.9 MWD/sT to the 0600 CORE MWD/sT and the CYCLE MWD/sT value in the 3D Monicore printout)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO2 Page 4 of 15 April 2021

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO2 Page 5 of 15 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

Reactor power is 99.9%.

Both reactor Recirculation Pumps are in operation.

The Shift Manager has given permission to perform N2RESP001, Core Operating Limits Verification.

Last two 3D Monicore printouts are available for reference.

Plant is in Normal Steady State operation with EOCRPT Operable.

FWSFE102, FW LN A LEFM BIAS FACTOR and FWSFE103, FW LN B LEFM BIAS FACTOR both indicate 1.0000 Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), perform N2RESP001 up to and including step 6.19.2.

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provides repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P

Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if STD: Proper communications used.

necessary.

2. Obtains a copy of the reference procedure and review / SAT / UNSAT utilize the correct section of the procedure.

STD: Reviews that steps 4.4 and 4.5 P are complete and confirms that section 5.0 prerequisites are complete.

3. Procedure SAT / UNSAT STD: Reads/reviews and P

determines that this is the (6.0) appropriate section and placekeeps step.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO2 Page 6 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

4. Verifies Reactor thermal power is 23%. SAT / UNSAT STD: Utilizes provided 3D monicore printout and determines that CORE P

POWER MWT is 3984.2 and divides (6.1) that by rated core thermal power of 3988 MWT and determines that CORE POWER is 99.9% and initials step.

5. Checks appropriate data source: SAT / UNSAT Data from 3D MONICORE PERIODIC LOG P STD: Places checkmark in the Data Data from Manual Monitor (NFAB711)

(6.2) from 3D MONICORE PERIODIC LOG check box and initials step.

6. Checks appropriate plant operating condition(s): SAT / UNSAT Normal Steady State STD: Places checkmark in the Startup, Shutdown or Power Maneuver in Progress Normal Steady State check box Single Pressure Regulator Operation and initials step.

Single Loop Operation EOCRPT Inoperable P

Turbine Bypass Inoperable (6.3) 2 or more SRVs Inoperable 1 Turbine Control Valve or Turbine Stop Valve Inoperable 1 Main Steam Line Isolated Other (Specify) _______________________

7. Verifies Core Thermal Power 3988 MWt by at least SAT / UNSAT one of the following:

STD: Checks the 3DMONICORE 3DMONICORE PERIODIC LOG PERIODIC LOG checkbox and NSSQB001A10M CORE THERMAL POWER - 10MIN P utilizes provided 3D monicore AVG (6.4) printout(s) and determines that Core Thermal Power is < 3988 by observing CORE POWER MWT is 3984.2 and initials step.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO2 Page 7 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

8. Verifies LEFM Feedwater Flow Correction Factors both SAT / UNSAT indicate 1.000 STD: Recalls from the initial P conditions that FWSFE102 and FWSFE102 FW LN A LEFM BIAS FACTOR (6.5) FWSFE103 both indicate 1.0000 FWSFE103 FW LN B LEFM BIAS FACTOR and checks both check boxes and initials step.

9. Verifies CYCLE EXPOSURE value incrementing as SAT / UNSAT expected by performing one of the following:

STD: Checks the OR COMPARE TREND 3DBB106 CORE CYCLE AVERAGE EXPOSURE two 3D MONICORE Periodic Logs OR COMPARE two 3D MONICORE Periodic Logs P checkbox and compares both of the (6.6) provided 3D monicore printout(s) and determines that CORE MWD/sT and CYCLE MWD/sT have incremented and initials step.

10. Verifies LOOP OPTION in 3D PERIODIC LOG report SAT / UNSAT matches the number of recirculation loops in operation STD: Recalls from the initial conditions that both Reactor P Recirculation Pumps are in service (6.7) and utilizes provided 3D monicore printout(s) and determines 2 Loops on is indicated and initials step.

11. Records most limiting MFLCPR SAT / UNSAT STD: utilizes provided 3D monicore P

printout(s) and determines most (6.8) limiting MFLCPR indicates 1.021 records value and initials step.

12. Verifies MFLCPR 1.0 {TS SR 3.2.2.1}. *PASS / FAIL STD: Evaluates MFLCPR and Cue: Acknowledge report from RO that MFLCPR is determines that MFLCPR is greater exceeding TS 3.2.2.1 allowance and direct RO that P than 1.0 and notifies the US/SM, the US/SM has been informed and is taking action (6.9) notes the step and then continues on with procedure.

and to put a note on the procedure step and continue on with the procedure. Failure = Determination of MFLCPR greater than 1.0 not achieved.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO2 Page 8 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

13. Records most limiting MFLPD SAT / UNSAT STD: utilizes provided 3D monicore P

printout(s) and determines most (6.10) limiting MFLPD indicates 0.816 records value and initials step.

14. Verifies MFLPD 1.0 {TS SR 3.2.3.1}. SAT / UNSAT P STD: Evaluates MFLPD and (6.11) determines that MFLPD is less than 1.0 and initials step.

15. Records most limiting MAPRAT SAT / UNSAT STD: utilizes provided 3D monicore P

printout(s) and determines most (6.12) limiting MAPRAT indicates 0.649 records value and initials step.

16. Verifies MAPRAT 1.0 {TS SR 3.2.1.1}. SAT / UNSAT P STD: Evaluates MAPRAT and (6.13) determines that MAPRAT is less than 1.0 and initials step.

17. Verifies Failed LPRMs match CRC Book Bypass Log SAT / UNSAT STD: Utilizes provided 3D monicore printout(s) and determines the listed failed sensors and compares P

the 3D monicore list of failed (6.14) sensors against the CRC book Bypass Log list of failed sensors and determines that the lists match and initials step.

18. IF any OTHER SENSORS are FAILED, THEN DOCUMENTS SAT / UNSAT below AND LIST corrective action taken, OTHERWISE STD: Determines from the previous MARK this step N/A P step that the lists match and that (6.15) no documentation is required and N/As step.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO2 Page 9 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

19. Verifies FLOW BASIS is MEAS SAT / UNSAT STD: Utilizes provided 3D monicore P

printout(s) and determines FLOW (6.16)

BASIS indicates MEAS and initials step.

20. IF TIP RUNS RECOMMENDED are indicated on 3D SAT / UNSAT MONICORE Periodic Log, THEN notify Reactor STD: Utilizes provided 3D monicore Engineering, OTHERWISE MARK this step N/A P printout(s) and determines TIP (6.17)

RUNS RECOMMENDED indicates NONE and N/As step.

21. APRM Calibration [T/S] SAT / UNSAT STD: Reads/reviews and P

determines that this is the (6.18) appropriate section and placekeeps step.

22. Records 3DMONICORE Core Power: _____________% SAT / UNSAT STD: Utilizes provided 3D monicore P

printout(s) and determines CORE (6.18.1)

POWER indicates 99.9% and records value and initials step.

23. Records APRM values: SAT / UNSAT Parameter Required APRM Setting AsFound Value Initials Within 2% of 3D STD: Utilizes provided 3D monicore APRM CH1 MONICORE Core Power (%) printout(s) and determines APRM Within 2% of 3D CALIBRATION READINGS for the APRM CH2 MONICORE Core Power (%)

APRMs as follows:

Within 2% of 3D APRM CH3 MONICORE Core Power (%) P APRM #1 = 100.0 Within 2% of 3D (6.18.2)

APRM CH4 MONICORE Core Power (%)

APRM #2 = 97.1 APRM #3 = 99.9 APRM #4 = 100.0 and records values in the table AS Found Value column and initials table step.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO2 Page 10 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA Per T.S. 3.3.1.1 Note 2: When Functions 2.b and 2.c channels are inoperable due to the Procedure Note: calculated power exceeding the APRM output by more than 2% RTP while operating at 23%

RTP, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months

24. IF any APRM value is outside the Required APRM *PASS / FAIL Setting, THEN NOTIFY SM to review TS 3.3.1.1 Functions STD: Compares data recorded in 2.b and 2.c, OTHERWISE MARK this step N/A. step 6.18.1 and data recorded for each APRM recorded in step 6.18.2 Cue: Acknowledge report from RO that APRM CH2 is and determines that APRM CH2 is P

outside the required APRM setting outside the required APRM setting and the need (6.18.3) and notifies the SM to review TS to review TS 3.3.1.1 Functions 2.b and 2.c. 3.3.1.1 Functions 2.b and 2.c.

Failure = Determination that APRM CH2 is outside the required APRM setting not achieved.

APRM gain adjustment is required if outside the allowable band OR may also be performed for other operational considerations provided the AsLeft setting meets Technical Specification requirements.

Procedure Note:

The new gain may be calculated by using the following equation:

New APRM Gain = (Required APRM Reading) x (Current APRM Gain)

(Current APRM Reading)

25. IF APRMs require adjustment, THEN PERFORM APRM SAT / UNSAT gain adjustments as follows, OTHERWISE MARK these P STD: Reads/reviews and steps N/A: (6.19) determines that this section is applicable and placekeeps step.

26. Records 3D MONICORE Core Power (%): SAT / UNSAT STD: Utilizes provided 3D monicore Required APRM Setting: _____________ printout(s) and determines CORE P

POWER indicates 99.9% and (6.19.1) records value in the required APRM setting space provided and initials step.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO2 Page 11 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

27. Identifies APRMs requiring adjustment. *PASS / FAIL STD: Compares data recorded in step 6.19.1 and data recorded for each APRM recorded in step 6.18.2 and determines that APRM CH2 is P

outside the required APRM setting (6.19.2) and checks the check box for APRM 2.

Failure = Determination that APRM 2 requires adjustment is not achieved.

After the applicant identifies which APRM(s) require adjustment, if any, provide the following cue:

Evaluator Note:

Cue: Your task is complete, another operator will complete any remaining actions.

TASK STANDARD Correctly completes N2RESP001 for the given 3D monicore information up to and including step 6.19.2.

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO2 Page 12 of 15 April 2021

RO JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

Reactor power is 99.9%.

Both reactor Recirculation Pumps are in operation.

The Shift Manager has given permission to perform N2RESP001, Core Operating Limits Verification.

Last two 3D Monicore printouts are available for reference.

Plant is in Normal Steady State operation with EOCRPT Operable.

FWSFE102, FW LN A LEFM BIAS FACTOR and FWSFE103, FW LN B LEFM BIAS FACTOR both indicate 1.0000 Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), perform N2RESP001 up to and including step 6.19.2.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO2 Page 13 of 15 April 2021

CRC Book Bypass Log (Provide to applicant)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO2 Page 14 of 15 April 2021

Attachment 1 (Provide to applicant)

Provide both copies of Note Pad 3D Monicore Official Case NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO COO2 Page 15 of 15 April 2021

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC RO Admin EC Revision: 0.0

Title:

Evaluate Injection System Vortex Limits Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / Mike Alexander 3/23/21 Validated by: N/A / Don Carr 12/30/20 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 3/26/21 Approximate Duration: 15 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EC Page 1 of 14 April 2021

References

1. NER2M039, Rev. 10.00, NMP2 Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Procedures (EOP/SAP) Basis Document

2. N2EOP6.29, Rev. 00100, Determining HCTL/NPSH/Vortex Limits

3. N2EOPC5 flowchart, Rev. 01400, Failure To Scram Flowchart

4. NUREG 1123 K/A 2.2.44 (4.2)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EC Page 2 of 14 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM tests the operators ability to interpret control room indications and evaluate injection system vortex limits and then determine associated required operator actions in accordance with N2EOP6.29 section 6.3.

b. This JPM is not considered Alternate Path.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. NSOPS01004, Determine Vortex Limit

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: N/A N/A LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C) 2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indications to K/A Statement: verify the status and operation of a system, and (Add justification statement below understand how operator actions and directives affect for K/A's < 3.0) plant and system conditions.

K/A Importance Rating: RO 4.2 SRO N/A

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EC Page 3 of 14 April 2021

5. Recommended Start Location

a. NLC Classroom

6. JPM Setup (if required)

a. N2EOP6.29 NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EC Page 4 of 14 April 2021

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EC Page 5 of 14 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant has suffered a seismic event with the following:

A vertical crack in the suppression pool wall occurs.

A LOCA has occurred resulting in low RPV water level.

The reactor has been scrammed and all control rods did not fully insert.

Reactor power is 2% and has remained at or below 2% for the entire transient.

Condensate and feedwater system has been severely damaged and is not available.

It was determined that RPV level could not be maintained above 39 inches actual The RPV was blown down per N2EOPC2.

RPV pressure has stabilized at 150 psig.

All available Preferred and Alternate ATWS injection systems are lined up and injecting (see data below)

CST suction source for RCIC is not available.

All available ECCS injection systems are taking a suction from the suppression pool resulting in suppression pool water level stabilizing at 192.5 ft by control room indication.

RPV level is rising with no indications of recriticality and currently just rose above the top of active fuel.

Injection system status:

HPCS is in PullToLock per N2EOPC5.

RCIC is injecting at 500 gpm LPCS is injecting at 7,500 gpm LPCI A has tripped due to a motor electrical fault LPCI B is injecting at 7,500 gpm LPCI C is not injecting due to its associated injection valve failing to open.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), evaluate injection system Vortex limits using the current given plant data in accordance with N2EOP6.29, Determining HCTL/NPSH/Vortex Limits section 6.3 and complete the provided JPM Worksheet.

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P

Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if STD: Proper communications used.

necessary.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EC Page 6 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

2. Obtains a copy of the reference procedure and review / SAT / UNSAT utilize the correct section of the procedure.

STD: Obtains any of the following as necessary to determine the P plant impact:

NER2M039 N2EOP6.29 N2EOPC5 flowchart The applicant will evaluate the following injection systems:

o RCIC (JPM Steps 3 through 7) o LPCS (JPM Steps 8 through 12)

Evaluator Note:

o LPCI B (JPM Steps 13 through 17)

Therefore N2EOP6.29 steps 6.3.1 through 6.3.4 will be repeated for each of the above systems

3. Determining pump Vortex Limits (RCIC) SAT / UNSAT P

STD: Reads/reviews and (6.3) determines that the step is applicable and placekeeps step,

4. Records Suppression Pool Water Level as read in the SAT / UNSAT Control Room.

STD: Determines from given initial conditions that suppression pool P

_________ Feet water level is 192.5 feet and writes (6.3.1) the value in the space provided for RCIC on the provided JPM Worksheet.

5. Obtains system flow for pump in question, as read in the SAT / UNSAT Control Room. (RCIC)

STD: Determines from given initial P conditions that RCIC pump flow is

_________ gpm (6.3.2) 500 gpm and writes the value in the space provided for RCIC on the provided JPM Worksheet.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EC Page 7 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

6. Using the appropriate figure for the pump in question *PASS / FAIL (Figures 2 through 5) determines if the pump Vortex STD: Plots the value of Suppression Limit is being exceeded. Pool water level (192.5 EL. Ft) on the Yaxis AND the value of RCIC pump flow (gpm) (500 gpm) on the Xaxis of Figure 5 and determines that the intersection of the plotted lines falls within the BAD region of P the graph. Determines that RCIC is (6.3.3) exceeding the vortex limit and circles the words Exceeding in the space provided for RCIC on the provided JPM Worksheet.

Failure = Exceeding circled in the space provided for RCIC on the provided JPM Worksheet not achieved.

7. IF the Vortex Limit is being exceeded AND throttling *PASS / FAIL pump discharge flow will NOT prevent meeting the STD: Determines from the flowchart objective, throttles pump discharge flow using conditions given that the RPV is the following procedures. above the top of active fuel and rising and determines that the flowchart objective is to restore For RCIC, EOP6.4: THROTTLING RCIC INJECTION and maintain RPV water level above 39 inches. Further determines that RCIC injection flow P is required to be throttled back to get on the Good side of Figure 5.

(6.3.4)

Circles the words Throttle to Reduce RCIC Discharge Flow in the space provided for RCIC on the provided JPM Worksheet.

Failure = Throttle to Reduce RCIC Discharge Flow circled in the space provided for RCIC on the provided JPM Worksheet with explanation section filled in not achieved.

8. Determining pump Vortex Limits (LPCS) SAT / UNSAT P

STD: Reads/reviews and (6.3) determines that the step is applicable and placekeeps step, NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EC Page 8 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

9. Records Suppression Pool Water Level as read in the SAT / UNSAT Control Room.

STD: Determines from given initial conditions that suppression pool P

_________ Feet water level is 192.5 feet and writes (6.3.1) the value in the space provided for LPCS on the provided JPM Worksheet.

10. Obtains system flow for pump in question, as read in the SAT / UNSAT Control Room. (LPCS)

STD: Determines from given initial P conditions that LPCS pump flow is

_________ gpm (6.3.2) 7,500 gpm and writes the value in the space provided for LPCS on the provided JPM Worksheet.

11. Using the appropriate figure for the pump in question *PASS / FAIL (Figures 2 through 5) determines if the pump Vortex STD: Plots the value of Suppression Limit is being exceeded. Pool water level (192.5 EL. Ft) on the Yaxis AND the value of LPCS pump flow (gpm) (7,500 gpm) on the Xaxis of Figure 3 and determines that the intersection of the plotted lines falls within the P BAD region of the graph.

(6.3.3) Determines that LPCS is exceeding the vortex limit and circles the words Exceeding in the space provided for LPCS on the provided JPM Worksheet.

Failure = Exceeding circled in the space provided for LPCS on the provided JPM Worksheet not achieved.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EC Page 9 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

12. IF the Vortex Limit is being exceeded AND throttling *PASS / FAIL pump discharge flow will NOT prevent meeting the STD: Determines from the flowchart objective, throttles pump discharge flow using conditions given that the RPV is the following procedures. above the top of active fuel and rising and determines that the flowchart objective is to restore N/A, Vortex Limits are NOT being exceeded and maintain RPV water level above 39 inches. Further determines that LPCS injection flow P is required to be throttled back to get on the Good side of Figure 3.

(6.3.4)

Circles the words Throttle to Reduce RCIC Discharge Flow in the space provided for LPCS on the provided JPM Worksheet.

Failure = Throttle to Reduce LPCS Discharge Flow circled in the space provided for LPCS on the provided JPM Worksheet with explanation section filled in not achieved.

13. Determining pump Vortex Limits (LPCI B) SAT / UNSAT P

STD: Reads/reviews and (6.3) determines that the step is applicable and placekeeps step,

14. Records Suppression Pool Water Level as read in the SAT / UNSAT Control Room.

STD: Determines from given initial conditions that suppression pool P

_________ Feet water level is 192.5 feet and writes (6.3.1) the value in the space provided for LPCI B on the provided JPM Worksheet.

15. Obtains system flow for pump in question, as read in the SAT / UNSAT Control Room. (LPCI B)

STD: Determines from given initial P conditions that LPCI B pump flow

_________ gpm (6.3.2) is 7,500 gpm and writes the value in the space provided for LPCI B on the provided JPM Worksheet.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EC Page 10 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

16. Using the appropriate figure for the pump in question *PASS / FAIL (Figures 2 through 5) determines if the pump Vortex STD: Plots the value of Suppression Limit is being exceeded. Pool water level (192.5 EL. Ft) on the Yaxis AND the value of LPCI B pump flow (gpm) (7,500 gpm) on the Xaxis of Figure 4 and determines that the intersection of the plotted lines falls within the P GOOD region of the graph.

(6.3.3) Determines that LPCI B is NOT exceeding the vortex limit and circles the words Not Exceeding in the space provided for LPCI B on the provided JPM Worksheet.

Failure = Not Exceeding circled in the space provided for LPCI B on the provided JPM Worksheet not achieved.

17. IF the Vortex Limit is being exceeded AND throttling SAT / UNSAT pump discharge flow will NOT prevent meeting the STD: Determines from the flowchart objective, throttles pump discharge flow using conditions given that the RPV is the following procedures. above the top of active fuel and rising and determines that the flowchart objective is to restore N/A, Vortex Limits are NOT being exceeded P and maintain RPV water level (6.3.4) above 39 inches. Further determines that LPCI B injection flow is not required to be throttled back to get on the Good side of Figure 4. Circles the words Control LPCS Injection Flow as Desired in the space provided for LPCI B on the provided JPM Worksheet.

TASK STANDARD The applicant has plotted and determined RCIC, LPCS and LPCI B vortex limits and associated actions based on the given information and completed all required portions of the attached worksheet.

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EC Page 11 of 14 April 2021

Evaluators Answer Key Do not Provide to Candidate RCIC Step 6.3.1 Record Suppression Pool Level Value: 192.5 Step 6.3.2 Record RCIC System Flow Value: 500 Vortex Limit Evaluation:

Exceeding / Not Exceeding (circle one)

Operator Action:

Control RCIC Injection Flow as Desired / Throttle to Reduce RCIC Discharge Flow (circle one)

LPCS Step 6.3.1 Record Suppression Pool Level Value: 192.5 Step 6.3.2 Record LPCS System Flow Value: 7,500 Vortex Limit Evaluation:

Exceeding / Not Exceeding (circle one)

Operator Action:

Control LPCS Injection Flow as Desired / Throttle to Reduce LPCS Discharge Flow (circle one)

LPCI B Step 6.3.1 Record Suppression Pool Level Value: 192.5 Step 6.3.2 Record LPCI B System Flow Value: 7,500 Vortex Limit Evaluation:

Exceeding / Not Exceeding (circle one)

Operator Action:

Control LPCI B Injection Flow as Desired / Throttle to Reduce LPCI B Discharge Flow (circle one)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EC Page 12 of 14 April 2021

RO JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant has suffered a seismic event with the following:

A vertical crack in the suppression pool wall occurs.

A LOCA has occurred resulting in low RPV water level.

The reactor has been scrammed and all control rods did not fully insert.

Reactor power is 2% and has remained at or below 2% for the entire transient.

Condensate and feedwater system has been severely damaged and is not available.

It was determined that RPV level could not be maintained above 39 inches actual The RPV was blown down per N2EOPC2.

RPV pressure has stabilized at 150 psig.

All available Preferred and Alternate ATWS injection systems are lined up and injecting (see data below)

CST suction source for RCIC is not available.

All available ECCS injection systems are taking a suction from the suppression pool resulting in suppression pool water level stabilizing at 192.5 ft by control room indication.

RPV level is rising with no indications of recriticality and currently just rose above the top of active fuel.

Injection system status:

HPCS is in PullToLock per N2EOPC5.

RCIC is injecting at 500 gpm LPCS is injecting at 7,500 gpm LPCI A has tripped due to a motor electrical fault LPCI B is injecting at 7,500 gpm LPCI C is not injecting due to its associated injection valve failing to open.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), evaluate injection system Vortex limits using the current given plant data in accordance with N2EOP6.29, Determining HCTL/NPSH/Vortex Limits section 6.3 and complete the provided JPM Worksheet.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EC Page 13 of 14 April 2021

JPM Worksheet Provide to Applicant RCIC Step 6.3.1 Record Suppression Pool Level Value:

Step 6.3.2 Record RCIC System Flow Value:

Vortex Limit Evaluation:

Exceeding / Not Exceeding (circle one)

Operator Action:

Control RCIC Injection Flow as Desired / Throttle to Reduce RCIC Discharge Flow (circle one)

LPCS Step 6.3.1 Record Suppression Pool Level Value:

Step 6.3.2 Record LPCS System Flow Value:

Vortex Limit Evaluation:

Exceeding / Not Exceeding (circle one)

Operator Action:

Control LPCS Injection Flow as Desired / Throttle to Reduce LPCS Discharge Flow (circle one)

LPCI B Step 6.3.1 Record Suppression Pool Level Value:

Step 6.3.2 Record LPCI B System Flow Value:

Vortex Limit Evaluation:

Exceeding / Not Exceeding (circle one)

Operator Action:

Control LPCI B Injection Flow as Desired / Throttle to Reduce LPCI B Discharge Flow (circle one)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EC Page 14 of 14 April 2021

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC RO Admin EP Revision: 0.0

Title:

Fire Fighting Response for a Fire in the Protected Area Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / Mike Alexander 3/23/21 Validated by: N/A / Don Carr 12/30/20 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 3/26/21 Approximate Duration: 20 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EP Page 1 of 11 April 2021

References

1. OPNM201005, Firefighting

2. NUREG 1123 K/A 2.4.27 (3.4)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EP Page 2 of 11 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM tests the operators ability to perform the RO actions for a fire in the protected area.

b. This JPM is not considered Alternate Path.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. N228500101005, Perform SiteWide or Emergency Announcement (Using PP/PA System)

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: N/A N/A LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C)

K/A Statement:

(Add justification statement below 2.4.27 Knowledge of fire in the plant procedures.

for K/A's < 3.0)

K/A Importance Rating: RO 3.4 SRO N/A

4. K/A Justification:

a. The JPM meets the K/A by testing a procedural RO responsibility that is directly tied to supporting Emergency Preparedness response / mitigation actions.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EP Page 3 of 11 April 2021

5. Recommended Start Location

a. Unit #2 Simulator

6. JPM Setup (if required)

a. Use of the PP/PA system will be required for this JPM.

b. Provide copies of OPNM201005, Attachment 1, RO Firefighting Checklist to each applicant. (Do not provide entire procedure, only provide attachment 1)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EP Page 4 of 11 April 2021

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EP Page 5 of 11 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

You are an onshift Reactor Operator.

The SM has been notified of a confirmed fire in the Unit 2 Turbine Building, outer truck bay.

This area is not a CO2 or Halon Protected Area.

It is determined that the fire requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish.

The OSC has not been activated.

This is a drill.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), Perform the RO actions for the fire per OPNM201005, Attachment 1, RO Firefighting Checklist step 1.0 only.

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P

Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if STD: Proper communications used.

necessary.

2. Obtains a copy of the reference procedure and review / SAT / UNSAT utilize the correct section of the procedure.

P STD: Obtains a copy of OPNM 201005 and reviews Attachment 1, RO Firefighting Checklist

3. UPON notification of a fire, OR upon receipt of an alarm SAT / UNSAT P

AND actuation of an automatic Fire Suppression System, (1.0) STD: Reads/reviews and PERFORMS the following: placekeeps step.

4. IF alarm is in an LHRA, THEN IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIES RP SAT / UNSAT to respond with the Fire Brigade Leader to alarm STD: Determines that the Unit 2 location, OTHERWISE MARKS this step N/A. P Turbine Building, outer truck bay is (1.1.1) not in a Locked High Radiation Area and placekeeps step with an N/A.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EP Page 6 of 11 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

5. PLACES the Gaitronics system in the Merge Mode *PASS / FAIL STD: On the GAITRONICS, places the MERGE switch in MERGE.

P Observes the RED MERGE light is (1.1.2) lit.

Failure = RED MERGE light lit on the GAITRONICS not achieved.

6. IF the event is a drill, THEN STARTS the announcement SAT / UNSAT with This is a drill, this is a drill. preceding the fire STD: Announces into the HANDSET alarm, OTHERWISE MARKS this step N/A P This is a drill, This is a drill while (1.1.3) holding down the talk pushbutton or INST Switch.

7. SOUNDS the Fire Alarm for 10 seconds SAT / UNSAT STD: On the GAITRONICS, places P

the FIRE ALARM switch to sound (1.1.4) the alarm for approximately 10 seconds.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EP Page 7 of 11 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

8. MAKES the following announcement: *PASS / FAIL STD: Makes the following announcement on into the Handset (or similar) while holding down the talk pushbutton or INST Switch:

Attention, Attention, this is a drill.

A fire has been detected at Unit 2 in the Unit 2 Turbine Building 250, Truck Aisle.

Cue: If asked, the FBL does not want a different assembly area. The NMP Fire Brigade shall report to the Unit 2 assembly area.

All other personnel are to remain clear of the Unit 2 Turbine Building, P outer truck bay.

(1.1.5) Failure = The following statements inserted into the canned announcement statement:

Blank Area 1 Unit 2 Turbine Building, outer truck bay (or similar)

Blank Area 2 Left Blank Blank Area 3 Unit 2 Turbine Building, outer truck bay (or similar) and announced as This is a Drill over the PP/PA Gaitronics system not achieved.

9. IF location of alarm is a CO2 protected fire zone, THEN SAT / UNSAT STATES the following announcement, OTHERWISE STD: Reviews/recalls the initial MARKS this step N/A. P conditions and determines that the (1.1.6) area is not a CO2 protected area and placekeeps the step as N/A.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EP Page 8 of 11 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

10. IF OSC has been activated, THEN ADDS the following SAT / UNSAT announcement Fire Brigade Leader contact the OSC for STD: Reviews/recalls the initial a briefing, OTHERWISE MARKS this step N/A. P conditions and determines that the (1.1.7)

OSC has not been activated and placekeeps the step as N/A.

11. REPEATS alarm AND announcement SAT / UNSAT P

(1.1.8) STD: Repeats JPM steps 7 & 8.

Cue: The alarm and announcement have been repeated.

12. IF OSC has NOT been activated, THEN REMOVES the SAT / UNSAT Gaitronics system from the Merge Mode, OTHERWISE STD: Reviews/recalls the initial MARKS this step N/A. conditions and determines that the OSC has not been activated and on P the GAITRONICS, pushes UP on the (1.1.9) MERGE switch. Observes the RED MERGE light is not lit. Pushes DOWN on the OUTDOOR SPEAKERS and ADM ISOLATE switches to reactivate those speakers.

13. IF Fire Brigade Leader does NOT respond within 60 SAT / UNSAT seconds, THEN REPEAT appropriate steps 1.1.1 - 1.1.7, STD: Acknowledges cue and OTHERWISE MARK this step N/A. P determines that the FBL has (1.1.10) responded and placekeeps the step Cue: Inform the operator that the Fire Brigade Leader as N/A.

has responded and confirmed the fire.

14. IF a fire is confirmed, THEN NOTIFIES SM AND RECORDS SAT / UNSAT time, OTHERWISE MARK this step N/A.

STD: Reviews/recalls the initial conditions and determines that the P

SM has already been notified of a (1.1.11) confirmed fire in the Unit 2 Turbine Building, outer truck bay and placekeeps the step as N/A.

After the applicant completes all of OPNM201005 Attachment 1, RO Firefighting Checklist, Evaluator Note: step 1.0 provide the following cue:

Cue: Your task is complete, another operator will complete any remaining actions.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EP Page 9 of 11 April 2021

TASK STANDARD OPNM201005 Attachment 1, RO Firefighting Checklist has been completed through step 1.0 for a confirmed fire.

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EP Page 10 of 11 April 2021

RO JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

You are an onshift Reactor Operator.

The SM has been notified of a confirmed fire in the Unit 2 Turbine Building, outer truck bay.

This area is not a CO2 or Halon Protected Area.

It is determined that the fire requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish.

The OSC has not been activated.

This is a drill.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), Perform the RO actions for the fire per OPNM201005, Attachment 1, RO Firefighting Checklist step 1.0 only.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM RO EP Page 11 of 11 April 2021

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC SRO Admin COO1 Revision: 0.0

Title:

Determine Plant Impact for Inoperable Unit Cooler Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / Mike Alexander 3/22/21 Validated by: N/A / Landon Swenson 12/30/20 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 3/26/21 Approximate Duration: 15 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO1 Page 1 of 12 April 2021

References

1. N2OP53E, Rev. 00900, Standby Switchgear/Battery Room Ventilation System

2. PID011J, Rev. 20, Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Service Water System

3. PID053E, Rev. 17, Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Control Building Ventilation and Air Conditioning

4. Unit #2 Technical Specifications

5. Unit #2 Technical Specification Bases

6. NUREG 1123 K/A 2.1.32 (4.0)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO1 Page 2 of 12 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM tests the operators ability to determine the plant impact of an inoperable unit cooler.

b. This JPM is not considered Alternate Path.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. NSPS11502003, Initiate Action to Comply with Technical Specifications

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: N/A N/A LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C)

K/A Statement: 2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system limits and (Add justification statement below precautions.

for K/A's < 3.0)

K/A Importance Rating: RO N/A SRO 4.0

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO1 Page 3 of 12 April 2021

5. Recommended Start Location

a. NLC Classroom

6. JPM Setup (if required)

a. Provide copy of N2OP53E.

b. Provide a copy of PID053E.

c. Provide a full size copy of PID011J.

d. Provide a copy of Unit #2 Technical Specifications with Bases.

e. Provide a copy of the following only if requested:

1) Provide a copy of N2OP78.

2) Provide a full size copy of PID011L.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO1 Page 4 of 12 April 2021

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO1 Page 5 of 12 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant is operating at 100% power.

While taking building rounds, an operator notices the Division 1 Chiller Equipment Room is warmer than normal.

Upon investigation, operators found 2SWP*V221A, HVC*UC103A INLET ISOL valve shut.

All attempts to reopen 2SWP*V221A have failed.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), determine the impact of this valve failure on plant operations. Document your results on the provided JPM Worksheet.

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P

Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if STD: Proper communications used.

necessary.

2. Obtains a copy of the reference procedure and review / SAT / UNSAT utilize the correct section of the procedure.

STD: Obtains any of the following as necessary to determine the plant impact:

P N2OP53E PID 53E PID 11J Unit 2 Technical Specifications JPM steps 3, 4 & 5 may be performed in any order.

The operator may choose to use different nomenclature to represent the affected component. This is acceptable provided it is obvious to the evaluator which component Evaluator Note: is affected. The Evaluators Aid at the end of this JPM may be used to assist in the grading of the below steps. The listing of the references on the Evaluators Aid is for ease of grading and review by the Evaluator, however it is not required for successful completion of the JPM.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO1 Page 6 of 12 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

3. Determines the following: *PASS / FAIL The closure of 2SWP*V221A makes STD: Recognizes that 2HVC*UC103A inoperable 2HVC*UC103A, DIVISION 1 CHILLER ROOM UNIT SPACE COOLER is INOPERABLE and documents in the P space provided for step 1 on the provided JPM Worksheet.

Failure = The word INOPERABLE (or similar) written in the space provided for step 1 on the provided JPM Worksheet not achieved.

4. With 2HVC*UC103A inoperable, 2HVK*CHL1A *PASS / FAIL is inoperable STD: Recognizes that with 2HVC*UC103A, DIVISION 1 CHILLER ROOM UNIT SPACE COOLER INOPERABLE, 2HVK*CHL1A, DIVISION I CONTROL AND RELAY ROOM CHILLER is also INOPERABLE per N2OP53E Attachment 1 Action 4 and documents in the P space provided for step 2 on the provided JPM Worksheet.

Failure = The statement 2HVK*CHL1A, DIVISION I CONTROL AND RELAY ROOM CHILLER is INOPERABLE (or similar) written in the space provided for step 2 on the provided JPM Worksheet not achieved.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO1 Page 7 of 12 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

5. Determines TS 3.7.3 Conditions A and B are *PASS / FAIL applicable. STD: References N2OP53E, Attachment 1, Action 4 and TS 3.7.3 and recognizes that, Conditions A and B are applicable:

Condition A, required action A.1:

o Restore control room envelope AC subsystem for the Main Control Room area to OPERABLE status.

within 30 days.

Condition B, required action B.1:

o Restore control room envelope AC subsystem for the Relay Room area to OPERABLE status. within 30 days.

P and documents in the space provided for step 3 on the provided JPM Worksheet.

Failure = The statements:

Enter TS 3.7.3, Conditions A and B. (N2OP53E, Attachment 1, Action 4)

Condition A: Restore control room envelope AC subsystem for the Main Control Room area to OPERABLE status.

within 30 days.

Condition B: Restore control room envelope AC subsystem for the Relay Room area to OPERABLE status. within 30 days.

(or similar) written in the space provided for step 3 on the provided JPM Worksheet not achieved.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO1 Page 8 of 12 April 2021

TASK STANDARD The applicant has documented that both 2HVC*UC103A and 2HVK*CHL1A are inoperable and that Technical Specification 3.7.3 conditions A & B apply on the provided worksheet.

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO1 Page 9 of 12 April 2021

Evaluators Answer Key Do not Provide to Candidate

1. Status of 2HVC*UC103A:

INOPERABLE

2. List any other impacted equipment and its status:

2HVK*CHL1A, DIVISION 1 CONTROL AND RELAY ROOM CHILLER is INOPERABLE

3. List actions required to be performed (include reference document and section).

Enter TS 3.7.3, Conditions A and B. (N2OP53E, Attachment 1, Action 4)

Condition A: Restore Division 1 control room envelope AC subsystem for the Main Control Room area to OPERABLE status within 30 days.

Condition B: Restore Division 1 control room envelope AC subsystem for the Relay Room area to OPERABLE status within 30 days.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO1 Page 10 of 12 April 2021

SRO JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant is operating at 100% power.

While taking building rounds, an operator notices the Division 1 Chiller Equipment Room is warmer than normal.

Upon investigation, operators found 2SWP*V221A, HVC*UC103A INLET ISOL valve shut.

All attempts to reopen 2SWP*V221A have failed.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), determine the impact of this valve failure on plant operations. Document your results on the provided JPM Worksheet.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO1 Page 11 of 12 April 2021

JPM Worksheet Provide to Applicant

1. Status of 2HVC*UC103A:

2. List any other impacted equipment and its status:

3. List actions required to be performed (include reference document and section).

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO1 Page 12 of 12 April 2021

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC SRO Admin COO2 Revision: 0.0

Title:

Determine Core Thermal Power IAW N2REP11 Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / Mike Alexander 3/22/21 Validated by: N/A / Landon Swenson 12/30/20 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 3/26/21 Approximate Duration: 15 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO2 April 2021

References

1. N2REP11, Rev. 00700, Independent Methods of Determining Core Thermal Power

2. NUREG 1123 K/A 2.1.7 (4.7)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO2 Page 2 of 12 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM tests the operators ability to manually determine Core Thermal Power.

b. This JPM is not considered Alternate Path.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. NS28300105001, Operate the Process Computer

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: N/A N/A LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C) 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make K/A Statement: operational judgments based on operating (Add justification statement below characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument for K/A's < 3.0) interpretation.

K/A Importance Rating: RO N/A SRO 4.7

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO2 Page 3 of 12 April 2021

5. Recommended Start Location

a. NLC Classroom

6. JPM Setup (if required)

a. Provide copy of N2REP11 with all of section 5.0 placekept as complete (Check step 5.1 Attachment 3 box). Also, placekeep all of Attachment 3, section 6.1 as complete. Next step to be performed is 6.2 (open circle this step).

b. Ensure each operator has a calculator.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO2 Page 4 of 12 April 2021

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO2 Page 5 of 12 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

2CEC*PNL603 MWth indication shows 3802 MWth.

The plant has been stable for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months with no changes to WCS flow, rods, or recirculation flow.

The SM has questioned the accuracy of the process computer core thermal power calculation and determined that a manual calculation of core thermal power is required.

MSR reheat steam is not optimized (MSRs are in Automatic).

The turbine bypass valves are closed.

The process computer is available.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), determine core thermal power using turbine first stage pressure in accordance with N2REP11, Attachment 3, the provided computer point information and the provided PPC Core Thermal Power report. Additionally, determine what, if any, notifications are required based on the results of Attachment 3 completion.

(Any steps requiring an Independent Verification will be completed by another operator at the completion of the procedure.)

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P

Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if STD: Proper communications used.

necessary.

2. Obtains a copy of the reference procedure and review / SAT / UNSAT utilize the correct section of the procedure.

P STD: Refers to the provided N2 REP11, Attachment 3 and handouts.

3. Determines that N2REP11, Attachment 3, step 6.1 has SAT / UNSAT been completed and placekept.

STD: Reviews procedure P placekeeping and initial conditions and determines that N2REP11, Attachment 3, step 6.1 is complete.

4. Process Computer points. SAT / UNSAT P

(6.2) STD: Reads/reviews and placekeeps step.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO2 Page 6 of 12 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

5. RECORDS the following Process Computer points. P SAT / UNSAT (6.2.1, first STD: Reads/reviews and bullet) placekeeps step.

6. Turbine First Stage Pressure = _______ psia SAT / UNSAT (MSSPA07) P STD: Determines and records the (6.2.1, first value of Turbine First Stage bullet) Pressure of 633.5 psia (MSSPA07) from JPM handout #1.

7. FW A Correction Factor _______ psia SAT / UNSAT (FWSFE102) P STD: Determines and records the (6.2.1, second value of FW A Correction Factor of bullet) 1.0 psia (FWSFE102) from JPM handout #1

8. FW B Correction Factor _______ psia SAT / UNSAT (FWSFE103) P STD: Determines and records the (6.2.1, third value of FW B Correction Factor of bullet) 1.0 psia (FWSFE103) from JPM handout #1.

9. IF the Process Computer is available THEN Demands SAT / UNSAT Plant Process Computer Program PPC Core Thermal STD: Determines that the Plant Power Report AND ATTACH it to this procedure, P Process Computer Program PPC OTHERWISE MARK this step N/A. (6.2.2) Core Thermal Power Report has already been demanded (JPM handout #1) and placekeeps step.

10. Calculation of Core Thermal Power SAT / UNSAT P

(6.3) STD: Reads/reviews and placekeeps step.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO2 Page 7 of 12 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

11. CALCULATES the % core thermal power based on the *PASS / FAIL computer points recorded in Step 6.2.1 using the STD: Using the equation provided following equation: calculates % CTP as 98.19%.

% CTP = [(0.14 x 633.5) + 9.5] x (1+1)

% CTP = [(0.14 x ______) + 9.5] X (______ + ______) ÷ 2 P ÷2 MSSPA07 FWSFE102 FWSFE103

% CTP = [(88.69) + 9.5] x 2 ÷ 2 (6.3.1)

% CTP = __________ % CTP = 98.19 x 1

% CTP = 98.19 Failure = calculation results between the values 97.8% to 98.5

% CTP not achieved.

12. IF Process Computer is available, THEN OBTAINS CMWt *PASS / FAIL from PPC Core Thermal Power Report demanded in step STD: Using the equation provided 6.2.1 AND CALCULATE % core thermal power, calculates % CTP as 98.19%.

OTHERWISE MARK this step N/A.:

P CMWt = 3802.16 MWth (6.3.2) % CTP = (3802.16) ÷ 39.88 CMWt = ________MWth % CTP = 95.34 Failure = calculation results

% CTP = (_______) CMWt ÷ 39.88 = _______ %

between the values 95.0% to 98.5

% CTP not achieved.

Per the Initiating Cue, any steps requiring an Independent Verification will be completed by another operator at the completion of the procedure. As such, procedure step 6.3.3 will not Evaluator Note:

be performed and should be reinforced by the evaluator that this step is to be left as not complete for the performance of this task.

13. IF Process Computer is available, THEN INDICATES if *PASS / FAIL core thermal power determined in Steps 6.3.1 AND STD: Determines that the two 6.3.2 agree within +/-2%, OTHERWISE MARK this step calculated thermal power values N/A. P are not within 2%:

(6.3.4) % Differential = 98.19 - 95.34 6.3.1 6.3.2 YES NO

% Differential = 2.85 And checks the NO box.

Failure = YES box checked.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO2 Page 8 of 12 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

14. IF Step 6.3.3 is checked NO, THEN immediately NOTIFIES *PASS / FAIL SM AND Reactor Engineering Supervisor, OTHERWISE STD: Informs the SM and Reactor MARK this step N/A. Engineering supervisor that the P calculations do not agree within Cue: As the SM and Reactor Engineering Supervisor, +/-2%. Proper communications used.

acknowledge the report that the calculated % CTP (6.3.5) does not agree within +/-2%. Failure = Verbal notification to the evaluator that the calculated %

CTP does not agree within +/-2% not achieved.

TASK STANDARD The applicant has completed the core thermal calculation by completing N2REP11 Attachment 3 and discussed the results with the Evaluator.

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO2 Page 9 of 12 April 2021

SRO JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

2CEC*PNL603 MWth indication shows 3802 MWth.

The plant has been stable for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months with no changes to WCS flow, rods, or recirculation flow.

The SM has questioned the accuracy of the process computer core thermal power calculation and determined that a manual calculation of core thermal power is required.

MSR reheat steam is not optimized (MSRs are in Automatic).

The turbine bypass valves are closed.

The process computer is available.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), determine core thermal power using turbine first stage pressure in accordance with N2REP11, Attachment 3, the provided computer point information and the provided PPC Core Thermal Power report. Additionally, determine what, if any, notifications are required based on the results of Attachment 3 completion.

(Any steps requiring an Independent Verification will be completed by another operator at the completion of the procedure.)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO2 April 2021

Computer Point Information Provide to Applicant Computer Point Value Turbine First Stage Pressure (MSSPA07) 633.5 psia FW A Correction Factor (FWSFE102) 1.0 FW B Correction Factor (FWSFE103) 1.0 NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO2 April 2021

PPC Core Thermal Power report Provide to Applicant OD3 Core Thermal Power and APRM Calibration Today (Now)

Nine Mile Point 2 GMWE CMWT WT WTSUB WD WT FLAG IREC ROD LIN 1350 3802.23 1.03 1.05 30.54 2.00 0 95.2 PR RWL DPCM WFW HFW WD DHS CAEQ CAQA 1024.3 184.2 15.44 14.93 400.8 525.4 22.80 .12 .15 1A 2B 3C 4D RAP 100.01 100.04 99.99 100.03 AGAP 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO COO2 April 2021

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC SRO Admin EC Revision: 0.0

Title:

Respond to Notification of a Safety Limit Violation Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / Mike Alexander 3/22/21 Validated by: N/A / Landon Swenson 12/30/20 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 3/26/21 Approximate Duration: 20 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EC Page 1 of 11 April 2021

References

1. LSAA1020, Reportability Tables and Decision Trees

2. LSAA1400, Event Reporting Guidelines

3. Unit #2 Technical Specifications

4. Unit #2 Technical Specification Bases

5. NUREG 1123 K/A 2.2.22 (4.7)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EC Page 2 of 11 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM tests the applicants ability to recognize the violation of the fuel cladding safety limit and determine what actions are necessary to take.

b. This JPM is not considered Alternate Path.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. NSPS11503003, Initiate Actions to Comply with Technical Specifications (PRA)

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: N/A N/A LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C)

K/A Statement: 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations (Add justification statement below and safety limits.

for K/A's < 3.0)

K/A Importance Rating: RO N/A SRO 4.7

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EC Page 3 of 11 April 2021

5. Recommended Start Location

a. NLC Classroom

6. JPM Setup (if required)

a. Ensure sufficient copies of Unit 2 Technical Specifications are available.

b. Ensure sufficient copies of the following are available upon request:

1) LSAA1110 (Reportability Manual)

2) LSAA1020

3) LSAA1400

b. Ensure sufficient copies of the Core Operating Limits Report for Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Cycle 18 are available upon request.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EC Page 4 of 11 April 2021

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EC Page 5 of 11 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

A plant startup is in progress.

Reactor Power is 25%.

Reactor core flow is 40.29 Mlbm/hr Reactor Pressure is 948 psig A computer malfunction has allowed the establishment of a nonconservative rod pattern.

The Reactor Engineer in the Control Room has just informed the US that a MCPR of 1.05 exists in the core.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), determine what, if any, actions are required by technical specifications and what, if any, required notifications apply. Document your results on the provided JPM Worksheet.

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P

Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if STD: Proper communications used.

necessary.

2. Obtains a copy of the reference procedure and review / SAT / UNSAT utilize the correct section of the procedure. P STD: Obtains copy of Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

Evaluator Note: JPM steps 3, 4 & 5 may be performed in any order.

3. Recognizes MCPR <1.07 is a Safety Limit violation *PASS / FAIL STD: Reviews T.S. 2.1 and Note: The applicant must determine, based on plant determines that Safety Limit MCPR conditions, that the MCPR safety limit applies, per P has been violated.

2.1.1.2. With the reactor steam dome pressure > 700 Failure = Determination that the psia and core flow > 10% rated core flow. Safety Limit for MCPR has been violated not achieved.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EC Page 6 of 11 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA Applicant may also indicate that T.S. 3.2.2 is applicable and determine that Condition A, required Action A.1 is required to restore MCPR(s) within limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months and if it is not Evaluator Note: completed within the associated completion time that Required Action B.1 to reduce Thermal Power to < 23% RTP is required within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . This is correct, but not required for credit since T.S. 2.2 is more limiting.

4. Determine required Technical Specification actions. *PASS / FAIL STD: References T.S. 2.2, and recognizes that, Actions 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 are applicable:

2.2.1:

o Restore compliance with all SLs within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ; and 2.2.2:

o Insert all insertable control rods within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

P and documents in the space provided for step 1 on the provided JPM Worksheet.

Failure = The statements:

2.2.1: Restore compliance with all SLs within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ; and.

2.2.2: Insert all insertable control rods within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

(or similar) written in the space provided for step 1 on the provided JPM Worksheet not achieved.

If the applicant identifies the need to write an IR, inform them another operator will write the Evaluator Cue:

IR.

A 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ENS report is required by two criteria:

o Tech Spec required shutdown - 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) - SAF 1.2 o Exceeding a Tech Spec Safety Limit - 10CFR50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) - SAF 1.16 Evaluator Note:

Applicant may also indicate the need for a 60 day written NRC notification following a Tech Spec required shutdown, per 10CFR72. This is correct, but not required for credit since this is a required written report vs. a required notification.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EC Page 7 of 11 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

5. Determines required notifications. *PASS / FAIL STD: Determines a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ENS report is required per SAF 1.16 and SAF 1.2 using LSAA1020 (Operations Decision Trees) and LSAA1110 and documents in the P space provided for step 2 on the provided JPM Worksheet.

Failure = The statement 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ENS report (or similar) written in the space provided for step 2 on the provided JPM Worksheet not achieved.

TASK STANDARD The Operator has determined the need to insert all control rods and determined a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months notification is required.

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EC Page 8 of 11 April 2021

Evaluators Answer Key Do not Provide to Candidate

1. Document Any Technical Specification Required Actions Here (If none write None):

T.S. 2.2 SL Violations is applicable:

With any SL violation, the following actions shall be completed within 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months s:

2.2.1 Restore compliance with all SLs; and 2.2.2 Insert all insertable control rods.

2. Document Any Applicable Required Notification(s) Here (If none write None):

4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ENS report NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EC Page 9 of 11 April 2021

SRO JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

A plant startup is in progress.

Reactor Power is 25%.

Reactor core flow is 40.29 Mlbm/hr Reactor Pressure is 948 psig A computer malfunction has allowed the establishment of a nonconservative rod pattern.

The Reactor Engineer in the Control Room has just informed the US that a MCPR of 1.05 exists in the core.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), determine what, if any, actions are required by technical specifications and what, if any, required notifications apply. Document your results on the provided JPM Worksheet.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EC Page 10 of 11 April 2021

JPM Worksheet Provide to Applicant

1. Document Any Technical Specification Required Actions Here (If none write None):

2. Document Any Applicable Required Notification(s) Here (If none write None):

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EC Page 11 of 11 April 2021

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC SRO Admin RC Revision: 0.0

Title:

Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Assessment for Inoperable Equipment Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / Mike Alexander 3/22/21 Validated by: N/A / Landon Swenson 12/30/21 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 3/26/21 Approximate Duration: 20 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO RC Page 1 of 16 April 2021

References

1. N2OP42, Offgas System

2. N2ODCM, NMPNS Unit 2 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

3. NUREG 1123 K/A 2.3.15 (3.1)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO RC Page 2 of 16 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM tests the operators ability to use and comply with the facilitys ODCM. The applicant determines that periodic OFG effluent grab samples and analyses are required per the ODCM and the time limits for the first and second grab samples.

b. This JPM is not considered Alternate Path.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. NSOM20203002, Review and Approve Operator Logs

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: N/A N/A LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C)

K/A Statement: 2.3.15 Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such (Add justification statement below as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey for K/A's < 3.0) instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

K/A Importance Rating: RO N/A SRO 3.1

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO RC Page 3 of 16 April 2021

5. Recommended Start Location

a. NLC Classroom

6. JPM Setup (if required)

a. Ensure adequate copies of the ODCM and Tech Specs are available.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO RC Page 4 of 16 April 2021

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO RC Page 5 of 16 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

Reactor power is 45% with power ascension in progress.

Both Offgas Inlet Radiation Monitors 2OFG*RE13A and 2OFG*RE13B were previously FUNCTIONAL and inservice.

