ML15181A232

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Initial Exam 2015-301 Final SRO Written Exam
ML15181A232
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/30/2015
From:
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety II
To:
References
Download: ML15181A232 (144)


Text

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 1 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 entered EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.1, (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation) following a LOCA outside containment
  • Safety Injection Termination criteria is NOT met o The crew has been directed to determine minimum SI flow per Enclosure 4 (Minimum S/I Flowrate Versus Time After Trip)

Current conditions:

  • The Unit 1 Reactor was tripped 60 minutes ago
  • NCS pressure is 1000 psig.
  • 1B NI pump is running with flow indicated at 380 gpm
  • 1A NV pump is running with flow indicated at 400 gpm The MINIMUM S/I Flowrate required to remove current reactor decay heat is _____(1)_____.

The _____(2)_____ pump is required to be secured.

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. 340 gpm

2. 1A NV B. 1. 340 gpm
2. 1B NI C. 1. 360 gpm
2. 1A NV D. 1. 360 gpm
2. 1B NI Page 1 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 2 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • The crew has just completed the actions of EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) following a Safety Injection due to Hi Containment Pressure
  • NV pump flow to the NC system Cold Legs is 390 GPM
  • NC system pressure is 1350 PSIG and STABLE
  • SG pressures are 1092 PSIG and STABLE
  • NC system subcooling on the ICCM is 22°F and STABLE Per the requirements of EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Enclosure 1 (Foldout Page), the crew

_____(1)_____ be required to secure NC pumps.

Upon transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-1 (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant),

Steam Generators _____(2)_____ be required for heat removal.

A. 1. will

2. will B. 1. will
2. will NOT C. 1. will NOT
2. will D. 1. will NOT
2. will NOT Page 2 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 3 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is in Mode 3
  • Rod control is capable of rod withdrawal.
  • NC loops 1A, 1B, and 1D are in operation.
  • 1A NC Pump lower bearing temperature is currently 190ºF and increasing 5ºF per minute (1) 1A NC Pump lower bearing temperature will reach trip setpoint in (2) What is the specified Completion Time of the action required by TS 3.4.5 (RCS Loops - MODE 3) following the trip of 1A NCP?

A. 1. 7 minutes

2. immediately B. 1. 7 minutes
2. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> C. 1. 1 minute
2. immediately D. 1. 1 minute
2. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Page 3 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 4 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 refueling is in progress
  • NC level is at 98%
  • 1B ND is in service
  • 1AD-9 B/6 ND Trn B to NC C-Legs Loops A-B Lo Flow alarms
  • The BOP notes the following amperage indication The crew will enter _____(1)_____ of AP/1/A/5500/019 (Loss of Residual Heat Removal System).

Once 1A ND is placed in service, the requirements of T.S. 3.9.4 (Residual Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level) _____(2)_____ met.

A. 1. Case II (Leak in ND)

2. are B. 1. Case II (Leak in ND)
2. are NOT C. 1. Case III (Loss of ND with Large Vent Path Established)
2. are D. 1. Case III (Loss of ND with Large Vent Path Established)
2. are NOT Page 4 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 5 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% RTP
  • 1A1 KC Pump is in service
  • 1B NV Pump is in service
  • OAC Alarm C1D2215 (KC Train A Low-Low Level Surge Tank Isol) is actuated due to an instrument failure Following the receipt of the OAC alarm, and assuming no operator action:

1RN-291 (KC Hx 1A Outlet Throttle Valve) will throttle in the _____(1)_____

direction in order to maintain KC system temperature.

1B NV Pump motor bearing temperatures will _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. open

2. increase B. 1. open
2. remain constant C. 1. closed
2. increase D. 1. closed
2. remain constant Page 5 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 6 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% RTP
  • A DCS malfunction has caused an Alternate Action on SPP-1 (Selected PZR Pressure-1)

Subsequently:

  • The Reactor does NOT trip automatically or manually
  • The crew has entered EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1 (Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS)

As NC pressure increases, 1NC-32B (PZR PORV) _____(1)_____

automatically open.

FR-S.1 contains guidance to ensure PZR pressure remains below the PORV setpoint in order to _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. will

2. ensure sufficient boration flow B. 1. will
2. prevent challenging PZR Safety Valves C. 1. will NOT
2. ensure sufficient boration flow D. 1. will NOT
2. prevent challenging PZR Safety Valves Page 6 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 7 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 Reactor has experienced a Safety Injection due to Low PZR Pressure
  • The CRS has just completed reading the immediate action steps of EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)
  • The following EMFs are in Trip 2 condition:

o 1EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) o 1EMF-71 (S/G A Leakage) o 1EMF-74 (S/G D Leakage) o 1EMF-26 (Steam Line 1A)

  • 1A S/G NR level is 35%
  • 1B, 1C and 1D S/G NR levels are 23%
  • Total CA flow is approximately 1000 gpm
  • The RO has depressed the CA SYS VLV CTRL TRN A and CA SYS VLV CTRL TRN B reset buttons
  • CA SYS VLV CTRL TRN A reset light is DARK
  • CA SYS VLV CTRL TRN B reset light is LIT CA flow to 1A S/G using the flow control valve _____(1)_____ under operator control EP/1/A/5000/E-0 _____(2)_____ require isolation of CA flow to the 1A S/G at this time.

A. 1. is

2. does B. 1. is
2. does NOT C. 1. is NOT
2. does D. 1. is NOT
2. does NOT Page 7 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 8 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • A seismic event has resulted in the following:

o 2A S/G has experienced a complete shear of the Main Steam line at the S/G outlet o 2D S/G has experienced a complete shear of the Main Feed line at the S/G inlet Which Steam Generator will decrease to 0% WR level FIRST?

Procedural guidance to isolate 2D S/G is contained in _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. 2A S/G

2. EP/2/A/5000/E-1 (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant)

B. 1. 2A S/G

2. EP/2/A/5000/E-2 (Faulted Steam Generator Isolation)

C. 1. 2D S/G

2. EP/2/A/5000/E-1 (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant)

D. 1. 2D S/G

2. EP/2/A/5000/E-2 (Faulted Steam Generator Isolation)

Page 8 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 9 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Both units have experienced a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP)
  • No backup Diesel VI compressor is available
  • EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.0 (Loss of All AC Power) was implemented on Unit 1 and the crew has just transitioned to EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.1 (Loss of All AC Power Recovery Without S/I Required)

Current conditions:

  • 30 minutes have elapsed since the LOOP
  • NC Thots are STABLE
  • S/G pressures are STABLE at 725 PSIG
  • S/G levels are decreasing and approaching 11% NR
  • NC Tcolds are 490°F and STABLE
  • VI header pressure is 0 PSIG Natural Circulation flow (1) be verified In accordance with ECA-0.1, the Operators will increase CA flow (2) .

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. can

2. using flow controllers in the control room B. 1. can
2. by notifying AO to throttle CA valves locally C. 1. can NOT
2. using flow controllers in the control room D. 1. can NOT
2. by notifying AO to throttle CA valves locally Page 9 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 10 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 tripped from 100% RTP due to a Loss of Offsite Power
  • NC cooldown is currently in progress in accordance with EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.2 (Natural Circulation Cooldown)
  • The trend of NC Temperature is as follows:

Time 0800 0830 0900 NC Temperature 535ºF 495ºF 455ºF In accordance with ES-0.2:

NC Temperature will be determined by monitoring of _____(1)_____ .

At 0900, the required cooldown rate _____(2)_____ been exceeded.

A. 1. NC Tave

2. has B. 1. NC Tave
2. has NOT C. 1. NC Tcolds
2. has D. 1. NC Tcolds
2. has NOT Page 10 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 11 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% RTP
  • 1ERPA is de-energized
  • The crew has entered AP/1/A/5500/029 (Loss of Vital or Aux Control Pwr)

In accordance with AP/29, an operator will be dispatched to 1A D/G room because _____(1)_____ .

Entry conditions of AP/1/A/5500/016 (Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation System) _____(2)_____ been met.

