Text

Initial Exam 2009-301 Draft SRO Written Exam
	ML100470424
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	02/02/2010
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	;
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FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination

~tionBank #JKA_syst~IKA.,-numbe-;:~~

[QuestionBank KA...system iKA..;.l1u!'"ber ~-----j QUESTION 1 D I . 1601 EPE007 ,,----,-, 2.4.50 KA desc IEPEOOJ GENERIC Ability to verifY system alann IEPE007 alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alann 41.10 / 43~

alarm response manual. (CFR: 41.10/43.5/

k53) 145.3) I Unit 1 is operating at 75% power and increasing following a refueling outage. The following are noted at 1015:

1AD-1, E/8 "TURB GEN HI VIBRATION" is LIT 1AO-1, Et8

Turbine bearing vibration readings on the OAC indicate:

o Bearing #9 at 11 mils o Bearing #10 at 13 mils What response is required for these conditions?

A. Monitor bearing vibrations and if vibration is unchanged at 1017, manually trip the turbine only.

B. Monitor bearing vibrations and if vibration is unchanged at 1017, manually trip the reactor and verify the turbine automatically trips.

C. Vibration limits have been exceeded for the current plant conditions, manually trip the turbine only.

O.

D. Vibration limits have been exceeded for the current plant conditions, manually trip the reactor and verify the turbine trips automatically.

Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 1 of200 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 1 D General.Discussion Bearing vibration> 12 mils is immediate trip criteria for this plant condition, the reactor is tripped first because reactor power is >69% (P9) . A 2 minute wait is plausible because if vibration is > 10 10 mils for 2 minutes, the turbine is also tripped. However that is for increasing speed between 800 and 1400 RPM only prior to syncronizing.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: A 2 minute wait is plausible because if vibration is > 10 mils for 2 minutes, the turbine is also tripped. However that is for increasing speed between 800 and 1400 RPM only prior to syncronizing.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: A 2 minute wait is plausible because if vibration is > I 0 mils for 2 minutes, the turbine is also tripped. However that is for increasing speed between 800 and 1400 RPM only prior to syncronizing. The Rx would be tripped first (>P-9)

Answer C Discussion Plausible: The turbine vibration limits have been exceeded, and turbine trip is required, but the reactor would be tripped first (> P9)

Answer D Discussion Correct: IF all of the following conditions are met, manually trip the reactor:

Reactor power greater than or equal to 69% (P-9).

Any bearing vibration exceeds 12 mils.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed Databook figure 24

~ OPT Approved lAD-I, E8 annunc resp mt3 lesson D

0 OPS Approved D

0 NRC Approved i QuestionBank # IKA_system jKA system IKA number IKA_number JI 16011EPE007 1601lEPE007 12.4.50 1I KA desc EPE007 GENERIC Ability to veritY system alann alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual. (CFR: 41.10/43.5 41.10 /43.5//

45.3) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 2 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA numb<\lI numbE(,_r

, _ _-III QUESTION 2 D 1602 I APE008 APEOOS II AKl.02

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--------------------------~-------------,

II KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to a Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: (CFR 41.8/41.10/

41.S ! 41.1 O!

45.3) Change in leak rate with change in pressure ...........................

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

Initial Conditions

1NV-294 (NV Pmps A&B Disch Flow Ctrl) is in manual

PRT pressure is 6 psig

PRT level is 67%

The PRT has a small external leak (0.05 gpm)

Pressurizer pressure is 2235 psig Final Conditions 10 minutes later

The crew notes pressurizer pressure is 2197 psig and slowly decreasing

PRT pressure is 15 psig

PRT level is 68%

Based on the conditions stated above, and assuming no operator action:

1. How (if at all) is charging flow affected?

2. How (if at all) is the external leakage rate from the PRT affected?

A. Charging flow is stable extemalleakage PRT external leakage rate will increase B. Charging flow is stable extemalleakage PRT external leakage rate is stable C. Charging flow is increasing extemalleakage PRT external leakage rate is stable D. Charging flow is increasing extemalleakage PRT external leakage rate will increase Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 3 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 2 D General Discussion As pressure decreases, charging flow will increase due to the larger DP bewteen charging pump discharge and NC pressure. As PRT pressure increases the leak leak should increase due to the higher DP. With 1NY -294 in manual, charging would stay stable if pressure was stable MODIFIED PER FRANK E. COMMENTS 9/14/09 Answer A Discussion Plausible: With 1NY -294 in manual, student may believe flow will not change. Second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: With 1NV -294 in manual, student may believe flow will not change. Candidate may believe PRT leakage would be stable since leak is very small and DP increase is < 10 psig Answer C Discussion Plausible: First part is correct. Student may believe PRT leakage would be stable since leak is very small and DP increase is < 10 psig Answer D Discussion Correct: Charging flow will increase as NC pressure decreases and PRT extemalleakage will increase as PRT pressure increases Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed BNT-FF

~ OPT Approved 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA_number I 16021APE008 IAK1.02 IAKl.02 I KA desc Knowledge ofofthe the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to a Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: (CFR 41.8/41.10 41.8 141.1011 45.3) Change in leak rate with change in pressure .......................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 4 of of200 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number I QUESTION 3 A 1603 I EPE009 I EA2.34 I

KA_desc Ability to detennine or interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: (CFR 43.5 145.13)

/45.13) Conditions for throttling or stopping HPJ HPI ............................

A LOCA has occurred on Unit 1. Given the following conditions:

The crew is in EP/1/A/5000/E-1 (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant) evaluating safety injection termination criteria

NC pressure is 1200 psig and stable

Containment pressure peaked at 2.8 psig and is slowly decreasing

NC subcooling is 2°F

Pressurizer level is 18% and slowly increasing

Total CA flow is 400 gpm

All S/G NR levels are approximately 21% and slowly increasing Can safety injection be terminated at this time and why or why not?

A. Yes, safety injection termination criteria are met

8. No, a secondary heat sink must be established and then safety injection can be terminated C. No, NC subcooling must be increased and then safety injection can be terminated D. No, Pressurizer level must be increased and then safety injection can be terminated Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 5 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 3 A General Discussion Original KA was replaced.

SI termination critera are:

Subcooling >0 one S/G > 11 II % (29% ACC) or total feed flow >450 gpm NC pressure stable or increasing PZR level> 11 % (20% ACC)

For the conditions specified, ACC numbers are NOT used in this case therefore SI1S/I can be terminated.

Answer A Discussion Correct: SI termination criteria are met as stated above Answer B Discussion Plausible: If containment pressure was> 3psig (ACC conditions) heat sink parameters would not be met for SI termination. Flow is < 450 gpm and S/G levels are < 29%

Answer C Discussion Plausible: Some procedures require greater than this subcooling to perform certain steps. But only >0 is required Answer D Discussion Plausible: If containment pressure was> 3psig (ACC conditions) PZR level parameter would not be met, <<20%)

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2009 MNS AUDIT (Bank 1033) o0 Developed Development References Student References Provided El

~

~ OPT Approved 0 OPS Approved OOPS o0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA IKA number II 1603IEPE009 16031EPE009 IEA2.34 I Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: (CFR 43.5 I/45.13) 45.13) Conditions for throttling or stopping HPI ........................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 6 of200 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA_system system IKA IKA_number number I QUESTION 4 D 1604 I EPE011 EPEOll I 2.4.35 I KA_desc KA desc EPE011 GENERIC Knowledge oflocal auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects. (CFR: 41.10/43.5 EPEOll

/45.13) 145.13)

Unit 1 was operating at 100% when a large break LOCA occurred. Given the following:

The control room crew is in EP/1/N5000/ES-1.3 (Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation)

Step 13.b verifies the ND & NS ROOMS sump pump "RESET" lights DARK

The crew notes the lights are currently LIT and dispatches an operator to perform a local action The dispatched operator will place the affected ND & NS ROOMS Sump Pumps in:

A. "AUTO" to ensure they start on "high" sump level to protect the ND and NS pump rooms from flooding B. "AUTO" to ensure they start on a "high-high" sump level to protect the ND and NS pump roo rooms ms from flooding C. "STDBY" to ensure contaminated water is contained within the sump due to potential ND and/or NS pump seal leakage D. "STDBY" to ensure a "high-high" annunciator alarm is received on increasing level to indicate possible ND and/or NS pump seal leakage Monday, October 19,2009 Page 7 ofof200 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 4 D General Discussion The sump pump reset lights should extinguish on an SI signal causing the pumps to only start on a high-high level.. If the reset lights are Iit,the lit,the sump pumps are placed in standby. This prevents the start of the pumps unless they reach the high-high level which also alarms on the control room annunciator panel to alert the operator of possible seal leakage. If the pumps started at the high level, the alarm would never be received unless the leakage was gross enough to exceed the sump pumps capacity.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Placing the pumps in AUTO will cause them to start at the high level but this would prevent receiving the HI-HI level annunciator.

The operational effect is to alert the operators of possible NDINS seal leakage Answer B Discussion Plausible: Placing the pumps in AUTO will cause them to start at a high level but this would prevent receiving the HI-HI level annunciator (the desired operational effect)

Answer C Discussion Plausible: Although this is the correct action, it does not ensure that the contaminated water will be contained within the sump ifleakage is greater than the pumps capacity.

Answer D Discussion Correct: Placing the sump pumps in standby will ensure a HI-HI level annunciator is received in the control room, indicating possible seal leakage Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided 0D Developed ESI-3 and basis 0D OPT Approved WL 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA IKA_number number II 16041EPEOIl l6041EPEO II 12 .4.35 1 KA_desc KA desc EPEOll GENERIC Knowledge of EPEOII local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects. (CFR: 41.10/43.5 oflocal 41.10 / 43.5

/45.13) 145.13) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE 19, 2009 Monday, October 19,2009 Page 8 of200 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_numberIKA number I QUESTION 5 A 1605 APE015/017 I I APE0151017 AK2.10 AK2.1O I

KA desc Knowledge of the interrelations between the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss ofRC of RC Flow) and the following: (CFR 41. 7 I 45.7) RCP indicators and controls ......................................

~================================================================~----

Unit 1 was operating in Mode 3 at full temperature and pressure. Given the following trends on the 1A NCP:

Time 0200 0205 0210 0215 Motor bearing temp (OF) 180 184 186 195 Lower pump bearing temp (OF) 221 225 228 231

1 seal outlet temp (OF) 205 227 235 251 Motor stator winding temp (OF) 312 314 316 323 What is the earliest time at which the 1A NCP must be secured?

A. 0200 B. 0205 C. 0210 D. 0215 Monday, October 19,2009 Page 9 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 5 A General Discussion Bank Question: 870 NCP Trip criteria:

Any motor bearing temperature >(= 19S0P 195°P Seal Outlet temperature >(= 235°P Motor winding temperature >(= 311 °P Any pump bearing water exit temperature >(= 225°P Answer A Discussion Correct: 0200 is the earliest time the NCP must be stopped since motor winding temperature reaches 311 degrees Answer B Discussion Plausible: If the student doesn't know the trip setpoint for securing the NCP on motor winding temperature, but knows the lower bearing temperature trip setpoint.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: If the student doesn't know the trip setpoints for securing the NCP on motor winding or pump bearing temperatures, but knows the #1 seal outlet temperature setpoint Answer D Discussion Ifthe Plausible: If the student doesn't know the trip setpoints for securing the NCP on motor winding, pump bearing, and #1 seal outlet temperatures, but knows the motor bearing trip setpoint Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2003 NRC Q45 (Bank 245)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed OP-CN-PS-NCP

~ OPT Approved 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank #JKA # IKA system JKA IKA number JI 16051APE015(017 IAK2.1O 160s1APE015(017 IAK2.10 I KA desc Knowledge of the interrelations between the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss ofRC Plow) and the following: (CPR 41.7 (

45.7) RCP indicators and controls ...................................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 10 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system 1606 I

[ APE025 IKA number I[ AK1.01 AK1.0l I

I[

QUESTION 6 c KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: (CFR 41.81 41.8 /

41.10/45.3) Loss of RHRS during all modes of operation .........................

ofRHRS Unit 1 was shutdown in Mode 6, in mid loop operations when a loss of ND cooling occurred. Given the following events and conditions:

The operators implemented CASE IV (Loss of ND in Mid Loop) of AP/1/A/55001019 (Loss of Residual Heat Removal System) and have reached step 22.

The ND system has been refilled and properly vented

Step 22 requires restart of one ND pump to restore cooling.

A caution wams the operator that restarting an ND pump can cause NC system level to decrease rapidly.

What is the reason for the NC system level decrease?

A. Due to the contraction of the water from the cooldown B. Due to the suction of water from the NC system into the ND pump C. Due to the collapse of system voids D. Due to increased system pressure Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 11 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 6 c General Discussion AP/I/A/55001019 (Loss of Residual Heat Removal System) , Case IV (Loss ofND in Mid Loop) caution prior to step 22 states" NC System AP/l/A/5500/019 level may decrease rapidly when an ND pump is started due to the collapse of system voids. Additional makeup flow may be required."

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Sufficient cooldown will cause volumetric contraction and level drop, Cooldown is insufficient to cause a level drop at representative temperatures Answer B Discussion Plausible: The suction surge is accompanied by discharge back into the system so the mass balance remains the same.

Answer C Discussion Correct: Per AP/l/A/5500/019 ICorrect: AP/l/A/55001019 (Loss of Residual Heat Removal System),

System) , Case IV (Loss ofND in Mid Loop) caution prior to step 22 Answer D Discussion Plausible: System pressure will not increase. Mid loop operations require an open vent path to atmosphere Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2003 NRC Q60 (Bank 260)

Development References Student References Provided

~

~ Developed Lesson Plan Objective: none

~

~ OPT Approved 1. AP-19 Case IV 0 OPS Approved OOPS o0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_number IKA number I 16061APE025 IAKI.OI IAKI.Ol I KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: (CFR 41.8 I 41.1 0 I 45.3) Loss of 41.10 ofRHRS RHRS during all modes of operation ........................ .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 12 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC QuestionBank # IKA IKA system Examination IKA IKA number II QUESTION 7 A 1607 II APE027 II AK3.03 I KA KA desc 0 I 45.6 I Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: (CFR 41.5,41.1 0/45.6/

45.13) Actions contained in EOP for PZR PCS malfunction ...................

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power. Given the following sequence of events:

A S/G PORV opened momentarily and caused NC pressure to decrease to 2205 psig

1A Pressurizer Heater bank failed ON

NC pressure is currently 2255 psig and increasing

The crew enters AP/1/A/5500/011 AP/1/A155001011 (Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies), Case II (Pressurizer Pressure Increasing)

Step 1 states:

"Verify the following Pzr Heaters - OFF"

1A

18

10

1. Is this step designated as an immediate action based on EP/AP procedure usage?

2. Which channel of pressurizer pressure provides input to the Pressurizer Pressure Master to create the spray valve demand to compensate for the 1A Pressurizer Heater Bank being on?

A. 1. This is not an immediate action in Case II of this procedure

2. Selected Pressurizer Pressure - 1 (SPP-1)

B. 1. This is an immediate action in Case II of this procedure

2. Selected Pressurizer Pressure - 1 (SPP-1)

C. 1. This is not an immediate action in Case II of this procedure

2. Selected Pressurizer Pressure - 2 (SPP-2)

D. 1. This is an immediate action in Case II of this procedure

2. Selected Pressurizer Pressure - 2 (SPP-2)

Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 13 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 7 A General Discussion API I I , Case II, step 1 AP/11, I is NOT designated as an immediate action. In the distributed control system (DCS) for pressurizer pressure uses the 4 pressurizer pressure channels in 2 separate circuits to develop 2 selected pressurizer pressure signals for control. These control signals are the second highest signal from each circuit. Only selected pressurizer pressure channell(SPP-l) channel 1(SPP-I) inputs the pressurizer pressure master Answer A Discussion SPP-I inputs the pressurizer pressure master Correct: Step 1 is NOT designated as an immediate action. Only SPP-l Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this step is an immediate action because the first step in API11, API I 1, Case 1, IS an immediate action. SPP-l SPP-I is correct Answer C Discussion Plausible: Step 1 is NOT designated as an immediate action. Student may believe SPP-2 inputs the pressurizer pressure master due to some shared functions (low press alarm & PORV POR V block)

Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this step is an immediate action because the first step in AP/11, AP/ll, Case 1,I, IS an immediate action and that SPP-2 inputs the pressurizer pressure master due to some shared functions (low press alarm & PORV block).

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided 0 Developed API11 AP/11 0 OPT Approved IPE DCS lesson 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I 16071APE027 IAK3.03 I

KA desc Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: (CFR 41.5,41.10 I 45.6 I 45.13) Actions contained in EOP for PZR PCS malfunction .................. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE DCSDCSDCS Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 14 ofof200 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number IKA_number I QUESTION 8 c 1608 I EPE029 I EK3.10 JI KA desc Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the ATWS: (CFR 41.5/41.10/45.6/45.13) Manual rod insertion The basis for manually inserting control rods during an ATWS event is to reduce reactor power to:

A. prevent total core flux from exceeding core thermal power limits B. prevent rapid heatup of the NC system and potential overfill of the pressurizer C. ensure the only heat transferred to the NC system is from core decay heat and NC pump heat D. ensure there is sufficient steam dump capacity to prevent opening the steam line code safeties Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 15 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 8 c General Discussion MODIFIED PER FRANK E. COMMENTS 9/14/09 9114/09 From E-O Basis for ensuring Rx trip: Reactor trip must be verified to ensure that only heat being added to the NC Ssytem is from decay heat and reactor coolant pump heat. The safeguards systems that protect the plant during accidents are designed assuming that only decay heat and NC pump heat are being added to the NC system. Preventing rapid heatup to prevent pzr overfill is why steam is dumped in S.l S.1 Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may think that since the reactor is not tripped, that inserting negative reactivity with the rods is necessary to prevent core overheating and may confuse this with core thermal power. Core thermal power will actually decrease.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: The reactor coolant system will heatup when the turbine is tripped, but this is the basis for dumping steam in the ATWS procedure.

Answer C Discussion ICorrect: Per FR-S.l basis document Icorrect:

Answer D Discussion Plausible: The student may think rods need to be inserted during an ATWS to remove enough heat to allow the steam dumps to operate within their capacity.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed FR-Sl and basis

~ OPT Approved 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA IKA_number number I 160slEPE029 IEK3.1O I KA desc KA_desc Knowledge ofthe of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the ATWS: (CFR 41.5/41.10/45.6/45.13) 41.5/41.10 145.6 145.13) Manual rod insertion 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 16 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 9 A 1609 I APE054 I AK3.04 I I I KA desc Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): (CFR 41.5,41.10 145.61

/45.6/

45.13) Actions contained in EOPs for loss ofMFW .........................

1A CF pump was out of service for maintenance when 18 1B CF pump tripped on low lube oil pressure. The crew has entered AP/1/A/5500/006 AP/1/N5500/006 (Loss of S/G Feedwater),

Case I (Loss of CF Supply To S/Gs).

What is the minimum power level which would require a manual reactor trip and what is the basis for manually tripping the reactor above that power level when in this procedure?

A. 5%; to ensure CA can maintain adequate S/G levels B. 10%; to ensure CA can maintain adequate S/G levels C. 5%; to minimize the pressure and temperature transient on the reactor D. 10%; to minimize the pressure and temperature transient on the reactor Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 17 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 9 A General Discussion AP106, Case I, states that CA can power operation up to 5%. 10% power is when the turbine is placed on line and also P-The basis document for AP/06, 10 and P13 setpoints. To minimize the pressure and temperature transient on the reactor is the basis for tripping the reactor on a turbine trip >P9.

Answer A Discussion Correct: CA can only supply S/G's when <5 % power. The Rx is tripped to ensure CA can maintain adequate S/G levels ICorrect:

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that CA can be used up to 10% power. Second part is correct Answer C Discussion Plausible: First part is correct. Student may believe this is the basis for tripping the reactor in this situation (actually basis for Rx trip on a turbine trip >P9)

Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that CA can be used up to 10% power and that this is the basis for tripping the reactor in this situation (actually basis for Rx trip on a turbine trip >P9)

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed AP/06 0 OPT Approved AP/06 background doc 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA_number I 16091APE054 IAK3.04 I KA desc Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): (CFR 41.5,41.1 41.5,41.100/45.6/

145.61 45.13) Actions contained in EOPs for loss ofMFW ........................ .

..401-9 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 18 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA 1610 16IO IKA system IKA I EPE055 IKA number I EK3.02 II I

QUESTION 10 c KA desc Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the Station Blackout: (CFR 41.5/41.10/45.6/45.13) 41.5 /41.10/45.6/45.13) Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite and onsite power ..........

Regarding the actions of EP/1/A/5000/ECA EP/1/A150001ECA 0.0 (Loss of All AC Power):

1. Why are intact S/Gs depressurized to 165 psig?

2. What is the basis for stopping the depressurization at 165 psig?

A. 1. To enhance natural circulation until forced cooling can be restored

2. To prevent injecting N2 from the CLAs B. 1. To enhance natural circulation until forced cooling can be restored

2. To prevent voiding in the reactor vessel upper head C. 1. To minimize NC inventory loss out of the NC pump seals

2. To prevent injecting N2 from the CLAs D. 1. To minimize NC inventory loss out of the NC pump seals

2. To prevent voiding in the reactor vessel upper head Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 19 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 10 c General Discussion The S/Gs are depressurized to reduce NC temperature and pressure thereby minimizing the loss of inventory out the NC pump seals. Although Natural Circulation might be enhanced, this is not the reason it is done in this procedure. Stopping the depressurization at 165 psig prevents injecting N2 from the CLAs. A bubble is actually assumed to form in the head.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Dumping steam will enhance natural eirc circ but this is not the reason for depressurizing the intact S/G's. Second part is correct Answer B Discussion Plausible: Dumping steam will enhance natural circ but this is not the reason for depressurizing the intact S/G's. A bubble is actually assumed to form in the head, it is reasonable that this may be prevented by stopping the depressurization.

Answer C Discussion Correct: The S/Gs are depressurized to reduce NC temperature and pressure thereby minimizing the loss of inventory out the NC pump seals.

Stopping the depressurization at 165 psig prevents injecting N2 from the CLAs Answer D Discussion Plausible: The S/Gs are depressurized to reduce NC temperature and pressure thereby minimizing the loss of inventory out the NC pump seals. A bubble is actually assumed to form in the head, it is reasonable that this may be prevented by stopping Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Modified from 126? Or NEW ask NRC Development References Student References Provided

~

~ Developed eca 0.0 step 23 and basis Step 23

~

~ OPT Approved 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_number IKA number I 1610lEPE055 IEK3.02 I KA desc 41.5 /41.10/45.6/45.13) Actions Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the Station Blackout: (CFR 41.5/41.10/45.6/45.13) contained in EOP for loss of off offsite onsite site and on site power 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 20 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number II QUESTION 11 B 1611 I APE056.

APE056 I 2.1.28 I KA KA desc I APE056 GENERIC Knowledge of the purpose "and ofthe -and function of major system components and controls. (CFR: 41.7)

I Unit 1 is operating at 75% power and Unit 2 is at 100% power when the following switchyard PCBs open:

PCB 17

PCB 18

PCB 19 Which one of the following statements correctly describes the effect on Units 1 and 2?

A. Unit 1 will remain at 75% power and Unit 2 will run back to 48% at 18% Imin B. Unit 1 will run back to 48% at 18% I min and Unit 2 will remain at 100%

C. Unit 1 will remain at 75% power and Unit 2 will run back to 23% at 25% Imin D. Unit 1 will run back to 23% at 25% I min and Unit 2 will remain at 100%

Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 21 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 11 B General Discussion Question tests the switchyard PCB (loss ofload) turbine runback circuit. With PCB's 17 and 18 open and and> > 48% power, Unit 1 ~48%

I runback to -48%

at 18%/min will occur due to loss of IA1A main buss line. Unit 2 is unaffected. The runback to 23% at 25%/min is for a loss of KG (generator stator cooling) Believe this is high cog versus memory because changing one stem condition will make another choice correct.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Unit 1 will runback. The student may believe Unit 2 is affected, this would be the correct runback rate and target Answer B Discussion Correct: Unit 1 I will runback at 18% Imin on loss ofload with PCBs 17 and 18 open Answer C Discussion Plausible: Unit 1I will runback. The student may believe Unit 2 is affected, run back target and rate are for the loss of generator stator cooling.

runback Answer D Discussion Plausible: Unit 1 will runback, but runback run back target and rate are for the loss of generator stator cooling.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2003 NRC Q42 (Bank 242)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed EPA

~ OPT Approved EHC 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1611 APE056 2.1.28 KA desc APE056 GENERIC Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls. (CFR: 41.7) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 22 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 12 D 1612 I APE057 I AA1.06 AAl.06 I I I KA desc Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR 41.7/45.5 //45.6) 45.6) Manual control of components for which automatic control is lost .......

Unit 1 was operating in Mode 3. Given the following events and conditions:

Initial Conditions

Cooldown was in progress with steam dumps in "PRESS" mode

1S8-9 (SM 8yp To Cond Ctrl Ctri #9) and 1S8-18 (SM 8yp To Cond Ctrl #18) were throttled open

NC loop temperatures were:

Loop A: 556°F Loop 8: 554°F Loop C: 556°F Loop D: 552°F Current Conditions

AC bus 1ERP8 de-energizes due to a fault

1S 8-9 is th rottled 0 pen and 1S8-18 is closed

NC temperature is slowly decreasing

1. What is the status of the P-12 interlock based on current conditions?

2. 8ased on current plant conditions, what operator action is required?

A. 1. P-12 is not actuated

2. Verify P-12 actuates when required and then place both train "STEAM DUMP INTLK" switches to "8YP" to continue the cooldown per OP/1/A/61 00/002 (Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown)

OP/1/A/61001002

8. 1. P-12 is not actuated

2. Restore power to 1 ERP8 per AP/1/A/5500/029 AP/1/A/55001029 (Loss of Vital or Aux Control Power)

C. 1. P-12 is actuated

2. Ensure CF Isolation has occurred per EP/1/A/5000/E-0 EP/1/A/5000/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

D. 1. P-12 is actuated

2. Place both train "STEAM DUMP INTLK" switches to "OFF RESET" to attempt to close 1S8-9 per AP/1/A/5500/028AP/1/A/55001028 (Secondary Steam Leak)

Monday, October 19,2009 Page 23 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 12 D General Discussion P-12 actuates on 2/4 NC loop temperatures <1= 553F Only one loop is below the stepoint until 1lERPB ERPB fails resulting in B NC loop satisfYing the 2/4 logic temperature failing low, satisfying Answer A Discussion Plausible: First part would be correct if unaware of lERPB failure result. Action is consistent with P-12 not being actuated, (no problem so cooldown is continued)

Answer B Discussion Plausible: First part would be correct if unaware of lERPB IERPB failure result AP/29 would be entered to address the lERPB failure Answer C Discussion Plausible: P-12 will be actuated due to meeting 2/4 logic. Student may believe a CF isolation has occurred at 553 F, but setpoint is actually 564 F and would have been bypassed by depressing the resets when opening the Rx trip brkrs brim after rod insertion.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: P-12 will be actuated due to meeting 2/4 logic. This is the correct action per AP/28 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed AP-29

~ OPT Approved IDE AP28 0D OPS Approved D

0 NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II l612[APE057 16121APE057 [AA1.06 IAAI.06 [

I KA desc Ability to operate and 1 or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR 41.7/45.5 145.6) Manual control of components for which automatic control is lost ...... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE DCSDCS DCS Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 24 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA 1613 I I

system JKA_system APE058 IKA number JKA_number I

I AK1.01 IJ I

QUESTION 13 c KA_desc KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of DC Power: (CFR 41.8/41.10/45.3) Battery charger equipment and instrumentation .......................