Both 2OFG*RE13A and 2OFG*RE13B indications have just failed downscale.

2OFG*RE13A and 2OFG*RE13B flow readings are unaffected and are functioning properly.

Troubleshooting has not yet commenced.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), complete the attached JPM Worksheet #1 regarding the failure of 2OFG*RE13A and 2OFG*RE13B.

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P

Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if STD: Proper communications used.

necessary.

2. Obtains a copy of the reference procedure and review / SAT / UNSAT utilize the correct section of the procedure.

P STD: ODCM obtained; Section D.3.3.2 and Bases B.3.3.2 are referenced.

If asked, during the course of this JPM, inform the operator that flow indications are unaffected.

The applicant will use SRO JPM Handout #1 to determine answers to questions #1 and Evaluator Note:

2 on JPM Worksheet #1. (JPM steps 3a and 3b)

Determination of the answers to the questions listed in JPM steps 3a and 3b may be performed in any order.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO RC Page 6 of 16 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA 3a. Evaluates JPM Worksheet #1, Question #1. *PASS / FAIL STD: Determines that the Which NMP Unit 2 License Document AND Section is appropriate license document is used to determine the actions for the current RE13A ODCM D.3.3.2 and documents in and RE13B conditions? the space provided for question #1 P on the provided JPM Worksheet

1.

Failure = ODCM D.3.3.2 (or similar) written in the space provided for question #1 on the provided JPM Worksheet #1 not achieved.

Since required action B.1 is to Enter the Condition referenced in Table D 3.3.21 for the channel, the applicant may not document required action B.1 as required and instead Evaluator Note:

document required condition C and associated actions. (In this case, credit may be given for documentation of condition C and associated actions)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO RC Page 7 of 16 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA 3b. Evaluates JPM Worksheet #1, Question #2. *PASS / FAIL STD: References ODCM D.3.3.2 and Per the Unit 2 License Document and Section listed in determines that the required Question #1 above, determine and record any required actions are:

actions based on the current RE13A and RE13B Condition B:

conditions. o Required Action B.1 Enter the condition reference in Table D 3.3.21 for the channel (Immediately)

AND Required Action B.2 Restore the nonfunctional channel(s) to functional status (within 30 days)

Condition C:

o Required Action C.1 Place the Nonfunctional channel in the tripped condition P (within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months )

OR o Required Action C.2.1 Take Grab Samples (within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AND once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter)

AND Required Action C.2.2 Analyze samples for gross activity (within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months from time of sampling completion)

(or similar wording) and documents in the space provided for question #2 on the provided JPM Worksheet #1.

Failure = The above statements (or similar) written in the space provided for question #2 on the provided JPM Worksheet #1 not achieved.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO RC Page 8 of 16 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA Applicant is NOT expected to implement REQUIRED ACTION C.1, however if implemented, they must determine that OFG will isolate and a shutdown is required. If applicant chooses placing the channels in trip, or just states both possible actions, Evaluator Note: provide the following role play to facilitate the remainder of the JPM:

Cue: The Shift Manager has decided to take grab samples per D.3.3.2 Required Action C.2.1.

Then provide cue in JPM Part B After the operator determines the ODCM sample requirements, provide the operator with the turnover sheet #2 and read associated initiating cue.

Determination of the answers to the questions listed in JPM steps 4a and 4b may be Evaluator Note:

performed in any order.

The applicant will use SRO JPM Handout #2 to determine answers to questions #1 and

2 on JPM Worksheet #2. (JPM steps 4a and 4b).

4a. Evaluates JPM Worksheet #2, Question #1. *PASS / FAIL STD: Determines that the latest What is the latest time that the first grab sample is due time that the first grab sample is per Action C.2.1? due per Action C.2.1 is 1800 (or 6:00 PM) and documents in the space provided for question #1 on P

the provided JPM Worksheet #2.

Failure = 1800 (or 6:00 PM) (or similar) written in the space provided for question #1 on the provided JPM Worksheet #2 not achieved.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO RC Page 9 of 16 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA 4b. Evaluates JPM Worksheet #2, Question #2. *PASS / FAIL STD: Determines that the latest Based on the time documented in Question 1 above, time the next grab sample is due what is the latest time the next grab sample is due (applying any allowed extensions)

(apply any allowed extensions)? is 0600 (or 6:00 AM) plus the time extension allowed by S.R. 3.0.2 (1.25 times completion time) which is 0900 (or 9:00 AM) and P

documents in the space provided for question #2 on the provided JPM Worksheet #2.

Failure = 0900 (or 9:00 AM) (or similar) written in the space provided for question #1 on the provided JPM Worksheet #2 not achieved.

TASK STANDARD The applicant has documented answers to questions #1 and #2 on both JPM worksheet #1 and JPM worksheet #2.

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO RC Page 10 of 16 April 2021

JPM Worksheet #1 Evaluators Answer Key Do not Provide to Candidate

1. Which NMP Unit 2 License Document AND Section is used to determine the actions for the current RE13A and RE13B conditions?

ODCM D.3.3.2

2. Per the Unit 2 License Document and Section listed in Question #1 above, determine and record any required actions based on the current RE13A and RE13B conditions.

Condition B:

o Required Action B.1 Enter the condition reference in Table D 3.3.21 for the channel (Immediately)

AND Required Action B.2 Restore the nonfunctional channel(s) to functional status (within 30 days)

Condition C:

o Required Action C.1 Place the Nonfunctional channel in the tripped condition (within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months )

OR o Required Action C.2.1 Take Grab Samples (within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AND once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter)

AND Required Action C.2.2 Analyze samples for gross activity (within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months from time of sampling completion)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO RC Page 11 of 16 April 2021

JPM Worksheet #2 Evaluators Answer Key Do not Provide to Candidate

1. What is the latest time that the first grab sample is due per Action C.2.1?

18:00 or 6:00 PM

2. Based on the time documented in Question 1 above, what is the latest time the next grab sample is due (apply any allowed extensions)?

0900 or 9:00 AM NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO RC Page 12 of 16 April 2021

SRO JPM Handout #1 INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

Reactor power is 45% with power ascension in progress.

Both Offgas Inlet Radiation Monitors 2OFG*RE13A and 2OFG*RE13B were previously FUNCTIONAL and inservice.

Both 2OFG*RE13A and 2OFG*RE13B indications have just failed downscale.

2OFG*RE13A and 2OFG*RE13B flow readings are unaffected and are functioning properly.

Troubleshooting has not yet commenced.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), complete the attached JPM Worksheet #1 regarding the failure of 2OFG*RE13A and 2OFG*RE13B.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO RC Page 13 of 16 April 2021

JPM Worksheet #1 Provide to Applicant

1. Which NMP Unit 2 License Document AND Section is used to determine the actions for the current RE13A and RE13B conditions?

2. Per the Unit 2 License Document and Section listed in Question #1 above, determine and record any required actions based on the current RE13A and RE13B conditions.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO RC Page 14 of 16 April 2021

SRO JPM Handout #2 INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

2OFG*RE13A/B were declared Nonfunctional at 0600 or 6:00 AM today.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), determine the latest time that the first sample is due. Then based upon this time, determine the latest time the next sample can be taken. Document your results on the provided JPM Worksheet #2.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO RC Page 15 of 16 April 2021

JPM Worksheet #2 Provide to Applicant

1. What is the latest time that the first grab sample is due per Action C.2.1?

2. Based on the time documented in Question 1 above, what is the latest time the next grab sample is due (apply any allowed extensions)?

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO RC Page 16 of 16 April 2021

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC SRO Admin EP Revision: 0.0

Title:

Emergency Plan Classification (Alert, EAL CA5)

Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / Mike Alexander 3/22/21 Validated by: N/A / Landon Swenson 12/30/20 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 3/26/21 Approximate Duration: 20 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EP Page 1 of 14 April 2021

References

1. EPAA1013 Addendum 4 Appendix 1, NMP Unit 2 EAL Wallboard

2. EPAA1013 Addendum 4, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 Emergency Classification Technical Bases

3. EPAA112100F01, Shift Emergency Director Checklist

4. NUREG 1123 K/A 2.4.41 (4.6)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EP Page 2 of 14 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM is to evaluate the SRO applicants ability to classify an event and perform the Station specific Initial Notification Form in accordance with Emergency Preparedness Procedures.

b. This JPM is not considered Alternate Path.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. NSEP10103004, Analyze Indications to Determine That an Emergency Plan Event is in Progress (PRA)

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: N/A N/A LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C)

K/A Statement: 2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level (Add justification statement below thresholds and classifications.

for K/A's < 3.0)

K/A Importance Rating: RO N/A SRO 4.6 NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EP Page 3 of 14 April 2021

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A

5. Recommended Start Location

a. NLC Classroom

6. JPM Setup (if required)

a. Ensure adequate copies of EPAA1013 Addendum 4 Rev. 004 are available.

b. Ensure adequate copies of NMP Unit 2 EAL Wallboard EPAA1013 Addendum 4 Appendix 1 Revision 01 are available.

c. Ensure adequate copies of EPAA112100F01 are available.

d. Ensure adequate copies of NMP EP AID EPA28 are available.

e. Ensure electronic Part 1 Notification Fact Sheet is available for use.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EP Page 4 of 14 April 2021

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The US has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EP Page 5 of 14 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant is in mode 5 and was Shutdown 3 days ago at midnight RPV head detensioning is in progress The equipment hatch was removed 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months ago RHR A tripped approximately three hours ago; RHR B was placed in SDC RHR B has since tripped. RCS Temperature has risen to 207°F, and exceeded 200°F 23 minutes ago RPV pressure is 0 psig Unit 1 is operating at 100% power Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), classify this event and complete the station specific initial notification form in accordance with EPAA112100F01 SHIFT EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CHECKLIST. This JPM is Time Critical.

Last 15 Minute Emergency Meteorology Report Data Data from Nine Mile Point Met System Date: XX/XX/XXXX Time (Local): XX:XX:XX Elevated Ground 200' Wind Speed (Main) 37 (mph) 30' Wind Speed (Main) 32 (mph) 200' Wind Dir From (Main) 352 (deg) 30' Wind Dir From (Main) 350 (deg) 200' Delta Temperature 0.05 (deg F) 100' Delta Temperature 0.7 (deg F)

Stability Class E Stability Class C 30' Air Temperature 50 (deg F) Precipitation (15 min) 1.02 (in)

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P

Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if STD: Proper communications used.

necessary.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EP Page 6 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

2. Obtains a copy of the reference procedure and review / SAT / UNSAT utilize the correct section of the procedure. P STD: Obtains and references EP AA112100F01.

Steps may not be performed in the order exactly as listed in the JPM.

Evaluator Note: The Operator may choose to utilize the Simplified Classification Sequence guide NMP EP AID EPA28.

3. Starts EPAA112100F01, Shift Emergency Director SAT / UNSAT Checklist P STD: Obtains EPAA112100F01 (EPAA112100 packet and reviews for required F01) actions. Determines that section 1.2 is applicable.

4. If the event is classified as an Alert, then PERFORMS the SAT / UNSAT P

following:

(1.2) STD: Reads/reviews and placekeeps step.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EP Page 7 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

5. RECORDS the EAL and declaration time *PASS / FAIL EAL/Threshold ________

STD: Determines the appropriate Declaration Time ________ classification is an Alert, EAL CA5 and records the EAL/Threshold code and Declaration Time on EP AA112100F01 in the space provided. Emergency classification and declaration shall be completed as soon as possible but no later than 15 minutes from the time indications of an EAL threshold being met or exceeded are available in the Control Room. The time written on the Shift P Emergency Director Checklist or SED job aid will count as (1.2.A) declaration time if no announcement is made.

The time difference below must be 15 minutes or less:

JPM Start Time: ____________

Declaration Time: ____________

Failure = CA5 recorded in the EAL/Threshold block and Declaration Time determined within 15 minutes of JPM start time and recorded in the Declaration Time block not achieved.

6. ANNOUNCES the event classification, possible SAT / UNSAT escalation paths, and declaration time to the Control STD: Announces to Control Room Room staff. personnel the EAL classification, possible escalation paths, and Cue: If asked for a peer check, report that the STA/IA is declaration times.

not available for peer check P (1.2.B)

DECLARE the event by announcing the following (from EPA28):

I am declaring a(n) (EAL Classification) at (time) due to (brief reason). Escalation criteria is(are) (Criteria) and I am assuming the role as Shift ED."

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EP Page 8 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

7. CALLS the Shift Communicator to the Control Room. SAT / UNSAT STD: Utilizes plant communication P

methods to call the Shift (1.2.C) Communicator to come to the control room. Proper communications used.

For the next two JPM steps, it is not expected that a radiological assessment would need Evaluator Note: to be performed with the given conditions, therefore the applicant may or may not choose to call the Shift Dose Assessor to the control room.

8. If not previously performed and if radiological SAT / UNSAT P

assessment is required as a result of the emergency (1.2.D) STD: Reads/reviews and condition, then PERFORMS the following: placekeeps step.

9. CALLS the Shift Dose Assessor and the Shift RP Tech to SAT / UNSAT the Control Room (or a predesignated location).

P STD: Reads/reviews and may call (1.2.D.1) the Shift Dose Assessor and the Shift RP Tech to the control room and placekeeps step accordingly.

For the next step, there is no security event in progress. The applicant should placekeep the Evaluator Note:

step, but not reference section 4.1.

10. Security Related Events, GOES TO Step 4.1 Security SAT / UNSAT Related Events. P STD: Reads/reviews and (1.2.F) determines step to be Not Applicable and placekeeps step.

11. If the ERO has not been activated, then DIRECTS SAT / UNSAT notification of the ERO using 1, Actual Event Respond STD: Directs Shift Communicator to to Facility, or 3, Actual Event Alternative Facility perform notification of the ERO Response, as appropriate, per EPAA112100F06. using EPAA112100F06. Proper (Tab 2) communications used.

P (1.2.G)

Cue: As Shift Communicator, acknowledge direction to notify ERO Note: Record time SED directs the Shift Communicator to activate the ERO as recorded in the SED Checklist NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EP Page 9 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

12. SELECTS the Emergency Public Address Announcements SAT / UNSAT from the form and DIRECTS performance of the public STD: Completes the PA address announcement within 15 minutes of event announcement form and directs classification. (Tab 1) P Shift Communicator to make (1.2.H) Emergency PA Announcement.

Cue: As Shift Communicator, acknowledge direction.

Proper communications used.

Wait 1 minute and then report that Station announcement has been made.

For the next JPM step, step 2 on EPCE114100F05 Part 1 Notification Fact Sheet is to be Evaluator Note:

treated a SAT/UNSAT step and therefore will not be graded as PASS/FAIL criteria.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EP Page 10 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

13. DIRECTS performance of State/Local notifications within *PASS / FAIL 15 minutes of the event classification as required per the Notifications procedure. STD: Accurately fills in and completes all information inside BLACK boxed in areas of Part 1 Notification Procedure: (Tab 3)

Notifications.

Notification form: (Tab 4)

Release in Progress Determination Guidance: (Tab 21) Step 3: B Release In Progress Determination Guidance Technical Step 4: Date /Time Basis (Tab 26)

Step 5: A Cue: If operators asks for a peer check, report that the Step 6: A STA/IA is not available for peer check Step 7: NMP U2 Box Checked Step 7: CA5 Provides the completed form to Shift Communicator and directs them to notify State and Local. Step 9 Wind speed filled in correctly Cue: As Shift Communicator, acknowledge direction and Step 10 Wind direction filled in P

record time Part 1 Notification received. correctly This notification is required to be completed within 15 minutes of the Emergency Declaration. This means that the state and local are required to be notified within 15 minutes.

The time difference below must be 15 minutes or less:

Declaration Time: ____________

Notification Time: ____________

Failure = The time difference between Declaration Time and Notification Time being less than 15 minutes not achieved.

Once the notification form has been completed. Provide the following cue:

Evaluator Note:

Cue: Your task is complete, another operator will complete any remaining actions.

TASK STANDARD Event has been classified and the Notification Form has been completed.

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EP Page 11 of 14 April 2021

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EP Page 12 of 14 April 2021

Part 1 Notification Form Evaluator Answer Key Do not Provide to Candidate NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EP Page 13 of 14 April 2021

SRO JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant is in mode 5 and was Shutdown 3 days ago at midnight RPV head detensioning is in progress The equipment hatch was removed 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months ago RHR A tripped approximately three hours ago; RHR B was placed in SDC RHR B has since tripped. RCS Temperature has risen to 207°F, and exceeded 200°F 23 minutes ago RPV pressure is 0 psig Unit 1 is operating at 100% power Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), classify this event and complete the station specific initial notification form in accordance with EPAA112100F01 SHIFT EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CHECKLIST. This JPM is Time Critical.

Last 15 Minute Emergency Meteorology Report Data Data from Nine Mile Point Met System Date: XX/XX/XXXX Time (Local): XX:XX:XX Elevated Ground 200' Wind Speed (Main) 37 (mph) 30' Wind Speed (Main) 32 (mph) 200' Wind Dir From (Main) 352 (deg) 30' Wind Dir From (Main) 350 (deg) 200' Delta Temperature 0.05 (deg F) 100' Delta Temperature 0.7 (deg F)

Stability Class E Stability Class C 30' Air Temperature 50 (deg F) Precipitation (15 min) 1.02 (in)

NMP2 NRC ADMIN JPM SRO EP Page 14 of 14 April 2021

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC Simulator JPM S1 Revision: 0.0

Title:

Transfer RCIC Lineup PostScram (Alternate Path)

Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / M. Alexander 3/23/21 Validated by: N/A / Don Carr 12/30/20 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 3/26/21 Approximate Duration: 15 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S1 Page 1 of 15 April 2021

References

1. N2OP35, Rev. 01600, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

2. N2ARP601300, Rev. 00200, 2CEC*PNL601 SERIES 300 ALARM RESPONSE PROCEDURES

3. NUREG 1123 K/A 217000 A4.07 (3.9/3.8)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S1 Page 2 of 15 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to transfer RCIC lineup from injection to CST to CST pressure control lineup.

b. This JPM is considered alternate path because once RCIC lineup is transferred, a low oil pressure condition occurs. RCIC shutdown is required.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. N221700001010, Respond to annunciator 601303, RCIC Turbine Brg Oil Press Low.

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: 2 Reactor Water Inventory Control LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C)

K/A Statement: 217000 A4.07 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor (Add justification statement below in the control room: Reactor pressure for K/A's < 3.0)

K/A Importance Rating: RO 3.9 SRO 3.8 NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S1 Page 3 of 15 April 2021

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A

5. Recommended Start Location

a. NLC Classroom

6. Simulator Setup

a. IC Number

1) IC021

b. Presets / With Triggers

1) Malfunctions a) None

2) Remotes a) RC02A, RCIC Level 8 Trip Defeat: Withdraw Trip Inserted Units N693A,E, Final = Defeated

3) Overrides a) None

4) Annunciators a) an601303, RCIC Turbine Brg Oil Pres Low, Final TRG1

= Crywolf

5) Event Triggers Event # Event Action Command 1 hzlmx123(2)==1 Left Blank

6) Equipment Out of Service a) None

7) Support Documentation a) Prepare a copy of N2EOPHC, attachment 6 Automatic RCIC Injection with steps up to including 3.2 placekept as complete. The next step to be completed is 3.3 (Open circle placekeep this step).

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S1 Page 4 of 15 April 2021

8) Miscellaneous a) IC174 (For ILT 201, not paired)

OR b) IC setup:

(1) Place the mode switch in shutdown (2) Verify that condensate and feedwater is controlling reactor water level (3) Start RCIC by arming and depressing the RCIC MANUAL INITIATION pushbutton (4) Ensure RCIC is injecting to the RPV (5) Verify that RPV level is above 108.8 inches so that the initiation signal will be able to be reset in later JPM steps.

7. Strategy Code

a. None

8. Tools and Equipment

a. None

9. Commitments

a. None

10. Prerequisites

a. None

11. Applicable Operator Fundamental Knowledge Check Question(s)

a. None NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S1 Page 5 of 15 April 2021

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Unit Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S1 Page 6 of 15 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant is shutdown following a reactor scram

RCIC is injecting in automatic

RCIC level 8 interlocks have been defeated per N2EOP6.20

Current RPV level band is 160 - 200 inches

Another operator is controlling RPV water level Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), realign RCIC for injection with full reject to the CST, in accordance with N2 EOPHC, Attachment 6, Automatic RCIC Injection section 3.3 and complete all remaining N2 EOPHC, Attachment 6, Automatic RCIC Injection actions up to and including step 4.0.

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P STD: Proper communications used.

Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary

2. IF injection with reject to CST is required: P SAT / UNSAT (N2EOPHC, Att.

6, Automatic STD: Reads/reviews and verifies RCIC Injection, that the step has been placekept.

Step 3.3)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S1 Page 7 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

3. Opens ICS*MOV124, TEST BYPASS TO CONDENSATE *PASS / FAIL STORAGE TK.

STD: Rotates the control switch for 2ICS*MOV124, TEST BYPASS TO P CONDENSATE STORAGE TK on (N2EOPHC, Att. 2CEC*PNL601 in the clockwise 6, Automatic direction to the OPEN position and RCIC Injection, verifies the RED light lit and the Step 3.3.1) GREEN light not lit.

Failure = 2ICS*MOV124 RED light ON and GREEN light OFF not achieved.

4. Controls injection flow to reactor by throttling P SAT / UNSAT ICS*FV108, TEST BYPASS TO CONDENSATE STOR TK, as (N2EOPHC, Att.

follows: 6, Automatic STD: Reads/reviews and verifies RCIC Injection, that the step has been placekept.

Step 3.3.2)

For JPM steps 5 and 6 the applicant will be throttling 2ICS*FV108 to control RPV injection in the assigned band. Since this is part of the initiating cue it will be a pass/fail step to adjust Evaluator Note:

2ICS*FV108 to establish full reject flow. The applicant may or may not need perform JPM step 6 therefore it has an N/A as a selection to grade the step.

5. OPENS ICS*FV108 to lower RPV injection. *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates the control switch for P 2ICS*FV108, TEST RETURN TO (N2EOPHC, Att. CONDENSATE STOR TK THROTTLE 6, Automatic on 2CEC*PNL601 in the clockwise RCIC Injection, direction to the OPEN position and Step 3.3.2 first verifies 2ICS*V156 RED light lit and bullet) GREEN light not lit.

Failure = 2ICS*V156 RED light ON and GREEN light OFF not achieved.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S1 Page 8 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

6. CLOSES ICS*FV108 to raise RPV injection *PASS / FAIL / NA STD: Rotates the control switch for P 2ICS*FV108, TEST RETURN TO CONDENSATE STOR TK THROTTLE (N2EOPHC, Att.

on 2CEC*PNL601 in the counter 6, Automatic clockwise direction to throttle RCIC Injection, CLOSED 2ICS*FV108 and verifies Step 3.3.2 second the GREEN and RED light lit.

bullet)

Failure = Control Switch for 2ICS*FV108 taken to the CLOSE position not achieved.

The CST should be refilled as water is depleted to maintain the suction source available due to being higher quality water, higher elevation, and not affected by containment Evaluator Note: heatup or steam discharges from the RPV.

Opening 2CNSAOV123 attempts to maintain CST level greater than 33 feet.

2CNSAOV123 will auto close when CST level rises to 46 feet.

7. IF injecting with suction from CST, THEN OPENS 2CNS *PASS / FAIL AOV123, CONDENSATE STORAGE TKS MAKE UP VLV STD: Rotates the control switch for 2CNSAOV123, CONDENSATE P STORAGE TKS MAKE UP VLV on (N2EOPHC, Att. 2CEC*PNL851 in the clockwise 6, Automatic direction to the OPEN position and RCIC Injection, verifies the RED light lit and the Step 4.0) GREEN light not lit.

Failure = 2CNSAOV123 RED light ON and GREEN light OFF not achieved.

Evaluator Note: Verify Trigger 1 inserted Malfunction an601303, RCIC Turbine Bearing Oil Press Low When 2CNSAOV123 RED light turns ON, the following Annunciator 601303 RCIC TURBINE Alternate Path: BRG OIL PRESS LOW alarms. The applicant will recognize the annunciator and respond to ARPs. The ARP will require the applicant to NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S1 Page 9 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

8. Recognizes and reports Annunciator 601303 RCIC SAT / UNSAT TURBINE BRG OIL PRESS LOW alarms References ARP for 601303 STD: Reads/reviews N2ARP P 601303.

Cue: If computer point is checked, report ISPC04 RCIC TURB BRG OIL PRESS is in alarm condition (display and alarm typer)

If RCIC is being used for Rx. Level/Pressure control, do not shutdown RCIC unless an alternate Procedure Note:

means of Rx. Level/Pressure control is available.

9. CONFIRMS that RCIC Turbine Speed is 1500 RPM, P SAT / UNSAT minimum rated speed. (N2ARP601303, STD: Observes RCIC speed greater Operator Action than or equal to 1500 RPM on E51 1.0) C002M1.

10. IF required, THEN RAISES RCIC Turbine Speed using SAT / UNSAT P

2ICS*FC101, FLOW CONTROLLER (N2ARP601303, STD: Observes RCIC speed greater Operator Action than 1500 RPM and determines 2.0) that raising turbine speed is not required and placekeeps step.

In the following step, an operator will be dispatched locally to evaluate RCIC Oil level and pressure indications. If the applicant waits for a report from the field prior to moving on with Evaluator Note:

the ARP actions, then report that RCIC oil pressure locally is 2.5 psig and nothing readily apparent is causing the low pressure condition and that oil level looks low in the sight glass.

11. DISPATCHES an operator to RCIC Room (Rx. 175') to SAT / UNSAT P

VERIFY proper oil levels on 2ICS*T1, RCIC TURBINE, AND (N2ARP601303, STD: Acknowledges Cue and to MONITOR oil pressure locally Operator Action placekeeps step.

3.0)

Cue: As field operator, acknowledge the direction In the following step, provide the following cue:

Evaluator Note: Cue: If asked, Feedwater is available for injection and RCIC is not needed for level and pressure control.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S1 Page 10 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

12. IF RCIC Turbine Speed is 1500 RPM, AND annunciator SAT / UNSAT has NOT cleared, AND RCIC is NOT required for Rx. P STD: Acknowledges Cue and Level/Pressure control, THEN SHUTSDOWN RCIC System (N2ARP601303, placekeeps step.

using N2OP35, Subsection G.1.0. Operator Action 4.0)

If RCIC is operating in response to an auto initiation signal, system is shutdown as Procedure Note: directed per Emergency Operating Procedures or per SM direction. [C1]

The following Steps are performed at 2CEC*PNL601.

13. Depresses RCIC INITIATION SEALIN RESET pushbutton SAT / UNSAT AND verifies white SEALIN light out P STD: Depresses and releases the (N2OP35, step RCIC SEALIN RESET pushbutton on G.1.1) 2CEC*PNL601 and verifies the white SEALIN light is not illuminated.

14. Verifies ICS*P2, WTR LEG PUMP, running SAT / UNSAT P

(N2OP35, step STD: Observes the RED light ON G.1.2) and the GREEN light OFF for 2ICS*P2 on 2CEC*PNL601.

15. Places ICS*FC101, FLOW CONTROLLER, in MANUAL SAT / UNSAT P

(N2OP35, step STD: Slides the AUTO/MANUAL G.1.3) control switch to the left to the MANUAL position on 2ICS*FC101.

16. Using RCIC FLOW CONTROLLER, reduces RCIC turbine SAT / UNSAT speed to between 1500 2000 RPM STD: Depresses and releases the P

CLOSE pushbutton on 2ICS*FC101 (N2OP35, step and observes RCIC speed indication G.1.4) using RCIC RPM meter E51C002 M1 until speed indicates between 1500 and 2000 RPM.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S1 Page 11 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

17. Stops RCIC Discharge Flow as follows: SAT / UNSAT P

(N2OP35, step STD: Reads/reviews and verifies G.1.5) that the step has been placekept.

18. IF RCIC is injecting to Reactor Vessel, THEN closes SAT / UNSAT ICS*MOV126, PMP 1 DISCH TO REACTOR, P STD: Reads/reviews and OTHERWISE MARK this step N/A (N2OP35, step determines that RCIC is no longer G.1.5.1) injecting to the reactor vessel and either placekeeps step N/A or may close 2ICS*MOV126.

19. IF RCIC is in full flow test, THEN closes the SAT / UNSAT P

following valves, OTHERWISE MARKS this step (N2OP35, step STD: Reads/reviews and verifies N/A:

G.1.5.2) that the step has been placekept.

20. ICS*FV108, TEST BYPASS TO CONDENSATE SAT / UNSAT STOR TK STD: Rotates the control switch for P 2ICS*FV108, TEST BYPASS TO (N2OP35, step CONDENSATE STOR TK on G.1.5.2.a) 2CEC*PNL601 in the counter clockwise direction to the CLOSE position and verifies the GREEN light lit and the RED light not lit.

21. ICS*MOV124, TEST RETURN TO SAT / UNSAT CONDENSATE STOR TK STD: Rotates the control switch for P 2ICS*MOV124, TEST RETURN TO (N2OP35, step CONDENSATE STOR TK on G.1.5.2.b) 2CEC*PNL601 in the counter clockwise direction to the CLOSE position and verifies the GREEN light lit and the RED light not lit.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S1 Page 12 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

22. Verifies ICS*MOV143, PMP MINIMUM FLOW TO SAT / UNSAT SUPPRESSION POOL, opens P STD: Observes the RED light ON (N2OP35, step and the GREEN light OFF for G.1.6) 2ICS*MOV143, PMP MINIMUM FLOW TO SUPPRESSION POOL on 2CEC*PNL601.

23. IF time permits, THEN closes ICS*MOV150, TURBINE SAT / UNSAT TRIP THROTTLE VLV, OTHERWISE MARKS this step N/A P STD: Reads/reviews and (N2OP35, step determines that based on the field Cue: As field operator, report that RCIC is now making G.1.7) report that time does not permit abnormal noises and there is no visible oil level in and placekeeps step.

the sight glass

24. Depresses TURBINE TRIP pushbutton AND verifies the *PASS / FAIL following:

STD: Depresses and releases the P

TURBINE TRIP pushbutton on (N2OP35, step 2CEC*PNL601.

G.1.8)

Failure = TURBINE TRIP not achieved.

25. ICS*MOV150, TURBINE TRIP THROTTLE VLV, SAT / UNSAT closed P STD: Observes the GREEN light ON (N2OP35, step and the RED light OFF for G.1.8.1) 2ICS*MOV150, TURBINE TRIP THROTTLE VLV on 2CEC*PNL601.

26. ICS*MOV126, PMP 1 DISCH TO REACTOR, closed. SAT / UNSAT P

STD: Observes the GREEN light ON (N2OP35, step and the RED light OFF for G.1.8.2) 2ICS*MOV126, PMP 1 DISCH TO REACTOR on 2CEC*PNL601.

27. ICS*MOV143, PMP MINIMUM FLOW TO SAT / UNSAT SUPPRESSION POOL, closed P STD: Observes the GREEN light ON (N2OP35, step and the RED light OFF for G.1.8.3) 2ICS*MOV143, PMP MINIMUM FLOW TO SUPPRESSION POOL on 2CEC*PNL601.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S1 Page 13 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

28. RCIC Turbine Speed lowers to 0 RPM P SAT / UNSAT (N2OP35, step STD: Observes RCIC speed lower to G.1.8.4) 0 RPM on E51C002M1.

After the applicant verifies all G.1.8 steps, provide the following cue:

Evaluator Note:

Cue: Your task is complete, another operator will complete any remaining actions.

TASK STANDARD RCIC has been tripped using the TURBINE TRIP pushbutton on 2CEC*PNL601.

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S1 Page 14 of 15 April 2021

JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant is shutdown following a reactor scram

RCIC is injecting in automatic

RCIC level 8 interlocks have been defeated per N2EOP6.20

Current RPV level band is 160 - 200 inches

Another operator is controlling RPV water level Evaluator: Ask trainee if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), realign RCIC for injection with full reject to the CST, in accordance with N2 EOPHC, Attachment 6, Automatic RCIC Injection section 3.3 and complete all remaining N2 EOPHC, Attachment 6, Automatic RCIC Injection actions up to and including step 4.0.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S1 Page 15 of 15 April 2021

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC Simulator JPM S2 Revision: 0.0

Title:

Override the Control Room Envelope ACU CrossDivisional Operating Interlock Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / M. Alexander 3/25/21 Validated by: N/A / Don Carr 12/30/20 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 3/26/21 Approximate Duration: 15 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S2 Page 1 of 14 April 2021

References

1. N2OP53A, Rev. 02000, Control Building Ventilation System

2. NUREG 1123 K/A 290003 A3.01 (3.3/3.5)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S2 Page 2 of 14 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to override the Control Room Envelope ACU Cross Divisional Operating Interlock in accordance with N2OP53A section H.15.0.

b. This JPM is not considered time critical because a note in the procedure states actuation of the override switches is required to be completed within 13 minutes after a fire that has disabled the previously running Control Room Envelope ACUs. In this JPM, the ACUs are still running.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. N228800301051 perform override of control room envelope ACU crossdivisional operation interlock.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S2 Page 3 of 14 April 2021

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: 9 Radioactivity Release LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C)

K/A Statement: 290003 A3.01 Ability to monitor automatic operations of (Add justification statement below the CONTROL ROOM HVAC including:

for K/A's < 3.0) Initiation/reconfiguration K/A Importance Rating: RO 3.3 SRO 3.5

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A

5. Recommended Start Location

a. NLC Classroom

6. Simulator Setup

a. IC Number

1) IC021 NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S2 Page 4 of 14 April 2021

b. Presets / With Triggers

1) Malfunctions a) FF16:012001, 332NW West Cable Chase CB Inserted 261 AA, Final = Alarm

2) Remotes a) None

3) Overrides a) None

4) Annunciators a) None

5) Event Triggers Event # Event Action Command None N/A N/A

6) Equipment Out of Service a) None

7) Support Documentation a) Prepare a copy of N2OP53A, section H.15.0 with no steps placekept as complete.

8) Miscellaneous a) IC172 (For ILT 201, paired with S7)

OR b) IC setup:

(1) Ensure that the simulator reflects the conditions stated in the initial conditions regarding Unit Coolers in service.

7. Strategy Code

a. None NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S2 Page 5 of 14 April 2021

8. Tools and Equipment

a. None

9. Commitments

a. None

10. Prerequisites

a. None

11. Applicable Operator Fundamental Knowledge Check Question(s)

a. None NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S2 Page 6 of 14 April 2021

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Unit Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S2 Page 7 of 14 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

A fire has developed in fire zone 332NW Cable Chase West, Control Bldg, 261' (Fire Area 16)

HVC*ACU1B, CONTROL ROOM AC FAN is available, but not running.

HVC*ACU2B, RELAY ROOM AC FAN is available and is running.

HVC*ACU1A, CONTROL ROOM AC FAN is available and is running

HVC*ACU2A, RELAY ROOM AC FAN is available, but not running.

The SM has directed that it is necessary to Override the Control Room Envelope ACU CrossDivisional Operating Interlock.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), Override the Control Room Envelope ACU CrossDivisional Operating Interlock in accordance with N2OP53A, H.15.0.

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P STD: Proper communications used.

Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary The control logic for the Control Room Envelope air handling units 2HVC*ACU1A/B and

ACU2A/B includes a start permissive which precludes simultaneous operation the units and is intended to auto start the unit in the opposite division in the event of a trip of the running unit. A fire affecting one division has the potential to override this interlock such that the opposite division ACU may become disabled. This subsection will utilize override switches to ensure operability of the division without the fire.

Procedure Note: Actuation of the override switches is required to be completed within 13 minutes after a fire that has disabled the previously running Control Room Envelope ACUs to ensure Control Room Envelope temperature remains <90°F.

This section is only used in response to a confirmed fire in Fire Areas 16, 17, 18, or 19.

The actions in this section are performed at 2CEC*PNL870(871) unless otherwise specified.

The Fire Zones listed in Step H.15.1 affect Division I components.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S2 Page 8 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA In the above procedure note, a time limit of 13 minutes is discussed. For this JPM, the fire has Evaluator Note: not yet disabled the previously running Control Room Envelope ACUs, so the JPM is NOT time critical.

2. IF fire is in any of the following Fire Zones: SAT / UNSAT 321NW Cable Chase West, Control Bldg, 237' (Fire Area 16) STD: Recalls from the initial conditions that the fire is located in 332NW Cable Chase West, Control Bldg, 261' fire zone 332NW and placekeeps (Fire Area 16) step.

352NW Cable Chase West, Control Bldg, P 288'6" (Fire Area 16) (H.15.1) 371NW Cable Chase West, Control Bldg, 306' (Fire Area 16) 333XL Div I Switchgear Room, Control Bldg, 261' (Fire Area 17)

THEN performs the following:

3. Checks the following ACUs are available OR are in SAT / UNSAT service: P HVC*ACU1B, CONTROL ROOM AC FAN. STD: Observes GREEN light ON and (H.15.1.1 first RED light OFF for 2HVC*ACU1B, bullet)

CONTROL ROOM AC FAN on 2CEC*PNL871.

4. HVC*ACU2B, RELAY ROOM AC FAN SAT / UNSAT P

STD: Observes GREEN light ON and (H.15.1.1 second RED light OFF for 2HVC*ACU2B, bullet)

RELAY ROOM AC FAN on 2CEC*PNL871.

The following steps will cause an auto start of 2HVC*ACU1B and *ACU2B, if not already Procedure Note:

running.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S2 Page 9 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

5. Verifies control switch is in PULLTOLOCK for the SAT / UNSAT following:

P STD: Rotates 2HVC*ACU1A, HVC*ACU1A, CONTROL ROOM AC FAN CONTROL ROOM AC FAN control (H.15.1.2 first switch counter clockwise and pulls.

bullet)

Verifies RED light OFF, GREEN light ON and that control switch handle is horizontal.

6. HVC*ACU2A, RELAY ROOM AC FAN SAT / UNSAT P STD: Rotates 2HVC*ACU2A, RELAY ROOM AC FAN control switch (H.15.1.2 second counterclockwise and pulls.

bullet)

Verifies RED light OFF, GREEN light ON and that control switch handle is horizontal.

7. Notifies SM to declare 2HVC*ACU1A AND 2HVC*ACU2A SAT / UNSAT inoperable AND to take actions per TS 3.7.2 AND 3.7.3 STD: Proper communications used.

P Cue: If notified, report that 2HVC*ACU1A AND (H.15.1.3) 2HVC*ACU2A have been declared inoperable AND that actions are being taken per TS 3.7.2 AND 3.7.3

8. Obtains SM permission to override HVC ACU cross SAT / UNSAT divisional operating interlock for 2HVC*ACU1A AND P STD: Recalls from the initial 2HVC*ACU2A (H.15.1.4) conditions that the SM has directed the task to be performed and place keeps step.

If HVC*ACU1B is not running, the following step should cause an automatic start of Procedure Note:

HVC*ACU1B.

The initial conditions for this JPM will have 2HVC*ACU1B not running, so it will auto start when the next step is performed.

Evaluator Note:

The next step requires an independent verification. If the operator requests an independent verification, repeat back the request for an independent verification only.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S2 Page 10 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

9. At 2CEC*PNL871, places keylock switch APPENDIX R CR *PASS / FAIL ACU1B OVERRIDE SW, to OVERRIDE STD: Obtains PA2235 key, inserts the key into the APPENDIX R CR ACU1B OVERRIDE SW on Cue: If asked, Independent Verification of this step will P 2CEC*PNL871 and rotates the key (H.15.1.5) clockwise to the OVERRIDE be performed later by an additional operator.

position.

Failure = APPENDIX R CR ACU1B OVERRIDE SW in OVERRIDE position not achieved.

10. Verifies HVC*ACU1B running. SAT / UNSAT P

STD: Observes RED light ON and (H.15.1.6) GREEN light OFF for 2HVC*ACU1B on 2CEC*PNL871.

11. WHILE continuing in this subsection, waits SAT / UNSAT approximately 2 minutes, THEN confirms proper operation of HVC*ACU1B P STD: Observes RED light ON and GREEN light OFF for 2HVC*ACU1B (H.15.1.7) on 2CEC*PNL871. Observes Cue: 2 minutes has elapsed. 2CEC*PNL871 for any indications of a malfunction of 2HVC*ACU1B.

12. Places HVC*ACU1B control switch, CONTROL ROOM AC SAT / UNSAT FAN, in NormalAfterSTART.

STD: Rotates 2HVC*ACU1B control P

switch on 2CEC*PNL871 clockwise (H.15.1.8) to the red flagged position and verifies RED light ON and GREEN light OFF.

If HVC*ACU2B is not running, the following step should cause an automatic start of Procedure Note:

HVC*ACU2B.

The next step requires an independent verification. If the operator requests an independent Evaluator Note:

verification, repeat back the request for an independent verification only.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S2 Page 11 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

13. At 2CEC*PNL871, places keylock switch APPENDIX R RR *PASS / FAIL ACU2B OVERRIDE SW, to OVERRIDE STD: Obtains PA2235 key, inserts the key into the APPENDIX R RR ACU2B OVERRIDE SW on Cue: If asked, Independent Verification of this step will P 2CEC*PNL871 and rotates the key (H.15.1.9) clockwise to the OVERRIDE be performed later by an additional operator.

position.

Failure = APPENDIX R RR ACU2B OVERRIDE SW in OVERRIDE position not achieved.

The initial conditions for this JPM will have 2HVC*ACU2B red flagged and running, so the next Evaluator Note:

3 steps will only require verification.

14. Verifies HVC*ACU2B running SAT / UNSAT P

STD: Observes red light on and (H.15.1.10) GREEN light OFF for 2HVC*ACU2B on 2CEC*PNL871.

15. WHILE continuing in this subsection, waits SAT / UNSAT approximately 2 minutes, THEN confirms proper STD: Observes RED light ON and operation of HVC*ACU2B P GREEN light OFF for 2HVC*ACU2B (H.15.1.11) on 2CEC*PNL871. Observes 2CEC*PNL871 for any indications of a malfunction of 2HVC*ACU2B.

16. Places HVC*ACU2B control switch, RELAY ROOM AC SAT / UNSAT FAN, in NormalAfterSTART.

P STD: Verifies 2HVC*ACU2B control (H.15.1.12) switch on 2CEC*PNL871 is red flagged verifies red light on and green light off.

After the applicant Places HVC*ACU2B control switch, RELAY ROOM AC FAN, in NormalAfter Evaluator Note: START, provide the following cue:

Cue: Your task is complete, another operator will complete any remaining actions.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S2 Page 12 of 14 April 2021

TASK STANDARD Both APPENDIX R CR ACU1B OVERRIDE SW and APPENDIX R RR ACU2B OVERRIDE SW have been placed in the OVERRIDE position.

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S2 Page 13 of 14 April 2021

JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

A fire has developed in fire zone 332NW Cable Chase West, Control Bldg, 261' (Fire Area 16)

HVC*ACU1B, CONTROL ROOM AC FAN is available, but not running.

HVC*ACU2B, RELAY ROOM AC FAN is available and is running.

HVC*ACU1A, CONTROL ROOM AC FAN is available and is running

HVC*ACU2A, RELAY ROOM AC FAN is available, but not running.

The SM has directed that it is necessary to Override the Control Room Envelope ACU CrossDivisional Operating Interlock.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), Override the Control Room Envelope ACU CrossDivisional Operating Interlock in accordance with N2OP53A, H.15.0.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S2 Page 14 of 14 April 2021

Training ID: 2019 NMP2 NRC Simulator JPM S-3 Revision: 0.0

Title:

Depressurizing the RPV to the Main Condenser Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / M. Alexander 1/5/21 Validated by: N/R / Don Carr 12/30/20 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 2/3/21 Approximate Duration: 15 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-3 Page 1 of 14 April 2021

References

1. N2-EOP-6.18, Rev. 00200, Depressurizing the RPV

2. NUREG 1123 K/A 239001 A4.09, (3.9/3.9)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-3 Page 2 of 14 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM test the ability of the applicant to Depressurize the RPV to the Main Condenser through one main steam line and the main turbine bypass valves in accordance with N2-EOP-6.18.

b. This JPM is not considered alternate path.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. N2-EOP06-01001-18, Implement N2-EOP-6.18, Depressurize the RPV

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: 3 Reactor Pressure Control LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C)

K/A Statement: 239001 A4.09 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor (Add justification statement below in the control room: Reactor pressure for K/A's < 3.0)

K/A Importance Rating: SRO 3.9 RO 3.9 NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-3 Page 3 of 14 April 2021

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A

5. Recommended Start Location

a. NLC Classroom

6. Simulator Setup

a. IC Number

a. IC-021 or equivalent

b. Presets / With Triggers

a. Malfunctions a) AD08A, ADS Valve N2 Supply Severed Inserted (MSS*PSV121), Final = True b) AD08C, ADS Valve N2 Supply Severed Inserted (MSS*PSV126), Final = True

b. Remotes a) None

c. Overrides a) None

d. Annunciators a) None

e. Event Triggers Event # Event Action Command None N/A N/A NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-3 Page 4 of 14 April 2021

f. Equipment Out of Service a) None

g. Support Documentation a) Prepare a copy of N2-EOP-6.18 section 6.1 with steps 6.1, 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 placekept as complete. Next step to be performed is 6.1.3.

h. Miscellaneous a) IC-175 (For ILT 20-1, not paired)

-OR-b) IC setup (1) Reset to IC-021, "100% Power MOC" (2) Leave simulator in Freeze (3) Insert malfunction RR20 at 3% with a 3 min ramp (4) Take out of Freeze (5) Do not restore pneumatics (6) Wait until Suppression chamber pressure reaches 17.0 psig (7) Terminate and Prevent panel 601 (8) Close the outboard MSIVs (9) Arm and depress ADS initiation switches (10) Then delete malfunction RR20 (11) Ensue DEHC screen 5530 Status is displayed (12) Place simulator in Freeze

7. Strategy Code

a. None NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-3 Page 5 of 14 April 2021

8. Tools and Equipment

a. None

9. Commitments

a. None

10. Prerequisites

a. None

11. Applicable Operator Fundamental Knowledge Check Question(s)

a. None B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For Plant JPM's:

a. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary.

b. With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated.

Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

2. For Simulator JPM's:

a. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will provide cues as necessary.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Unit Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-3 Page 6 of 14 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

A LOCA has occurred

The outboard MSIVs were closed in attempt to control cooldown rate

2CEC*PNL601 has been terminated and prevented

An RPV Blowdown was required and has been performed

Only 5 SRVs could be opened

EOP Jumper #11, #15, #17 & #19 have been installed Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), Depressurize RPV to main condenser; in accordance with N2-EOP-6.18, section 6.1.

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P

Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if STD: Proper communications used necessary

2. IF a LOCA signal is present OR expected, using PA235 SAT / UNSAT key, places the following LOCA override switches to OVERRIDE: (2CEC*PNL851) P STD: Determines from initial (6.1.3) conditions that a LOCA signal is present and determines step as applicable.

3.

LOCA OVERRIDE VLV 2IAS*SOV166 SAT / UNSAT STD: Places a PA235 key in LOCA P

override key lock switch (6.1.3 first bullet) 2IAS*SOV166 and turns the switch clockwise to the OVERRIDE position.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-3 Page 7 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

4.

LOCA OVERRIDE VLV 2IAS*SOV184 SAT / UNSAT P STD: Places a PA235 key in LOCA (6.1.3 second override key lock switch bullet) 2IAS*SOV184 and turns the switch clockwise to the OVERRIDE position.

5. Verifies open the following valves (2CEC*PNL851) SAT / UNSAT P STD: Determines from initial (6.1.4) conditions that a LOCA signal is present and determines step as applicable.

6.

2IAS*SOV166, PRIMARY CNTMT OUTBD ISOL SAT / UNSAT VLV TO SRV STD: Rotates spring return to P

neutral control switch for (6.1.4 first bullet) 2IAS*SOV166 clockwise to the OPEN position and observes RED light lit and GREEN light not lit.

7.

2IAS*SOV184, PRIMARY CNTMT INBD ISOL VLV SAT / UNSAT TO SRV P STD: Rotates spring return to (6.1.4 second neutral control switch for bullet) 2IAS*SOV184 clockwise to the OPEN position and observes RED light lit and GREEN light not lit.

The trip units referenced in the following step are not modeled in the simulator and will be provided using the cue listed below. For JPM construction purposes the step has been condensed into one step since the step will be completed using an Evaluator cue.

Evaluator Note:

The Evaluator cue will require that the Evaluator take the value of reactor pressure from C33-R605 on 2CEC*PNL603 and subtract 100 psig. The Evaluator will then provide the resultant value of pressure to the applicant.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-3 Page 8 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

8. Records differential pressure across the MSIVs using SAT / UNSAT C33-R605 on 2CEC*PNL603 AND one or more of the following Trip Units: STD: Acknowledges cue from Evaluator and records differential

B22-N676A, STM LINE PRESS LO (2CEC*PNL609) pressure value that is <150 psid and placekeeps step complete.

B22-N676C, STM LINE PRESS LO (2CEC*PNL609)

B22-N676B, STM LINE PRESS LO (2CEC*PNL611)

B22-N676D, STM LINE PRESS LO P (2CEC*PNL611) (6.1.5)

Cue: When asked what any of the above trip units are reading, inform the applicant that trip unit B22-N676A(B,C,D) is reading X (where X = C33-R605 value minus 100 psig) (if C33-R605 reads less than 100 psig, then report that trip unit B22-N676A(B,C,D) reads 10 psig)

9. IF differential pressure across the MSIVs is > 150 psid, SAT / UNSAT opens at least one pair of MSIVs by performing N2-OP-1, Section H.4.0 AND THEN continue at Step 6.1.8 STD: Determines from previous P step that differential pressure (6.1.6) across the MSIVs is 150 psid and placekeeps the N/A, differential pressure across the MSIVs is 150 psid portion of the step.

10. IF differential pressure across the MSIVs is 150 psid, SAT / UNSAT opens at least one pair of MSIVs as follows:

P STD: Determines from initial (6.1.7) conditions that a LOCA signal is present and determines step as applicable.

11. Verifies MSIV isolation signals reset by performing the SAT / UNSAT following: (2CEC*PNL602) P (6.1.7.a) STD: Reviews procedure step and placekeeps with circle and slash.

The initial conditions for the JPM have all MSIV control switches (both inboard and outboard)

Evaluator Note: closed. For JPM construction purposes the step has been condensed into one step since the step will be completed using JPM initial conditions.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-3 Page 9 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

12. Places control switches for the following to CLOSE: SAT / UNSAT

2MSS*AOV6A, MSIV STD: Determines from initial

2MSS*AOV6B, MSIV conditions that all outboard MSIVs are closed with their associated

2MSS*AOV6C, MSIV control switches in the CLOSE

2MSS*AOV6D, MSIV P position with RED lights OFF and

2MSS*AOV7A, MSIV (6.1.7.a.1)

GREEN lights ON. Determines that

2MSS*AOV7B, MSIV all inboard MSIVs are still open

2MSS*AOV7C, MSIV and places the control switches for

2MSS*AOV7D, MSIV 2MSS*AOV6A, B, C & D in the CLOSE position and verifies RED lights OFF and GREEN lights ON.

13. Depresses pushbutton B22H-S33, INBD ISOL LOGIC SAT / UNSAT RESET P

STD: Depresses pushbutton B22H-(6.1.7.a.2)

S33, INBD ISOL LOGIC RESET on control room panel 602.

14. Depresses pushbutton B22H-S32, OUTBD ISOL LOGIC SAT / UNSAT RESET P

STD: Depresses pushbutton B22H-(6.1.7.a.3)

S32, OUTBD ISOL LOGIC RESET on control room panel 602.

There are four main steam lines A, B, C & D. In order to create a flowpath, two A designated AOVs, two B designated AOVs, two C designated AOVs or two D designated AOVs would need to be opened.