A. 1. D/G control power has been lost

2. have B. 1. D/G control power has been lost
2. have NOT C. 1. D/G Day Tank auto makeup capability has been lost
2. have D. 1. D/G Day Tank auto makeup capability has been lost
2. have NOT Page 11 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 12 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% RTP
  • The 125 VDC/120 VAC Auxiliary Control Power System is in normal alignment
  • The supply breaker from 1CDA to Static Inverter 1KXIA trips open Alternate power to 1KXPA will be _____(1)___ aligned.

The crew can verify 1KXPA is energized by observing that _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. manually

2. NC pump vibration monitor is IN SERVICE B. 1. automatically
2. NC pump vibration monitor is IN SERVICE C. 1. manually
2. individual P-11 Channel 1 status light on 1SI-7 is LIT D. 1. automatically
2. individual P-11 Channel 1 status light on 1SI-7 is LIT Page 12 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 13 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Units 1 & 2 are at 100% RTP
  • 1A RN pump is in service
  • 1A and 2A KC trains are in service Subsequently:
  • The crew has entered AP/0/A/5500/020 (Loss of Nuclear Service Water), Case II (Loss of RN Pit Level)

Enclosure 2 (RN Valve Alignment for RN Swap to SNSWP) will direct the BOP to ensure _____(1)_____ is closed .

Following system stabilization, the BOP is directed to Ensure KC Hx Outlet Mode Switches - Properly Aligned. In response, the BOP _____(2)_____

required to reposition 1RN-291 (KC Hx 1A Outlet Throttle Valve) from its original alignment.

A. 1. 1RN-47A (RN Supply X-Over Isol)

2. is B. 1. 1RN-47A (RN Supply X-Over Isol)
2. is NOT C. 1. 1RN-48B (RN Supply X-Over Isol)
2. is D. 1. 1RN-48B (RN Supply X-Over Isol)
2. is NOT Page 13 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 14 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Both units are at 100% RTP
  • VI pressure is decreasing
  • The crew has entered AP/0/A/5500/022 (Loss of Instrument Air)

In accordance with AP/22, an operator will be dispatched to align air cylinders to operating compressors if VI pressure decreases below a MAXIMUM of

_____(1)_____ in order to _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. 60 psig

2. provide a backup VI supply B. 1. 60 psig
2. prevent compressor damage C. 1. 76 psig
2. provide a backup VI supply D. 1. 76 psig
2. prevent compressor damage Page 14 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 15 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% RTP
  • Operators are controlling the Main Generator Voltage Regulator in MANUAL
  • An electrical grid disturbance results in the Main Generator operating with a power factor of 0.8 lagging The concern with operating the Main Generator at a 0.8 lagging power factor is overheating of the generator _____(1)_____ .

If the OATC depresses the Voltage Adjust RAISE pushbutton, power factor will become _____(2)_____ lagging.

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. core end

2. more B. 1. field windings
2. more C. 1. core end
2. less D. 1. field windings
2. less Page 15 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 16 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.2 (LOCA Outside Containment) has been entered following an event Containment Phase A Isolation _____(1)_____ automatically occurred.

In accordance with ECA-1.2, the parameter used to verify that the LOCA has been isolated is _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. has NOT

2. pressurizer level B. 1. has NOT
2. NC pressure C. 1. has
2. pressurizer level D. 1. has
2. NC pressure Page 16 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 17 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 has experienced a Safety Injection due to Hi Containment Pressure
  • Containment pressure peaked at 2.7 psig and is now slowly decreasing
  • The crew has implemented EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1 (Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)
  • All attempts to restore CA flow have been unsuccessful In accordance with FR-H.1:

The NEXT source of feed water attempted for restoration of flow to the S/Gs is through the CM/CF system using _____(1)_____ .

The crew will be required to establish bleed and feed when W/R level in at least 3 S/Gs is less than a MAXIMUM level of _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. either Main Feed Water pump

2. 24%

B. 1. either Main Feed Water pump

2. 36%

C. 1. Hotwell and Booster pumps

2. 24%

D. 1. Hotwell and Booster pumps

2. 36%

Page 17 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 18 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Which of the following is a complete list of the reasons for the reactor operator performing a controlled depressurization of the Steam Generators (SGs) during the performance of EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.1, (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)?

List of Reasons

1. Minimize NC dilution potential in case of a subsequent tube rupture
2. To establish conditions for injection of the Cold Leg accumulators
3. Minimize reactor coolant flow from the LOCA
4. To establish conditions for ND system operation A. 1 and 2 ONLY B. 3 and 4 ONLY C. 1, 2, and 3 ONLY D. 2, 3, and 4 ONLY Page 18 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 19 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • The crew is responding to a continuous rod withdrawal on Unit 1 per AP/1/A/5500/015 Case 2, Continuous Rod Motion
  • Control rods have been placed in manual and rod motion has stopped
  • Boron is being added with 1A boric acid transfer pump to return Tavg to Tref Subsequently:
  • 1ETA experiences a loss of power
  • The blackout sequencer re-energized 1ETA Which choice states the minimum action(s), if any, required to be completed before the operator can secure the 1A boric acid transfer pump using its control switch?

A. Reset the 1A diesel generator sequencer and then reset the 1A boric acid transfer pump B. Reset the 1A diesel generator sequencer C. Reset the 1A boric acid transfer pump D. No additional actions are required Page 19 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 20 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

In accordance with SLC 16.9-19 (Refueling Operations - Manipulator Crane),

the overload cutoff limit for the Reactor Building Manipulator crane is required to be less than or equal to _____(1)_____ pounds.

The reason for the manipulator crane overload limits is to prevent damage to the _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. 2900

2. Core Internals B. 1. 3250
2. Core Internals C. 1. 2900
2. Refueling Bridge D. 1. 3250
2. Refueling Bridge Page 20 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 21 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • All NC pumps are running
  • The crew is preparing to depressurize the NC system to minimize subcooling Which of the following sets of operating conditions will result in the LEAST Primary-to-Secondary leakage?

NCS Temperature NCS Pressure A. 504°F 770 PSIG B. 512°F 826 PSIG C. 516°F 855 PSIG D. 524°F 885 PSIG Page 21 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 22 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 2 is at 50% Power.
  • The crew enters AP/2/A/5500/023 (Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum) due to decreasing vacuum.

The following conditions are noted:

Time 1257 1258 1259 1300 A Cond. Vacuum 23.2 22.0 21.7 21.5 B Cond. Vacuum 24.0 22.6 21.9 21.7 C Cond. Vacuum 24.3 22.9 22.3 22.0 Based upon the above information, which of the following describes:

1) The latest time the crew must take action(s) PRIOR to exceeding the turbine trip setpoint?
2) The action(s) the crew must take?

A. 1. 1258

2. Trip the Turbine and Reactor B. 1. 1258
2. Trip the Turbine ONLY C. 1. 1259
2. Trip the Turbine and Reactor D. 1. 1259
2. Trip the Turbine ONLY Page 22 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 23 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • The Control Room has been evacuated due to toxic gas Following Control Room evacuation, per AP/1/A/5500/017 (Loss of Control Room),

which of the following completes the statements below?

Reactor shutdown condition can be verified by monitoring of _____(1)_____ .

Shutdown margin will be maintained by use of the _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. Source Range instrumentation

2. Standby Makeup Pump B. 1. Source Range instrumentation
2. Boric Acid Transfer Pumps C. 1. Wide Range Neutron instrumentation
2. Standby Makeup Pump D. 1. Wide Range Neutron instrumentation
2. Boric Acid Transfer Pumps Page 23 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 24 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

In accordance with AP/1/A/5500/018, (High Activity in Reactor Coolant) which of the following is a complete list of EMFs used to validate High Reactor Coolant Activity?