Given the following:

Vital charger 1ECC fails

1EMXA is unavailable to the spare charger (1 ECS)

The CRS directs an NLO to align the alternate supply to 1ECS so that 1ECS can be tied to bus 1 EDC before the battery is depleted

1. What other MCC can be aligned to provide an altemate alternate supply to 1ECS?

2. Per OP/11A163501008 OP/1/N6350/008 (125VDC/120VAC Vital Instrument and Control Power System), what plant mode(s) allow this alignment?

A. 1. 1EMXC

2. No Mode only 8.

B. 1. 1EMXC

2. Modes 5,6 and No Mode C. 1. 1EMXJ

2. No Mode only D. 1. 1EMXJ

2. Modes 5, 6 and No Mode Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 25 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 13 c General Discussion The spare charger can be supplied form lEMXA IEMXA and lEMXJ. IEMXJ. Cross train power supply can only be aligned in NO MODE per procedure.

Normally (modes 1-6), when lECCIECC is removed from service, the space charger (lECS)

(IECS) is aligned and is powered from lEMXA.

IEMXA. 1IEMXC EMXC seems logical since lEMXA IEMXA powers lECA,IECA, but lEMXI IEMXI supplies lECC IECC and neither can supply the spare charger Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe lEMXC IEMXC supplies charger lECC, IECC, and can be used to power the spare charger (lECS). No mode is correct Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe lEMXC IEMXC supplies charger lECC, IECC, and can be used to power the spare charger (lECS). Student may think cross train power supply to spare is available in shutdown modes Answer C Discussion Correct: lEMXJ IEMXJ is the only available power supply to the spare charger (lECS) with lEMXA IEMXA unavailable. This alignment can only be performed in No Mode Answer D Discussion Plausible: 1IEMXJ EMXJ is the correct available power supply to the spare charger (l ECS). Student may think cross train power supply to spare is (lECS).

available in shutdown modes Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed EPL

~ OPT Approved OP/1/Al63501008 D

0 OPS Approved D

0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system JKA_number IKA_number JI 1613IAPE058 IAK1.01 I KA_desc KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of DC Power: (CFR 41.8 141.10 141.1 0 I 45.3) Battery charger equipment and instrumentation ...................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 26 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA_number number I QUESTION 14 A 1614 I APE062 AA1.02 I I I KA desc Ability to operate and and!/ or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of ofNuc1ear Nuc1ear Service Water (SWS): (CFR 41.7 41.7/45.5/45.6)

! 45.5 ! 45.6) Loads on the SWS in the control room ..............................

Units 1 and 2 are operating at 100% power with RN pump 2A running. Given the following conditions and indications:

RN pumps 1A, 1B 1Band and 2B start

An Emergency Lo Pit Level actuation occurs

1. What is the expected position of 1RN-538 (Station RN Disch Hdr X-Over) and RN-54A (Station RN Disch Hdr X-Over) based on these conditions?

2. Where is RN discharge flow from the DIGs directed based on the above conditions?

A. Closed Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond B. Closed RL discharge piping to Lake Wylie C. Open Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond D. Open RL discharge piping to Lake Wylie Monday, October 19,2009 Page 27 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 14 A General Discussion The RN discharge header crossover valves (lRN-53B and lRN-54A) close on an emergency low pit level (2/3 logic) and on an Ss or Sp signal they remain open. All pumps start in either case.

RN discharge from the DIGs swaps to the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) on Emergency low pit level, but remains aligned to the lake on an Sp signal. The main RN discharges from the Esssentiani Headers are aligned to both the SNSWP and the RL discharge on a Sp signal therefore aligned to both is plausible.

Answer A Discussion Correct: lRN-53B and lRN-54A close and RN discharge flowpath from the DIGs aligns to the SNSWP on emergency low pit level, 2/3 ch coincidence Answer B Discussion Plausible: lRN-53B and lRN-54A close on emergency low pit level. The RN discharge flowpath to the DIGs will align to the SNSWP but stay aligned to the lake for other signals.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that valves stay open which is true for Ss andlor Sp signal. The RN discharge flowpath to the DIGs will align to the SNSWP Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that valves stay open which is true for Ss andlor Sp signal. The RN discharge flowpath to the DIGs will align to the SNSWP but stay aligned to the lake for other signals.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided D Developed RN lesson plan

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # #lKA IKA system IKA number I l6l4iAPE062 16141APE062 IAA1.02 I

KA desc Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water (SWS): (CFR 41.7 145.5 145.6)

I 45.6) Loads on the SWS in the control room ............................. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 28 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA number IKA_number I QUESTION 15 D 1615 I APE065 I I AA1.03 I KA_desc KA desc Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss ofInstrument Air: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5/45.6) 41.7/45.5 /45.6) Restoration of systems served by instrument air when pressure is regained Unit 1 is in Mode 3 and Unit 2 is in No Mode. During outage work on Unit 2, the instrument air (VI) supply to Unit 2 is severed and the entire VI header depressurizes.

An NLO in the area notes the problem and manually closes the VI supply isolation valve to Unit 2 and the VI header quickly repressurizes. Given the following valves and positions (prior to the loss of VI):

VALVE POSITION 1NV-1A (NC Letdn to Regen Hx Isol) Open 1 CA-149 (S/G 1A CF Byp To CA Nozzle) Open 1 NV-153A (Letdn Hx Otlt 3-Way Vlv) "DEMIN" 1 RN-291 (1A KC HX Outlet Throttle) "MINIFLOW" 1 I Throttled Which one of the valves will automatically return to the position indicated in the table above after VI pressure is restored?

A. 1NV-1A B. 1CA-149 C. 1 NV-153A D. 1RN-291 1 RN-291 Monday, October 19,2009 Page 29 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 15 D General Discussion ofYI On loss of 1RN-291 will go back to throttled position to control mini VI the valves will fail as indicated below. Once air is restored lRN-291 miniflow.

flow. The ofYL other valves will require operator actions to be returned to their position prior to the loss of VI.

Answer A Discussion NY -1 A fails closes and will not reopen without operator action. Student may believe the valve will return to its previous position on Plausible: 1NY-I ofYI a short term loss of VI Answer B Discussion Plausible: 1CA-149 will fail closed and will not reopen without operator action. Student may believe the valve will return to its previous position on a short term loss ofofYI VI Answer C Discussion Plausible: 1NY -153A will swap to the VCT YCT position and must be manually returned to the "Demin" position. Student may believe the valve will ofYI return to its previous position on a short term loss of VI Answer D Discussion Correct: This valve will fail open and will throttle automatically once air is restored.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW

~

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed AP/22

~

~ OPT Approved D

0 OPS Approved D

0 NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II l6151APE065 16151APE065 IAA1.03 I KA desc Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss ofofInstrument Instrument Air: (CFR 41.7 145.5 145.6) Restoration of ofsystems systems served by instrument air when pressure is regained 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 30 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I QUESTION 16 D 1616 I WE04 II EA2.2 I KA_desc KA desc Ability to detennine and interpret the following as they apply to the (LOCA Outside Containment) 43.5! 45.13) Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility*s license and amendments.

(CFR: 43.5/45.13)

A loss of coolant accident outside containment has occurred on the residual heat removal system injection header.

The crew is performing Step 3 of EP/1/N5000/ECA-1.2, EP/1/NSOOO/ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment, which states:

"Verify leak path is isolated as follows:"

Which one of the following indications is used by this procedure to identify that the leak has been successfully isolated?

A. NO Pump discharge pressure increasing B. Pressurizer level increasing C. NO/NS room sump levels decreasing O. Reactor coolant pressure increasing Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 31 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 16 D General Discussion ECA-l.2 looks for the pressure increase as the crews isolate each train ofND. It is the only "symptom" that can be used to verify verifY successful leak isolation.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: ND disharge pressure would increase but that is not the indication used by ECA-1.2.

ECA-l.2 .

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Pressurizer level increasing is a later issue for SI S1 termination. It is not reasonable to assume that level would already be on scale and is not the indication used by ECA-1.2.

Answer C Discussion if the leak is contained and the sumps are pumped down but is not the indication used by ECA-1.2 Plausible: This might be true ifthe ECA-l.2 Answer D Discussion Correct: ECA-l.2 specifically uses NC pressure increasing as the parameter for leak isolation determination Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2005 NRC Q16 (Bank 420)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed PIl/Al5000IECA-1.2 PIli A15000IECA-1.2

~ OPT Approved 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_system IKA_number IKA_numberl I 16l61 WE04 16161WE04 IEA2.2 JI KA desc Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (LOCA Outside Containment)

/45.13) Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility*s license and amendments.

(CFR: 43.5 145.13) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 32 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system 1617 IKA system I WEDSWE05 IKA_number IKA number I EK2.1 I

I QUESTION 17 c KA_desc KA desc Knowledge ofofthe the interrelations between the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7/

41.7/45.7) 4S.7) Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Unit 1 was operating at 100% when a total loss of instrument air occurred. Given the following events and conditions:

When the instrument air header depressurized, a total loss offeedwater of feedwater occurred

The operators tripped the reactor and completed EP/1/A/SOOO/E-0 EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1 (Respond to a Loss of The operators transitioned to EP/1/A/SOOO/FR-H.1 Secondary Heat Sink)

EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1 requires opening PZR PORVs Step 22 of EP/1/A/SOOO/FR-H.1 Which one of the following statements describes:

1.. The motive force to open the PZR PORVs, and 1

2. The correct EOP bases for step 22 of EP/1/A/SOOO/FR-H.1?EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1?

A. 1. Air pressure comes from dedicated accumulator tanks

2. PORVs are required to provide a bleed path B. 1. Air pressure comes from dedicated accumulator tanks

2. PORVs are required to depressurize the NC system to protect the S/G tubes from creep failure C. 1. N2 pressure comes from the cold leg accumulators A and B

2. PORVs are required to provide a bleed path D. 1. N2 pressure comes from the cold leg accumulators A and B

2. PORVs are required to depressurize the NC system to protect the S/G tubes from creep failure Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 33 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 17 c General Discussion With a loss of VI, CLAs A& B are aligned to supply N2 to the PZR PORVs. Per H.l step 22, two PZR PORVs are opened to establish an NC system bleed path.

Tube failure may become a risk with Hi DP if ifthe the S/G is required to be depressurized to introduce a low pressure water source, but this is not the basis for step 22 .

Answer A Discussion Plausible: N2 pressure comes from the CLAs not dedicated air accumulators, although some plants have these. PZR PORVs are required bleed path for heat removal Answer B Discussion Plausible: N2 pressure comes from the CLAs not dedicated air accumulators, although some plants have these. Tube failure may become a risk with hi DP if the S/G is required to be depressurized to introduce a low pressure water source, not step 22 basis ifthe Answer C Discussion Correct: N2 pressure does comes from the CLAs A & B. PZR PORVs are required bleed path for heat removal Answer D Discussion Plausible: N2 pressure does comes from the CLAs A & B. Tube failure may become a risk with hi DP if the S/G is required to be depressurized to introduce a low pressure water source, but this is not the basis for step 22 .

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2004 NRC Q30 (Bank 1230)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed FR-H.l and basis

~ OPT Approved VI 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I 16171WE05 1617IWE05 IEK2.1 JI KA desc Knowledge of ofthe the interrelations between the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 145.7)

/ 45.7) Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 34 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number 1618 I WEll I EA2.1 I

I QUESTION 18 c KA desc Ability to detennine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation) 43.5 /45.13) Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnonnal and emergency operations.

(CFR: 43.5/45.13)

Unit 1 is responding to a LOCA into the Auxiliary Building in EP/1/Al5000/ECA-1.2 EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.2 (LOCA Outside of Containment). At the transition point from EP/1/Al5000/ECA-1.2, EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.2, the leak has not been isolated.

Which procedure will EP/1/Al5000/ECA-1.2 EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.2 direct the crew to enter?

A. EP/1/Al5000/FR-C.2 EP/1/A/5000/FR-C.2 (Response to Degraded Core Cooling)

B. EP/1/Al5000/E-1 EP/1/A/5000/E-1 (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant)

C. EP/1/Al5000/ECA-1.1 EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.1 (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

D. EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.2 (Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization)

EP/1/Al5000/ES-1.2 Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 35 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 18 c General Discussion This question does not require the student to memorize procedure transitions. Instead, the student is expected to logically assess conditions (LOCA into the AUX BLD that cannot be isolated and pressure continues to decrease after completion ofECA-1.2) and deduce that the containment sump inventory is still being lost. The only correct procedure would be ECA-l.l to address this problem. All other procedure transitions do not work.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Transition to FR-C.2 is plausible since it is possible that an unisolated LOCA would result in degraded core cooling.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Not the correct procedural transition if the NC system pressure continues to decrease (leak path not isolated).

This would be the correct procedure if the NC system pressure was stable or increasing.

Answer C Discussion Correct: Continuing loss of inventory means that there may be insufficient water in containment for recirculation cooling Answer D Discussion Plausible: Transition to ES-l.2 ES-1.2 not allowed, as the leak is not isolated.

The name of the procedure is appropriate for the situation.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2003 NRC Q21 (Bank 221)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed EP21esson

~ OPT Approved ECA-l.2 ECA-1.2 ECA-l.l 0 OPS Approved FR-c.:t FR-C.2 0 NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number I 16181WE11 161SlWEll IEA2.1 I

KA desc KA_desc Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

(CFR: 43.5 145.13)

/45.13) Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 36 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number IKA_number II QUESTION 19 D 1619 II APEOO5 JI AK2.02 I KA KA desc 41.7 145.7) Breakers, relays, Knowledge of the interrelations between the Inoperable I/ Stuck Control Rod and the following: (CFR 41.7/45.7) disconnects, and control room switches ........................................................

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power. Given the following:

While performing the RCCA movement test, control rod H-8 slipped into the core to 200 steps withdrawn

All other Bank D control rods are at 216 steps withdrawn as indicated on DR PI and step demand counters

The crew is in AP/1/A/5500/014 AP/1/A/55001014 (Control Rod Misalignment) and currently OP/1/A/6150/008 (Rod Control).

referring to OP/11A161501008

1. What is the maximum time allowed to restore rod H-8 to within limits per Technical Specification 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment Limits)?

perOP/11A161501008 (Rod Control), for which rod(s) will the

2. During rod retrieval perOP/1/A/6150/008 crew utilize the lift coil disconnect switch(es)?

A. 1. 30 minutes

2. Rod H-8 B. 1. 30 minutes

2. All rods in the affected bank except H-8 C. 1. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

2. Rod H-8 D. 1. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

2. All rods in the affected bank except H-8 19, 2009 Monday, October 19,2009 Page 37 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 19 D General Discussion The unaffected rods will have their lift coils disconnected per OP/1/N6150/008,OP/1/A/6150/008, enclosure 4.6, step 2.11. Per TS 3.1.4, one hour is allowed to realign to within group limits. 30 minutes is the AFD spec which is often utilized with misaligned rods.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: AFD TS 3.2.3 action is 30 minutes. The student may be confused as whether all rods except H-8 or only rod H-8 needs to be disconnected Answer B Discussion Plausible: AFD TS 3.2.3 action is 30 minutes. The unaffected rods will have their lift coils disconnected.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: TS 3.1.4 action time is correct. The student may be confused as whether all rods except H-8 H-8 H -8 or only rod H -8 needs to be disconnected Answer D Discussion Correct: TS 3.1.4 action time is correct. The unaffected rods will have their lift coils disconnected.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed AP/14 API14

~ OPT Approved OP/lIN6150/008 OP/1/A/6150/008 TS 3.1.4 D

0 OPS Approved TS 3.2.3 D

0 NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_systemsystem IKA number IKA_number II 1619iAPE005 16191APE005 IAK2.02 I KA desc Knowledge of the interrelations between the Inoperable I/ Stuck Control Rod and the following: (CFR 41.7 41. 7 145.7)

/45.7) Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches .......................................................

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 38 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA number IKA_number II QUESTION 20 D 1620 I I APE033 I 2.1.19 2.l.l9 JI KA desc I APE033 GENERIC Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status. (CFR: 4l.l0 41.10 145.12)

/ 45.12)

I Unit 1 was conducting a plant startup preparing to swap main feed nozzles. Given the following:

The control board meter for N-35 has failed and is being replaced

OAC point C1A0766 (N-35 Intermediate Range Level) is reading 3.1 X 10-55 amps

Other Intermediate Range and Power Range NI channel indications are:

o N-36 = 2.7 x 10-66 amps

=

o N-41 = 11.2%

o N-42 = 11.2%

o N-43 = 11.3%

o N-44 = 1 0.8%

10.8%

Thermal Power Best Esti mate = 11.1 %

Estimate

The C-1 interlock has not been manually blocked

1. Which intermediate range instrument is reading incorrectly?

2. Assuming no operator actions are taken to block C-1 or address the incorrectly I/R channel, alarm 1AD-02, C/3 (IIR reading IIR (I/R Hi Flux Level Rod Stop) will occur

_ _ _ _ it would have if both IIR

_____ I/R Nls were operating correctly.

A. 1. N-35 is reading too high for existing conditions

2. soonerthan sooner than B. 1. N-35 is reading too high for existing conditions

2. at the same time C. 1. N-36 is reading too low for existing conditions

2. later than D. 1. N-36 is reading too low for existing conditions

2. at the same time Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 39 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 20 D General Discussion N-36 is reading low and N-35 is reading correctly based on power range indications. Only the meter for N-35 is failed, the OAC indication is correct.

The C-l interlock is 112 logic at 20% amps equivalent. Since N-35 is reading correctly and is higher than N-36 the alarm will come in at the proper time based on the N-35 indication Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe N-35 is failed and is reading incorrectly, only the N-35 meter is failed. If the student believes N-35 is reading high, the second part would be correct also.

Answer B Discussion If it was reading higher and the logic was Plausible: Student may believe N-35 is failed and is reading incorrectly, only the N-35 meter is failed. Ifit 2/2, then the second part would be correct also.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: N-36 is reading too low. lfit Ifit was reading lower and the logic was 2/2, then the second part would be correct also.

Answer D Discussion Correct: N-36 is reading too low. Since C-l is not blocked, the alarm will occur at the same time it would have if all instrumentation was ifall indicating correctly Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2004 NRC Q78 (Bank 1278)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed ENB

~ OPT Approved 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1620 APE033 2.1.19 KA desc APE033 GENERIC Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status. (CFR: 41.10 I145.12) 45.12) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 40 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 21 B 1621 APE037 AK1.01 AKl.Ol I I! I KA KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Generator Tube Leak: CFR 41.8/ 41.l0 /

41.8 /41.10 45.3) Use of steam tables ..............................................

Unit 1 was operating at 50% power when a steam generator tube leak occurred on 1A S/G and was isolated per AP/1/A/5500/010 AP/1/A155001010 (Reactor Coolant Leak), Case I (Steam Generator Tube Leak).

Assuming uniform conditions in 1A S/G, at what minimum bulk fluid temperature in S/G 1A would an unmonitored offsite release occur?

Reference provided A. 557.0 of B. 560.7 of C. 566.1 of D. 567.7 of Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 41 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 21 B General Discussion S/G is isolated per AP/1/A/5500/01O, lA S/O APIlIA/5500101 0, Case 1. The S/O S/G PORV is verified closed, but not isolated. An unmonitored release would occur if the S/G PORV should lift. The S/O lA S/O S/G PORV lift setpoint is 1125 psig. Using steam tables, the saturation temperature for 1140 psia = 560.712 degrees Answer A Discussion Plausible: SS7 557 is the temperatrue steam dumps control at. This would be correct except lA S/G is isolated and this would be a monitored release IA S/O (air ejectors thru Unit Vent.)

Answer B Discussion ICorrectTsat for 1125 psig (1140 psia) == 560.712 degrees F ICorrect:Tsat Answer C Discussion S/G PORV is isolated. This is saturation temperature for the first safety relief, 1175 psig (1190 psia). Tsat for Plausible: If the student believes the S/O 1190 psia = 566.116 degrees F Answer D Discussion S/G PORV is isolated and confuses the first and second safety lift setpoints.This is saturation temperature Plausible: If the student believes the S/O for the second safety relief,1190 psig (1205 psia) Tsat for 1205 psia = 567.709 degrees F Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed Steam tables Steam Tables

~ OPT Approved SM lesson APIIO AP/I0 D

0 OPS Approved 0

D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 16211APE037 IAK1.01 I

KA_desc KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Generator Oenerator Tube Leak: CFR 41.8/41.101 41.8/41.10/

45.3) Use of steam tables ............................................. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 42 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA number IKA_number I QUESTION 22 A 1622 I APE067 I I I AK1.01 JI KA_desc Knowledge of ofthe the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Plant Fire on Site: (CFR 41.8/41.10/45.3) Fire classifications, by type ........................................

A trash bin near the Spent Fuel Pool truck bay doors caught fire and smoke was drawn into the Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation (VF) system supply ductwork.

1. What affect will this condition have on the operation of the VF system?

2. How is this fire classified?

A. 1. The VF Supply fan will trip only

2. Class A Fire B. 1. The VF Supply fan will trip only

2. Class B Fire C. 1. The VF Supply fan and the VF Filtered Exhaust fans will swap to filter mode

2. Class A Fire D. 1. The VF Supply fan and the VF Filtered Exhaust fans will swap to filter mode

2. Class B Fire Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 43 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 22 A General Discussion Per discussion with Frank on 8112/09 this means A,B,C,D fire types. He suggested making a question of what type of fire and how is it extinguished.

The VF supply fans wiII will trip and an alarm will sound in the control room, but the exhaust fans will continue to run unless manually secured by the operating crew.

Answer A Discussion Correct: Only the VF supply fan will wiII trip. Trash bin would contain ordinary combustibles (wood,paper,etc.) and would be classified as Class A Answer B Discussion Plausible: Only VF supply fan would trip. Student may believe ordinary combustibles are included in Class B fire Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe VF fans supply fan wiII will trip and align to filter mode on fire protection. Class A fire is correct Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe VF fans supply fan wiII will trip and align to filter mode on fire protection. Student may believe ordinary combustibles are included in Class B fire Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed VF D OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_number IKA number I 1622iAPE067 iAK 1.01 iAK Ji KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of ofthe the following concepts as they apply to Plant Fire on Site: (CFR 41.8/41.10/45.3) Fire ofthe classifications, by type .......................................

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 44 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 23 B 1623 I WE03 I EK2.2 I I I KA desc Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Cooldown and ofthe Depressurization) and the following: --

rem~val systems, 41.7 /45.7) Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal (CFR: 41.7/45.7) syst~ms, and of these systems to the operation of the facility.

relations between the proper operation ofthese \\

Unit 1 is responding to a small break LOCA in EPI1/A/5000/ES-1.2, EP/1 /A/5000/ES-1.2, (Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization). Step 16 requires the operators to depressurize the NC system.

Which one of the following statements describes the priority and reasons for using the prescribed methods of depressurizing the NC system?

A. 1. Auxiliary spray - preferred method - does not degrade containment

2. PORV - alternate method - faster depressurization than normal spray

3. Pressurizer spray - alternative method - will not workJLNC work JLNC pump is not running B. 1. Pressurizer spray - preferred method to be used usedJiNC if NC pump is running

2. PORV - alternate method - better than auxiliary spray

3. Auxiliary Spray - method of last resort - too slow and may thermal shock the spray nozzles and degrade regenerative heat exchanger C. 1. PORV - preferred method - rapid depressurization rate

2. Pressurizer spray - alternative method - next most rapid depressurization rate

3. Auxiliary spray - method of last resort - too slow and may thermal shock the spray nozzles D. 1. Auxiliary spray - preferred method - does not degrade containment

2. Pressurizer spray - alternative method - will not work.!! work If NC pump is not running

3. PORV - method of last resort - will rupture PRT and degrade containment e nvi ron ment environment Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 45 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 23 B General Discussion nonnal pressurizer spray, if available. If spray is unavailable, a PZR PORV is used. 1fno Step 16 ofES-1.2 uses normal Ifno PORVs are available, then NV aux spray is used.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe aux spray is preferred to PZR PORV due to possible reseating res eating problems and pressurizer spray is too slow. PZR PORV is the alternative method Answer B Discussion ICorrect: Per ES-l.2 ES-1.2 step 16 Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe PZR PORV preferred for rapid pressure reduction. Pressurizer spray preferred over aux spray Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe aux spray is preferred to pressurizer spray because of a more rapid depressurization and pressurizer spray preferred over PORV due to possible reseating problems Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2003 NRC Q28 (Bank 228)

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided ES1.2 ES 1.2 and ERG Background Document ES-1.2 step 14

~ OPT Approved page 17 OOPS Approved o NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 16231WE03 IEK2.2 I KA desc Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 /45.7) Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and 41.7/45.7) relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation ofthe facility.

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 46 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_number IKA number I QUESTION 24 A 1624 I WEOS I EK3.1 J

I KA_desc KA desc Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Pressurized Thennal Shock)

(CFR: 41.5/41.10, 45.6, 45.13) Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

A large steam line break occurred on Unit 1 and due to a failure of all MSIVs to close, the crew entered EP/1/A/5000/FR-P.1 (Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock).

Which part of the reactor vessel is most susceptible to failure for this accident sequence and what is the reason that it is most susceptible?

A. Inner reactor vessel wall; because the temperature gradient across the reactor vessel wall and the pressure stress is additive and highest at the inner wall during the cooldown B.

8. Inner reactor vessel wall; because the temperature gradient across the reactor vessel wall and the pressure stress is additive and highest at the inner wall during a subsequent heatup after the S/Gs fully depressurize

c. Outer reactor vessel wall; because the temperature gradient across the reactor vessel wall and the pressure stress is additive and highest at the outer wall during the cooldown D. Outer reactor vessel wall; because the temperature gradient across the reactor vessel wall and the pressure stress is additive and highest at the outer wall during a subsequent heatup after the S/Gs fully depressurize 19, 2009 Monday, October 19,2009 Page 47 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 24 A General Discussion Stress Profiles Stress Pro fil es

1) Heatup a) Pressure stress is higher on inner wall than outer wall.

b) Thennal Thermal gradient during heatup causes tensile stress on outer wall (cooler), compressive stress on inner wall.

C) The compressive stress on the inner wall effectively cancels portion of the pressure stress. Causes a lower total tensile 'Stress stress on the inner wall.

Vessel inner wall is further from allowable stress values.

2) Cooldown a) Pressure stress profile is the same as for heatup.

Thermal gradient during cooldown causes tensile stress on inner wall, compressive stress on outer wall.

b) Thennal C) The tensile stress on the inner wall due to Delta T reinforces the tensile stress due to pressure. This causes higher total tensile stress on inner wall. The Vessel is closer to allowable stress values.

3. Since total stress is higher on the vessel inner wall on cooldown than heatup, cooldown is more limiting Summary: Stresses are highest at the inner wall during the cooldown due to the pressure stress being additive to the temperature gradient stress.

Answer A Discussion ICorrect: Per discussion above Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may be confused on heatup and cooldown.

cooldown.The The inner vessel wall is correct but during cooldown, not subsequent heatup Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may be confused on vessel inner wall or outer wall. Correct reasons, outer vessel wall is incorrect Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may be confused on which vessel wall and whether during cooldown or subsequent heatup Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~

~ Developed PTS

~

~ OPT Approved D

0 OPS Approved D

0 NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number JI 16241WE08 16241WE08 IEK3.1 I KA desc Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Pressurized Thennal Thermal Shock) 41.5 /41.1 0, 45.6, 45.13) Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of (CFR: 41.5/41.10, temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 48 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 25 D

-~II QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number 1625 I WEl3WEB I EK3.1 I I KA desc Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Steam Generator Overpressure)

(CFR: 41.5 /41.10, 45.6,45.13) Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

Given the following:

1A S/G pressure is 1212 psig and increasing

The crew has implemented EP/1/A15000/FR-H.4 EP/1/N5000/FR-HA (Response to Loss of Normal Steam Release Capabilities)

1A S/G level is approximately 18% N/R level

Operators have been dispatched to manually operate the 1A 1A S/G PORV

1. How will1Awill 1A S/G indicated level initially respond when the PORV is opened?

2. What is the reason for this response?

A. 1. Indicated level will initially decrease

2. Increased voiding in the S/G downcomer region will cause a "shrink" phenomenon B. 1. Indicated level will initially increase

2. Increased voiding in the S/G downcomer region will cause a "swell" phenomenon C. 1. Indicated level will initially decrease

2. Increased voiding in the S/G tube bundle area will cause a "shrink" phenomenon D. 1. Indicated level will initially increase

2. Increased voiding in the S/G tube bundle area will cause a "swell" phenomenon Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 49 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 25 D General Discussion normal power operation, steam voids are fonned During nonnal formed in the tube bundle region of the Steam Generator. The amount of voiding present is dependent on steam pressure, power level, and feedwater temperature. As these voids fonn form or collapse, water is displaced into or out of the down comer region where level is sensed.

downcomer SHRINK occurs when a transient occurs that results in a DECREASE in steam voiding. This appears as a rapid DECREASE in NIR N/R S/G level.