Document the inboard and outboard MSIVs that were opened below by placing an X in the appropriate block:

Inboard MSIV Outboard MSIV A Main Steam Line 6A 7A Evaluator Note:

B Main Steam Line 6B 7B Main RPV C Main Steam Line Condenser 6C 7C D Main Steam Line 6D 7D NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-3 Page 10 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

15. Opens one pair of MSIVs as follows: (2CEC*PNL602) SAT / UNSAT P

(6.1.7.b) STD: Reviews procedure step and placekeeps with circle and slash.

16. Places the control switch for ANY outboard MSIV to *PASS / FAIL AUTO STD: Rotates the control switch for 2MSS*AOV7A(B,C,D) clockwise to P the AUTO position and verifies the (6.1.7.b.1) RED light ON and the GREEN light OFF.

Failure = 2MSS*AOV7A(B,C,D) RED light ON GREEN light OFF not achieved.

17. Places the control switch for the corresponding inboard *PASS / FAIL MSIV to AUTO STD: Rotates the control switch for 2MSS*AOV6A(B,C,D) clockwise to P the AUTO position and verifies the (6.1.7.b.2) RED light ON and the GREEN light OFF.

Failure = 2MSS*AOV6A(B,C,D) RED light ON GREEN light OFF not achieved.

18. IF a pair of MSIVs can NOT be opened, aligns steam line SAT / UNSAT drains to depressurize the RPV as follows:

STD: Determines from previous P

step that a pair of MSIVs could be (6.1.8) opened and placekeeps the N/A, A pair of MSIVs are open portion of the step.

19. IF Turbine Bypass Valves are NOT already open, THEN SAT / UNSAT perform the following at 2CEC*PNL851 DEHC HMI to fully open Turbine Bypass Valves: P STD: Determines that the Turbine (6.1.9) Bypass Valves are NOT already open and that the step is applicable and placekeeps step.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-3 Page 11 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

20. At upper right corner of the HMI display, Selects *PASS / FAIL CONTROL button STD: Depresses the CONTROL pushbutton on touchscreen panel 2CEC*PNL851 DEHC HMI in the Display Selection section of the P

5530 screen (located on the upper (6.1.9.a) right corner portion of the HMI display) and verifies the CONTROL button turns blue.

Failure = CONTROL pushbutton on 2CEC*PNL851 DEHC HMI indicating Blue not achieved.

21. Selects BPV JACK from right side of HMI display *PASS / FAIL STD: Depresses the BPV JACK pushbutton on touchscreen panel 2CEC*PNL851 DEHC HMI in the Controls section of the 5532 P

screen (located on the right hand (6.1.9.b) side of the HMI display) and verifies the BPV JACK button turns blue.

Failure = BPV JACK pushbutton on 2CEC*PNL851 DEHC HMI indicating Blue not achieved.

22. Selects FULL OPEN on BPV JACK control screen (5537) *PASS / FAIL STD: Depresses the FULL OPEN pushbutton on touchscreen panel 2CEC*PNL851 DEHC HMI in the Bypass Valve Jack section of the 5537 screen (located on the P

bottom of the HMI display) and (6.1.9.c) verifies the Confirm Full Open pop up window appears (screen 7052).

Failure = Confirm Full Open pop up window appearing (screen 7052) on 2CEC*PNL851 DEHC HMI not achieved.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-3 Page 12 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

23. Selects CONFIRM on popup window (7052) *PASS / FAIL STD: Depresses the CONFIRM pushbutton on touchscreen panel 2CEC*PNL851 DEHC HMI in the Confirm Full Open section of the 7052 screen and verifies the popup P

window disappears and that the (6.1.9.d) FULL OPEN pushbutton turns dark blue on the Bypass Valve Jack section of the 5537 screen.

Failure = FULL OPEN pushbutton on 2CEC*PNL851 DEHC HMI (screen 5537) indicating dark blue not achieved.

24. Verifies all Turbine Bypass Valves indicate FULL OPEN SAT / UNSAT AND reactor pressure is lowering STD: Observes JACK TARG indicate 100.00, JACK RATE indicate 10%/Sec, JACK DMD indicate 100% and TOTAL POS.

P indicate 100.00 on touchscreen (6.1.9.e) panel 2CEC*PNL851 DEHC HMI in the Bypass Valve Jack section of the 5537 screen (located on the bottom of the HMI display). Also verifies that BPV1-5 on the 5537 screen mimic indicate all RED and 100.

Once the CONFIRM FULL OPEN pushbutton has been pushed and the bypass valves are full Evaluator Note: open provide the following cue:

Cue: Your task is complete. Another operator will complete any remaining actions.

TASK STANDARD RPV is depressurizing to Main Condenser via Bypass valves.

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-3 Page 13 of 14 April 2021

JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

A LOCA has occurred

The outboard MSIVs were closed in attempt to control cooldown rate

2CEC*PNL601 has been terminated and prevented

An RPV Blowdown was required and has been performed

Only 5 SRVs could be opened

EOP Jumper #11, #15, #17 & #19 have been installed Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), Depressurize RPV to main condenser; in accordance with N2-EOP-6.18, section 6.1.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-3 Page 14 of 14 April 2021

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC Simulator JPM S4 Revision: 0.0

Title:

HPCS Pump Run Following Maintenance (Alternate Path)

Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / M. Alexander 3/23/21 Validated by: N/A / Don Carr 12/30/20 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 3/26/21 Approximate Duration: 15 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S4 Page 1 of 12 April 2021

References

1. N2OP33, Rev. 01800, High Pressure Core Spray System

2. N2ARP601700, 2CEC*PNL601 Series 700 Alarm Response Procedures

3. NUREG 1123 K/A 209002 A4.01 (3.7/3.7)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S4 Page 2 of 12 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM tests the applicants ability to manipulate controls associated with the High Pressure Core Spray System. The operator will perform a HPCS pump run following maintenance in accordance with N2OP33.

b. This JPM is considered alternate path because when the test return to condensate storage tank valves are opened per procedure and the HPCS min flow valve closes, 2CSH*P1 (HPCS Pump) will experience a pump motor overcurrent condition, but fail to trip as designed. The applicant will evaluate panel indications and reference the applicable annunciator response procedure and place 2CSH*P1 control switch in PTL.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. N220900201003, Shutdown the High Pressure Core Spray System to Inoperable NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S4 Page 3 of 12 April 2021

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: 4 Heat Removal From Reactor Core LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C)

K/A Statement: 209002 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor (Add justification statement below in the control room: HPCS Pump for K/A's < 3.0)

K/A Importance Rating: SRO 3.7 RO 3.7

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A

5. Recommended Start Location

a. NLC Classroom

6. Simulator Setup

a. IC Number

a. IC021 NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S4 Page 4 of 12 April 2021

b. Presets / With Triggers

a. Malfunctions a) None

b. Remotes a) CS02, 2CSH*MOV110 Appendix R Ckt Breaker, Inserted Final = Close

c. Overrides a) AO154, 0600 AMP Ammeter, Final = 600 TRG1

d. Annunciators a) an601730, hpcs pump 1 motor overcurrent, TRG1 Final = Crywolf

e. Event Triggers Event # Event Action Command 1 hzacshr604>0.6 .AND. hzacshr606>0.6 Left Blank 2 zdcshps2(5)==1 dor ao154

f. Equipment Out of Service a) None

g. Support Documentation a) Prepare a copy of N2OP33 with steps H.17.1, H.17.2.a and H.17.2.b placekept as complete. Next step to be performed is H.17.3.

h. Miscellaneous a) IC171 (For ILT 201, paired with S5)

7. Strategy Code

a. None

8. Tools and Equipment

a. None NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S4 Page 5 of 12 April 2021

9. Commitments

a. None

10. Prerequisites

a. None

11. Applicable Operator Fundamental Knowledge Check Question(s)

a. None NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S4 Page 6 of 12 April 2021

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Unit Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S4 Page 7 of 12 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant operating at rated power.

The plant process computer is out of service for corrective maintenance.

Minor maintenance was conducted on the HPCS system.

HPCS has been declared inoperable.

The maintenance activity has been completed.

N2OP33, section E.1 Fill and Vent has been completed satisfactorily.

Breaker 2EHS*MCC2016B, 2CSH*MOV110COND STG TK TEST BP VALVE is ON and the ALARM CIRCUIT control switch is in ENABLE.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), Perform a HPCS Pump Run Following Maintenance in accordance with N2 OP33, section H.17.0.

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P STD: Proper communications used.

Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary

2. Verifies 2CSH*MOV110, TEST RETURN TO CONDENSATE SAT / UNSAT TK THROTTLE valve indicates 0%, CLOSED STD: Observes 2CSH*MOV110, P TEST RETURN TO CONDENSATE TK (H.17.3) THROTTLE percent valve position meter reading 0% on 2CEC*PNL601.

Starting 2CSH*P1 with the suction from the CST can result in Gross Failure alarms on trip Procedure Note:

units E22N652, HPCS PMP SUCT LO, and E22N653, HPCS PMP SUCT HI.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S4 Page 8 of 12 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

3. STARTS 2CSH*P1, HPCS PUMP 1. *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates the control switch for 2CSH*P1, HPCS PUMP 1 on 2CEC*PNL601 clockwise to the P

NormalAfterStart position and (H.17.4) observes the RED light lit and GREEN light not lit.

Failure = 2CSH*P1 RED light ON and GREEN light OFF not achieved.

4. VERIFIES 2CSH*MOV107, PMP 1 INJECTION VLV, is SAT / UNSAT closed.

P STD: Observes 2CSH*MOV107, (H.17.5) PMP 1 INJECTION VLV GREEN light lit and RED light not lit on 2CEC*PNL601.

5. OBSERVES 2CSH*MOV105, MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS SAT / UNSAT VLV, opens.

P STD: Observes 2CSH*MOV105, (H.17.6) MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS VLV RED light lit and GREEN light not lit on 2CEC*PNL601.

Throttling HPCS return flow to CST with only one throttle valve can cause extensive valve damage.

Procedure Caution:

With HPCS operating in full flow test with suction and return to the CSTs, A CST will fill up and overflow if level is not monitored.

If the applicant requests A CST level, provide the following cue:

Evaluator Note:

Cue: A CST level currently reads 41 feet During performance of the following step, 2CSH*P1 will experience a motor overcurrent condition with a failure of 2CSH*P1 to trip. The applicant will recognize that annunciator Alternate Path: 601730, HPCS Pump 1 Motor Overcurrent is in alarm and that that 2CSH*P1 current ammeter indicates upscale with 2CSH*P1 still running. The applicant will reference the ARP and place the pump control switch in PTL.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S4 Page 9 of 12 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA The PASS/FAIL criteria for the next step does not require the applicant to achieve the Evaluator Note: procedural directed flow rate of 6350 gpm to 6450 gpm because the alternate path event trigger will initiate prior to achieving this flow value.

6. THROTTLES OPEN 2CSH*MOV110 AND 2CSH*MOV112, *PASS / FAIL TEST RETURN TO CONDENSATE TK, in equal increments STD: Alternately rotates the control to establish 6350 gpm (6350 gpm to 6450 gpm) on E22 switch for 2CSH*MOV110 AND R603 (P601). 2CSH*MOV112, TEST RETURN TO CONDENSATE TK, in equal P

increments on 2CEC*PNL601 in the (H.17.7) clockwise direction to the OPEN position and then releases.

Failure = HPCS pump flow rising as read on HPCS System Flow meter E22R603 not achieved.

Candidate may choose to close 2CSH*MOV110 AND 2CSH*MOV112 prior to or after tripping Evaluator Note:

the HPCS pump. If this is performed, it will not result in a JPM failure.

7. Recognizes that annunciator 601730, HPCS Pump 1 *PASS / FAIL Motor Overcurrent is in alarm and that 2CSH*P1 STD: Rotates the control switch for current ammeter indicates upscale with 2CSH*P1 still 2CSH*P1, HPCS PUMP 1 on running. References ARP 601730 and determines that 2CEC*PNL601 counter clockwise to the automatic response did not occur. Determines per P the PullToLock position and observes that both the green and operator action 3 that 2CSH*P1 control switch is red indicating lights are OFF and required to be placed in PTL and places 2CSH*P1 that pumps amps indicate zero.

control switch in PTL.

Failure = 2CSH*P1 RED light OFF and GREEN light OFF not achieved.

8. Reports to the US that 2CSH*P1 experienced a motor SAT / UNSAT overcurrent condition with a failure of 2CSH*P1 to P STD: Proper communications used.

automatically trip and that HPCS has been secured by placing the control switch in PTL.

Once 2CSH*P1, HPCS PUMP 1 control switch has been placed in PullToLock. Provide the following cue:

Evaluator Note:

Cue: Your task is complete, another operator will complete any remaining actions.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S4 Page 10 of 12 April 2021

TASK STANDARD HPCS pump has been secured by placing the pump control switch in PTL.

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S4 Page 11 of 12 April 2021

JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant operating at rated power.

The plant process computer is out of service for corrective maintenance.

Minor maintenance was conducted on the HPCS system.

HPCS has been declared inoperable.

The maintenance activity has been completed.

N2OP33, section E.1 Fill and Vent has been completed satisfactorily.

Breaker 2EHS*MCC2016B, 2CSH*MOV110COND STG TK TEST BP VALVE is ON and the ALARM CIRCUIT control switch is in ENABLE.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), Perform a HPCS Pump Run Following Maintenance in accordance with N2 OP33, section H.17.0.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S4 Page 12 of 12 April 2021

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC Simulator JPM S-5 Revision: 0.0

Title:

Rotate Drywell Unit Coolers (Alternate Path)

Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / M. Alexander 1/5/21 Validated by: N/R / Don Carr 12/30/20 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 2/3/21 Approximate Duration: 15 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-5 Page 1 of 11 April 2021

References

1. N2-OP-60, Rev. 00402, Drywell Cooling

2. N2-ARP-873200, Rev. 00001, 2CEC*PNL873 SERIES 200 ALARM RESPONSE PROCEDURES

3. NUREG 1123 K/A 223001, A4.12 (3.5/3.6)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-5 Page 2 of 11 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to rotate the Drywell Unit Coolers 3A and B and respond to a degraded condition on Unit Cooler 3B.

b. This JPM is considered alternate path because once the unit coolers have been rotated, the operator will receive indication that the unit cooler placed in service has degraded. The operator will be required to respond per the applicable ARP and place the previously running unit cooler back in service and place in pull to lock the degraded unit cooler.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. N2-223004-01002, Rotate Drywell Unit Coolers 3A and 3B.

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: 5 Containment Integrity LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-5 Page 3 of 11 April 2021

K/A Statement: 223001 A4.12 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor (Add justification statement below in the control room: Drywell coolers/chillers for K/A's < 3.0)

K/A Importance Rating: RO 3.5 SRO 3.6

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A

5. Recommended Start Location

a. NLC Classroom

6. Simulator Setup

a. IC Number

1) IC-021

b. Presets / With Triggers

1) Malfunctions a) PC36B, DW Unit Cooler 3B Vibration High, TRG3 Delay = 3, Final = True

2) Remotes a) None

3) Overrides a) None

4) Annunciators a) None

5) Event Triggers Event # Event Action Command 3 hzlcw2ccpmov3a(1)==1 .AND. hzlpc1drsb03(2)==1 Left Blank (2CCP-MOV3A Green Light On and UC3B Red Light On)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-5 Page 4 of 11 April 2021

6) Equipment Out of Service a) None

7) Support Documentation a) Prepare a copy of N2-OP-60, section F.2.0 with no steps placekept as complete.

8) Miscellaneous a) IC-171 (For ILT 20-1, paired with S-4)

-OR-b) IC setup:

(1) This JPM can be performed in Mode 1, 2, or 3 as long as power is available to both Unit Coolers 3A and B (2) Ensure Drywell Unit Cooler 3A is running and 3B is secured

7. Strategy Code

a. None

8. Tools and Equipment

a. None

9. Commitments

a. None

10. Prerequisites

a. None

11. Applicable Operator Fundamental Knowledge Check Question(s)

a. None NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-5 Page 5 of 11 April 2021

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Unit Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-5 Page 6 of 11 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant is in Mode 1

2DRS-UC3A is running and 2DRS-UC3B is in standby

Unit Coolers 3A and 3B need to be rotated to equalize runtime Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), Rotate Drywell Unit Coolers by starting 2DRS-UC3B and stopping 2DRS-UC3A in accordance with N2-OP-60, Section F.2.0.

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P STD: Proper communications used.

Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary

2DRS-UC3A and UC3B should be rotated occasionally to equalize operating time and equipment wear.

Procedure Note:

All control switches and indicating lights are located on 2CEC*PNL873, unless otherwise noted.

2. Opens CCP-MOV3B UNIT COOLER 3B RBCLC INLET to the *PASS / FAIL standby unit cooler. STD: Rotates the control switch for 2CCP-MOV3B UNIT COOLER 3B RBCLC INLET on 2CEC*PNL873 in P the clockwise direction to the OPEN (F.2.1) position and verifies the RED light lit and the GREEN light not lit.

Failure = 2CCP-MOV3B RED light ON and GREEN light OFF not achieved.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-5 Page 7 of 11 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

3. Starts standby unit cooler DRS-UC3B. *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates the control switch for 2DRS-UC3B, UNIT COOLER on 2CEC*PNL873 in the clockwise P

direction to the START position and (F.2.2) verifies the RED light lit and the GREEN light not lit.

Failure = 2DRS-UC3B RED light ON and GREEN light OFF not achieved.

4. Stops DRS-UC3A by placing control switch to STOP *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates the control switch for 2DRS-UC3A, UNIT COOLER on 2CEC*PNL873 in the counter P

clockwise direction to the STOP (F.2.3) position and verifies the GREEN light lit and the RED light not lit.

Failure = 2DRS-UC3A RED light OFF and GREEN light ON not achieved.

Three seconds after completion of the following step, a high vibration condition will occur on Alternate Path: 2DRS-UC3B. The operator will reference ARP 873214 which will direct restarting UC3A and placing in Pull-To-Lock UC3B.

5. Closes CCP-MOV3A, UNIT COOLER 3A RBCLC INLET to *PASS / FAIL the standby unit cooler.

STD: Rotates the control switch for 2CCP-MOV3A UNIT COOLER 3A RBCLC INLET on 2CEC*PNL873 in the counter clockwise direction to P

the CLOSE position and verifies the (F.2.4)

GREEN light lit and the RED light not lit.

Failure = 2CCP-MOV3A RED light OFF and GREEN light ON not achieved.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-5 Page 8 of 11 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

6. Recognizes and reports Annunciator 873214 DRYWELL SAT / UNSAT UNIT CLR 3B VIBRATION HIGH alarms P References ARP for 873214 STD: Reads/reviews N2-ARP-873214.

7. IF 2DRS-UC3A, UNIT COOLER is available, THEN P SAT / UNSAT PERFORMS the following: (N2-ARP-873214, Operator Action STD: Reads/reviews and 1.0) placekeeps step.

8. OPENS CCP-MOV3A, UNIT COOLER 3A RBCLC INLET *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates the control switch for 2CCP-MOV3A UNIT COOLER 3A P RBCLC INLET on 2CEC*PNL873 in (N2-ARP-873214, the clockwise direction to the OPEN Operator Action position and verifies the RED light 1.0.a) lit and the GREEN light not lit.

Failure = 2CCP-MOV3A RED light ON and GREEN light OFF not achieved.

9. STARTS 2DRS-UC3A. *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates the control switch for P 2DRS-UC3A, UNIT COOLER on 2CEC*PNL873 in the clockwise (N2-ARP-873214, direction to the START position and Operator Action verifies the RED light lit and the 1.0.b)

GREEN light not lit.

Failure = 2DRS-UC3A RED light ON and GREEN light OFF not achieved.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-5 Page 9 of 11 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

10. STOPS 2DRS-UC3B by placing control switch in PULL TO *PASS / FAIL LOCK STD: Rotates the control switch for 2DRS-UC3B, UNIT COOLER on P 2CEC*PNL873 in the counter (N2-ARP-873214, clockwise direction to the Pull-To-Operator Action Lock position and verifies the 1.0.c) GREEN light lit and the RED light not lit.

Failure = 2DRS-UC3B RED light OFF and GREEN light ON not achieved.

11. CLOSES CCP-MOV3B, UNIT COOLER 3B RBCLC INLET SAT / UNSAT P STD: Rotates the control switch for 2CCP-MOV3B UNIT COOLER 3B (N2-ARP-873214, RBCLC INLET on 2CEC*PNL873 in Operator Action the counter clockwise direction to 1.0.d) the CLOSE position and verifies the GREEN light lit and the RED light not lit.

After the applicant closes 2CCP-MOV3B, provide the following cue:

Evaluator Note:

Cue: Your task is complete, another operator will complete any remaining actions.

TASK STANDARD 2CCP-MOV3B is closed with 2DRS-UC3B secured and 2DRS-UC3A placed in service.

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-5 Page 10 of 11 April 2021

JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant is in Mode 1

2DRS-UC3A is running and 2DRS-UC3B is in standby

Unit Coolers 3A and 3B need to be rotated to equalize runtime Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), Rotate Drywell Unit Coolers by starting 2DRS-UC3B and stopping 2DRS-UC3A in accordance with N2-OP-60, Section F.2.0.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-5 Page 11 of 11 April 2021

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC Simulator JPM S-6 Revision: 0.0

Title:

Energize Reserve Station Transformer 1B, NPS-SWG003 and NNS-SWG015 Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / M. Alexander 1/5/21 Validated by: N/R / Don Carr 12/30/20 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 2/3/21 Approximate Duration: 20 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-6 Page 1 of 17 April 2021

References

1. N2-SOP-3, Rev. 01900, Loss of AC Power

2. NUREG 1123 K/A 262001 A4.01 (3.4/3.7)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-6 Page 2 of 17 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM tests the applicants ability to manipulate electrical and breaker controls required to energize Reserve Station Transformer 1B from Off-Site 115 KV Line 6 per N2-SOP-3. Then restore power to 2NPS-SWG003 and NNS-SWG015 per N2-SOP-3.

b. This JPM is NOT considered alternate path.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. N2-262000-01009, Return 2RTX-XSR1B, B Reserve Station Service Transformer to service.

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: 6 Electrical LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C)

K/A Statement: 262001 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor (Add justification statement below in the control room: All breakers and disconnects for K/A's < 3.0) (including available switch yard): Plant-Specific NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-6 Page 3 of 17 April 2021

K/A Importance Rating: RO 3.4 SRO 3.7

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A

5. Recommended Start Location

a. NLC Classroom

6. Simulator Setup

a. IC Number

1) IC-021

b. Presets / With Triggers

1) Malfunctions a) None

2) Remotes a) None

3) Overrides a) None

4) Annunciators a) None

5) Event Triggers Event # Event Action Command None N/A N/A

6) Equipment Out of Service a) None NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-6 Page 4 of 17 April 2021

7) Support Documentation a) Prepare a copy of N2-SOP-3, Attachment 1 section 1.7 with no steps placekept as complete. Additionally, provide N2-SOP-3, Attachments 2 through 11.

8) Miscellaneous a) IC-188 (For ILT 20-1, not paired)

-OR-b) IC setup:

(1) From IC-188:

(a) Reset simulator to IC-021 (b) Override switch check (c) Insert malfunction ED02B, Loss of Offsite 115 KV Line 6, FV=True to trip the 86 devices (d) Reset back to IC-188 (e) Begin JPM

7. Strategy Code

a. None

8. Tools and Equipment

a. None

9. Commitments

a. None

10. Prerequisites

a. None

11. Applicable Operator Fundamental Knowledge Check Question(s)

a. None NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-6 Page 5 of 17 April 2021

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Unit Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-6 Page 6 of 17 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The Plant has experienced a loss of Off-Site 115 KV Line 6.

The plant was manually scrammed.

Immediate and subsequent actions of N2-SOP-3 are complete.

Fault identification and isolation per Attachment 1 section 1.6 are complete.

Power has been restored to Off-Site 115 KV Line 6 and Power Control has verified its availability and reliability.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), energize Reserve Station Transformer 1B from Off-Site 115 KV Line 6 per N2-SOP-3. Then restore power to 2NPS-SWG003 and NNS-SWG015 per N2-SOP-3, Section 1.7..

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P STD: Proper communications used.

Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary

2. Reviews N2-SOP-3 Attachment 1 Section 1.7, Power SAT / UNSAT Restoration to determine applicable Attachment to P Energize Reserve Transformer 1B (1.7) STD: Determines that section 1.7.2 is applicable and placekeeps step.

3. Performs Attachment 6 of this procedure SAT / UNSAT P

(1.7.2) STD: Determines that Attachment 6 is applicable and placekeeps step.

Procedure Note: The following steps are performed at Panel 852 unless otherwise noted.

4. Prerequisites SAT / UNSAT P

(Attachment 6, STD: Determines step is applicable step 6.1) and placekeeps step.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-6 Page 7 of 17 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

5. PRIOR to executing the following steps, power must be SAT / UNSAT available from Line 5 OR Line 6 Contacts System Power Control to verify availability AND P STD: Recalls from the initial conditions that Power has been reliability of offsite source(s) PRIOR to restoration (Attachment 6, restored to Off-Site 115 KV Line 6 step 6.1.1) and Power Control has verified its availability and reliability and place keeps step.

6. Attachment 1, Section 1.6, Fault Identification and SAT / UNSAT Isolation, is complete P STD: Recalls from the initial (Attachment 6, conditions that Fault identification step 6.1.2) and isolation per Attachment 1 section 1.6 are complete and place keeps step.

7. Upon completion of Attachment 6, return to SAT / UNSAT P

Attachment 1, Section 1.7, as appropriate to restore (Attachment 6, power to plant. STD: Reads, reviews and place step 6.1.3) keeps step.

Attempting to energize Reserve Station Service Transformer 1B without resetting lockout Procedure Caution:

relays 86-2SPRY01 or 86-2SPRZ08 may result in a complete loss of offsite power.

8. At Panel 808 (CB 288'), verifies reset 86-2SPRY01 (RES SAT / UNSAT STA SER XFMR 1B PRIM PROT LO RELAY). P (Attachment 6, STD: Reads, reviews and acknowledges cue and place keeps Cue: If asked, inform the applicant that 86-SPRY01 step 6.1.4) step.

Primary Lock Out Relay is reset.

9. At Panel 809 (CB 288'), verify reset 86-2SPRZ08 (RES STA SAT / UNSAT SER XFMR 1B BU PROT LOCKOUT RELAY). P (Attachment 6, STD: Reads, reviews and acknowledges cue and place keeps Cue: If asked, inform the applicant that 86-SPRZ08 step 6.1.5) step.

Backup Lock Out Relay is reset.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-6 Page 8 of 17 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

10. Energizing Reserve Station Service Transformer 1B from SAT / UNSAT Line 5 P (Attachment 6, STD: Determines step is not step 6.2) applicable and placekeeps step N/A.

11. Energizing Reserve Station Service Transformer 1B from SAT / UNSAT P

Line 6 (Attachment 6, STD: Determines step is applicable step 6.3) and placekeeps step.

12. Closes MDS2 - (115 KV MOD SWITCH 63) LINE 6 *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates 115 KV MOD SWITCH Cue: If directed as switchyard operator to verify that all 63 MDS 2, control switch clockwise P

three phases are closed, report that all three to the CLOSE position. Verifies RED (Attachment 6, phases of the disconnect are closed. light ON and GREEN light OFF.

step 6.3.1)

Failure = 115 KV MOD SWITCH 63 MDS 2 RED light ON and GREEN light OFF not achieved.

In the following two JPM steps, the control switches will be in the Pull-To-Lock position prior Evaluator Note: to manipulation which will require the applicant to take the control switches out of the Pull-To-Lock position while repositioning the components.

13. Close MDS4 - (115 KV CIRCUIT SWITCHER CKT SWITCH *PASS / FAIL

38) STD: Rotates 115 KV CIRCUIT SWITCHER MDS 4 CKT SWITCH 38, control switch clockwise to the P

CLOSE position. Verifies RED light (Attachment 6, ON and GREEN light OFF.

step 6.3.2)

Failure = 115 KV CIRCUIT SWITCHER MDS 4 CKT SWITCH 38 RED light ON and GREEN light OFF not achieved.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-6 Page 9 of 17 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

14. IF required, places in Normal-After-Trip 2NPS-SWG003-1 SAT / UNSAT P STD: Rotates 2NPS-SWG003-1, (Attachment 6, control switch clockwise to the step 6.3.3) NORMAL-AFTER-START position (Green Flagged). Verifies GREEN light ON and RED light OFF.

15. Returns to Attachment 1, Section 1.7. SAT / UNSAT P

(Attachment 6, STD: Reads, reviews and place step 6.3.4) keeps step.

16. Reviews N2-SOP-3 Attachment 1 Section 1.7, Power SAT / UNSAT Restoration to determine applicable Attachment to P Energize 2NPS-SWG003 (1.7) STD: Determines that section 1.7.8 is applicable and placekeeps step.

17. Performs Attachment 7 of this procedure SAT / UNSAT P

(1.7.8) STD: Determines that Attachment 7 is applicable and placekeeps step.

Procedure Note: The following steps are performed at Panel 852 unless otherwise noted.

18. Prerequisites SAT / UNSAT P

(Attachment 7, STD: Determines step is applicable step 7.1) and placekeeps step.

19. PRIOR to executing the following steps, power must be SAT / UNSAT available from one of the following sources:

STD: Recalls that N2-SOP-03 P Attachment 6 was completed and

Reserve Station Service Transformer 1B (Attachment 7, that Reserve Station Service (Attachment 6) Transformer 1B has power.

step 7.1.1)

Reserve Station Service Transformer 1A (Attachment 2)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-6 Page 10 of 17 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

20. Attachment 1, Section 1.6, Fault Identification and SAT / UNSAT Isolation, is complete P STD: Recalls from the initial (Attachment 7, conditions that Fault identification step 7.1.2) and isolation per Attachment 1 section 1.6 are complete and place keeps step.

21. Upon completion of Attachment 7, returns to SAT / UNSAT P

Attachment 1, Section 1.7, as appropriate to restore (Attachment 7, power to plant. STD: Reads, reviews and place step 7.1.3) keeps step.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-6 Page 11 of 17 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

22. Verifies reset the following lockouts: SAT / UNSAT At Panel 813 (CB 288): STD: Reads, reviews, and acknowledges cue and place keeps step.

86-2NPSY01 (13.8KV BUS NPS-003 PROT LOCKOUT RLY) 86-2NNSY04 (4.16KV BUS NNS-013 PROT LOCKOUT RLY)

At Panel 810 (CB 288):

86-2SPXX01 (AUX XFMR ATX-XS3 PROT LOCKOUT RELAY) P (Attachment 7, At Panel 815 (CB 288): step 7.1.4) 86-2NNSX05 (4.16KV BUS NNS-012 PROT 1 LOCKOUT RELAY)

At Panel 867 (CB 288):

86-2SPGZ01 (GENERATOR BACKUP PROT LOCKOUT RELAY 2)

Cue: If asked, Attachment 6 step 7.1.4 lockouts have been verified reset. Step 7.1, Prerequisites, are completed.

23. Energizing 2NPS-SWG003 from Reserve Station Service SAT / UNSAT P

Transformer 1B (Attachment 7, STD: Determines step is applicable step 7.2) and placekeeps step.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-6 Page 12 of 17 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

24. Places 3-14 in PULL-TO-LOCK *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates Breaker 3-14 control switch counter clockwise to the Pull-To-Lock position and pulls.

P Verifies RED light OFF, GREEN light (Attachment 7, OFF and that control switch handle step 7.2.1) is horizontal.

Failure = Breaker 3-14 RED light OFF, GREEN light OFF and control switch handle horizontal not achieved.

25. Places SYNC switch to ON (SYNCHRONIZE RES STA SVCE *PASS / FAIL XFMR 1B) STD: At 2CEC*PNL852, places the sync key switch in the SYNCHRONIZE RES STA SVCE XFMR P 1B slot and rotates SYNCHRONIZE (Attachment 7, RES STA SVCE XFMR 1B synch step 7.2.2) switch clockwise to the ON position.

Failure = SYNCHRONIZE RES STA SVCE XFMR 1B synch switch in the ON position not achieved.

Performance of the following JPM step will cause many control room alarms to come in as Evaluator Note: NPS-SWG003 is re-energized. Ensure that the applicant is told that these alarms will be handled by an additional operator.

26. Closes 3-1 *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates Breaker 3-1 control P switch clockwise to the CLOSE (Attachment 7, position. Verifies RED light ON and step 7.2.3) GREEN light OFF.

Failure = Breaker 3-1 RED light ON and GREEN light OFF not achieved.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-6 Page 13 of 17 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

27. Places SYNC switch to OFF SAT / UNSAT P

STD: At 2CEC*PNL852, rotates (Attachment 7, SYNCHRONIZE RES STA SVCE XFMR step 7.2.4) 1B synch switch counter clockwise to the OFF position.

In the next JPM step, the control switch will be in the Pull-To-Lock position prior to Evaluator Note: manipulation which will require the applicant to take the control switch out of the Pull-To-Lock position while repositioning the component.

28. Closes 13-6 *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates Breaker 13-6 control switch clockwise to the CLOSE P

position. Verifies RED light ON and (Attachment 7, GREEN light OFF.

step 7.2.5)

Failure = Breaker 13-6 RED light ON and GREEN light OFF not achieved.

29. Returns to Attachment 1, Section 1.7. SAT / UNSAT P

(Attachment 7, STD: Reads, reviews and place step 7.2.6) keeps step.

30. Reviews N2-SOP-3 Attachment 1 Section 1.7, Power SAT / UNSAT Restoration to determine applicable Attachment to P Energize 2NPS-SWG003 STD: Determines that section (1.7) 1.7.10 is applicable and placekeeps step.

31. Performs Attachment 9 of this procedure SAT / UNSAT P

(1.7.10) STD: Determines that Attachment 9 is applicable and placekeeps step.

Procedure Note: The following steps are performed at Panel 852 unless otherwise noted.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-6 Page 14 of 17 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

32. Prerequisites SAT / UNSAT P

(Attachment 9, STD: Determines step is applicable step 9.1) and placekeeps step.

33. PRIOR to executing the following steps, power must be SAT / UNSAT available from one of the following sources:

STD: Recalls that N2-SOP-03 Attachment 7 was completed and

2NPS-SWG003 (Attachment 7) P that 2NPS-SWG003 has power.

(Attachment 9,

2ENS*SWG103 (Division 2 Emergency Switchgear) step 9.1.1)

(Attachment 8)

Cue: Another operator has completed Attachment 8.

34. Attachment 1, Section 1.6, Fault Identification and SAT / UNSAT Isolation, is complete P STD: Recalls from the initial (Attachment 9, conditions that Fault identification step 9.1.2) and isolation per Attachment 1 section 1.6 are complete and place keeps step.

35. Upon completion of Attachment 9, returns to SAT / UNSAT P

Attachment 1, Section 1.7, as appropriate to restore (Attachment 9, power to plant. STD: Reads, reviews and place step 9.1.3) keeps step.

36. At Panel 804 (CB 288), verify 86-2NNSY15 (4.16KV BUS SAT / UNSAT NNS-015 PROTECTION LOCKOUT RELAY) reset. P (Attachment 9, STD: Reads, reviews, and acknowledges cue and place keeps Cue: If asked, inform the applicant that 86-NNSY15, step 9.1.4) step.

NNS-015 Protection Lock Out Relay is reset.

37. Energizing 2NNS-SWG015 (Stub Bus) from 2NPS- SAT / UNSAT P

SWG003 (Attachment 9, STD: Determines step is applicable step 9.2) and placekeeps step.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-6 Page 15 of 17 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

38. Verifies 3-6 closed SAT / UNSAT P

(Attachment 9, STD: Verifies Breaker 3-6 indicates step 9.2.1)

RED light ON and GREEN light OFF.

In the next JPM step, the control switch will be in the Pull-To-Lock position prior to Evaluator Note: manipulation which will require the applicant to take the control switch out of the Pull-To-Lock position while repositioning the component.

39. Closes 15-3 *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates Breaker 15-3 control switch clockwise to the CLOSE P

position. Verifies RED light ON and (Attachment 9, GREEN light OFF.

step 9.2.2)

Failure = Breaker 15-3 RED light ON and GREEN light OFF not achieved.

After the applicant closes breaker 15-3, provide the following cue:

Evaluator Note:

Cue: Your task is complete, another operator will complete any remaining actions.

TASK STANDARD Reserve Transformer 1B energized from Line 6. NPS-SWG003 energized from Reserve Transformer 1B. NNS-SWG013 and NNS-SWG015 energized from NPS-SWG003.

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-6 Page 16 of 17 April 2021

JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The Plant has experienced a loss of Off-Site 115 KV Line 6.

The plant was manually scrammed.

Immediate and subsequent actions of N2-SOP-3 are complete.

Fault identification and isolation per Attachment 1 section 1.6 are complete.

Power has been restored to Off-Site 115 KV Line 6 and Power Control has verified its availability and reliability.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), energize Reserve Station Transformer 1B from Off-Site 115 KV Line 6 per N2-SOP-3. Then restore power to 2NPS-SWG003 and NNS-SWG015 per N2-SOP-3, Section 1.7..

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-6 Page 17 of 17 April 2021

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC Simulator JPM S7 Revision: 0.0

Title:

Perform RPS Weekly Surveillance (Alternate Path)

Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / M. Alexander 3/25/21 Validated by: N/A / Don Carr 12/30/20 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 3/26/21 Approximate Duration: 15 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S7 Page 1 of 16 April 2021

References

1. N2OSPRPSW002, Rev. 00100, Manual Scram Channel Functional Test

2. N2SOP08, Rev. 01400, Unplanned Power Changes

3. NUREG 1123 K/A 212000 A4.01 (4.6/4.6)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S7 Page 2 of 16 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to perform the RPS Weekly Surveillance.

b. This JPM is considered alternate path because when the scram test is performed, three control rods will individually scram. The operator will be required to enter N2SOP08 and place the Mode Switch in Shutdown.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. N221200001029, Perform N2OSPRPSW002, Manual Scram Channel Functional Test.

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: 7 Instrumentation LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C)

K/A Statement: 212000 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor (Add justification statement below in the control room: Provide manual SCRAM signal(s) for K/A's < 3.0)

K/A Importance Rating: RO 4.6 SRO 4.6 NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S7 Page 3 of 16 April 2021

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A

5. Recommended Start Location

a. NLC Classroom

6. Simulator Setup

a. IC Number

1) IC021

b. Presets / With Triggers

1) Malfunctions a) RD091039, Control Rod Failure Scrammed, TRG1 Final = True b) RD095427, Control Rod Failure Scrammed, TRG1 Final = True c) RD093407, Control Rod Failure Scrammed, TRG1 Final = True

2) Remotes a) None

3) Overrides a) None

4) Annunciators a) None

5) Event Triggers Event # Event Action Command 1 zdrps3dp(3)==1 Left Blank (A2 Manual Scram Pushbutton Depressed)

6) Equipment Out of Service a) None NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S7 Page 4 of 16 April 2021

7) Support Documentation a) Prepare a copy of N2OSPRPSW002, Attachment 1, with steps up to including 6.1.6 placekept as complete. The next step to be completed is N2OSPRPS W002, Attachment 1 step 6.2 (Open circle placekeep this step). The applicant will only be performing testing on RPS A and C channels, so N/A all of Attachment 2 for sections of B and D.

8) Miscellaneous a) IC172 (For ILT 201, paired with S2)

OR b) IC setup:

(1) This JPM should be performed in Mode 1 (2) Ensure that both RPS A and B are reset

7. Strategy Code

a. None

8. Tools and Equipment

a. None

9. Commitments

a. None

10. Prerequisites

a. None

11. Applicable Operator Fundamental Knowledge Check Question(s)

a. None NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S7 Page 5 of 16 April 2021

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Unit Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S7 Page 6 of 16 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant is in Mode 1

Maintenance has just been completed on RPS A1 and A2

Post Maintenance testing is required for RPS Channels A1 and A2

Communications have been established between 2CEC*PNL603 and 2CEC*PNL609

Thermography completed SAT on all HCUs Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), Perform a Manual Scram Channel Functional Test on RPS Channel A and C in accordance with N2OSPRPSW002, Attachment 1.

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P STD: Proper communications used.

Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary All indicators and controls for this test are located on panel 2CEC*PNL603 unless otherwise Procedure Note:

specified.

2. VERIFIES there is NO half scram on the "B" side SAT / UNSAT P

STD: Observes the four white RPS B (6.2.1) power lights are lit on 2CEC*PNL603.

3. NOTIFIES CRO a half scram on "A" side will be SAT / UNSAT generated. P (6.2.2) STD: Proper communications used.

Cue: Acknowledge report from applicant NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S7 Page 7 of 16 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA The operator may choose to perform the actions for an Expected Annunciator which involves informing the CRS and reviewing the associated ARP. As the Evaluator, and as necessary, Instructor Note: during the course of this JPM, acknowledge the Expected or Actual Annunciators as the CRS.

Additionally, at your discretion you may choose to inform the operator that all further notifications for Expected Annunciators are not required.

4. ARMS the REACTOR SCRAM A1 pushbutton *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates the REACTOR SCRAM A1 pushbutton collar in the P clockwise direction to the ARMED (6.2.3) position.

Failure = REACTOR SCRAM A1 pushbutton collar in the ARMED position not achieved.

5. VERIFIES annunciator 603113, RPS A MANUAL SCRAM SAT / UNSAT SWITCH ARMED, has alarmed P (6.2.4) STD: Observes Annunciator 603113 in alarm on 2CEC*PNL603.

6. DEPRESSES AND HOLDS for 2 to 3 seconds the REACTOR *PASS / FAIL SCRAM A1 pushbutton STD: Depresses for 2 to 3 seconds and releases the REACTOR SCRAM P

A1 pushbutton on 2CEC*PNL603.

(6.2.5)

Failure = REACTOR SCRAM A1 pushbutton depression not achieved.

7. VERIFIES the following annunciators have alarmed: SAT / UNSAT P

(6.2.6) STD: Reads/reviews and placekeeps step.

8. 603110 RPS A AUTO TRIP P SAT / UNSAT (6.2.6, first STD: Observes Annunciator 603110 bullet) in alarm on 2CEC*PNL603.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S7 Page 8 of 16 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

9. 603111 RPS A MANUAL TRIP P SAT / UNSAT (6.2.6, second STD: Observes Annunciator 603111 bullet) in alarm on 2CEC*PNL603.

10. VERIFIES the status of the following indicating lights SAT / UNSAT P

(6.2.7) STD: Reads/reviews and placekeeps step.

11. REACTOR SCRAM TRIP LOGIC A1 on SAT / UNSAT 2CEC*PNL609 is extinguished P (6.2.7, first STD: Acknowledges Cue and placekeeps step. Proper Cue: REACTOR SCRAM TRIP LOGIC A1 on 2CEC*PNL609 bullet) communications used.

is extinguished.

12. PILOT SCRAM VALVE SOLENOIDS A, C, E, SAT / UNSAT P

AND G are extinguished STD: Observes the four white pilot (6.2.7, second lights on 2CEC*PNL603 for RPS A bullet) not lit.

13. RESETS the REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC A *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates the REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC A control switch P clockwise to the RESET position and (6.2.8) releases on 2CEC*PNL603.

Failure = REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC A control switch rotated to the RESET position not achieved.

If the Plant Computer Printouts and/or Sequence of Events do not print out the right Instructor Note: computer points, then provide a cue as necessary to indicate to the candidate that all required computer points are in.

14. VERIFIES the following occurred for the tripped SAT / UNSAT condition: P (6.2.9) STD: Reads/reviews and placekeeps step.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S7 Page 9 of 16 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

15. VERIFIES the following Plant Computer Printouts SAT / UNSAT P

(6.2.9.1) STD: Reads/reviews and placekeeps step.

16. RPSUC01 RPS A MANUAL TRIP TRIPPED P SAT / UNSAT (6.2.9.1, first STD: Acknowledges evaluator Cue.

Cue: Computer point RPSUC01 indicates Tripped. bullet) Proper communications used.

17. RPSUC03 RPS A AUTO TRIP TRIPPED P SAT / UNSAT (6.2.9.1, second STD: Acknowledges evaluator Cue.

Cue: Computer point RPSUC03 indicates Tripped. bullet) Proper communications used.

18. VERIFIES the following Sequence of Events Printouts SAT / UNSAT P

(6.2.9.2) STD: Reads/reviews and placekeeps step.

19. RPSUC01 RPS A MANUAL TRIP TRIPPED P SAT / UNSAT (6.2.9.2, first STD: Acknowledges evaluator Cue.

Cue: Computer point RPSUC01 indicates Tripped. bullet) Proper communications used.

20. RPSUC03 RPS A AUTO TRIP TRIPPED P SAT / UNSAT (6.2.9.2, second STD: Acknowledges evaluator Cue.

Cue: Computer point RPSUC03 indicates Tripped. bullet) Proper communications used.

21. VERIFIES the following alarms AND indications for the SAT / UNSAT reset condition P (6.2.10) STD: Reads/reviews and placekeeps step.

22. 1. VERIFIES the following annunciators have SAT / UNSAT extinguished P (6.2.10.1) STD: Reads/reviews and placekeeps step.

23. 603110 RPS A AUTO TRIP P SAT / UNSAT (6.2.10.1, first STD: Observes Annunciator 603110 bullet) clears on 2CEC*PNL603.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S7 Page 10 of 16 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

24. 603111 RPS A MANUAL TRIP P SAT / UNSAT (6.2.10.1, second STD: Observes Annunciator 603111 bullet) clears on 2CEC*PNL603.

25. 2. VERIFIES the following Plant Computer SAT / UNSAT Printouts: P (6.2.10.2) STD: Reads/reviews and placekeeps step.

26. RPSUC01 RPS A MANUAL TRIP ALMCLR P SAT / UNSAT (6.2.10.2, first STD: Acknowledges evaluator Cue.

Cue: Computer point RPSUC01 indicates ALMCLR. bullet) Proper communications used.

28. RPSUC03 RPS A AUTO TRIP ALMCLR P SAT / UNSAT (6.2.10.2, second STD: Acknowledges evaluator Cue.

Cue: Computer point RPSUC03 indicates ALMCLR. bullet) Proper communications used.

29. 3. VERIFY the following Sequence of Events SAT / UNSAT Printouts P (6.2.10.3) STD: Reads/reviews and placekeeps step.

30. RPSUC01 RPS A MANUAL TRIP ALMCLR P SAT / UNSAT (6.2.10.3, first STD: Acknowledges evaluator Cue.

Cue: Computer point RPSUC01 indicates ALMCLR. bullet) Proper communications used.

31. RPSUC03 RPS A AUTO TRIP ALMCLR P SAT / UNSAT (6.2.10.3, second STD: Acknowledges evaluator Cue.

Cue: Computer point RPSUC03 indicates ALMCLR. bullet) Proper communications used.

32. 4. VERIFY the status of the following indicating SAT / UNSAT lights P (6.2.10.4) STD: Reads/reviews and placekeeps step.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S7 Page 11 of 16 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

33. REACTOR SCRAM TRIP LOGIC A1 on SAT / UNSAT 2CEC*PNL609 is illuminated P STD: Proper communications used.

(6.2.10.4, first Cue: REACTOR SCRAM TRIP LOGIC A1 on 2CEC*PNL609 bullet) is illuminated.

34. PILOT SCRAM VALVE SOLENOIDS A, C, E, SAT / UNSAT P

AND G are illuminated STD: Observes the four white lights (6.2.10.4, second bullet) for PILOT SCRAM VALVE SOLENOIDS A, C, E, AND G on 2CEC*PNL603 are lit.

35. DISARMS the REACTOR SCRAM A1 pushbutton *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates the REACTOR SCRAM A1 pushbutton collar in the counter P clockwise direction to the (6.2.11) DISARMED position.

Failure = REACTOR SCRAM A1 pushbutton collar in the DISARMED position not achieved.

36. VERIFIES annunciator 603113, RPS A MANUAL SCRAM SAT / UNSAT SWITCH ARMED, is extinguished P STD: Observes Annunciator (6.2.12) 603113, RPS A MANUAL SCRAM SWITCH ARMED clears on 2CEC*PNL603.

37. Manual SCRAM Channel "C" Test SAT / UNSAT P

(6.3) STD: Reads/reviews and placekeeps step.

All indicators and controls for this test are located on panel 2CEC*PNL603 unless otherwise Procedure Note:

specified.

38. VERIFIES there is NO half scram on the "B" side SAT / UNSAT P

STD: Observes the four white RPS B (6.3.1) power lights are lit on 2CEC*PNL603.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S7 Page 12 of 16 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

39. NOTIFIES CRO a half scram on "A" side will be SAT / UNSAT generated. P (6.3.2) STD: Proper communications used.

Cue: Acknowledge report from applicant

40. ARMS the REACTOR SCRAM A2 pushbutton *PASS / FAIL STD: Rotates the REACTOR SCRAM A2 pushbutton collar in the P clockwise direction to the ARMED (6.3.3) position.

Failure = REACTOR SCRAM A2 pushbutton collar in the ARMED position not achieved.

41. VERIFIES annunciator 603113, RPS A MANUAL SCRAM SAT / UNSAT SWITCH ARMED, has alarmed P (6.3.4) STD: Observes Annunciator 603113 in alarm on 2CEC*PNL603.

Once the operator depresses the REACTOR SCRAM A2 pushbutton, three control rods will Alternate Path:

scram. The operator will respond per N2SOP08 & N2SOP101C and scram the reactor.

42. DEPRESSES AND HOLDS for 2 to 3 seconds the REACTOR *PASS / FAIL SCRAM A2 pushbutton STD: Depresses for 2 to 3 seconds and releases the REACTOR SCRAM P

A2 pushbutton on 2CEC*PNL603.

(6.3.5)

Failure = REACTOR SCRAM A2 pushbutton depression not achieved.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S7 Page 13 of 16 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

43. Recognizes using the Rod Worth Minimizer, Full Core SAT / UNSAT Display, and/or R*Time that three control rods STD: Using the RWM, Full Core scrammed. display, and/or R*Time, determines that three rods have scrammed by observing the drifting control rod P message on the RWM and/or three Blue SCRAM LIGHTS on the Full Core Display are lit and/or reviewing the R*Time Rod display to check for scrammed control rods.

The operator may or may not refer to N2SOP08 prior to taking the next action. Either action is acceptable. Additionally, due to the immediate action requirement of N2SOP08 to scram the reactor based on more than one rod drifted or scrammed, attempts to refer to the ARP Evaluator Note: for required actions or delaying scramming the reactor for an unreasonable amount of time should not occur. If the operator refers to the Rod Drift or Accumulator Trouble ARP or delays scramming the reactor for an unreasonable amount of time, then Step 44 should be graded as FAIL.

44. Arms and depresses BOTH Manual Scram pushbuttons *PASS / FAIL on either side of 2CEC*PNL603 AND Places the Reactor STD: Arms and depresses Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN position. Scram A1 and Reactor Scram B1 OR Reactor Scram A2 and Reactor Scram B2 AND/OR P rotates the Reactor Mode Switch (N2SOP101C) counter clockwise to the Shutdown Position on 2CEC*PNL603.

Observes that the reactor scrams and all rods insert.

Failure = Full Reactor Protection System trip not achieved.

After the applicant places the scrams the reactor, provide the following cue:

Evaluator Note:

Cue: Your task is complete, another operator will complete any remaining actions.

TASK STANDARD Reactor Protection System tripped with all control rods fully inserted.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S7 Page 14 of 16 April 2021

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S7 Page 15 of 16 April 2021

JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant is in Mode 1

Maintenance has just been completed on RPS A1 and A2

Post Maintenance testing is required for RPS Channels A1 and A2

Communications have been established between 2CEC*PNL603 and 2CEC*PNL609

Thermography completed SAT on all HCUs Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), Perform a Manual Scram Channel Functional Test on RPS Channel A and C in accordance with N2OSPRPSW002, Attachment 1.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S7 Page 16 of 16 April 2021

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC Simulator JPM S-8 Revision: 0.0

Title:

Secure 2SWP*P1A Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / M. Alexander 1/5/21 Validated by: N/R / Don Carr 12/30/20 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 2/3/21 Approximate Duration: 15 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-8 Page 1 of 15 April 2021

References

1. N2-OP-11, Rev. 01500, Service Water System

2. N2-OP-58, Rev. 005T1, Screenwell Building and Fire Pump Rooms Ventilation Systems

3. NUREG 1123 K/A 400000 A4.01 (3.1/3.0)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-8 Page 2 of 15 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to perform a shutdown of one service water pump when five service water pumps are in service initially.

b. This JPM is not considered alternate path.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. N2-276000-01001, Monitor Operation of SWP System.