1. 1EMF-18 (NC Filter 1A)
2. 1EMF-48 (NC Sample Line Reactor Coolant)
3. 1EMF-39 (Containment Gas Hi Rad)

A. 1 ONLY B. 2 and 3 ONLY C. 1 and 2 ONLY D. 1, 2, and 3 Page 24 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 25 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

In accordance with EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.2 (Post LOCA Cooldown And Depressurization):

The crew will FIRST attempt to establish an NC system cooldown using the

_____(1)_____ .

The crew will cooldown _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. SM PORVs

2. as close as possible without exceeding 100°F in an hour B. 1. SM PORVs
2. at the maximum rate C. 1. Condenser Dumps
2. as close as possible without exceeding 100°F in an hour D. 1. Condenser Dumps
2. at the maximum rate Page 25 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 26 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Following an event, equipment failures have resulted in a RED condition on the NC Integrity CSF Status Tree.
  • NC Cooldown rate was approximately 220°F per hour
  • NC System temperature is currently 240°F
  • The crew is performing a soak in accordance with EP/1/A/5000/FR-P.1 (Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition).

Which of the following actions is permitted by FR-P.1 during the soak?

A. Energize PZR heaters B. Start an additional NV Pump C. Place Auxiliary Spray in service D. Initiate a cooldown at less than 50°F per hour Page 26 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 27 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 has experienced an event
  • Containment pressure is 2.8 psig
  • Containment radiation is indicating 30 R/Hr
  • Containment sump level is 17 feet Entry requirements for _____(1)_____ are currently met.

TS 3.3.3 (Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation) requires operability of

_____(2)_____ .

A. 1. EP/1/A/5000/FR-Z.2 (Response to Containment Flooding)

2. Containment Radiation Instruments ONLY B. 1. EP/1/A/5000/FR-Z.2 (Response to Containment Flooding)
2. Containment Radiation AND Containment Sump Water Level Instruments C. 1. EP/1/A/5000/FR-Z.3 (Response to High Containment Radiation Level)
2. Containment Radiation Instruments ONLY D. 1. EP/1/A/5000/FR-Z.3 (Response to High Containment Radiation Level)
2. Containment Radiation AND Containment Sump Water Level Instruments Page 27 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 28 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Which of the following alarms would confirm a failure of a #2 NCP seal?

1A NCP Standpipe _____(1)_____ level alarm.

1A NCP #1 Seal Leakoff _____(2)_____ flow alarm.

A. 1. High

2. High B. 1. High
2. Low C. 1. Low
2. High D. 1. Low
2. Low Page 28 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 29 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • VCT Purge is in progress
  • 1AD-7 H/2 (VCT HI/LO Pressure) is in alarm As VCT pressure decreases, NCP #1 Seal leakoff flow will _____(1)_____ .

The Annunciator Response Procedure for 1AD-7 H/2 will direct Chemistry to

_____(2)_____ .

A. 1. decrease

2. secure VCT purge B. 1. decrease
2. increase primary sample frequency C. 1. increase
2. secure VCT purge D. 1. increase
2. increase primary sample frequency Page 29 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 30 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

The 1A Boric Acid Transfer Pump receives power from __________ .

A. SMXG B. 1EMXA C. 1EMXG D. 1MXW Page 30 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 31 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • The Unit 1 NC system is currently SOLID in Mode 5
  • 1A ND is in service
  • 1B ND is secured
  • ND Letdown is in service
  • The BOP has been directed to perform a 10ºF heatup To commence heatup, the BOP will manually operate _____(1)_____ .

In order to prevent exceeding LTOP limits during the heatup, the BOP will throttle 1NV-135 (ND Flow to Letdown HX) in the _____(2)_____ direction.

A. 1. 1ND-26 (ND HX 1A Outlet CTRL)

2. open B. 1. 1ND-26 (ND HX 1A Outlet CTRL)
2. closed C. 1. 1ND-27 (ND HX 1A Bypass CTRL)
2. open D. 1. 1ND-27 (ND HX 1A Bypass CTRL)
2. closed Page 31 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 32 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • The crew is performing EP/1/A/5000/E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture) following a Unit 1 event o 1B S/G has been isolated per EP/1/A/5000/E-3 o A plant cooldown has been initiated o The crew is preparing to depressurize the NC system o ALL NC pumps are in service During NC cooldown, 1B NC Hot Leg Temperature (Thot) will be _____(1)_____

1C NC Hot Leg (Thot) Temperature.

During NC depressurization 1NC-27 (PZR Spray Ctrl Frm Loop A) will be

_____(2)_____ effective than 1NC-29 (PZR Spray Ctrl Frm Loop B)

A. 1. equal to

2. less B. 1. higher than
2. less C. 1. equal to
2. more D. 1. higher than
2. more Page 32 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 33 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is in the process of drawing a bubble in the Pressurizer
  • The following step is taken from OP/1/A/6100/001 (Controlling Procedure For Unit Startup) following actions to vent Nitrogen from the PZR as the bubble is formed:

In order to determine when Nitrogen venting is complete, the operators will verify _____(1)_____ .

If necessary to lower PRT pressure following this evolution, PRT level will be decreased by draining to the _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. PRT temperature equalizes with PZR steam space temperature

2. Reactor Coolant Drain Tank B. 1. PRT temperature equalizes with PZR steam space temperature
2. Containment Floor and Equipment Sump C. 1. PRT level increases without a corresponding PRT pressure increase
2. Reactor Coolant Drain Tank D. 1. PRT level increases without a corresponding PRT pressure increase
2. Containment Floor and Equipment Sump Page 33 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 34 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • A Unit 1 event has occurred
  • Containment pressure peaked at 3.2 psig The non-essential KC headers were automatically isolated by the

_____(1)_____ signal.

Based on this alignment, Spent Fuel Pool temperature will _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. Phase A

2. increase B. 1. Phase A
2. decrease C. 1. Phase B
2. increase D. 1. Phase B
2. decrease Page 34 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 35 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% RTP
  • A slight cooldown of the NC system causes the "C" PZR heaters to be full "on"
  • A malfunction of two PZR pressure transmitters causes an Alternate Action to occur on the Pressurizer Pressure Control System Assuming NO operator actions:

The PZR Pressure Master will be in _____(1)_____ control AND C Heaters _____(2)_____ be energized.

A. 1. Manual

2. will B. 1. Manual
2. will NOT C. 1. Automatic
2. will D. 1. Automatic
2. will NOT Page 35 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 36 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 2 is at 100% RTP
  • 2B Pressurizer heaters are manually energized to promote mixing following unit start-up
  • All plant parameters are at equilibrium
  • A fault causes breaker 2LXH-6C (2B NC PZR Heater Power Panel PHP2B Feeder) to OPEN.
1) How will the output of the pressurizer master control change?
2) What is the systems response to the loss of heat input?

A. 1. Increase

2. Pressurizer Spray Valves will close prior to A & D Pressurizer Heaters energizing B. 1. Decrease
2. Pressurizer Spray Valves will close prior to A & D Pressurizer Heaters energizing C. 1. Increase
2. A & D Pressurizer Heaters will energize prior to Pressurizer Spray Valves closing D. 1. Decrease
2. A & D Pressurizer Heaters will energize prior to Pressurizer Spray Valves closing Page 36 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 37 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Which of the following describes the impact on the Reactor Protection System for a loss of 125 VDC Panelboard 1EPA or 1EPD?

A. SSPS Logic Bay has lost one of two power supplies B. SSPS Output Bay has lost one of two power supplies C. The associated Reactor Trip Breaker cannot be opened by the UV trip D. The associated Reactor Trip Breaker cannot be opened by the Shunt trip Page 37 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 38 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Which of the following describes features of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) which are designed to prevent spurious actuations?

A loss of a MAXIMUM of _____(1)_____ Vital I&C channel(s) will NOT result in an actuation.

Hi Containment Pressure Safety Injection signal logic requires _____(2)_____

channels above setpoint for actuation.

A. 1. one

2. 2 of 3 B. 1. one
2. 2 of 4 C. 1. two
2. 2 of 3 D. 1. two
2. 2 of 4 Page 38 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 39 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • An accident has occurred on Unit 1 The Containment Air Return Fans will start _____(1)_____ following receipt of an Sp signal.