SWELL occurs when any transient occurs that results in an INCREASE in steam voiding. It appears as a rapid INCREASE in indicated NIR S/G level.

At 1175 psig FR-H.4 is entered. When the S/G PORV is opened the indicated S/G level will swell due to increased voiding in the tube bundle region.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may be confused on shrink and swell as well as the tube bundle area and the downcomer region Answer B Discussion Plausible: Swell will occur but not due to increased voiding in the downcomer region Answer C Discussion Plausible: Although voiding in the tube bundle region will increase, this will not result in swell, not shrink Answer D Discussion Correct: When the S/G PORV is opened the indicated S/G level will swell due to increased voiding in the tube bundle region and water is displacement into the downcomer region.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided 0 Developed IFE 0 OPT Approved FR-H.4 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA IKA_number number II I 625\WE13 1625\WE13 \EK3.1 \\

KA desc Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Steam Generator Overpressure)

(CFR: 41.5 /41.1

/41.10,0, 45.6,45.13) Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 50 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA system QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA IKA_number number I QUESTION 26 B 1626 I WE14 I EA2.1 I I

KA desc Ability to detennine and interpret the following as they apply to the (High Containment Pressure)

(CFR: 43.5 /45.13) Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnonnal and emergency operations.

43.5/45.13)

Which one of the following specifies the minimum condition(s) that would require a RED path entry into EP/1/A/5000/FR-Z.1 EP/1/N5000/FR-Z.1 (Response to High Containment Pressure)?

A. 3 psig containment pressure alone B. 15 psig containment pressure alone C. 3 psig containment pressure combined with no NS trains indicating flow D. 15 psig containment pressure combined with no NS trains indicating flow Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 51 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 26 B General Discussion 15 psig red path is entered regardless of NS status ofNS Answer A Discussion Plausible: NS initiation setpoint for high containment pressure. Student may believe high containment pressure requires entering FR FR-Z.1

-Z.l due to procedure title Answer B Discussion Correct: 15 psig is the entry requirement for FR-Z.l Answer C Discussion Plausible: NS initiation setpoint for high containment pressure. Student may believe high containment pressure without NS in service requires entering FR-Z.1 FR-Z.l due to procedure title and no containment spray available Answer D Discussion Plausible: 15 psig is the entry requirement, this is independent ofNS of NS status. Student may believe NS being unavailable is part of entry conditions for FR-Z.l FR-Z.1 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided

~

F-O

~ OPT Approved

~

D OPS Approved OOPS oD NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank #JKA system IKA IKA number II 16261WE14 IEA2.1 I KA desc Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (High Containment Pressure)

/45.13) Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

(CFR: 43.5 145.13) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 52 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II QUESTION 27 B 1627 I I WE15 I EA1.2 I KA KA desc Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Containment Flooding) 41.7/45.5/45.6)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5/45.6) Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

A large break LOCA has occurred on Unit 1. The S/G sample valves must to be opened to verify a S/G tube leak does not exist.

Which of the following does not need to be RESET to allow the S/G sample valves to be opened?

A. Phase A B. Phase B C. KC NC NI Nt NM St D. CA SYS VL V CTRL Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 53 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 27 B General Discussion The KC,NC,NI,NM St RESETs are specifically designed to prevent spurious valve repositioning due to containment flooding. The steam generator sample valves have a separate reset. A separate reset is required because a containment Phase A signal disables the open circuits for these valves to prevent them from spuriously repositioning due to containment flooding. Phase B is not required, but the student may think this is a Phase B signal to close the NM valves.

To allow these valves to be operated, Phase A, CA SYS VL V CTRL, and KC,NC,NI,NM St signals must be reset Answer A Discussion Plausible: Phase A signals ARE required to be reset Answer B Discussion Correct: Phase B is NOT required to be reset Answer C Discussion Plausible: KC,NC,NI,NM St signals ARE required be reset Answer D Discussion Plausible: CA SYS VL V CTRL IS required to be reset

[Plausible:

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed E-l

~ OPT Approved D

0 OPS Approved D

0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I I 627[WE15 16271WE15 [EA1.2 IEA1.2 [I KA desc Ability to operate and 1/ or monitor the following as they apply to the (Containment Flooding)

(CFR: 41.7 145.5 145.6) Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

41.7/45.5/45.6) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 54 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA number IKA_number I QUESTION 28 A 1628 I SYSOO3 I K4.04 I I I KA desc KA_desc Knowledge of RCPS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) Adequate cooling ofRCP motor and ofRCPS seals ...........................

What of the following states the system that provides cooling water to the reactor coolant pump motor bearings and a signal that will isolate that cooling water from the pump?

A. KG KC provides cooling water and isolates on a Phase B signal B. KC provides cooling water and isolates on a Safety Injection signal KG G.

C. YV provides cooling water and isolates on a Phase B signal D. YV provides cooling water and isolates on a Safety Injection signal Monday, October 19,2009 Page 55 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 28 A General Discussion KC provides the cooling to the motor bearings but YV provides cooling to the NCP motor stator. Phase B acuation on Hi-Hi containment pressure (3psig) isolates KC to NCP supply and return valves Answer A Discussion Correct: KC provides the cooling to the motor bearings and Phase B acuation on Hi-Hi containment pressure (3psig) isolates KC to NCP supply and return valves Answer B Discussion Plausible: KC does provide cooling. Some containment components KC cooling are isolated on a Phase A signal (NCDT and excess letdown)

Answer C Discussion Plausible: YV does not supply the NCP motor bearings, but does isolate on a Phase B signal Answer D Discussion Plausible: YV provides cooling to the NCP motor stator. Student may believe cooling is isolated on an SI signal Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed NCP lesson

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA number IKA_number I 1628!SYSOO3 1628jSYSOO3 jK4.04

!K4.04

!j KA desc Knowledge ofRCPS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) Adequate cooling ofRCP motor and seals .......................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 56 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA_system number IKA_number II QUESTION 29 B 1629 I SYS004 I A4.08 I KA~

KA desc I Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 4117 /45.5 to 45.8) Charging .......................................................

4117/45.5 jI Unit 1 was decreasing power and stopped at 85% to repair the valve positioner for 1NV-294 (NV Pumps A & & B Disch Flow Ctrl). The SLIM station for 1NV-294 was transferred from "AUTO" to "LOCAL" control for the repair. Given the following:

Pressurizer level is 53%

Following the repair, the SLIM station for 1 NV-294 was transferred directly from "LOCAL" to "AUTO".

The power decrease recommenced at 10%/hr

1. As power is decreased, how will 1NV-294 respond?

2. What operator actions (if any), are needed to establish normal pressurizer level control during the power decrease?

A. 1. 1NV-294 valve position will not change

2. Restore the Pressurizer Level Master to automatic by transferring the 1 NV-294 SLIM station from "AUTO" to "MANUAL" and then back to "AUTO" B. 1. 1NV-294 valve position will not change

2. Restore the Pressurizer Level Master to automatic using the soft controls on DCS graphic "NV - Charging Flow" C. 1. 1NV-294 valve position increases

2. Restore the Pressurizer Level Master to automatic using the soft controls on DCS graphic "NV - Charging Flow" D. 1. 1NV-294 valve position decreases

2. No operator actions are required Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 57 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 29 B General Discussion When 1I NV -294 is placed in LOCAL, the LEVEL MASTER goes to manual. Even after I NV -294 is placed in auto, the master remains in MAUNAL until the operator places it back in auto by using the soft control. As long as the master is in manual, 1I NV294 will not get signals to change position.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: 1I NV -294 position will not change due to the Pzr pzr level master being in manual. Student may believe this will restore the auto function as this is similar to restoring a feed reg valve Answer B Discussion I NY -294 position will not change due to the level master being in manual. The Pzr level master is restored using the DCS soft control Correct: INY-294 Answer C Discussion Plausible: The student may believe 1I NVNY -294 has been fully restored to auto via the SLIM station and an increase in 1I NV -294 position is necessary. This is wrong for the power & Pzr level given. The Pzrpzr level master is restored using the DCS soft control Answer D Discussion Plausible: The student may believe I NY -294 has been fully restored to auto via the SLIM station. A decrease in I NV -294 position would be necessary for the power & Pzr level given.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided

~

ILE

~

~ OPT Approved D

D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA KA_system system 1629SYS004 1629 SYS004 A4.0S A4.08 KA desc Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 4117 //45.5 45.5 to 45.S) 45.8) Charging ...................................................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE DCSDCSDCS DCSDCS DCS Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 58 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination jKA system QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA IKA_number number II QUESTION 30 B 1630 j SYS005 I I A4.05 I KA KA_desc desc Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.8) Position ofRWST recirculation valve (locked when not in use, continuously monitored when in use) ..........................

Unit 1 is at 100% power.

For current conditions, what is the normal position of 1NO-33 (NO Sys Rtn To FWST) and how is this position administratively controlled?

A. Closed; white tagged in position B. Closed; locked in position C. Open; white tagged in position O. Open; locked in position Monday, October 19,2009 Page 59 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 30 B General Discussion KJA Originally asked to be replaced because this is a manual valve. Frank said that pump miniflow could be considered as recirc to meet this KIA and to re-evaluate. Later stated that we should try to meet it with ND33.

This valve is normally closed and locked in position (refer to PT/OIBI4700/30).

PT/01B14700/30).

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Correct position. White tags are commonly used for configuration control in some plant modes Answer B Discussion Correct: This valve is normally closed and locked in position (refer to PT/OIBI4700/30).

PT/01B14700/30).

Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this is normal recirc flowpath and this valve is open at times during shutdown ops. White tags are commonly used for configuration control in some plant Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this is normal recirc flowpath and this valve is open at times during shutdown ops. Locked is correct Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed ND OP (Page 70 of pdf)

~ OPT Approved PT/OIBI4700/40 PT/01B14700/40 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I 1630lSYS005 IA4.05 I KA desc Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.8) Position ofRWST recirculation valve (locked when not in use, continuously monitored when in use) ......................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 60 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II QUESTION 31 B 1631 I SYSOO5 K1.13 K1.l3 I I I KA KA desc Knowledge of the physical connections and/or andlor cause-effect relationships between the RHRS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.91 41.9 /

45.7 to 45.8) SIS ............................................................

Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a large break LOCA occurred. Given the following:

FWST level is 35%

All automatic actions have occurred

No operator actions have occurred

1. Which ECCS pump(s) are taking suction from the containment sump?

2. Which NC cold legs are the NO pumps currently injecting into?

A. 1. NO pumps only

2. Band C NC cold legs B. 1. NO pumps only

2. All 4 cold legs C. 1. NV pumps, NI pumps, NO pumps

2. Band C NC cold legs O. 1. NV pumps, NI pumps, NO pumps

2. All 4 cold legs Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 61 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 31 B General Discussion On the auto swap, only the ND pump suction aligns to the containment sump from the FWST. The NI and NY NV pumps remain on the FWST and additional operator action is required to swap them to the cont sump (via the ND pump discharge). ND injects to all four cold legs on CLR, however during HLR, ND only injects into B Bandand C hot legs.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: ND pumps are correct with auto actions complete and no operator action. B and hot legs are used for ND hot leg recirc Answer B Discussion Correct: ND pumps are correct with auto actions complete and no operator action and will be injecting into all 4 cold legs Answer C Discussion Plausible: This would be correct if operator actions had occurred (NY (NV and NI indirectly from the ND pumps). B and hot legs are used for ND hot leg recirc Answer D Discussion Plausible: This would be correct if operator actions had occurred (NY (NV and NI indirectly from the ND pumps). All pumps will be injecting into to all 4 cold legs Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed NI lesson

~ OPT Approved E-O ES-I.3 ES-1.3 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_number IKA number II 1631lSYSOO5 16311SYSOO5 IK1.l3 I KA desc Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RHRS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 /

45.7 to 45.8) SIS ........................................................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 62 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 32 A 1632 I SYSOO6 I A1.07 Al.07 I KA KA desc Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ECCS controls 41.5 /45.5) Pressure, high and low ............................................

including: (CFR: 41.5145.5)

Unit 1 has experienced a steam line break accident. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

The operating crew has completed EP/1/A15000/E-2 EP/1/N5000/E-2 (Faulted Steam Generator Isolation)

NC pressure initially decreases to 1400 psig

Safety injection termination criteria has been met and the crew is preparing to EP/1/N5000/ES-1.1 (Safety Injection Termination) transition to EP/1/A15000/ES-1.1

NC pressure is 2200 psig and increasing Per Enclosure 1 of EPI1IA15000/E-2, EP/1 IN5000/E-2, at what NC pressure will 1NV-202B and 1NV-203A (NV Pumps A&B Recirc Isol) be closed as NC pressure initially decreases and at what NC pressure will they be reopened as NC pressure subsequently increases to provide protection to the NV pumps?

A. Closed at <1500 psig decreasing and re-opened at >2000 psig increasing B. Closed at <1500 psig decreasing and re-opened at >1955 psig increasing C. Closed at <1620 psig decreasing and re-opened at >2000 psig increasing D. Closed at <1620 psig decreasing and re-opened at >1955 psig increasing Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 63 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 32 A General Discussion Per enclosure 1I the valves are closed ifNC pressure is <1500 psig and NV 81 SI flowpath is aligned and are reopened at NC pressure> 2000 psig .

Answer A Discussion Correct: Per E-2, enclosure 1, I, the recirc valves are closed ifNC pressure is <1500 psig and NV 81 SI flowpath is aligned and are reopened at NC pressure> 2000 psig .

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Valves are closed if ifNC NC pressure is <1500 psig and NV SI 81 flowpath is aligned. 1955 psig is the setpoint for permissive P-IIP-l1 and is close to the required >2000 psig Answer C Discussion Plausible: 1620 psig is procedurally (-100 psig conservatism) the shutoff head for the N1 NI pumps and is close to the required <1500 psig.

Reopening at >2000 psig is correct Answer D Discussion Plausible: 1620 psig is procedurally (-100 psig conservatism) the shutoff head for the N1 NI pumps and is close to the required <1500 psig. 1955 P-l1 and is close to the required >2000 psig psig is the setpoint for permissive P-II Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW

~ Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed E-2

~ OPT Approved

~

0 OPS Approved OOPS o

0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # jKA jKA system jKA_number jKA number j j

1632jSYS006 163218Y8006 jA1.07 IAI.0? JI KA desc Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ECC8 ECCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5/45.5) Pressure, high and low ........................................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 64 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 33 D 1633 I SYSOO6 I K5.06 I

KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to ECCS: (CFR: 4l.5/45.7) 41.5/45.7) Relationship between ECCS flow and RCS pressure ...................

Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a LOCA occurred at Time O. Given the NC System pressure trend shown below:

2500 It a-2000 .

s

II It a-D.

1500 E

It 1:

1;: 1000

~

1; u

z 500 o

o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8g 9 10 .11 11 Time (minutes)

Which of the following describes when each of the ECCS pumps listed begins to inject flow into the NC system?

NI Pumps ND Pumps A. Between 0 and 1 minute Between 8 and 9 minutes B. Between 1 and 2 minutes Between 8 and 9 minutes C. Between 0 and 1 minute Between 9 and 10 minutes D. Between 1 and 2 minutes Between 9 and 10 minutes Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 65 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 33 D General Discussion NI shutoff head is 1536, ND shutoff head is 195.

MODIFIED PER FRANK E. COMMENTS 9/14/09 Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe shutoff head ofNI and ND are higher or misinterpret the graph Answer B Discussion Plausible: NI will begin injecting at -~ 1.5 minutes. Student may believe shutoff head ofND is higher or misinterpret the graph Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe shutoff head ofNI is higher or misinterpret the graph. ND will begin to inject at -~ 9.7 minutes Answer D Discussion Correct: NI will begin injecting at -~ 1.5 minutes and ND will begin to inject at -~ 9.7 minutes Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed ND

~ OPT Approved NI D OPS Approved D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_systemsystem IKA number IKA_number II 116331SYS006 6331SYS006 IK5.06 II KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to ECCS: (CFR: 41.5/45.7) Relationship between ECCS flow and RCS pressure .................. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 66 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number IKA_number I QUESTION 34 B 1634 SYSOO7 K5.02 I I I KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of ofthe the following concepts as they apply to PRTS: (CFR: 41.5/45.7) Method of offonning forming a steam bubble in the PZR ........................

Unit 1 has completed NC fill and vent activities following a forced outage. Given the following:

A nitrogen blanket was placed on the pressurizer during the outage

NC level is 85% in preparation for drawing a bubble in the pressurizer

1. What is the limit on pressurizer heat up rate per Selected Licensee Commitment 16.5-4 (Pressurizer)?

2. What indication verifies nitrogen venting is complete while drawing a bubble in the pressurizer?

A. 1. 100°F per hour

2. PRT temperature equalizes with Pzr steam space temperature B. 1. 100°F per hour

2. PRT level increases without a corresponding PRT pressure increase C. 1. 200°F per hour

2. PRT temperature equalizes with Pzr steam space temperature D. 1. 200°F per hour

2. PRT level increases without a corresponding PRT pressure increase Monday, October 19,2009 Page 67 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 34 B General Discussion PZR heatup rate per SLC 16.5-4 is 100 degrees Flhour. FIhour. PRT pressure and level indications are used to determine detennine when all N2 has been vented formation. N2 venting is considered complete when PRT pressure does not increase with a corresponding from the pressurizer during bubble fonnation.

PRT PR T level increase Answer A Discussion Plausible: 100 Flhr is correct pzr heatup rate. PRT temperature equal to Pzr steam space temperature may be logical to the student based on steaming the PZR to the PRT Answer B Discussion Correct: PZR heatup rate per SLC 16.5-4 is 100 degrees Flhour. N2 venting is considered complete when PRT pressure does not increase with a corresponding PRT level increase Answer C Discussion Plausible: 200 Flhr is the pzr cooldown rate per SLC 16.5-4. PRT temperature equal to pzr steam space temperature may be logical to the student based on steaming the PZR to the PRT Answer D Discussion Plausible: 200 Flhr is the pzr cooldown rate per SLC 16.5-4. N2 venting is considered complete when PRT pressure does not increase with a corresponding PRT level increase Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW D Developed Development References Student References Provided OP/lIN6100/001, enclosure 4.1. NOTE prior to step OP/1/N6100/001,

~ OPT Approved 2.43. SLC 16.5-4 D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I 1634jSYS007 16341SYS007 jK5.02 IK5.02 Ij KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to PRTS: (CFR: 41.5 41.5/45.7)

/45.7) Method ofoffonning forming a steam bubble in the PZR ....................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 68 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number IKA I I

QUESTION 35 B 1635 I I SYSOO8 I AI.03 A1.03 I KA KA desc Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CCWS controls including: (CFR: 41.5/45.5) CCW pressure ...................................................

Unit 1 is in Mode 3. Given the following:

1AD-6, E/1 (NGP (NCP A Thermal Barrier KG KC Outlet Hi/lo Hi/Lo Flow) is LIT

The flow trend below:

100 ~~--~~--,--,- ..-,-.-,--....~--,--,-~-,.----~~~

!l: 90 -~*-~--~~---+--~--+--i---0--+---+-~-+--**~-~~

.Q I.L

...., 80 (I)

-:;::; 70

l 0 60

.~

E Qj-;::--

c: SO 50

'- n. 0..

ro

<tI bJ) b.O 40 co -

C!l ro<tI 30 ..

E'-

(l)

IJ) 20 .

..c

..c:

I- 10 u

U

~

o0 o 10 20 30 40 SO 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 Time (seconds)

1. At what time on the above graph should 1KC-394A KG-394A (NC (NG Pump 1A Therm Bar Otlt) have automatically closed?

2. If the NGP NCP 1A thermal barrier can not be isolated from the KG System by any means, how is over pressurization of the KC KG surge tanks prevented?

A. 1. 100 seconds

2. The KG surge tanks vent line is large enough to prevent over pressurization B. 1. 130 seconds

2. The KC KG surge tanks vent line is large enough to prevent over pressurization C.

G. 1. 100 seconds

2. The KC KG surge tanks relief valve to the KG drain sump is large enough to prevent over pressurization D. 1. 130 seconds

2. The KG KC surge tanks relief valve to the KG drain sump is large enough to prevent over pressurization Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 69 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 35 B General Discussion Thermal barrier tube rupture Thennal Thermal barrier KC outlet valve will auto close at >/= 60 gpm for 30 seconds (time delay)

Thennal Overpressurization of surge tanks is prevented by vent piping design size Correct flow and time delay required Reliefvalves Relief valves are typically used to prevent tank overpressurization Answer A Discussion Plausible: The correct flow has been reached but not for 30 seconds. Overpressurization of surge tanks is prevented by vent piping design size is correct Answer B Discussion Thennal barrier KC outlet valve will auto close at >/= 60 gpm for 30 seconds (time delay). Overpressurization of surge tanks is Correct: Thermal prevented by vent piping design size Answer C Discussion Plausible: The correct flow has been reached but not for 30 seconds. Reliefvalves Relief valves are typically used to prevent tank overpressurization, this not true for the KC surge tank Answer D Discussion Plausible: Thermal wiII auto close at >/= 60 gpm for 30 seconds (time delay). Relief Thennal barrier KC outlet valve will Reliefvalves valves are typically used to prevent tank overpressurization,this not true for the KC surge tank Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed KC lesson plan and 1lAD-6 AD-6 ARP

~ OPT Approved 0D OPS Approved 0

D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA number IKA_number II 163SlSYS008 IAl.03 JI KA desc Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CCWS controls including: (CFR: 41.5/45.5) 41.5 /45.5) CCW pressure .................................................. .

401*9 Comments:

401-9 401*9 Comments RESPONSE 401-9 Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 70 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system 1636 IKA I

system SYSOI0 SYS010 IKA I

number IKA_number K6.01 II I

QUESTION 36 c I

KA KA_desc desc Knowledge of the effect ofa of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the PZR PCS: (CFR: 41.7/45.7) 41.7 /45.7) Pressure detection systems Unit 1 was operating at 100%. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

Pressurizer Pressures channel indications:

o Ch. 1 2238 psig o Ch. 2 2238 psig o Ch. 3 2236 psig o Ch. 4 2234 psig

A single channel of pressurizer pressure failed offscale HIGH

A second channel of pressurizer pressure failed offscale LOW

No operator actions have been taken yet

1. What affect does this combination of channel failures have on Pressurizer Pressure Master operation?

2. What is the status of Unit 1 after these channel failures?

A. 1. The Pressurizer Pressure Master is not affected

2. The Unit 1 reactor tripped on low pressurizer pressure B. 1. The Pressurizer Pressure Master has swapped to manual

2. The Unit 1 turbine has run back on OTDelta OTDeita T C. 1. The Pressurizer Pressure Master has swapped to manual

2. Unit 1 is operating at 100%

D. 1. The Pressurizer Pressure Master is not affected

2. Unit 1 is operating at 100%

Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 71 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 36 c General Discussion If two or more of the pressurizer pressure channel inputs are invalid an Alternate Action condition and alarm will occur. If an Alternate Action occurs it will cause the Selected PZR Pressure signal to transfer to a previous good value and swaps the Pressurizer Pressure Master to manual.

When an Alternate Action in Selected PZR Pressure-l logic takes place the following occur:

Shifts the PZR Pressure Master to manual Blocks NC-34A actuation Blocks Low Pressure control deviation alarm and Backup Heaters on When an Alternate Action in Selected PZR Pressure-2 logic takes place the following occur:

Actuates the Low Pressure alarm and blocks opening ofNC-34A Blocks NC-32B and NC-36B actuation Actuates an Alternate Action alarm and annunciator Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that the pzr pressure master will remain in automatic with 2 good channels remaining but the Rx may trip on Pzrpzr pressure due to meeting 2/4 protection channels Answer B Discussion Plausible: The pzr pressure master will swap to manual. The student may believe the 2/4 OTDT for turbine runback ronback has been satisfied Answer C Discussion Correct: The pzr pressure master will swap to manual. Unit operation will be unaffected Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that the pzr pressure master will remain in automatic with 2 good channels remaining. Unit operation will be unaffected Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed IPE

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank #JKA system IKA_system IKA number IKA_number I 16361SYSOlO IK6.01 I KA desc Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the PZR PCS: (CFR: 41.7/45.7) Pressure detection systems 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE DCSDCSDCS DCS DCS DCS Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 72 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 37 B 1637 I SYS012 I K6.10 K6.l0 I KA desc Knowledge of the effect ofa of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the RPS: (CFR: 41.7 41.7/45/7)

/4517) Permissive circuits Unit 1 is increasing power at 55%. Given the following conditions:

1A NC pump spuriously tripped

Both reactor trip breakers are closed

1. Which permissive enables a reactor trip on the loss of one NC pump?

2. For the conditions above, should a reactor trip have automatically occurred?

A. 1. P-7

2. Yes B. 1. P-8

2. Yes C. 1. P-7

2. No D. 1. P-8

2. No Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 73 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 37 B General Discussion On increasing power, P-8 (2/4 PR >1= of flow (2/3 flow ch.) Rx trip. Also on increasing power, P-7 (2/4

>/= 48%) enables the lout of 4 loop loss offlow PR >1=

>/= 10%) unblocks the 2 out of 4 loop loss of flow (2/3) Rx trip. With reactor power at 55% the Rx should automatically trip.

Per TS 3.3.1 bases:

In MODE 1 above the P-8 setpoint, a loss offlow of flow in one RCS loop could result in DNB conditions in the core. In MODE 1 below the P-8 setpoint, a loss offlow in two or more loops is required to actuate a reactor trip because of the lower power level and the greater margin to the design limit DNBR.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe P-7 unblocks 1 loop loss of flow. The Rx should trip automatically Answer B Discussion Correct: P-8 is the correct permissive and the Rx should trip automatically Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe P-7 setpoint is higher and Rx trip is not required Answer D Discussion Discus.sion Plausible: P-8 is the correct permissive. Student may believe P-8 setpoint is higher and Rx trip is not required Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW

~ Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed IPX lesson

~ OPT Approved

~

D OPS Approved D NRC Approved I IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA IKA_number number II 16371SYS012 IK6.10 IK6.l0 I I

KA desc Knowledge of the effect ofa of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the RPS: (CFR: 41.7/45/7) 41.7 145/7) Permissive circuits 401-9 401*9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE 401*9 Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 74 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system [KA system [KA number IKA_number I

[

QUESTION 38 B 1638 SYS013 I K5.02 I I

KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the ESFAS: (CFR: 41.5/45.7) Safety system logic and reliability ..................................

Unit 1 is in Mode 3 and reducing NC pressure and temperature for a refueling outage.

Given the following:

Pressurizer pressure channels indicate at follows:

o Channel 1 is 1972 psig o Channel 2 is 1985 psig o Channel 3 is 1965 psig o Channel 4 is 1951 1951psig psig

Assuming pressurizer pressu rizer pressure channel 2 fails "as-is" at 1985 psig while the other channels of pressurizer pressure continue to track NC pressure as it decreases How many of the remaining operable pressurizer pressure channels are required to be below the P-11 setpoint before "ECCS TRN AlB PZR PRESS" can be blocked?