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: 8 Plant Service Systems LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C)

K/A Statement: 400000 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor (Add justification statement below in the control room: CCW indications and control for K/A's < 3.0)

K/A Importance Rating: RO 3.1 SRO 3.0 NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-8 Page 3 of 15 April 2021

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A

5. Recommended Start Location

a. NLC Classroom

6. Simulator Setup

a. IC Number

1) IC-021

b. Presets / With Triggers

1) Malfunctions a) None

2) Remotes a) None

3) Overrides a) None

4) Annunciators a) None

5) Event Triggers Event # Event Action Command None N/A Left Blank

6) Equipment Out of Service a) None NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-8 Page 4 of 15 April 2021

7) Support Documentation a) Prepare a copy of N2-OP-11, section G.1.0 Stopping One Service Water Pump When Other Pumps Will Remain Running with no steps placekept as complete.

Open circle step G.1.0. Prepare a copy of N2-OP-58, section H OFF-NORMAL OPERATIONS with no steps placekept as complete. The whole H section must be given since it would be leading the applicant to only give them section H.7.0.

8) Miscellaneous a) IC-170 (For ILT 20-1, paired with S-6)

-OR-b) IC setup:

(1) Ensure the plant is operating in Mode 1 (2) Ensure that the following service water pumps are in operation:

2SWP*P1A 2SWP*P1C 2SWP*P1E 2SWP*P1B 2SWP*P1D (3) Ensure that both 2HVY*UC2A and 2HVY*UC2C are in service.

7. Strategy Code

a. None

8. Tools and Equipment

a. None

9. Commitments

a. None NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-8 Page 5 of 15 April 2021

10. Prerequisites

a. None

11. Applicable Operator Fundamental Knowledge Check Question(s)

a. None NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-8 Page 6 of 15 April 2021

B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary. (Note, read the next only if conducting a plant JPM). With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated. Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Unit Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-8 Page 7 of 15 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant is operating in Mode 1

The following operable service water pumps are in operation:

2SWP*P1A 2SWP*P1C 2SWP*P1E 2SWP*P1B 2SWP*P1D

Two CCS heat exchangers are currently in service

Two CCP heat exchangers are currently in service

2SWP*STR4A is not in continuous backwash

2HVY*UC2A, SVCE WTR PMP BAY A UNIT COOLER, and 2HVY*UC2C, SVCE WTR PMP BAY C UNIT COOLER, are in service Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), shutdown 2SWP*P1A in accordance with N2-OP-11, section G.1.0 and verify proper pump bay unit cooler lineup.

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue. SAT / UNSAT P STD: Proper communications used.

Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary Because the Service Water System cools equipment that is required for all Plant operating conditions, this System should never be completely shutdown. If unusual circumstances Procedure Note:

require a shutdown of the entire Service Water System, a Procedure and Safety Evaluation will be written to cover the situation.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-8 Page 8 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

This Subsection is written assuming 2SWP*P1A, Service Water Pump 1A, is the Pump to be stopped. If a different Pump is to be stopped, substitute the letter in parentheses for the Pump to be stopped.

If shutting down a fifth running Service Water Pump verify two or Less CCP Heat Exchangers are in service and that two or Less CCS Heat Exchangers are in service.

Procedure Note:

Five Operable Service Water Pumps must be in service whenever three CCP and/or CCS Heat Exchangers are in service. Four Pump Operation is acceptable for short durations while Shifting Service Water Pumps.

Low flow alarm 601116 (601219) may alarm when pump flow is lowered below 2,900 gpm.

2. Verifies System Flow less than or equal to 10,000 SAT / UNSAT gpm/Pump for each Pump that will remain running. IF STD: Determines that system flow required, THEN starts a standby Pump per Subsection will remain less than or equal to E.2.0. 10,000 gpm for each pump that P will remain running by calculating (N2-OP-11, Step the flow that SWP*P1A is carrying G.1.1) and dividing that number by four and adding that value to 2SWP*P1C, E, B & D discharge flow values and ensures that the number is less than or equal to 10,000 gpm.

3. Verifies limitations described in Precaution and SAT / UNSAT Limitation D.12.0 are met. STD: Determines that the Precautions and Limitations of D.12.0 include D.12.1 for Operational conditions 1, 2 and 3 P

and D.12.2 for Operational (N2-OP-11, Step Conditions 4 and 5, during G.1.2) movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. Determines that all D.12.1 Precautions and Limitations are met and the D.12.2 Precautions and Limitations are N/A.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-8 Page 9 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

4. IF 2SWP*STR4A is in Continuous Backwash, THEN SAT / UNSAT removes 2SWP*STR4A from Continuous Backwash per P Section H.3.0. STD: Determines from the initial (N2-OP-11, Step conditions that 2SWP*STR4A is not G.1.3) in Continuous Backwash and placekeeps step as N/A.

5. Throttles closed 2SWP*MOV74A, PMP 1A DISCH, to SAT / UNSAT obtain approximately 1,500 gpm. STD: Throttles closed P 2SWP*MOV74A, PMP 1A DISCH by (N2-OP-11, Step rotating the control switch on G.1.4) 2CEC*PNL601 counter clockwise to the CLOSED position and releasing when 2SWP*FI96A indicates 1,500 gpm.

6. Observes Pumps remaining in service pick up Flow, AND SAT / UNSAT NO Pump Flow exceeds 10,000 gpm. IF necessary, THEN STD: Observes 2SWP*P1C, E, B & D P

throttle Pump Discharge valves 2SWP*MOV74C, E, B & (N2-OP-11, Step discharge flow indication on D to maintain Pump Flows less than or equal to 10,000 G.1.5) 2SWP*FI96C, E, B and D on gpm. 2CEC*PNL601 and verifies that they indicate less than 10,000 gpm.

7. PLACES 2SWP*P1A control switch to NORMAL-AFTER- *PASS / FAIL STOP. STD: Rotates the control switch for 2SWP*P1A, SERVICE WATER PUMP 1A on 2CEC*PNL601 in the counter clockwise direction to the P

NORMAL-AFTER-STOP (Green (N2-OP-11, Step Flagged) position and verifies the G.1.6)

GREEN light lit and the RED light not lit.

Failure = 2SWP*P1A control switch in the GREEN FLAGGED position not achieved.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-8 Page 10 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

8. VERIFIES 2SWP*MOV74A closes. SAT / UNSAT STD: Observes 2SWP*MOV74A, P PMP 1A DISCH closed by verifying (N2-OP-11, Step pump flow indication on G.1.7) 2SWP*FI96A indicates 0 gpm on 2CEC*PNL601 and 2SWP*MOV74A RED light not lit and the GREEN light lit.

9. Locally verifies 2SWP*V1A, DISCHARGE CHECK VLV, is SAT / UNSAT closed. STD: Proper communications used.

P Placekeeps step as complete.

(N2-OP-11, Step Cue: As field operator, acknowledge the direction to G.1.8) locally verify 2SWP*V1A is closed and report that 2SWP*V1A is closed.

10. IF required to seat 2SWP*V1A, partially open, THEN SAT / UNSAT P

closes 2SWP*MOV74A. STD: Proper communications used.

(N2-OP-11, Step G.1.9) Placekeeps step as complete.

Cue: It is not required to seat 2SWP*P1A partially open.

11. At Panel 2CES*PNL504, verifies control switch for SAT / UNSAT 2SWP*MOV1A in AUTO AND Valve is closed. STD: Proper communications used.

Placekeeps step as complete.

P Cue: As field operator, acknowledge the direction to (N2-OP-11, Step locally verify control switch for 2SWP*MOV1A in G.1.10)

AUTO AND Valve is closed and report that the control switch for 2SWP*MOV1A is in AUTO AND the Valve is closed.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-8 Page 11 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

12. Momentarily open 2SWP*STR4A Vent Plug to verify SAT / UNSAT Strainer AND Pump discharge piping are full. STD: Proper communications used.

Placekeeps step as complete.

Cue: As field operator, acknowledge the direction to P

momentarily open 2SWP*STR4A Vent Plug to (N2-OP-11, Step verify Strainer AND Pump discharge piping are full G.1.11) and report that 2SWP*STR4A Vent Plug has been momentarily opened and the strainer and pump discharge piping is full.

It is necessary to place the second SWP pump bay unit cooler in service when operating three Procedure Caution: pumps in one bay continuously. For short term operation placing second HVY unit cooler in service is not required.

13. IF third SWP pump in one pump bay was secured, THEN SAT / UNSAT P

secures second operating unit cooler in that bay per N2- (N2-OP-11, Step OP-58, Section H. STD: Reads/reviews and G.1.12) placekeeps step.

14. Determines correct section of N2-OP-58 to secure one SAT / UNSAT of the two operating service water pump bay unit STD: Reviews N2-OP-58 coolers. P precautions and limitations and (N2-OP-58) determines that section H.7.2 is to be used to secure one of the two operating service water pump bay unit coolers.

15. WHEN operation of a second unit cooler in Division I is SAT / UNSAT P

NO longer required, for the unit cooler being removed (N2-OP-58, step from service, THEN performs the following: STD: Reads/reviews and H.7.2) placekeeps step.

Once the applicant has determined the correct section of N2-OP-58 to secure one of the operating service water pump bay unit coolers, if asked, direct the operator to remove Evaluator Note: 2HVY*UC2C from service. For successful completion of this JPM it does not matter which service water pump bay unit cooler is removed from service. Either unit cooler is acceptable as long as at least one unit cooler is removed from service.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-8 Page 12 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

16. Closes 2SWP*V1050A, 2HVY*UC2A OUTLET ISOLATION SAT / UNSAT / NA VALVE STD: Proper communications used.

P Placekeeps step as complete.

Cue: As field operator, acknowledge the direction to (N2-OP-58, step close 2SWP*V1050A, 2HVY*UC2A OUTLET H.7.2, first bullet)

ISOLATION VALVE and report that 2SWP*V1050A is closed.

17. Closes 2SWP*V1051A, 2HVY*UC2C OUTLET ISOLATION SAT / UNSAT / NA VALVE STD: Proper communications used.

P Placekeeps step as complete.

Cue: As field operator, acknowledge the direction to (N2-OP-58, step close 2SWP*V1051A, 2HVY*UC2C OUTLET H.7.2, first bullet)

ISOLATION VALVE and report that 2SWP*V1051A is closed.

18. At 2CEC*PNL870, places the control switch for *PASS / FAIL / NA 2HVY*UC2A in PULL-TO-LOCK STD: Rotates the control switch for 2HVY*UC2A, SVCE WTR PMP BAY A UNIT COOLER, on 2CEC*PNL870 in P

the counter clockwise direction to (N2-OP-58, step the Pull-To-Lock position and H.7.2, second verifies the GREEN light lit and the bullet) RED light not lit.

Failure = 2HVY*UC2A control switch in the Pull-To-Lock position not achieved.

19. At 2CEC*PNL870, places the control switch for *PASS / FAIL / NA 2HVY*UC2C in PULL-TO-LOCK STD: Rotates the control switch for 2HVY*UC2C, SVCE WTR PMP BAY C UNIT COOLER, on 2CEC*PNL870 in P

the counter clockwise direction to (N2-OP-58, step the Pull-To-Lock position and H.7.2, second verifies the GREEN light lit and the bullet) RED light not lit.

Failure = 2HVY*UC2C control switch in the Pull-To-Lock position not achieved.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-8 Page 13 of 15 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA After the applicant places 2HVY*UC2A(C) in PULL-TO-LOCK, provide the following cue:

Evaluator Note:

Cue: Your task is complete, another operator will complete any remaining actions.

TASK STANDARD 2SWP*P1A has been secured with 2SWP*P1C, E, B & D remaining in operation with one of the two Division I Service Water Pump Bay Unit Coolers remaining in service 2HVY*UC2A or 2HVY*UC2C.

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-8 Page 14 of 15 April 2021

JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant is operating in Mode 1

The following operable service water pumps are in operation:

2SWP*P1A 2SWP*P1C 2SWP*P1E 2SWP*P1B 2SWP*P1D

Two CCS heat exchangers are currently in service

Two CCP heat exchangers are currently in service

2SWP*STR4A is not in continuous backwash

2HVY*UC2A, SVCE WTR PMP BAY A UNIT COOLER, and 2HVY*UC2C, SVCE WTR PMP BAY C UNIT COOLER, are in service Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), shutdown 2SWP*P1A in accordance with N2-OP-11, section G.1.0 and verify proper pump bay unit cooler lineup.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM S-8 Page 15 of 15 April 2021

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC Plant JPM P-1 Revision: 0.0

Title:

Lineup for Boron injection with the Hydro Pump Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / Mike Alexander 1/5/21 Validated by: N/R / Ben Berner 12/30/20 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 2/3/21 Approximate Duration: 25 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-1 Page 1 of 17 April 2021

References

1. N2-EOP-6.15, Rev. 00002, SLS Hydro Pump Injection

2. NUREG 1123 K/A 295037 EA1.10, (3.7/3.9)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-1 Page 2 of 17 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM tests the applicants ability to inject boron into the RPV using the SLS Hydro pump. The applicant will lineup and inject from the SLS tank through the 2SLS*MOV1A piping, through the Hydro Pump and into the RPV using 2SLS*V34 and 35. Additionally, this requires lining up service air to the Hydro Pump.

b. This JPM is NOT considered alternate path.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. N2-EOP06-01001-15, Implement N2-EOP-6.15, SLS Hydro Pump Injection

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: 1 Reactivity Control LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-1 Page 3 of 17 April 2021

295037 EA1.10 Ability to operate and/or monitor the K/A Statement: following as they apply to SCRAM CONDITION PRESENT (Add justification statement below AND REACTOR POWER ABOVE APRM DOWNSCALE OR for K/A's < 3.0) UNKNOWN: Alternate boron injection methods: Plant-Specific K/A Importance Rating: RO 3.7 SRO 3.9

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A

5. Recommended Start Location

a. Unit #2 R.P. Access Building

6. Simulator Setup

a. IC Number

a. N/A

b. Presets / With Triggers

a. Malfunctions a) None

b. Remotes a) None

c. Overrides a) None

d. Annunciators a) None

e. Event Triggers Event # Event Action Command None N/A N/A NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-1 Page 4 of 17 April 2021

f. Equipment Out of Service a) None

g. Support Documentation a) Prepare a copy of N2-EOP-6.15, with no steps placekept as completed. Include a copy of the precautions and limitations.

h. Miscellaneous a) None

7. Strategy Code

a. None

8. Tools and Equipment

a. None

9. Commitments

a. None

10. Prerequisites

a. None

11. Applicable Operator Fundamental Knowledge Check Question(s)

a. None B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For Plant JPM's:

a. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-1 Page 5 of 17 April 2021

b. With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated.

Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

2. For Simulator JPM's:

a. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will provide cues as necessary.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Unit Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-1 Page 6 of 17 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

A SCRAM condition is present and reactor power is 7%.

Boron injection is required.

Both Standby Liquid Control pumps will not start.

A field operator is standing by for any actions needed that are not on Reactor Building 289.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), commence boron injection with the hydro pump lined up to 2SLS*P1A piping in accordance with EOP-6.15.

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P STD: Proper communications used Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary.

Procedure Note: Figure 1 shows the general arrangement and equipment connections listed in this procedure.

2. Hydro Pump Injection Line Up to 2SLS*P1A Piping SAT / UNSAT S

STD: Reads/reviews determines (N2-EOP-6.15, section is applicable and step 6.1) placekeeps step.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-1 Page 7 of 17 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

3. Removes plug from 2SLS*V42, 2SLS*P1A SUCTION

PASS / FAIL PRESS TEST CONN (Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS Area)

STD: Removes the plug from 2SLS*V42, 2SLS*P1A SUCTION Cue: The component you have identified is in the PRESS TEST CONN by rotating plug position you described. in the counter clockwise direction S

using appropriate wrench on Rx (N2-EOP-6.15, Bldg, EL289, SLS Area until the plug step 6.1.1) is removed.

Failure = plug removal from 2SLS*V42 not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

4. Using 25 ft hard suction hose (black) with brass

PASS / FAIL couplings AND the appropriate connections, connects hose to 2SLS*V42. (Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS Area) STD: Connects 25 foot hard suction hose to 2SLS*V42, 2SLS*P1A SUCTION PRESS TEST CONN by Cue: The component you have identified is in the threading the brass connection in position you described. S the clockwise direction on Rx Bldg, (N2-EOP-6.15, EL 289, SLS Area until the hose step 6.1.2) connection is attached and tightens using appropriate wrench.

Failure = 25 foot hard suction hose connection to 2SLS*V42 not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-1 Page 8 of 17 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

5. Using 25 ft hard suction hose (black) with brass

PASS / FAIL couplings AND the appropriate connections, connects hose to suction side of Hydro Pump. (Rx Bldg, EL 289, STD: Connects 25 foot hard suction hose to the suction side of the SLS Area)

Hydro Pump by threading the brass connection in the clockwise Cue: The component you have identified is in the direction on Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS S

position you described. Area until the hose connection is (N2-EOP-6.15, attached and tightens using step 6.1.3) appropriate wrench.

Failure = 25 foot hard suction hose connection to the suction side of the Hydro Pump not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

6. Removes cap downstream of 2SLS*V35, INJECTION

PASS / FAIL HEADER DRAIN VLV. (Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS Area)

STD: Removes the cap from 2SLS*V35, INJECTION HEADER Cue: The component you have identified is in the DRAIN VLV by rotating cap in the position you described. counter clockwise direction using S appropriate wrench on Rx Bldg, (N2-EOP-6.15, EL289, SLS Area until the cap is step 6.1.4) removed.

Failure = cap removal from 2SLS*V35 not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-1 Page 9 of 17 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

7. Using 25 ft Hydro Hose with Hi Press SS Couplings AND

PASS / FAIL the appropriate connections, connects hose to 2SLS*V35. (Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS Area) STD: Connects 25 foot hydro hose to 2SLS*V35, INJECTION HEADER DRAIN VLV by threading the stainless steel connection in the Cue: The component you have identified is in the S clockwise direction on Rx Bldg, EL position you described. (N2-EOP-6.15, 289, SLS Area until the hose step 6.1.5) connection is attached and tightens using appropriate wrench.

Failure = 25 foot hydro hose connection to 2SLS*V35 not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

8. Using 25 ft Hydro Hose with Hi Press SS Couplings AND

PASS / FAIL the appropriate connections, connects hose to discharge side of Hydro Pump. (Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS STD: Connects 25 foot hydro hose to the discharge side of Hydro Area)

Pump by threading the stainless steel connection in the clockwise Cue: The component you have identified is in the direction on Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS S Area until the hose connection is position you described.

(N2-EOP-6.15, attached and tightens using step 6.1.6) appropriate wrench.

Failure = 25 foot hydro hose connection to the discharge side of Hydro Pump not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

For the next step, 2MWS-V24, is physically on top of SLS tank. This is a difficult valve to get to that involves climbing a ladder. Provide the following Cue:

Evaluator Note:

Cue: An additional operator is standing by to operate 2MWS-V24 and is awaiting your direction.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-1 Page 10 of 17 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

9. Closes 2MWS-V24, MWS TO SLC SYSTEM ISOL. (Rx Bldg,

PASS / FAIL EL 289, on top of SLS tank)

STD: Directs field operator to close 2MWS-V24, MWS TO SLC SYSTEM Cue: When directed to close 2MWS-V24, MWS TO SLC S ISOL on Rx Bldg, EL 289, on top of SYSTEM ISOL, report that 2MWS-V24, has been SLS tank. Proper communications (N2-EOP-6.15, closed. step 6.1.7) used.

Failure = Closure of 2MWS-V24 not achieved as determined by applicant verbalization.

10. Open 2SLS*MOV1A, STORAGE TANK OUTLET VLV, SAT / UNSAT manually as follows: S STD: Reads/reviews determines (N2-EOP-6.15, section is applicable and step 6.1.8) placekeeps step.

Procedure Note: A CAT 60 key may be required for entry at 2EHS*MCC102.

For the next step the applicant should recall from the initial conditions that a field operator is standing by to perform any required actions that are not on Reactor Building 289. The Evaluator Note:

applicant should direct the field operator to place 2EHS*MCC102-17D, 2SLS*MOV1A, SLCS STORAGE TANK OUTLET MOV to OFF.

11. Places 2EHS*MCC102-17D, 2SLS*MOV1A, SLCS

PASS / FAIL STORAGE TANK OUTLET MOV to OFF. (Aux Bay North, EL 240) STD: Directs field operator to place 2EHS*MCC102-17D, 2SLS*MOV1A, SLCS STORAGE TANK OUTLET MOV Cue: When directed to place 2EHS*MCC102-17D, S to OFF in Aux Bay North, EL 240).

2SLS*MOV1A, SLCS STORAGE TANK OUTLET MOV (N2-EOP-6.15, Proper communications used.

step 6.1.8.a) to OFF, report that 2EHS*MCC102-17D, has been Failure = 2EHS*MCC102-17D taken to OFF. placed in OFF not achieved as determined by applicant verbalization.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-1 Page 11 of 17 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

12. Opens 2SLS*MOV1A, manually (Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS

PASS / FAIL Area)

STD: Opens 2SLS*MOV1A, Cue: The component you have identified is in the STORAGE TANK OUTLET VLV by position you described. rotating valve handwheel in the counter clockwise direction on RB S El 293' Nth of SLS Storage Tank (N2-EOP-6.15, until the valve is open by local step 6.1.8.b) valve indication and or by stem position.

Failure = Opening of 2SLS*MOV1A not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

13. Opens 2SLS*V42, 2SLS*P1A SUCTION PRESS TEST CONN.

PASS / FAIL (Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS Area)

STD: Opens 2SLS*V42, 2SLS*P1A SUCTION PRESS TEST CONN by Cue: The component you have identified is in the rotating valve handwheel in the position you described. S counter clockwise direction on Rx (N2-EOP-6.15, Bldg, EL 289, SLS Area until the step 6.1.9) valve is open by local valve indication and or by stem position.

Failure = Opening of 2SLS*V42 not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

14. Proceed to Section 6.3 to continue procedure SAT / UNSAT S STD: Reads/reviews determines (N2-EOP-6.15, section is applicable and step 6.1.10) placekeeps step.

15. Common Hydro Pump Injection Lineup to 2SLS*P1A or SAT / UNSAT 2SLS*P1B Piping S STD: Reads/reviews determines (N2-EOP-6.15, section is applicable and step 6.3) placekeeps step.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-1 Page 12 of 17 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

16. Opens 2SLS*V35, INJECTION HEADER DRAIN VLV. (Rx

PASS / FAIL Bldg, EL 289, SLS Area)

STD: Opens 2SLS*V35, INJECTION HEADER DRAIN VLV by rotating Cue: The component you have identified is in the valve handwheel in the counter position you described. S clockwise direction on Rx Bldg, EL (N2-EOP-6.15, 289, SLS Area until the valve is step 6.3.1) open by local valve indication and or by stem position.

Failure = Opening of 2SLS*V35 not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

17. Opens 2SLS*V34, INJECTION HEADER DRAIN VLV. (Rx

PASS / FAIL Bldg, EL 289, SLS Area STD: Opens 2SLS*V34, INJECTION HEADER DRAIN VLV by rotating Cue: The component you have identified is in the valve handwheel in the counter position you described. S clockwise direction on Rx Bldg, EL (N2-EOP-6.15, 289, SLS Area until the valve is step 6.3.2) open by local valve indication and or by stem position.

Failure = Opening of 2SLS*V34 not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

For the next 3 JPM steps the applicant will contact the control room operator to request the Evaluator Note: position of either 2SLS*MOV5A OR 2SLS*MOV5B. The applicant can specify one or the other.

Only one valve is required to be verified open to complete the step satisfactorily.

18. Verifies open, EITHER 2SLS*MOV5A OR 2SLS*MOV5B: SAT / UNSAT (2CEC*PNL601) S STD: Reads/reviews determines (N2-EOP-6.15, section is applicable and step 6.3.3) placekeeps step.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-1 Page 13 of 17 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

19.

SLS*MOV5A, OUTBOARD ISOL STOP CHECK VLV SAT / UNSAT / NA S STD: Contacts the control room Cue: If contacted as the control room operator to verify operator and acknowledges control (N2-EOP-6.15, 2SLS*MOV5A open, report that 2SLS*MOV5A is step 6.3.3, first room operator report using proper open. bullet) communications and placekeeps step.

20.

SLS*MOV5B, OUTBOARD ISOL STOP CHECK VLV SAT / UNSAT / NA S STD: Contacts the control room Cue: If contacted as the control room operator to verify operator and acknowledges control (N2-EOP-6.15, 2SLS*MOV5B open, report that 2SLS*MOV5B is step 6.3.3, room operator report using proper open. second bullet) communications and placekeeps step.

21. Using 50 ft Air Hose, connects air hose to Hydro Pump

PASS / FAIL VLV. (Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS Area)

STD: Connects 50 foot air hose to the Hydro Pump VLV on Rx Bldg, EL Cue: The component you have identified is in the S 289, SLS Area until the hose position you described. connection is attached.

(N2-EOP-6.15, step 6.3.4) Failure = 50 foot air hose connection to the Hydro Pump VLV not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

22. Verifies closed, Hydro Pump Manual Air Inlet Isolation. SAT / UNSAT (Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS Area) STD: Verifies closed the Hydro S Pump Manual Air Inlet Isolation on Cue: The component you have identified is in the (N2-EOP-6.15, Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS Area by step 6.3.5) position you described. observing local valve position indication.

23. Verify Hydro Pump Air Regulator spring tension is SAT / UNSAT backed off. (Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS Area) STD: Verifies the Hydro Pump Air S Regulator spring tension is backed Cue: The component you have identified is in the (N2-EOP-6.15, off on Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS Area by position you described. step 6.3.6) rotating/verify rotated the air regulator control knob to verify that spring tension is backed off.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-1 Page 14 of 17 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

24. Using 50 ft Air Hose, connects air hose from Hydro

PASS / FAIL Pump to 2SAS-V529, SERVICE AIR CONNECTION located behind SLS pump. (Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS Area) STD: Connects 50 foot air hose from Hydro Pump to 2SAS-V529, SERVICE AIR CONNECTION located Cue: The component you have identified is in the behind SLS pump on Rx Bldg, EL S

position you described. (N2-EOP-6.15, 289, SLS Area until the hose step 6.3.7) connection is attached.

Failure = 50 foot air connection from Hydro Pump to 2SAS-V529 not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

25. Opens 2SAS-V529. (Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS Area)

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: Opens 2SAS-V529, Service Air Connection by rotating valve position you described.

handwheel in the counter clockwise S direction on Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS (N2-EOP-6.15, Area until the valve is open by local step 6.3.8) valve indication and or by stem position.

Failure = Opening of 2SAS-V529 not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

26. OPENS Hydro Pump Manual Air Inlet Isolation. (Rx Bldg,

PASS / FAIL EL 289, SLS Area)

STD: Opens the Hydro Pump Manual Air Inlet Isolation on Rx Cue: The component you have identified is in the Bldg, EL 289, SLS Area by rotating position you described. the valve handwheel in the counter S clockwise direction until the valve (N2-EOP-6.15, is open by local valve indication step 6.3.9) and or by stem position.

Failure = Opening of the Hydro Pump Manual Air Inlet Isolation not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-1 Page 15 of 17 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

27. Starts Hydro Pump by tightening spring tension on

PASS / FAIL Hydro Pump Air Regulator. (Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS Area)

STD: Rotates the air regulator control knob to tighten the spring Cue: The component you have identified is in the tension on the Hydro Pump Air position you described. Regulator on Rx Bldg, EL 289, SLS S

(N2-EOP-6.15, Area to start the Hydro Pump.

step 6.3.10) Failure = Hydro Pump start by tightening spring tension on Hydro Pump Air Regulator not achieved as determined by applicant verbalization.

Once the applicant starts the Hydro Pump by tightening spring tension on Hydro Pump Air Regulator and describes the expected response, provide the following cue:

Instructor Note:

Cue: Your task is complete, another operator will complete any remaining actions.

TASK STANDARD Boron being injected from the SLS tank using 2SLS*MOV1A piping through the Hydro Pump and into the reactor vessel through 2SLS*V34 & 35.

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-1 Page 16 of 17 April 2021

JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

A SCRAM condition is present and reactor power is 7%.

Boron injection is required.

Both Standby Liquid Control pumps will not start.

A field operator is standing by for any actions needed that are not on Reactor Building 289.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), commence boron injection with the hydro pump lined up to 2SLS*P1A piping in accordance with EOP-6.15.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-1 Page 17 of 17 April 2021

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC Plant JPM P-2 Revision: 0.0

Title:

Reduce Lighting Loads During Station Blackout (2LAC-PNLU02 only)

Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / Mike Alexander 1/5/21 Validated by: N/R / Ben Berner 12/30/20 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 2/3/21 Approximate Duration: 30 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-2 Page 1 of 18 April 2021

References

1. N2-SOP-02, Rev. 01400, Station Blackout/Extended Loss of AC Power Support Procedure

2. NUREG 1123 K/A 295003 AA1.01, (3.7/3.8)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-2 Page 2 of 18 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM tests the applicants ability to perform load stripping during station blackout conditions.

The applicant will perform N2-SOP-02, Attachment 3, step 3.2.2 to align breakers in accordance with Table 3 for 2LAC-PNLU02 only.

b. This JPM is NOT considered alternate path.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. N2-SOP-01-01001.01, Monitor and Control 125VDC Battery Loading

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: 6 Electrical LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C)

K/A Statement: 295003 AA1.01 Ability to operate and/or monitor the (Add justification statement below following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS for K/A's < 3.0) OF A.C. POWER: A.C. electrical distribution system NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-2 Page 3 of 18 April 2021

K/A Importance Rating: RO 3.7 SRO 3.8

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A

5. Recommended Start Location

a. Unit #2 R.P. Access Building

6. Simulator Setup

a. IC Number

a. N/A

b. Presets / With Triggers

a. Malfunctions a) None

b. Remotes a) None

c. Overrides a) None

d. Annunciators a) None

e. Event Triggers Event # Event Action Command None N/A N/A

f. Equipment Out of Service a) None NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-2 Page 4 of 18 April 2021

g. Support Documentation a) Prepare a copy of N2-SOP-02, Attachment 3 with steps 1.0 through 3.2.1 placekept as completed. The next step to be performed is 3.2.2 (Open circle this step)

h. Miscellaneous a) None

7. Strategy Code

a. None

8. Tools and Equipment

a. Flashlight and Cat 60 Key

9. Commitments

a. None

10. Prerequisites

a. None

11. Applicable Operator Fundamental Knowledge Check Question(s)

a. None B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For Plant JPM's:

a. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary.

b. With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated.

Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-2 Page 5 of 18 April 2021

2. For Simulator JPM's:

a. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will provide cues as necessary.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Unit Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-2 Page 6 of 18 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

A Station Blackout is occurring

It has been determined that neither Div 1 nor Div 2 4.16 kV switchgear will be re-energized within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

N2-SOP-01 flowchart actions are being conducted

Flowchart section BL is being implemented

Safety Related Battery loads have been secured in accordance with N2-SOP-02, Attachment 3, Step 3.1

It has now been 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months since the Station Blackout occurred

A plant announcement that actions will be taken to reduce battery loading which will include turning off most essential lighting has been made.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), reduce lighting loads per N2-SOP-02, Attachment 3, Step 3.2 for 2LAC-PNLU02 only.

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P STD: Proper communications used Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary.

2. Verifies breakers listed in Attachment 3, TABLE 2 are in SAT / UNSAT specified position S STD: Reads/reviews determines (N2-SOP-02, step section is applicable and 3.2.2) placekeeps step.

3. References Attachment 3, Table 2: Lighting Electrical SAT / UNSAT Load Shed for 2LAC-PNLU02 (Battery 1B) STD: Reads/reviews and verifies S

(N2-SOP-02, that Attachment 3, Table 2:

Attachment 3, Lighting Electrical Load Shed for Table 2) 2LAC-PNLU02 (Battery 1B) is the correct table.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-2 Page 7 of 18 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

4. Determines physical location of 2LAC-PNLU02 SAT / UNSAT S STD: Determines that 2LAC-(N2-SOP-02, PNLU02 is located on Control Attachment 3, Building 261 elev. (In corridor Table 2) across from Remote S/D Room, between doors).

It is not required to align 2LAC-PNLU02 breakers in numerical order. It is acceptable to align the Table 2 breakers in any order as long as all breakers are in the required position in Evaluator Note:

accordance with Table 2 when the applicant has completed the task. The JPM is written with breakers aligned in numerical order.

5. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 1 is in the OFF position

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places Breaker 1 circuit breaker in OFF by position you described. S pushing the breaker handle to the (N2-SOP-02, OFF position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 Breaker 1 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

6. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 2 is in the OFF position

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places Breaker 2 circuit breaker in OFF by position you described. S pushing the breaker handle to the (N2-SOP-02, OFF position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 Breaker 2 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-2 Page 8 of 18 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

7. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 3 is in the OFF position

PASS / FAIL STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places Cue: The component you have identified is in the Breaker 3 circuit breaker in OFF by position you described. S pushing the breaker handle to the (N2-SOP-02, OFF position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 Breaker 3 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

8. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 4 is in the OFF position

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places Breaker 4 circuit breaker in OFF by position you described. S pushing the breaker handle to the (N2-SOP-02, OFF position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 Breaker 4 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

9. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 5 is in the OFF position

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places Breaker 5 circuit breaker in OFF by position you described. S pushing the breaker handle to the (N2-SOP-02, OFF position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 Breaker 5 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-2 Page 9 of 18 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

10. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 6 is in the OFF position

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places Breaker 6 circuit breaker in OFF by position you described. S pushing the breaker handle to the (N2-SOP-02, OFF position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 Breaker 6 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

11. Determines that 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 7 is a spare and SAT / UNSAT does not need to be re-aligned. STD: Determines that 2LAC-S (N2-SOP-02, PNLU02 breaker 7 is a spare and Attachment 3, does not contain a breaker and Table 2) therefore does not need to be re-aligned.

12. Determines that 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 8 is a spare SAT / UNSAT and does not need to be re-aligned. STD: Determines that 2LAC-S (N2-SOP-02, PNLU02 breaker 8 is a spare and Attachment 3, does not contain a breaker and Table 2) therefore does not need to be re-aligned.

13. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 9 is in the OFF position

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places Breaker 9 circuit breaker in OFF by position you described. S pushing the breaker handle to the (N2-SOP-02, OFF position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 Breaker 9 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-2 Page 10 of 18 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

14. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 10 is in the OFF position

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places Breaker 10 circuit breaker in OFF position you described. S by pushing the breaker handle to (N2-SOP-02, the OFF position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 Breaker 10 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

15. Determines that 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 11 is a spare and SAT / UNSAT does not need to be re-aligned. STD: Determines that 2LAC-S (N2-SOP-02, PNLU02 breaker 11 is a spare and Attachment 3, does not contain a breaker and Table 2) therefore does not need to be re-aligned.

16. Determines that 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 12 is a spare and SAT / UNSAT does not need to be re-aligned. STD: Determines that 2LAC-S (N2-SOP-02, PNLU02 breaker 12 is a spare and Attachment 3, does not contain a breaker and Table 2) therefore does not need to be re-aligned.

17. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 13 is in the OFF position

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places Breaker 13 circuit breaker in OFF position you described. S by pushing the breaker handle to (N2-SOP-02, the OFF position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 Breaker 13 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-2 Page 11 of 18 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

18. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 14 is in the OFF position

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places Breaker 14 circuit breaker in OFF position you described. S by pushing the breaker handle to (N2-SOP-02, the OFF position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 Breaker 14 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

19. Determines that 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 15 is a spare and SAT / UNSAT does not need to be re-aligned. STD: Determines that 2LAC-S (N2-SOP-02, PNLU02 breaker 15 is a spare and Attachment 3, does not contain a breaker and Table 2) therefore does not need to be re-aligned.

20. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 16 is in the OFF position

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places Breaker 16 circuit breaker in OFF position you described. S by pushing the breaker handle to (N2-SOP-02, the OFF position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 Breaker 16 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

21. Determines that 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 17 is a spare and SAT / UNSAT does not need to be re-aligned. STD: Determines that 2LAC-S (N2-SOP-02, PNLU02 breaker 17 is a spare and Attachment 3, does not contain a breaker and Table 2) therefore does not need to be re-aligned.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-2 Page 12 of 18 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

22. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 18 is in the OFF position

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places Breaker 18 circuit breaker in OFF position you described. S by pushing the breaker handle to (N2-SOP-02, the OFF position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 Breaker 18 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

23. Determines that 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 19 is a spare and SAT / UNSAT does not need to be re-aligned STD: Determines that 2LAC-S (N2-SOP-02, PNLU02 breaker 19 is a spare and Attachment 3, does not contain a breaker and Table 2) therefore does not need to be re-aligned.

24. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 20 is in the OFF position

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places Breaker 20 circuit breaker in OFF position you described. S by pushing the breaker handle to (N2-SOP-02, the OFF position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 Breaker 20 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

25. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 21 is in the OFF position

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places Breaker 21 circuit breaker in OFF position you described. S by pushing the breaker handle to (N2-SOP-02, the OFF position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 Breaker 21 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-2 Page 13 of 18 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

26. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 22 is in the OFF position

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places Breaker 22 circuit breaker in OFF position you described. S by pushing the breaker handle to (N2-SOP-02, the OFF position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 Breaker 22 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

27. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 23 is in the OFF position

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places Breaker 23 circuit breaker in OFF position you described. S by pushing the breaker handle to (N2-SOP-02, the OFF position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 Breaker 23 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

28. Determines that 2LAC-PNLU02 double pole breaker SAT / UNSAT 24/26 is a spare and does not need to be re-aligned. STD: Determines that 2LAC-S (N2-SOP-02, PNLU02 double pole breaker 24/26 Attachment 3, is a spare and does not contain a Table 2) breaker and therefore does not need to be re-aligned.

29. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 double pole breaker 25/27 is in

PASS / FAIL the OFF position STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places double pole breaker 25/27 circuit Cue: The component you have identified is in the S breaker in OFF by pushing the position you described. (N2-SOP-02, breaker handle to the OFF position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 double pole breaker 25/27 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-2 Page 14 of 18 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

30. Determines that 2LAC-PNLU02 double pole breaker SAT / UNSAT 28/30 is a spare and does not need to be re-aligned. STD: Determines that 2LAC-S (N2-SOP-02, PNLU02 double pole breaker 28/30 Attachment 3, is a spare and does not contain a Table 2) breaker and therefore does not need to be re-aligned.

31. Determines that 2LAC-PNLU02 double pole breaker SAT / UNSAT 29/31 is a spare and does not need to be re-aligned. STD: Determines that 2LAC-S (N2-SOP-02, PNLU02 double pole breaker 29/31 Attachment 3, is a spare and does not contain a Table 2) breaker and therefore does not need to be re-aligned.

32. Determines that 2LAC-PNLU02 double pole breaker SAT / UNSAT 32/34 is a spare and does not need to be re-aligned. STD: Determines that 2LAC-S (N2-SOP-02, PNLU02 double pole breaker 32/34 Attachment 3, is a spare and does not contain a Table 2) breaker and therefore does not need to be re-aligned.

33. Determines that 2LAC-PNLU02 double pole breaker SAT / UNSAT 33/35 is a spare and does not need to be re-aligned. STD: Determines that 2LAC-S (N2-SOP-02, PNLU02 double pole breaker 33/35 Attachment 3, is a spare and does not contain a Table 2) breaker and therefore does not need to be re-aligned.

34. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 36 is in the ON position SAT / UNSAT S STD: Determines that 2LAC-Cue: The component you have identified is in the (N2-SOP-02, PNLU02 breaker 36 is already in position you described. Attachment 3, the ON position and therefore does Table 2) not need to be re-aligned.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-2 Page 15 of 18 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

35. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 37 is in the ON position SAT / UNSAT S STD: Determines that 2LAC-Cue: The component you have identified is in the (N2-SOP-02, PNLU02 breaker 37 is already in position you described. Attachment 3, the ON position and therefore does Table 2) not need to be re-aligned.

36. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 38 is in the OFF position

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places Breaker 38 circuit breaker in OFF position you described. S by pushing the breaker handle to (N2-SOP-02, the OFF position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 Breaker 38 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

37. Determines that 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 39 is a spare and SAT / UNSAT does not need to be re-aligned STD: Determines that 2LAC-S (N2-SOP-02, PNLU02 breaker 39 is a spare and Attachment 3, does not contain a breaker and Table 2) therefore does not need to be re-aligned.

38. Determines that 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 40 is a spare and SAT / UNSAT does not need to be re-aligned STD: Determines that 2LAC-S (N2-SOP-02, PNLU02 breaker 40 is a spare and Attachment 3, does not contain a breaker and Table 2) therefore does not need to be re-aligned.

39. Determines that 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 41 is a spare and SAT / UNSAT does not need to be re-aligned STD: Determines that 2LAC-S (N2-SOP-02, PNLU02 breaker 41 is a spare and Attachment 3, does not contain a breaker and Table 2) therefore does not need to be re-aligned.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-2 Page 16 of 18 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

40. Verifies 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker 42 is in the OFF position

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: At 2LAC-PNLU02 places Breaker 42 circuit breaker in OFF position you described. S by pushing the breaker handle to (N2-SOP-02, the position.

Attachment 3, Table 2) Failure = 2LAC-PNLU02 Breaker 42 circuit breaker in OFF not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

Once the applicant verifies all Table 2, panel 2LAC-PNLU02 breaker positions, provide the following cue:

Instructor Note:

Cue: Your task is complete, another operator will complete any remaining actions.

TASK STANDARD 2LAC-PNLU02 breakers aligned per N2-SOP-02, Attachment 3, Table 2 for lighting electrical load shed.

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-2 Page 17 of 18 April 2021

JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

A Station Blackout is occurring

It has been determined that neither Div 1 nor Div 2 4.16 kV switchgear will be re-energized within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

N2-SOP-01 flowchart actions are being conducted

Flowchart section BL is being implemented

Safety Related Battery loads have been secured in accordance with N2-SOP-02, Attachment 3, Step 3.1

It has now been 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months since the Station Blackout occurred

A plant announcement that actions will be taken to reduce battery loading which will include turning off most essential lighting has been made.

Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), reduce lighting loads per N2-SOP-02, Attachment 3, Step 3.2 for 2LAC-PNLU02 only.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-2 Page 18 of 18 April 2021

Training ID: 2021 NMP2 NRC Plant JPM P-3 Revision: 0.0

Title:

Align Fire Water System to Inject through RHR B (Alternate Path)

Approvals:

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed by: Signature on File / Mike Alexander 1/5/21 Validated by: N/R / Ben Berner 12/30/20 Facility Reviewer: Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 2/3/21 Approximate Duration: 25 minutes Documentation of Performance:

Performer:

Evaluator:

Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:

Grade: Pass / Fail Comments:

Evaluators Signature: Date:

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-3 Page 1 of 14 April 2021

References

1. N2-EOP-6.6, Rev. 00102, RHR Fire Water System Cross-Tie

2. NUREG 1123 K/A 295031 EA1.08, (3.8/3.9)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-3 Page 2 of 14 April 2021

Instructor Information A. JPM Information

1. Description

a. This JPM tests the operator's ability to line up the Fire Water System to RHR Loop 'B' in accordance with N2-EOP-6.6.

b. This JPM is considered alternate path because when the applicant attempts to open the initially selected FHR valve, the valve will be jammed. The trainee must then disconnect the EOP fire hose from the initially selected FHR valve and connect it to the other allowable FHR valve specified in the procedure.

c. Critical steps are annotated in the Evaluator standard column with a bolded Pass/Fail.

2. Task Information:

a. N2-EOP06-01001-06, Implement N2-EOP-6.6, Cross-Tie RHR Fire Water System

3. Evaluation / Task Criteria License Level: (Target SRO RO EO N/A Audience)

Perform Evaluation Method:

Simulate Plant Evaluation Location: Simulator Classroom Yes Time Critical Task:

No Yes Alternate Path:

No Safety Function: 2 Reactor Water Inventory Control LOD Value: (Must be >1.0) 3 (Ref. NRC 71111.11 Inspection Manual, APP. C)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-3 Page 3 of 14 April 2021

K/A Statement: 295031 EA1.08 Ability to operate and/or monitor the (Add justification statement below following as they apply to REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL:

for K/A's < 3.0) Alternate injection systems K/A Importance Rating: RO 3.8 SRO 3.9

4. K/A Justification:

a. N/A

5. Recommended Start Location

a. Unit #2 R.P. Access Building

6. Simulator Setup

a. IC Number

a. N/A

b. Presets / With Triggers

a. Malfunctions a) None

b. Remotes a) None

c. Overrides a) None

d. Annunciators a) None

e. Event Triggers Event # Event Action Command None N/A N/A NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-3 Page 4 of 14 April 2021

f. Equipment Out of Service a) None

g. Support Documentation a) Prepare a copy of N2-EOP-6.6, with steps 6.2 through 6.2.5 placekept as completed. Next step to be performed is step 6.2.6 (Open circle this step).

h. Miscellaneous a) None

7. Strategy Code

a. None

8. Tools and Equipment

a. None

9. Commitments

a. None

10. Prerequisites

a. None

11. Applicable Operator Fundamental Knowledge Check Question(s)

a. None B. Read Before Every JPM Performance

1. For Plant JPM's:

a. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-3 Page 5 of 14 April 2021

b. With the exception of accessing panels, no plant equipment will be physically manipulated.

Repositioning of devices will be simulated by discussion and acknowledged by my cues.

2. For Simulator JPM's:

a. For the performance of this JPM, I will act as all those you need to talk to. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will provide cues as necessary.

C. Read Before Each Evaluated JPM

1. This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Unit Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional verification will not be provided.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-3 Page 6 of 14 April 2021

INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant has lost all high pressure feed.

2FPW-P1 has been started and is currently running.

The EOP Director has given the order to start lining up alternate injection systems.

RHS B is not in operation and 2RHS*P1B control switch is in Pull-To-Lock

The following valves are closed:

2RHS*MOV15B, Outlet to Drywell Spray 2RHS*MOV33B, Outlet to Suppr Pool Spray 2RHS*FV38B, Return to Suppr Pool Cooling 2RHS*MOV24B, LPCI B Injection Vlv 2RHS*MOV40B, SDC B Return 2RHS*MOV12B, Heat Exchanger 1B Outlet Vlv 2RHS*MOV8B, Heat Exchanger 1B Inlet Bypass Vlv Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), perform the field actions to align fire water injection to RHS Train 'B' per N2-EOP-6.6, steps 6.2.1 through 6.2.11.

START TIME PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue SAT / UNSAT P STD: Proper communications used Cue: Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary.

2. Verifies closed 2CNS-V622, CNS TO RHR SUPPLY ISOL (Rx SAT / UNSAT Bldg, EL289 Southside across from CRD maintenance STD: Verifies 2CNS-V622, CNS TO room) RHR SUPPLY ISOL closed by attempting to rotate the valve S

Cue: The component you have identified is in the handwheel in the clockwise (N2-EOP-6.6, direction on Rx Bldg, EL289 position you described. step 6.2.6)

Southside across from CRD maintenance room to ensure it is closed or uses local valve indication and or local stem position.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-3 Page 7 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

3. Verifies closed 2RHS*V79, CONDENSATE FLUSH TO SAT / UNSAT HEAD SPRAY HDR ISOL. (Rx Bldg EL 289) STD: Verifies 2RHS*V79, CONDENSATE FLUSH TO HEAD Cue: The component you have identified is in the SPRAY HDR ISOL closed by position you described. S attempting to rotate the valve (N2-EOP-6.6, handwheel in the clockwise step 6.2.7) direction on Rx Bldg EL 289 to ensure it is closed or uses local valve indication and or local stem position.

Residual pressure may exist when removing the test connection blind flange between valves Procedure Caution:

2CNS-V622 and 2RHS*V79 (Figure 4).

4. Removes test connection blind flange from between

PASS / FAIL valves 2CNS-V622 AND 2RHS*V79 (Figure 4). (Rx Bldg EL 289) STD: Unbolts and removes test connection blind flange from between valve 2CNS-V622 AND Cue: The component you have identified is in the 2RHS*V79 by unthreading four position you described. bolts using 1 1/16 inch wrench in S

the counter clockwise direction on (N2-EOP-6.6, Rx Bldg, EL 289, until the test step 6.2.8) connection blind flange is removed.

Failure = Test connection blind flange from between valve 2CNS-V622 AND 2RHS*V79 removal not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-3 Page 8 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

5. Installs 21/2" firehose adapter to test connection flange

PASS / FAIL (Figure 4). (Rx Bldg EL 289)

STD: Bolts 21/2" firehose adapter to test connection flange using Cue: The component you have identified is in the associated gasket to location position you described. where the blind flange was removed from above by threading S four bolts in the clockwise direction (N2-EOP-6.6, on Rx Bldg, EL 289, and tightening step 6.2.9) with 1 1/16 inch wrench until the 21/2" firehose adapter to test connection flange is tightened.

Failure = 21/2" firehose adapter to test connection flange installation not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

6. Connects male end of 21/2" firehose from EOP gangbox,

PASS / FAIL to test connection flange adapter (Figure 4). (Rx Bldg EL 289) STD: Connects male end of 21/2" firehose obtained from the EOP gangbox to the test connection Cue: The component you have identified is in the flange adapter by threading male position you described. end in the clockwise direction on Rx S Bldg, EL 289, and tightening with (N2-EOP-6.6, spanner wrench until the 21/2" step 6.2.10) firehose from the EOP gangbox is tightened to the test connection flange adapter.

Failure = 21/2" firehose connection to the test connection flange not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

FHR 78 (Rx Bldg EL 289 near South stairwell entrance) OR FHR 86 (Rx Bldg EL 289 Across from Procedure Note:

SLS Tank) may be used to supply firewater to RHS B.

7. Aligns firewater supply to RHR B via test connection SAT / UNSAT flange adapter as follows: (Rx Bldg, EL 289, near South S STD: Reads/reviews and stairwell entrance) (N2-EOP-6.6, placekeeps step.

step 6.2.11)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-3 Page 9 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA The applicant has a choice of where to get the supply of fire water from.

Fire Hose Reel 78 through 2FPW-V375, FHR 78 ANGLE VALVE

-OR-Evaluator Note:

Fire Hose Reel 86 through 2FPW-V383, FHR 86 ANGLE VALVE As described below in the Alternate Path discussion, whichever source the applicant picks first will be unable to be lined up, requiring the applicant to swap to the other source.

8. a. Disconnects firehose at FHR 78 OR FHR 86

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: Removes firehose at FHR 78 (FHR 86) by unthreading the position you described.

firehose in the counter clockwise S direction using spanner wrench on (N2-EOP-6.6, Rx Bldg, EL 289.

step 6.2.11.a)

Failure = Firehose at FHR 78 (FHR

86) removal not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

9. b. Connects 21/2" EOP firehose from test

PASS / FAIL connection flange adapter, to FHR 78 OR FHR 86 STD: Connects the other end of the 21/2" EOP firehose that was connected to the test connection Cue: The component you have identified is in the flange adapter to FHR 78 (FHR 86) position you described. by threading it in the clockwise S direction on Rx Bldg, EL 289, and (N2-EOP-6.6, tightening with spanner wrench step 6.2.11.b) until the 21/2" firehose is tightened to FHR 78 (FHR 86).