In order to open, Containment Air Return Dampers require differential pressure to be less than or equal to a MAXIMUM of _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. 10 seconds

2. 0.5 psid B. 1. 10 seconds
2. 0.9 psid C. 1. 9 minutes
2. 0.5 psid D. 1. 9 minutes
2. 0.9 psid Page 39 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 40 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Under normal conditions, Containment Ventilation Units are cooled by the

_____(1)_____ system.

Containment Ventilation cooling water supply is isolated by a _____(2)_____

signal.

A. 1. YV

2. Phase A B. 1. YV
2. Phase B C. 1. RN
2. Phase A D. 1. RN
2. Phase B Page 40 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 41 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • A Unit 1 event has occurred
  • NC System pressure is 1940 PSIG and lowering slowly
  • Containment pressure is 2.3 PSIG and rising slowly NF (ICE CONDENSER) system valve(s) will receive a signal to CLOSE.

COMPONENT LEGEND:

1NF-228A (Glycol Sup Cont Isol Otsd) 1NF-233B (Glycol Ret Cont Isol) 1NF-234A (Glycol Ret Cont Isol)

A. 1NF-233B ONLY B. 1NF-228A and 1NF-233B ONLY C. 1NF-228A and 1NF-234A ONLY D. 1NF-228A, 1NF-233B and 1NF-234A Page 41 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 42 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

The bistables required to permit Containment Spray Pump operation will

_____(1)_____ to actuate. Once started, the NS pumps will secure on decreasing containment pressure at _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. energize

2. 0.9 psig B. 1. energize
2. 0.35 psig C. 1. de-energize
2. 0.9 psig D. 1. de-energize
2. 0.35 psig Page 42 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 43 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • A Unit 1 reactor trip has occurred due to a secondary system malfunction
  • EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) has been performed and a transition has been made to EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1 (Reactor Trip Response)
  • The crew has entered EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.2 (Response to Steam Generator Overpressure)
  • The crew is preparing to dump steam from the affected S/G FR-H.2 will only allow steam release from the affected S/G if NR level is less than a MAXIMUM of _____(1)_____ .

If the maximum level has been exceeded, an evaluation must be performed prior to release due to the potential effects of _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. 83%

2. steamline water hammer B. 1. 92%
2. steamline water hammer C. 1. 83%
2. condenser tube damage D. 1. 92%
2. condenser tube damage Page 43 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 44 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 2 is at 100% RTP Subsequently:
  • 2A CFPT tripped
  • All S/G levels remain within a 48%-52% band for the 30 seconds following the CFPT trip If reactor power was greater than a MINIMUM of _____(1)_____ prior to the event, S/G level control setpoints will change to a lower specific value for a period of _____(2)_____ prior to ramping back to the normal programmed value.

A. 1. 56%

2. 6 minutes B. 1. 65%
2. 6 minutes C. 1. 56%
2. 10 minutes D. 1. 65%
2. 10 minutes Page 44 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 45 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% RTP The Steam Generator Water Level Control system will automatically runback CFPTs at 3% per minute if _____(1)_____ until the condition is cleared.

In order to ensure 1B CFPT assumes MORE load than 1A, CFPT BIAS must be adjusted _____(2)_____ than 0%

A. 1. CFPT speed exceeds 6226 rpm

2. greater B. 1. CFPT speed exceeds 6226 rpm
2. less C. 1. CF Header Pressure exceeds 1300 psig
2. greater D. 1. CF Header Pressure exceeds 1300 psig
2. less Page 45 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 46 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • A Unit 1 event has occurred
  • Containment pressure 4.5 psig
  • No Containment EMFs are in alarm
  • The crew has entered EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

S/G 1A 1B 1C 1D NR Level 28% increasing 26% increasing 9% decreasing 24% increasing CA Flow 225 gpm 200 gpm 250 gpm 150 gpm Prior to being given specific S/G level control guidance by the CRS, the OATC can reduce feed flow to non-faulted S/Gs when level reaches _____(1)_____ .

Following completion of Enclosure 1 (Foldout Page) actions, S/G

_____(2)_____ will be receiving the highest CA flow rate.

A. 1. 29%

2. 1A B. 1. 29%
2. 1D C. 1. 39%
2. 1A D. 1. 39%
2. 1D Page 46 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 47 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Which of the following describes how the concern for potential feed line voiding and water hammer in the discharge piping of the CA pumps is addressed?

If a _____(1)_____ condition exists, an OAC alarm is generated.

To mitigate this condition, the operators will _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. high pressure

2. run the CA pump to flush and reseat the CA pump discharge check valve B. 1. high temperature
2. run the CA pump to flush and reseat the CA pump discharge check valve C. 1. high temperature
2. operate 1CF-105 (S/G Tempering Flow Supply Throttle) to increase tempering flow D. 1. high pressure
2. operate 1CF-105 (S/G Tempering Flow Supply Throttle) to increase tempering flow Page 47 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 48 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% RTP
  • Battery Charger 1ECC needs to be removed from service for maintenance
  • Standby Charger 1ECS will be aligned to supply Distribution Center 1EDC In accordance with OP/1/A/6350/008 (125V/120VAC Vital Instrument and Control Power System), 1ECS must be powered from _____(1)_____ . This power supply alignment is required in Modes _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. 1EMXA

2. 1 - 4 B. 1. 1EMXA
2. 1 - 6 C. 1. 1EMXJ
2. 1 - 4 D. 1. 1EMXJ
2. 1 - 6 Page 48 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 49 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 2 is in Mode 4 performing a cooldown for refueling
  • Train 2A ND is in service
  • ND flow is stable at 3400 gpm Which of the following describes:
1) the effect on NC cooldown rate of losing power to Vital DC Bus 2EPA; AND
2) what action the operator will take to restore the desired cooldown rate per AP/2/A/5500/029 (Loss of Vital or Aux Control Power)?

A. 1. Rate INCREASES

2. Manually adjust setpoint of 2ND-26 (ND HX 2A OUTLET CTRL)

B. 1. Rate DECREASES

2. Place PWR DISCON FOR 2NI-173A switch to THROT and manually control 2NI-173A C. 1. Rate INCREASES
2. Place PWR DISCON FOR 2NI-173A switch to THROT and manually control 2NI-173A D. 1. Rate DECREASES
2. Manually adjust setpoint of 2ND-26 (ND HX 2A OUTLET CTRL)

Page 49 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 50 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% RTP Subsequently:
  • A Blackout of 1ETA occurs
  • While loading, the Accelerated Sequence halts at Load Group 2 Assuming D/G voltage and speed permissives are met, the Accelerated Sequence _____(1)_____ re-initiate once the Committed Sequence completes Load Group 2.

Following completion of all Load Groups, the sequencer _____(2)_____ need to be reset in order to start the 1A KF Pump.

A. 1. will

2. does B. 1. will
2. does NOT C. 1. will NOT
2. does D. 1. will NOT
2. does NOT Page 50 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 51 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Concerning the operation of 1EMF-46A (Component Cooling Water):

When a Trip 2 alarm is received, 1KC-122 (KC Surge Tank Vent)

_____________ automatically close.

When the associated KC train pumps are NOT running, the EMF loss of flow alarm ________________ blocked from being received in the control room.

A. 1. will

2. is B. 1. will
2. is NOT C. 1. will NOT
2. is D. 1. will NOT
2. is NOT Page 51 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 52 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Per EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.3 (Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation), Enclosure 2 (Aligning NS for Recirculation), in order to provide cooling to the Containment Spray (NS) Heat Exchanger, the operator will align _____(1)_____ at a flowrate less than the MAXIMUM of _____(2)_____.

A. 1. RN

2. 5000 gpm B. 1. RN
2. 4650 gpm C. 1. KC
2. 5000 gpm D. 1. KC
2. 4650 gpm Page 52 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 53 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • The BOP is currently performing actions of EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.3 (Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation), Enclosure 2 (Aligning NS for Recirculation)
  • Containment pressure is 6 psig
  • Containment sump level is 5 feet Upon opening 1NS-18A (NS Pump A Suct From Cont Sump), Containment Integrity status will change to _____(1)_____ .