A. 1 of the other 2 remaining channels that input P-11 B. 2 of the other 2 remaining channels that input P-11 C. 1 of the other 3 remaining channels that input P-11 D. 2 of the other 3 remaining channels that input P-11 Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 75 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 38 B General Discussion There are 4 channels of ofpzr pzr pressure for trip logic. CH 4 does NOT input P-ll logic, only channels 1, 1,22 and 3. 2/3 channels less than P-ll (1955 psig) cause the P-ll light on SI119 SI/19 to light (block permissive).

pennissive). Since there are only 2 channels left (1 and 3) that input P-ll, both must be less than P-ll to allow the permissive.

pennissive. Possible misconception of requiring 2/4 logic Answer A Discussion Plausible :Ifthe student thinks that Ch 4 inputs P-ll P-l1 , then this would be correct.

Answer B Discussion Correct: Channels 1,2 and 3 input P-ll. P-l1. 2/3 channels less than 1955 psig cause the P-ll SII19 to light (block permissive).

P-l1 light on SI/19 pennissive). Since there are only 2 channels left (1 and 3) that input P-ll, P-Il, both must be less than P-ll to allow the permissive.

pennissive.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: There are only 2 remaining channels that input P-ll, but almost all other permissive pennissive signals have 4 channels Answer D Discussion Plausible: There are only 2 remaining channels that input P-ll, P-Il, but almost all other pennissive permissive signals have 4 channels.This would be correct if Ch 4 were the failed channel.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed TS 3.3.2

~ OPT Approved 0D OPS Approved D0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA IKA number II 1638iSYS013 iK5 .02 iK5 i KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications ofthe following concepts as they apply to the ESFAS: (CFR: 41.5/45.7) Safety system logic and reliability ................................. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,20092009 Page 76 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 39 A 1639 II SYS022 I A2.01 I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts ofthe of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13) 41.5 /43.5/45.3 /45.13) Fan motor over-current Unit 1 was operating at 100% power. Given the following events and conditions:

1A, 1A,11B, B, and 1 1CC Lower Containment Ventilation Units (LCVU's) are in service

LCVU 1B 1B fan trips on over-current

Lower containment average temperature is 11rF 11 rF and slowly increasing Based on the conditions above, what is the first action OP/1/A164501001 OP/1/N64501001 (Containment Ventilation (VV) Systems) specifies to provide additional cooling to lower containment?

A. Start 1D 1D LCVU in LOW speed B. Place 1A and 1C LCVUs in "MAX" cooling only C. Place 1A and 1C LCVUs in "MAX" cooling and HIGH speed D. Start 1D LCVU in HIGH speed and place 1A and 1C LCVUs in HIGH speed Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 77 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 39 A General Discussion Per Enclosure 4.11, when additional units are available, they should be placed on in LOW speed. Ifno If no additional units are available, then the available units should be placed in HIGH speed. System operation has changed within the last 2 years to operate in MAX cooling mode all the time.

Answer A Discussion Correct: Per OP/lIAl64501001 OPII IAl6450100 1 Enclosure 4.11, when idle LCVUs are available, they should be placed on in LOW speed.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: This is the normal alignment (MAX), but selecting "Max Cool" was a correct action in the past.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: This would be the first action if these were the only available LCVUs.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: If an idle LCVU is not available, 2 of the operating LCVUs LCVU s are placed in HIGH SPEED per enclosure 4.11. Since 1D LCVU is available, no units would be started in high speed as a first action Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed

References:

~ OPT Approved OPII IAl6450100 11 Encl4.11 OP/lIA/64501001l VV lesson plan D OPS Approved D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA number IKA_number JI 1639!SYS022 16391SYS022 !A2.01 IA2.01 !I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13) 41.5 143.5 145.3 145.13) Fan motor over-current 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 78 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 40 D 1640 I SYS022 I K3.02 I I I KA desc Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7!

41.7/45.6) 45.6) Containment instrumentation readings ...............................

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

Initial lower containment average temperature was 103°F

All YV flow to containment was lost

Current lower containment average temperature is 116°F and increasing

1. What are the Technical Specification temperature range limits for lower containment temperature based on current plant status?

2. What affect does a higher containment temperature have on indicated pressurizer level?

A. 1. 60°F - 120°F

2. indicated level will be lower than actual level B. 1. 60°F-120°F 60°F - 120°F

2. indicated level will be higher than actual level C. 1. 100°F-120°F 100°F - 120°F

2. indicated level will be lower than actual level D. 1. 100°F -120°F

2. indicated level will be higher than actual level Monday, October 19, 19,20092009 Page 79 of200 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 40 D General Discussion This KA is met because it appears to be asking about containment conditions deteriorating and affects on instruments based on that. pzr level is affected by containment temperature since its reference leg is in containment.

Containment temperature limits are 100-120 in Mode 1 and 60-120 in modes 2,3,4. 2, 3, 4. Actual level will be lower than indicated level because as the reference leg heats up and becomes less dense, it will have the effect on the DP cell similar to increasing pzr level.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: If student thinks Mode 2,3 and 4 limits apply. If student thinks level effect is reverse Answer B Discussion Plausible: If student thinks Mode 2,3 and 4 limits apply. Indicated level will be higher than actual level because as the reference leg heats up and becomes less dense, indicated level will increase Answer C Discussion Plausible: Mode 1 Containment temperature limits. If student thinks level effect is reverse Answer D Discussion Correct: Containment temperature limits are 100-120 in Mode 1. I. indicated level will be higher than actual level because as the reference leg heats up and becomes less dense, indicated level will increase Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Sou rce Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed TS 3.6.5

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA IKA_number number II 1640lSYS022 IK3.02 I KA desc Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6) Containment instrumentation readings .............................. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,20092009 Page 80 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # [KA system 1641 IKA I SYS025 IKA

[KA number A3.02 I

[

QUESTION 41 c I I I KA KA desc Ability to monitor automatic operation ofthe of the ice condenser system, including: (CFR: 41.7/45.5) Isolation valves Which one of the following parameters provides an input to the automatic close signal for 1NF-228A (NF Supply Containment Isolation Valve)?

A. glycol flow B. refrigerant compressor oil pressure C. glycol expansion tank level D. refrigerant compressor suction pressure Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 81 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 41 c General Discussion The NF supply containment isolation (I (1 NF-228A) is located outside containment and closes on:

1) A loss of air or power

2) An St signal.

3) A Low-Low expansion tank level.

INF-228A is controlled from the control room. A key switch is provided on the local NF control panel to allow the Low-Low Expansion Tank Level interlock to be bypassed. Meets the KA because these are parameters that could be monitored to determine when NF228A closes or why it closed.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: This condition will trip the refrigerant compressor. Student may believe INF-228A closes on high or low flow Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe 1NF-228A closes for chiller protection. This condition will trip the refrigerant compressor.

Answer C Discussion Correct - INF-228A closes on glycol expansion tank 10-10 level.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe 1INF-228A NF-228A closes to prevent system perturbation. This condition will trip the refrigerant compressor.

perturbation.This Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2004 NRC Q22 (Bank 1222)

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided Lesson Plan Objective: CNT-NF SEQ 3

~ OPT Approved

References:

1. OP-CN-CNT-NF pages 12-13 D OPS Approved D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 1641!SYS025 !A3.02 !

KA desc Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ice condenser system, including: (CFR: 41.7/45.5) 41.7 /45.5) Isolation valves 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 82 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 42 A 1642 I SYS026 II I A2.02 I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5 /45.3 145.13) 41.5 143.5 145.3 /45.13) Failure of automatic recirculation transfer ...........................

Unit 1 was at 100% power when a LOCA occurred. The automatic and manual swap to CLR failed and the crew implemented EP/11A15000IECA-1.1 EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.1 (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation). The following conditions were noted:

The reactor trip and safety injection occurred 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ago

Containment pressure was 11.2 psig

FWST level has decreased to 4.9%

In addition to securing ND pumps, what additional pumps (if any) are required to be secured per EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.1?

A. All NI pumps, all NV pumps and all NS pumps 8.

B. All NI pumps, all NV pumps and all but one NS pump C. All NI pumps, all but one NV pump and all NS pumps D. No additional pumps are required to be secured Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 83 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 42 A General Discussion On the swap to CLR at 37% FWST level, the crew would enter EPIlIA!5000/ES-1.3 EP/IIN5000IES-I.3 (Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation). At step 2 they would enter the RNO and take action to secure the ND pumps and get the containment sump suctions aligned. When step 5 is reached they would dispatch operators to manually align the containment sump suctions to ND and go to EP/lIA!5000IECA-1.1 EP/1/N5000IECA-l.l (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation). In step 3 d RNO they are sent to step 4 and at step 6 RNO they determine the FWST is less than 5% and are sent to step 33 where they secure all ECCS Pumps, remove Sequencer Control Power and remove NS Pump Control Power Fuses.

11.2 psig containment pressure would require II NS pump in service per ECA-1.1 step 7, but all pumps are secured when FWST level is < 5%

Answer A Discussion Correct: Since ND pumps have been secured, NI,NV, and NS are still operating aligned to the FWST and are required to be secured also Answer B Discussion Plausible: NI and NV pumps will be secured. Student may believe I NS pump is required to be in service due to the 11.2 psig containment pressure Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe one NV pump is left on to minimize flow until other sources can be used, but at 5% FWST level all pumps must be secured.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe remaining pumps need to be in service. 5% FWST level= -20,000 ~20,000 gallons Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2006 NRC Q43 (Bank 649) oD Developed Development References Student References Provided Do OPT Approved 1. EPIlIA!5000IES-1.3 EP/1/N5000IES-1.3 (Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation)

DOOPSOPS Approved EP/1/N5000IECA-l.l (Loss of Emergen

2. EP/lIA!50001ECA-1.l Em ergen Do NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II I 6421SYS026 16421SYS026 IA2.02 I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13) 41.5 143.5 145.3 145.13) Failure of automatic recirculation transfer .......................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 84 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA_number number II QUESTION 43 A 1643 SYS039 A1.09 I I I KA desc Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MRSS controls including: (CFR: 41.5/45.5) Main steam line radiation monitors .................................

Unit 1 is in Mode 3 preparing for a startup when 1 EMF-27 (Steamline 1 B) comes into 1B)

Trip 2 alarm.

Assuming a large tube leak had occurred on 1B S/G, what additional EMF(s) would also be expected to be in a Trip 1 or Trip 2 alarm at this time?

A. 1EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) only B. 1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) and 1EMF-28 1EMF-28 (Steamline 1C) 1C) only C. 1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) and 1EMF-72 1EMF-72 (S/G B Leakage) only D. 1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust), 1EMF-72 (S/G B Leakage), and 1EMF-73 (S/G C Leakage)

Monday, October 19,2009 Page 85 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 43 A General Discussion Nl6 monitors 71,72,73,74 do not register.

In Mode 3 the N16 Answer A Discussion Correct: In Mode 3 only lEMF-33 IEMF-33 and 1EMF-27 lEMF-27 (given) would be available for detection of a tube leak Answer B Discussion Plausible: If the student believes that there is shine associated with the Steamline monitors (26,27,28,29) but this applies to the N16 Nl6 monitors only.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: IfN-16 monitors were active this would be correct but 1EMF-73 lEMF-73 would likely also be in alarm.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: N-16 monitors do not alarm in Mode 3 but at power this would be correct.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed E-3 D OPT Approved E-3 background document SM D OPS Approved NC D NRC Approved PC QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number IKA_number I 16431SYS039 l6431SYS039 IAl.09 IA1.09 II KA desc Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MRSS controls including: (CFR: 41.5/45.5) Main steam line radiation monitors ................................ .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 86 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I QUESTION 44 B 1644 I SYS039 I 2.2.37 I KA desc II SYS039 GENERIC Ability to detennine determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment. (CFR: 41.7 /43.5 /45.12) 41.7/43.5 I

Unit 1 is in Mode 3 at full temperature and pressure. Given the following status of 1SV-19 (S/G 1A PORV) nitrogen bottle boUle pressures:

Bottle #1 - 1970 psig

BoUie Bottle #2 - 2165 psig What action (if any) is required for 1SV-19 per Selected Licensee Commitment 16.10-1 (Steam Vent Ventto to Atmosphere)?

A. No action is required as long as BoUie Bottle #2 remains greater than 2100 psig B. Immediately take action to restore the nitrogen supply to operable status only C. Immediately enter the applicable conditions of Technical Specification 3.7.4 (S/G PORVs) only D. Immediately take action to restore the nitrogen supply to operable status and immediately enter the applicable conditions of Technical Specification 3.7.4 (S/G PORVs)

Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 87 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 44 B General Discussion Per SLC 16.10-1, N2 pressure lower limit per bottle is 2100 psig. If BOTH bottles are less tha 2100, the PORV is inoperable per TS. If only Ifonly one is below 2100 then SLC 16.10-1 Condition A is the only commitment action applicable.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may believe no action is necessary for 1 bottle < 2100 psig Answer B Discussion Correct: With 1 bottle < 2100 psig, condition A ofSLC of SLC 16.10-1 applies Answer C Discussion Plausible: This is the one correct action for Condition B of SLC 16.10-1 for both bottles < 2100 psig, but Condition A would also apply ofSLC concurrently Answer D Discussion Plausible: These are the correct actions to take for both bottles < 2100 psig, Conditions A and B per SLC 16.10-1 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided 0D Developed SLC 16.10-1

~ OPT Approved TS 3.7.4 0

D OPS Approved 0

D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA_system KA number 1644 SYS039 1644SYS039 2.2.37 KA desc SYS039 GENERIC Ability to determine detennine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment. (CFR: 41.7/43.5 /45.12) 41.7/43.5/45.12) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 88 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA system IKAIKA number II QUESTION 45 D 1645 I SYS059 I A4.08 A4.0S I KA KA desc Ability to manually operate and monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.8) 45.S) Feed regulating valve controller Unit 1 was operating at 28% power awaiting Chemistry results prior to increasing power. Given the following:

One channel of steam flow on 1C S/G is out of service for calibration

A leak has just developed on the instrument line for the in-service channel of steam flow on 1C S/G causing it to fail low

1. Based on current conditions, which control mode is being used by DCS for S/G level control?

2. Based on current conditions, what feature of DCS prevents the CF reg valve and CF bypass reg valve controller from causing a feedwater transient?

A. 1. Low Power Mode

2. 1 1C C S/G level error is being used in single element control B. 1. Low Power Mode

2. The CF Reg Valve and CF Reg Bypass Valve SLIM stations transfer to MANUAL C. 1. High Power Mode

2. The CF Reg Valve and CF Reg Bypass Valve SLIM stations transfer to MANUAL D. 1. High Power Mode

2. 1C S/G level error is being used in single element control Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 89 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 45 D General Discussion Once sufficient flow is developed for the Steam and Feed Flow transmitters to provide reliable indication, SGWLC shifts to High Power Mode.

The feed demand signal now is developed based on the Narrow Range Level Error and on CF/SM flow mismatch. The high power controller is in service when> 20% power increasing and until 17% power decreasing.

g) Loss of steam flow signals in the High Power Mode causes transfer to single element control ofS/G level and forces flow mismatch to zero.

The SGWLC system uses three (3) elements (parameters) to control S/G water level, they are steam flow, feed flow, and level. Without feed flow and steam flow signals the control system is in single element control and would be using level error only to control S/G level.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may believe the low power controller is in service at this power. Without feed flow and steam flow signals the control system is in single element control and would be using level error only to control S/G level.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: The student may believe the low power controller is in service at this power and the 1I C S/G valves will be forced to manual due the failure Answer C Discussion Plausible:The high power mode will be in service at this power. The student may believe the 1lCC S/G valves will be forced to manual due the failure Answer D Discussion Correct: The high power mode will be in service at this power. Without feed flow and steam flow signals the control system is in single element control and would be using level error only to control S/G level.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2005 NRC Q41 (Bank 44S) 200S 445)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed Lesson IFE DCS D OPT Approved AP/1/A/55 00/006 AP/lINSSOO/006 D OPS Approved D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA number I 164S(SYS059 164SISYSOS9 (A4.08 IA4.08 J(

KA desc 41.7/45.5 Ability to manually operate and monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7/ 4S.S to 4S.8) 45.8) Feed regulating valve controller 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE DCS DCS DCS DCSDCSDCS Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 90 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I QUESTION 46 D 1646 I SYS061 I 2.4.20 I KA desc I SYS061 GENERIC Knowledge of the operational implications ofEOP warnings, cautions, and notes. (CFR: 41.10/43.5 41.10/43.5/45.13)

/45.13)

I Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a loss of offsite power occurred and the transient resulted in a reactor trip. Given the following conditions and sequence of events related to the CA system 30 minutes after the initial event:

Train "A" CA has been RESET

Train "B" "8" CA could not be RESET and a maintenance crew is investigating

The CA common suction piping from condensate grade sources ruptures

1AD-5, E/1 "CA Pumps Train A Loss of Norm Suct" is LIT

1AD-5, E/2 "CA Pumps Train 8 B Loss of Norm Suct" is LIT How will the CA system respond after 5 seconds?

A. 1A CA pump trips CAPT #1 trips 1 B CA pump suction shifts to the RN system 18 B.

8. 1A CA pump suction shifts to the RN system CAPT #1 suction shifts to the RN system 1B CA pump trips 18 C. 1A 1A CA pump suction shifts to the RN system CAPT #1 trips 1 B CA pump trips 18 D. 1A 1A CA pump trips CAPT #1 suction shifts to the RN system 1 B CA pump suction shifts to the RN system 18 Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 91 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 46 D General Discussion This is testing the NOTE prior to step 1 of Case II of AP/06 When RESET, CA behaves as a manual trip. On low suction pressure >5 seconds the CA trains that have been reset will trip and the CA trains that have not been reset will swap suction source. CAPT needs BOTH trains reset to be considered "reset".

Answer A Discussion Plausible: If the student believes A train reset only is required for CAPT. lA pump will trip and 1B IB will swap to RN Answer B Discussion Plausible: If the candidate believes reset allows suction swap Answer C Discussion Plausible: If the candidate reverses the logic Answer D Discussion Correct: With train B not reset,IB CAPT#1 will shift on low suction pressurer >5 sec and with train A reset and low suction pressurer >5 reset,lB and CAPT#l sec, lA will trip.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2003 NRC Q5 (Bank 205)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed CA

~ OPT Approved AP/06 AD-5 ANNUNC RESP 0D OPS Approved 0

D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA_system KA system KA number 1646 SYS061 1646SYS061 2.4.20 KA desc SYS061 GENERIC Knowledge of the operational implications ofEOP of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes. (CFR: 41.10 41.1 0 I 43.5 145.13) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 92 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA number IKA_number I QUESTION 47 D 1647 I SYS062 I I I A3.01 I KA_desc KA desc Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ac distribution system, including: (CFR: 41.7/45.5) Vital ac bus amperage Given the following:

1B DIG automatically started due to the incoming breaker to 1 ETB spuriously opening

While monitoring DIG operating parameters, the crew notes that DIG 1B "VOLTS" is 4000 V

Voltage is adjusted to normal How will 1B DIG output "AMPS" and "P/F" indications respond to this adjustment?

Howwill1B AMPS P/F A. increase less lagging B. increase stay the same sam e

c. decrease less lagging D. decrease sam e stay the same Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 93 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 47 D General Discussion Students must understand that the DIG is not in parallel and that voltage must be adjusted UP. When voltage is increased, DIG lETA amps decrease. This has no effect on Power Factor. This is OE from an NLO who was attempting to control power factor while operating in isochronous mode.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Voltage needs to be increased. Student may unsure of direction for adjustment to normal voltage and of voltage and current relationship. Power factor is unaffected Answer B Discussion Plausible: Voltage needs to be increased. Student may unsure of direction for adjustment to normal voltage and of voltage and current relationship. Power factor will be unaffected Answer C Discussion Plausible: Amps will decrease as voltage is increased, but power factor is unaffected Answer D Discussion Correct: Amps will decrease as voltage is increased and power factor will be unaffected Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2008 NRC Q47 (Bank 553)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed DG3 lesson

~ OPT Approved D

0 OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system jKA_system IKA_number I l6471SYS062 16471SYS062 IA3.0l IA3.01 JI KA desc Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ac distribution system, including: (CFR: 41.7 145.5) Vital ac bus amperage 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 94 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_system IKA number IKA_number II QUESTION 48 B 1648 I SYS062 I K2.01 II KA desc I Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CPR:

(CFR: 41.7) Major system loads ............................................. . I Unit 1 is operating at 100% power. Given the following:

All systems are properly aligned and in service for current plant conditions

A fault on transformer 1T1 B caused the 1TB and 1TD TO short side incoming breakers to open Which one of the following describes the status of the 1Band 1 10D NC Pumps (NCP) and how power to 1TB and 1 TO is restored to normal alignment?

1TD A. NCPs 1B and 1D are tripped; buses 1TB and 1TD 1TO are automatically transferred back once the fault is cleared B. NCPs 1Band 1D are running; buses 1TB and 1TD TO are manually transferred back once the fault is cleared C. NCPs 1B and 1D are tripped; buses 1TB and 1TD 1TO are manually transferred back once the fault is cleared O.

D. NCPs 1Band 1D are running; buses 1TB and 1TD TO are automatically transferred back once the fault is cleared Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 95 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 48 B General Discussion Transformer 1I TIB supplies the short side of 1I TB and 1lTD.

TD. The short side of 1I TB and 1lTD TD supply ""B"" and ""D"" reactor coolant pumps respectively. The short side incoming breakers in this situation are tripped by a Zone B lockout. This would cause the tie breakers to rapidly close on all four 6.9KV switchgear (1 TA, 1I TB, 1I TC, and 1I TD), preventing a Rx trip on NCP undervoltage or NCP underfrequency. This requires manual transfer back to the normal breaker after the fault condition is cleared and the lockout is reset.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe busses are deenergized and the bus will transfer back to normal automatically once the fault is cleared Answer B Discussion Correct: Tie breakers will rapidly close on all four 6.9KV switchgear (1 TA, 1I TB, 1TC, and 1TD) and busses will remain energized. Restoration to normal alignment is performed manually Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe busses are deenergized. Restoration to normal alignment is performed manually Answer D Discussion Plausible:Tie breakers will rapidly close on all four 6.9KV switchgear (1 TA, 1TB, 1TC, and 1TD) and busses will remain energized. The student may believe the bus will transfer back to normal automatically once the fault is cleared.

yep Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO lIDft9 Comprehension BANK 2006 NRC Q22 (Bank 99)

~ Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed f sgaGe umpenlfg I EPg EPA uI

~ OPT Approved EP EPB 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1648 SYS062 K2.01 KA desc Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) Major system loads ............................................. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE htr E I {: sidg-o Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 96 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II QUESTION 49 D 1649 I SYS063 I K2.0 K2.011 I KA desc I Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 4l.

41.7)

7) Major DC loads ................................................ . I What is the power supply for the main turbine emergency bearing oil pump (EBOP)?

A. 120V AC B. 125V DC C. 208VAC D. 250V DC Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 97 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 49 D General Discussion

[ThiS IThis comes from DPD(250vdc)

Answer A Discussion Plausible: This is approximate voltage but AC Answer B Discussion Plausible: 1A DIG DC fuel oil booster pump uses this supply IPlausible:lA Answer C Discussion Plausible:This is switchyard aux power voltage, approximate voltage but AC Answer D Discussion ICorrect: - comes from DPD DC bus Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~

~ Developed EPJ

~

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA KA_system system KA number 1649SYS063 K2.01 KA desc Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

folIo wing: (CFR: 41.7) Major DC loads ................................................ .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 98 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA IKA number II QUESTION 50 D 1650 I SYS063 I I K3.01 I KA KA desc Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the DC electrical system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6) ofthe 41.7 145.6) ED/G Unit 1 is operating at 100% power. Given the following:

1AD-11, AlB "125VDC Diesel Gen A Control Pwr Sys Trbl" is LIT

1AD-11, 8/7 B/7 "DIG 1A Panel Trouble" is LIT

The reflash module indicates"1DGCA supply to DG Control Panel1A open"

1A DIG Panel alarm E/5 "Loss of DC Control Power" is LIT What affect (if any) will this condition have on the start capability of the 1A DIG?

A. None, 1/A DIG will start on an automatic start signal or manually as designed 8.

B. 1A DIG will start on an automatic start signal but can not be started manually 1A C. 1A DIG can be started manually but will not start on an automatic start signal 1A D. 1A DIG will not start manually or on an automatic start signal Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 99 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 50 D General Discussion lA IA DIG has a loss of DC control power. If the Diesel Generator is shutdown, there is no DC power available to the startingsolenoids.The power.Ifthe starting solenoids. The diesel generator will not start.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe the lAIA DIG is unaffected Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe IA DIG will start on an automatic signal, lA IA DIG cannot be started manually Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe IAI A DIG can be started manually, IAI A DIG will not start on an automatic signal Answer D Discussion Correct: With a loss of DC control power, if the Diesel Generator is shutdown, there is no DC power available to the starting solenoids.The diesel generator will not start.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed EPL 0D OPT Approved DGI DGlA ann resp E/5 DGIA D

0 OPS Approved EQB D

0 NRC Approved I AD-II annunciator resp lAD-II QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I 1650lSYS063 l650lSYS063 I K 3 . 0 1 1I IK3.01 KA desc Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the DC electrical system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 I 45.6) ED/G 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 100 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA system IKA IKA number II QUESTION 51 D 1651 SYS064 K4.01 I I I KA desc Knowledge ofED/G system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) Trips while loading the ED/G (frequency, voltage, speed) ...............

Unit 1 was in Mode 3 when 1ETA experienced a blackout. Given the following:

The 1A DIG started and was sequencing on loads per the accelerated sequence

Half way through the accelerated sequence, the fuel racks stuck in an open position causing DIG speed to exceed the overspeed trip setpoint

1. What is the setpoint for the DIG overspeed trip?

2. For the conditions stated above will the DIG trip?

A. 1. 495 rpm

2. No 8.

B. 1. 495 rpm

2. Yes C. 1. 517.5 rpm

2. No D. 1. 517.5 rpm

2. Yes Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 101 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 51 D General Discussion The DIG overspeed trip is at 115% (517.5 rpm) of normal speed (450 rpm). The main turbine trips at 110% of normal speed) 450*1.1 =

495rpm. Overspeed is an emergency trips. On an auto start, ONLY emergency trips will trip the DIG, for manual starts emergency or non-emergency trips will trip it.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may believe overspeed is 110% of normal (450) and overspeed is not an emergency trip Answer B Discussion Plausible: The student may believe overspeed is 110% of normal (450). The IA lA DIG will trip on overspeed (emergency trip)

Answer C Discussion Plausible: This is the correct overspeed setpoint. The student may believe overspeed is not an emergency trip Answer D Discussion ICorrect: The DIG overspeed trip is at 115% (517.5 rpm) of normal speed (450 rpm). The lA DIG will trip on overspeed (emergency trip)

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed DG3

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I 16511SYS064 IK4.01 I KA desc of EDIG system design feature(

Knowledge ofEDIG s) andlor interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) Trips while loading the EDIG feature(s)

(frequency, voltage, speed) .............. .

401*9 Comments:

401-9 401-9 401*9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 102 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number jI QUESTION 52 A 1652 I SYS073 I I I A2.01 I KA_desc KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts oftheof the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to cor- rect, control, or mitigate the consequences of ofthose those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 /43.5 /45.3 /45.13) Erratic or 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13) failed power supply ......................................

Unit 1 was operating at 50% power when a power spike causes a 1EMF-33 (CSAE EXHAUST) Trip 2 alarm.