Failure = 21/2" firehose connection to FHR 78 (FHR 86) not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

In the following step, the applicant will attempt to open the initially selected Fire Hose Reel (FHR) valve 2FPW-V375 (2FPW-V383) which would pressurize the hose connected to the RHR Alternate Path: system. The Evaluator will provide a cue indicating that the initially selected FHR valve is jammed, forcing the applicant to disconnect from the initially selected Fire Hose Reel valve and hook up the fire hose to the other Fire Hose Reel valve.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-3 Page 10 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

10. c. Opens 2FPW-V375, FHR 78 ANGLE VALVE OR

PASS / FAIL 2FPW-V383, FHR 86 ANGLE VALVE STD: Attempts to open 2FPW-V375 (2FPW-V383), FHR 78 (86) ANGLE Cue: 2FPW-V375, FHR 78 ANGLE VALVE (2FPW-V383, VALVE by rotating valve handwheel FHR 86 ANGLE VALVE) will not move due to valve in the counter clockwise direction binding. If asked, the fire hose appears to be on Rx Bldg EL 289. Acknowledges depressurized. S cue that 2FPW-V375 (2FPW-V383)

(N2-EOP-6.6, will not move due to valve binding step 6.2.11.c) and that the fire hose appears to be depressurized using proper communications.

Failure = Attempted opening of 2FPW-V375 (2FPW-V383) not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

11. Disconnects 21/2" EOP firehose from test connection

PASS / FAIL flange adapter, from FHR 78 OR FHR 86 STD: Unthreads the end of the EOP firehose connected to FHR 78 (FHR Cue: The component you have identified is in the

86) using spanner wrench, by position you described. turning it in the counter clockwise S direction on Rx Bldg EL 289 until the hose connection is removed.

Failure = EOP firehose removal from FHR 78 (FHR 86) not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

12. Re-performs the step to align firewater supply to RHR B SAT / UNSAT via test connection flange adapter as follows: (Rx Bldg, S STD: Reads/reviews and EL 289, near South stairwell entrance) (N2-EOP-6.6, placekeeps step.

step 6.2.11)

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-3 Page 11 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

13. a. Disconnects firehose at FHR 86 OR FHR 78

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: Removes firehose at FHR 86 (FHR 78) by unthreading the position you described.

firehose in the counter clockwise S direction using spanner wrench on (N2-EOP-6.6, Rx Bldg, EL 289.

step 6.2.11.a)

Failure = Firehose at FHR 86 (FHR

78) removal not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

14. b. Connects 21/2" EOP firehose from test

PASS / FAIL connection flange adapter, to FHR 86 OR FHR 78 STD: Connects the other end of the 21/2" EOP firehose that was connected to the test connection Cue: The component you have identified is in the flange adapter to FHR 86 (FHR 78) position you described. by threading it in the clockwise S direction on Rx Bldg, EL 289, and (N2-EOP-6.6, tightening with spanner wrench step 6.2.11.b) until the 21/2" firehose is tightened to FHR 86 (FHR 78).

Failure = 21/2" firehose connection to FHR 86 (FHR 78) not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

15. c. Opens 2FPW-V383, FHR 86 ANGLE VALVE OR

PASS / FAIL 2FPW-V375, FHR 78 ANGLE VALVE STD: Opens 2FPW-V383 (V375),

FHR 86 (78) ANGLE VALVE by Cue: The component you have identified is in the rotating valve handwheel in the position you described. counter clockwise direction on Rx S Bldg EL 289 until the valve is open (N2-EOP-6.6, by local valve indication and or by step 6.2.11.c) stem position.

Failure = Opening of 2FPW-V383 (V375), FHR 86 (78) ANGLE VALVE not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-3 Page 12 of 14 April 2021

PERFORMANCE ACT. CODE EVALUATOR P / S / NA

16. d. Unlocks AND opens 2RHS*V79. (Rx Bldg EL 289)

PASS / FAIL Cue: The component you have identified is in the STD: Unlocks the lock on 2RHS*V79 using PL-3 key and Opens it by position you described.

rotating valve handwheel in the S counter clockwise direction on Rx (N2-EOP-6.6, Bldg EL 289 until the valve is open step 6.2.11.d) by local valve indication and or by stem position.

Failure = Opening of 2RHS*V79 not achieved as determined by candidate verbalization.

Once the applicant Unlocks AND opens 2RHS*V79, provide the following cue:

Instructor Note:

Cue: Your task is complete, another operator will complete any remaining actions.

TASK STANDARD Fire water injection to RHS 'B' using fire water hose reel connection FHR 78 OR FHR 86 through 2RHS*V79 is aligned.

STOP TIME NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-3 Page 13 of 14 April 2021

JPM Handout INITIAL CONDITIONS Given:

The plant has lost all high pressure feed.

2FPW-P1 has been started and is currently running.

The EOP Director has given the order to start lining up alternate injection systems.

RHS B is not in operation and 2RHS*P1B control switch is in Pull-To-Lock

The following valves are closed:

2RHS*MOV15B, Outlet to Drywell Spray 2RHS*MOV33B, Outlet to Suppr Pool Spray 2RHS*FV38B, Return to Suppr Pool Cooling 2RHS*MOV24B, LPCI B Injection Vlv 2RHS*MOV40B, SDC B Return 2RHS*MOV12B, Heat Exchanger 1B Outlet Vlv 2RHS*MOV8B, Heat Exchanger 1B Inlet Bypass Vlv Evaluator: Ask applicant if he/she has any questions after presenting initial conditions INITIATING CUE (Applicant Name), perform the field actions to align fire water injection to RHS Train 'B' per N2-EOP-6.6, steps 6.2.1 through 6.2.11.

NMP2 NRC 2021 JPM P-3 Page 14 of 14 April 2021

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Op-Test No.: LC2 20-1 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: The plant is operating at approximately 4.5% power with power ascension in progress. RHR B is in suppression pool cooling due to a completed RCIC run that raised suppression pool temperature Turnover: 1. Reactor power is approximately 4.5%.

2. The crew will transfer reboiler steam supply to main steam and recommence the startup to raise power to 8%.

Critical Tasks: See page 2 Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description N/A N-BOP, Transfer reboiler steam supply to main steam.

1 SRO N2-OP-25, Sect. F.5.0 N/A R-ATC Recommence the reactor startup and raise power using control SRO rods per N2-OP-101A.

2 N2-OP-101A NM07 I-ATC, IRM failure downscale while raising power.

3 SRO ARP's, N2-OP-92 RD08 C-ATC, Control Rod Overtravel.

4 SRO TS-SRO ARP's, N2-OP-30, T.S. 3.1.3 RH13A, C-BOP, Inadvertent Initiation of ECCS w/ Min Flow Failure.

RH15 SRO 5 (ILT 16-1 TS-SRO Scenario #1 Event 6) ARP's, N2-OP-100A, T.S. 3.5.1, 3.6.1.6, 3.6.2.3, 3.6.2.4 Remote C-BOP Loss of RPM-MG1A.

6 RP04 SRO N2-SOP-97 RR:PA:MT:I M-All A spurious trip of both RCS pumps and an isolation of the MSIVs RR:PB:MT:I occurs. The reactor will fail to automatically scram on MSIV MS12 position or RPV high pressure and will fail to scram when the RPS 7 pushbuttons are armed and depressed. Scram using RRCS.

N2-EOP-RPV OVR- C-All One SRV 'C' solenoid fuse blows.

8 Dis N2-EOP-RPV CW08 C-All Isolable SWP break occurs in the 'B' RHR heat exchanger room that results in one area above the maximum safe value.

9 N2-EOP-SC

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Op-Test No.: LC2 20-1

1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 Event 8, 9

2. Abnormal events (2-4) 4 Events 3, 4, 5, 6

3. Major transients (1-2) 1 Event 7

4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2 N2-EOP-RPV, N2-EOP-SC

5. Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions (>1 per scenario set) 0

6. Pre-identified Critical Tasks (> 2) 2 CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS: CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:

CT-1.0, Given the plant with a failure of RPS to trip, the crew will manually Critical Task 1.0 is identified as critical scram the reactor using the RRCS manual initiation push buttons within 10 because with a failure of an automatic minutes of the indications that RPS failed to trip in accordance with N2-SOP- RPS scram to occur due to RPV high 101C. pressure, the Reactor must be scrammed. This malfunction represents a failure of an automatic actuation of an ESF system. Manually performing the action reduces the rate of energy production and thus the heat input into the Secondary Containment.

CT-2.0, Given an isolable service water leak in the RHR B Pump room that Critical Task 2.0 is identified as critical threatens ECCS capacity, the crew will isolate the leak within 15 minutes of because failure to isolate the SWP leak the indications of the pipe break in accordance with N2-EOP-SC. into the RHR B pump room could cause damage to and loss of RHR B resulting in degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity.

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The scenario begins at 4.5% reactor power with a reactor startup in progress and no equipment out of service. RHR B is in suppression pool cooling due to a completed RCIC run that raised suppression pool temperature.

Event 1 is the normal evolution performed by the BOP operator to transfer Reboiler steam supply to main steam.

Event 2 is a reactivity evolution. The ATC operator will recommence the reactor startup by raising power using control rods per N2-OP-101A.

Event 3 occurs during the control rod withdrawal, when an IRM fails downscale. The crew will respond per the ARPs and bypass the IRM.

Event 4 occurs when control rod 26-43 is fully withdrawn per the control rod sequence to the full out position and overtravels. The SRO will declare the control rod inoperable and evaluate T.S.

3.1.3. The crew will perform the actions of the ARP and N2-OP-30 to recouple and recover the control rod to be back in accordance with the approved control rod sequence.

Event 5 occurs after the control rod has been recoupled, when an inadvertent Division I ECCS signal is received. This causes the CSL and RHR 'A' pumps to automatically start and run on minimum flow. During the transient 2RHS*MOV4A (2RHS*P1A minimum flow valve) fails closed. The crew will evaluate using redundant and independent indications that the ECCS signal is not valid and determine that 2RHS*P1A is running at shutoff head. The crew will then place 2RHS*P1A in P-T-L. The crew will evaluate Technical Specifications for the inoperability of two ECCS injection systems.

Event 6 occurs when 2RPS-MG1 spuriously trips off. A silent half scram occurs on RPS 'A' requiring the crew to enter and execute the actions of N2-SOP-97. The crew will dispatch an Equipment Operator to verify the condition of 2RPM-MG1. The crew will then reposition the power source selector switch to the alternate 'A' position and direct the field operator to reset the EPAs. With the EPAs reset, the crew will recognize that the silent half scram has been reset and exit N2-SOP-97.

Event 7 & 8 start when a spurious trip of both reactor recirculation pumps and an isolation of the MSIVs occurs. The reactor will fail to automatically scram on RPV high pressure and will fail to scram when RPS is manual trip is attempted using the arm and depress pushbuttons on panel 603 and the reactor mode switch. The crew will recognize the failure of the reactor to scram and manually initiate RRCS using the arm and depress pushbuttons on panel 603 (Critical Task 1.0). The SRO will classify the failure to scram as an Unusual Event. During the vessel isolation transient, SRVs will open causing heat addition to the suppression pool. The crew may start RCIC to augment RPV pressure control. The pressure transient caused by manual SRV operation will add heat to the suppression pool. The crew will use SRVs to control pressure and when the first operated SRV solenoid keylock switch is placed in open, the 'C' solenoid fuses will blow requiring the use of other SRVs for pressure control.

Event 9 occurs when an isolable SWP break occurs in the 'B' RHR heat exchanger room that results in one area above the maximum safe value. The crew will enter N2-EOP-SC and take required actions. The crew will diagnose the source of the leak and determine that it is from the service water system in the RHR 'B' heat exchanger room. The crew will also determine that N2-EOP-SC requires the system isolated (close SWP*MOV90B) (Critical Task 2.0). The

scenario concludes when RPV pressure and level are stabilized and are being controlled in the ordered band.

Copy of Training Id: NMP2 NRC 2021 Scenario 1 Revision: 0.0 SC2, Nonprimary system leak or flooding in secondary containment exceeding max safe level and/or

Title:

fire in secondary containment exceeding max safe temperature.

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed By Signature on File / Mike Alexander 3/24/21 Validated By Landon Swenson 12/31/20 Don Carr 12/31/20 Ben Berner 12/31/20 Facility Reviewer Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 3/26/21

NOTES References

1. N2OP25, Auxiliary Steam, Auxiliary Condensate, and Gland Seal

2. N2OP101A, Plant StartUp

3. N2ARP603200, 2CEC*PNL603 Series 200 Alarm Response Procedures

4. N2OP92, Neutron Monitoring

5. N2ARP603400, 2CEC*PNL603 Series 400 Alarm Response Procedures

6. N2OP30, Control Rod Drive

7. N2ARP601400, 2CEC*PNL601 Series 400 Alarm Response Procedures

8. N2ARP601100, 2CEC*PNL601 Series 100 Alarm Response Procedures

9. N2SOP97, Reactor Protection System Failures

10. N2EOPSC, Secondary Containment Control

11. N2ARP602300, 2CEC*PNL602 Series 300 Alarm Response Procedures

12. N2OP101C, Plant Shutdown

13. N2SOP101C, Reactor Scram

14. N2EOPRPV, RPV Control Flowchart

15. N2EOP6.1, Low RPV Water Level/High Drywell Pressure Actuations

16. N2OP31, Residual Heat Removal System

17. N2EOPHC, NMP2 EOP Hard Cards Procedure

18. EPAA113, Personnel Protective Actions

19. EPAA114, Notifications

20. NMP Unit 2 EAL Wallboard EPAA1013 Addendum 4 Appendix 1 Revision 01

21. N2TSPEC, NMPNS Unit 2 Improved Technical Specifications (Volume 1, 2, 3)

22. OPAA112101, Shift Turnover and Relief 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 1 of 44

NOTES Instructor Information A. Scenario Description

1. Sequence of Events / Expected Crew Response

a. The scenario begins at 4.5% reactor power with a reactor startup in progress and no equipment out of service. RHR B is in suppression pool cooling due to a completed RCIC run that raised suppression pool temperature.

b. Event 1 is the normal evolution performed by the BOP operator to transfer Reboiler steam supply to main steam.

c. Event 2 is a reactivity evolution. The ATC operator will recommence the reactor startup by raising power using control rods per N2OP101A.

d. Event 3 occurs during the control rod withdrawal, when an IRM fails downscale. The crew will respond per the ARPs and bypass the IRM.

e. Event 4 occurs when control rod 2643 is fully withdrawn per the control rod sequence to the full out position and overtravels. The SRO will declare the control rod inoperable and evaluate T.S. 3.1.3. The crew will perform the actions of the ARP and N2OP30 to recouple and recover the control rod to be back in accordance with the approved control rod sequence.

f. Event 5 occurs after the control rod has been recoupled, when an inadvertent Division I ECCS signal is received.

This causes the CSL and RHR 'A' pumps to automatically start and run on minimum flow. During the transient 2RHS*MOV4A (2RHS*P1A minimum flow valve) fails closed. The crew will evaluate using redundant and independent indications that the ECCS signal is not valid and determine that 2RHS*P1A is running at shutoff head.

The crew will then place 2RHS*P1A in PTL. The crew will evaluate Technical Specifications for the inoperability of two ECCS injection systems.

g. Event 6 occurs when 2RPSMG1 spuriously trips off. A silent half scram occurs on RPS 'A' requiring the crew to enter and execute the actions of N2SOP97. The crew will 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 2 of 44

NOTES dispatch an Equipment Operator to verify the condition of 2RPMMG1. The crew will then reposition the power source selector switch to the alternate 'A' position and direct the field operator to reset the EPAs. With the EPAs reset, the crew will recognize that the silent half scram has been reset and exit N2SOP97.

h. Event 7 & 8 start when a spurious trip of both reactor recirculation pumps and an isolation of the MSIVs occurs.

The reactor will fail to automatically scram on RPV high pressure and will fail to scram when RPS is manual trip is attempted using the arm and depress pushbuttons on panel 603 and the reactor mode switch. The crew will recognize the failure of the reactor to scram and manually initiate RRCS using the arm and depress pushbuttons on panel 603 (Critical Task 1.0). The SRO will classify the failure to scram as an Unusual Event. During the vessel isolation transient, SRVs will open causing heat addition to the suppression pool. The crew may start RCIC to augment RPV pressure control. The pressure transient caused by manual SRV operation will add heat to the suppression pool.

The crew will use SRVs to control pressure and when the first operated SRV solenoid keylock switch is placed in open, the 'C' solenoid fuses will blow requiring the use of other SRVs for pressure control.

i. Event 9 occurs when an isolable SWP break occurs in the

'B' RHR heat exchanger room that results in one area above the maximum safe value. The crew will enter N2 EOPSC and take required actions. The crew will diagnose the source of the leak and determine that it is from the service water system in the RHR 'B' heat exchanger room.

The crew will also determine that N2EOPSC requires the system isolated (close SWP*MOV90B) (Critical Task 2.0).

The scenario concludes when RPV pressure and level are stabilized and are being controlled in the ordered band.

2. Termination Criteria

a. Reactor level being controlled in assigned band.

b. 'B' RHS Service Water supply (2SWP*MOV90B) is closed.

2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 3 of 44

NOTES

3. Critical Tasks CT1.0 Justification:

Safety Significance: Critical Task 1.0 is identified as critical because with a failure of an automatic RPS scram to occur due to RPV high pressure, the Reactor must be scrammed. This malfunction represents a failure of an automatic actuation of an ESF system. Manually performing the action reduces the rate of energy production and thus the heat input into the Secondary Containment.

Cueing: Multiple annunciators will provide indications that RPS failed to initiate automatically. Annunciator 603306 for scram air header being depressurized will not be in alarm, the eight white scram pilot solenoid lights will remain lit on 2CEC*PNL603, control rods will remain withdrawn and reactor power will remain at its pretransient value. N2SOP101C provides direction on how to scram the Reactor.

Measurable Performance Indicators: Arming and depressing the manual RRCS initiation pushbuttons will provide observable actions for the evaluation team.

Performance Feedback: Control rod position and Reactor power indications will provide performance feedback regarding the success of the ARI scram.

Bounding Criteria: Time limit based on Operations representative recommendation.

a. CT1.0, Given the plant with a failure of RPS to trip, the crew will manually scram the reactor using the RRCS manual initiation push buttons within 10 minutes of the indications that RPS failed to trip in accordance with N2 SOP101C.

CT2.0 Justification:

Safety Significance: Critical Task 2.0 is identified as critical because failure to isolate the SWP leak into the RHR B pump room could cause damage to and loss of RHR B resulting in degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity.

Cueing: Multiple annunciators will provide indications of the secondary containment leak such as 601641, RHR Pump Room B Flooding, 851425, RHR Ht Exch A/B Cubicle Flooded and 851453, Reactor Bldg Floor Drain System Trouble. Additionally, Service water flow to RHR B Heat exchanger Flow rises to approximately 9,100 gpm as indicated on E12R602B on panel 601. N2EOPSC provides direction to isolate the leak.

Measurable Performance Indicators: The crew will manually close 2SWP*MOV90B.

Performance Feedback: Service water flow to RHR B Heat exchanger Flow lowering to approximately 0 gpm as indicated on E12 R602B on panel 601 and field reports of flooding indications will provide performance feedback regarding the success of the isolation.

Bounding Criteria: Time limit based on Operations representative recommendation.

b. CT2.0, Given an isolable service water leak in the RHR B Pump room that threatens ECCS capacity, the crew will isolate the leak within 15 minutes of the indications of the pipe break in accordance with N2EOPSC.

4. Length

a. 60 minutes 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 4 of 44

NOTES

5. Mitigation Strategy Code

a. SC2, Nonprimary system leak or flooding in secondary containment exceeding max safe level and/or fire in secondary containment exceeding max safe temperature.

6. Technical Specifications (Applicable actions for initial conditions only)

a. 3.3.2.1 condition C, actions C.2.1.2 and C.2.2

7. EAL Classification

a. Unusual Event, EAL MU3 1)

B. Initial Conditions

1. IC Number

a. IC012 or equivalent

2. Presets / With Triggers

a. Malfunctions

1) RD082643, Control Rod Failure Uncoupled, Final = Inserted True

2) NM07A IRM Channel Failure - Downscale (A), Final = TRG1 True

3) RH13A, ECCS Inadvertently Initiates (Div I), Final = TRG3 True

4) RH15, RHS*MOV4A Valve Fails Shut, Final = True TRG3 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 5 of 44

NOTES

5) RP03, Reactor Protection System Failure To Scram, TRG6 Final = True

6) RP12A, RRCS Division Failure (Div I), Final = True TRG6

7) RP12B, RRCS Division Failure (Div II), Final = True TRG6

8) MS12, Reactor Vessel Isolation, DT = 10 sec, Final = TRG6 True

9) RR:PA:MT:I, RRP 1A Motor Failure, DT = 1 sec, Final = TRG6 Short

10) RR:PB:MT:I, RRP 1B Motor Failure, DT = 1 sec, Final = TRG6 Short

11) CW08, Isolable SW Break Loop B in RHR Hx Room, DT TRG6

= 10 min, Final = 100

b. Remotes

1) RM02041, SWP23B Current Radiation Level Online, Inserted Final = Online

2) RM03041, SWP23B Current Radiation Level Power, Inserted Final = On

3) RP04, RPS MG1 Stop/Start, Final = Stop TRG4

4) RP01, RPS MG1 EPA, Final = Reset TRG5

5) RC02A, RCIC Level 8 Trip Defeat: Withdraw Trip Units TRG7 N693A,E Final = Defeated

6) RM02040, SWP23A SWP From RHR 'A' Ht Exch Rad TRG8 Monit Online, Final = Online

7) RM03040, SWP23A SWP From RHR 'A' Ht Exch Rad TRG8 Monit Power, Final = On

c. Overrides

1) DI6000, On Mode Switch (Shutdown), Final = Off Inserted

2) DI6001, On Mode Switch (Refuel), Final = Off Inserted

3) DI6002, On Mode Switch (Startup), Final = On Inserted

4) DI6003, On Mode Switch (Run), Final = Off Inserted 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 6 of 44

NOTES

d. Annunciators

1) None

e. Event Triggers Event # Event Action Command 2 zdrdri==1 dmf rd082643 9 zdads08(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538 ior di3229 off (Keylock switch MSS*PSV137) 10 zdads09(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538 ior di3207 off (Keylock switch MSS*PSV128) 11 zdads10(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538 ior di3231 off (Keylock switch MSS*PSV133) 12 zdads11(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538 ior di3233 off (Keylock switch MSS*PSV123) 13 zdads15(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538 ior di3219 off (Keylock switch MSS*PSV122) 14 zdads17(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538 ior di3235 off (Keylock switch MSS*PSV132) 15 zdads18(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538 ior di3221 off (Keylock switch MSS*PSV135) 16 zdads19(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538 ior di3223 off (Keylock switch MSS*PSV136) 17 zdads20(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538 ior di3201 off (Keylock switch MSS*PSV127) 18 zdads21(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538 ior di3203 off (Keylock switch MSS*PSV131) 19 zdads22(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538 ior di3205 off (Keylock switch MSS*PSV126) 20 zdads23(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538 ior di3237 off (Keylock switch MSS*PSV121) 21 zdads24(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538 ior di3225 off (Keylock switch MSS*PSV134) 22 zdads25(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538 ior di3239 off (Keylock switch MSS*PSV120) 23 zdads26(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538 ior di3241 off (Keylock switch MSS*PSV130) 24 zdads27(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538 ior di3227 off (Keylock switch MSS*PSV125) 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 7 of 44

NOTES Event # Event Action Command 25 zdads28(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538 ior di3243 off (Keylock switch MSS*PSV129) 26 zdads29(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538 ior di3249 off (Keylock switch MSS*PSV124) 27 rz:rrsbc13==1 .OR. rz:rrsbc14==1 dmf rp12a 28 rz:rrsbc13==1 .OR. rz:rrsbc14==1 dmf rp12b

f. Equipment Out of Service

1) None

g. Support Documentation

1) Unit 2 Rod Movement Sheet for Sequence ID:

NM2C18SU

h. Miscellaneous

1) Reset to IC012, "Startup Ready for Actions at 925 psig"

2) Insert control rods to reduce power to ~ 4.5 5.0%

3) Place the reactor mode switch in "Startup"

4) Bypass the RWM

5) Withdraw GE group 8 (Unit 2 Rod Movement Sheet)

RWM Step 9 control rods to position 12 up to and including control rod 4227.

6) Markup the Unit 2 Rod Movement Sheet for GE group 8 (A2 startup control rod sequence) RWM Step 9 rods up to and including control rod 4227.

7) Post yellow "To Rod Position" sign with "12" written in.

8) Initial both of the concurrence to proceed "ALL" blocks on page 17 of the Unit 2 Rod Movement Sheet.

9) Initial the RO "Move Complete INIT" block on page 17 of the Unit 2 Rod Movement Sheet up to and including control rod 3419.

2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 8 of 44

NOTES

10) Initial the PEER "Move Complete INIT" block on page 17 only of the Unit 2 Rod Movement Sheet up to and including control rod 3419.

11) Ensure the "Prepared by" and "Verified by" with dates is filled in at the bottom of page 17 of the Unit 2 Rod Movement Sheet.

12) Ensure a copy of N2OP96 is present at the rod withdrawal desk by panel 603.

13) Mark up N2OP101A, section E.1.0 initialed off, section E.2.0 initialed off and E.3.0 initialed off up to E.3.4. (open circle step E.3.4). Additionally, open circle step E.2.63.3.

14) Clear APRM 2/4 Voter trip memory

15) Reset IRMs at the back panels to ensure all trips are clear.

16) Verify the following SREI07 pages, which apply to IC021, are displayed:

a) Unit #2 CRAM Rod Listing (Remove this from simulator for this scenario).

b) Rapid Power Reduction Instructions (SREI07 page 15 of 29) in the CRC book only.

c) Current Control Rod Positions & Face Adjacent Rods (SREI07 page 17 of 29) in the CRC book only.

C. Shift Turnover Information

1. Reactor Power: 4.5%

2. Rodline: Below 100%

3. Technical Specification LCOs in effect:

a. 3.3.2.1 condition C, actions C.2.1.2 and C.2.2

b. 3.5.1 condition A, action A.1 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 9 of 44

NOTES

4. Significant Problems / Abnormalities / Equipment Out of Service:

a. The RWM is bypassed and Tech Spec 3.3.2.1 condition C, actions C.2.1.2 and C.2.2 are being met by:

1) Verified that startup with RWM inoperable has not been performed in the last calendar year.

AND

2) The movement of control rods is being verified in compliance with banked position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) by a second licensed operator.

b. RHR B is in suppression pool cooling due to a completed RCIC run that raised suppression pool temperature.

Suppression pool temperature is being lowered back down to 75°F. Maintain RHR B system parameters asis until target suppression pool temperature of 75°F is reached.

Tech Spec 3.5.1 condition A, action A.1 has been entered.

5. Evolutions / Maintenance Scheduled for this Shift:

a. Transfer Reboiler steam supply to main steam per N2OP 25, Section F.5.0. An EO is standing by at the Auxiliary Boilers and by 2CESIPNL204.

b. Continue the reactor startup using control rod withdrawal per N2OP101A and the provided ReMA.

2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 10 of 44

NOTES SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION ON COMING SHIFT: N D DATE: Today PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SRO, ROs)

PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

LCO Status (SRO)

Shift Turnover Information Sheet Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:

Reactor power is at ~4.5%

RPV Pressure is 925 psig with 1 bypass valve partially open Feed Pump A is running with level control on LV55A A reactor startup in progress per N2-OP-101A. Currently on step E.3.4 (e.2.63.3). The Clean Steam Reboiler is still on the Aux Boilers.

Currently on NM2C18-SU sequence page 17, rod 42-35 withdrawing control rods from position 08 to position 12 The RWM is bypassed and Tech Spec 3.3.2.1 condition C, actions C.2.1.2 and C.2.2 are being met by:

Verified that startup with RWM inoperable has not been performed in the last calendar year.

AND The movement of control rods is being verified in compliance with banked position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) by a second licensed operator.

RHR B is in suppression pool cooling due to a completed RCIC run that raised suppression pool temperature. Suppression pool temperature is being lowered back down to 75°F. Maintain RHR B system parameters as-is until target suppression pool temperature of 75°F is reached. Tech Spec 3.5.1 condition A, action A.1 has been entered.

PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions:

Transfer Reboiler steam supply to main steam per N2-OP-25, Section F.5.0. An EO is standing by at the Auxiliary Boilers and by 2CES-IPNL204.

Once reboiler steam supply has been transferred to main steam, continue the reactor startup using control rod withdrawal per N2-OP-101A and the provided ReMA.

2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 11 of 44

NOTES Event #1 - Transfer Reboiler Steam Supply to Main Steam Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions Reactor at ~4.5% power

Critical activities or tasks Close 2ASSAOV145, AUX BLR STM INLET VLV,

- Place the Reboiler 2ASSSTV112 and 2ESSSTV104 control switches in the AUTO

Final (expected) operating result Operating with reboiler steam supply on main steam

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

N/A Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. None "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is performed)

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions SRO

Directs BOP to transfer Reboiler steam supply to Main Steam per N2OP25, Section F.5.0 BOP Role Play:

Acknowledges direction to transfer Reboiler steam As EO, when asked, provide indications from the Aux supply to Main Steam Boilers. Use normal operating indications from N2OP25,

Determines RPV pressure is 925 psig and one turbine F.1.0 to respond to any additional requests for indications. bypass valve is opened at least 20%

Determines an operator is stationed at the Auxiliary Boilers.

Determines 2ASSMOV148, MAIN STM TO AUX STM Role Play: ISOL VLV is already open As EO, when asked to locally open 2ASSV23, wait 1

Directs field operator to open 2ASSV23 minute and then report that 2ASSV23 is open.

Acknowledges field operator report that 2ASSV23 is open

Closes 2ASSAOV145, AUX BLR STM INLET VLV, 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 12 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

Places the Reboiler 2ASSSTV112 and 2ESSSTV104 control switches in the AUTO Role Play:

Directs the local operator to depress the RESET As EO directed to depress the reset pushbuttons for PUSHBUTTONS for 2CNALV8A, LV8B and LV8C on 2CNALV8A, LV8B and LV8C, wait 10 seconds and inform the 2CESIPNL204 the control room that it has been completed.

Opens 2CNAHV34A Role Play:

As EO directed to confirm that 2CNALV8A, LV8B and LV

Directs the local operator to confirm that 2CNA 8C are modulating to control Reboiler Drain tank level and LV8A, LV8B and LV8C are modulating to control that 2CNALV9A and LV9B are closed, wait 1 minute and Reboiler Drain tank level and that 2CNALV9A and inform the control room that 2CNALV8A, LV8B and LV LV9B are closed 8C are modulating and controlling Reboiler Drain tank

Monitors for proper Reboiler operation level and that 2CNALV9A and LV9B are closed.

Reports steam supply transferred.

Role Play:

If asked, inform the candidate that there is no longer any load on the auxiliary boilers.

Role Play:

If asked as the EO about the following, wait 1 minute then report:

At Main Turbine, no steam is blowing from turbine shaft seals.

A water level exists in the Gland Exhaust loop seal as indicated by air not being sucked in Event

Reboiler steam supply on main steam Termination Criteria 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 13 of 44

NOTES Event #2 & #3 Withdraw control rods to raise power and failed IRM Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions Reactor at ~4.5% power

Critical activities or tasks Withdraw control rods to continue the reactor startup.

Bypass IRM A

Final (expected) operating result Reactor power at ~4.5% with IRM A bypassed

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

N/A Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. None "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is performed)

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions The following is a list of the control rods and positions SRO that will be moved in accordance with the approved

Directs RO to continue the reactor startup using ReMA: control rods per the startup rod sequence and ReMA Control Rod # From To 4235 08 12 1827 08 12 5019 08 12 1043 08 12 5043 08 12 1019 08 12 1851 08 12 4211 08 12 4251 08 12 1811 08 12 2643 (Overtravels) 12 48 3419 12 48 3443 12 48 2619 12 48 Note: ATC

Acknowledges direction to raise power to 10%

2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 14 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions During validation the following malfunction was entered

Reviews N2OP96 actions for first time rod selection when control rod 4211 was being withdrawn. and withdrawal actions:

SELECTS the rod to be moved by momentarily depressing the pushbutton for that rod on the Rod Select Module at 2CEC*PNL603Monitors RPV, CRD and Nuclear Instruments OBSERVES the following:

- The pushbutton for selected rod is lit

- The white select light on full core display is lit for control rod

- The rod's position is indicated AND in correct location on 4Rod Display

- IF available, THEN Rod Worth Minimizer indicates correct rod AND rod position OTHERWISE MARK this step N/A Notch Withdrawal is performed as follows:

- VERIFIES Reactor mode switch is not in SHUTDOWN AND there are no rod withdrawal blocks.

- VERIFIES correct rod has been selected per sequence being used

- WITHDRAWS selected control rod as follows:

o DEPRESSES WITHDRAW push button.

o CONFIRMS Rod motion as indicated by:

Rod position indication on 4 Rod Display Withdraw light is illuminated o RELEASES WITHDRAW pushbutton o OBSERVES SETTLE light illuminated Continuous Withdrawal is performed as follows:

- VERIFIES Reactor mode switch is not in SHUTDOWN AND there are no rod withdrawal blocks

- VERIFIES correct rod has been selected per sequence being used AND that continuous rod withdrawal is allowed for given conditions 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 15 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

- SIMULTANEOUSLY DEPRESSES WITHDRAW AND CONTINUOUS WITHDRAW push buttons AND OBSERVE WITHDRAW AND CONTINUOUS WITHDRAW lights are on

Continues control rod withdrawal per the startup sequence

Monitors NI indications, reactor level and reactor pressure.

When the Lead Evaluator has determined power has been raised sufficiently, insert the following malfunction:

TRG1 NM07A IRM Channel Failure - Downscale (A), Final = True IRM A indication fails downscale A Rod Block occurs The following annunciators alarm:

603213, IRM DOWNSCALE 603442, CONTROL ROD OUT BLOCK Crew

Recognizes and reports failed IRM A SRO

Acknowledges report of failed IRM A

Directs the RO to respond per the ARPs ATC

Acknowledges direction to respond per the ARPs

References ARP 603213

Determines the white DOWNSCALE light for IRM A is lit.

Informs the SRO that the ARP allows IRM A to be bypassed

Acknowledges direction to bypass IRM A

References N2OP92, Section H.2.0 and bypasses IRM A as follows:

2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 16 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Determines no other IRMs are bypassed Performs a channel check and determines all other IRMs are within two decades of each other Places the IRM BYPASS JOYSTICK to position A.

Verifies the BYPASS light for IRM A is lit on Annunciators 603213 and 603442 clear 2CEC*PNL603

Informs the SRO that IRM A has been bypassed Role Play: SRO If contacted as the SM, acknowledge the failure of IRM A

Acknowledges report that IRM A may be bypassed.

and concur with bypassing IRM A. Additionally, inform

May contact the SM to concur with bypassing IRM A the SRO that you will contact the work week manager and

Directs RO to bypass IRM A I&C.

Acknowledges report that IRM A has been bypassed.

May declare IRM A inoperable and refer to TS 3.3.1.1

May determine that there are still 3 IRMs operable for RPS A and that no additional actions are required Event

IRM A has been bypassed Termination * (Control Rod withdrawal must continue in order to get the next event to occur.)

Criteria 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 17 of 44

NOTES Event #4 - Control Rod Overtravel Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions Plant is in S/U with control rods being withdrawn per the approved control rod sequence

Critical activities or tasks Insert and recouple control rod

Final (expected) operating result Operating at ~5% power with all control rods coupled

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

N/A Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. None "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is performed)

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions When control rod 2643 is withdrawn to the full out ATC position the following malfunction becomes apparent:

Obtains a copy of the NM2C18SU UNIT 2 rod movement sheets and review / utilize the correct

RD082643, Control Rod Failure Uncoupled, Final = RWM step rod movement sheets True

Selects control rod 2643 on the rod select module at 2CEC*PNL603.

Depresses and holds the continuous withdraw and withdraw pushbuttons simultaneously until control Role Play: rod 2643 indicates position 48.

As Reactor Engineering, if asked inform the crew that they

Recognizes and reports annunciator 603444, have permission to attempt to recouple control rod 2643. "Control Rod Overtravel" is in alarm.

Performs the annunciator response actions of 603444, "Control Rod Overtravel" Refers to N2OP30, Section H.

Performs the actions of N2OP30, section H.2.0 for uncoupled control rod

IF permitted by Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM may be bypassed as allowed by TS 3.3.2.1):

2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 18 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions When the insert pushbutton is depressed (zdrdri==1) the Inserts control rod 2643 two notches in an following malfunction will be deleted: attempt to recouple rod.

RD082643, Control Rod Failure Uncoupled, Final =

True The following annunciator clears when control rod 26-43 is inserted:

603444, "Control Rod Overtravel" Role Play:

As Reactor Engineering inform the performing operator Consults with Reactor Engineering before control that control rod 2643 withdrawal is permissible. rod withdrawal.

Role Play:

As Reactor Engineering inform the performing operator Withdraws control rod to position 48 with that control rod 2643 withdrawal is to be performed Reactor Engineering concurrence, AND observe using single notch withdrawal to position 48. nuclear instrumentation response during rod movement.

Applies a continuous withdraw signal at position 48 AND verify 603444, CONTROL ROD OVERTRAVEL, does NOT alarm IF control rod is successfully recoupled on first attempt, THEN reposition control rod with Reactor Engineering concurrence.

Informs SRO/Reactor Engineering that control rod 2643 is at its intended position of 48

Initials the "coupling check" block in the NM2C18SU UNIT 2 rod movement sheet for control rod 2643

Verifies "Full Out" light illuminated on 2CEC*PNL603 full core display and initials the "Full Out Light" block in the NM2C18SU UNIT 2 rod movement sheet for control rod 2643.

Initials the "Move Complete" block in the NM2C18 SU UNIT 2 rod movement sheet for control rod 26 43.

Waits for Peer verification of control rod position for control rod 2643 on the NM2C18SU UNIT 2 rod movement sheet 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 19 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions SRO

Acknowledges report of 603444, "Control Rod Note: Overtravel"

Declares the control rod INOPERABLE AND per Spec Condition Applicable Actions Technical Specification 3.1.3 3.1.3 C C.1 and C.2 Action Description

Acknowledges report that control rod 2643 is at its C.1 Fully insert inoperable control rod. (3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months ) intended position of 48 C.2 Disarm the associated CRD. (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months )

Event

Actions of N2OP30 to recouple control rod 2643 are complete.

Termination Criteria 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 20 of 44

NOTES Event #5 Inadvertent Initiation of ECCS w/ Min Flow Failure Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions Reactor startup in progress

Critical activities or tasks Place 2RHS*P1A in PTL

Final (expected) operating result 2RHS*P1A in PTL

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

N/A Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. None "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is performed)

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Booth Operator When directed by the lead evaluator, insert the following malfunctions:

TRG3 RH13A, ECCS Inadvertently Initiates (Div I),

Final = True RH15, RHS*MOV4A Valve Fails Shut, Final =

True The following plant response occurs after Div I ECCS event initiation:

Division I low pressure ECCS pumps receive initiation signals and auto start Division I Diesel Generator starts RHS*MOV4A closes LPCI A / LPCS initiation white light illuminates The following annunciators alarm after Div I ECCS event BOP initiation:

Silences, acknowledges and reports annunciators 601413, LPCS PUMP 1 AUTO START 601413 and 601442 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 21 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions 601426, LPCS SYSTEM ACTUATED

Provides crew update for the Division I Low Pressure 601442, RHR PUMP 1A AUTO START ECCS initiation 601451, RHR A SYSTEM ACTUATED

Recognizes that 2RHS*MOV4A, RHR 'A' minimum 601539, ADS A LPCS / RHR A PERMISSIVE flow valve, is closed 852109, DIVISION I EDG 1 START SYSTEM

Reviews ARP 601413 and 601442:

TROUBLE

Verifies the validity of the LOCA initiation using at 852117, EDG 1 RUNNING least two redundant indications

Ensures by two separate and redundant means that Role Play:

the initiation is not valid If requested to provide RHR and CSL trip unit indications

Checks trip unit indications for status (2CEC*PNL629), report that no trip units are in alarm and that no gross failures are present.

Places 2RHS*P1A in PTL The following annunciator alarms when 2RHS*P1A is

Provides crew update that RHR 'A' has been placed placed in P-T-L:

in PTL 601431, RHR A SYSTEM INOPERABLE

Dispatches field operator to perform running checks The following annunciator clears when 2RHS*P1A is placed in P-T-L: on the Div I DG 601442, RHR PUMP 1A AUTO START

Checks trip unit indications for status The following computer point is generated when 2RHS*P1A is placed in P-T-L:

RHSBC12, RHR A Sys (Inop)

If directed, places 2CSL*P1 in PTL The following annunciator alarms if 2CSL*P1 is placed in

Provides crew update that CSL has been placed in P P-T-L: TL 601401, DIVISION I LPCS SYSTEM INOPERABLE The following annunciator clears if 2CSL*P1 is placed in P-T-L:

601413, LPCS PUMP 1 AUTO START 601539, ADS A LPCS / RHR A PERMISSIVE The following computer point is generated if 2CSL*P1 is placed in P-T-L:

CSLBC02, Div I LPCS Sys (Inop)

If directed, shuts down the Division I diesel Role Play:

generator per N2OP100A, Section H.16.0 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 22 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions If dispatched as an EO to monitor diesel running

Places EMERGENCY DSL GEN 1 LOCA SIGNAL BYPASS parameters, wait 5 minutes and then report that all diesel switch to ON running indications are normal for the Division I EDG.

Places DIVISION I 2EGS*EG1 START switch in PULL TOLOCK SRO

Oversees / directs crew actions

Directs indications of LOCA be evaluated using two independent redundant indications

Directs 2RHS*P1A placed in PTL.

May direct 2CSL*P1 placed in PTL. (if this is performed, T.S. 3.0.3 entry would be required)

May direct Division I Diesel Generator shutdown per Role Play: N2OP100A If contacted to perform vibration readings on 2CSL*P1,

Evaluates plant parameters paying particular acknowledge the report. attention to containment indications This is done to address N2OP32 P&L 3.0 which

Maintains crew oversight and provides coaching states, If LPCS Pump is to run on minimum flow when necessary for an extended period of time, as soon as personnel are available, take vibration readings every 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or as determined by pump component specialist and verify readings remain stable. Do not permit the LPCS pump to exceed a runout flow of 7800 GPM.

Note:

Evaluates plant conditions against Tech Specs and Spec Condition Applicable Actions determines the following apply:

3.5.1 A A.1 Action Description

LCO 3.5.1 Condition A and C A.1 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray

LCO 3.6.1.6 Condition A subsystem to OPERABLE status. (7 days)

LCO 3.6.2.3 Condition A

LCO 3.6.2.4 Condition A Spec Condition Applicable Actions 3.5.1 C C.1

May also evaluate LCO 3.3.5.1 Condition A, B & E Action Description (this may be contingent on troubleshooting results)

Restore one ECCS injection/spray C.1 subsystem to OPERABLE status. (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months )

Spec Condition Applicable Actions 3.6.1.6 A A.1 Action Description 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 23 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Restore RHR drywell spray subsystem to A.1 OPERABLE status. (7 days)

Spec Condition Applicable Actions 3.6.2.3 A A.1 Action Description Restore RHR suppression pool cooling A.1 subsystem to OPERABLE status. (7 days)

Spec Condition Applicable Actions 3.6.2.4 A A.1 Action Description Restore RHR suppression pool spray A.1 subsystem to OPERABLE status. (7 days)

The following T.S. is only applicable if the crew places CSL*P1 in PTL during this event:

Spec Condition Applicable Actions 3.5.1 H H.1 Action Description H.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. (Immediately)

Event

2RHS*P1A has been placed in PTL Termination

Or as determined by the lead evaluator/instructor Criteria 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 24 of 44

NOTES Event #6 - Loss of RPMMG1A Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions Plant operating at power

Critical activities or tasks Power source selector switch taken to the Alt A position Silent half scram on RPS 'A' reset

Final (expected) operating result Operating with silent half scram reset

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

N/A Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. None "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is performed)

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Booth Operator:

When directed by lead evaluator insert the following remote function:

TRG4 RP04, RPS MG1 Stop/Start, Final = Stop BOP

Provides update to control room of the silent half scram on RPS 'A' and entry conditions for N2SOP Division I Pilot Scram Solenoids A, C, E & G all de- 97.

energize

Performs N2SOP97 actions:

Determines cause to be the loss of scram Role Play:

solenoid power.

When dispatched as field operator to report local Determines all lights out in trip system indications, wait 1 minute to get to the local area then call Verifies power source selector switch in 'normal' back to the control room and report the following:

Dispatches operator to check status of:

RPM EPA's are tripped

- RPMEPA's RPMMG1A is off

- RPM MG set RPM MG set supply breaker NHSMCC0087 is closed.

- RPM MG set supply breaker 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 25 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Acknowledges report from the field Role Play: Determines RPMMG1A is not running When directed to place RPMMG1 output switch to "OFF," Directs field operator to place the output switch wait 30 seconds then report that RPMMG1A output to "OFF" and hold the motor off pushbutton until switch has been placed in "OFF" and the motor off the green light comes on.

pushbutton has been held in off and the green light is lit. Acknowledges report from the field that RPM MG1A is in Off and green light is lit.

Provides crew update to inform of next step to reposition the power source selector switch per N2SOP97 Verifies that Alternate 'A' feed available light is illuminated Places power source selector switch in alternate "A" position Role Play: Proceeds to section 'A' of N2SOP97 to reset the As field operator dispatched to reset the RPM EPA's, wait EPA's 1 minute, insert the following remote: Directs field operator to perform the following:

- Verify all trip flags for ACB1A are reset TRG5 RP01, RPS MG1 EPA, Final = Reset - Reset ACB1A by taking the switch from 'TRIP' to 'ON' Then report that all trip flags are reset and that RPM EPA - Verify all trip flags for ACB1B are reset 1A &1B have been reset - Reset ACB1B by taking the switch from 'TRIP' to 'ON' Division I Pilot Scram Solenoids A, C, E & G all re- Acknowledges report from field that RPM EPA's energize. are reset

Makes crew update that silent half scram has been reset per N2SOP97 Role Play: SRO If asked, report as the field operator that no knife

Provides crew update on entry into N2SOP97 switches were operated to reset the ACBs.

Directs RO to enter and execute N2SOP97

Maintains crew oversight and looks ahead for potential issues/thresholds

Evaluates risk

Provides crew transient brief / reverse brief 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 26 of 44

NOTES Event

Silent Half Scram Reset Termination Criteria 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 27 of 44

NOTES Event #7 & 8 - Spurious MSIV Isolation with RPS Actuation Failure and Blown SRV Fuse.

Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions Plant at ~ 5% power Verify the following overrides are inserted before the spurious RCS Pump trip and MSIV isolation is initiated:

DI6000, On Mode Switch (Shutdown), Final = Off

DI6001, On Mode Switch (Refuel), Final = Off

DI6002, On Mode Switch (Startup), Final = On

DI6003, On Mode Switch (Run), Final = Off

Critical activities or tasks Manual reactor scram (RRCS)

Final (expected) operating result Shutdown with all control rods inserted

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

None Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. Given the plant with a failure of RPS to trip, the crew will manually scram the "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is reactor using the RRCS manual initiation push buttons within 10 minutes of the performed) indications that RPS failed to trip in accordance with N2SOP101C.

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Booth Operator:

When directed by the lead instructor/evaluator, insert the following malfunctions:

TRG6 RP03, Reactor Protection System Failure To Scram, Final = True RP12A, RRCS Division Failure (Div I), Final =

True RP12B, RRCS Division Failure (Div II), Final =

True RR:PA:MT:I, RRP 1A Motor Failure, DT = 1 sec, Final = Short RR:PB:MT:I, RRP 1B Motor Failure, DT = 1 sec, Final = Short 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 28 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions MS12, Reactor Vessel Isolation, DT = 10 sec, Final = True CW08, Isolable SW Break Loop B In RHR Hx Room, DT = 10 min, Final = 100 The plant responds as follows:

Both RCS Pumps trip to off All MSIVs fail closed RPS/RRCS fail to scram Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown fails to insert control rods The following annunciators alarm:

602108, RECIRC PMP 1A/1B MG ST MOT ELEC 602114, RECIRC PMP 1A/1B MG ST MOT OVRLD 602125, RECIRC PMP 1A MG SET PROT REL TRIP 602126, RECIRC PMP 1B MG SET PROT REL TRIP 602228, MS LINE PIPE TUNNEL TEMP HI/HI 603208, APRM TRIP SYSTEM UPSCALE 603131, REACTOR PRESSURE HIGH 603442, CONTROL ROD OUT BLOCK 602218, DIVISION I NSSSS ISOL SIGNAL 602224, DIVISION II NSSSS ISOL SIGNAL 603402, RPS B NMS TRIP 603403, RPS B REACTOR PRESSURE HIGH TRIP 603408, RPS B MSIV CLOSURE TRIP 603422, DIVISION I/II RRCS POTENTIAL ATWS 603445, DIVISION I/II RRCS TROUBLE 602131, REACTOR PRESSURE HIGH 603103, RPS A REACTOR PRESSURE HIGH TRIP 603108, RPS A MSIV CLOSURE TRIP The following malfunctions become apparent when RPS is RO actuated:

Recognizes that both RCS pumps have tripped

RP02, Reactor Protection System Failure To Scram

Recognizes and reports annunciators 603126, Automatic, Final = True 603426, 602218 and 602224

RP12A, RRCS Division Failure (Div I), Final = True

May recognize/report that the reactor failed to

RP12B, RRCS Division Failure (Div II), Final = True scram automatically

Arms and depresses RPS trip actuation switches 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 29 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions When the mode switch is placed in shutdown the

Recognizes/reports that manual RPS actuation failed following overrides become apparent: to trip RPS

DI6000, On Mode Switch (Shutdown), Final = Off

Places the mode switch in shutdown

DI6001, On Mode Switch (Refuel), Final = Off

Recognizes/reports that the mode switch failed to

DI6002, On Mode Switch (Startup), Final = On trip RPS

DI6003, On Mode Switch (Run), Final = Off

Continues with N2SOP101C actions to scram the reactor:

The following occurs:

Arms and depresses BOTH divisions of RRCS on When RPS is manually actuated RPS will fail to trip 2CEC*PNL603 When the Mode switch is taken to shutdown RPS fails to trip

Provides scram report, by reporting:

RRCS ARI function does not automatically insert Reactor mode switch in shutdown control rods on high pressure initiation Manual RPS trip was required SRVs lift to control pressure, resulting in heat APRMs downscale addition to the suppression pool Reactor pressure and trend When the RRCS pushbuttons are armed and Reactor level and trend depressed, ARI inserts all control rods MSIVs status Feedwater pumps are running All control rods fully inserted

Reports EOP entry condition on high reactor pressure 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 30 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions EAL Criteria Met SRO (N2EOPRPV)

Indications available for Unusual Event, EAL MU3:

Acknowledges and repeats back scram report

Acknowledges report of EOP entry condition on high reactor pressure

Provides crew update and enters EOPRPV on low RPV water level and high RPV pressure

Performs EOPRPV actions:

Directs scram procedure entered (N2SOP101C Performs level control actions

- Verifies needed auto isolations, ECCS starts and diesel generator response occurred per EOP 6.1

- Determines that RPV water level is known

- Determines that RPV water level can be restored and maintained between 159.3 and 202.3 inches using Feedwater, RCIC and HPCS

- Directs an RPV level band of 160 200 inches

- May direct RCIC high RPV water level interlock defeated in accordance with N2EOP6.20 TIME: _____________ Performs Pressure control actions:

- Determines that SRVs are cycling

- Determines that RPV pressure can be stabilized below 1052 psig using the SRVs

- Directs pressure band of 8001000 psig using SRVs

- Directs drywell pneumatics restored

Throttles open WCS*MOV110 (Cleanup Demin Bypass Valve) 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 31 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions RO (N2SOP101C)

Acknowledges direction to perform N2SOP101C actions

Performs N2SOP101C actions:

Verifies:

- All rods full in

- Reactor power lowering

- Turbine tripped/TSVs & TCVs shut

- Generator tripped and house loads transferred

- SDV V & D Valves closed

- RCS pumps downshift (tripped to off)

- RPV pressure on TBVs or SRVs FWLC controlling level > 159.3" Determines that the scram cannot be promptly reset due to RPS failure Fully inserts IRMs and SRMs Energizes 2WCSMOV107 If required, secures makeup to the cooling tower Role Play:

Shuts down HWC If directed to energize 2WCSMOV107, wait 1 minute then Performs Level control leg:

manually insert the following remote function:

CU05B, 2WCSMOV107 Appendix R Ckt Breaker, - Takes manual control of FWLC and controls RPV level in ordered band using FWS Final = Close Acknowledges pressure band of 8001000 psig Then report to the control room that 2WCSMOV107 is using SRVs energized.