In order to return Containment Integrity status to a Yellow condition, the BOP will be required to _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. red

2. start 1A NS pump ONLY B. 1. orange
2. start 1A NS pump ONLY C. 1. red
2. start 1A NS pump and align 1A NS HX cooling water flow D. 1. orange
2. start 1A NS pump and align 1A NS HX cooling water flow Page 53 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 54 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 and 2 are operating at 100% RTP
  • AP/0/A/5500/022 (Loss of Instrument Air) has been entered due to decreasing VI header pressure
  • Attempts to restore VI pressure have been unsuccessful Subsequently:
  • Both units are tripped per direction of AP/22
  • VI Pressure continues to decrease Per OMP 1-7 (Emergency/Abnormal Procedure Implementation Guidelines), the actions of AP/22 will be continued _____(1)_____ .

As VI pressure decreases, AP/22 will FIRST dispatch operators to manually control _____(2)_____ .

Procedure Legend:

EP/1(2)/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

EP/1(2)/A/5000/ES-0.1 (Reactor Trip Response)

A. 1. following actions to control key plant parameters in ES-0.1

2. CA feed flow B. 1. following actions to control key plant parameters in ES-0.1
2. NV charging flow C. 1. IMMEDIATELY following completion of Immediate Actions in E-0
2. CA feed flow D. 1. IMMEDIATELY following completion of Immediate Actions in E-0
2. NV charging flow Page 54 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 55 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • A Unit 1 event has occurred
  • Containment pressure is 3.8 psig and slowly decreasing
  • SI has not been reset
  • Containment isolation signals have not been reset In order to re-establish Instrument Air to Containment:

Safety Injection _____(1)_____ required to be RESET.

Phase B _____(2)_____ required to be RESET.

A. 1. is

2. is B. 1. is
2. is NOT C. 1. is NOT
2. is D. 1. is NOT
2. is NOT Page 55 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 56 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 50% RTP
  • Control Bank D is at 195 steps withdrawn Subsequently:
  • STIP-1 (Selected Turbine Impulse Pressure Input to Reactor Control System) fails to the 100% value Assuming no operator action, Control Bank D will __________ .

A. withdraw 5 steps B. withdraw 36 steps C. remain at 195 steps D. withdraw until Reactor Power reaches 103%

Page 56 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 57 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 tripped from 100% RTP due to a loss of Offsite Power.
  • The crew has transitioned to EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.3 (Natural Circulation Cooldown With Steam Void In Vessel) due to void formation in the Vessel Head
  • All PZR Heaters are OFF Under these conditions, if charging flow is greater than letdown flow, PZR level will _____(1)_____ .

Vessel UR Level must be maintained greater than 68% in order prevent

_____(2)_____ .

A. 1. decrease

2. fuel uncovery B. 1. decrease
2. void entry into hot legs C. 1. increase
2. fuel uncovery D. 1. increase
2. void entry into hot legs Page 57 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 58 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% RTP Consider each statement separately If AFD exceeds specified limits, the OATC will be notified by an alarm on the

_____(1)_____ .

If the AFD monitor function is not available, T.S. 3.2.3 (Axial Flux Difference) requires _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. Operator Aid Computer

2. a power reduction to <50%

B. 1. Operator Aid Computer

2. manual logging of % delta flux C. 1. Detector Current Comparator
2. a power reduction to <50%

D. 1. Detector Current Comparator

2. manual logging of % delta flux Page 58 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 59 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Containment Hydrogen Recombiners receive power from a(n) _____(1)_____

Motor Control Center.

Containment Hydrogen Recombiners should not be placed in service if Containment Hydrogen concentration is greater than or equal to a MAXIMUM of

_____(2)_____ .

A. 1. unit

2. 4%

B. 1. unit

2. 6%

C. 1. essential

2. 4%

D. 1. essential

2. 6%

Page 59 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 60 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 has tripped from 100% power
  • 1A Rx Trip Breaker is OPEN
  • 1B Rx Trip Breaker is CLOSED The MAXIMUM NC temperature at which all Steam Dumps will be fully closed is

_____(1)_____ degrees F.

Atmospheric Dumps _____(2)_____ operate following the Reactor Trip.

A. 1. 557

2. will B. 1. 557
2. will NOT C. 1. 560
2. will D. 1. 560
2. will NOT Page 60 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 61 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% power.
  • Generator Breaker 1A spuriously opens.
  • The ONLY annunciator associated with the Turbine or Generator that alarms is:

 1AD-11, F/1, GEN BKR B OVERCURRENT Which of the following describes:

1) another annunciator which SHOULD have alarmed; AND
2) a manual action required for mitigating these conditions?

A. 1. 1AD-1, F/4, TURB RUNBACK INITIATED

2. Manually initiate a turbine runback to 48%

B. 1. 1AD-1, F/4, TURB RUNBACK INITIATED

2. Manually trip Generator Breaker 1B C. 1. 1AD-11, F/7, GEN BKR B TROUBLE
2. Manually initiate a turbine runback to 48%

D. 1. 1AD-11, F/7, GEN BKR B TROUBLE

2. Manually trip Generator Breaker 1B Page 61 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 62 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% RTP
  • A S/G tube leak has developed If 1EMF-33 exceeds the _____(1)_____ setpoint, the BOP will ensure the

_____(2)_____ system AUTOMATICALLY re-aligns (assuming NO operator action).

A. 1. Trip 1

2. S/G Blowdown (BB)

B. 1. Trip 1

2. Condenser Offgas (ZJ)

C. 1. Trip 2

2. S/G Blowdown (BB)

D. 1. Trip 2

2. Condenser Offgas (ZJ)

Page 62 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 63 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • The Condensate System is aligned for High Pressure Cleanup Subsequently:
  • The 1A CFPT experiences a complete loss of oil pressure due to an LF Pump trip The windmill protection circuit will send a direct signal to trip the operating

_____(1)_____ .

Low CFPT oil pressure will cause the 1A CFPT _____(2)_____ to close.

A. 1. Hotwell Pumps

2. recirc valve B. 1. Hotwell Pumps
2. discharge valve C. 1. Condensate Booster Pumps
2. recirc valve D. 1. Condensate Booster Pumps
2. discharge valve Page 63 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 64 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% RTP
  • 1EMF-53A (Containment Hi Range) loses power As a result of this power failure:

1A1 Cont Floor & Equip Sump Pump is _____(1)_____ .

Entry in the action statement of Tech Spec 3.3.3 (Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation) _____(2)_____ required.

A. 1. ON

2. is B. 1. ON
2. is NOT C. 1. OFF
2. is D. 1. OFF
2. is NOT Page 64 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 65 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 4% RTP following startup o Main Turbine warming is in progress o 1A CFPT is in service o 1B CFPT is Tripped o All S/G levels are 39%
  • The crew has entered AP/1/A/5500/023 (Loss of Condenser Vacuum) due to a loss of Condenser Circulating Water (RC) Pumps Subsequently:
  • 1A CFPT trips on low vacuum actuation The OATC _____(1)_____ required to trip the reactor.

1A and 1B CA pumps _____(2)_____ automatically start.

A. 1. is

2. will B. 1. is
2. will NOT C. 1. is NOT
2. will D. 1. is NOT
2. will NOT Page 65 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 66 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Note the table below from SLC 16.5-3, Chemistry (excerpt).

PARAMETER STEADY STATE LIMIT TRANSIENT LIMIT Dissolved Oxygen = 0.10 ppm = 1.00 ppm Chloride = 0.15 ppm = 1.50 ppm Fluoride = 0.15 ppm = 1.50 ppm

1) In accordance with SLC 16.5-3 (Chemistry), Fluoride is a _____(1)_____

chemistry parameter.

2) In accordance with the applicable abnormal operating procedure, if dissolved oxygen were at a value in Action Level 3, a shutdown to Mode 3 would be required in a MAXIMUM of _____(2)_____ hours.

A. 1. Primary

2. 3 B. 1. Primary
2. 24 C. 1. Secondary
2. 3 D. 1. Secondary
2. 24 Page 66 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 67 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% RTP
  • 1AD-7 C/4 NCP Seal Water Lo Flow alarms o The OAC indicates 1B NCP Seal Injection Flow is 0 gpm In order to determine that seal water flow to the 1B NCP has been isolated, the BOP would verify an increase in flow on _____(1)_____ .