What manual operator actions (if any) are required to place systems affected by this EMF alarm in their post alarm condition per OP/1/B/61 00101 00/01 OX (Annunciator Response to RadiationRad iatio n Monitoring Mo nitoring PaneI1RAD-1)

Panel 1RAD-1 )

A. Swap "Unit 1 CSAE EXH" discharge from "UNIT VENT" to "AUTO" B. Close 1BB-48 (BB Pumps Disch to TB Sump)

C. Close S/G Sam Sample pie valves D. No manual actions are required Monday, October 19,2009 Page 103 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 52 A General Discussion On trip 2, the BB valves close and the NM valves close. The ZJ must be swapped manually to AUTO. We are associating "predict" with what will and will not position automatically.

Answer A Discussion Correct: On trip 2, the BB valves close and the NM valves close. ZJ must be swapped to VA (aux building ventilation) manually to placing the switch in AUTO (nonnal (normal position is "Unit Vent").

Answer B Discussion Plausible:This valve automatically closes Answer C Discussion IPlausible: NM sample valves auto close.

/Plausible:

Answer D Discussion Plausible: If the student believes ZJ automatically swaps to V A (aux building ventilation)

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~

~ Developed lRAD-l ARP

~

~ OPT Approved D

OOPS OPS Approved o

D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number IKA_number I 16521SYS073 1652/SYS073/A2.01 IA2.01 I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to cor- rect, control, or mitigate the consequences of ofthose those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 /43.5 /45.3 /45.13) Erratic or 41.5/43.5/45.3 failed power supply ..................................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 104 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA 1653 IKA_system I

system I SYS076 IKA_number IKA II number K2.0l K2.01 II II QUESTION 53 c KA desc I Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) Service water ................................................... .

I 2B RN pump is normally powered from:

A...

A. 6900V bus 2TB long side B. 6900V bus 2TD long side c.

C. 4160V bus 2ETB D. 4160V bus 2FTB Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 105 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 53 c General Discussion These are all possible loads for "B" train large motors.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this large motor is supplied from this buss. Condensate and RC pumps come off the long side of both 2TD and 2TB Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this large motor is supplied from this buss. Condensate and RC pumps come off the long side of both 2TD and 2TB Answer C Discussion ICorrect: 2B RN pump power supply is 2ETB Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this large motor is supplied from this buss. 2 of3 of 3 Main fire pumps come off the 4160 V blackout buss.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2008 NRC Q53 (Bank 559)

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided EPC lesson D OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA_system KA system KA number 1653 SYS076 K2.01 KA desc Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) Service water ................................................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 106 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I QUESTION 54 D 1654 I SYS078 I I K3.02 I KA_desc KA desc Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the lAS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6) Systems having pneumatic valves and controls ........................

Unit 1 automatically tripped from 100% power and the crew entered EP/1/A/5000/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection). Given the following:

Both trains ofCA of CA SYS VLV VL V RESET have been "RESET" and CA flow has been throttled to maintain proper S/G levels

20 minutes after the reactor trip, a complete loss of VI pressure occurs How long (if at all) can CA flow continue to be controlled using the CA flow control valves, and when control is lost, how will CA flow be affected?

A. CA flow control is lost immediately and then CA flow will decrease B. CA flow control is lost immediately and then CA flow will increase C. CA flow control will be maintained for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and then CA flow will decrease D. CA flow control will be maintained for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and then CA flow will increase Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 107 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 54 D General Discussion CA flow control valves fail open on a loss of air pressure. These valves have their own air accumulators that allow control to be maintained for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months when VI is lost. Once accumulators deplete, the valves will fail open and from the throttled position per the stem, flow will increase.

Decreasing is plausible because other feedwater sources to the S/Gs fail closed (CF).

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may not take into account the VI air accumulators that will last for an hour. Control is not immediately lost. Once the air accumulators deplete, the valves will fail open and from the throttled position per the stem, flow will increase Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may not take into account the VI air accumulators that will last for an hour. Control is not immediately lost. Once the air accumulators deplete, the valves will fail open and from the throttled position per the stem, flow will increase Answer C Discussion Plausible: The air accumulators have depleted after an hour and CA flow control is lost, but the valves will fail open and from the throttled position per the stem, flow will increase Answer D Discussion Correct Correct: The air accumulators have depleted after an hour and CA flow control is lost. The valves will fail open and from the throttled position per the stem, flow will increase Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed AP/22

~ OPT Approved CA D

0 OPS Approved D

0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number II 16541SYS078 IK3.02 I I

KA desc Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the lAS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6) Systems having pneumatic valves ofthe and controls ....................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 108 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I QUESTION 55 c 1655 I SYSI03 I II K1.01 Kl.Ol I KA desc Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the containment system and the following systems: (CFR:

41.2 to 41.9 //45.7 45.7 to 45.8) CCS ...........................................................

At 1000, a secondary steam leak occurred in the Unit 1 containment. The crew has started a controlled shutdown using AP/1 API 1IA/550IA/550010090100 9 (Rapid Downpower).

Containment pressure and temperature trends indicate:

Time Temperature Pressure 1000 113°F 0.15 psig 1005 11 rF 117°F 0.31 psig 1010 119°F 0.42 psig 1015 122°F 0.48 psig 1020 126°F 0.65 psig 1025 129°F 0.91 psig During which time period did the Lower Containment Ventilation Units (LCVUs) cooling water bypass valve (full flow valve) automatically open?

Assume no manual operator actions have been taken related to LCVU operation.

A. Between 1005 and 1010 B. Between 1010 and 1015 C. Between 1015 and 1020 D. Between 1020 and 1025 Monday, October 19,2009 Page 109 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 55 c General Discussion The LCVU bypass valve will be opened by an operator selecting HIGH speed on each LCVU or when containment pressure reaches 0.5 psig.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: 0.3 psig is the old CPCS permissive signal IPlausible:

Answer B Discussion Plausible: The student may believe the cooling units start on high temperature (l20F is the TS cont hi temp)

Answer C Discussion Correct: The LCVU bypass valve will be opened by an operator selecting HIGH speed on each LCVU or when containment pressure reaches 0.5 psig.

Answer D Discussion Plausible:0.9 psig is the current CPCS permissive signal Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Sou Source rce RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed NS D OPT Approved VV AP/009 D OPS Approved AP128 AP/28 D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA_number II l6551SYSl03 16551SYS103 IKI.Ol IK1.01 I KA desc Knowledge of the physical connections andlor and/or cause-effect relationships between the containment system and the following systems: (CFR:

41.2 to 41.9 I/45.7 45.7 to 45.8) CCS .......................................................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 110 11 0 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_number II QUESTION 56 B 1656 JI SYSDOI SYSOOI I K2.Dl K2.01 I KA desc II Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) One-line diagram of power supply to MIG sets ....................... . II Unit 1 was in Mode 3 with shutdown banks withdrawn in preparation for startup.

Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

The 1TXS is isolated for transmissions inspection

A fault on the short side of 1TC occurs Which MG set(s) has/have a power supply available and what is the current status of the shutdown banks?

A. Only 1B MG set; shutdown banks are inserted B. Only 1B MG set; shutdown banks are withdrawn C. 1A and 1B MG sets; shutdown banks are inserted D. 1A and 1B MG sets; shutdown banks are withdrawn Monday, October 19,2009 Page 111 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 56 B General Discussion MG sets are powered from LXC (1 (lA)

A) and LXD (1(IB).

B). In this case 1I TC short faults and the alternate power supply from 1I TXS is isolated.

Therefore all power to lA IA MG set is lost as well as power to I C NCP. There is no reactor trip required either manually or automatically due to an NCP loss in this condition <<P-7). 1IBB MG set will continue to be powered from 1I LXD. Therefore the shutdown banks would still be withdrawn.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that 1IB B MG set is energized but 1C NCP trip causes a Rx trip Answer B Discussion Correct: IB MG set continues to be powered from ILXD, but MG set IA loses power. There is no reactor trip required either manually or auotmatically due to an NCP loss in this condition <<P-7).

Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that power is available to both MG sets and 1I C NCP trip causes a Rx trip.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that power is available to both MG sets and shutdown banks will still be withdrawn Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2008 NRC Q56 (Bank 562)

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided EPA oD OPT Approved IRE D OPS Approved OOPS Do NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1656 SYSOOI 1656SYSOOI K2.01 KA desc Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) One-line diagram of power supply to MIG sets ....................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 112 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKAIKA_system system IKA_number IKA number I QUESTION 57 B 1657 I SYSOO2 I K1.07 I KA desc Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RCS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 /

45.7 to 45.8) Reactor vessel level indication system ..............................

What is the RVLlS LR level that corresponds to the top of the core?

A. 41%

B. 54%

C. 61%

D. 70%

Monday, October 19,2009 Page 113 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 57 B General Discussion Original KIA KJ A replaced.

The core is shown to be from 23 to 54% on the lower-range meter. 41 % and 61 % are used in the core cooling CSF procedure as key levels. 70%

is the top of scale for the lower range but the upper range goes from 60% to 120% so an operator may think that 70% is top of core.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: <41 % is used in F-O for determination ofFR-C procedures Answer B Discussion Correct: 54% corresponds to the top of the core on RVLIS Answer C Discussion Plausible: 61 % is used in FR-C.l to verify adequate core cooling' Answer D Discussion Plausible: This is the top of scale for RVLIS LR level IPlausible:

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW oD Developed Development References Student References Provided CCM

~

~ OPT Approved D

OOPSOPS Approved o

D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I 16571SYS002 IK1.07 IKI.07 I KA desc Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RCS and the following systems: (CFR: 4l.241.2 to 41.9 /

45.7 to 45.8) Reactor vessel level indication system ............................. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 114 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II QUESTION 58 A 1658 SYSOll A2.ll A2.11 I I I KA KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR LCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5 41.5! 43.5 !/45.3 45.3 !/45.13) 45.13) Failure of PZR level instrument - low ...............................

Unit 1 is operating at 100%. Given the following indications:

Pressurizer level is 61% 61 % and increasing

Spray valves have throttled open and pressurizer pressure is slowly decreasing towards normal pressure

Charging flow initially decreased and has stabilized at a lower flow rate

Letdown flow is 0 gpm g pm

All pressurizer heaters are off

1. Which one of the following failures would account for all these indications?

2. What procedure will be used to address the results of this failure?

A. 1. PZRLEVEL-1 "PZR LVL LOW" output signal is present (TRUE state)

2. AP/1/A/5500/012 (Loss of Charging or Letdown)

B. 1. Channel 1 pressurizer level/pressure common reference leg has ruptured

2. AP/1/A/5500/012 (Loss of Charging or Letdown)

C. 1. PZRLEVEL-2 "PZR L LVL VL LOW" output signal is present (TRUE state)

2. AP/1/A/5500/011 (Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies)

D. 1. Channel 1 pressurizer level/pressure common reference leg has ruptured

2. AP/1/A/5500/011 AP/1/A/55001011 (Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies)

Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 115 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 58 A General Discussion IfPZRLEVEL-1 output is "PZR LVL LOW", then letdown will be isolated due to 1INV-2A IfPZRLEVEL-l NV-2A closing and heaters off. Charging flow will decrease due to the level increase from the letdown isolation and will stabilize at minimum flow (47gpm). Due to pzrPzr level increasing, pressure will increase causing spray to actuate. API12 AP/12 will be used to address the loss ofletdown.

Answer A Discussion ICorrect: Per the discussion above Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe reference leg failure has occurred, pzr level and pressure share reference leg. API12 is the correct procedure Answer C Discussion Plausible: PZRLEVEL-2 low output would be the same result as channell. The student may believe that APIl1 AP/11 is the appropriate procedure due to possible pzr pressure malfunction Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe reference leg failure has occurred, pzr level and pressure share reference leg and that APlll AP/l1 is the appropriate procedure due to possible pzr pressure malfunction.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed ILEDCS D OPT Approved 1ad-6 ann resp AP/ll API11 D OPS Approved ap/12 D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number JI 16581SYSOll 16581SYS011 IA2.11 I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts ofthe of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR LCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 143.5 145.3 145.13) Failure of PZR level instrument - low ..............................

401-9 Comments:

401*9 401*9 Comments RESPONSE 401-9 DCS DCS DCS DCSDCSDCS Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 116 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA_system IKA_number number I QUESTION 59 D 1659 I SYS016 I K3.04 I KA KA_desc desc Knowledge of ofthe the effect that a loss or malfunction of the NNIS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6) MFW system Unit 1 was operating at 8% power. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

1A CFPT suction flow signal to 1CF-6 (1A CF Pump Recirc Control) failed high

CF header pressure is 1348 psig and increasing

1A 1 A CFPT actual suction flow is 2997 gpm and decreasing How will current conditions and trends affect the operation of the 1A 1A CFPT?

A. 1A CFPT will immediately trip when discharge pressure reaches 1350 psig B. 1A CFPT speed will decrease when pressure exceeds 1350 psig and the feed pump will continue to operate normally C. 1A CFPT speed will increase to raise suction flow and the feed pump will continue to operate normally D. 1A CFPT will trip in 20 seconds unless suction flow is increased Monday, October 19,2009 Page 117 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 59 D General Discussion CF pump trip on header pressure is at 1385 psig and does occur immediately. CF pump trip on low suction flow is <3000 gpm for 20 seconds.

When 1CF-6 suction flow signal fails high, 1I CF-6 closes. Because of ofthe the low power condition, CF flow demand is low, therefore when the valve closes flow drops and discharge pressure increases. With DCS, at 1350 psig, CFPT speed will decrease to maintian discharge pressure <

1350 psig. This will aggravate the low flow condition.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may believe this is the trip setpoint for the high discharge pressure.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Speed decrease will occur and student may believe the feed pump will remain in service Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that CF pump speed will increase suction flow and pump will remain in service.

Answer D Discussion Correct: 1lA A CFPT suction flow will decrease to < 3000 gpm and cannot be increased due to 1lCF-6CF-6 closure and speed reduction and will trip after a 20 second time delay Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW o

D Developed Development References Student References Provided IFEDCS IFE DCS o

D OPT Approved D OPS Approved OOPS Do NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA IKA_system system lKA_number IKA number II 16591SYS016 IK3.04 I KA desc Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction ofofthe the NNIS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6) MFW system 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE DCSDCS DCS DCS DCS Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 118 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA 1660 IKA system IKA II SYS028 IKA number II K6.01 I

I QUESTION 60 c KA KA desc 41.7 /45.7) Hydrogen recombiners Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the HRPS: (CFR: 41.7/45.7)

A large LOCA occurred on Unit 1. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

CONDITIONS at 1100

Containment hydrogen concentration of 6.2%

Containment pressure is 5.3 psig

1A Hydrogen Recombinerwas OP/1 IA/645010 10 Recombiner was placed in service per OP/1/A164501010 (Containment Hydrogen Control Systems)

CONDITIONS at 2100

During the previous hourly temperature check, an NLO discovered the 1A 1A Hydrogen Recombiner breaker had tripped

Containment hydrogen is 3.2%

Containment pressure is 3.5 psig

1B Hydrogen Recombiner pre-heating is complete and an NLO has called the control room for guidance on adjusting power output

1. What minimum approval was required to place 1A 1A Hydrogen Recombiner in service at 11 OO?

2. To what approximate power output should 1 B Hydrogen Recombiner be adjusted at2100?

Reference provided A. 1. OSM approval

2. 53 KW B. 1. OSM approval

2. 59 KW C. 1. TSC approval

2. 53 KW D. 1. TSC approval

2. 59 KW Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 119 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 60 c General Discussion conc > 6%. The output is adjusted per Data Book Figure 10 TSC approval is required prior to placing a hydrogen recombiner in service with H2 cone>

and with 3.5 psig in containment, the value read off the chart is 53 KW. Ifthe A recombiner line is used, power will be adjusted too high (59 KW).

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may believe only OSM approval is necessary. 53 Kw is correct Answer B Discussion Plausible: The student may believe only OSM approval is necessary. 59 Kw is obtained if the student uses the lA recombiner that tripped Answer C Discussion Correct: Requires TSC approval, 53 Kw is correct using B recombiner Answer D Discussion Plausible: Requires TSC approval. 59 Kw is obtained if the student uses the lA recombiner that tripped Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed OP/lIA/64501010 enc14.10 OP/1!A/6450101O encl4.10 Databook Figure 10

~ OPT Approved Databook Figure 10 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA jKA system jKA number IKA Ij 1660lSYS028 IK6.01 I I

KA_desc KA desc 41.7 I 45.7) Hydrogen recombiners of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the HRPS: (CFR: 41.7/45.7)

Knowledge of the effect ofa 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 120 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA IKA number II QUESTION 61 A 1661 I SYS033 I I K4.04 I

KA KA desc Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) Maintenance of spent fuel pool radiation Workers are shuffling fuel assemblies in the Spent Fuel Pool in preparation for placing some new fuel into the pool for an upcoming outage.

1. What is the minimum required spent fuel pool water level over the top of the fuel assemblies specified by Technical Specifications to meet the assumptions for iodine decontamination factors following a fuel handling accident?

2. By design, what system provides the assured source of makeup to the Spent Fuel Pool?

A. 1. 23 feet

2. RN B. 1. 23 feet

2. RF c.

C. 1. 39 feet

2. RN D. 1. 39 feet

2. RF Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 121 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 61 A General Discussion TS 3.7.14 requires 23 feet of water above the top of ofthe the spent fuel assemblies. 39 feet is the spent fuel pool (SFP) low level alann setpoint. The RN system is the assured makeup source, however for B5b purposes, a fire pump has been purchased and the RF system is capable of using either the portable HALE pump or an RF pump to supply RF water to the SPF. However, it is not the designed assured source.

Answer A Discussion Correct: TS 3.7.14 requires 23 feet of water above the top of the spent fuel assemblies. The RN system is the assured makeup source to the SFP Answer B Discussion Plausible: 23 feet is correct. RF can be used for B.5.B purposes, but is not the designed assured makeup Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may confuse 23 feet with 39 feet (SFP 10 level alann setpoint). RN is assured makeup Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may confuse 23 feet with 39 feet (SFP 10 level alann setpoint). RF can be used for B.5.B purposes, but is not the designed assured makeup Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided KF

~ OPT Approved TS 3.7.14 D

OOPS OPS Approved o

D NRC Approved I QuestionBank # #JKA IKA system IKA number I 1661!SYS033 16611SYS033 IK4.04 I KA desc Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) Maintenance of spent fuel pool radiation 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 122 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA_system IKA number II QUESTION 62 B 1662 SYS035 Al.02 A1.02 I I I KA desc Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the S/GS controls 41.5/45.5) including: (CFR: 41.5 /45.5) S/G pressure ....................................................

Unit 1 is in Mode 3 at 2235 psig and 55rF with wtth shutdown banks withdrawn. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

Steam pressure and NC Loop temperature are noted to be decreasing rapidly

The reactor is manually tripped

Main Steam Isolation does not actuate automatically and manual actuation has failed Which of the following is a complete list of the valve groups that are ensured to be closed to compensate for the lack of an automatic or manual Main Steam Isolation?

A. MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves B. MSIVs, MSIV bypass valves and S/G PORVs C. MSIVs, MSIV bypass valves, S/G PORVs and CAPT steam supplies D. MSIVs, MSIV bypass valves, S/G PORVs and S/G PORV block valves Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 123 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 62 B General Discussion 114 S/Gs < 775 psig. The operator is expected to take manual action for failed auto action. Since SM isolation setpoint is 2/3 steam pressures on 1/4 the S/G depressurization was not automatically terminated and manual initiation of main steam isolation was unsuccessful, the operator must manually operate and/or ensure the required valves that normally close on main steam isolation are in the closed position. The required valves are the main steam isolations, main steam isolation bypasses and PORVs.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may not think the POR PORV V is required to isolate the steam line Answer B Discussion Correct: The required valves are the main steam isolations, main steam isolation bypasses and PORVs.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: The student may believe all the correct valves and the CAPT steam supplies need to be isolated. The CAPT steam supplies are isolated in E-2 iffaulted if faulted and E-3 if ruptured Answer D Discussion Plausible:The student may believe all the correct valves and the PORV blocks need to be isolated. PORV blocks are closed to isolate failed or inadvertent operation ofPORVs Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2004 NRC Q73 (Bank 1273)

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided SM oD OPT Approved D

OOPSOPS Approved oD NRC Approved IKA system QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA_number I l6621SYS035 16621SYS035 IA1.02 I KA desc Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the S/GS controls including: (CFR: 41.5/45.5) S/G pressure ................................................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 124 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 63 D 1663 A4,07 I SYS041 I I KA desc 41.7/45.5 to 45,8) Remote gagging of stuck open-relief valves Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41,7/45.5 Unit 1 was operating at 75,0% power with turbine at 900 MW. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

The turbine was placed in "MW IN" for an engineering test

1S8-27 1SB-27 (SM Byp 8yp Gond Gtrl #27) failed to approximately 75% open

Attempts to close 1S8-27 SB-27 from the control room failed and operators were dispatched to close the local manual isolation valve

Steady state conditions were reached with 1SB-27 S8-27 not yet isolated

The engineering test was aborted and the turbine was placed in "MW our

Operators slowly closed the manual isolation valve for 1 S8-27 SB-27 What are the approximate values of reactor and turbine power when steady state conditions are reached after 1SB-27 S8-27 is isolated?

Assume:

S8-27 is approximately linear and proportional with % open Steam flow thru 1 SB-27

Steady state is a combined temperature error signal of approximately O°F Reactor Power Turbine Power A. 72.0% 865 MW B.

8. 73.1% 882MW 882 MW G. 76.9% 918 MW D. 78.0% 935MW 935 MW Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 125 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 63 D General Discussion Requested KIA change. Discussed with Frank E and he said that we could use "isolate" as gagging to meet the KIA.

This was run on the sim and the values were about 932 MW and 77.9% power.

Must know that a condenser dump is worth 4% total steam flow and a PORV is only worth 2.5 (distractor). Also with MW IN - turbine will maintain MW (i.e. 900 MW until MW OUT is selected, at which point when the steam dump is isolated, the turbine load will get the 3% steam

~935 MW) and cause reactor power to go up an additional 3% to flow which was going through the steam dump, increasing turbine load to -935 compensate for the 3% steam flow (i.e. reactor power will increase 6% until the steam dump is isolated, and then the reactor power will decrease 3%, for a final value of 78%}. The reactor and turbine power of -~ +1- 1.9% is if of78%}. ifthey they assume a PORV 75% open rather than a condenser dump.

The lower final values are if they reverse the effects ofMW IN lOUT and how reactor responds.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: If student reverses the effects of MW IN lOUT and how reactor responds for a 75% open dump.

ofMW Answer B Discussion Plausible: If student reverses the effects ofMW IN lOUT and how reactor responds for a 75% stuck open S/G PORV Answer C Discussion Plausible: If the student uses PORV steam worth for dump worth. These would be correct values for a 75% stuck open S/G PORV Answer D Discussion Correct: After turbine is in MW OUT and dump has been isolated, Rx power and MW should have increased by -3 ~3 %, -78%

~78% power and -735

~735 MW from original 75% and 900 MW Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed ide

~ OPT Approved ERC SM D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_system IKA number IKA_number I 16631SYS041 IA4.07 I KA desc Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 I 45.5 to 45.8) Remote gagging of stuck open-relief valves 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 126 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system

[KA system IKA_number

[KA number J[

QUESTION 64 D 1664 I SYS045 I K5.01 I I

KA desc Knowledge ofofthe the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MTIB System: (CFR: 41.5/45.7) Possible presence of explosive mixture in generator if ifhydrogen hydrogen purity deteriorates .......................................

What gas is first used to purge the main generator casing when the generator is shutdown for outage maintenance and what is the purpose of the purge?

A. N2 gas; to prevent condensation in the hot generator windings B. C02 gas; to prevent condensation in the hot generator windings C. N2 gas; to prevent an explosive mixture D. C02 gas; to prevent an explosive mixture Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 127 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 64 D General Discussion C02 is used to purge the casing, however N2 is an available gas that is also inert. If the student thinks that H2 and the 02 in the air will combine and condense on the hot windings of ofthe the generator when it is shut down for an outage Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that combining H2 and 02 in high temperature environment (e.g. as in H2 recombiner) will result in water in the generator.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: C02 is correct. Student may believe that combining H2 and 02 in high temperature environment (e.g. as in H2 recombiner) will result in condensation of water in the generator Answer C Discussion Plausible: N2 is not used. Preventing an explosive mixture is correct Answer D Discussion Correct: C02 is used to prevent an explosive mixture Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed EGB

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I 6641SYS045 I 664!SYS045 IK5.01

!K5.01 !I KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MT/B System: (CFR: 41.5/45.7) 41.5 145.7) Possible presence of explosive mixture in generator if ifhydrogen hydrogen purity deteriorates ...................................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 128 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA system QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA number IKA_number II QUESTION 65 D 16651 1665 1 SYSD15 SYS015 I 1 A3.D3 A3.03 I1 KA desc I Ability to monitor automatic operation of ofthe the NIS, including: (CFR: 41.7/45.5) Verification of proper functioning/operability ........................ 1 1

Given the following conditions:

An inadvertent reactor trip has occurred on Unit 1

The Control Room is performing actions in EP/1/A/5000/ES-O.1 (Reactor Trip Response) when the following indications are noted:

o Intermediate Range Channel N-35 is reading 5x1 OE-11 amps and decreasing o Intermediate Range Channel N-36 is reading 1x1 OE-9 amps and stable Based on current conditions:

1. What is the status of source range instruments N-31 and N-32?

2. What operator action (if any) is required to ensure both source range instruments are energized?

A. 1. Both N-31 and N-32 are energized

2. No action is required B. 1. N-31 is energized; N-32 is not energized

2. Reset TRN B SR SELECT" only C. 1. N-31 is energized; N-32 is not energized

2. Reset 'TRN "TRN A SR SELECT" and "TRN B SR SELECT" D. 1. Both N-31 and N-32 are not energized

2. Reset "TRN A SR SELECT" and "TRN B SR SELECT" Monday, October 19,2009 Page 129 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 65 D General Discussion Source range instruments energize automatically at P-6.(10E-I0 P-6.( 1OE-l 0 amps) For the case given, one of the IR instruments is hung up (presumably due to a compensation issue). In this case neither source range instrument will indicate until both trains of SR are reset. Resetting one or the other is plausible because there are some systems (i.e. CA) where resetting a single train provide partial system control.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may think only 1 IR channel below P-6 will energize the SRs .

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may think P-6 is NI related (N-35 energizes N-31, etc) and only B train SR would require reset Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may think P-6 is NI related (N-35 energizes N-31, etc) and both trains of ofSR SR require reset Answer D Discussion Correct: Both IR channels must be < P-6 to auto energize the SR. N-36 is undercompensated, which will require both trains ofSR of SR to be reset Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2006 NRC Q59 (Bank 136)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed ENB

~ OPT Approved D

0 OPS Approved D

0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA_system KA system KA number 1665 SYS015 A3.03 KA desc Ability to monitor automatic operation of the NIS, including: (CFR: 41.7/45.5) Verification of proper functioning/operability ....................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 130 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system 1666 I GEN2.1 IKA number I 2.1.3 II II QUESTION 66 c KA desc I Conduct of Operations Knowledge of shift or short-tenn short-term relief turnover practices. (CFR: 41.10/45.13) 41.1 0/ 45.l3) I Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

Unit 1 is at 100% power

Unit 2 is in Mode 5

No reactivity changes are planned

Initially there are 2 ROs assigned to each unit

The Unit 1 BOP is preparing to leave the site but plans to retum within an hour

An RO recently assigned to the procedure group with an active license has reported to the control room to fill-in during the BOP's absence

1. Does this situation meet the requirements for "short term relief' as specified in OMP 2-22 (Shift Turnover)?

2. Based on these conditions, how many ROs are required to meet the minimum administrative shift manning requirements of OMP 1-10 (Shift Manning and Overtime Requirements)?

A. 1. No

2. 3 B. 1. Yes

2. 3 c.