Attains keys and opens SRVs Restores drywell pneumatics in accordance with N2EOPHC, attachment 7:

- At 2CEC*PNL851, places LOCA OVERRIDE VLV IAS*SOV166 to OVERRIDE

- Opens IAS*SOV166

- At 2CEC*PNL851, places LOCA OVERRIDE VLV IAS*SOV184 to OVERRIDE

- Opens IAS*SOV184

- At 2CEC*PNL601, places LOCA OVERRIDE VLV IAS*SOV164 to OVRD

- Opens IAS*SOV164

- At 2CEC*PNL601, places LOCA OVERRIDE VLV IAS*SOV165 to OVRD

- Opens IAS*SOV165 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 32 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Note: RO The following trigger logic is designed so that the first SRV

Recognizes/reports that MSS*PSV### has lost power C solenoid that is operated to control reactor pressure and has closed will lose power. Since it is not certain which SRV will be

Opens an additional SRV as necessary to control used first, it is necessary to setup a trigger logic that will reactor pressure in ordered band cause the first operated SRV to lose power and only the first SRV operated. All triggers will be listed here, but only one of them should actuate based on which C solenoid SRV is operated first. The rest of the listed triggers will not be used.

When the 'C' solenoid keylock switch for 2MSS*PSV### is taken to the open position and annunciator 601538 is not in alarm (zdads##(2) .AND. .NOT. AN_601538), the following override becomes active:

TRG926 DI####, Insert 8 SOL C Fuse, Final = Off MSS*PSV 'C' solenoid fuses blow, MSS*PSV### does not open or closes if open and both the green and red light indication is lost.

Role Play: SRO If requested to close 2RDS*V28, then wait 1 minute and

Acknowledges report that MSS*PSV###

then manually insert the following remote function:

Directs other SRVs used to maintain reactor pressure in ordered band

RD05, Accm Charging Hdr Isol V28, Final = Close

May direct RCIC high RPV water level interlock defeated per N2EOP6.20 Then report that 2RDS*V28 is closed 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 33 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Role Play: RO If directed to defeat the high RPV water level interlock,

If directed, acknowledges direction to defeat the wait 1 minute then insert the following remote: RCIC high RPV water level interlock in accordance with N2EOP6.20 TRG7 RC02A, RCIC Level 8 Trip Defeat: Withdraw

Reviews N2EOP6.20 Trip Units N693A,E, Final = Defeated

Performs N2EOP6.20, section 6.3 actions:

Using a 27379 Key (SM Key BoxHook #73),

Then report that the high RPV water level interlock has removes the tamper bar for Card File E21A Z21, been defeated. (2CEC*PNL629)

Unfastens AND withdraws approximately 1 in.,

trip unit B22 N693A, RPV HI WTR LVL 8, (Card File E21A Z21, 2CEC*PNL629)

Unfastens AND withdraws approximately 1 in.,

trip unit B22 N693E, RPV HI WTR LVL 8, (Card File E21A Z21, 2CEC*PNL629)

Notifies EOP Director AND SM that RCIC Level 8 interlocks are defeated 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 34 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions RO

May perform an emergency FWS pump restart (if feedpumps trip) when RPV level drops below level 8 in accordance with N2SOP101C Level control actions:

Determines at least 1 condensate pump is running Verifies the following:

- > 2 condensate pumps running

- > 2 booster pumps running

- 2FWRFV2s closed (FWS pump min flow valves)

- 2FWSHIC55s, 2FWSHIC1010s and 2FWS HIC1600 in manual with 0% output

- Resets Level 8 signal by depressing the Hi level trip A, B & C reset pushbuttons on panel 603 Starts the feedwater pump as follows:

Confirms suction pressure > 500 psi Verifies aux oil pump running Places FWS pump control switch to red flag When 2FWSFV2A/B/C ~ 19% open, confirms FWS pump starts Confirms flow ~ 800 gpm Injects as required with 2FWSLV55A/B or 2FWS LV10A/B/C Verifies that the aux oil pump stops

Reports to the SRO that a FWS pump has been restarted SRO

Acknowledges report that RCIC level 8 interlocks are defeated

May direct RCIC restarted and direct injection with reject to the CST for reactor pressure control

Acknowledges report that a FWS pump has been restarted (if feedpumps tripped and were ordered to be restarted) 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 35 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions RO

If required/directed, restarts RCIC using N2EOPHC, attachment 5 section 5.0

Performs N2EOPHC, Attachment 5 section 5.0 actions:

Determines that RCIC is not operating, but that the initiation white light is already in Verifies the following:

- GLAND SEAL SYSTEM AIR COMPRESSOR starts

- ICS*MOV116 opens

- Opens ICS*MOV120

- ICS*MOV126 opens

- WHEN RCIC flow >220 gpm, ICS*MOV143 closes

- WHEN RCIC discharge pressure > Reactor pressure, ICS*V156 AND ICS*V157 open

- RCIC injection to Reactor controlled at 600 gpm

- ICS*AOV109 closes

- ICS*AOV110 closes

- ICS*AOV130 closes

- ICS*AOV131 closes Controls RCIC operation as follows:

Determines that injection with reject to CST is required:

- Opens ICS*MOV124, TEST BYPASS TO CONDENSATE STORAGE TK

- Controls injection flow to the reactor by throttling ICS*FV108, TEST BYPASS TO CONDENSATE STOR TK as follows

- Opens ICS*FV108 to lower RPV injection

- Closes ICS*FV108 to raise RPV injection Maintains RPV level high in the ordered band, but below 202.3 inches to facilitate reactor scram reset to avoid bottom head cooldown

Informs SRO that RCIC is injecting tank to tank for reactor pressure control 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 36 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions SRO (N2EOPPC)

If directed, acknowledges report that RCIC is injecting tank to tank for reactor pressure control

May direct HPCS placed in standby in accordance with N2OP33 (if required)

May direct HPCS and Feedwater level 8 trips defeated per N2EOP6.20

May direct RHR 'A' placed in suppression pool cooling

May direct RHR B SWP flow and RHR system flow raised to cool the suppression pool Booth Operator: RO If requested to place SWP radiation monitor RE23A in

If directed, places RHR 'A' in suppression pool service, insert the following remotes: cooling

Recalls that RHR A is in PTL due to auto start and TRG8 RM02040, SWP23A SWP From RHR A Ht failure of the minimum flow valve to open and the Exch Rad Monit Online, Final = Online need to open 2RHS*FV38A immediately after RHR RM03040, SWP23A SWP From RHR A Ht pump start Exch Rad Monit Power, Final = On

Attains a copy of N2OP31, section F.4.0

Performs N2OP31, section F.4.0 actions:

Starts a 5th service water pump Notifies Shift Manager to declare RHS A LPCI mode inoperable Directs radiation protection department to start SWP radiation monitor SWP*RE23A Opens SWP*MOV90A Throttles open SWP*MOV33A to establish service water flow to RHR 'A' Verifies RHS*MOV24A closed Makes plant announcement for the start of RHS*P1A Starts RHS*P1A Immediately throttles open RHS*FV38A to establish 7450 gpm RHR 'A' total flow Verifies RHS*MOV4A closed Informs SRO that RHR 'A' is in suppression pool cooling 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 37 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions If directed to defeat the HPCS Level 8 interlocks by placing

If directed defeats HPCS Level 8 trips by directing a HPCS INJ VLV LEVEL 8 BYPASS TEST SWITCH in the TEST field operator to perform the actions of N2EOP6.20 position, manually insert the following remote function:

CS14, OPSCSH01 PNL625 TST.SW CSH*MOV107, Final = Test Wait 1 minute, then report that the HPCS Level 8

Acknowledges field operator report interlocks have been defeated.

Informs SRO that the HPCS Level 8 interlocks have been defeated per N2EOP6.20 If directed to defeat the Feedwater Level 8 interlocks by

If directed defeats Feedwater Level 8 trips by installing jumpers, manually insert the following remote directing a field operator to perform the actions of function: N2EOP6.20

FW11, RFP Level8 Trip Override, Final = Override Wait 1 minute, then report that the Feedwater Level 8

Acknowledges field operator report interlocks have been defeated.

Informs SRO that the HPCS Level 8 interlocks have been defeated per N2EOP6.20 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 38 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions RO

If directed/required, places HPCS in standby in accordance with N2OP33

Reviews N2OP33, section G.1.0 section 1.0

Performs N2OP33, section G.1.0 section 1.0 actions:

Momentarily depresses MANUAL INITIATION SEALIN RESET pushbutton Observes extinguished MANUAL INITIATION SEALIN RESET white light Closes CSH*MOV107, PMP 1 INJECTION VLV WHEN CSH system flow is less than 634 GPM, verifies open CSH*MOV105, MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS VLV Stops CSH*P1, HPCS PUMP 1.

Momentarily depresses HI WTR LEVEL SEALIN RESET pushbutton Observes extinguished HI WTR LEVEL SEALIN RESET white light Verifies MANUAL INITIATION pushbutton collar is in DISARM Verifies closed CSH*MOV105, MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS VLV SRO

May direct Group 5 isolations defeated per N2EOP 6.30 If directed to lift and tape leads and install jumper #9 to RO defeat the group 5 isolation interlocks, manually insert

If directed, defeats the Group 5 isolation interlocks the following malfunction: in accordance with N2EOP6.30

RH08, Group 5 Isolation Failure (RHS*MOV122/113), Final = True Wait 1 minute, then report that the lead has been lifted and taped and jumper #9 has been Installed.

2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 39 of 44

NOTES Event Termination

Reactor level being controlled in assigned band lowering Criteria 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 40 of 44

NOTES Event #9 - RHS 'B' Service Water Piping Rupture Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions RHS 'B' is in Suppression Pool Cooling

Critical activities or tasks Close 2SWP*MOV90B

Final (expected) operating result Service Water to RHS 'B' is isolated

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

DMSSC2 Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. Given an isolable service water leak in the RHR B Pump room that threatens ECCS "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is capacity, the crew will isolate the leak within 15 minutes of the indications of the performed) pipe break in accordance with N2EOPSC.

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions 10 minutes after event 7 & 8 are initiated, the following malfunction becomes apparent:

CW08, Isolable SW Break Loop B In RHR Hx Room, Final = 100 An isolable service water line break occurs downstream of SWP*MOV90B in the RHR 'B' Heat exchanger room Service water flow to RHR B Heat exchanger Flow rises to approximately 9,100 gpm as indicated on E12-R602B on panel 601 The following annunciators alarm:

601641, RHR Pump Room B Flooding 851425, RHR Ht Exch A/B Cubicle Flooded 851453, Reactor Bldg Floor Drain System Trouble Note: RO 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 41 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Crew may decide to attempt to isolate the leak by closing

Silences, acknowledges and reports annunciators 2SWP*MOV90B. 601641, 851425 and 851453

Provides crew update of flooding alarm in the RHR Note: 'B' pump room Use one of the role plays below to report field indications

Performs ARP601641 actions:

of the leak. Use role play #1 if the leak has not yet been Dispatches an operator to investigate the isolated. Use role play #2 if the leak has been isolated by flooding locally the time you are dispatched to investigate local Evaluates suppression pool water level and indications. determines that it is stable and not lowering Calls rad waste operator to verify status of area Role Play: sump pumps

1. If dispatched locally as Equipment Operator to Acknowledges field report of sump pump status investigate the flooding before it is isolated, wait Directs the SRO to refer to EOPs 3 minutes then the report the following:

Performs ARP851425 actions:

a. As you approached the 'B' RHR heat Determines which cubicle is flooded exchanger room, there is a sound of Determines that both DFRP2Q and P2R are rushing water and you could see a running couple of inches of water on the floor Informs the SRO to refer to N2EOPSC

(~3 inches) in the room.

b. Tell the Control room that you don't feel it is safe to get any closer to determine the actual source of the rupture and you cant tell if it service water or RHR water.

Role Play:

2. If dispatched locally as Equipment Operator to investigate the flooding after it is isolated, wait 3 minutes then the report the following:

a. You don't hear the sound of rushing water, but there still appears to be water on the floor of the RHR 'B' heat exchanger room.

b. Doesnt appear to be water leaking anymore. Looks like about an inch or two of water on the floor.

Role Play:

2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 42 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions If contacted, as rad waste operator for status of RHR 'B' area sump pumps, report the following:

Both DFRP2Q and P2R are running SRO

Acknowledges report of annunciators 601641, 851425 and 851453 in alarm

Provides crew update for entry into N2EOPSC

Enters N2EOPSC on Area water level above 0 inches and floor drain sump water level high

Performs N2EOPSC actions:

Determines HVR exhaust radiation has not exceeded an isolation setpoint Determines that HVR should not and did not isolate Determines that the problem is not temperature or radiation related Determines that cannot restore and maintain a floor drain sump level below its highhigh setpoint Determines the need to isolate all discharges into affected areas except systems needed for damage control and other EOP actions Determines that since the RHR 'B' break is causing a deterioration of the SWP system that the leak need be isolated to preserve suppression pool cooling on at least one loop of RHR Evaluates Wait block (step SC6)

Determines one area is above maximum safe values References OPNM1011111001, Attachment 2 section 6.4, for determining secondary containment water level areas RO 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 43 of 44

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

Recognizes/reports that RHR B Heat exchanger Flow is reading approximately 9,100 gpm as indicated on E12R602B on panel 601 or determines from field operator report that SWP is the source of the leak.

SRO

Acknowledges report that RHR B Heat exchanger Flow is reading approximately 9,100 gpm as indicated on E12R602B on panel 601 or report from field operator that SWP is the source of the leak.

Directs RO to attempt to isolate the leak by closing 2SWP*MOV90B.

RO

Acknowledges direction to attempt to isolate the leak by closing 2SWP*MOV90B.

Closes 2SWP*MOV90B

Recognizes/reports that RHR B Heat exchanger Flow is reading approximately 0 gpm as indicated on E12 R602B on panel 601 and that it appears that the leak has been isolated SRO

Acknowledges RO report that 2SWP*MOV90B has been closed and that RHR B Heat exchanger Flow is reading approximately 0 gpm as indicated on E12 R602B on panel 601 and that it appears that the leak has been isolated.

Event

Reactor level being controlled in assigned band.

Termination * 'B' RHS Service Water supply (2SWP*MOV90B) is closed.

Criteria 2021 NRC Scenario 1 Page 44 of 44

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Op-Test No.: LC2 20-1 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: The scenario begins at 85% reactor power in preparation to raise load line. Reactor power has been adjusted to complete ReMA step 1. Load Line Adjustment is on hold until further direction from Reactor Engineering.

Turnover: 1. The BOP operator to swap Reactor Recirculation Pump HPU A subloops to 1 in lead and 2 in standby in accordance with N2-OP-29.

2. The ATC operator will recommence the load line adjustment by raising power using control rods per the approved ReMA.

Critical Tasks: See page 2 Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description N/A N-BOP, Swap Recirc Pump HPU subloops.

1 SRO N2-OP-29 RD07 R-ATC Stuck Control Rod.

2 (ILT 16-1 Scenario #1 SRO Event 2) N2-OP-30 RR08B I-ATC, Loss of recirculation flow input to APRM #2.

3 (ILT 16-1 SRO Scenario #3 Event 3) ARP's, N2-OP-92 RC14 C-BOP, ICS*P2 Trip w/ Indications Discharge Piping Not Full.

4 SRO TS-SRO ARP's, N2-OP-35, T.S. 3.5.3 RR15A, C-All Failure of 2RCS*P1A Inner and Outer Seal.

5 RH16A TS-SRO N2-SOP-29.1, T.S. 3.4.1 RR20 M-All LOCA with one pair of Drywell to Suppression Chamber vacuum breakers failing open. Inability to stay below PSP RPV Blowdown.

6 N2-EOP-RPV, N2-EOP-PC, N2-EOP-C2 Remote C-All RHS*MOV15A 600V Bkr Trips and RHS*MOV25B Jammed.

RH27 7 Malfunction RH10B N2-EOP-PC RH22B C-All RHS*MOV4B Fails to Auto-Close.

8 N2-EOP-PC

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Op-Test No.: LC2 20-1

1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 Event 7, 8

2. Abnormal events (2-4) 4 Events 2, 3, 4, 5

3. Major transients (1-2) 1 Event 6

4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2 N2-EOP-RPV, N2-EOP-PC

5. Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions (>1 per scenario set) 1 N2-EOP-C2

6. Pre-identified Critical Tasks (> 2) 2 CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS: CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:

CT-1.0, Given the plant with an isolable primary system leak into the drywell, Critical Task 1.0 is identified as critical the crew will manually isolate the A recirculation loop within 30 minutes of because without operator action to trip the indications of rising drywell pressure in accordance with N2-SOP-29.1. and isolate the Recirc pump, Drywell pressure would continue to rise until the reactor automatically scrams. This also represents a degradation of a fission product barrier.

CT-2.0, Given the plant with rising primary containment pressure due to a Critical Task 2.0 is identified as critical LOCA, the crew will perform a RPV blowdown within 15 minutes of because without operator action there determining that PSP is exceeded with both drywell spray flow paths would be a continued release of energy unavailable from the control room in accordance with N2-EOP-C2. from the RPV into the containment. The action serves to terminate, or reduce as much as possible, any continued primary containment pressure increase. The decision to perform a RPV blowdown will be made based on an evaluation of available containment spray systems and may be made prior to exceeding PSP if it is determined that the given rate of change of suppression chamber pressure will cause PSP to be exceeded before additional (outside control room) spray systems can be lined up.

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The scenario begins at 85% reactor power with 2RDS-P1B out of service in preparation to raise load line. Reactor power has been adjusted to complete ReMA step 1. Load Line Adjustment is on hold until further direction from Reactor Engineering.

Event 1 is the normal evolution performed by the BOP operator to swap Reactor Recirculation Pump HPU A subloops to 1 in lead and 2 in standby in accordance with N2-OP-29.

Event 2 is a reactivity evolution. The ATC operator will recommence the load line adjustment by raising power using control rods per the approved ReMA. While the RO is raising power using rods a control rod will stick. The crew will take action to raise drive water pressure per N2-OP-

30. Raising drive water pressure will free the stuck rod and allow the load line adjustment to continue.

Event 3 occurs when the recirculation flow input to APRM #2 fails downscale. The crew will verify all other APRMs are reading normal and determine that a scram should not have occurred. The crew will follow up with ARP actions and local panel indications and determine that APRM #2 is required to be bypassed per N2-OP-92. The crew will also evaluate T.S.

3.3.1.1.

Event 4 occurs when RCIC keepfill pump 2ICS*P2 trips on motor overload. The crew will also receive annunciator alarms for 2ICS*P2 low discharge pressure and RCIC discharge piping not full. The crew is expected to carry out the ARP actions, close 2ICS*MOV150, and declare RCIC inoperable. The crew will be required to evaluated T.S. 3.5.3.

Event 5 occurs after 2ICS*MOV150 has been closed, when the inner and outer seals on 2RCS*P1A slowly degrade. The crew will enter N2-SOP-29.1. RCS seal pressure will exceed the danger limit established in N2-SOP-29.1 and Drywell pressure will begin to rise. The crew will then trip 2RCS*P1A and close 2RCS*P1A suction and discharge isolation valves (Critical Task 1.0) and enter N2-SOP-29. N2-SOP-29 will require the first four cram rods inserted.

Additionally, N2-SOP-29.1 will require WCS flow lowered to <450 gpm and the cleanup suction valve from recirc. 'A' closed.

Event 6, 7 & 8 start when a small LOCA causes primary containment parameters to degrade.

The LOCA will cause drywell pressure to rise relatively rapidly, forcing the crew to determine whether or not an emergency power reduction can be performed before the scram occurs. The crew should verify the validity of the event, using redundant diverse indications. Following the scram the crew will maintain reactor water level with condensate and feedwater. The drywell pressure rise will require entry into N2-EOP-PC. One pair of Drywell to Suppression Chamber Vacuum breakers will fail open causing drywell and suppression chamber pressure to rise at nearly the same rate and be at approximately the same pressure. The crew will then evaluate that RHR A, 'B' and service water spray through RHR'B' are available for containment spray systems. When containment spray is attempted with RHR 'B', the containment spray valve (RHS*MOV25B) will stick shut and will not be able to be opened. This failure of the RHR 'B' containment spray valve will render the RHR B drywell spray system unavailable. When containment spray is attempted with RHR 'A', the containment spray valve (RHS*MOV15A) power supply breaker will trip open and will not be able to be opened from the control room.

Pressure Suppression Pressure will be exceeded and an RPV blowdown is required (Critical Task 2.0). After the blowdown the crew will be notified that RHS*MOV25B can be opened in the field and Drywell sprays will be available. When RHS*MOV25B has been opened in the field and drywell spray follow is established, RHS*MOV4B will fail to auto close requiring the crew to

manually close RHS*MOV4B in order to get full drywell spray flow. The crew will continue with containment spray to reduce containment pressure.

Copy of Training Id: NMP2 NRC 2021 Scenario 2 Revision: 0.0

Title:

RL5, Steam leak in containment with inability to maintain in safe region of PSP, RPV Blowdown.

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed By Signature on File / Mike Alexander 3/24/21 Validated By Landon Swenson 12/29/20 Don Carr 12/29/20 Ben Berner 12/29/20 Facility Reviewer Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 3/26/21

NOTES References

1. N2OP29, Reactor Recirculation System

2. N2OP30, Control Rod Drive

3. N2ARP603200, 2CEC*PNL603 Series 200 Alarm Response Procedures

4. N2OP92, Neutron Monitoring

5. N2ARP601300, 2CEC*PNL601 Series 300 Alarm Response Procedures

6. N2OSPICSM001, RCIC Gas Accumulation Monitoring and Valve Lineup Verification

7. N2ARP602100, 2CEC*PNL602 Series 100 Alarm Response Procedures

8. N2SOP29.1, Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Failure

9. N2SOP29, Sudden Reduction in Core Flow

10. N2ARP851200, 2CEC*PNL851 Series 200 Alarm Response Procedures

11. N2ARP603100, 2CEC*PNL603 Series 100 Alarm Response Procedures

12. N2SOP101D, Rapid Power Reduction

13. N2SOP101C, Reactor Scram

14. N2EOPRPV, RPV Control Flowchart

15. N2EOPPC, Primary Containment Control Flowchart

16. N2EOP6.1, Low RPV Water Level/High Drywell Pressure Actuations

17. N2EOP6.22, Containment Sprays

18. N2OP79, Radiation Monitoring

19. N2EOPHC, NMP2 EOP Hard Cards Procedure

20. N2EOPC2, RPV Blowdown Flowchart

21. EPAA113, Personnel Protective Actions

22. EPAA114, Notifications

23. NMP Unit 2 EAL Wallboard EPAA1013 Addendum 4 Appendix 1 Revision 01

24. N2TSPEC, NMPNS Unit 2 Improved Technical Specifications (Volume 1, 2, 3)

25. OPAA112101, Shift Turnover and Relief 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 2 of 42

NOTES Instructor Information A. Scenario Description

1. Sequence of Events / Expected Crew Response

a. The scenario begins at 85% reactor power with 2RDSP1B out of service in preparation to raise load line. Reactor power has been adjusted to complete ReMA step 1. Load Line Adjustment is on hold until further direction from Reactor Engineering.

b. Event 1 is the normal evolution performed by the BOP operator to swap Reactor Recirculation Pump HPU A subloops to 1 in lead and 2 in standby in accordance with N2OP29.

c. Event 2 is a reactivity evolution. The ATC operator will recommence the load line adjustment by raising power using control rods per the approved ReMA. While the RO is raising power using rods a control rod will stick. The crew will take action to raise drive water pressure per N2 OP30. Raising drive water pressure will free the stuck rod and allow the load line adjustment to continue.

d. Event 3 occurs when the recirculation flow input to APRM

2 fails downscale. The crew will verify all other APRMs are reading normal and determine that a scram should not have occurred. The crew will follow up with ARP actions and local panel indications and determine that APRM #2 is required to be bypassed per N2OP92. The crew will also evaluate T.S. 3.3.1.1.

e. Event 4 occurs when RCIC keepfill pump 2ICS*P2 trips on motor overload. The crew will also receive annunciator alarms for 2ICS*P2 low discharge pressure and RCIC discharge piping not full. The crew is expected to carry out the ARP actions, close 2ICS*MOV150, and declare RCIC inoperable. The crew will be required to evaluated T.S.

3.5.3.

f. Event 5 occurs after 2ICS*MOV150 has been closed, when the inner and outer seals on 2RCS*P1A slowly degrade.

The crew will enter N2SOP29.1. RCS seal pressure will 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 3 of 42

NOTES exceed the danger limit established in N2SOP29.1 and Drywell pressure will begin to rise. The crew will then trip 2RCS*P1A and close 2RCS*P1A suction and discharge isolation valves (Critical Task 1.0) and enter N2SOP29.

N2SOP29 will require the first four cram rods inserted.

Additionally, N2SOP29.1 will require WCS flow lowered to <450 gpm and the cleanup suction valve from recirc. 'A' closed.

g. Event 6, 7 & 8 start when a small LOCA causes primary containment parameters to degrade. The LOCA will cause drywell pressure to rise relatively rapidly, forcing the crew to determine whether or not an emergency power reduction can be performed before the scram occurs. The crew should verify the validity of the event, using redundant diverse indications. Following the scram the crew will maintain reactor water level with condensate and feedwater. The drywell pressure rise will require entry into N2EOPPC. One pair of Drywell to Suppression Chamber Vacuum breakers will fail open causing drywell and suppression chamber pressure to rise at nearly the same rate and be at approximately the same pressure.

The crew will then evaluate that RHR A, 'B' and service water spray through RHR'B' are available for containment spray systems. When containment spray is attempted with RHR 'B', the containment spray valve (RHS*MOV25B) will stick shut and will not be able to be opened. This failure of the RHR 'B' containment spray valve will render the RHR B drywell spray system unavailable. When containment spray is attempted with RHR 'A', the containment spray valve (RHS*MOV15A) power supply breaker will trip open and will not be able to be opened from the control room. Pressure Suppression Pressure will be exceeded and an RPV blowdown is required (Critical Task 2.0). After the blowdown the crew will be notified that RHS*MOV25B can be opened in the field and Drywell sprays will be available. When RHS*MOV25B has been opened in the field and drywell spray follow is established, RHS*MOV4B will fail to auto close requiring the crew to manually close RHS*MOV4B in order to get full drywell 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 4 of 42

NOTES spray flow. The crew will continue with containment spray to reduce containment pressure.

2. Termination Criteria

a. RPV has been blown down.

b. Reactor level being controlled in assigned band.

3. Critical Tasks CT1.0 Justification:

Safety Significance: Critical Task 1.0 is identified as critical because without operator action to trip and isolate the Recirc pump, Drywell pressure would continue to rise until the reactor automatically scrams. This also represents a degradation of a fission product barrier.

Cueing: Multiple annunciators will provide indications that the RCS seal is degraded with rising drywell pressure. Annunciator 602115, RECIRC PMP 1A SEAL STAGING FLOW HIGH / LOW and 602109, RECIRC PUMP 1A OUTER SL LEAK HIGH. N2SOP 29.1 provides direction on how perform the actions to trip and isolate 2RCS*P1A.

Measurable Performance Indicators: Tripping RCS*P1A and closing RCS*MOV10A and 18A will provide observable actions for the evaluation team.

Performance Feedback: Drywell pressure and RCS*P1A suction and discharge MOV valve position indications will provide performance feedback regarding the success of the isolation.

Bounding Criteria: Time limit based on Operations representative recommendation.

a. CT1.0, Given the plant with an isolable primary system leak into the drywell, the crew will manually isolate the A recirculation loop within 30 minutes of the indications of rising drywell pressure in accordance with N2SOP29.1.

CT2.0 Justification:

Safety Significance: Critical Task 2.0 is identified as critical because without operator action there would be a continued release of energy from the RPV into the containment. The action serves to terminate, or reduce as much as possible, any continued primary containment pressure increase. The decision to perform a RPV blowdown will be made based on an evaluation of available containment spray systems and may be made prior to exceeding PSP if it is determined that the given rate of change of suppression chamber pressure will cause PSP to be exceeded before additional (outside control room) spray systems can be lined up.

Cueing: Multiple annunciators will provide indications of the primary containment leak such as 603140, Drywell Pressure High/Low.

Additionally, R*Time and Reg Guide 1.97 instruments for drywell and suppression chamber pressure will provide cuing to the applicants. N2EOPPC and N2EOPC2 provide direction to conduct an RPV blowdown.

Measurable Performance Indicators: Arming and depressing the ADS logic initiation pushbuttons will provide observable actions for the evaluation team.

Performance Feedback: Drywell pressure indications lowering will provide performance feedback regarding the success of the RPV blowdown.

Bounding Criteria: Time limit based on Operations representative recommendation.

b. CT2.0, Given the plant with rising primary containment pressure due to a LOCA, the crew will perform a RPV 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 5 of 42

NOTES blowdown within 15 minutes of determining that PSP is exceeded with both drywell spray flow paths unavailable from the control room in accordance with N2EOPC2.

4. Length

a. 60 minutes

5. Mitigation Strategy Code

a. RL5, Steam leak in containment with inability to maintain in safe region of PSP, RPV Blowdown.

6. Technical Specifications (Applicable actions for initial conditions only)

a. None

7. EAL Classification

a. Alert, EAL FA1:

1)

2) RC3.1 OR RC4.2 B. Initial Conditions

1. IC Number

a. IC021 or equivalent (IC177 for ILT 201)

2. Presets / With Triggers

a. Malfunctions

1) RH10B, RHS*MOV25B Jammed, Final = True Inserted

2) RH22B, RHS*MOV4B Fails to AutoClose, Final = True Inserted

3) RD073435, Control Rod Failure Stuck, Final = True TRG1

4) RR08B, RR Flow Unit Failure Downscale (B), Final = TRG2 True

5) RC14, ICS*P2 Trip, Final = True TRG3 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 6 of 42

NOTES

6) RR15A, Failure of RR Pump Inner Seal (P1A), Ramp = TRG4 5:00, Final = 4

7) RR16A, RR Pump Upper Seal (P1A), Delay = 5:00, TRG4 Final = 1

8) RR20, RR loop RuptureDBA LOCA, Ramp = 15:00, TRG6 Final = 2.5

9) PC10A, Drywell/Wetwell Vacuum Breaker Pair Failed TRG6 Open 2ISC*RV33AB, Delay = 1:00, Final = True

10) TC:PA:MT:I, Turbine EHC Pump A Motor Failure, TRG6 Final = Seize

11) TC:PB:MT:I, Turbine EHC Pump B Motor Failure, Final TRG6

= Seize

b. Remotes

1) RR03, V57A (CRDH Line) Recirc Pump Seal Supply, TRG5 Final = Close

2) RM02040, SWP23A SWP From RHR 'A' Ht Exch Rad TRG7 Monit Online, Final = Online

3) RM03040, SWP23A SWP From RHR 'A' Ht Exch Rad TRG7 Monit Power, Final = On

4) RM02041, SWP23B Current Radiation Level Online, TRG8 Final = Online

5) RM03041, SWP23B Current Radiation Level Power, TRG8 Final = On

6) RH27, RHS*MOV15A 600 V Bkr Status, Final = Open TRG9

7) RH30, RHS*MOV25B 600 V BKR STATUS, Final = TRG10 Open

8) RH19, Manual Handwhl Ops RHS*MOV25B, Final = TRG11 Open

c. Overrides

1) None 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 7 of 42

NOTES

d. Annunciators

1) AN601325, AN601325 RCIC Wtr Leg Pmp 2 Dis Pres TRG3 Low, Delay = 10, Final = Crywolf

2) AN601348, AN601348 RCIC High Pt Vent Level Low, TRG3 Delay = 30, Final = Crywolf

e. Event Triggers Event # Event Action Command 1 rdvposb(109)==128 Left Blank 9 zdrhs05a(2)==1 Left Blank 15 hzardr602>0.827 dmf RD073435 (Drive Water DP greater than 290 psid)

f. Equipment Out of Service

1) 2RDSP1B is out of service due to high pump vibrations.

g. Support Documentation

1) Provide N2OP29, section F.2.0 with step F.2.5 marked as N/A.

2) Provide Load Line adjustment ReMA.

h. Miscellaneous

1) Place CRD Pump 1B control switch in PTL with clearance reference tag applied.

2) Clear 2/4 Voter Module trip memory

3) Verify the following SREI07 pages, which apply to IC021, are displayed:

a) Unit #2 CRAM Rod Listing (SREI07 page 16 of

29) in both the CRC book and at panel 602 (attached to N2SOP101D).

b) Rapid Power Reduction Instructions (SREI07 page 15 of 29) in the CRC book only.

2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 8 of 42

NOTES c) Current Control Rod Positions & Face Adjacent Rods (SREI07 page 17 of 29) in the CRC book only.

C. Shift Turnover Information

1. Reactor Power: 85%

2. Rodline: Below 100%

3. Technical Specification LCOs in effect:

a. None

4. Significant Problems / Abnormalities / Equipment Out of Service:

a. 2RDSP1B is out of service due to high pump vibrations.

5. Evolutions / Maintenance Scheduled for this Shift:

a. Swap Reactor Recirculation Pump HPU A subloops to 1 in lead and 2 in standby in accordance with N2OP29

b. Following the recirc HPU subloop swap, continue with load line adjustment to raise load line in accordance with approved ReMA.

2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 9 of 42

NOTES SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION ON COMING SHIFT: N D DATE: Today PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SRO, ROs)

PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

LCO Status (SRO)

Shift Turnover Information Sheet Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:

Reactor power is at 85% with a load line adjustment in progress. Load line adjustment ReMA is on hold until reactor recirculation HPU subloop swap has been completed.

2RDS-P1B is out of service due to high pump vibrations PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions:

Swap Reactor Recirculation Pump HPU A subloops to 1 in lead and 2 in standby in accordance with N2-OP-29.

Once the Reactor Recirculation Pump HPUs have been swapped, continue with load line adjustment ReMA.

2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 10 of 42

NOTES Event #1 - Swap Recirc Pump HPU A subloops to 1 in lead and 2 in standby Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions Reactor at power

Critical activities or tasks Place HPU A subloop 1 in lead and 2 in standby

Final (expected) operating result HPU A subloop 1 in lead and 2 in standby

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

N/A Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. None "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is performed)

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions SRO

Directs BOP to place HPU A subloop 1 in lead and 2 in standby IAW N2OP29, Sect. F.2.0 BOP

Acknowledges direction to place HPU A subloop 1 in lead and 2 in standby

Verifies SUB LOOP 2 HPU in lead AND controlling Flow Control Valve

May momentarily depress SUB LOOP 1 READY pushbutton to obtain:

SUB LOOP 1 READY light illuminated SUB LOOP 1 MAINTENANCE light extinguished

Momentarily depresses SUB LOOP 1, PUMP/FAN MTR RUN pushbutton

Verifies the following SUB LOOP 1 indications are Role Play: illuminated:

As field operator, directed to locally determine pressure SUB LOOP 1, PUMP/FAN MTR RUN light report that local pressure gauge indicates 1900 psi and SUB LOOP 1, PRESSURIZED light that adjustment is NOT required.

2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 11 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

Contacts field operator and determines local pressure gauge is reading between 1850 and 1950 psi

Determines 2RCSRV47A adjustment is NOT required Role Play: BOP (cont.)

As field operator, acknowledge direction to monitor decay

Performs the following for subloop 2:

pressure. When asked, state that pressure decay check Directs field operator to use 2RCSPI1001B2, was satisfactory. and monitor accumulator pressure decay

Depresses SUB LOOP 1, LEAD pushbutton

Verifies the following indications illuminated SUB LOOP 1, LEAD light SUB LOOP 1, OPERATIONAL light SUB LOOP 1, PRESSURIZED light OR local pressure gauge indicates 18501950 psi.

SUB LOOP 2, PUMP/FAN MTR STOP light SUB LOOP 2, READY light

Determines, 602105 RECIRC FCV A(B) MOTION INHIBIT, alarms AND immediately clears

Reports that HPU A subloop 1 is in lead and 2 is in standby SRO

Acknowledges RO report that HPU A subloop 1 is in lead and 2 is in standby Event

HPU A subloop 1 is in lead and 2 is in standby Termination Criteria 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 12 of 42

NOTES Event #2 Withdraw control rods to raise load line with one control rod stuck Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions Reactor at ~85% power

Critical activities or tasks Withdraw control rods to raise load line Raise drive water pressure to free the stuck control rod

Final (expected) operating result Reactor power at 85% with control rod freed

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

N/A Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. None "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is performed)

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions SRO

Directs RO to raise reactor load line using the provided ReMA ATC

Acknowledges direction to raise load line using control rods

Reviews N2OP96 actions for first time rod selection and withdrawal actions:

SELECTS the rod to be moved by momentarily depressing the pushbutton for that rod on the Rod Select Module at 2CEC*PNL603Monitors RPV, CRD and Nuclear Instruments OBSERVES the following:

- The pushbutton for selected rod is lit

- The white select light on full core display is lit for control rod 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 13 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

- The rod's position is indicated AND in correct location on 4Rod Display

- IF available, THEN Rod Worth Minimizer indicates correct rod AND rod position OTHERWISE MARK this step N/A Notch Withdrawal is performed as follows:

- VERIFIES Reactor mode switch is not in SHUTDOWN AND there are no rod withdrawal blocks.

- VERIFIES correct rod has been selected per sequence being used

- WITHDRAWS selected control rod as follows:

o DEPRESSES WITHDRAW push button.

o CONFIRMS Rod motion as indicated by:

Rod position indication on 4 Rod Display Withdraw light is illuminated o RELEASES WITHDRAW pushbutton o OBSERVES SETTLE light illuminated

Withdraws control rods IAW rod sequence using single notch withdrawal.

Note:

Determines and reports rod 3435 is stuck at When rod 3435 is moved from position 6 to position 8 position 8 (rdvposb(109)==128), verify the following malfunction is inserted:

TRG1 RD073435, Control Rod Failure Stuck, Final = True Note:

The crew may free the stuck rod using the guidance in N2 OP30 or N2OP96. Either procedure is acceptable. Both sets of procedural actions are included in this guide for reference by the evaluation team.

Role Play:

Acknowledges direction to respond to the stuck As field operator report: control rod per N2OP30 or N2OP96 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 14 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

The HCU valve lineup looks good and the HCU

N2OP30 Actions:

sounds normal References section H.1.2, Failure to Withdraw

SOV120 or SOV122 Directional Control Valves are Using Single Notch Withdrawal.

functioning correctly Attempts to withdraw rod 3435 again while

134 or 136 HCU manifold filters are not plugged monitoring drive water flow

Stabilization valves appear to be functioning correctly There appears to be no problems at the HCU for control rod 3435.

Note: Determines one of the following:

Do to variations in drive water flow indications, the crew - Drive water flow was not approximately 4 may determine that the insert portion of the DCV GPM during the insert portion of the rod sequence is operating correctly and continue on H.1.2. If withdrawal.

the crew determines the insert portion of the DCV OR sequence is operating correctly, then they will refer to - Drive water flow was approximately 4 GPM section H.1.1 to continue trying to free the stuck rod. The during the insert portion of the rod actions are relatively the same, so either action is withdrawal.

acceptable. May refer to section H.1.1, Failure to Insert Note: Raises drive water pressure 50 psid by throttling When drive water pressure is raised above 300 psid, shut on 2RDSPV101 verify TRG 15 inserts to automatically delete the following Attempts to WITHDRAW rod 3435 one notch malfunction: Determines rod 3435 inserted/withdrew one notch to position 10

RD073435, Control Rod Failure Stuck, Final = True Lowers drive water pressure back to 260 psid Note:

N2OP96 Actions:

Once rod 3435 has been withdrawn to position 10, the IF control rod failed to withdraw, THEN RAISES Lead Evaluator may choose to either continue the load drive water pressure in less than 50 psid line adjustment or may move on to the next event increments, up to approximately 350 psid by (recommended). throttling closed 2RDSPV101, DRIVE WTR PRESS CONTROL MOV AND return to Step F.2.1.4 to perform single Notch Withdrawal of the stuck control rod, OTHERWISE MARK this step N/A WHEN control rod motion is achieved OR it is determined motion will not be achieved with 350 psid Drive Water pressure, THEN RESTORES Drive 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 15 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Water pressure to normal band (approximately 260 psid) by throttling open 2RDSPV101, DRIVE WTR PRESS CONTROL MOV, OTHERWISE MARK this step N/A.

IF control rod fails to withdraw at elevated drive pressure, THEN GO to N2OP30 H.1.0, Failure to Insert/Withdraw Control Rod, OTHERWISE MARK this step N/A OBSERVES selected rod moves continuously outward on 4Rod Display.

MONITORS appropriate nuclear instruments closely for proper response RELEASES BOTH push buttons AND ALLOW rod to settle into desired notch AND OBSERVE proper cycling of INSERT, WITHDRAW, AND SETTLE lights.

SRO Role Play:

Acknowledges report that rod 3435 is stuck at If contacted as the SM/RE for direction, inform them to position 8 follow the appropriate procedures for a rod which fails to

May contact SM/RE for direction withdraw.

Directs RO to respond to the stuck rod per N2OP30 or N2OP96 Event

Control Rod 3435 has been freed Termination

Reactor power has been raised sufficiently as determined by the Lead Evaluator Criteria

Or as determined by the lead evaluator/instructor 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 16 of 42

NOTES Event #3 - Loss of recirculation flow input to APRM #2 Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions Reactor Power at rated with no APRM's bypassed

Critical activities or tasks Bypass APRM #2

Final (expected) operating result Operating at rated power with APRM #2 bypassed

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

N/A Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. None "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is performed)

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions When directed by the lead evaluator, insert the following malfunction:

TRG2 RR08B, RR Flow Unit Failure Downscale (B),

Final = True Recirc. flow input to APRM #2 occurs The following annunciators alarm: ATC 603202, "APRM Trip System Upscale / Inoperable"

Silences, acknowledges and reports annunciator 603208, "APRM Trip System Upscale" 603202, 603208, 603212 & 603217 603217, "Flow Reference Off Normal"

Provides crew update for APRM #2 upscale trip 603218, "OPRM Trip Enabled" 603442, "Control Rod Out Block" 603212, "OPRM ALARM" The following computer points are generated:

NMPUC08, "APRM 2 STP UPSC Trip (Tripped)"

Reviews ARP 603202, 603208, 603212 & 603217:

2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 17 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions APRM/RBM/OPRM/Flow B alarm status lights on panel Determines by Red UPSC / INOP light on panel 603 indicate "UPSC Tr or Inop" and 'UPSC Alarm" for 603 that APRM #2 has alarmed APRM 2 Determines that a scram did not occur Checks all other APRM channels to verify a scram should not have occurred Validates that an instrument malfunction was the cause Determines that a scram should not have occurred Determines that a power reduction is not required Inform Shift Manager to review technical specifications The following are the APRM chassis indications on panel Checks APRM 2 panel 608 indications 608:

Flow bar graph indicates 0%

STP bar graph alarm triangle indicates ~52%

STP bar graph Trip double triangle indicates ~60%

Trip status screen shows STP Upscale trip, STP Upscale alarm and OPRM trip enabled 2/4 voter modules all indicate High/Inop Trip and memory red lights for APRM #2 Role Play:

If requested to provide all other 2/4 voter module indications, report that all 2/4 voter modules show High/Inop Trip and memory red lights for APRM #2 only.

Role Play:

If requested, report that all other APRM's are reading within 2% of each other as indicated at Panel 608.

Discusses with SRO that ARP 603202, 603208 &

603217 require APRM#2 bypassed and seeks concurrence

Acknowledges direction from SRO to bypass APRM

2

Continues with ARP 603202, 603208 & 603217 actions:

Determines that APRM #2 should be bypassed per N2OP92 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 18 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Performs N2OP92,section H.2.0 actions to bypass APRM #2

- Verifes NO other APRM in bypass

- Determines that an APRM is to be bypassed, and performs a Channel Check (APRMs within 2%) to verify NO other APRM is INOPERABLE The following annunciators clear when APRM 2 is for the division being bypassed bypassed: - Places the APRM BYPASS joystick to the 603202, "APRM Trip System Upscale / Inoperable" bypass position for APRM #2 603208, "APRM Trip System Upscale" - Verifies the following:

603217, "Flow Reference Off Normal" o APRM 2 BYPASS light is lit on 603218, "OPRM Trip Enabled" 2CEC*PNL603 603442, "Control Rod Out Block" o BYP is displayed in inverse video in the 603212, "OPRM ALARM" header for APRM 2 Chassis at H13P608 o The blue BYPASSED LED is lit for APRM 2 Role Play:

on each 2/4 MDL at H13P608 If requested to provide all other 2/4 voter module indications when APRM 2 is bypassed, report that all 2/4 voter modules show a blue bypassed light for APRM #2 Role Play:

May reset the memory on all 2/4 voter modules If requested to provide all other 2/4 voter module per N2OP92 section F.4.0:

indications when 2/4 voter module memories are reset,

- On 2/4 MDL 1 (24) depresses the TRIP report that all trip and memory red lights are clear MEMORY RESET pushbutton

- On 2/4 MDL 1 (24) verifies all red and yellow LEDs are extinguished SRO

Oversees crew actions.

Provides direction/concurrence to bypass APRM 2

Provides crew transient brief / reverse brief

Maintains crew oversight and looks ahead for potential issues/thresholds.

Evaluates PRA (CDF & LERF)

Evaluates risk

Maintains crew oversight and provides coaching when necessary.

Evaluates risk 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 19 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

Reviews:

Tech. Spec. 3.3.1.1 and determines that no action is required since 3 out of 4 APRMs are still operable TRM 3.3.2 Table T3.3.21 still met Note:

Contacts Work Week Manager for investigation /

Shift Manager shall provide crew oversight and not make support. (When time permits) notification phone calls until plant conditions are stable.

Contacts Plant Management. (When time permits)

Event

APRM #2 has been bypassed Termination Criteria 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 20 of 42

NOTES Event #4 2ICS*P2 Trip w/ Indications Discharge Piping Not Full Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions Plant at power with RCIC operable and available

Critical activities or tasks Close 2ICS*MOV150

Final (expected) operating result RCIC out of service and inoperable with 2ICS*MOV150 closed

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

N/A Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. None "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is performed)

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Booth Operator When directed by the lead evaluator, insert the following malfunctions:

TRG3 RC14, ICS*P2 Trip, Final =True AN601325, AN601325 RCIC Wtr Leg Pmp 2 Dis Pres Low, Delay = 10, Final = Crywolf AN601348, AN601348 RCIC High Pt Vent Level Low, Delay = 30, Final = Crywolf The following plant response occurs after event initiation: BOP 2ICS*P2 trips

Recognizes / reports the following annunciators in 2ICS*P1 discharge pressure lowers alarm 601314, 601325, 601348 The following annunciator alarms after event initiation: 2ICS*P2 tripped 601314, RCIC WTR LEG PMP 2 MOTOR 2ICS*P1 discharge pressure lowered OVERLOAD 601325, RCIC WTR LEG PMP 2 DISCH PRESS LOW (10 seconds) 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 21 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions 601348, RCIC HIGH PT VENT LEVEL LOW (30 seconds)

The following computer points are generated after event initiation:

ICSTC18, RCIC WTR LEG PMP 2 MOTOR OVERLOAD Role Play: BOP (ARP 601314, 601325, 601348)

As Equipment Operator dispatched to 2ICS*P2 breaker,

Dispatches Equipment Operator(s) to 2ICS*P2 and wait 1 minute and report the breaker 2EHS*MCC102 associated breaker (2EHS*MCC102) to investigate breaker 16B thermal overload is tripped. cause for pump trip

Monitors 2ICS*P1 suction pressure using E51R604 Role Play: (P601 meter)

As Equipment Operator dispatched to 2ICS*P2, wait 1

Determines alarms are valid minute and report the following:

Motor is warm to the touch Outboard pump bearing is hot; the bearing appears to have seized The following annunciator alarms when 2ICS*MOV150 is BOP closed:

Closes 2ICS*MOV150 601305, RCIC SYSTEM INOPERABLE

Dispatches Equipment Operator to perform N2OSP ICSM001 Subsection 8.3, Discharge Piping Fill The following computer point is generated when

Informs crew that 2ICS*MOV150 is shut 2ICS*MOV150 is closed:

ICSBC04, RCIC Sys (inop)

Note: SRO Spec Condition Applicable Actions

Declares RCIC inoperable 3.5.3 A A.1 and A.2

Evaluates plant conditions against Tech Specs and Action Description Verify by administrative means High determines the following apply:

A.1 Pressure Core Spray System is OPERABLE

ITS 3.5.3 Condition A (RCIC inop)

(Immediately)

Restore RCIC System to OPERABLE status A.2 (14 Days)

Event

2ICS*MOV150 has been closed Termination Criteria 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 22 of 42

NOTES Event #5 - Failure of 2RCS*P1A Inner and Outer Seal Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions Plant operating at power with both RCS pumps in service

Critical activities or tasks Trip 2RCS*P1A

Final (expected) operating result Reactor online with operation in the heightened awareness region

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

N/A Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. Given the plant with an isolable primary system leak into the drywell, the crew will "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is manually isolate the A recirculation loop within 30 minutes of the indications of performed) rising drywell pressure in accordance with N2SOP29.1.

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Booth Operator:

When directed by the lead evaluator, insert the following malfunctions:

TRG4 RR15A, Failure of RR Pump Inner Seal (P1A),

Ramp = 5:00, Final = 4 RR16A, RR Pump Upper Seal Failure (P1A),

Delay = 5:00, Final =1 Slow degradation occurs to the 'A' RCS Upper seal The following annunciator alarms approximately 1 minute ATC after event initiation:

Silences acknowledges and reports annunciator 602115, RECIRC PMP 1A SEAL STAGING FLOW 602115 HIGH / LOW

Provides crew update for degrading 2RCS*P1A upper seal The following annunciator alarms approximately 5

Reviews ARP 602115:

minutes after event initiation:

Monitors drywell equipment drain leak rate 602109, RECIRC PUMP 1A OUTER SL LEAK HIGH 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 23 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions 602220, RECIRC PUMP 1A/1B MOT TEMP HIGH Monitors seal cavity pressure using, RRP 1A Upper Seal Cav Press meter (B35R602A) on panel 602 The following computer point is generated: Determines seal cavity pressure is rising RCSFC09, RCS P1A SEAL STAGING FLO (HIGH) Monitors seal cavity temperature using point 8, Pump A No. 2 Seal Cavity, on recorder B35R601 at panel 614

Provides crew update for the requirement of ARP 602115 to enter N2SOP29.1.