Following an actual loss of seal injection flow, the BOP _____(2)_____ expect to receive OAC alarm C1A0831 NC Pump B Lower Brg Water Temp Hi-Hi.

A. 1. 1NVP5650 (Total Seal Wtr Flow)

2. will B. 1. 1NVP5650 (Total Seal Wtr Flow)
2. will NOT C. 1. 1NVP5330 (NCP 1A Seal In Flow)
2. will D. 1. 1NVP5330 (NCP 1A Seal In Flow)
2. will NOT Page 67 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 68 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • During an outage, a planned maintenance activity will result in a YELLOW Defense in Depth (DID) sheet configuration.

In accordance with NSD 403 (Shutdown Risk Management):

Defense in Depth (DID) sheets are first initiated once _____(1)_____is reached on a shutdown.

A RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN is _____(2)_____ for a YELLOW risk condition.

A. 1. Mode 3

2. optional B. 1. Mode 3
2. required C. 1. Mode 4
2. optional D. 1. Mode 4
2. required Page 68 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 69 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is in Mode 3 In accordance with Tech Spec 2.1.2 (RCS Pressure Safety Limit), NC system pressure shall be less than or equal to a MAXIMUM of _____(1)_____ PSIG.

Based on the conditions above, if the NC system Safety Limit is exceeded, NC system pressure must be restored to within limits in a MAXIMUM of

_____(2)_____ .

A. 1. 2485

2. 5 minutes B. 1. 2735
2. 5 minutes C. 1. 2485
2. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> D. 1. 2735
2. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Page 69 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 70 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is in Mode 6
  • A fuel handling accident involving fuel damage occurs o 1EMF-17 (Reactor Building Refueling Bridge) is in alarm In accordance with AP/1/A/5500/025 (Damaged Spent Fuel), additional radiation monitoring will be provided by _____(1)_____ .

If this radiation monitor reaches Trip 2 setpoint, the Containment Evacuation Alarm _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. 1EMF-53A/B (Containment Train A/B)

2. will AUTOMATICALLY actuate B. 1. 1EMF-53A/B (Containment Train A/B)
2. must be MANUALLY actuated C. 1. 1EMF-38 (Containment Particulate Monitor)
2. will AUTOMATICALLY actuate D. 1. 1EMF-38 (Containment Particulate Monitor)
2. must be MANUALLY actuated Page 70 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 71 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is in Mode 3.
  • The NV system is being aligned for startup.
  • The procedure in use requires independent verification of a single valve located in a room with a general dose rate of 130 mREM/hr.
  • Estimated time to independently verify the valve's position is 10 minutes.
  • There are no known hot spots in the area.
  • There is no airborne activity in this room.
  • The room has no surface contamination areas.
  • Necessary approvals are obtained.

Per NSD 700 (Verification Techniques), independent verification of the valve above _____(1)_____ be waived because _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. may

2. the general area dose rate is GREATER than 100 mREM/hr B. 1. may NOT
2. the general area dose rate is LESS THAN 1 REM/hr C. 1. may
2. the radiation exposure for a single verification would EXCEED the allowable limit D. 1. may NOT
2. the radiation exposure for a single verification is WITHIN the allowable limit Page 71 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 72 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Prior to a Refueling Outage, an Operators exposure for the current year is 1250 mREM
  • The Operators first assigned task during the Refueling Outage results in a dose of 600 mREM Based on the conditions above, the next time the Operator logs on to the EDC computer, they will receive an _____(1)_____ notification flag.

In accordance with PD-RP-ALL-001 (RADIATION WORKER RESPONSIBILITIES), the Operator must _____(2)_____ prior to entering the RCA.

A. 1. ALERT

2. notify their supervisor AND obtain a dose extension B. 1. EXCLUDE
2. notify their supervisor AND obtain a dose extension C. 1. ALERT
2. notify their supervisor ONLY D. 1. EXCLUDE
2. notify their supervisor ONLY Page 72 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 73 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • A large fire was reported at the Operations Training Building
1) Which of the following describes the availability of the Fire Brigade to respond to this fire?
2) Which procedure contains the guidance for requesting offsite fire department support?

A. 1. The fire brigade is not allowed to respond to fires outside the Protected Area

2. AP/0/A/5500/045 (Plant Fire)

B. 1. The fire brigade is not allowed to respond to fires outside the Protected Area

2. RP/0/B/5000/029 (Fire Brigade Response)

C. 1. The fire brigade may respond to fires outside the Protected Area as resources permit

2. AP/0/A/5500/045 (Plant Fire)

D. 1. The fire brigade may respond to fires outside the Protected Area as resources permit

2. RP/0/B/5000/029 (Fire Brigade Response)

Page 73 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 74 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • 1A S/G has experienced a Tube Rupture
  • The crew has transitioned to EP/1/A/5000/E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture)
  • NC pressure is 1650 psig
  • The CRS has just read a series of NOTES prior to E-3, Step 10 Initiate NC System cooldown as follows:

Once the cooldown is initiated:

the OATC will dump steam while maintaining steam pressure negative rate less than 2 psig per second in order to prevent a _____(1)_____ .

if NC system subcooling is lost, the crew _____(2)_____ secure NC pumps.

A. 1. main steam isolation

2. will B. 1. main steam isolation
2. will NOT C. 1. S/G lo-lo level actuation
2. will D. 1. S/G lo-lo level actuation
2. will NOT Page 74 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 75 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • A Fire alarm has actuated in the Unit 1 CA Pump Room
  • An Operator dispatched to the area reports that there is smoke and some cables with glowing embers but, NO visible flames In accordance with AP/1/A/5500/045 (Plant Fire), this _____(1)_____ classified as an ACTIVE fire.

In accordance with RP/0/B/5000/029 (Fire Brigade Response), in addition to making an announcement on the Fire Brigade Radio and activating the Fire Brigade Pagers, a Plant PA announcement _____(2)_____ required when dispatching the Fire Brigade.

A. 1. is

2. is B. 1. is
2. is NOT C. 1. is NOT
2. is D. 1. is NOT
2. is NOT Page 75 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 76 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is in Mode 4
  • 1A and 1B CA Pumps are aligned for standby readiness
  • In service:

o 1A ND Pump o 1B NC Pump

  • Removed from service per R&R:

o 1B ND Pump o 1A, 1C, and 1D NC Pumps Subsequently:

  • 1B NCP Supply Breaker fails o The crew has entered the actions of LCO 3.4.6 (RCS Loops - Mode 4)
  • S/G Levels are as follows:

S/G 1A 1B 1C 1D NR Level 11% 14% 12% 11%

Consider each statement separately Restoring 1B ND pump _____(1)_____ allow the crew to exit the actions of LCO 3.4.6.

Restoring 1A NC pump _____(2)_____ allow the crew to exit the actions of LCO 3.4.6.

A. 1. will

2. will B. 1. will
2. will NOT C. 1. will NOT
2. will D. 1. will NOT
2. will NOT Page 76 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 77 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • The crew has entered EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1 (Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS) o Emergency Boration has been initiated Subsequently:
  • The Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers are opened locally In order to initiate Emergency Boration, a MINIMUM of _____(1)_____ NV Pump(s) must be in operation.

The crew will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) following verification that _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. one

2. the reactor is subcritical ONLY B. 1. two
2. the reactor is subcritical ONLY C. 1. one
2. SDM is verified per Reactivity Balance Procedure D. 1. two
2. SDM is verified per Reactivity Balance Procedure Page 77 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 78 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 has experienced a Loss of Offsite Power
  • 1B D/G failed to start
  • Safety Injection was initiated due to decreasing PZR level following Reactor Trip
  • Given the following parameters o All CA flow control valves are closed o All S/G pressures are approximately 1125 psig and stable o 1A S/G NR level is 67% and increasing o 1B, 1C, & 1D S/G NR levels are 39% and slowly decreasing o NC Subcooling is 8ºF and stable Which of the following describes the correct classification for this event in accordance with RP/0/A/5000/001 (Classification of Emergency)?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 4.1.S.2 B. 4.1.S.3 C. 4.1.A.1 D. 4.5.A.2 Page 78 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 79 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 was at 100% power when a total loss of onsite and offsite power occurred.