C. 1. No

2. 4 D. 1. Yes

2. 4 2.4 Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 131 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 66 c General Discussion Because the replacement RO has not been part of the shift activities on this day, he cannot get an abbreviated turnover which is permitted by OMP 2-22. With both units in modes 5, 6, or no mode only 3 RO's would be required. If either unit was in mode 4 or above, then 4 would be needed. In this case 4 are needed.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The first part is correct. The requirements for short term relief turnover are not met.The student may believe the 4th RO is unnecessary Answer B Discussion Plausible: The requirements for short term relief turnover are not met, and the 4th RO IS required to meet shift manning for these plant conditions. The student may believe the reverse of the correct answer is true.

Answer C Discussion Correct: The replacement RO has not been part of the shift activities and therefore he cannot meet the requirements for short term relief. With Unit 1 in Mode 1 and Unit 2 in Mode 5, 4 RO's are required Answer D Discussion Plausible: The student may believe the short term relief is OK for this situation. The 4th RO IS required to meet shift manning for these plant conditions the second part is correct.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided 0D Developed OMP 1-10

~ OPT Approved OMP 2-22 D

0 OPS Approved D

0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA KA_system system KA number 1666GEN2.1 2.1.3 KA desc Conduct of Operations Knowledge of shift or short-term relief turnover practices. (CFR: 41.1 41.10/45.13) 0/45.13) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 132 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA system QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA_number IKA number I QUESTION 67 B 1667 I GEN2.1 JI 2.1.5 I KA desc Conduct of Operations Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc. (CFR:

41.10/43.5/45.12)

Per OMP 1-10 (Shift Manning and Overtime Requirements), what is the minimum total number of Fire Brigade members assigned for a given shift and how many of the Fire Brigade members are designated as "first responders"?

A. 8 total with 3 being designated as first responders B. 8 total with 5 being designated as first responders C. 10 total with 3 being designated as first responders D. 10 total with 5 being designated as first responders Monday, October 19,2009 Page 133 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 67 B General Discussion lOis the minimum ops crew compliment per TS (NLO +RO+SRO). Also ONS uses 5 suppemental members which would be 10/5 as designated first responders. 3 is the number of supplemental (non-first responders) (NSDl12)

(NSDI12)

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe only 3 of ofthe the 8 minimum assigned are designated first responders, confusing with supplemental members Answer B Discussion Correct: Per NSD 112 a total of8 of 8 members are required and per OMP 1-10, 5 of those members must be designated as first tirst responders Answer C Discussion Plausible: The student might confuse the total number with the total crew compliment and that only 3 of the assigned are designated first responders, Answer D Discussion Plausible: The student might confuse the total number with the total crew compliment, 5 first responders is correct Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed OMP 1-10 0

D OPT Approved NSD112 D

0 OPS Approved 0

D NRC Approved QuestionBank #IKA system

IKA_system IKA number IKA_number I 16671GEN2.1 12 .1.5 1

1 1

KA desc Conduct of Operations Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc. (CFR:

41.10/43.5 /45.12) 41.10/43.5/45.12) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 134 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system 1668 I GEN2.1 I

IKA number I 2.1.7 I

I QUESTION 68 c KA desc Conduct of Operations Ability to evaluate plant perfonnance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (CFR: 41.5 /43.5/45.12/45.13)

Unit 1 is at 100% Power when an event occurred. The following parameters were noted:

NC Tavg is 584°F and slowly decreasing

NC pressure is 2229 psig and slowly decreasing

Turbine load is 1195 MW and slowly decreasing

Containment humidity is 14% and stable

Steam header pressure is 965 psig and slowly decreasing

S/G levels are all at 67% NR and stable

PZR level is 54% and slowly decreasing

Power Range Nls are all at 100.1 % and slowly increasing Which one of the following is the cause of these indications?

A. Main Turbine Control Valve #4 is failing closed B. Feed leak has occurred outside containment C. Steam leak has occurred outside containment D. NC leak has occurred inside containment Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 135 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 68 c General Discussion Meets the KA because you are evaluating plant perfonnance data and detennining that a problem exists and what that problem is. Indications point to a steam leak outside containment Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this would account for some ofthe of the indications, but several would be the opposite of what is in stem.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this would account for some of the indications, but a feed leak outside would not cause Tavg or MW to drop.

Answer C Discussion Correct: These are all indications ofa steam leak outside containment Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this would account for some of the indications.The indications. The NC Leak does not directly affect MW or NC Temp and would increase containment humidity.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2006 NRC Q67 (Bank 673)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed APIIO AP/I0

~ OPT Approved AP/28 AP/2S D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number II 166S!GEN2.1 16681GEN2.1 12.1.7

!2.1.7 !I KA desc Conduct of Operations Ability to evaluate plant perfonnance and make operational judgments jUdgments based on operating characteristics, reactor 41.5 143.5 145.12 I 45.13) behavior, and instrument interpretation. (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.12/45.13) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 136 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 69 B 1669 I GEN2.2 I I 2.2.1 I

KA desc Equipment Control Ability to perform perfonn pre-startup procedures for the facility, including operating those controls associated with plant

/41.10/43.5 equipment that could affect reactivity. (CFR: 41.5 /41.1 /43.6/45.1) 0/43.5 /43.6 /45.1)

The following conditions exist on Unit 1:

MODE 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure, preparing for a reactor startu p

The reactor coolant system (NC) has been diluted to the estimated critical boron concentration

1KC-132 (Letdn Hx Otlt Temp Ctrl) control is in MANUAL

All other controls are in AUTOMATIC and functioning normally

Letdown flow is decreased from 100 gpm to 50 gpm Assuming NO other manipulations, over the next hour, Source Range counts will ?

A. INCREASE due to warmer water exiting the letdown heat exchanger B. INCREASE due to cooler water exiting the letdown heat exchanger C. DECREASE due to warmer water exiting the letdown heat exchanger D. DECREASE due to cooler water exiting the letdown heat exchanger Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 137 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 69 B General Discussion A decrease in letdown temperature will result in a reduction in boron concentration at the demineralizer outlet due to increased boron ion exchange by the anion resin at lower temperatures. Positive reactivity would be added due to reduced RCS boron concentration. In November of 1996 at Turnkey Point, reactor power increased .3% over a 30 minute period as a result oflowering non-regenerative heat exchanger outlet temperature. Ran on Simulator. Letdown temperature decreased by approximately 15 IS degrees. Students may think that because letdown is reduced (which will reduce charging (in auto))

auto>> that the regen HX will not cool LID as much going into the LID hx and offset any additional cooling by KC. This is what would make warmer plausible.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may think heat exchanger outlet temperature and ion exchange are reverse.

Answer B Discussion Correct: With KC flow maintained and letdown flow decreased, letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature will decrease, thus removing boron and increasing SR counts Answer C Discussion Plausible:Student Plausible: Student may think heat exchanger outlet temperature is reverse Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may think ion exchange is reverse.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2005 NRC Q70 (Bank 474)

Development References Student References Provided

~

~ Developed OP-CN-PS-NV lesson

~~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_systemsystem IKA number IKA_number II 16691GEN2.2 I 6691GEN2.2 12.2.1 1I KA desc Equipment Control Ability to perform pre-startup procedures for the facility, including operating those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity. (CFR: 41.5 /41.10/43.5/43.6/45.1)

/41.10/43.5 /43.6/45.1) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 138 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II QUESTION 70 B 1670 I GEN2.2 I I 2.2.25 1I KA KA desc Equipment Control Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (CPR:

(CFR: 41.5 /

41.7/43.2)

Per Technical Specification 2.1.2 (RCS Pressure SL):

1. What NC System valves are credited to maintain the reactor coolant system below the safety limits?

2. What are the modes of applicability of this Technical Specification?

A. 1. Pzr safety valves only Mod es 1,2,3

2. Modes 1 , 2, 3 and 4 B. 1. Pzr safety valves only

2. Modes 1, 2, 3, 4 1,2,3, and 5 4and C. 1. Pzr safety valves and Pzr PORVs

2. Modes Mod es 1,2,3 1 , 2, 3 and 4 D. 1. Pzr safety valves and Pzr PORVs

2. Modes 1, 2, 3, 4and 1,2,3,4 and 5 Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 139 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 70 B General Discussion Discussed this with Frank since Basis is SRO, but he pointed out that basis of safety limits is NOTSRO only, therefore it IS RO.

Only the safetys are credited on the NC system. Mode 1-5 is the applicability.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe RCS safety limit applies in Modes 1-4 Answer B Discussion Correct: The pressurizer safety valves are the credited NC system valves per TS 2.1.2 basis and RCS pressure safety limit applies in Modes 1-5 perTS 2.12 Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe safeties and PORVs are the required NC system valves and that the RCS safety limit applies in Modes 1-4 Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe safeties and PORVs are the required NC system valves. Modes 1-5 applicability is correct Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~

~ Developed TS 2.1.2 and basis

~

~ OPT Approved 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA_number I 16701GEN2.2 167°IGEN2.2 12.2.25 12 .2 . 25 1 1

KA desc Equipment Control Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (CFR: 41.5 /

41.7 /43.2) 41.7/43.2) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 140 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination 1671 IKA system QuestionBank # IKA_system I GEN2.3 I

IKA_number IKA number JI 2.3.14 I

I QUESTION 71 c KA_desc KA desc Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities. (CFR: 41.12/43.4 / 45.10)

Unit 1 was operating at 77% power. Given the following sequence of events and conditions:

CA pump 1A was tagged out for work

A tube rupture occurs in the 1 B S/G

The crew is isolating the 1B S/G in EP/1 /N5000/E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

1SV-13 1SV-13 (S/G 1 B PORV Manual Ctrl) is open and the isolation valve will not close

RP reports significant contamination and radiation in the Unit 1 interior doghouse

At Step 4.b of EP/1 /A/5000/E-3, the steam supply to the CAPT from 1 B S/G must be isolated Which valve will be used to isolate the CAPT steam supply under the conditions stated above?

A. 1SA-1 (Main Steam 1B to CAPT Maint Isol)

B. 1SA-2 1 SA-2 (S/G 1B 1B SM to CAPT)

C. 1SA-3 (S/G 1B SM to CAPT Stop Check)

D. CAPT #1 trip and throttle valve Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 141 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 71 c General Discussion With the IB S/G ruptured and the IB S/G PORV intermediate and unable to be isolated, the inside doghouse area would have elevated radiation and contamination levels and would be inaccessible. The CAPT#1 CAPT#I steam supply would normally be isolated using the T&T valve if both motor driven CA pumps were available (IA is not) until 1I SA-I SA-l is closed by dispatched operators, at which time the T&T valve would be reopened to CAPT#I available from the 1I C S/G supply. Since the doghouse would be inaccessible due to rad and contamination levels, I SA-3 (aux make the CAPT#1 bldg) would be used to isolate the IB S/G supply to the CAPT#l.

CAPT#1. I Answer A Discussion Plausible:This valve would normally be used for isolation of the CAPT but would be inaccessible in this situation Answer B Discussion Plausible:This is an air operated valve and although it is in the steam supply flowpath, tlowpath, it is not used for CAPT isolation purposes Answer C Discussion Correct: This valve would be used for the CAPT isolation in this situation Answer D Discussion Plausible:The T&T valve is normally closed first, but only if ifboth both motor driven pumps are available (IA is not) and then I1SA-I SA-l would be closed (if accessible) to allow the CAPT to be supplied from 1I C S/G Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2004 NRC Q3 (Bank 1203)

~ Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed E-3

~ OPT Approved

~

D OOPS OPS Approved o

D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_system IKA number IKA_number I 16711GEN2.3 12.3.14 1 KA desc Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities. (CFR: 41.12/43.4 /45.10) 41.12 143.4 145.10) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 142 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA_system IKA_number number II QUESTION 72 B 1672 II GEN2.3 I 2.3.13 I KA KA desc Radiation Control Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor

alanns, alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. (CFR: 41.12 /

43.4 /45.9/45.10) 43.4/45.9/45.10)

Unit 1 is operating at 75% power. An engineer needs to enter the Reactor Building pipechase area to perform some scoping work for a future modification.

Per Site Directive 3.1.2 (Access to Reactor Building and Areas Having High Pressure Steam Relief Devices):

1. What permission is required to allow entry into this area?

2. What operational modes require use of the "buddy system" for entry into the Reactor Building?

A. 1. Radiation Protection and the wee SRO

2. Modes 1 and 2 only B. 1. Radiation Protection and the wee SRO

2. Modes Mod es 1,2,3 1 , 2, 3 and 4

e. 1. wee SRO only

2. Modes 1 and 2 only D. 1. wee SRO only

2. Modes 1,2,3 and 4 Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 143 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 72 B General Discussion Per the SD, a buddy is required in modes 1-4. RP and the WCCSRO permission is required.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: RP and WCC SRO is correct. Student may believe a buddy is only required in Modes 1 & 2 Answer B Discussion Correct: RP and WCC SRO permission is required. Buddy system applies in Modes 1-4 Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe only the WCC SRO permission is required and that the buddy system only applies in Modes 1I & 2.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe only the WCC SRO permission is required. Modes 1-4 is correct Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided

~

SD 3.1.2

~

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved OOPS o

D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system

\KA system IKA_number IKA number I 1672IGEN2.3 1672IGEN2.3 12.3.13 1 KA desc Radiation Control Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. (CFR: 41.12/

41.12 /

43.4 /45.9/45.10) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 144 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_number IKA number I QUESTION 73 D 1673 I GEN2.3 I 2.3.7 I KAde~

KA desc I Radiation Control Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal orabnormal conditions. (CFR: 41.12 /45.10) 41.12/45.10) I An RWP that you are preparing to work under states that the highest dose rate in a particular area (at 30 cm) is 325 mRlhr. When you arrive in the area, a flashing yellow light is in the entry path to the area.

1. How would an area with a dose rate of 325 mRlhr be posted?

2. What is the significance of the flashing yellow light?

A. 1. Radiation Rad iation Area

2. Radiography is in progress and no entry is permitted B. 1. High Radiation Area

2. Radiography is in progress and no entry is permitted c.

C. 1. Radiation Area

2. The area is a "Locked" High Radiation Area and the RWP you have cannot be used to enter the area D. 1. High Radiation Area

2. The area is a "Locked" High Radiation Area and the RWP you have cannot be used to enter the area Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 145 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 73 D General Discussion Dose rates from 100-1000 mRlhr require a posting of HIGH radiation area. A flashing yellow light signifies that an area is a LOCKED high rad area A flashing yellow light is used for "locked high rad areas" (> 1 Rlhr) where locking is not practical.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may believe this area should be posted as a radiation area and the flashing yellow light signifies radiography in progress Answer B Discussion Plausible: The area should be posted high radiation area. The student may believe the flashing yellow light signifies radiography in progress Answer C Discussion Plausible: The student may believe this area should be posted as a radiation area. It is true that the RWP R WP could no longer be used Answer D Discussion Correct: Dose rates from 100-1000 mRlhr require a posting of HIGH radiation area. The RWP could no longer be used since area dose rates have increased Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed NSD 507

~ OPT Approved 0D OPS Approved 0

D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1673GEN2.3 1673 GEN2.3 2.3.7 KA desc Radiation Control Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal orabnormal conditions. (CFR: 41.12 145.10) 145.1 0) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 146 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA_number I QUESTION 74 D 1674 GEN2.4 2.4.21 I I I KA desc Emergency Procedures 1/ Plan Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc. (CFR: 41.7 143.51

/43.5/

45.12)

Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a complete loss of offsite power occurred.

A LOCA occurred on the transient. Given the following conditions:

1A DIG did not start and manual start attempts have failed

Containment pressure is 3.4 psig

NC subcooling is -8°F

Core exit thermocouples are 642°F

RVLlS level 37%

SIG NR levels are all 25%

CA has not been reset

CA flow is 420 gpm

IIR SUR is 0 DPM

SIR SUR is 0.3 DPM Which one of the following is the highest priority CSF at this time?

A. SUBCRITICALITY S UBCRITICALITY B. CORE CO RE COOLING COOLI NG C. CONTAINMENT D. HEAT SINK Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 147 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 74 D General Discussion Based on conditions, SUB CRITICALITY is YELLOW, CORE COOLING is ORANGE, CONTAINMENT is ORANGE, and HEAT SINK is RED. The RED path for HEAT SINK is the highest priority Answer A Discussion Plausible: Even though this is the highest priority left to right, it is only YELLOW, so it is not highest overall.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Even though this is higher priority left to right, it is ORANGE and any RED takes priority.

Answer C Discussion Plausible:This is another orange path, and student may think that this might be red due to only one train ofNS Answer D Discussion Correct: ACC numbers for S/G levels is 29% to meet heat sink and with total CA flow less than 450 gpm, then Red Path conditions are met and this is the highest priority.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW

~ Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed

1. OP-CN-EP-CSF

~~ OPT Approved F-O 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II I 6741GEN2.4 12.4.21 1I KA desc Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, 41.7 /43.5 /

core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc. (CFR: 41.7/43.5 45.12) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 148 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number IKA_number I QUESTION 75 B 1675 I GEN2.4 I 2.4.29 I KA desc II Emergency Procedures /I Plan Knowledge of the emergency plan. (CFR: 4l.l0 41.1 0 I/ 43.5/45.11) 43.5 145.11) II An offsite release is occurring due to a stuck open S/G PORVon 1C S/G which has a significant tube leak.

Which one of the following identifies:

1. The on-site emergency facility that assumes responsibility for communications with offsite agencies including the NRC once it is activated?

2. What emergency c1assification(s) classification(s) require(s) an evacuation of all non-essential personnel?

A. 1. Technical Support Center (TSC)

2. Site Area Emergency or General Emergency B. 1. Technical Support Center (TSC)

2. General Emergency only C. 1. Operations Support Center (OSC)

2. Site Area Emergency or General Emergency D. 1. Operations Support Center (OSC)

2. General Emergency only Monday, October 19,2009 Page 149 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 75 B General Discussion The TSC becomes the station's central control area for emergency response and technical management. The TSC is activated at the Alert Status and will assume responsibility for communication with offsite agencies, including NRC, after activation.

Site Evacuation may occur for Site Area Emergency and ALWAYS occurs for General Emergency, must be preceded by a Site Assembly. All non-essential site personnel should proceed to one of two Evacuation Sites based on site selection criteria.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Correct location, but student may believe an evacuation is required at SAE. An evacuation can be done at the SAE level but is REQUIRED at the GE level.

Answer B Discussion Correct: The TSC will assume responsibility for communication with offsite agencies, including NRC, after activation. Site Evacuation may occur for Site Area Emergency, but is REQUIRED for General Emergency Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe the OSC is responsible for communications and an evacuation is required at SAE. An evacuation can be done at the SAE level but is REQUIRED at the GE level.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe the OSC is responsible for communications. An evacuation can be done at the SAE level but is REQUIRED at the GE level.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2008 NRC Q75 (Bank 581)

~ Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed SEP lesson

~

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved OOPS oD NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA KA_system system 1675 GEN2.4 2.4.29 KA desc Emergency Procedures 1 Plan Knowledge of the emergency plan. (CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.11) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 150 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system 1676 I APEOO8 iKA iKA_number I

number AA2.18 I

JI QUESTION 76 c KA desc detennine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: (CFR: 43.5 !/45.13)

Ability to determine 45.13) Computer indications for RCS temperature and pressure ...............

Unit 1 was operating at 100%. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

A pressurizer safety valve opened and did not fully reclose

The crew manually tripped the reactor, initiated safety injection and entered EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) due to the rapid decrease in EP/1/A15000/E-0 NC pressure

The following indications are noted on the OAC:

o NC pressure is 1035 psig and stable o NC Tavg is 554°F and slowly decreasing o PRT pressure is 65 psig and increasing o PRT temperature is 220°F and increasing

1. Based on the OAC indications what should the temperature be downstream of the safety valve?

2. Which overpressure relief transient was used to determine the design relief capacity of the safety valves?

A. 1. 550°F

2. NCP locked rotor B. 1. 550°F

2. Main turbine trip C. 1. 320°F

2. NCP locked rotor D. 1. 320°F

2. Main turbine trip

Monday, Monday. October 19. 19, 2009 Page 151 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 76 c General Discussion For the leaking safety, the tailpipe temeprature is based on the saturation temperature of the pressure downstream of the valve which is 320 degrees based on 65 psig (80 psia). Based on the upstream pressure the temperature would be 550 degrees (this is the TMI issue). Per the basis ofTS 3.4.10, the PZR safeties were sized based on a locked rotor event. The safeties handle multiple high pressure scenarios, one of which is a turbine trip.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this is the correct temperature based on upstream conditions. The event is correct.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this is the correct temperature based on upstream conditions Even though the turbine trip is something that the safeties are designed to lift for, their capacity is not sized based on this event.

Answer C Discussion Correct: 320 F is the correct temperature for downstream conditions. Locked rotor event is correct per TS 3.4.10 bases Answer D Discussion Plausible: 320 F is the correct temperature for downstream conditions. Even though the turbine trip is something that the safeties are designed to lift for, their capacity is not sized based on this event.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed TS 3.4.10 and Basis Steam Tables 0D OPT Approved 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_number IKA number I 16761APE008 IAA2.18 I

KA desc Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: (CFR: 43.5 145.13) Computer indications for RCS temperature and pressure .............. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 152 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I QUESTION 77 B 1677 EPE011 EA2.02 I EPEOll I I KA desc Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: (CFR 43.5 43.5!/45.13) 45.13) Consequences to RHR of not resetting safety injection ................

Unit 1 was operating at 100%. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

1A NV pump trips

A dispatched operator reports an overcurrent relay has actuated on the breaker

The crew entered AP/1/A/55001012AP/1/A/5500/012 (Loss of Charging and Letdown)

1B NV pump has just been placed in service

1. What is the current status of NV letdown?

2. Which one of the following describes the latest time that 1A NV pump can be restored to prevent entering a shutdown action per Technical Specification 3.5.2 (ECCS-Operating)?

(E CCS-Operating)?

A. 1. In service

2. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months B. 1. Isolated

2. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months C. 1. In service

2. 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months D. 1. Isolated

2. 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 153 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 77 B General Discussion Requested a new KIA, was asked to try again by Frank and he mentioned loss of ofrecirc recirc procedure specifically. Called again 1018 10/8 after attempting to write a new question and was unsuccessful. He provided a new KA.

When all charging pumps are tripped, letdown automatically isolates. In this situation, Tech Spec 3.5.2, 3.5.2 , Condition A, is applied and allows 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months of inoperability before the shutdown action is entered with one train ofECCS inoperable. Two trains ofECCS are required operable in Modes 1-3. One train ofECCS consists of one charging pump, one safety injection pump, one RHR pump, and one RHR Hx.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may not realize letdown automatically isolates on loss of all charging pumps. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is allowed per TS 3.5.2, Condition A, before Unit 1 is requiremed to be in Mode 3 in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Answer B Discussion Correct: When all charging pumps are tripped, letdown automatically isolates. In this situation, Tech Spec 3.5.2 , Condition A, is applied and allows 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months of inoperability before the shutdown action is entered with one train ofECCS inoperable.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may not realize letdown automatically isolates on loss of all charging pumps. Student may add the 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowed to get to Mode 3, resulting in 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months .

Answer D Discussion Plausible: When all charging pumps are tripped, letdown automatically isolates. The student may add the 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowed to get to Mode 3, resulting in 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months .

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed TS3.5.2

~ OPT Approved API12 AP/12 D OPS Approved D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA number IKA_number II 1677iEPEOll 16771EPEOll iEA2.02 IEA2.02 iI KA desc Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: (CFR 43.5 145.13) Consequences to RHR of not resetting safety injection ............... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 154 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA number IKA_number I QUESTION 78 D 1678 I EPE038 I 2.4.18 I KA desc I EPE038 GENERIC Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs. (CFR: 41.10/43.1/45.13) I Unit 1 was operating at 100% power. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

Manual reactor trip and safety injection occurred due to a tube rupture on 1A S/G

A complete loss of offsite power occurs

All S/G pressures have been maintained stable by automatic operation of the S/G PORVs

The crew is in EP/1/A/5000/E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture) cooling down the NC system to the required core exit temperature based on 1A S/G pressure

Current NC loop Tcolds are:

o A Loop - 245°F o BLoop - 520°F o C Loop - 526°F o

o D 0 Loop - 518°F

1. What is the basis for the required core exit temperature selection?

2. What is the correct procedure flowpath for this situation?

A. 1. To ensure intact S/G pressures will remain above the main steam isolation setpoint for the NC system cooldown and depressurization

2. Transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-P.1 (Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition)

B. 1. To ensure intact S/G pressures will remain above the main steam isolation setpoint for the NC system cooldown and depressurization

2. Continue in EP/1/A/5000/E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

C. 1. To establish and maintain subcooling for the NC system cool down and cooldown depressurization

2. Transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-P.1 (Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition)

D. 1. To establish and maintain subcooling for the NC system cooldown and depressurization

2. Continue in EP/1/A/5000/E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 155 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 78 D General Discussion The core exit temperature selected is based on the lowest ruptured S/G pressure in order to establish adequate subcooling margin. The pressure in the intact S/G's must be maintained less than the ruptured S/G in order to maintain subcooling.

Based on S/G pressure being controlled by the S/G PORV's, the NC system would be cooled down to 520 F based on core exit thermocouples. The saturation pressure for 520F is ~825psig which is 50# > the SM isolation setpoint giving a plausible distractor.

With NCP's off, E-3 directs disregarding the T-cold in the ruptured loop because it may cause an invalid Integrity Status Tree condition. This may be due to reverse flow during cooldown or SI flow redirection during depressurization. If Ifan an orange or red path is encountered due to the ruptured S/G T-Cold then the crew would NOT transition to P.I P.1 Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may believe the temperature is selected is to prevent a main steam isolation. The student may believe transition to FR-P.1 FR-P.I is required, but E-3 directs disregarding the T-cold in the ruptured loop ifno NCPs are on Answer B Discussion Plausible: The student may believe the temperature is selected is to prevent a main steam isolation. Continuing in E-3 is the correct procedure flowpath Answer C Discussion Plausible: The core exit temperature selected is based on the lowest ruptured S/G pressure in order to establish adequate subcooling margin. The student may believe transition to FR-P.I FR-P.1 is required, but E-3 directs disregarding the ruptured loop T-cold Answer D Discussion Correct: The core exit temperature selected is based on the lowest ruptured S/G pressure in order to establish adequate subcooling margin.

Continuing in E-3 is the correct procedure flowpath Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided document,P.l EP-3 and background document,P.1

~ OPT Approved OOPS Approved o NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA_system KA system KA number 1678 EPE038 2.4.18 KA desc EPE038 GENERIC Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs. (CFR: 41.10 I 43.1 145.13) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 156 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA number IKA_number II QUESTION 79 B 1679 I APE054 I 2.1.30 II KA desc II APE054 GENERIC Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls. (CFR: 41. 7/45.7) 41.7/45.7)

I Unit 1 was operating at 100% power and Unit 2 was in No Mode when terrorist explosions resulted in a total loss of switchyard 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago. Given the following events and conditions:

1A DIG failed to start

The terrorists have broken through the security fence and taken control of the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS)

The OSM orders an evacuation of the control room due to the ongoing security AP/1/A/55001017 threat per AP/1 IA/55001017 (Loss of Control Room)

1. Which Unit 1 CA pump(s) is/are currently available and can be controlled from the location to which the crew is evacuated?

2. What is the current emergency classification for this situation?

Reference provided A. 1. CAPT #1 only

2. Alert B. 1. CAPT #1 only

2. Site Area Emerge Emergency ncy C. 1. CAPT #1 and 1B motor driven CA Pump

2. Alert D. 1. CAPT #1 and 1B motor driven CA Pump

2. Site Area Emergency 19, 2009 Monday, October 19,2009 Page 157 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 79 B General Discussion All CF flow is lost because with the loss of offsite power, vacuum is lost and I A CA has no power. This makes answers C 1I and D 1I plausible but not correct. The knowledge is to know WHERE to send the crew. For terrorist threats, the SSF is manned, not the ASP. The only controls available for CA from the SSF is the CAPT. The ASP has controls for all CA pumps. The classification is an SAE due to the security event. It would be an ALERT due to power loss alone. Must understand that the AP evacuates to the SSF directly on security threats.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The CAPT is the only CA source which can be controlled from the SSF. The student may believe this is an Alert because without a security threat or if ifthe the threat was not within a vital area, it would be an ALERT.