Approximately 2 minutes and 45 seconds after event SRO initiation RCS 'A' upper seal cavity pressure exceeds 920

Oversees crew actions.

psig

Provides crew update on entry into N2SOP29.1

Directs RO to enter and execute N2SOP29.1 Role Play: BOP (N2SOP29.1)

If asked for 2RCS*P1A pump vibration field indications,

Performs N2SOP29.1 actions:

wait 1 minute and report that 2RCS*P1A vibrations are Evaluates all 4 legs (Seals, Vibration, normal and unchanged. Temperature and Current)

Determines that upper seal cavity pressure is rising

Provides crew update that RCS 'A' seal cavity pressure has exceeded 920 psig, but DFR has not experienced > 1 gpm rise or a rise in drywell pressure has not occurred

Continues to perform monitoring of pump conditions Booth Operator:

6 minutes after malfunction RR15A and RR16A have been initially entered and when directed by the lead evaluator, modify the following malfunction:

Modify RR16A, RR Pump Upper Seal Failure (P1A), Final = 5 RCS 'A' upper seal cavity pressure drops below 100 psig BOP (N2SOP29.1) due to second seal degradation

Continues with N2SOP29.1 actions:

Reevaluates all 4 legs (Seals, Vibration, Temperature and Current) 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 24 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Drywell pressure begins to slowly rise

Determines that upper seal cavity temperature is rising RCS 'A' upper seal cavity pressure drops below 100 psig

Provides crew update that RCS 'A' upper seal cavity pressure has dropped below 100 psig with drywell pressure rising and that N2SOP29.1 requires 2RCS*P1A tripped and isolated and N2SOP29 entered 2RCS*P1A trips

Evaluates Temperature leg of N2SOP29.1 and that RCS MG1A current goes to zero Annuciator 602115 is in alarm and that Upper seal Recirc Motor 1A current goes to zero Recirc Pmp 1A speed lowers cavity temperature is greater than 200°F and that Total Core flow drops to ~44 mlbm/hr N2SOP29.1 requires 2RCS*P1A tripped and N2 APRM power lowers to ~64% SOP29.1 entered Indicated MWth output on panel 603 begins to lower

Continues with N2SOP29.1 actions at 'A':

Indicated MWe output on panel 603 begins to lower Trips 2RCS*P1A by placing Recirc Pmp 1A Motor Reactor operation is now in the "Exit Region" of the single a Brkr 5A to the stop position and enters N2SOP loop power to flow map 29 The following annunciators alarm following event initiation:

602207, Recirc Pump 1A Low Speed Auto Transfer Not Available (comes in then clears) 603218, OPRM Trip Enabled 603139, Reactor Water Level High / Low The following computer points are generated:

FWSLC01, Reactor Wtr Level Hi / Lo (Hi /Lo)

NMPBC37, APRM 1 OPRM Trip Enabled (Alarm)

NMPBC36, APRM 4 OPRM Trip Enabled (Alarm)

NMPBC22, APRM 2 OPRM Trip Enabled (Alarm)

NMPBC19, APRM 3 OPRM Trip Enabled (Alarm)

WCS System flow lowers to < 450 gpm The following annunciators alarm when WCS flow is reduced:

602317, RWCU Filter Demin 1 Trouble 602318, RWCU Filter Demin 2 Trouble Performs the following:

2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 25 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions WCS filters go on hold - Lowers WCS flow to < 450 gpm

- Closes WCS*MOV105 Role Play:

When operator dispatched to close 2RCSV2029A, wait 1 minute then insert the following remote:

TRG5 RR03, V57A (CRDH Line) Recirc Pump Seal Supply, Final = Close

- Directs field operator to close RCSV2029A Then report 2RCSV2029A is shut.

The following annunciator alarms when RCS*MOV10A is closed:

602207, Recirc Pump 1A Low Speed Auto Transfer Not Available After ~ 9 minutes, the following annunciators alarm: Closes RCS*MOV10A 602117, Recirc Pmp 1A Seal Clg Wtr Flow Low Closes RCS*MOV18A 602135, Recirc Pmp 1A Motor Winding Clg Wtr

Performs N2SOP29 actions:

Flow Low Determines that at least one recirc pump is in service Determines that core flow AND power are not The following annunciators alarm when cram rods are within the Scram Region inserted: Determines that core flow AND power are not 603204, RBM Upscale / Inoperable left of Line 'K' 603442, Control Rod Out Block

Provides crew update of the requirement of N2SOP 603212, OPRM Alarm 29, to insert the first four cram rods:

Inserts the first four cram rods Reactor power lowers to ~54% after cram rod insertion Recovers per N2SOP29 Attachment 1 Total core flow remains at 44 mlbm/hr Reactor operation is still in the "Exit Region" SRO

Provides crew oversight and reactivity oversight during CRAM rod insertion (if required)

BOP

Continues with N2SOP29, attachment 1 actions 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 26 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Reactor operation is still in the "Exit Region" of the single Determines that core flow and power are within loop power to flow map the EXIT Region Reviews note that states, " If in single loop operation, drive flow in the operating loop is limited to less than 41,800 gpm, as indicated by flow recorder at 2CEC*PNL602 and Reactor Thermal power is limited to below line J (original ELLLA Line) of SLO Power/Flow Map" Determines the requirement to immediately exit the region by either raising core flow or inserting more cram rods (if required)

Requests direction from US on means to be used to exit the 'Exit Region' (if required)

SRO

Acknowledges request on means to be used to exit the 'Exit Region'

Directs RO to exit the 'Exit region' by inserting CRAM rods/adjusting RCS flow using the 'B' recirc flow control valve ATC

Acknowledges direction to exit the 'exit region' by inserting CRAM rods/adjusting RCS flow using the 'B' Note: recirc flow control valve (if required)

If CRAM rods are used it will take a total (including CRAM

Adjusts the 'B' recirc flow control valve, not to rods) of approximately 11 rods. exceed 41,800 gpm drive flow, to achieve total core flow above 65 mlbm/hr (if required)

OR Inserts CRAM rods as necessary to exit the exit region

Reports to the US that the 'exit region' has been Note: exited using CRAM rods/recirc. flow (if required)

Heightened awareness actions start here

Continues with N2SOP29, attachment 1 actions (section 3.0):

Closes Flow Control valve for the tripped Pump (RCSFCV 'A')

Verifies flow rate of operating loop less than 41,800 gpm on recorder at Panel 602 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 27 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Notifies I&C to perform scram and rod block monitor setpoint changes Verifies Plant is operating to the Left of Line E (Jet Pump Cavitation Limit Line) on Single Loop Power - Flow Map Verifies thermal power is below Line J on Single Loop Power - Flow Map Determines 2RCS*P1A pump speed indicates 0 rpm after 1 minute Determines inability to restart 2RCS*P1A

Exits N2SOP29 and enters N2OP29, subsection H.6.0 Role Play: SRO When Reactor Engineering notified, report that fuel

Provides additional plant parameter monitoring due thermal limits are being evaluated. to plant transient affecting reactor core parameters

Provides independent position verification on the Role Play: power to flow map As reactor engineering, 1 minute after initial request to

Notifies reactor engineer and requests thermal limit evaluate thermal limits, report back that thermal limits evaluation have been evaluated as satisfactory.

Note:

Spec Condition Applicable Actions

Reviews technical specification 3.4.1 for single loop 3.4.1 C C.1 operations and evaluates Condition C, Action C.1 Action Description Satisfy the requirements of the C.1 LCO. (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months )

Event

2RCS*P1A secured Termination Criteria 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 28 of 42

NOTES Event #6, 7 & 8 - LOCA with one pair of Drywell to Suppression Chamber vacuum breakers failing open and inability to stay below PSP RPV Blowdown.

Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions Plant at power Verify the following malfunction is inserted before the event is initiated:

RH10B, RHS*MOV25B Jammed, Final = True

Critical activities or tasks RPV Blowdown performed

Final (expected) operating result Reactor shutdown and depressurized

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

DMSRL5 Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. Given the plant with rising primary containment pressure due to a LOCA, the crew "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is will perform a RPV blowdown within 15 minutes of determining that PSP is performed) exceeded with both drywell spray flow paths unavailable from the control room in accordance with N2EOPC2.

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Booth Operator: RO When directed by the lead instructor/evaluator, insert the

Silences, acknowledges and reports annunciator following malfunction: 851254

Performs ARP 851254 actions:

TRG6 RR20, RR Loop RuptureDBA LOCA, Ramp = Ensures Shift Manager notified 15:00, Final = 2.5 Notifies radiation protection department PC10A, Drywell/Wetwell Vacuum Breaker Attempts to identify the cause and notifies Pair Failed Open 2ISC*RV33AB, Delay = 1:00, chemistry to sample the containment Final = True Analyzes drywell leak rates TC:PA:MT:I, Turbine EHC Pump A Motor

Recognizes and Reports Drywell pressure rising and Failure, Final = Seize reports annunciator 603140 TC:PB:MT:I, Turbine EHC Pump B Motor

Performs ARP 603140 actions:

Failure, Final = Seize Checks drywell pressure readings on redundant independent indicators to validate value and The following plant response occurs:

trend CMS10s go into Alarm 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 29 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Drywell pressure will start to rise Recognizes/reports that Drywell and Suppression Drywell leak rates rise Chamber Pressure are tracking together and that they are at the approximate same value.

The following annunciator alarms: Monitors:

851254, Process Airborne Rad Monitor Activated - Drywell pressure in psia 603140, Drywell Pressure High/Low - Drywell temperatures

- Drywell leak rates Role Play - Radiation levels If contacted as Radiation Protection, confirm CMS10 Determines drywell pressure change is not due alarms are valid to barometric pressure change and determines that N2OP61A actions will not be appropriate for this situation due to the relative rapid rise in drywell pressure As the steam leak gets worse, the following malfunction becomes apparent:

PC10A, Drywell/Wetwell Vacuum Breaker Pair Failed Open 2ISC*RV33AB, Final = True The following annunciators alarm: SRO 851254, Process Airborne Rad Monitor Activated

Verifies RO has taken ownership of drywell pressure and set benchmark for inserting a manual scram

Acknowledges RO report that Drywell and Suppression Chamber Pressure are tracking together and that they are at the approximate same value.

May direct RO to lower power using Recirc flow IAW with N2SOP101D Note: RO Based on timeliness of crew actions and where the

If directed, acknowledges direction to reduce reactor threshold to take the mode switch to shutdown is power by reducing recirc. flow IAW with SOP101D.

established, the crew may not reduce recirc flow. Instead

Provides crew update for entry into N2SOP101D the power reduction may be stopped and the reactor for power reduction scrammed.

Enters N2SOP101D and performs actions:

Verifies MFLCPR is not greater than 0.95 Determines that recirc loop A and B flow control valves cannot be throttled closed Drywell pressure continues to rise and reaches pre- RO established drywell pressure threshold 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 30 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

Reports drywell pressure at preestablished threshold scram the reactor SRO

Acknowledges report of drywell pressure at pre established threshold

Directs RO to scram the reactor RO

Acknowledges SRO direction to scram the reactor

Arms AND depresses BOTH Manual Scram pushbuttons on either side of 2CEC*PNL603.

Places the Reactor Mode Switch in the SHUTDOWN position

Provides scram report, by reporting:

Reactor mode switch in shutdown APRMs downscale Reactor pressure and trend Reactor level and trend MSIVs open Feedwater pumps are running All control rods fully inserted

Reports EOP entry condition on high drywell pressure and low RPV water level Drywell Pressure reaches 1.68 psig EAL Criteria Met Indications available for Alert, EAL FA1:

Fission Product Barrier Matrix:

RC3.1

-OR-

RC4.2 TIME: _____________

2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 31 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions SRO

Acknowledges and repeats back scram report EDGs and ECCS pumps auto start.

Acknowledges report of EOP entry condition on high drywell pressure ISC Groups 3, 4, 8 and 9 auto isolate.

Provides crew update and enters EOPRPV on low RPV water level and high drywell pressure HVR auto isolates and GTS trains maintain neg. D/P on

Provides crew update and enters EOPPC on high Rx Building.

drywell pressure

Performs N2EOPRPV actions:

HVC special filter trains auto initiate Directs scram procedure entered (N2SOP101C)

Performs level control actions:

- Verifies needed auto isolations, ECCS starts and diesel generator response occurred per EOP 6.1

- Determines that RPV water level is known

- Determines that RPV water level can be restored and maintained between 159.3 and 202.3 inches using condensate booster pump injection

- Directs an RPV level band of 160 - 200 inches

- May direct manual initiation of RCIC

- May direct HPCS level 8 interlocks defeated per N2EOP6.20 Performs Pressure control actions:

- Determines that no SRVs are cycling

- Determines that RPV pressure can be stabilized below 1052 psig using the main turbine bypass valves Directs a pressure band of 8001000 psig RO

Performs N2SOP101C actions:

Verifies:

- All rods full in

- Reactor power lowering

- Turbine tripped/TSVs & TCVs shut

- Generator tripped and house loads transferred

- SDV V & D Valves closed

- RCS pumps downshift

- RPV pressure on TBVs or SRVs FWLC controlling level > 159.3 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 32 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Determines that the scram cannot be promptly reset due to the high drywell pressure scram signal Fully inserts IRMs and SRMs Energizes 2WCSMOV107 If required, secures makeup to the cooling tower Shuts down HWC Performs Level control leg:

- Recognizes that level will be stabilized using condensate and feedwater system If directed to defeat the HPCS Level 8 interlocks by placing - If directed defeats HPCS Level 8 trips by HPCS INJ VLV LEVEL 8 BYPASS TEST SWITCH in the TEST directing a field operator to perform the actions of N2EOP6.20 position, manually insert the following remote function:

CS14, OPSCSH01 PNL625 TST.SW CSH*MOV107, Final = Test Wait 1 minute, then report that the HPCS Level 8

- Acknowledges field operator report interlocks have been defeated.

- Informs SRO that the HPCS Level 8 interlocks have been defeated per N2EOP6.20 Role Play: SRO If directed to lift and tape leads and install jumper #9 to

Performs N2EOPPC primary containment pressure defeat the group 5 isolation interlocks, manually insert leg actions:

the following malfunction: Determines cannot maintain containment pressure below 1.68 psig

RH08, Group 5 Isolation Failure Determines that suppression chamber spray is (RHS*MOV122/113), Final = True required before suppression chamber pressure reaches 10 psig Wait 1 minute, and then report that the lead has been Determines that suppression pool water level is lifted and taped and jumper #9 has been installed. below EL 217 ft.

Determines that suppression chamber sprays are warranted Directs RO to place RHR B in suppression chamber sprays Waits until suppression chamber pressure is above 10 psig 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 33 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Booth Operator: RO If requested to place SWP radiation monitor RE23A in

Acknowledges report to place RHR A or B in service, insert the following remotes: suppression chamber sprays in accordance with N2 EOP6.22 TRG7 RM02040, SWP23A SWP From RHR A Ht

Reviews N2EOP6.22 Exch Rad Monit Online, Final = Online

Performs N2EOP6.22, section 6.1.3 RM03040, SWP23A SWP From RHR A Ht Opens SWP*MOV90B (may be delayed until after Exch Rad Monit Power, Final = On sprays are in service).

Verifies RHR*P1B running.

If requested to place SWP radiation monitor RE23B in Verifies RHS*MOV24B overridden closed.

service, insert the following remotes: Opens RHS*MOV33B to establish suppression chamber spray flow.

TRG8 RM02041, SWP23B Current Radiation Level Opens RHS*FV38B and establish approximately Online, Final = Online 7450 gpm - If suppression pool cooling is RM03041, SWP23B Current Radiation Level directed.

Power, Final = On Throttles open SWP*MOV33B to establish flow not to exceed 7400 gpm Starts 5th SWP pump Then report 2SWP*RE23A is in service (post LOCA).

Closes RHS*MOV8B after 10 minute time delay.

Directs RP to place SWP*RE23B in service

Reports to the US that RHR B is in suppression chamber spray SRO

Acknowledges report that RHR B is in suppression chamber spray

Directs pneumatics restored to the Drywell

Establishes a benchmark for closing the outboard MSIVs to control cooldown rate

May direct low pressure ECCS pumps terminated and prevented with a high drywell pressure and reactor pressure lowering (N2EOPRPV, step P1)

Directs Suppression Chamber Spray secured prior to Suppression Chamber pressure lowering to 0 psig RO

Restores pneumatics to the drywell using N2EOPHC attachment 7 panel 601:

2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 34 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions At 2CEC*PNL851:

- PLACES LOCA OVERRIDE VLV IAS*SOV166 to OVERRIDE

- OPENS IAS*SOV166

- PLACES LOCA OVERRIDE VLV IAS*SOV184 to OVERRIDE

- OPENS IAS*SOV184 At 2CEC*PNL601

- PLACES LOCA OVERRIDE VLV IAS*SOV164 to OVRD

- OPENS IAS*SOV164

- PLACES LOCA OVERRIDE VLV IAS*SOV165 to OVRD

- OPENS IAS*SOV165

Informs the SRO that Drywell pneumatics has been restored RO

If directed, terminates and prevents Low pressure ECCS injection using N2EOPHC attachment 4:

PLACES CSL*P1, PMP 1, control switch in PULL Suppression chamber pressure exceeds 10 psig TOLOCK IF a LPCI A/LPCS initiation signal is NOT present, THEN ARMS AND DEPRESSES LPCI A/LPCS MANUAL INITIATION pushbutton CLOSES AND, IF possible, OVERRIDES:

- 2RHS*MOV24A, LPCI A INJECTION VLV

- 2CSL*MOV104, PMP 1 INJECTION VLV PLACES RHS*P1C, PMP 1C, control switch in PULLTOLOCK.

IF a LPCI B & C initiation signal is NOT present, THEN ARMS AND DEPRESSES LPCI B & C MANUAL INITIATION pushbutton CLOSES AND, IF possible, OVERRIDES:

- 2RHS*MOV24B, LPCI B INJECTION VLV

- 2RHS*MOV24C, LPCI C INJECTION VLV

Reports to the US that low pressure ECCS has been terminated and prevented 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 35 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

Acknowledges direction to secure Suppression Chamber Spray prior to Suppression Chamber pressure lowering to 0 psig

Closes the outboard MSIVs at prestablished pressure value and shifts pressure control to the SRVs

Recognizes/reports to the US that suppression chamber pressure has reached 10 psig SRO

Acknowledges report that Drywell pneumatics have been restored

Acknowledges report that suppression chamber pressure has reached 10 psig

Continues on with N2EOPPC primary containment pressure leg actions:

Determines that suppression pool water level is below EL 217 ft.

Directs RO to verify the following:

- Both recirculation pumps tripped

- All drywell unit coolers tripped RO

Verifies and reports that both recirculation pumps are tripped

Verifies and reports that all drywell unit coolers are tripped SRO

Acknowledges report that:

Both recirculation pumps are tripped All drywell unit coolers are tripped

Directs RO to place RHR A/'B' in drywell sprays in accordance with N2EOP6.22 RO

If directed to place RHR A in service, acknowledges report to place RHR A in drywell sprays in accordance with N2EOP6.22

Reviews N2EOP6.22 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 36 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

Performs N2EOP6.22, section 6.2.2 Verifies an initiation signal present.

Opens SWP*MOV90A (may be delayed until after sprays are in service).

Verifies RHS*MOV24A overridden closed.

Verifies closed RHS*FV38A Verifies RHR A pump running.

Opens RHS*MOV33A and verifies flow (If suppression chamber spray is required When RHS*MOV15A control switch is taken to the open concurrently with drywell sprays).

position (zdrhs05a(2)==1), the following remote function Attempts to open RHS*MOV15A becomes active: Recognizes/reports the failure of RHS*MOV15A Dispatches an operator to investigate TRG9 RH27, RHS*MOV15A 600V Bkr Status,

Reports to the US that RHS*MOV15A will not open Final = Open Role Play:

If directed investigate RHS*MOV15A breaker locally, wait 1 minute, then report that the breaker is tripped open and cannot be reclosed.

Role Play:

If directed to attempt to locally manually open RHS*MOV15A wait 1 minute, then report that RHS*MOV15A clutch will not engage and that you cannot get it open.

RO

If directed to place RHR B in service, acknowledges report to place RHR B in drywell sprays in accordance with N2EOP6.22

Reviews N2EOP6.22

Performs N2EOP6.22, section 6.2.2 Verifies an initiation signal present.

Opens SWP*MOV90B (may be delayed until after sprays are in service).

Verifies RHS*MOV24B overridden closed.

Verifies closed RHS*FV38B.

Verifies RHR B pump running.

2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 37 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Opens RHS*MOV33B and verifies flow (If suppression chamber spray is required When RHS*MOV25B control switch is taken to the open concurrently with drywell sprays).

position, the following malfunction becomes apparent: Attempts to open RHS*MOV25B

Reports to the US that RHS*MOV25B will not open

RH10B, RHS*MOV25B Jammed, Final = True Role Play: SRO If contacted as Equipment Operator to deenergize and

Determines that drywell sprays are not immediately attempt to manually open 2RHS*MOV25B wait 1 minute available and insert the following remote:

Continues with N2EOPPC, Primary Containment Pressure Leg actions:

TRG10 RH30, RHS*MOV25B 600 V BKR STATUS, Evaluates PSP and determines cannot stay inside Final = Open the pressure suppression pressure THEN Determines that RPV blowdown required

Provides crew update for entry into N2EOPC2 (RPV Delete the following malfunction: Blowdown) due exceeding Pressure Suppression Pressure RH10B, RHS*MOV25B Jammed, Final = True

Enters and performs the actions of N2EOPC2:

Determines that the reactor will remain Then wait 1 more minute and report back that you are shutdown without boron unable to manually open 2RHS*MOV25B, but will keep Determines drywell pressure >1.68 psig trying. Directs Low pressure ECCS terminated and prevented or verified terminated and prevented Role Play: if performed earlier If contacted as Equipment Operator to Perform N2EOP Receives report that low pressure ECCS has been 6.6, RHR FIRE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE, acknowledge terminated and prevented the order.

Directs 7 ADS valves opened RO

Acknowledges direction to terminate and prevent low pressure ECCS

Terminates and prevents Low pressure ECCS injection or verifies terminated and prevented using N2EOPHC attachment 4:

PLACES CSL*P1, PMP 1, control switch in PULL TOLOCK 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 38 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions IF a LPCI A/LPCS initiation signal is NOT present, THEN ARMS AND DEPRESSES LPCI A/LPCS MANUAL INITIATION pushbutton CLOSES AND, IF possible, OVERRIDES:

- 2RHS*MOV24A, LPCI A INJECTION VLV

- 2CSL*MOV104, PMP 1 INJECTION VLV PLACES RHS*P1C, PMP 1C, control switch in PULLTOLOCK.

IF a LPCI B & C initiation signal is NOT present, THEN ARMS AND DEPRESSES LPCI B & C MANUAL INITIATION pushbutton CLOSES AND, IF possible, OVERRIDES:

- 2RHS*MOV24B, LPCI B INJECTION VLV

- 2RHS*MOV24C, LPCI C INJECTION VLV

Reports to the US that low pressure ECCS has been terminated and prevented

Acknowledges direction to open all 7 ADS valves.

Opens all 7 ADS valves using N2EOPHC attachment 8:

Determines that no SRVs are stuck open and that an ECCS pump is operating INITIATE Blowdown using ONE of the methods below:

- Arms and depresses all ADS LOGIC pushbuttons for BOTH divisions:

o ADS LOGIC "A" manual pushbutton o ADS LOGIC "E" manual pushbutton o ADS LOGIC "B" manual pushbutton o ADS LOGIC "F" manual pushbutton

- TAKES control switches to OPEN at EITHER 2CEC*PNL628 or 2CEC*PNL631 UNTIL a total of 7 SRVs are open:

o MSS*PSV137 o MSS*PSV127 o MSS*PSV126 o MSS*PSV121 o MSS*PSV134 o MSS*PSV130 o MSS*PSV129 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 39 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

Reports to the US that all 7 ADS SRVs are opened based on solenoids being energized and all ADS N2 Tanks having acceptable pressure SRO

Acknowledges report that all 7 ADS SRV's are open Role Play: RO After the RPV blowdown has been conducted, call the

Acknowledges field report that 2RHS*MOV25B can control room and report that 2RHS*MOV25B has be freed be opened and directs the field operator to fully up and can now be opened. open 2RHS*MOV25B

Reports to the SRO that 2RHS*MOV25B can be If directed to fully open RHS*MOV25B then insert the opened from the field and that it is being opened.

following remote:

TRG11 RH19, Manual Handwhl Ops RHS*MOV25B, Final = Open As RHR B establishes full drywell spray flow, the following malfunction becomes apparent:

Recognizes/reports that when full spray flow is achieved that 2RHS*MOV4B has failed to close as

RH22B, RHS*MOV4B Fails to AutoClose, Final = True designed

Manually closes 2RHS*MOV4B Role Play: SRO When 2RHS*MOV25B has gone full open, then call the

Acknowledges report that 2RHS*MOV25B can be control room and inform the crew that 2RHS*MOV25B is opened from the field and that it is being opened full open.

Acknowledges RO report that 2RHS*MOV4B has failed to close as designed and that is has been manually closed

May Direct RHR B placed in suppression pool cooling RO

Acknowledges field report that 2RHS*MOV25B can be opened and directs the field operator to fully open 2RHS*MOV25B 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 40 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

If directed places RHR A/B in suppression pool cooling

Acknowledges direction to place RHR 'A' / RHR 'B' in suppression pool cooling

Attains a copy of N2EOPHC, Attachment 5

Performs N2EOPHC, Attachment 5 actions FOR RHR A:

PLACES 2SWP*MOV90A control switch in OPEN VERIFIES 2RHS*MOV24A closed STARTS 2RHS*P1A THROTTLES OPEN 2RHS*FV38A to establish 7450 GPM flow OPENS 2SWP*MOV33A to establish flow up to 7400 GPM WHEN possible, THEN CLOSES 2RHS*MOV8A STARTS 2SWP*RE23A per N2OP79, F.4.0 OR NOTIFIES RP

Performs N2EOPHC, Attachment 5 actions FOR RHR B:

PLACES 2SWP*MOV90B control switch in OPEN IF 2RHS*P1C is NOT running, THEN SHUTS 2RHS*MOV4C VERIFIES 2RHS*MOV24B closed STARTS 2RHS*P1B THROTTLES OPEN 2RHS*FV38B to establish 7450 GPM flow OPENS 2SWP*MOV33B to establish flow up to 7400 GPM WHEN possible, THEN CLOSES 2RHS*MOV8B STARTS 2SWP*RE23B per N2OP79, F.4.0 OR NOTIFIES RP.

Informs US that both RHR 'A' / 'B' are in suppression pool cooling

Monitors Suppression Pool temperature trend and updates US SRO 2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 41 of 42

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

Acknowledges that RHR A/B is in suppression pool cooling Event Termination

RPV has been blown down.

Criteria

Reactor level being controlled in assigned band.

2021 NRC Scenario 2 Page 42 of 42

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Op-Test No.: LC2 20-1 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: The scenario begins at rated reactor power with 2WCS*P1B out of service for seal leakage.

Turnover: 1. Event 1 is the normal evolution performed by the BOP operator to start 2RHS*P1C in Full Flow Test Mode Operation in accordance with N2-OP-31 Section H.12.0 and run for 5 minutes.

Critical Tasks: See page 2 Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description N/A N-BOP, Start RHR in full flow test mode.

1 SRO N2-OP-31 DI-4567 C-ATC, A RCS FCV fails open.

2 (ILT 16-1 SRO Scenario #2 Event 3) TS-SRO N2-SOP-08, N2-SOP-101D, T.S. 3.4.1 ED16 R-ATC, Main Transformer Loss of Cooling.

3 SRO ARP's, N2-SOP-101D RC16 I-BOP, Isolable RCIC Steam Leak with failure of Automatic Isolation.

4 RC11 SRO TS-SRO ARP's, N2-EOP-SC, T.S. 3.5.3, 3.3.6.1 CW12B C-BOP, IAS Mini Loop Cooling Wtr Pmp Trip, Standby Fails To Auto Start.

5 CW13A SRO ARP's, N2-OP-13 TU02 C-ATC, Rising Main Turbine Vibration.

6 SRO ARP's, N2-SOP-101C RD17Z M-All Low power ATWS, loss of valid level indication, RPV flooding MS04 (ATWS leg).

7 RR27 N2-EOP-PC, N2-EOP-C4 AD08 C-All One ADS Valve Nitrogen Supply Severed.

8 N2-EOP-C4 DG04A C-All EDG1 Fail to UV / LOCA Auto Start.

9 N2-EOP-C5

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Op-Test No.: LC2 20-1

1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 Event 8, 9

2. Abnormal events (2-4) 5 Events 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

3. Major transients (1-2) 1 Event 7

4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 N2-EOP-PC

5. Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions (>1 per scenario set) 1 N2-EOP-C5, N2-EOP-C4

6. Pre-identified Critical Tasks (> 2) 4 CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS: CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:

CT-1.0, Given the plant with an isolable RCIC steam leak in the reactor Critical Task 1.0 is identified as critical building, the crew will manually isolate RCIC prior to any area temperature because with no operator action the reaching 212°F in accordance with N2-EOP-SC. primary system will continue to discharge into the Secondary Containment. An area temperature above its isolation setpoint is an indication that steam from a primary system may be discharging into the Secondary Containment. As temperatures continue to rise, the continued operability of equipment needed to carry out EOP actions may be compromised.

CT-2.0, Given a condition where RPV Flooding is warranted with all control Critical Task 2.0 is identified as critical rods not full in, the crew will terminate and prevent all RPV injection except because without operator action, the boron, CRD and RCIC prior to opening ADS valves and until RPV pressure manual RPV blowdown combined with an lowers below the MSCP in accordance with N2-EOP-C4. ATWS in progress would cause the uncontrolled injection of relatively cold water which would result in fuel damage.

CT-3.0, Given a condition where RPV Flooding is warranted with all control Critical Task 3.0 is identified as critical rods not full in, the crew will open 7 SRVs within 15 minutes of the because without operator action, reactor indications of unknown RPV water level in accordance with N2-EOP-C4. pressure would remain too high to facilitate the only remaining preferred injection source to inject into the vessel.

This would prevent RPV water level from being restored and therefore prevent adequate core cooling from being assured. The intent is to get at least 7 SRVs (ADS or non-ADS) open.

CT-4.0, Given a condition where RPV Flooding is warranted with all control Critical Task 4.0 is identified as critical rods not full in, 7 SRVs open, and RPV pressure < 178 psig; the crew will because with Reactor water level slowly raise injection to flood the RPV to the main steam lines in accordance unknown, the status of core cooling is with N2-EOP-C4. unknown. RPV flooding is required to establish conditions to cool the core.

This protects the fuel cladding integrity.

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The scenario begins at rated reactor power with 2WCS*P1B out of service for seal leakage.

Event 1 is the normal evolution performed by the BOP operator to start 2RHS*P1C in Full Flow Test Mode Operation in accordance with N2-OP-31 Section H.12.0.

Event 2 occurs when reactor recirculation flow control valve 'A' begins to drift open. The crew will examine reactor power and MWe output and determine an unplanned power change is occurring. The crew will enter and take the actions on N2-SOP-8. N2-SOP-8 will require the crew to depress the HPU shutdown pushbutton to lock up the flow control valve and close the associated hydraulic fluid outside isolation valve. The crew will reduce reactor power to restore and maintain reactor power < 3988 MWth using either cram rods or recirculation flow. The crew will investigate the cause of the transient and evaluate required Tech. Specs.

Event 3 occurs when main transformer XM1A begins to overheat. The operators will be alerted to this condition when annunciator 852618 and corresponding computer point SPMTC01 go into alarm. The crew will dispatch a field operator to investigate local indications including a general visual inspection, cooling pump operation, cooling fan operation and local temperature readings.

The field operator will report back that some cooling fans are not running and that local temperatures are rising. The crew will determine that local temperature will exceed 110°C, requiring the crew to reduce MVAR loading in addition to reducing reactor power. When MVAR load is reduced and reactor power reduction has been performed the field operator will report that main transformer temperatures are lowering and are below 110°C.

Event 4 occurs when a steam leak in the RCIC Pump Room occurs. The crew will enter and execute the actions of N2-EOP-SC. The crew may order a Reactor Building Evacuation to protect station personnel. RCIC room temperatures will initiate an automatic isolation of RCIC; however RCIC will fail to isolate automatically, requiring the crew to recognize the failure and take actions to manually isolate the RCIC system (Critical Task 1.0). RCIC will isolate manually using the keylock Containment Isolation Valve control switches on Panel 601. The crew will then monitor Secondary Containment (RCIC room) and RCIC system parameters to verify the steam leak was successfully isolated and evaluate Tech. Specs.

Event 5 occurs when the instrument air mini loop cooling water pump trips. The standby mini loop cooling water pump will fail to auto start. The crew will perform the appropriate ARP/SOP actions and manually start the standby mini loop cooling water pump to restore cooling water to the operating IAS compressors. The crew may enter N2-SOP-19 and start the standby mini loop cooling water pump. The crew will be forced to closely monitor IAS system parameters to ensure a loss of instrument air does not occur.

Event 6 starts when a rise in Main Turbine Vibration occurs caused by foreign material in one of the bearing oil lines. The crew will be forced to monitor main turbine vibration and determine from 851140, Turbine Generator Vibration High when the threshold for tripping the main turbine has been reached. The crew will then scram the reactor and trip the turbine in accordance with N2-SOP-21.

Events 7, 8 & 9 start after the scram when the control rods only insert to position 02 with reactor power remaining at approximately 1%. The crew will enter N2-EOP-RPV and transition to N2-EOP-C5. The crew will inhibit ADS and place HPCS in PTL. A small steam leak in the drywell will cause drywell pressure to rise. The crew will enter N2-EOP-PC. The Division I diesel generator will fail to start on the LOCA (high drywell pressure) signal. RPV pressure will be

controlled automatically by EHC. Control rods will be inserted in accordance with N2-EOP-6.14 initially, until SRMs and IRMs are inserted and it is determined that the reactor is shutdown with no boron injected, then the crew may exit the power leg of N2-EOP-C5 and insert control rods per N2-SOP-101C and N2-OP-30. When average drywell temperature is above 250°F, all RPV water level instruments will experience reference leg flashing. The crew will exit N2-EOP-C5 and enter N2-EOP-C4. All RPV injection will be terminated and prevented except for boron, CRD, and RCIC (Critical Task 2.0) and then 7 ADS valves will be opened (Critical Task 3.0) to flood the RPV to the main steam lines. One ADS SRV will fail to open, requiring the crew to open one additional non-ADS SRV to achieve a total of 7 SRVs open. As RPV pressure lowers all RPV level instruments will fail upscale. When RPV pressure is < 178 psig, RPV injection will be commenced to flood the RPV to the main steam lines (Critical Task 4.0).

Copy of Training Id: NMP2 NRC 2021 Scenario 4 Revision: 0.0 AT5, Low power ATWS, loss of all RPV level instrumentation, RPV flooding required, no neutron

Title:

response seen during flooding.

Signature / Printed Name Date Developed By Signature on File / Mike Alexander 3/24/21 Validated By Landon Swenson 12/31/20 Don Carr 12/31/20 Ben Berner 12/31/20 Facility Reviewer Signature on File / Matt Kostyal 3/26/21

NOTES References

1. N2OP31, Residual Heat Removal System

2. N2SOP08, Unplanned Power Changes

3. N2SOP101D, Rapid Power Reduction

4. N2ARP602100, 2CEC*PNL602 Series 100 Alarm Response Procedures

5. N2ARP852600, 2CEC*PNL852 Series 600 Alarm Response Procedures

6. N2OP68, Main Generator, Main Transformers, 345KV Yard and Generator/Unit Protection

7. N2ARP601300, 2CEC*PNL601 Series 300 Alarm Response Procedures

8. N2EOPSC, Secondary Containment Control

9. N2EOP6.28, Determining Reactor Building Temperatures

10. N2ARP851200, 2CEC*PNL851 Series 200 Alarm Response Procedures

11. N2SOP19, Loss of Instrument Air

12. N2OP19, Instrument and Service Air System

13. N2ARP851100, 2CEC*PNL851 Series 100 Alarm Response Procedures

14. N2OP21, Main Turbine System

15. N2SOP21, Turbine Trip

16. N2SOP101C, Reactor Scram

17. N2EOPRPV, RPV Control Flowchart

18. N2EOPPC, Primary Containment Control Flowchart

19. N2EOPC5, Failure to Scram Flowchart

20. N2EOP6.2, Defeating RCIC/Main Turbine Trip Interlock, Steam Line Isolations and High Exhaust Pressure Trip

21. N2EOPHC, NMP2 EOP Hard Cards Procedure 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 1 of 51

NOTES

22. N2EOP6.13, RRCS Manual Initiation

23. N2EOP6.1, Low RPV Water Level/High Drywell Pressure Actuations

24. N2EOP6.10, Maintaining/Restoring the Main Condenser for RPV Pressure Control

25. N2EOPC4, RPV Flooding Flowchart

26. N2EOP6.30, RPV Injection Via Shutdown Cooling Return

27. N2EOP6.14, Alternate Control Rod Insertions

28. N2EOP6.22, Containment Sprays

29. EPAA113, Personnel Protective Actions

30. EPAA114, Notifications

31. NMP Unit 2 EAL Wallboard EPAA1013 Addendum 4 Appendix 1 Revision 01

32. N2TSPEC, NMPNS Unit 2 Improved Technical Specifications (Volume 1, 2, 3)

33. OPAA112101, Shift Turnover and Relief 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 2 of 51

NOTES Instructor Information A. Scenario Description

1. Sequence of Events / Expected Crew Response

a. The scenario begins at rated reactor power with 2WCS*P1B out of service for seal leakage.

b. Event 1 is the normal evolution performed by the BOP operator to start 2RHS*P1C in Full Flow Test Mode Operation in accordance with N2OP31 Section H.12.0.

c. Event 2 occurs when reactor recirculation flow control valve 'A' begins to drift open. The crew will examine reactor power and MWe output and determine an unplanned power change is occurring. The crew will enter and take the actions on N2SOP8. N2SOP8 will require the crew to depress the HPU shutdown pushbutton to lock up the flow control valve and close the associated hydraulic fluid outside isolation valve. The crew will reduce reactor power to restore and maintain reactor power < 3988 MWth using either cram rods or recirculation flow. The crew will investigate the cause of the transient and evaluate required tech. specs.

d. Event 3 occurs when main transformer XM1A begins to overheat. The operators will be alerted to this condition when annunciator 852618 and corresponding computer point SPMTC01 go into alarm. The crew will dispatch a field operator to investigate local indications including a general visual inspection, cooling pump operation, cooling fan operation and local temperature readings. The field operator will report back that some cooling fans are not running and that local temperatures are rising. The crew will determine that local temperature will exceed 110°C, requiring the crew to reduce MVAR loading in addition to reducing reactor power. When MVAR load is reduced and reactor power reduction has been performed the field operator will report that main transformer temperatures are lowering and are below 110°C.

e. Event 4 occurs when a steam leak in the RCIC Pump Room occurs. The crew will enter and execute the actions of N2 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 3 of 51

NOTES EOPSC. The crew may order a Reactor Building Evacuation to protect station personnel. RCIC room temperatures will initiate an automatic isolation of RCIC; however RCIC will fail to isolate automatically, requiring the crew to recognize the failure and take actions to manually isolate the RCIC system (Critical Task 1.0). RCIC will isolate manually using the keylock Containment Isolation Valve control switches on Panel 601. The crew will then monitor Secondary Containment (RCIC room) and RCIC system parameters to verify the steam leak was successfully isolated and evaluate Tech. Specs.

f. Event 5 occurs when the instrument air mini loop cooling water pump trips. The standby mini loop cooling water pump will fail to auto start. The crew will perform the appropriate ARP/SOP actions and manually start the standby mini loop cooling water pump to restore cooling water to the operating IAS compressors. The crew may enter N2SOP19 and start the standby mini loop cooling water pump. The crew will be forced to closely monitor IAS system parameters to ensure a loss of instrument air does not occur.

g. Event 6 starts when a rise in Main Turbine Vibration occurs caused by foreign material in one of the bearing oil lines. The crew will be forced to monitor main turbine vibration and determine from 851140, Turbine Generator Vibration High when the threshold for tripping the main turbine has been reached. The crew will then scram the reactor and trip the turbine in accordance with N2SOP 21.

h. Events 7, 8 & 9 start after the scram when the control rods only insert to position 02 with reactor power remaining at approximately 1%. The crew will enter N2EOPRPV and transition to N2EOPC5. The crew will inhibit ADS and place HPCS in PTL. A small steam leak in the drywell will cause drywell pressure to rise. The crew will enter N2 EOPPC. The Division I diesel generator will fail to start on the LOCA (high drywell pressure) signal. RPV pressure will be controlled automatically by EHC. Control rods will be inserted in accordance with N2EOP6.14 initially, until 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 4 of 51

NOTES SRMs and IRMs are inserted and it is determined that the reactor is shutdown with no boron injected, then the crew may exit the power leg of N2EOPC5 and insert control rods per N2SOP101C and N2OP30. When average drywell temperature is above 250°F, all RPV water level instruments will experience reference leg flashing. The crew will exit N2EOPC5 and enter N2EOPC4. All RPV injection will be terminated and prevented except for boron, CRD, and RCIC (Critical Task 2.0) and then 7 ADS valves will be opened (Critical Task 3.0) to flood the RPV to the main steam lines. One ADS SRV will fail to open, requiring the crew to open one additional nonADS SRV to achieve a total of 7 SRVs open. As RPV pressure lowers all RPV level instruments will fail upscale. When RPV pressure is < 178 psig, RPV injection will be commenced to flood the RPV to the main steam lines (Critical Task 4.0).

2. Termination Criteria

a. RPV blowdown has been performed.

b. RPV injection is in progress with RPV water level at the main steam lines.

c. Control rods are being inserted.

3. Critical Tasks CT1.0 Justification:

Safety Significance: Critical Task 1.0 is identified as critical because with no operator action the primary system will continue to discharge into the Secondary Containment. An area temperature above its isolation setpoint is an indication that steam from a primary system may be discharging into the Secondary Containment. As temperatures continue to rise, the continued operability of equipment needed to carry out EOP actions may be compromised.

Cueing: Multiple annunciators will provide indications that the RCIC system has sustained a steam leak. Annunciator 601332, RCIC Equip Room Temperature High,601341, RCIC Equip Room Temperature HiHi and 601333, RCIC Pipe Chase/Reactor Vent Temp High. Also, secondary containment temperatures will be rising while the steam leak is occurring. N2EOPSC provides direction on how perform the actions to isolate RCIC.

Measurable Performance Indicators: Manually closing 2ICS*MOV121 & 128 will provide observable actions for the evaluation team.

Performance Feedback: Lowering secondary containment temperatures as well as lowering RCIC steam supply pressure will provide performance feedback regarding the success of the isolation.

Bounding Criteria: Based on the procedural requirements of N2EOPSC step SC8, before any parameter exceeds a Maximum Safe Value the reactor is to be scrammed and N2EOPRPV entered. Performing the action to manually isolate RCIC prior to reaching this temperature prevents the requirement to perform a reactor scram.

2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 5 of 51

NOTES

a. CT1.0, Given the plant with an isolable RCIC steam leak in the reactor building, the crew will manually isolate RCIC prior to any area temperature reaching 212°F in accordance with N2EOPSC.

CT2.0 Justification:

Safety Significance: Critical Task 2.0 is identified as critical because without operator action, the manual RPV blowdown combined with an ATWS in progress would cause the uncontrolled injection of relatively cold water which would result in fuel damage.

Cueing: Multiple annunciators and panel meter readings will provide indication of an ATWS with lowering RPV water level and degradation of high pressure injection systems.

Measurable Performance Indicators: Operation of the CSL pump control switch, CSL injection valve control switch, RHS A injection valve control switch, RHS B injection valve control switch, RHS C injection valve control switch, RHS C pump control switch and Feedwater valve controller switches will provide observable actions for the evaluation team.

Performance Feedback: CSL and RHS C pump indication lights, RHS A and B injection valve light indications, feedwater valve indication and feedwater flow indication on control room pane 603 will provide performance feedback regarding the success of crew actions.

Bounding Criteria: Based on the procedural requirements of N2EOPC4 step 3, it is required to terminate and prevent all RPV injection except Boron, CRD and RCIC prior to opening all 7 ADS valves.

b. CT2.0, Given a condition where RPV Flooding is warranted with all control rods not full in, the crew will terminate and prevent all RPV injection except boron, CRD and RCIC prior to opening ADS valves and until RPV pressure lowers below the MSCP in accordance with N2EOPC4.

CT3.0 Justification:

Safety Significance: Critical Task 3.0 is identified as critical because without operator action, reactor pressure would remain too high to facilitate the only remaining preferred injection source to inject into the vessel. This would prevent RPV water level from being restored and therefore prevent adequate core cooling from being assured. The intent is to get at least 7 SRVs (ADS or nonADS) open.

Cueing: Multiple annunciators and panel meter readings will provide indication of an ATWS with loss of RPV water level indication.

Measurable Performance Indicators: Operation of ADS LOGIC Manual Initiation arm and depress control switches with applicable white initiation light response, operation of an additional C solenoid keylock switch and lowering reactor pressure indication will provide observable actions for the evaluation team.

Performance Feedback: Lowering reactor pressure indication on multiple pressure indicators will provide performance feedback regarding the success of crew actions.

Bounding Criteria: Time limit based on Operations representative recommendation.

c. CT3.0, Given a condition where RPV Flooding is warranted with all control rods not full in, the crew will open 7 SRVs within 15 minutes of the indications of unknown RPV water level in accordance with N2EOPC4.

2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 6 of 51

NOTES CT4.0 Justification:

Safety Significance: Critical Task 4.0 is identified as critical because with Reactor water level unknown, the status of core cooling is unknown. RPV flooding is required to establish conditions to cool the core. This protects the fuel cladding integrity.

Cueing: Multiple Reactor water level indications will indicate either downscale or invalid. N2EOPRPV provides direction to implement N2EOPC4, RPV Flooding, ATWS leg.

Measurable Performance Indicators: Manipulation of injection system controls will provide observable actions for the evaluation team.

Performance Feedback: Reactor pressure and SRV acoustic indications will provide performance feedback regarding success of RPV flooding actions.

Bounding Criteria: Based on the procedural requirements of N2EOPC4 step 16, it is required to slowly raise injection until indications of being flooded to the main steam lines are observed per detail W.

d. CT4.0, Given a condition where RPV Flooding is warranted with all control rods not full in, 7 SRVs open, and RPV pressure < 178 psig; the crew will slowly raise injection to flood the RPV to the main steam lines in accordance with N2EOPC4.

4. Length

a. 60 minutes

5. Mitigation Strategy Code

a. AT5, Low power ATWS; loss of all RPV level instrumentation; RPV flooding required; no neutron response seen during flooding.

6. Technical Specifications (Applicable actions for initial conditions only)

a. T.S. 3.5.1, Condition A, Required Action A.1 in preparation for starting RHR C in full flow test mode.

7. EAL Classification

a. Site Area Emergency, EAL FS1:

1)

2) FC2.3 and RC2.2 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 7 of 51

NOTES B. Initial Conditions

1. IC Number

a. IC021 or equivalent (IC179 for ILT 201)

2. Presets / With Triggers

a. Malfunctions

1) RC11, RCIC Isolation Failure, Final = True Inserted

2) ED16, Gen Transformer Cooling Fan Failure, Final = Inserted 89

3) AD08B, ADS Valve N2 Supply Severed (MSS*PSV127), Inserted Final = True

4) DG04A, EDG1 Fail to UV / LOCA AutoStart, Final = Inserted True

5) RD070219, Control Rod FailureStuck, Final = True Inserted

6) RD070615, Control Rod FailureStuck, Final = True Inserted

7) RD17Z, RD17 For All Banks, Final = 02 Inserted

8) RC01, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Auto Start Inserted Failure, Final = True

9) RC16, RCIC Steam Leak into RCIC Pump Room, Ramp TRG2

= 5:00, Final = 15

10) CW12B, 2CCPP2B Fails to AutoStart, Final = True TRG3

11) CW13A, 2CCPP2A Pump Trip, Final = True TRG3

12) TU02, Main Turbine Bearing High Vibration, Ramp = TRG4 10:00, Final = 15%

13) MS04, Steam Line Rupture Inside Primary TRG5 Containment, Ramp = 5:00, Final = 2

14) RR50, Reference Leg Flashing, Final = True TRG9

15) RR27, RPV Level Instruments All Fail Upscale, Final = TRG10 True

16) RH08, Group 5 Isolation Failure TRG11 (RHS*MOV122/113), Final = True 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 8 of 51

NOTES

17) RP14A, RRCS ARI Failure / Defeated, Final = True TRG12

18) RP14B, RRCS ARI Failure / Defeated, Final = True TRG12

19) RP02, Reactor Protection System Failure To Scram TRG13 Automatic, Final = True

b. Remotes

1) RC10, Defeat RCIC/MT Trip Intlk (EOP6 Att 2), Final = TRG6 Defeated

2) MS06A, Defeat Level One Isolation of MSIVs (Jumper TRG7 K148A), Final = Defeated

3) MS06B, Defeat Level One Isolation of MSIVs (Jumper TRG7 K148B), Final = Defeated

4) MS06C, Defeat Level One Isolation of MSIVs (Jumper TRG7 K148C), Final = Defeated

5) MS06D, Defeat Level One Isolation of MSIVs (Jumper TRG7 K148D), Final = Defeated

6) OG03, Off Gas High Radiation Isolation Defeated, TRG8 Final = Defeated

7) RM02040, SWP23A SWP From RHR 'A' Ht Exch Rad TRG14 Monit Online, Final = Online

8) RM03040, SWP23A SWP From RHR 'A' Ht Exch Rad TRG14 Monit Power, Final = On

9) RM02041, SWP23B Current Radiation Level Online, TRG15 Final = Online

10) RM03041, SWP23B Current Radiation Level Power, TRG15 Final = On

c. Overrides

1) DI4567, On MIA Flow Controller A, Final = On TRG1

d. Annunciators

1) None 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 9 of 51

NOTES

e. Event Triggers Event # Event Action Command 5 rp:d535 == 1 .AND. rp:d536 == 1 Left Blank 9 dwtgas > 250 Left Blank 10 thpdome < 265 dmf rr50 20 Left Blank mmf ed16 101 21 ypxed16 > 100.0 set edklag = 6e4 29 rrvf60(1)>0.61 imf rr52a 30 rrvf60(1)>0.61 dor di4567

f. Equipment Out of Service

1) 2WCSP1B is out of service due to seal leakage.

g. Support Documentation

1) Provide N2OP31, section H.12.0 with step H.12.1 Placekept as complete and H.12.2 open circled.

h. Miscellaneous

1) Place 2WCS*P1B control switch in PTL with clearance reference tag applied.

2) Clear APRM 2/4 Voter Module trip memory

3) Verify the following SREI07 pages, which apply to IC021, are displayed:

a) Unit #2 CRAM Rod Listing (SREI07 page 16 of

29) in both the CRC book and at panel 602 (attached to N2SOP101D).

b) Rapid Power Reduction Instructions (SREI07 page 15 of 29) in the CRC book only.

c) Current Control Rod Positions & Face Adjacent Rods (SREI07 page 17 of 29) in the CRC book only.

C. Shift Turnover Information

1. Reactor Power: Rated 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 10 of 51

NOTES

2. Rodline: Below 100%

3. Technical Specification LCOs in effect:

a. T.S. 3.5.1, Condition A, Required Action A.1 in preparation for starting RHR C in full flow test mode

4. Significant Problems / Abnormalities / Equipment Out of Service:

a. 2WCS*P1B is out of service due to seal leakage.

5. Evolutions / Maintenance Scheduled for this Shift:

a. Start 2RHS*P1C in Full Flow Test Mode Operation in accordance with N2OP31 Section H.12.0 and run for 5 minutes.

2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 11 of 51

NOTES SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION ON COMING SHIFT: N D DATE: Today PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SRO, ROs)

PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

LCO Status (SRO)

Shift Turnover Information Sheet Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:

Reactor power is at rated power.

2WCS-P1B is out of service due to seal leakage.

PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions:

Start 2RHS*P1C in Full Flow Test Mode Operation in accordance with N2-OP-31 Section H.12.0 and run for 5 minutes.