(1) Which procedure contains voltage values on essential DC busses (EDA, EDB, EDC, and EDD) requiring essential batteries (EBA, EBB, EBC, EBD) to be removed from service?

(2) After power is restored and the battery chargers are placed in service, in accordance with Tech Spec 3.8.4 (DC Sources - Operating), what is the MINIMUM voltage required for the essential batteries to be OPERABLE?

Procedure Legend:

AP/1/A/5500/007 (Loss of Normal Power)

AP/1/A/5500/029 (Loss of Vital or Aux Control Power)

A. 1. AP/07

2. 125 volts B. 1. AP/29
2. 125 volts C. 1. AP/07
2. 110 volts D. 1. AP/29
2. 110 volts Page 79 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 80 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% RTP
  • The TCC has reported that Real Time Contingency Analysis (RTCA) indicates INADEQUATE switchyard voltage
  • The crew has entered AP/1/A/5500/037 (Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances)
  • Main Generator operating conditions are as follows o Hydrogen Pressure (psig) 73 o Generator VARS 750 o Generator MW 1200 In accordance with AP/37:

the CRS will direct the OATC to _____(1)_____ .

once required jumpers are placed, both trains of offsite power

_____(2)_____ remain inoperable.

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. decrease turbine load

2. do B. 1. decrease turbine load
2. do NOT C. 1. decrease generator voltage
2. do D. 1. decrease generator voltage
2. do NOT Page 80 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 81 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • A Unit 1 event has occurred from 100% RTP
  • NC Pressure is 300 psig
  • All S/G Pressures are 700 psig
  • Containment sump level is currently 3.4 feet and slowly increasing
  • EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.3 (Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation) has been implemented
  • 1NI-185A (ND Pump 1A Cont Sump Suct) AND 1NI-184B (ND Pump 1B Cont Sump Suct) will NOT open Implementation of _____(1)_____ is required.

The implemented procedure will direct the crew to _____(2)_____ .

Procedure Legend:

EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.1 (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.3 (Containment Sump Blockage)

A. 1. ECA-1.1

2. depressurize S/Gs to cooldown the NC system B. 1. ECA-1.1
2. depressurize the NC system to increase SI flow C. 1. ECA-1.3
2. depressurize S/Gs to cooldown the NC system D. 1. ECA-1.3
2. depressurize the NC system to increase SI flow Page 81 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 82 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Unit 1 is operating at 98% power. PT/1/A/4600/001 (RCCA Movement Test) is in progress. As Control Bank D was being moved, one control rod in Control Bank D slipped to 120 steps withdrawn and stopped. Below is an incore thermocouple map one minute later.

R P N M L K J H G F E D C B A 1 576 572 576 605 546 599 611 603 2

3 605 624 BAD 569 4 597 602 609 617 5 602 625 616 614 6 563 611 611 626 623 568 7 602 606 617 620 8 561 612 634 572 626 9 619 611 613 614 10 548 610 606 613 574 11 627 BAD 610 614 12 612 599 608 622 13 620 619 576 626 562 14 540 628 613 608 614 15 BAD 622 580 Rod _____(1)_____ is misaligned.

In order to continue Mode 1 operation, Tech. Spec. 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment Limits) will require a power reduction, SDM verification, and completion of

_____(2)_____ .

A. 1. D-12

2. FNH(X,Y) surveillance ONLY B. 1. M-4
2. FNH(X,Y) surveillance ONLY C. 1. D-12
2. FNH(X,Y) AND FQ(X,Y,Z) surveillances D. 1. M-4
2. FNH(X,Y) AND FQ(X,Y,Z) surveillances Page 82 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 83 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is in Mode 6 offloading fuel
  • N-31 and N-32 are in service
  • 1A and 1B BDMS are in service Subsequently:
  • Source Range Instrument (N-31) fails The CRS _____(1)_____ required to enter the action statement of LCO 3.9.2 (Nuclear Instrumentation).

In order to meet the operability requirements of LCO 3.9.2, source range audible indication _____(2)_____ required.

A. 1. is

2. is B. 1. is
2. is NOT C. 1. is NOT
2. is D. 1. is NOT
2. is NOT Page 83 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 84 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • A Unit 1 event has occurred
  • Upon completion of step 2 of ES-1.3, the OATC reports the following Status Indicators /

Annunciators:

o Reactor Coolant Integrity Status is RED o 1AD-9 B/6 ND Trn B To C-Legs Loops A-B Lo Flow is LIT due to trip of 1B ND Pump The CRS is required to implement __________ .

Procedure Legend:

EP/1A/5000/ES-1.3 (Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation)

EP/1A/5000/FR-P.1 (Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock)

EP/1A/5000/ECA-1.1 (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

A. FR-P.1 IMMEDIATELY B. FR-P.1 at step 8 of ES-1.3 C. ECA-1.1 IMMEDIATELY D. ECA-1.1 at step 4 of ES-1.3 Page 84 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 85 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 was initially at 100% power.
  • The crew has performed and exited EP/1/A/5000/E-0, (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).
  • 1B S/G pressure is being maintained at approximately 1210 psig.

The MAXIMUM number of S/G safety relief valves (associated with 1B S/G) that did NOT function as designed is _____(1)_____ .

To mitigate this event, the CRS would enter _____(2)_____ .

Procedure Legend:

EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.2, (Response to Steam Generator Overpressure)

EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.4, (Response to Loss of Normal Steam Release Capabilities)

A. 1. 3

2. FR-H.2 B. 1. 5
2. FR-H.2 C. 1. 3
2. FR-H.4 D. 1. 5
2. FR-H.4 Page 85 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 86 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% RTP
  • Containment Pressure Channel Two has failed low
  • All required Tech Spec actions have been completed Subsequently:
  • A faulty Containment Pressure bistable has initiated a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection The faulty bistable initiating this event was associated with Containment Pressure Channel _____(1)_____ .

The CRS will direct the SI termination sequence per _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. One

2. EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

B. 1. One

2. EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 (Safety Injection Termination)

C. 1. Four

2. EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

D. 1. Four

2. EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 (Safety Injection Termination)

Page 86 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 87 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • The crew has entered EP/1/A/5000/ECA-2.1 (Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators) following a Unit 1 event
  • All attempts to close MSIVs from the Control Room have failed Subsequently:
  • The crew has reached the step (in ECA-2.1) just prior to verification of S/I termination criteria
  • 1A MSIV indicates closed on the main control board
  • 1A S/G pressure is slowly increasing In accordance with ECA-2.1, the crew is required to transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-2 (Faulted Steam Generator Isolation) _____(1)_____

based on indication of _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. immediately

2. increasing S/G pressure B. 1. following completion of S/I termination in ECA-2.1
2. increasing S/G pressure C. 1. immediately
2. MSIV closure D. 1. following completion of S/I termination in ECA-2.1
2. MSIV closure Page 87 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 88 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is in Mode 4
  • 1A ND train is in RHR
  • CA system aligned per T.S. minimum requirements Subsequently:
  • PRT level is increasing
  • PZR level is decreasing
  • PZR Relief Valve and Safety Valve Temperatures indicate 105 ºF and stable
  • AP/1/A/5500/027 (Shutdown LOCA) has been entered Following completion of applicable steps in AP/27, the CRS will transition to

_____(1)_____ .

If needed, additional heat removal capability will be available via operation of

_____(2)_____ CA Pump(s).

A. 1. AP/1/A/5500/010 (Reactor Coolant Leak)

2. one B. 1. AP/1/A/5500/010 (Reactor Coolant Leak)
2. two C. 1. AP/1/A/5500/019 (Loss of Residual Heat Removal System)
2. one D. 1. AP/1/A/5500/019 (Loss of Residual Heat Removal System)
2. two Page 88 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 89 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

1000 Both Units are at 100% RTP 1AD-11 E/7 D/G B Panel Trouble is received

 Dispatched operator reports B/1 Low Level Lube Tank in alarm

 Operator also reports leak at D/G Lube Oil Tank

 The crew enters the actions of LCO 3.8.1 (AC Sources -

Operating) 1005 The crew enters OP/0/A/6400/006C, Enclosure 4.11 and then transitions to Enclosure 4.12B 1020 Enclosure 4.12B alignment is completed At 1005 Unit 2 _____(1)_____ in LCO 3.7.8 (Nuclear Service Water System),

Condition A (One NSWS train inoperable).