Answer B Discussion Correct: The crew has evacuated to the SSF and the CAPT is the only CA source which can be controlled from the SSF. The classification is an SAE (4.6.S.I-I)

(4.6.S.I-l) due to the security event.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: The student may believe that the evacuatlion is to the ASP and may believe the classification is an Alert because without a security threat or if the threat was not within a vital area, it would be an ALERT.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: The student may believe that the evacuatlion is to the ASP. The classification is an SAE (4.6.S.I-I)

(4.6.S.1-1) due to the security event.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed RP/OI RP101Al5000100 I (Classification of RP/OIA/5000100l

~ OPT Approved API17 Emergency) Enclosure 1I 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1679 APE054 1679APE054 2.1.30 KA desc APE054 GENERIC Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls. (CFR: 41.7 41.7/45.7) 145.7) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 158 of 200

,FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA QuestionBank # [KA system IKA

[KA number I[

QUESTION 80 D 16S0 1680 I APE077 I 2.4.1S 2.4.18 I KA desc I[

APE077 APE017 GENERIC Knowledge ofthe of the specific bases for EOPs. (CFR: 41.10/43.1/45.13) I Unit 1 is operating at 100% power and Unit 2 is in No Mode. Given the following:

1100 Catawba switchyard voltage is abnormally low due to a loss of a large section of the east coast electrical grid

AP/1/N55001037 (Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 1102 The crew enters AP/11A155001037 Disturbances), Case I (Abnormal Generator or Grid Voltage)

1110 The TCC reported that RTCA (Real Time Contingency Analysis) indicates CNS switchyard voltage would not be adequate if Unit 1 should trip

1310 The crew notified SPOC to install jumpers per AM/11A151 AM/1/N51 001008 (4Kv Essential Power (EPC) System Degraded Voltage Logic) per AP/11A155001037.

AP/1/N55001037.

1. How (if at all) does the RTCA status at 1110 affect Technical Specifications for shared systems (RN,VC,YC,VA)?

2. What is the basis for installing these jumpers under the current conditions?

A. 1. Shared systems (RN,VC,YC,VA) are operable

2. To initiate and seal in a blackout signal to the DIG sequencer to prevent multiple actuations due to unstable grid conditions B. 1. Shared systems (RN,VC,YC,VA)

(RN,VC,YC,vA) are operable

2. To prevent the DIG sequencer from restarting the sequence on a LOCA signal after 5 seconds due to a degraded bus voltage situation C. 1. Shared systems (RN,VC,YC,VA) are inoperable

2. To initiate and seal in a blackout signal to the DIG sequencer to prevent multiple actuations due to unstable grid conditions D. 1. Shared systems (RN,VC,YC,VA)

(RN,VC,YC,vA) are inoperable

2. To prevent the DIG sequencer from restarting the sequence on a LOCA signal after 5 seconds due to a degraded bus voltage situation Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 159 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 80 D General Discussion In AP/37, the shared systems that require a normal and emergency power source are declared inoperable when the TCC reports that the RTCA indicates switchyard voltage would be inadequate on a trip. The reason jumpers are placed is to prevent the DIG from loading the loca loads and trip .The then load shedding and restarting the LOCA loads due to the degraded buss conditons 5 seconds later.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe shared systems are still operable until the Unit should trip. 2nd part is plausible, because the jumpers do cause a BIO to be initiated immediately if a LOCA occurs, but BIO signal does not seal in.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe shared systems are still operable until the Unit should trip. Jumpers are placed to prevent "double sequencing" of LOCA loads due to a BIO after 5 seconds when buss voltage is degraded Answer C Discussion Plausible: Shared systems are inoperable per AP 137. 2nd part is plausible because the jumpers do cause a BIO to be initiated immediately if a AP137.

LOCA occurs, but BIO signal does not seal in.

Answer D Discussion Correct: Shared systems are inoperable per AP/37. Jumpers are placed to prevent "double sequencing" ofLOCA loads due to a BIO after 5 seconds when buss voltage is degraded Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed EQB

~ OPT Approved AP/37 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA KA_system system KA number 1680 APE077 16S0APE077 2.4.18 2.4.IS KA desc APE077 GENERIC Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs. (CFR: 41.10 I 43.1 145.13) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 160 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system 1681 IKA system I WE05 IKA number IKA_number I EA2.1 I

I QUESTION 81 c I I KA_desc KA desc Ability to determine detennine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

(CFR: 43.5/45.13) Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

Unit 1 was operating at SO% 50% power. Given the following:

Initial Conditions

1A 1A CA pump red tagged for PMs

UST level is 104%

During a board walkdown, 1CA-6 (CA Pmps Suct From CA CST) was noted to be closed Final Conditions

The reactor was manually tripped due to a main steam equalization header break

All power is lost to 1ETB 1SM-5 (S/G 1

1SM-S 1BBS SM M Isol) failed to close

1SM-3 (S/G 1C SM Isol) failed to close

1A S/G conditions - NR level is 10% ; pressure is 6S0 650 psig

1B S/G conditions - NR level is 0% ; pressure is S 5 psig

1C 1C S/G conditions - NR level is 0% ; pressure is 7 psig

1D S/G conditions - NR level is 8% ; pressure is 67S 675 psig

The crew is preparing to exit EP/1/A/SOOO/E-0 EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

1. Based on the Initial Conditions, how many CA pumps were required to be declared inoperable per Technical Specifications?

2. What procedprocedure ure will be used next?

A. 1. 1A CA Pump only

2. EP/1 EP/1/A/SOOO/E-2

/A/5000/E-2 ( Faulted Steam Generator Isolation)

B. 1. All three CA pumps

2. EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1 EP/1/A/SOOO/FR-H.1 (Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

C. 1. 1A CA Pump only

2. EP/1/A/SOOO/FR-H.1 EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1 (Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

D. 1. All three CA pumps

2. EP/1/A/5000/E-2 EP/1/A/SOOO/E-2 ( Faulted Steam Generator Isolation)

Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 161 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 81 c General Discussion Only 1I CA pump is required to be declared inoperable per the initial conditions. Closing 1I CA-6 does not make any CA pumps inoperable, this would only affect TS 3.7.6. E-2 would be the correct procedure under the stated conditions if this were Unit 2, but the heat sink requirements for Unit 1I are higher (II (11 % versus 9% for unit 2) Student must also understand that they have no CA flow since CAPT has no pressure amd IA I A and IB are not powered for various reasons and therefore FR-H.I FR-H.l entry conditions are met (No S/G NR level> 11 II % and total feedwater flow <450 gpm).

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Only 1lA A CA pump is inoperable. Part 2 is plausible because E-2 would be the correct procedure for Unit 2 under the stated conditions Answer B Discussion Plausible:: Candidate may believe all CA pumps are inoperable because the CACST is isolated. FR-H.l entry conditions are met FR-H.I Answer C Discussion Correct: Only lA CA pump is inoperable and FR-H.l entry conditions are met Answer D Discussion Plausible: Candidate may believe all CA pumps are inoperable because the CACST is isolated. Part 2 is plausible because E-2 would be correct for Unit 2 under the stated conditions Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed EP/1/ A/5000IFR-H.l EP/1/A/5000IFR-H.l

~ OPT Approved EP/1/ A/5000/FR-E-2 EP/1/A/5000/FR-E-2 EP/1/ A/5000/FR-E-0 EP/1/A/5000IFR-E-0 0 OPS Approved TS 3.8.1 and basis 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA ]KA system ]KA number IKA I]

16811WE05 IEA2.1 I KA desc Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

(CFR: 43.5 /45.13) Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 162 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I QUESTION 82 B 1682 APEOO5 I AA2.04 I I KA_desc KA desc Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod: (CFR: 43.5 /45.13) Interpretation of computer in-core TC map for inoperable/stuck rod location .....

Unit 1 is operating at 98% power. A surveillance test per PT I1/A/46001001 (RCCA PTI1/A/46001001 Movement Test) is in progress. At 0200, as Control Bank D was being moved, control rod H-8 did not move and another rod in Control Bank D slipped to 120 steps withdrawn and stopped. IAE has determined both rods are untrippable. A boration is in progress because SDM is not met. This is an incore thermocouple map one minute later.

R P N M L K J H G F E DeB A 576 572 576 546 599 611 603 605 2

3 605 624 BAD 569 4 597 602 609 617 5 602 625 616 614 6 563 611 611 626 623 568 7 602 606 617 620 8 561 612 634 572 626 9 619 611 613 614 10 548 610 606 613 574 11 627 BAD 610 614 12

- 612 599 608 622 13 620 619 576 626 562 14 540 628 613 608 614 15 BAD 622 580 Which single rod has slipped into the core to 120 steps withdrawn, and assuming SDM is still not met, what is the earliest time the crew is required to be.::: be ~ 75% power per Technical Specification 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment Limits)?

A. Rod D-12; 0400 B. Rod M-4; 0400 C. Rod D-12; 0800 D. Rod M-4; 0800 Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 163 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 82 B General Discussion changed "DROPPED TO STUCK IN KA. Wrong KA per Frank Based on the map provided, ROD M4 is the correct rod (temperature is depressed in this area and higher in opposite side of core.

Based on one rod being outside group alignment limits (H-8 should be within 12 steps because rod withdrawl would be halted when it did not move),, the crew has 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to get to <=75% per TS 3.1.4- B.2.2 . Additionally for the untrippable rods they have 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to be in Mode 3 per move)

TS 3.1.4- A.2 and therefore 0800 is plausible.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe rod D-12 is the affected rod (located in control bank D). 0400 is the correct time required to be </= 75% power Answer B Discussion Correct: Based on the map provided, ROD M4 is the indicated rod that slipped to 120 swd (temperature is depressed in this area and higher in opposite side of core). Per TS 3.1.4, Condition A and Condition B apply and must be </= 75% power by 0400.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe rod D-12 is the affected rod (located in control bank D). Student may believe 6 hrs to be <75% but actually Mode D).Student 3 per TS 3.1.4- A.2 and therefore 0800 is plausible.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: Based on the map provided, ROD M4 is the indicated rod that slipped to 120 swd (temperature is depressed in this area and higher in opposite side of core). 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to Mode 3 per TS 3.1.4- A.2 and therefore 0800 is plausible.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed TS 3.1.4 and basis

~ OPT Approved PT/l/A/4600/001 PT /1/ Al4600/00 1 D

0 OPS Approved D0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA jKA system jKA number IKA Ij 16821APE005 IAA2.04 I

KA desc KA_desc Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod: (CFR: 43.5 /45.13) Interpretation of computer in-core TC map for inoperable/stuck rod location 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 164 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number I QUESTION 83 A 1683 I APE032 I 2.4.4 I

KA desc KA_desc APE032 GENERIC Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2/45.6) 41.10/43.2/45.6)

Unit 1 was in Mode 6 performing core alterations. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

N-32 was removed from service 3 days ago

1AD-2, E/2 (TRAIN A SHUTDOWN MARGIN ALARM) is LIT 2

N-31 indicates 1.1 x1 x1002 cps

BDMS Train A train indicates IE1" "E1" 2

BDMS Train B indicates 1.4 x1 x100 2 cps

1. What procedure is entered to address the stated conditions?

2. Can core alterations continue based on the above conditions?

A. 1. AP/1/A/5500/013 AP/1/A/55001013 (Boron Dilution)

2. Yes B. AP/1/A/55001013 (Boron Dilution)

1. AP/1/A/5500/013

2. No c.

C. AP/1/A/55001016 (Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation System)

1. AP/1/A/5500/016

2. Yes D. AP/1/A/55001016 (Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation System)

1. AP/1/A/5500/016

2. No 19, 2009 Monday, October 19,2009 Page 165 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 83 A General Discussion Both APs have an entry condition SIR Hi flux at shutdown, but only AP/13 has entry conditions for the alarm alann given. With 2 instruments having approximately the same value, they should be determined to be operable. (N3l and BDMS B train). TS 3.9.2 (Mode 6) requires 2 neutron flux source range monitors which can be any combination ofSR of SR Nls NIs or BDMS channels. Ifthe If the student believes both BDMS channels are required, then suspension of core alterations is plausible. The basis of the TS states that the Nis or the BDMS channels can be used in any combination to meet the 2 channels required by the LCO.

Answer A Discussion Correct: Shutdown margin alarm is addessed per AP/13. AP/I3. 2 required source range flux monitors (N-3l and B BDMS) are operable and core alterations may continue Answer B Discussion Plausible: This is the correct procedure. If the student believes both BDMS channels are required, then suspension of core alterations is plausible.

Answer C Discussion AP/l6 is the wrong procedure and will not perform actions required to regain control after BDMS alarms, however since it is also Plausible: AP/16 considered source range monitoring, AP/16 seems like a logical choice. Core alterations can continue.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: AP/16 is the wrong procedure and will not perform actions required to regain control after BDMS alarms, however since it is also considered source range monitoring, AP /16 seems like a logical choice. Also, core alterations can continue.

AP/16 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed ENC

~ OPT Approved AP/l6 AP/16 AP/13 D OPS Approved TS 3.9.2 and basis D NRC Approved IAD-2 Annunc resp lAD-2 IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA number IKA_number I l6831APE032 16831APE032 12.4.4 1I KA_desc KA desc APE032 GENERIC Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures. (CFR: 41.1 41.100 I 43.2 145.6) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 166 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA number IKA_number II QUESTION 84 D 1684 I APE033 I 2.1.30 2.l.30 II KA desc II APE033 GENERIC Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls. (CFR: 41.7 /45.7) 41.7/45.7)

I Unit 1 is at 9% power performing a startup. Given the following:

Intermediate Range channel N-35 fails low

The crew removes N-35 from service per the applicable abnormal procedure

IAE estimates 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months for repair of N-35

1. When removing N-35 from service per the abnormal procedure, which fuses (if any) are removed?

2. Which course of action can be taken to maintain compliance with Technical Specification 3.3.1 (Reactor Trip Instrumentation) until N-35 can be returned to service in 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ?

A. 1. The control power fuses

2. Maintain current power level until N-35 is repaired B. 1. The control power fuses

2. Increase reactor power to 12% over the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months c.

C. 1. No fuses are removed

2. Maintain current power level until N-35 is repaired D. 1. No fuses are removed

2. Increase reactor power to 12% over the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 167 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 84 D General Discussion Discussed wanting to change this K/ A since the question we have does not appear to be SRO. Frank asked us to try again 10/8/09 he was OK K/A with assessing indications/conditions versus locating /operating.

This is assessing current plant conditions and noting that you are >P6 (10-10 amps) and < P10 PI 0 (10%) and determining a course of action that complies with TS 3.3.1 which allows 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to repair N35 or be in a place where the TS doesn't apply. This can be done by reducing power to

PI0. only one IR channel operable. Control power fuses are not removed for the IR instruments per AP/16. This is something lAB IAE might do. The control power fuses for the power range Nis are removed when a channel fails. Answer A Discussion Plausible: Control power fuses are removed for PR failures. The student may believe that power cannot be increased with only one IR channel operable. Answer B Discussion Plausible: Control power fuses are removed for PR failures. Increasing power> P-l 0 (10%) within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is a correct action P-I0 Answer C Discussion Plausible:Control power fuses are not removed. The student may believe that power cannot be increased with only one IR channel operable. Answer D Discussion Correct: Control power fuses are not removed. Increasing power> P-l 0 (10%) within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is a correct action Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension , NEW ~ Developed Development References Student References Provided AP/16, case III and T.S. 3.3.1 bases API16, ~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved OOPS oD NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA_system KA system KA number 1684 APE033 2.1.30 KA desc APE033 GENERIC Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls. (CFR: 41.7/45.7) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 168 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system 1685 I APE067 I IKA number I I AA2.02 I I QUESTION 85 c KA desc determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: (CFR: 43.5 145.13) Damper position Ability to detennine A fire on site resulted in a large amount of smoke entering the Auxiliary Building Ventilation (VA) system ductwork.

1. What affect will this situation have on VA system operation?

2. Once all automatic actions associated with the VA system have occurred based on the conditions above, is the VA system considered operable per Technical Specifications?

A. 1. VA Supply fans (ABSU) will trip only

2. Yes B. 1. VA Supply fans (ABSU) will trip only

2. No

c. 1. VA Supply fans (ABSU) will trip and the ABSU inlet dampers will close

2. Yes D. 1. VA Supply fans (ABSU) will trip and the ABSU inlet dampers will close

2. No Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 169 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 85 c General Discussion When smoke is detected in the V A ductwork, the V A supply fans will trip and the inlet dampers will close. The supply fans and unfiltered exhaust fans are not required to meet TS 3.7.12, only the filtered exhaust fans. SRO only because a determination of system operability must be made based on equipment status. Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe only the supply fans will trip on smoke detection. V A is operable with this alignment Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe only the supply fans will trip on smoke detection. Second part is plausible because the VC system is inoperable if its supply dampers are closed. Answer C Discussion Correct: V A supply fans will trip and the inlet dampers will close. V VA VAA is operable with this alignment Answer D Discussion Plausible: VA VA supply fans will trip and the inlet dampers will close. Second part is plausible because the VC system is inoperable if its supply dampers are closed. Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided ~ Developed VA D 0 OPT Approved TS 3.7.12 D 0 OPS Approved D 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I 16851APE067 IAA2.02 I KA desc Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: (CFR: 43.5 /45.13) Damper position 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 170 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_number II QUESTION 86 D 1686 I SYSOO3 JI A2.02 I1 KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RCPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45/13) Conditions which exist for an abnormal shutdown of an RCP in comparison to a normal shutdown of an RCP ................... Unit 1 was at 3% power and increasing. Given the following:

1AO-7 C/1 NCP #1 "SEAL LEAKOFF HI FLOW" is LIT 1AD-7

1B NCP sealleakoff is 6.5 gpm

1B NCP Seal Outlet temperature is 165°F and stable

1B 1B NCP Lower Bearing temperature is 140°F and stable

AP/1/N55001008 (Malfunction of Reactor Coolant Pump)

The crew enters AP/1/A/5500/008 What is the maximum time 11B B NCP can remain in service and what procedure does AP/1 IA/55001008 direct the crew to enter after the pump is tripped? AP/1/A/5500/008 A. 5 minutes; EP/1/A/5000/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) B. AP/1/A/55001004 (Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump) 5 minutes; AP/1/A/5500/004 C. 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ; OP/1/N61001002 OP/1/A/6100/002 (Controlling Procedure For Unit Shutdown) D. O. AP/1/A/55001004 (Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump) 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ; AP/1/A/5500/004 Monday, October 19,2009 Page 171 of200 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 86 D General Discussion SRO ONLY because it is asking for steps within the body of the procedure and making decisions about procedure flowpath based on indications. AP/OS (Malfunction of Reactor Coolant Pump) with # 1 sealleakoffflow > 6 gpm but < 7.5 gpm and # 1 seal outlet or lower bearing Per AP/08 temperatures NOT increasing, the affected NC pump must be shutdown within S 8 hrs. If#1 seal outlet or lower bearing temperatures ARE increasing, then the affected NC pump must be shutdown within 5 minutes. After all actions have been taken (Unit shutdown with control banks inserted) the pump is tripped and the crew will GO TO AP/04 (Loss of reactor Coolant Pump) Answer A Discussion Plausible: IF temperature on the lower bearing or # 1seal outlet was increasing, then this would be correct. Answer B Discussion Plausible: This would be correct ififleakoffwas leakoff was greater than 7.5 gpm or if if#1

1 seal outlet or lower bearing temperatures ARE increasing and control banks were inserted Answer C Discussion Plausible: The time is correct, but althought this procedure is plausible, its not the correct procedure.

Answer D Discussion Correct: Per AP/08, AP/OS, step 13. After all actions have been taken (Unit shutdown with control banks inserted) the pump is tripped and the crew will GO TO AP/04 (Loss of reactor Coolant Pump) Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory MODIFIED 2008 200S NRC QS6Q86 (Bank 592) Development References Student References Provided D 0 Developed AP/OOS AP/008 D 0 OPT Approved D 0 OPS Approved D 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA_number I 16S61SYS003 16861SYS003 IA2.02 I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RCPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3 ofthose 41.5 143.5/45.3 145/13) Conditions which exist for an abnormal shutdown of an RCP in comparison to a normal shutdown of an RCP .................. . 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 172 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA_system system IKA IKA_number number II QUESTION 87 c 1687 II SYS008 I 2.4.9 I KA desc SYS008 GENERIC Knowledge oflow power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies. (CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.13) Unit 1 is at 450°F and 1860 psig heating up with shutdown banks withdrawn following a refueling outage. Given the following conditions and sequence of events: Initial Conditions

All KC is lost and no KC pumps can be immediately restarted per AP/1/A/55001021 (Loss of Component Cooling)

YO has been manually aligned to provide cooling to 1A NV pump

Letdown is manually isolated and pressurizer level is increasing Final Conditions

The crew tripped the reactor and all reactor coolant pumps

The resultant transient causes a CROM housing leak estimated to be approximately 200 gpm

The crew manually safety injected

KC has not yet been restored

1. What procedure direction does AP/1/A/55001021 provide for maintaining NC pump seal injection for the current situation?

2. What procedure will the crew "GO TO" based on the final conditions?

A. 1. Maintain YO aligned to 1A NV pump and continuously monitor motor cooler flows, motor bearing temperatures and motor stator temperature

2. EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection)

B. 1. Maintain YO aligned to 1A NV pump and continuously monitor motor cooler flows, motor bearing temperatures and motor stator temperature

2. AP/1/A/55001027 (Shutdown LOCA)

C. 1. Realign KC to the 1A NV pump, start the Standby Makeup Pump, and after a maximum of 10 minutes secure the 1A NV pump

2. EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection)

O. 1. Realign KC to the 1A NV pump, start the Standby Makeup Pump, and after a maximum of 10 minutes secure the 1A 1A NV pump

2. AP/1/A/55001027 (Shutdown LOCA)

Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 173 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 87 c General Discussion YD must be isolated and KC must be realigned to NV pumps if a safety injection occurs per AP /21. The standby makeup pump provides seal AP/21. injection then. The crew must secure the NV pump within 10 minutes per enclosure 7 of AP21. The correct procedure to address the SI is E-O. AP127 is not used unless in Mode 4 or in Mode 3 with the CLAs isolated (which they would not be in this situation). AP/27 Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe YD alignment can be maintained. E-O is the correct procedure to address the SI Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe YD alignment can be maintained. Student may believe AP/27 is appropriate procedure to address the SI Answer C Discussion Correct: YD must be isolated and KC must be realigned to NV pumps if a safety injection occurs. E-O is the correct procedure to address the SI Answer D Discussion Plausible: YD must be isolated and KC must be realigned to NY NV pumps if a safety injection occurs. Student may believe AP /27 is appropriate AP/27 procedure to address the SI Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided ~ Developed AP05 ~ OPT Approved AP27 AP21 D0 OPS Approved D0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA

IKA system IKA IKA number II 16871SYS008 12 .4.9 1

1 1 KA desc SYS008 GENERIC Knowledge of low powerlshutdown power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies. (CFR: 41.10 I/ 43.5 43.5/45.13) 145.13) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 174 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA system IKA IKA_number number II QUESTION 88 A 1688 II SYS039 I A2.02 I KA KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) based on predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of ofthose those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13) Decrease in turbine load as it relates to steam escaping from relief valves . Given the following:

Rod control is in MANUAL.

Turbine power has decreased from 1227 MW to 1164 MW and stabilized.

Security has reported significant steam escaping from the interior doghouse What single steam relief valve passing full flow produced the conditions noted and what actions were directed by the procedure the crew initially implemented based on the stated conditions?

A. A steam line safety; trip the reactor and go to EP/1/Al5000/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. B. A S/G PORV; trip the reactor and go to EP/1/Al5000/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. c. C. A S/G PORV; initiate a unit shutdown per AP/1/Al5500/009 (Rapid Downpower) D. A steam line safety; initiate a unit shutdown per AP/1/Al5500/009 (Rapid Downpower) Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 175 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 88 A General Discussion A PORV is - 2.5% steam flow and a safety is - 5%. The turbine MW reduction represents one S/O safety valve full open (-60 MW). This would be -30MW with a PORV full open. AP/28 directs tripping the reactor and entering E-O if a steam leak is not < 5%. Otherwise a load reduction is performed per AP/09 (or the OP which is not an answer choice) . Answer A Discussion Correct: AP/28 directs tripping the reactor and entering E-O if a steam leak is NOT < 5%. Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe M Mww reduction is due to a S/O POR PORV, V, E-O is the correct procedure direction Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe Mw reduction is due to a S/O PORV and that a unit shutdown is necessary per AP/09 Answer D Discussion Plausible: S/O safety valve full open (-60 MW) is correct. Student may believe that a unit shutdown is necessary per AP 109 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension MODIFIED 2008 NRC Q88 (Bank 594) Development References Student References Provided ~ Developed AP/28 and basis ~ OPT Approved SM D0 OPS Approved 0 D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_system IKA number IKA_number II 16881SYS039 IA2.02 II KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) based on predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 143.5 ofthose 1 45.3 1145.13) 143.5/45.3 45.13) Decrease in turbine load as it relates to steam escaping from relief valves . 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 176 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA IKA QuestionBank # IKA_systemIKA_number system number II QUESTION 89 B 1689 I SYS063 I 2.2.40 II KA KA desc I SYS063 GENERIC Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system. (CFR: 41.10/43.2/43.5/45.3) I Unit 1 is in Mode 3 and cooling down in preparation for a refueling outage when IAE discovers a bad cell on 1DGBA during surveillance testing per Technical Specification SR 3.8.4.2.

1. When is the cascade to Technical Specification 3.8.1 (AC Sources - Operating required to be made?

2. With 1DGBA already inoperable, why is an additional cascade to Technical Specification 3.8.9 (Distribution Systems - Operating) required if A or D channels of DC power become inoperable?