Entry into T.S. 3.5.1, Condition A, Required Action A.1 (7 days) has been performed in preparation for starting RHR C in full flow test mode.

2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 12 of 51

NOTES Event #1 - RHR C Full Flow Test Mode Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions Reactor at rated power

Critical activities or tasks Place RHR C in full flow test mode

Final (expected) operating result Operating at rated power with RHR C in standby

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

N/A Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. None "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is performed)

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions SRO

Directs Starting 2RHS*P1C in Full Flow Test per N2 OP31, section H.12.0

Verifies entry into TS 3.5.1 Condition A.1. Restore to operable with 7 day Completion Time BOP

Starts 2RHS*P1C in Full Flow Test per N2OP31 H.12.0:

Starts 2RHS*P1C, RHR Pump 1C.

Using 2RHS*FV38C, RETURN TO SUPPR POOL COOLING THROTTLE, adjusts RHR C TOTAL FLOW to 7450 gpm (7450 gpm to 7500 gpm).

Observes 2RHS*MOV4C, PMP 1C MINIMUM FLOW VLV closes.

Operates 2RHS*P1C until NO longer required.

Closes 2RHS*FV38C, TEST FLOW RETURN TO SUPPR POOL THROTTLE.

Role Play: Observes 2RHS*MOV4C, PMP 1C MINIMUM FLOW VLV opens.

2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 13 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions If asked as field operator for the condition of 2RHS*P1B Stops 2RHS*P1C, RHR Pump 1C.

rotation, report that 2RHS*P1B is NOT rotating Notifies SRO LPCI "C" may be declared operable backwards.

Event

RHR C has been secured from full flow test mode.

Termination Criteria 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 14 of 51

NOTES Event #2 RCS FCV A Drifts Open Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions Reactor Power ~ 98%

Critical activities or tasks Shutdown 'A' RCS HPU Power reduction to maintain below license limit (if necessary)

Final (expected) operating result Operating with A RCS HPU shutdown, power reduced (if necessary)

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

N/A Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. None "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is performed)

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Booth Operator When directed by the lead evaluator, insert the following malfunction:

TRG1 DI4567, On MIA Flow Controller A, Final =

On The following plant response occurs: ATC 2RCS-HC1603A, % valve position indication begins

Recognizes rising MWth indication to rise

Recognizes rising generator MWe output indication Indicated MWth output on panel 603 begins to rise

Recognizes RCSFCV 'A' drifting open Indicated MWe output on panel 603 begins to rise

Provides crew update of RCSFCV 'A' drifting open APRM indicated power rises on panel 603 After approximately 3 minutes the following annunciators may alarm if the crew fails to quickly recognize the FCV drift:

851150, Turbine Bypass Valve Open 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 15 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions 851160, Turbine Bypass Valve 89A Thru 89E Out Temp High

Performs N2SOP08, and N2SOP101D actions

Performs the actions of N2SOP08:

Role Play: Evaluates IF/THEN statement that says If If requested, as I&C, report that the LVDT is already in Unintended RCS FCV movement is occurring service. Then Depress the HPU shutdown pushbutton at 2CEC*PNL602

- Depresses the HPU A shutdown pushbutton at 2CEC*PNL602 When the HPU shutdown pushbutton is depressed, the Determines power change is NOT due to a following annunciators alarm:

drifting control rod 602101, Recirc FCV A Hydraulics Inoperable Determines power change is due to Recirc FCV 602103, Recirc FCV A Backup Hydr Inoperable motion 602105, Recirc FCV A Motion Inhibit Closes the loop 'A' hydraulic fluid outside isolation valve The following plant response occurs:

If necessary, provides crew update for the RCS-FCV 'A' Stops drifting override of N2SOP08 to maintain reactor power 3988 Mwth The following computer points are generated:

RCSBC09, RCS FCV A BU Hydr Inop (Inop) Reduces reactor power to remain below 3988 RCSBC07, RCS FCV A Hydr Inop (Inop) MWth using CRAM rods or recirc. flow RCSBC05, RCS FCV A Mtn Inhib (Alarm) Monitors Offgas and Main Steam Line Rad Monitors for evidence of fuel failure

Makes plant announcement for SOP entry

Performs N2SOP08, attachment 2:

Determines that the affected loop will remain in service Informs SRO to refer to technical specification 3.4.1 for loop flow mismatch Contacts I & C to evaluate RVDT position feedback signal Determines that only one RCS FCV has been hydraulically isolated Determines that the recirc HPU was shutdown and exits N2SOP08 SRO

Provides crew update on N2SOP08 and N2SOP 101D entry 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 16 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

Directs RO to enter and execute N2SOP08 and N2 SOP101D

Provides reactivity oversight during power reduction to maintain less than rated power

Establishes reactor power band following initial reactor power reduction Role Play:

Oversees crew actions When Reactor Engineering notified, report that fuel

Provides crew transient brief / reverse brief thermal limits are being evaluated. If requested,

Provides additional plant parameter monitoring due recommend no rod withdraw operations until evaluation to plant transient affecting reactor core parameters is complete.

Provides independent position verification on the power to flow map Role Play:

Notifies reactor engineer and requests thermal limit As reactor engineering, 5 minutes after initial request to evaluation evaluate thermal limits, report back that thermal limits

Maintains crew oversight and looks ahead for have been evaluated as satisfactory.

potential issues / thresholds Note:

Maintains crew oversight and provides coaching when necessary.

Condition B: Recirculation loop flow mismatch not within limits.

Reviews Technical Specification 3.4.1 for loop flow mismatch, Cond. B, Action B.1 AND B.2.

Spec Condition Applicable Actions 3.4.1 B B.1 & B.2 Action Description Declare the recirculation loop with lower B.1 flow to be "not in operation" (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months )

Prohibit operation in the MELLLA domain or B.2 MELLLA+ domain defined in the COLR (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months )

Event

HPU for RCS FCV 'A' shutdown Termination

Reactor power is reduced 3988 MWth Criteria 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 17 of 51

NOTES Event #3 - Main Transformer Overheat Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions Ensure that the scenario initial conditions have malfunction ED16 inserted at a final value of 89°C and that transformer temperatures have stabilized Plant operating at power with the main generator and main transformer in service

Critical activities or tasks Reduce MVAR Reduce reactor power

Final (expected) operating result Operating with MVAR and reactor power reduced

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

N/A Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. None "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is performed)

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions When directed by the lead evaluator, modify the following malfunction:

TRG20 ED16, Main Transformer Loss of Cooling, Final = 101 The following computer point alarms: BOP SPMTC01, MN XFMR XM1A OIL TEMP

Recognizes / reports annunciator 852618 The following annunciator alarms:

852618, "Main XFMR 1A/1B/1C/1D Oil System Trouble" Note: BOP (N2ARP01, 852618)

The intent of the field report for temperatures is to drive

Determines computer point SPMTC01 in alarm the crew to reduce MVARs and perform a power 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 18 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions reduction. The crew may ask for more temperature

Refers to operator Actions section 3.0 for updates than are given in this sim guide. If the crew asks Transformer High Temperature for more temp updates then provide slowly rising

Determines that subsection 3.2 applies temperature indications that will drive the crew to

Dispatches Field Operator to investigate local perform a MVAR reduction and power reduction. The temperature indications requirement to perform these actions is if temp cannot be maintained below 110°C.

Role Play:

If asked, report that the red alarm light on the gas

May ask field operator if red Alarm light on gas analyzer is not lit. analyzer is lit

Refers to ARP852618 operator actions step 4.0 for high transformer temperature or loss of cooling

Evaluates N2OP68, section H (ARP852618, step 4a)

Determines that ARP 852618 step 4c applies Role Play:

When directed as field operator to investigate local main transformer oil temperatures and indications, wait 3

Acknowledges report from field operator minutes and report that local gauge temperature

Reports field information to the SRO indicates 103°C and rising slowly and it appears one bank of the cooling fans are not running. Also, if asked, both oil pumps are running.

Role Play:

When requested by the control room for a temperature

Determines that local gauge temperature will exceed update and/or when directed by the lead evaluator, 110°C report local gauge main transformer temperatures

Determines:

indicate 108°C and rising slowly. A MVAR reduction is required A rapid power reduction is required per N2SOP Role Play: 101D.

As field operator sent to attempt to get the second bank

Reports to the SRO the requirements for the MVAR of cooling fans running, wait 2 minutes and report that and power reduction.

you are unable to get the second bank of cooling fans running and that you are requesting EMD assistance.

2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 19 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Role Play:

If asked to verify breaker status for transformer cooling, report the following status for only those breakers requested:

Circuit Breaker 83 Group No. 1 Cooler on

Circuit Breaker 84 Group No. 2 Cooler on

Circuit Breaker 8P1 Pump No. 1 on

Circuit Breaker 8P2 Pump No. 2 on

2NJSUS44D normal supply breaker to 2MTXXM1A on

2NJSUS411C alternate supply breaker to 2MTX XM1A on BOP

Contacts power control to determine what value of Role Play: MVAR loading is acceptable If contacted as power control, report that a reduction in

Acknowledges report from power control MVAR to 0 MVAR's (unity) is permissible

Informs SRO that power control can support an MVAR reduction to 0 MVAR Main transformer temperatures continue to slowly rise BOP

Acknowledges direction to reduce generator MVAR loading

Using the guidance of N2OP68, reduces MVAR loading by lowering the Main Generator AC Voltage Regulator control switch position until 0 MVAR is indicated on the Main Generator MEGVARS meter

Reports to SRO that main generator VARS have been adjusted to 0 MVAR's

Contacts field operator to request local temperature indication

Acknowledges report from the field operator Role Play:

Informs the SRO of field operator report When directed as field operator to investigate local main transformer temperatures and indications, wait 1 minute and report that local gauge temperature indicates 111°C and rising slowly, but the rate of temperature rise has slowed. (Ensure that the crew reduces reactor power to

< 95% prior to giving the role play that temperatures are lowering) 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 20 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Role Play:

If contacted as reactor engineering to verify thermal limits, wait 5 minutes then report that thermal limits are satisfactory.

Main transformer temperatures continue to slowly rise ATC (N2SOP101D)

Acknowledges direction to enter N2SOP101D to reduce power to preestablished value

Determines that Core flow is > 60 mlbm/hr

Determines that core power/flow is not above the MELLLA+ boundary

Determines that Reactor Manual Control is available

Lowers reactor power to preestablished power level using recirculation flow control valves and/or CRAM rods

Informs SRO that power reduction has stopped and power is at preestablished power level Main transformer temperatures begin to slowly lower BOP

Makes plant announcement Places the Gaitronics in Merge.

Sounds the Station Alarm for approximately 10 seconds.

Announces the entry into N2SOP101D due to rising main transformer temperatures Removes the Gaitronics from Merge.

Verifies the opposite Unit heard announcement Role Play:

When directed as field operator to investigate local main

Acknowledges report from the SRO to contact the field operator for local main transformer transformer temperatures and indications, wait 1 minute temperature and report that local gauge temperature indicates 112°C

Contacts field operator to report main transformer and lowering slowly and that he will inform the control local temperature indication room when temperatures lower below 110°C.

Acknowledges report from field operator that main transformer temperatures are lowering slowly

Informs SRO that main transformer temperatures are slowly lowering.

5 minutes after the above role play is made or when SRO directed by the lead instructor, delete the following Acknowledges report from crew of receipt of malfunction: annunciator 852618 Acknowledges field report from RO 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 21 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

ED16, Main Transformer Loss of Cooling Acknowledges report from RO of the need to reduce MVAR loading and reduce reactor power per N2SOP 101D Confers with the SRO of ARP requirements Makes control room update for the entry into N2SOP 101D.

Directs RO to contact power control for guidance to reduce MVAR loading Acknowledges power control report from RO Directs RO to reduce generator MVAR's to 0 MVAR Acknowledges report that main generator VARS have been adjusted to 0 MVAR's Acknowledges field operator report from RO concerning transformer temperatures Directs RO to enter N2SOP101D to reduce power to a preestablished value Provides crew update for the entry into N2SOP101D Acknowledges report from RO that reactor power has been lowered to preestablished power level and that the power reduction has been stopped Directs Field operator contacted to investigate main transformer temperature Acknowledges report that main transformer temperature is lowering slowly Establishes reactor power band Event

Main Transformer temperature has been lowered using the guidance of N2ARP01 and Termination N2OP68 as applicable Criteria 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 22 of 51

NOTES Event #4 Isolable RCIC Steam Leak in Pipe Chase Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions Plant at power with RCIC operable and available Verify the following malfunction is inserted:

RC11, RCIC Isolation Failure, Final = True

Critical activities or tasks Manually isolate RCIC

Final (expected) operating result Operating with RCIC isolated

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

N/A Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. Given the plant with an isolable RCIC steam leak in the reactor building, the crew "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is will manually isolate RCIC prior to any area temperature reaching 212°F in performed) accordance with N2EOPSC.

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Booth Operator When directed by the lead evaluator, insert the following malfunction:

TRG2 RC16, RCIC Steam Leak into RCIC Pump Room, Ramp = 5:00, Final = 15 The following plant response occurs after event initiation: BOP RCIC Pump room Steam leak develops

Silences, acknowledges and reports annunciator 601332.

Approximately 2 minutes after event initiation, the

Acknowledges report to monitor Secondary following annunciator alarms: Containment temperatures 601332, RCIC Equip Room Temperature High

Monitors secondary containment temperatures on panel 632 & 642, Using N2EOP6.28, Tables 1, 2 & 3

Performs ARP 601332 actions:

Determines that RCIC is not being used for Rx.

Level/Pressure control Using trip units on 2CEC*PNL632 AND 2CEC*PNL642, monitors RCIC Room 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 23 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions temperatures to confirm the high temperature alarm.

Determines that RCIC Room temperatures are high OR rising, and verifies running HVR*UC421A AND *UC412B, RCIC Room Unit Coolers, at 2CEC*PNL870 AND 2CEC*PNL871.

Contacts Radiation Protection and dispatches an operator to the RCIC Room (Rx. 175) to check for steam leaks

Determines that the following trip units are in alarm and are rising:

2LDS*TRSH2A(1) (RCIC Pump Room) 2LDS*TRSH2A(2) (RB Pipe Chase 206) 2LDS*TRSH2B(1) (RCIC Pump Room) 2LDS*TRSH2B(2) (RB Pipe Chase 206)

Updates the SRO copy of N2EOP6.28 Table 3

Provides crew update of the rising secondary containment temperatures Approximately 3 minutes and 30 seconds after event

Silences, acknowledges and reports annunciator 601341 initiation, the following annunciator alarms:

Determines that 2LDS*TRSH2A/B(1) & (2) have 601341, RCIC Equip Room Temperature Hi-Hi reached their trip setpoints

Determines using N2EOP6.28, Tables 1, 2 & 3 that Approximately 5 minutes after event initiation the RCIC should have isolated following annunciator alarms:

Provides crew update for the temperature reaching 601333, RCIC Pipe Chase/Reactor Vent Temp High its isolation setpoint and that RCIC should have isolated When RCIC automatic high temperature isolation setpoint

Verifies the following isolations occurred:

is reached, the following malfunction becomes apparent: ICS*MOV121 & 128 & 170

Determines that ICS*MOV121 & 128 remain open RC11, RCIC Isolation Failure, Final = True and failed to isolate

Provides crew update for the failure of RCIC to isolate

Manually isolates RCIC by closing ICS*MOV121 &

128

Reports ICS*MOV121 & 128 indicate full closed

If directed, evacuates the reactor building SRO

May direct the reactor building evacuated

Evaluates entry into N2EOPSC Area Temperature above an Isolation setpoint 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 24 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

Provides crew update for entry into N2EOPSC

Directs RO to monitor secondary containment temperatures

Performs N2EOPSC actions:

Evaluates Both the temperature / Radiation Leg and the Water Level Leg of N2EOPSC Determines that no action is required for the Water Level Leg Continues with the Temperature / Radiation Leg of N2EOPSC Determines that an area temperature is above its isolation setpoint

Acknowledges report that RCIC failed to isolate automatically

Continues with N2EOPSC actions:

Determines need to isolate all discharges into affected areas except systems needed for fire fighting or other EOP actions Directs RO to attempt manual isolation of RCIC

Acknowledges report that RCIC is isolated Note: SRO

Evaluates Technical Specifications Spec Condition Applicable Actions

Evaluates Tech. Spec. 3.5.3 Condition A 3.5.3 A A.1 & A.2

Evaluates Tech. Spec. 3.3.6.1 Condition A, B, C & F Action Description Immediately verifies by administrative

Evaluates reportability per LSAA1400 50.72(b)(3)(v)

A.1 means that HPCS is operable section 3.2.7 Restore RCIC System to OPERABLE status A.2 within 14 days Spec Condition Applicable Actions 3.3.6.1 A A.1 Action Description A.1 Place channel in trip. (24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months )

Spec Condition Applicable Actions 3.3.6.1 B B.1 Action Description B.1 Restore isolation capability. (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months )

Spec Condition Applicable Actions 3.3.6.1 C C.1 Action Description Enter the Condition referenced in Table C.1 3.3.6.11 for the channel. (Immediately) 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 25 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Spec Condition Applicable Actions 3.3.6.1 F F.1 Action Description Isolate the affected penetration flow F.1 path(s). (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months )

Event

RCIC has been manually isolated Termination Criteria 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 26 of 51

NOTES Event #5 - IAS Mini Loop Cooling Pump Trip, Standby Fails To Start Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions 2CCPP2A Pump in operation, 2CCPP2B in Standby

Critical activities or tasks Start 2CCPP2B

Final (expected) operating result Operating with 2CCPP2A secured and 2CCPP2B in service

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

N/A Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. None "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is performed)

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Booth Operator:

When directed by the lead evaluator, insert the following malfunctions:

TRG3 CW12B, 2CCPP2B Fails to AutoStart, Final =

True BOP CW13A, 2CCPP2A Pump Trip, Final = True

Silences, acknowledges and reports annunciators 851259 and 851260

Provides crew update for loss of the running The following plant response occurs after event initiation: instrument air mini loop cooling water pump.

RBCLCW Feed Pump 2A for Instrument Air

Recognizes/Reports failure of the standby pump to Compressor Heat Exchangers (CCP-P2A) trips auto start Loss of instrument air compressor cooling occurs

Acknowledges SRO direction to enter and execute N2SOP19 2CCP-P2B fails to auto start

Performs N2SOP19 actions:

Evaluates If/Then statements and determines The following annunciators alarm:

that none currently apply 851259, Instr Air Compressor Clg Wtr Flow Low Evaluates 3 legs concurrently (Header Pressure, 851260, Instr Air Compressor Cooling Sys Trouble Compressor, Compressor Cooling)

Determines that the Compressor Cooling leg directly applies 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 27 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions The following computer points are generated: Determines that compressors have lost cooling CCPFC05, RBCLCW P2A/B Dis Hdr Flo (Low) Evaluates If/Then statement:

CCPPC17, RBCLCW Pmp P2A,B Suct Pr (Low) - If any RBCLC Pump can be started, Then Start RBCLC Pump P2B When CCP-P2B is manually started the following annunciator clears: - Manually starts CCPP2B 851259, Instr Air Compressor Clg Wtr Flow Low Verify cooling is restored to air compressors Determines that it is not required to reset The following computer point clears: compressor local fault(s)per N2OP19, Section H.8.0.

CCPFC05, RBCLCW P2A/B Dis Hdr Flo (Low)

Performs N2SOP19 Attachment 1 Exits N2SOP19 AND enters N2OP19, Section F.1.0.

Note:

The crew may choose to start 2CCPP2B using the ARP and not enter N2SOP19. The scenario guide is written as if the crew enters and executed N2SOP19.

Role Play:

Acknowledges report from the field and provides the As field operator dispatched locally to investigate the loss information to the crew during the reverse brief of 2CCPP2A, wait 1 minute and report that there are no visible indications as to the cause of the pump trip both locally at the pump and at the power supply. If asked, also report that pump pressure and flow are normal with 2CCPP2B running and that you are unsure of why 2CCP P2B failed to start. Head tank level is in normal range.

SRO

Acknowledges loss of the running instrument air mini loop cooling water pump with the failure of the standby pump to auto start report from RO

Provides crew update for the entry into N2SOP19

Directs RO to enter and execute N2SOP19

Oversees crew actions.

(If performed) Provides crew update for N2SOP19 entry

Directs the RO to implement the appropriate ARPs and/or N2SOP19.

Provides crew transient brief / reverse brief

May direct CCPP2B protected 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 28 of 51

NOTES Event

2CCPP2B has been started Termination Criteria 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 29 of 51

NOTES Event #6 - Rising Main Turbine Vibration Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions Reactor at power

Critical activities or tasks Scram the reactor

Final (expected) operating result Reactor scrammed

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

N/A Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. None "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is performed)

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Booth Operator:

When directed by the lead evaluator, insert the following malfunction:

TRG4 TU02, Main Turbine Bearing High Vibration, Ramp = 10 minutes, Final = 15 The following plant response occurs after event initiation: BOP/ATC Turbine bearings 3, 5, 6, 7 & 8 will experience an

Recognizes/ Reports Turbine Vibration Hi increasing vibrational magnitude greater than the Annunciator 851140 normal reading for a given rpm The further removed a bearing is from the center of the disturbance, the less pronounced will be the vibrational increase of that bearing The increasing vibration will be indicated on 2TMI-NBR134 located on P842 The following annunciators alarm approximately 2.5 minutes after event initiation:

851140, Turbine Generator Vibration High 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 30 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions The following computer points are generated approximately 3.5 minutes after event initiation:

TMINC05, TURB GEN BRG 5 VIB TMINC06, TURB GEN BRG 6 VIB Role Play BOP (ARP 851140)

As EO if directed to check out main turbine bearings and

Monitors turbine vibration Lube Oil, respond that you will obtain RP support and

Makes station announcement brief for High Rad Area entry and check out the turbine

When it becomes apparent that vibration will or has bearings. exceeded 12 mils, recognizes that a main turbine trip is required IAW with N2SOP21 SRO

Acknowledges crew report

Reviews action levels in 851140 Any Bearing Vibration 10 mils for 15 Minutes, trip Main Turbine Any Bearing Vibration is 12 mils, trip Main Turbine Any Bearing Vibration is >9 mils with >3 mils/minute rate of change, trip Main Turbine IF Bearing Vibration is projected to exceed 30 mils following a Turbine Trip THEN break condenser vacuum IAW N2OP21, Subsection E.5.4

Provides crew update for the entry into N2SOP21

Directs RO to enter and execute N2SOP21

Directs/concurs with requirement to trip the main turbine

Directs RO to scram the reactor

May order a precautionary evacuation of the Turbine Building ATC (N2SOP21)

Arms AND depresses BOTH Manual Scram pushbuttons on either side of 2CEC*PNL603.

Places the Reactor Mode Switch in the SHUTDOWN position 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 31 of 51

NOTES Event

The reactor has been scrammed Termination Criteria 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 32 of 51

NOTES Event #7, 8 & 9 - Low power ATWS, loss of valid level indication, RPV flooding (ATWS leg).

Event Enter important information about the event here such as:

Information

Presumed or required initial plant operating conditions Reactor has been scrammed Verify the following malfunctions are inserted before the event is initiated:

AD08B, ADS Valve N2 Supply Severed (MSS*PSV127), Final = True

DG04A, EDG1 Fail to UV / LOCA AutoStart, Final = True

RD070219, Control Rod FailureStuck, Final = True

RD070615, Control Rod FailureStuck, Final = True

RD17Z, RD17 For All Banks, Final = 02

RC01, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Auto Start Failure, Final = True

Critical activities or tasks RPV Blowdown performed RPV level raised to the elevation of the main Steam Lines

Final (expected) operating result Reactor shutdown and depressurized

Mitigation Strategy code (if applicable)

DMSAT5 Critical Tasks If this performance objective is used in an evaluated scenario and there are critical tasks (Ensure the task action is performed in this objective, list the critical task(s) below:

bolded and italicized in the

1. Given a condition where RPV Flooding is warranted with all control rods not full in, "Operator Actions" column where the critical task is the crew will terminate and prevent all RPV injection except boron, CRD and RCIC performed) prior to opening ADS valves and until RPV pressure lowers below the MSCP in accordance with N2EOPC4.

2. Given a condition where RPV Flooding is warranted with all control rods not full in, the crew will open 7 SRVs within 15 minutes of the indications of unknown RPV water level in accordance with N2EOPC4.

3. Given a condition where RPV Flooding is warranted with all control rods not full in, all 7 SRVs open, and RPV pressure < 178 psig; the crew will slowly raise injection to flood the RPV to the main steam lines in accordance with N2EOPC4.

Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Note: RO When the Manual Scram Pushbuttons are armed and

Makes scram report by reporting the status of the depressed, all rods with the exception of 2 which remain following:

2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 33 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions at position 48, will insert to position 02 and power will Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN (Yes) lower to approximately 1%. APRMs downscale (Yes)

RPV pressure & trend MSIVs open (Yes)

RPV water level & trend FW Pumps running (Yes)

Control Rods full in (No)

When the RPS logic is tripped by manually tripping RPS

Performs N2SOP101C immediate actions (rp:d535==1 .AND. rp:d536==1), the following malfunction becomes active:

TRG5 MS04, Steam Line Rupture Inside Primary Containment, Ramp 5:00, Final = 2 SRO

Repeats back scram report to RO (OATC)

Oversees / directs crew actions RO

Makes plant announcement for N2SOP101C entry Crew Drywell Pressure reaches 1.68 psig

Recognizes / reports the following:

N2EOPRPV entry (Reactor power, Drywell pressure)

N2EOPPC entry (Drywell pressure)

When drywell pressure reaches 1.68 psig the following Div I EDG failed to start on LOCA signal malfunction becomes apparent:

DG04A, EDG1 Fail to UV/LOCA AutoStart, Final = True EAL Criteria Met RO Indications available for Alert, EAL FA1:

Manually starts Div I EDG using control switch at 2CEC*PNL852 Fission Product Barrier Matrix:

RC3.1

-OR-

RC4.2 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 34 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions TIME: _____________

SRO

Enters & executes N2EOPRPV Informs crew of N2EOPRPV entry Determines the following:

- Scram was initiated

- Failure to scram has occurred

Exits N2EOPRPV and enters & executes N2EOPC5 Informs crew that reactor has failed to scram, exiting N2EOPRPV, and entering N2EOPC5 SRO (N2EOPC5)

Directs inhibiting ADS

Directs preventing HPCS injection

May direct preventing Main Turbine trip from RCIC (N2EOP6.2)

May direct the actions of N2SOP21 be placed on hold until the reactor is shutdown

Concurrently enters & executes all legs of procedure RO (N2EOPHC Attachment 7)

Inhibits ADS:

Places DIV I ADS AUTOMATIC INITIATION DISABLE switch to ON and verifies the associated white light is lit Places DIV II ADS AUTOMATIC INITIATION DISABLE switch to ON and verifies the associated white light is lit Verifies 601521 DIVISION I ADS AUTOMATIC INITIATION DISABLED is lit Verifies 601522 DIVISION II ADS AUTOMATIC INITIATION DISABLED is lit

Informs SRO that ADS is inhibited RO

Prevents HPCS injection by placing control switch for 2CSH*P1 in PTL 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 35 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Informs SRO that HPCS injection is prevented Role Play: RO (N2EOP6.2)

If contacted to defeat Main Turbine trip from RCIC per N2

If directed, prevents Main Turbine trip from RCIC EOP6.2 Section 6.1, insert the following remote: Removes relay E51AK102 in 2CEC*PNL613 Delivers relay to SRO TRG6 RC10, Defeat RCIC/MT Trip Intlk (EOP6 Att Informs SRO that Main Turbine trip from RCIC is 2), Final = Defeated defeated Then report that relay E51AK102 in 2CEC*PNL613 has been pulled.

SRO (N2EOPC5)

Power Leg Verifies Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN Directs initiating RRCS (N2EOP6.13)

The following plant response occurs after event initiation: RO (N2SOP21, if continuing)

Turbine trip goes to completion

Trips the Main Turbine by depressing both Turbine MSV, CV, CIVs close Trip pushbuttons simultaneously on PNL851.

TBVs open to control pressure

Verifies the following:

House loads transfer House loads transfer MWe drop to ~0 MWe drop to ~0 R230 and R925 open R230 and R925 open 41 M & E open 41 M & E open MDS1/23N open MDS1/23N open Carries out remaining actions from N2SOP21

As required initiates Condenser Neck Spray by opening 2CNMMOV126 Adjust 2TMLHIC132 to control Oil temp at appox 85°F

Verifies the following:

2MSSAOV92A closed 2MSSAOV92B closed 2ASSSTV112 open 2ESSSTV104 closed Heater Drain Pumps stopped

Starts 2TMLP3

Starts 2TMLP4 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 36 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

Verifies 2TMLP6A through P6H running

Verifies Turning Gear control switch in 'Normafter Stop'

Verifies Steam drains open

Verifies 2CNMAOV101 & 109 closed RO (N2EOP6.13)

Initiates RRCS:

Arms and depresses the following pushbuttons (2CEC*PNL603):

- DIVISION I CHANNEL A MANUAL INITIATION

- DIVISION I CHANNEL B MANUAL INITIATION

- DIVISION II CHANNEL A MANUAL INITIATION

- DIVISION II CHANNEL B MANUAL INITIATION Ensures the following (2CEC*PNL603):

- Division I ARI INIT amber light on

- Division II ARI INIT amber light on

Informs SRO that RRCS has been initiated but ARI failed to insert control rods Role Play: SRO (N2EOPC5)

If directed to defeat the RCIC level 8 logic, wait 1 minute

Acknowledges RO report that control rods are at then manually insert the following remote: position 02 and two are at position 48

Level Leg:

RC02A, RCIC Level 8 Trip Defeat:Withdraw Trip Directs verification of auto actions per N2EOP Units N693A,E, Final = Defeated 6.1 for isolations, ECCS, and DGs Determines the Main Condenser is available May direct bypassing the following isolations per N2EOP6.10

- MSIV low water level

- Offgas high radiation RO (N2EOP6.1)

As time permits, verifies auto actions occurred as expected

Informs SRO when auto actions verified Role Play RO (N2EOP6.10)

If contacted to defeat MSIV low water level isolation per

If directed, defeats MSIV low water level isolations at N2EOP6.10, insert the following remotes: 2CEC*PNL609 (611)

Installs the following EOP Jumpers:

2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 37 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions TRG7 MS06A, Defeat Level One Isolation of MSIVs - #20 from relay B22HK148A to jumper block (Jumper K148A), Final = Defeated (P609)

- #18 from relay B22HK148C to jumper block MS06B, Defeat Level One Isolation of MSIVs (P609)

(Jumper K148B), Final = Defeated

- #13 from relay B22HK148B to jumper block MS06C, Defeat Level One Isolation of MSIVs (P611)

(Jumper K148C), Final = Defeated - #12 from relay B22HK148D to jumper block (P611)

MS06D, Defeat Level One Isolation of MSIVs Verifies 2IAS*SOV166, LOCA OVERRIDE VLV (Jumper K148D), Final = Defeated switch in OVERRIDE (P851)

Verifies 2IAS*SOV184, LOCA OVERRIDE VLV Wait 1 minute and report that the MSIV low water level switch in OVERRIDE (P851) jumpers have been installed. Verifies the following valves are open:

- 2IAS*SOV166 (P851)

Role Play - 2IAS*SOV184 (P851)

If contacted as field operator to defeat the Offgas high IF required, defeats OFG system high radiation radiation isolation per N2OP42 Attachment 6, wait 1 isolation AND restores OFG system per N2OP minute and insert the following remote: 42, Attachment 6

- Dispatches field operator to lift lead at 2OFG TRG8 OG03, Off Gas High Radiation Isolation IPNL122 Defeated, Final = Defeated

Informs SRO that MSIV low water level isolation is defeated Then report that the Offgas high radiation isolation has If defeated, informs SRO that OFG high radiation been defeated. isolation is defeated Crew

Recognizes / reports the following:

N2EOPRPV entry (RPV water level)

N2EOPPC entry (Drywell Pressure & Temp)

SRO

Reenters N2EOPRPV, exits N2EOPRPV, and reenters & executes N2EOPC5

Reenters & executes N2EOPPC

Informs crew of the following:

N2EOPRPV reentry, exiting N2EOPRPV, and entering N2EOPC5 N2EOPPC reentry SRO (N2EOPC5) 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 38 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

Power Leg:

Determines reactor power < 4%

Determines RCS pumps tripped Directs inserting control rods using Alternate Rod insertion methods (N2EOP6.14)

SRO (N2EOPC5)

Pressure Leg:

Determines the following:

- Drywell pressure > 1.68 psig

- No SRVs are cycling Directs RPV pressure band of 800 1000 psig using EHC

- Directs restoring pneumatics to the drywell Assigns critical parameter for monitoring /

reporting the following:

- Suppression pool temperature (110°F is a key value for BIIT)

RO

Maintains RPV pressure 800 1000 psig using EHC or appropriate pressure band using SRV's if the MSIV's close.

Restores pneumatics to the drywell using N2EOPHC attachment 7 panel 601:

At 2CEC*PNL851:

- PLACES LOCA OVERRIDE VLV IAS*SOV166 to OVERRIDE

- OPENS IAS*SOV166

- PLACES LOCA OVERRIDE VLV IAS*SOV184 to OVERRIDE

- OPENS IAS*SOV184 At 2CEC*PNL601

- PLACES LOCA OVERRIDE VLV IAS*SOV164 to OVRD

- OPENS IAS*SOV164

- PLACES LOCA OVERRIDE VLV IAS*SOV165 to OVRD

- OPENS IAS*SOV165

Periodically updates SRO on suppression pool temperature and trend 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 39 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions SRO (N2EOPC5)

Level Leg:

Directs restoring and maintaining RPV water level between 160 inches and 200 inches (Wide Range) using Condensate / Feedwater RO

Restores and maintains RPV water level between 160 inches and 200 inches using at least one of the following controllers to control Feedwater flow to the RPV:

2FWSHIC1010A, B, or C Drywell Pressure rises to 10 psig SRO

Performs N2EOPPC primary containment pressure leg actions:

Determines cannot maintain containment pressure below 1.68 psig Determines that suppression chamber and Drywell spray is required Directs RO to verify the following:

- Both recirculation pumps tripped

- All drywell unit coolers tripped Determines that suppression pool water level is below EL 217 ft.

Determines that suppression chamber and drywell sprays are warranted Directs RO to place RHR A or B in suppression chamber and drywell sprays RO

Verifies and reports that both recirculation pumps are tripped

Verifies and reports that all drywell unit coolers are tripped

Acknowledges SRO direction to place RHR A/B in suppression chamber and drywell sprays in accordance with N2EOP6.22

Reviews N2EOP6.22 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 40 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

Performs N2EOP6.22, section 6.2.2 Verifies an initiation signal present.

Opens SWP*MOV90A/B (may be delayed until after sprays are in service).

Verifies RHS*MOV24A/B overridden closed.

Verifies closed RHS*FV38A/B Verifies RHR A/B pump running.

Opens RHS*MOV33A/B and verifies flow (If suppression chamber spray is required concurrently with drywell sprays).

Opens RHS*MOV15A/B Opens RHS*MOV25A/B Verifies the proper operation of 2RHS*MOV4A/B Verifies spray header flow is approximately 7,450 gpm Verifies open 2SWP*MOV90A/B Throttles open 2SWP*MOV33A/B to establish approximately 7,450 gpm When possible closes 2RHS*MOV8A/B Starts 2SWP*RE23A/B SRO

Acknowledges report that RHR A/B is in suppression chamber and drywell spray Note: Crew Inserting malfunction RR50 below should be performed

Recognizes / reports the following:

when drywell temperature has peaked and is beginning to All RPV water level instruments are experiencing lower due to containment sprays and/or when directed by reference leg flashing the lead evaluator.

(OR this will occur on event trigger, as described below, if crew is slow to spray)

When average drywell temperature > 250°F (dwtgas>250), the following malfunction becomes active:

TRG9 RR50, Reference Leg Flashing, Final = True 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 41 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions EAL Criteria Met Indications available for Site Area Emergency, EAL FS1:

FC2.3 RC2.2 Time:______

SRO (N2EOPC5)

Level Leg Determines RPV water level is unknown Exits Level and Pressure legs and enters &

executes N2EOPC4

Informs crew of the following:

Exiting Level & Pressure legs of N2EOPC5, and entering N2EOPC4 SRO (N2EOPC4)

Determines reactor will not remain shutdown without boron

Directs terminating and preventing all injection except boron, CRD, and RCIC 2CEC*PNL601 2CEC*PNL603 RO (N2EOPHC Attachment 2)

Acknowledges direction to terminate and prevent injection at panel 603

Verifies feedwater injection terminated and prevented at panel 603 using T & P hard card (N2 EOPHC, Attachment 2):

IF desired, TERMINATES AND PREVENTS from DFWLCS HMI as follows:

- At the lower right hand corner of the DFWLCS HMI, SELECTS DFWLCS MODE 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 42 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

- SELECTS ATWS CONTROL MODE

- SELECTS TERMINATE AND PREVENT

- SELECTS CONFIRM OR VERIFIES the following controllers in manual with 0% output

- 2FWSHIC1600

- 2FWSHIC1010A

- 2FWSHIC1010B

- 2FWSHIC1010C

- 2FWSLIC1055A

- 2FWSLIC1055B

- 2CNMLIK1137

Informs SRO that injection terminated and prevented at 2CEC*PNL603 RO (N2EOPHC Attachment 4)

Acknowledges direction to terminate and prevent low pressure ECCS injection on panel 601

Terminates and prevents low pressure ECCS injection using the Terminate & Prevent hard card (N2EOP HC, Attachment 4):

PLACES CSL*P1, PMP 1, control switch in PULL TOLOCK IF a LPCI A/LPCS initiation signal is NOT present, THEN ARMS AND DEPRESSES LPCI A/LPCS MANUAL INITIATION pushbutton CLOSES AND, IF possible, OVERRIDES:

- 2RHS*MOV24A, LPCI A INJECTION VLV

- 2CSL*MOV104, PMP 1 INJECTION VLV PLACES RHS*P1C, PMP 1C, control switch in PULLTOLOCK.

IF a LPCI B & C initiation signal is NOT present, THEN ARMS AND DEPRESSES LPCI B & C MANUAL INITIATION pushbutton CLOSES AND, IF possible, OVERRIDES:

- 2RHS*MOV24B, LPCI B INJECTION VLV

- 2RHS*MOV24C, LPCI C INJECTION VLV

Informs SRO that injection terminated and prevented at 2CEC*PNL601 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 43 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions When RPV pressure < 250 psig (thpdome<265), the SRO (N2EOPC4) following malfunctions become active:

Determines suppression pool level > 192' elevation

Directs opening all 7 ADS valves TRG10 RR27, RPV Level Instruments All Fail Upscale, Final = True When RPV pressure < 250 psig (thpdome<265), the following malfunction will be deleted:

RR50, Reference Leg Flashing, Final = True RO (N2EOPHC Attachment 8)

Acknowledges direction to open all 7 ADS valves.

Opens all 7 ADS valves using N2EOPHC attachment When ADS Logic is actuated and 7 ADS valves are opened, 8:

the following malfunction becomes apparent: Determines that no SRVs are stuck open and that an ECCS pump is operating AD08B, ADS Valve N2 Supply Severed INITIATE Blowdown using ONE of the methods (MSS*PSV127), Final = True below:

- Arms and depresses all ADS LOGIC pushbuttons for BOTH divisions:

o ADS LOGIC "A" manual pushbutton o ADS LOGIC "E" manual pushbutton o ADS LOGIC "B" manual pushbutton o ADS LOGIC "F" manual pushbutton

- TAKES control switches to OPEN at EITHER 2CEC*PNL628 or 2CEC*PNL631 UNTIL a total of 7 SRVs are open:

o MSS*PSV137 o MSS*PSV127 o MSS*PSV126 o MSS*PSV121 o MSS*PSV134 o MSS*PSV130 o MSS*PSV129

Recognizes/reports that one ADS SRV did not open due to loss of nitrogen

Opens/reports one additional nonADS SRV

Confirms seven SRVs open 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 44 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

Verifies ADS SRV accumulators are 150 psig

Informs SRO that 7 SRVs are open and RPV pressure is lowering Crew

Recognizes / reports the following:

All RPV water level instruments are upscale SRO (N2EOPC4)

Directs suppression chamber and drywell sprays secured on RHR A/B

Directs defeating Group 5 isolation for 2RHS*MOV40A(B) per N2EOP6.30

Acknowledges RO report that one ADS valve failed to open and that one additional nonADS SRV has been opened.

Determines 7 SRVs are open

When RPV pressure < 178 psig, directs flooding the RPV to main steam lines using Condensate /

Feedwater and RHR through Shutdown cooling injection to maintain at least 2 SRVs open and RPV pressure > 178 psig RO

Secures drywell and suppression chamber sprays on RHR A/B

Raises injection to RPV using at least one of the following controllers to fill the RPV to the main steam lines:

2FWSHIC1010A, B, or C Role Play RO (N2EOP6.30)

If contacted to defeat the Group 5 isolation for

Verifies closed the following valves:

2RHS*MOV40A(B) per N2EOP6.30, insert the following 2RHS*MOV15A(B) malfunction: 2RHS*MOV8A(B), if possible 2RHS*MOV33A(B)

TRG11 RH08, Group 5 Isolation Failure 2RHS*MOV38A(B)

(RHS*MOV122/113), Final = True 2RHS*MOV34A(B) 2RHS*MOV40A(B)

Then report Group 5 isolation for 2RHS*MOV40A(B)

At 2CEC*PNL623(622) performs the following:

defeated Lifts and tapes lead on terminal point BB58(62) 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 45 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Install EOP Jumper #24(9) on terminal points BB 49(41) AND AA72(60)

Informs SRO that Group 5 isolation for 2RHS*MOV40A(B) defeated RO

Verifies reactor pressure has been reduced to less than 178 psig

Throttles open RHS*MOV40A(B), SDC A(B) RETURN (2CEC*PNL601) to a maximum of 7450 gpm on E12 R603A(B), RHR A TOTAL FLOW meter to control RPV water level

Reports to the US injection to the vessel is established

Throttles open SWP*MOV33A(B), HEAT EXCHANGER 1A(B) SVCE WTR OUTLET VLV THROTTLE to establish flow NOT to exceed 7400 gpm on E12R602A(B),

SVCE WTR TO RHR A(B) HX FLOW meter Note: RO (N2EOP6.14)

The timing of when the crew will determine when the

Acknowledges direction to insert control rods per reactor is shutdown with no boron injected is not certain, EOP6.14 so the crew may insert control rods per N2EOP6.14 until

Performs N2EOP6.14 flow chart actions:

reactor shutdown is confirmed and then may or may not Determines that the 8 White Scram Solenoid back out of the actions to insert control rods per N2EOP Power Lights are off 6.14. Both sets of procedural actions (N2EOP6.14 and Determines that the Blue SCRAM Lights are Lit on N2SOP101C/N2OP30) to insert control rods are Full Core Display included in this guide for evaluator reference. Concurrently performs the following:

- Additional manual scrams Goes to A AND

- Insert Control Rods Goes to B Dons appropriate electrical PPE DEenergizes/Fails Closed ARI Solenoids

- In Relay Room, C22P001, Bay B, using L660 key, north side, lower door (see Figure 7), pulls 20 amp fuses:

o C22AF5A o C22AF6A

- In Relay Room, C22P002, Bay B, using L660 key, north side, lower door (see Figure 8), pulls Role Play: 20 amp fuses:

2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 46 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions When requested to defeat ARI, insert the following o C22AF5B malfunctions: o C22AF6B Defeats RPS interlocks:

TRG12 RP14A, RRCS ARI Failure / Defeated, Final = - At 2CEC*PNL609, using PA235 key, places True keylock switch C72AS10A, RPS A1 SCRAM LOGIC BYPASS in BYPASS RP14B, RRCS ARI Failure / Defeated, Final =

- At 2CEC*PNL609, using PA235 key, places True keylock switch C72AS10C, RPS A2 SCRAM LOGIC BYPASS in BYPASS Then report ARI function is defeated. - At 2CEC*PNL611, using PA235 key, places keylock switch C72AS10B, RPS B1 SCRAM Role Play: LOGIC BYPASS in BYPASS When requested to defeat RPS, insert the following - At 2CEC*PNL611, using PA235 key, places malfunction: keylock switch C72AS10D, RPS B2 SCRAM LOGIC BYPASS in BYPASS Resets RPS:

TRG13 RP02, Reactor Protection System Failure To

- Resets REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC A, B, C Scram Automatic, Final = True and D

- Verifies the following:

Then report RPS auto trips are defeated o Eight white PILOT SCRAM VALVE SOLENOIDS lights are lit.

o 603306, CRD Scram Valve Pilot Air Header Press High/Low is clear.

o 2RDS*AOV124/132, Scram Discharge Volume Vent Valves open.

o 2RDS*AOV123/130, Scram Discharge Volume Drain Valves open.

o Scram Discharge Volume is drained (603130, 603109, or 603409 clear).

Waits for scram discharge volume (SDV) to drain Performs manual Control Rod Insertion (Performs Concurrently with Manual Scrams) while the SDV drains:

- Verifies 2RDSP1A, CRD Pump 1A, running.

- Verifies 2RDSP1B, CRD Pump 1B, running

- Places 2RDSFC107, CRD Flow Control, in MANUAL (M).

- WHILE maintaining 2RDSP1A AND 2RDSP1B current < 40 amps, OPENS 2RDSFC107

- Closes 2RDSPV101, Drive Wtr Press Control MOV, to maximize Drive Water P 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 47 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions

- At 2CEC*PNL603, places the RWM in BYPASS with an SHH 5366 key (SM Key Locker Tag

151)

- IF NOT performing Additional Manual Scrams, and IF needed to raise system flow OR Drive Water P, closes 2RDSV28 Charging Water Header Isol

- Using Figure 2 Rod Insertion First Sequence, starting with a control rod at OR near the center:

o Selects a NOT FULL IN control rod o Depresses the RMCS CONTINUOUS INSERT pushbutton UNTIL control rod motion stops o Repeats Steps 1 AND 2, working outward in a spiral pattern rapidly inserting control rods

- Using Figure 3 Rod Insertion Second Sequence, starting with a control rod at OR near the center:

o Select a NOT FULL IN control rod o Depress the RMCS CONTINUOUS INSERT pushbutton UNTIL control rod motion stops o Repeat Steps 1 AND 2, working outward in a spiral pattern rapidly inserting control rods

Informs US when control rod motion is achieved RO

Inserts the SRMs and IRMs and determines that the IRMs are reading less than range 6 and informs the SRO SRO

Acknowledges RO report that IRMs are reading less than range 6

Reevaluates N2EOPC5 Power Leg actions:

Determines that the reactor is shutdown AND No boron has been injected and Enters the Scram procedure (N2SOP101C) and exits the power leg of N2EOPC5 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 48 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Directs RO to insert control rods per N2SOP 101C RO

Acknowledges the order to insert control rods per N2SOP101C

Performs the actions of N2SOP101C to insert control rods References the IF/THEN Statement that says "All rods NOT confirmed at 00, AND N2EOPC5 Power leg is NOT currently entered THEN N2OP 30, Section H.14.0" At 2CEC*PNL603, verifies the following pumps are running:

- RDSP1A, CRD PUMP 1A

- RDSP1B, CRD PUMP 1B At 2CEC*PNL603, places controller 2RDSFC107, CRD FLOW CONTROL, in MANUAL.

Depresses OPEN pushbutton on 2RDSFC107 UNTIL controller output meter shows 100% OR RDS pump motor current approaches 40 amps.

At 2CEC*PNL603, checks RDS system flow rises on C12R606, CRD SYSTEM FLOW o Closes 2RDS PV101, DRIVE WTR PRESS CONTROL MOV, to maximize drive water P. (2CEC*PNL603)

Ensures RDS drive water P rises on C12R602, DRIVE WTR DIFF PRESS. (2CEC*PNL603)

IF needed to raise system flow OR Drive Water P, THEN closes 2RDSV28, CHARGING WATER HEADER ISOL. (Rx Bldg, EL261, RDS Flow Control Station, above RDSFLT2A/2B)

At 2CEC*PNL603, using an SHH 5366 key, bypasses RWM by taking RWM Operator Console BYPASS/OPERATE/TEST switch to BYPASS position At 2CEC*PNL603, starting with a control rod at OR near center, selects a control rod to be driven in on Rod Select Matrix.

2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 49 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Inserts control rods by depressing AND holding Reactor Manual Control System (RMCS)

CONTINUOUS INSERT pushbutton UNTIL control rod motion stops.

SRO (N2EOPPC)

Oversees / directs crew actions

Concurrently enters & executes all legs of procedure Prioritizes actions in Primary Containment Pressure and Suppression Pool Temperature Legs

May direct starting a 5th service water pump

May direct starting RHR A(B) in suppression pool cooling, suppression pool sprays, and/or drywell sprays if not already performed RO

If directed, verifies a 5th service water pump per N2 OP31 Section H.12.0

Informs SRO that 5th service water pump is operating Booth Operator: RO (N2OP31 Section F.4.0)

If requested to place SWP radiation monitor RE23A in

If directed, places RHR A(B) in supp pool cooling service, insert the following remotes: Notifies Shift Manager to declare RHS A(B) LPCI mode inoperable TRG14 RM02040, SWP23A SWP From RHR A Ht Directs Radiation Protection Dept. to start Exch Rad Monit Online, Final = Online radiation monitor 2SWP*RE23A(B)

RM03040, SWP23A SWP From RHR A Ht Opens 2SWP*MOV90A(B)

Exch Rad Monit Power, Final = On Throttles open SWP*MOV33A(B) to establish 7400 gpm as indicated on E12R602A(B)

If requested to place SWP radiation monitor RE23B in Verifies 2RHS*MOV24A(B) closed service, insert the following remotes: Makes plant announcement for the start of 2RHS*P1A(B)

TRG15 RM02041, SWP23B Current Radiation Level Starts 2RHS*P1A(B)

Online, Final = Online Verifies 2RHS*MOV4A(B) open RM03041, SWP23B Current Radiation Level Throttles open 2RHS*FV38A(B) to establish ~

Power, Final = On 7450 gpm RHR A(B) total flow Verifies 2RHS*MOV4A(B) closed Then report 2SWP*RE23A is in service 2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 50 of 51

NOTES Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Closes 2RHS*MOV8A(B) to maximize suppression pool cooling

Informs SRO that RHR A(B) are in suppression pool cooling RO (N2EOP6.22)

If directed, places RHR A(B) in suppression chamber and drywell sprays Verifies open 2SWP*MOV90A(B)

Verifies closed and overridden 2RHS*MOV24A(B)

Verifies running 2RHS*P1A(B)

Opens RHS*MOV33 A(B) and verifies 450 gpm on SUPPR SPRAY HEADER FLOW (2RHS*FI64A[B])

Verifies closed 2RHS*FV38A(B)

Verifies open 2RHS*MOV4A(B)

Initiates drywell sprays by opening 2RHS*MOV15A(B) and 2RHS*MOV25A(B)

Verifies closed RHS*MOV4A(B)

Verifies approximately 7450 gpm on DRYWELL SPRAY HEADER FLOW (2RHS*FI63A[B])

Throttles open 2SWP*MOV33A(B) not to exceed 7400 gpm (E12R602A[B])

When possible, closes RHS*MOV8A(B)

Notifies Radiation Protection to start Radiation Monitor 2SWP*RE23A(B)

Informs SRO that suppress chamber and drywell sprays are in service Event Termination

RPV blowdown has been performed.

Criteria

RPV injection is in progress with RPV water level at the main steam lines.

Control rods are being inserted.

2021 NRC Scenario 4 Page 51 of 51

v t e Letter Sequence Other
EPID:L-2021-OLL-0027, (Open)
Initiation Acceptance... Administration Questions Answers Results Approval... Other: ML21123A224, ML21123A241, ML21133A147, ML21133A242, ML21137A169
MONTHYEAR2021-05-13 [Table View]

ML21123A241

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