A. 1. Immed iately

2. Because A and D channels supply power to the SSPS output bays B. 1. Immediately

2. Because A Aand and D channels supply power to 1EDE 1EDE and 1EDF1EDF C. 1. Within 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

2. Because A and D channels supply power to the SSPS output bays D. 1. Within 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

2. Because Aand A and D channels supply power to 1EDE 1EDE and 1EDF1EDF Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 177 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 89 B General Discussion With the DG DC system inoperable, 3.8.4 action directs entry into 3.8.1 immediately. From the basis for TS 3.8.4 - Being powered from auctioneering diode circuits from either the A channel of DC or the A Train ofDG DC, distribution center EDE supplies breaker control power to the 4.16 kV AC and the 600 VAC switchgear, auxiliary feedwater pump controls, and other important DC loads. The EDF center is powered from the B Train ofDG DC or the D channel of DC and provides DC power to Train B loads, similar to EDE center. With the loss ofofthe the channel DC power and the associated DG DC power, the load center power for the train is inoperable and the Condition(s) and Required Action(s) for the Distribution Systems must be entered immediately. Channels A and D do supply power to the SSPS output bays, however, that is not why the actions are cascaded. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is plausible because that is the time where cascades are made FROM 3.8.1 when redundant equipment is inoperable. Answer A Discussion Plausible: With the DG DC system inoperable, 3.8.4 action directs entry into 3.8.1 immediately. Student may believe this is the reason for cascade to 3.8.9, (SSPS output bays powered via associated inverter) Answer B Discussion Correct: With the DG DC system inoperable, 3.8.4 action directs entry into 3.8.1 immediately. A & D channels of DC power supply power to lEDEIEDF which supply 4160v control power,etc. (per discussion) Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe 4 hrs is correct because that is the time where cascades are made FROM 3.8.1 when redundant equipment is inoperable. (SSPS output bays powered via associated inverter) A & D Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe 4 hrs is correct because that is the time where cascades are made FROM 3.8.1 when redundant equipment is inoperable. The second part is correct. Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided ~ ~ Developed TS 3.8.4 and basis ~ ~ OPT Approved 0 OPS Approved OOPS o 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA_system KA system 1689SYS063 2.2.40 KA desc SYS063 GENERIC Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system. (CFR: 41.10 41.10/43.2/43.5/45.3) /43.2/43.5/45.3) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 178 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA_system IKA_number number I QUESTION 90 A 1690 I SYS076 I A2.02 I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SWS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45/3/45/13) 41.5/43.5/45/3 /45/13) Service water header pressure ...................................... Unit 1 and 2 were operating at 100% power with 2A RN pump in service. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

1A DIG was tagged for PMs

The following annunciators were LIT:

o 1AD-12, Al2 - URN "RN Essential Hdr A Pressure - Lo" o 2AD-12, Al2 - URN "RN Essential Hdr A Pressure - Lo" o 1AD-12, Al5 - URN "RN Essential Hdr B Pressure - Lo" o 2AD-12, Al5 - URN "RN Essential Hdr B Pressure - Lo"

The 2A RN pump tripped

The 1A RN pump was started and the above alarms cleared

1. Is the 2A DIG operable per Technical Specifications for the conditions stated above?

2. What system manipulations (if any) are required per OP/OIAl64001006C (Nuclear Service Water System)?

A. 1. No

2. No manipulations are required, only verification of the RN system lineup B. 1. No

2. The CA assured makeup valves from Train A RN on both units have power removed C. 1. Yes

2. No manipulations are required, only verification of the RN system lineup D. 1. Yes

2. The CA assured makeup valves from Train A RN on both units have power removed Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 179 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 90 A General Discussion lA DIG inoperability results in lA RN pump being inoperable. When 2A RN pump trips, the A train loop ofRN becomes inoperable, resulting in the inoperability of both units A train DIGs. Although lA IA RN is functional, it is inoperable by Tech Specs due to its inoperable DIG. The RN OP, encl. 4.11, will require ensuring at least one crossover flowpath combinations is open from either unit. These valves are normally open and there is no information given that would cause contradict this status. A common misconception is that an inoperable RN pump makes a DIG inoperable, but this is reverse logic. The exception is in the case where both RN pumps are inoperable in which case both DIG's are inoperable. Actions for aligning an RN pump for single pump flow ( typically when inoperable> 72 hrs) include deenergizing the CA assured makeup valve Answer A Discussion Correct: Both DIG's are inoperable. Ensuring one crossover flowpath combinations from either unit is open is verified since they are already open and are not required to be manipulated Answer B Discussion Plausible: Both DIG's are inoperable. Student may believe A train CA assured makeup on both units must have power removed. Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe only the IA DIG is inoperable. Ensuring one crossover flowpath combinations from either unit is open is verified since they are already open and are not required to be manipulated Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe only the lA DIG is inoperable and that A train CA assured makeup on both units must have power removed .. Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided 0 Developed ap/20 ~ OPT Approved 1I ad-12 ann resp RN 0 OPS Approved OP 101Al64001006C OP/O/A/64001006C 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # jKA system IKA IKA jKA number II 1690lSYS076 IA2.02 I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SWS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CPR: 41.5 143.5 145/3 145113) Service water header 14513 145/13) pressure ..................................... . 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 180 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system [KA system [KA number IKA_number I [ QUESTION 91 B 1691 I SYS016 I A2.02 I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the NNIS; and (b) based on those predictions, use or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.5) Loss of power supply ............................................. Unit 1 is performing a power decrease required by Technical Specifications. Given the following:

At 45% power, 1SMPS5219 (Turbine Impulse Pressure 1 ATWSI AMSAC Related) stopped decreasing

The power supply to 1SMPS5218 (Turbine Impulse Pressure 1 ATWSI AMSAC Related) has failed

IAE has been notified to repair failed channels

Current reactor power is 28.5%

1. What guidance does OP/1/A/61 001003 (Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation) provide for the AMSAC system for this situation?

2. What is the Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) basis for the AMSAC System?

A. 1. Stop the power decrease

2. AMSAC provides an independent means of initiating a turbine trip and automatic feedwater isolation under ATWS conditions B. 1. Continue the power decrease

2. AMSAC provides an independent means of initiating a turbine trip and auxiliary feedwater autostart under ATWS conditions C. 1. Stop the power decrease

2. AMSAC provides an independent means of initiating a turbine trip and auxiliary feedwater autostart under ATWS conditions D. 1. Continue the power decrease

2. AMSAC provides an independent means of initiating a turbine trip and automatic feedwater isolation under ATWS conditions Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 181 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 91 B General Discussion AMSAC input from turbine impulse pressure is 2/2 logic at 235 psig (-40% turbine load). AMSAC will automatically reset on load increase> 40% iflogic is met (2/2) and will automatically bypass on load decrease < 40% iflogic is met (2/)2 and 120 sec time delay. Since 2SMPS5218 power supply is failed and 2SMP5219 is failed at 45%, the 2/2 212 logic cannot be met to bypass AMSAC on the power decrease. The power decrease procedure notes that if AMSAC cannot be bypassed and the power decrease is required by Tech Specs, continue with the power decrease while IAE repairs the switches. AMSAC basis: Per 10 CFR 50.62, Each pressurized water reactor must have equipment from sensor output to final actuation device, that is diverse from the reactor trip system, to automatically initiate the auxiliary feedwater feed water system and initiate a turbine trip under conditions indicative of an ATWS. This equipment must be designed to perform its function in a reliable manner and be independent from the existing reactor trip system. Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe power decrease is stopped to prevent AMSAC actuation. Student may believe AMSAC provides independent means ofturbine of turbine trip and CF isolation Answer B Discussion Correct: Power decrease must continue due to TS shutdown. Basis is as stated Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe power decrease is stopped to prevent AMSAC actuation. Basis is correct Answer D Discussion Plausible: Power decrease must continue due to TS shutdown. Student may believe AMSAC provides independent means of turbine trip and CF isolation Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided ~ Developed CF ~ OPT Approved SLC 16.7-1 basis OP/lIA/61 001003 OPIl/A/61 D 0 OPS Approved D 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system tKA system tKA number IKA_number I t 16911SYS016 IA2.02 I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the NNIS; and (b) based on those predictions, use or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.5) 41.5/43.5 145.3 145.5) Loss of power supply ............................................ . 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 182 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA_systemIKA_number IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 92 D 1692 I SYS029 I 2.1.28 I KA desc II SYS029 GENERIC Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls. (CFR: 41.7)

41. 7) I Unit 1 is currently in Mode 6 preparing to unload the third fuel assembly from the core.

Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

Unit 1 entered Mode 3 five days ago

All plant systems are in normal operation for the current conditions

The B train Containment Purge Exhaust System (VP) duct heaters lose power

The B train VP system fan status/ system flow is unchanged

1. When VP is required to be operable, does a loss of the duct heaters affect the operability of the VP train?

2. For the conditions above, is the VP system required to be operable per Technical Specification 3.9.3 (Containment Penetrations)?

A. 1. Yes

2. Yes B. 1. No

2. Yes C. 1. Yes

2. No D. 1. No

2. No Monday, October 19,2009 Page 183 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 92 D General Discussion TS 3.9.3 does not apply because the basis states that recently irradiated is part of a critical core within the last 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . If they believe it is 7 days vice 3 they will choose YES. Per the basis, the heaters do not affect the operability of the VP train, however the heaters do have an action specific to them and if they believe the spec applies this would be appealing. Because the heaters have a specificc TS action associated with them iit is logiclogiccal cal to assume this is "major equipment" and meets the KA. Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe the VP system operability is affected by the heaters and may believe 3.9.3 is applicable if they think recently irradiated is within the last 7 days Answer B Discussion Plausible: Loss of heaters does not affect VP operability. Student may believe 3.9.3 is applicable if they think recently irradiated is within the last 7 days. Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may may believe the VP system operability is affected by the heaters. TS 3.9.3 does not apply because the basis states that recently irradiated is part of a critical core within the last 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . Answer D Discussion Correct: Loss of heaters does not affect VP operability. TS 3.9.3 does not apply because the basis states that recently irradiated is part of a critical core within the last 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided ~ Developed TS 3.9.3 and basis ~ OPT Approved VP D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1692SYS029 2.1.28 KA desc SYS029 GENERIC Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls. (CFR: 41.7) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 184 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II QUESTION 93 B 1693 I SYS033 A2.03 I I I KA KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System; and (b) based on those contro 1, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 predictions, use procedures to correct, control, / 43.5 /45.3 41.5/43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) Abnormal spent fuel pool water level or loss of water level ............. Unit 1 is in Mode 6 with core unload in progress. Given the following:

An RP technician in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) calls the control room and reports that level in the SFP is decreasing

The fuel assembly most recently removed from the core is currently in the reactor building manipulator crane

1. Based on current conditions, what procedure will be used to perform the mitigative actions necessary to address the problem?

2. What direction will the procedure provide for the fuel assembly currently being handled?

A. 1. AP/1/A/55001026 (Loss of Refueling Canal Level)

2. Lower the fuel assembly into the upender and place in the fully down position B. 1. AP/1/A/55001026 (Loss of Refueling Canal Level)

2. Lower the fuel assembly to fully down in the core or the deep end of the canal C. 1. AP/1/A/55001041 (Loss of Spent Fuel Cooling or Level)

2. Lower the fuel assembly into the upender and place in the fully down position D. 1. AP/1/A/55001041 (Loss of Spent Fuel Cooling or Level)

2. Lower the fuel assembly to fully down in the core or the deep end of the canal Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 185 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 93 B General Discussion Based on the stem, AP141 appears to be appropriate and may in fact be the procedure chosen. However, based on the stem, the refueling canal and the SFP are physically connected at this time (refueling in progress) and step 1I of AP/41 checks this and sends the crew to AP/26 without taking any mitigative actions. If the assembly is in the reactor building manipulator crane, the procedure directs the assembly to be placed fully down in the core or the deep end of the canal. Answer A Discussion Plausible: AP/26 steps will perform the required mitigative actions. This action would be taken if the assembly had been placed in the upender Answer B Discussion Correct: AP/26 steps will perform the required mitigative actions. Since the assembly is in the reactor building manipulator crane, the procedure directs the assembly to be placed fully down in the core or the deep end of the canal. Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe mitigative actions will be taken in AP 141. This action would be taken ifthe AP/41. if the assembly had been placed in the upender Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe mitigative actions will be taken in AP 141. Since the assembly is in the reactor building manipulator crane, the AP/41. procedure directs the assembly to be placed fully down in the core or the deep end of the canal. Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided ~ Developed AP/26 ~ OPT Approved AP/41 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I 16931SYS033 IA2.03 II KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System; and (b) based on those ofthe predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.31 41.5 143.5 145.3 1 45.13) Abnormal spent fuel pool water level or loss of water level 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 186 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system 1694 I GEN2.1 I IKA number I 2.1.26 I I QUESTION 94 c KA desc Conduct of Operations Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen). (CFR: 41.10/45.12) 41.1 0/45.12) Unit 1 entered a forced outage 3 days ago to replace an NC pump motor.

2 work crews are involved in replacing the NCP motor, an NC pump crew and an IAE crew. The tagout boundary is being shared by both crews

The NC pump crew has the new motor in place and has outstanding Work Order Task Assignments (WOTAs) for wiring completion

The IAE crew has asked the Unit 1 SRO for clearance of their WOTA to allow electrical testing of the new motor which requires connecting an outside power source Per NSD 500 (Red Tags/Configuration Control Tags), in addition to ensuring the work can be performed safely, what additional condition is required to be met by the Unit 1 SRO prior to granting clearance to the IAE crewWOTA?

A. The Unit 1 SRO must obtain OSM concurrence B. The Unit 1 SRO must ensure the two crews have established constant communication C. The Unit 1 SRO must ensure all affected crews have been informed of the intent to apply an outside power source D. The Unit 1 SRO must ensure the IAE supervisor has walked down the area where the outside power source will be applied Monday, October 19,2009 Page 187 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 94 c General Discussion If work will apply a Hazardous Energy Source within boundaries ofa Ifwork of a tagout: The Work Group Supervisor/designee shall ensure the Operational Control Group is informed. Prior to the Operational Control Group giving clearance to apply a Hazardous Energy Source within boundaries of a tagout, Operational Control Group Supervisor/designee giving clearance shall: Ensure any affected crew previously or subsequently given clearance is informed of Hazardous Energy Source being applied. Ensure that work can be performed safely. The Work Group Supervisor/designee shall walk down the area into which hazardous energy will be applied. Answer A Discussion Plausible: Candidate may believe OSM concurrence is necessary, OSM approval is required for exception to tag placement Answer B Discussion Plausible: Candidate may believe constant communication is necessary, this is true for some plant evolutions Answer C Discussion Correct: OCG supv shall: Ensure any affected crew previously or subsequently given clearance is informed of Hazardous Energy Source being applied. Ensure that work can be performed safely. Answer D Discussion Plausible: The work group supervisor is required to walk down the area as stated above in the discussion, but this is not required for the SRO to grant clearance Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW ~ Development References Student References Provided ~ Developed NSD500 0D OPT Approved 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA .IKA number I I I 6941GEN2. 6941GEN2.1I 12.1.26 1I KA desc Conduct of Operations Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen). (CFR: 41.10/45.12) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 188 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II QUESTION 95 A 1695 I GEN2.2 I 2.2.41 II KA KA desc I Equipment Control Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings. (CFR: 41.10 /45.12/45.13) / 45.12/45.13) I Unit 1 was operating at 100% power. Given the following:

NO-54 (18 ND 1ND-64 NO Train Cold Leg Injection Return Safety Relief) lifted and did not reseat

The crew used the closest valves in the piping available to isolate the leak

Due to parts availability it will be 4-5 days before repairs can be completed

The crew began a Technical Specification shutdown

1. How many trains of ND NO are operable?

2. What is the first operational mode reached where Technical Specification 3.5.2 (ECCS - Operating) no longer applies?

Reference provided A. 1. No trains are operable Mode 4

2. Mode4 B.

8. 1. No trains are operable

2. Mode 5 C. 1. 28 Train of N NOD only

2. Mode 4 O.

D. 1. 28 Train of N NOD only

2. Mode 5 Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 189 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 95 A General Discussion Per OP/I/A/62001004 OPIlIAl62001004 Residual Heat Removal System L&P 2.9 Closing IND-32A (ND Train lA IA Hot Leg Inj Isol) or IND-65B (ND Train IB Hot Leg Inj Isol) in Modes 1,2 or 3 makes both trains ofND inoperable since ND must be capable of injecting into all 4 cold legs while meeting single failure criterium. Therefore, both valves are required to be open to ensure operability of both trains. Answer A Discussion Correct: Isolation required closing 2ND-65B which results in both trains ofND being inoperable. TS 3.5.2 is applicable to MODES 1-3 Answer B Discussion Plausible: The student may not realize closing 2ND-65B results in both trains ofND being inoperable and may believe TS 3.5.2 applies in Modes 1-4 Answer C Discussion Plausible: The student may think only 2B ND train is affected and TS 3.5.2 is not met but knows the applicability Answer D Discussion Plausible: The student may think only 2B ND train is affected and TS 3.5.2 is not met and applicability is Modes 1-4 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided ~ Developed TS 3.5.2 CN-1561-1.1 CN-1561-1.l ~ OPT Approved CN-1561-1.l CN-1561-1.1 CN-1562-1.3 CN-1562-1.3 0 OPS Approved OPIlIAl62001004 OP/l/A/62001004 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA_system KA system KA number 1695GEN2.2 2.2.41 KA desc Equipment Control Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings. (CFR: 41.10 145.12 145.13) 41.10/45.12/45.13) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE STUDENTS WILL GET FULL SIZE DRAWINGS Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 190 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 96 A 1696 II GEN2.2 II 2.2.44 II KA desc KA Equipment Control Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator /43.5 /45.12) actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. (CFR: 41.5 /43.5/45.12) Unit 1 is in Mode 3 performing a leakage calculation per PT/1/A/4150/001 D (NC System Leakage Calculation). Given the following:

Reactor coolant pump (NCP) sealleakoffvalues are:

o 1A NCP is 3.6 gpm o 1 1BB NCP is3.8 is 3.8 gpm o 1 1CC NCP is 3.9 gpm o 1 1DD NCP is4.2 is 4.2 gpm

NC unidentified leakage is 0.2 gpm

NC identified leakage is 4.3 gpm

VCT pressure is 35 psig

An NLO has been dispatched to reduce VCT pressure to 25 psig What effect will this operator action have on NCP sealleakoff, and what is a correct action for this situation?

A. NCP sealleakoffflow will increase. Notify Security within 15 minutes that the SSF is degraded. B. NCP sealleakoffflow seal leakoff flow will decrease. Immediately declare the standby makeup pump inoperable and if the standby makeup pump is not restored within 7 days, declare the SSF inoperable. C. NCP sealleakoffflow seal leakoff flow will increase. Immediately declare the standby makeup pump inoperable and ifthe if the standby makeup pump is not restored within 7 days, declare the SSF inoperable. D. NCP seal sealleakoffflow leakoff flow will decrease. Notify Security within 15 minutes that the SSF is degraded. Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 191 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 96 A General Discussion SRO ONLY because RO job function is not to detennine who needs to be notified based on Tech Spec/SLC entries. The SRO function is to enter this into the TSAIL computer which is where the prompt is provided to notify Security. TSAIL entry is part of an SRO T&Q Guide associated with the Work Control Center. The tank has a hydrogen pressure regulator to maintain overpressure. If pressure decreases, NCP sealleakoff sealleakoffincreases. increases. Answer A Discussion Correct: When VCT pressure decreases, leakoffwill increase. With NC total leakage >/= 20 gpm the standby makeup pump is inoperable and therefore the SSF is inoperable and Security is required to be notified within 15 minutes Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe leakoffwill decrease with VCT pressure and the standby makeup pump can be inoperable for 7 days prior to declaring the SSF inoperable Answer C Discussion Plausible: When VCT pressure decreases, sealleakoffwill seal leako ff will increase. Student may believe the standby makeup pump can be inoperable for 7 days prior to declaring the SSF inoperable Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe 1eakoffwill leakoffwill decrease with VCT pressure. With NC total leakage >/= 20 gpm the standby makeup pump is inoperable and therefore the SSF is inoperable and Security is required to be notified within 15 minutes Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory BANK 2005 NRC Q84 (Bank 488) Development References Student References Provided 0 Developed SLC 16.7-9 ~ OPT Approved NCP 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system .IKA IKA number I 16961GEN2.2 12 .2 .44 .44 1I KA desc Equipment Control Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. (CFR: 41.5 /43.5/45.12) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 192 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II QUESTION 97 A 1697 I GEN2.3 I 2.3.4 II KA KA desc II Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. (CFR: 41.12 I/43.4 43.4 /45.10) 145.10) I Given the following:

A LOCA has occurred in Unit 1

The TSC has been fully staffed and activated

An individual is needed for lifesaving activities during which 27 Rem of ofTEDE TEDE exposure is expected to be received Is the individual required to be a volunteer and who is required to approve the exposure for this lifesaving activity?

A. The individual is required to be a volunteer and the TSC Emergency Coordinator is required to approve the exposure B. The individual is required to be a volunteer and the Operations Shift Manager is required to approve the exposure C. The individual is not required to be a volunteer and the TSC Emergency Coordinator is required to approve the exposure D. The individual is not required to be a volunteer and the Operations Shift Manager is required to approve the exposure Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 193 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 97 A General Discussion To save a life or protect a large population on a volunteer basis only, a person may receive greater than 25 rem TEDE, greater than 75 rem to the lens of the eye, and greater than 250 rem to the skin and extremities. The Emergency Coordinator must approve extending the emergency worker dose limits. Since the TSC is fully staffed and activated, this would be the TSC Coordinator. Answer A Discussion Correct: For> 25 Rem the individual is required to be a volunteer and TSC coordinator approval is required Answer B Discussion Plausible: For> 25 Rem the individual is required to be a volunteer. Student may believe OSM approval is required Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may think volunteer is not required. TSC approval is correct Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may think volunteer is not required and OSM approval is required Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory MODIFIED 2005 NRC Q92 (Bank 496) D Developed Development References Student References Provided HP lesson ~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1697GEN2.3 2.3.4 KA desc Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. (CFR: 41.12/43.4 /45.10) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 194 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA_number number I QUESTION 98 D 1698 I GEN2.3 I 2.3.7 I KA desc I Radiation Control Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal orabnormal conditions. (CFR: 41.12 //45.10) 45.10) II An individual with a current year Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) of 1500 mR is preparing to perform a job in the RCA. The RWP states that the dose rate in the area is 200 mR/hr.

1. What is the maximum time he can work in this area without an approved dose extension?

2. If the job were estimated to take 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , what is the minimum level RP position that could provide the approval of the dose extension?

A. 1. 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months

2. An RP Supervisor B. 1. 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months

2. The RP Manager C. 1. 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months

2. An RP Supervisor D. 1. 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months

2. The RP Manager Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 195 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 98 D General Discussion Asked Frank to replace KIA KJA since it was a duplicate of one on the RO exam and we were having trouble determining a good question that was SRO level and operationally valid and with 3 plausible distractors. RP supervisor gives permission to enter hi rad areas when the alert limit (1600 mr) is exceeded. Dose extensions from 1800 up to 2000 mr are NSDS07. Work can be done up to the exclude limit without extension which is 1800 mr. At 200 mr !hr, approved by the RPM per NSD507. Ihr, the worker would reach alert in 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months and exclude in 1.5 hrs Answer A Discussion Plausible: Plausible if student believes extension required above 1600 mrem (i.e. exclude status), RP supervisor approval required to enter high rad area above 1600 mrem. Answer B Discussion Plausible: Plausible if student believes extension required above 1600 mrem (i.e. exclude status), , correct approval Answer C Discussion Plausible: Correct time, 2nd part plausible because RP supervisor approval required to enter high rad area above 1600 mrem. Answer D Discussion Correct: At 200 mr !hr, the worker would reach alert in 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months and exclude in 1.5 hrs. Dose extemsions up to 2000 mr are approved by the RPM per NSDS07. NSD507. Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory BANK D Developed Development References Student References Provided nsdS07 nsd507 D OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1698GEN2.3 2.3.7 KA desc Radiation Control Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal orabnormal conditions. (CFR: 41.12/45.10) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 196 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II QUESTION 99 D 1699 I GEN2.4 I 2.4.20 II Md~ ~~ I Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of the operational implications ofEOP warnings, cautions, and notes. (CFR: 41.10/43.5 4l.l0 /43.5/45.13) /45.13) II Unit 1 was at 25% and increasing following a refueling outage. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ago, Unit 1 experienced a large break LOCA

Containment sump level is 5.2 ft

During the swap to cold leg recirculation, 1 NI-136B (ND Supply To Nt NI Pump 1B) could not be opened

The crew has verified SII EP/1/A/5000IES-1.3 (Transfer to Cold Leg S/I flow per EP/1/N5000/ES-1.3 Recirculation)

EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.3 when all running The crew is preparing to transition out of EP/1/N5000/ES-1.3 ECCS pumps begin showing signs of cavitation

1. What was the status of 1 B Nt NI pump when SII S/I flow was verified per EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.3?

EP/1/N5000/ES-1.3?

2. Which procedure proced ure will provide the mitigative actions to address cavitation of the ECCS pumps?

A. 1. 1B NI Nt was secured because 1 NI-136B Nt-136B could not be opened

2. EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.1 (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

B. 1. 1B NI was secured because 1 NI-136B Nt-136B could not be opened

2. EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.3 (Containment Sump Blockage)

C. 1. 1B1B NIN I is running with suction from 1A train ND

2. EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.1 (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

D. 1. 1B NI Nt is running with suction from 1A train ND EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.3

2. EP/1 /A/5000/ECA-1.3 (Containment Sump Blockage)

Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 197 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 99 D General Discussion Per ES 1.3 if adequate sump level is present and cavitation occurs with no other known cause, then blockage should be suspected and directs the SRO to ECA-1.3 versus ECA-1.1. With NI136B closed the NI pump will still have flow from the A train ND. A pump with no suction flow would be secured. Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may believe that IB I B NI has no suction since INI-136B I NI-136B could not be opened and ECA 1.1 will provide the mitigative actions to address cavitation Answer B Discussion Plausible: The student may believe that IB NI has no suction since IINI-136B ECA-I.3 will provide the actions to address NI-136B could not be opened. ECA-1.3 the cavitation Answer C Discussion Plausible: 1IB B NI pump will receive suction flow from the IIA A ND pump discharge. The student may believe ECA 1.1 will provide the mitigative actions to address cavitation Answer D Discussion Correct: IB NI pump will receive suction flow from the lAIA ND pump discharge. Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided ~ Developed es1.3 D 0 OPT Approved eca1.1 ecal.3 D 0 OPS Approved D 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1699GEN2.4 2.4.20 KA desc Emergency Procedures I/ Plan Knowledge of the operational implications ofEOP warnings, cautions, and notes. (CFR: 41.10 I 43.5 145.13) 41.10/43.5/45.13) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 198 of 200 FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QuestionBank # IKA system 1700 I I GEN2.4 IKA number I 2.4.50 I I QUESTION 100 c KA desc Procedures / Plan Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual. (CFR: Emergency Procedures! 41.10/43.5/45.3) 41.10! 43.5! 45.3) Unit 1 is in Mode 5 after refueling. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

The control room receives a 4911 emergency call reporting an explosion in Unit 1 containment

Operators note VCT level decreasing and estimate NC leakage to be 22 gpm

1RAD-1, A/2 (1 EMF-39 Containment Gas Hi Rad) is LIT

1RAD-3, E/2 (1 EMF 22 594 KK,53 VP Filter) is LIT and indicates 5200 mR/hr mRlhr

NC system is in a "Loops Filled" condition

Both trains of SSPS are in "TEST"

Security has confirmed the explosion in containment was an act of sabotage

1. Based on the above conditions, how would this event be classified?

2. What operator action is required prior to clearing the 1EMF-39 trip 2 alarm?

Reference provided A. 1. Stte Site Area Emergency

2. Initiate Containment Closure B. 1. Alert

2. Initiate Containment Closure C. 1. Site Area Emergency

2. Secure VP per the operating procedure D. 1. Alert

2. Secure VP per the operating procedure Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 199 of 200

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2009 SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 100 c General Discussion The event is classified as a Site Area Emergency (4.6.S.1-3) due to confirmed sabotage. This would otherwise be classified as an Alert (4.3.A.3-

3) based on the dose rates associated with lEMF-22.

of~SPS are in test. To The reactor coolant leak results in lEMF-39 trip 2 alarm. lEMF-39 will send a direct signal to trip VP even ifboth trains of;SSPS prevent an automatic restart ofVP following the lEMF-39 trip 2, VP must be secured by procedure. Containment closure would be initiated if the NC system was in a loops not filled condition Answer A Discussion Plausible: Site Area Emergency is correct. Containment closure would be initiated ifNC was in a loops not filled condition Answer B Discussion Plausible: The student may believe the correct classification is alert due to the VP filter EMF reading and that containment closure should be initiated as the required action Answer C Discussion Correct: Site area Emergency is correct per 4.6.S.1-3. VP is secured per the OP to prevent automatic restart on reset of lEMF-39 trip 2 Answer D Discussion Plausible: The student may believe the correct classification is alert due to the VP filter EMF reading. VP is secured per the OP to prevent automatic restart on reset of lEMF-39 trip 2 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided D Developed lRAD-l and lRAD-3 IRAD-3 Annunc resp RP/OIA/50001001 (Classification of RP/OIN5000/001 ~ OPT Approved RP/OI Emergency) Enclosure 1 VP D OPS Approved D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 17001GEN2.4 2 .4.50 112.4.50 11 KA desc Emergency Procedures I Plan Ability to verify verifY system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual. (CFR: 41.10 I 43.5 145.3) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 200 of 200

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