At 1020 Unit 2 _____(2)_____ in LCO 3.7.8 (Nuclear Service Water System),

Condition A (One NSWS train inoperable).

Procedure Legend for OP/0/A/6400/006C (Nuclear Service Water System):

Enclosure 4.11 (Operability Actions With One RN Pump and/or Its Associated D/G Inoperable With Both Units Entering an Action Statement)

Enclosure 4.12B (Alignment For Single Pump Flow Balance Due To One Train B RN Pump and/or Its Associated D/G Inoperable)

A. 1. is

2. is B. 1. is
2. is NOT C. 1. is NOT
2. is D. 1. is NOT
2. is NOT Page 89 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 90 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • The VI system on Unit 1 has become heavily contaminated with oil
  • E VI Dryer has become clogged
  • The crew enters AP/0/A/5500/022 (Loss of Instrument Air)
  • Backup VI Compressors CANNOT be started Subsequently:
  • The VI system is restored
  • A Temporary Engineering change is required to align alternate air supply to CA Flow Control valves for system oil removal During performance of AP/22, the CRS FIRST directed operators to verify proper operation of _____(1)_____ as pressure decreased.

The required Temporary Engineering Change _____(2)_____ require a 10CFR50.59 evaluation.

A. 1. 1VI-670 (VI Dryer Auto Bypass)

2. does B. 1. 1VI-670 (VI Dryer Auto Bypass)
2. does NOT C. 1. 1VI-487 (Skid E Purge Exhaust to Atmos)
2. does D. 1. 1VI-487 (Skid E Purge Exhaust to Atmos)
2. does NOT Page 90 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 91 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% RTP
  • 1AD-9 E/1 Accum Tank A Hi/Lo Press has alarmed
  • The BOP has determined 1A Cold Leg Accumulator Pressure is low The CRS will direct a Nitrogen makeup to the 1A CLA in order to ensure the T.S. 3.5.1 (Accumulators) MINIMUM required pressure of _____(1)_____ psig is not violated.

A MINIMUM of _____(2)_____ operable CLAs will sufficiently cover the core prior to significant fuel clad melting following a LOCA.

A. 1. 585

2. Three B. 1. 585
2. Four C. 1. 678
2. Three D. 1. 678
2. Four Page 91 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 92 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% RTP
  • Channel 4 PZR Pressure has failed low
  • All required T.S. actions have been completed Subsequently:
  • 1B NC Loop Tcold experiences a power supply failure Channel 2 OTdeltaT setpoint will _____(1)_____ .

Assuming no other actions are taken, the latest time that Unit 1 will be required to reach Mode 3 is in _____(2)_____ hours.

A. 1. increase

2. 7 B. 1. decrease
2. 7 C. 1. increase
2. 78 D. 1. decrease
2. 78 Page 92 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 93 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Concerning operation of the Reactor Building Manipulator Crane:

In order to prevent dropping a fuel assembly, the load cell must indicate less than

_____(1)_____ in order to operate the Gripper.

In accordance with MP/1/A/7150/026 B (Unit 1 Reactor Manipulator Crane Operation), any Interlock bypass, not approved by procedure, requires a MINIMUM of _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. 500 lbs

2. Fuel Handling SRO approval ONLY B. 1. 500 lbs
2. Fuel Handling SRO approval AND CRS notification when bypassed and restored C. 1. 1200 lbs
2. Fuel Handling SRO approval ONLY D. 1. 1200 lbs
2. Fuel Handling SRO approval AND CRS notification when bypassed and restored Page 93 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 94 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Concerning Fuel Handling requirements:

PT/1/A/4550/001C (Refueling Communications Test) is required to be performed within a MAXIMUM of _____(1)_____ of commencing fuel movement.

In order to unlatch Control Rods per MP/0/A/7150/067 (Rod Cluster Control Assembly Drive Rod Latching & Unlatching), the Refueling SRO _____(2)_____

required to be in the Reactor Building.

A. 1. 30 minutes

2. is B. 1. 30 minutes
2. is NOT C. 1. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />
2. is D. 1. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />
2. is NOT Page 94 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 95 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is at 100% RTP
  • Unit 2 is in Mode 4 In order to meet the MINIMUM requirements of OMP 1-10 (Shift Manning and Overtime Requirements), _____(1)_____ licensed SROs will be onsite at all times.

Per NSD 200 (Work Hour Guidelines and Limits), all hours worked during a declared emergency _____(2)_____ be included in future work hour calculations.

A. 1. 4

2. will B. 1. 4
2. will NOT C. 1. 5
2. will D. 1. 5
2. will NOT Page 95 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 96 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

For high activity in the reactor coolant, to ensure that the requirements of Tech.

Spec. 3.4.16, (RCS Specific Activity) are met, the SRO is ALSO required to apply the requirements of AP/1/A/5500/018, (High Activity in Reactor Coolant) for NC System Dose Equivalent _____(1)_____ .

These RCS Specific Activity limits are based on the _____(2)_____ Design Basis Accident.

A. 1. I-131

2. LOCA outside containment B. 1. I-131
2. Steam Generator Tube Rupture C. 1. Xe-133
2. LOCA outside containment D. 1. Xe-133
2. Steam Generator Tube Rupture Page 96 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 97 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is in Mode 6
  • 1AD-4 B/1 (S/G A Level Deviation) will not illuminate. IAE has Blocked the inputs for outage related activities
  • 1AD-9 B/7 (FWST Emerg Lo Temp) will not illuminate. IAE has disconnected the associated transmitter in order to temporarily change the alarm setpoint for an upcoming test In accordance with OMP 2-31(Control Room Instrumentation Status):

OMP 2-31, Attachment 1 (TMs Affecting Control Room Annunciators) will be used to track the inoperability of _____(1)_____ .

Attachment 1 will be filed in the _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. 1AD-4 B/1

2. Ops Shift Routine Logbook B. 1. 1AD-9 B/7
2. Ops Shift Routine Logbook C. 1. 1AD-4 B/1
2. Shift Work Manager Logbook D. 1. 1AD-9 B/7
2. Shift Work Manager Logbook Page 97 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 98 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • Unit 1 is in Mode 3 following a refueling outage
  • The status of the Personnel Air Locks (PAL) is as follows:

o Upper Airlock Inner Door Operable o Upper Airlock Outer Door Operable o Lower Airlock Inner Door Inoperable o Lower Airlock Outer Door Operable

  • Repairs required are on the barrel (airlock side of the inner door)

The guidance for Containment entry, to repair the Lower Airlock Door, is contained in _____(1)_____ .

The Lower Airlock Outer Door _____(2)_____ be opened to make the repair.

A. 1. Tech. Spec. 3.6.2, (Containment Air Locks)

2. may B. 1. Tech. Spec. 3.6.2, (Containment Air Locks)
2. may NOT C. 1. Site Directive 3.1.2, (Access to Reactor Building and Areas Having High Pressure Steam Relief Devices)
2. may D. 1. Site Directive 3.1.2, (Access to Reactor Building and Areas Having High Pressure Steam Relief Devices)
2. may NOT Page 98 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 99 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

For a planned release of the contents of a Monitor Tank to the Low Pressure Service Water discharge (RL) via the Nuclear Service Water System (RN), which of the following describes a condition that would PREVENT approval of the release?

A. The pH of the contents is 8.8.

B. A boron release with a boron concentration at 480 ppm C. Planned release flowrate is 95 gpm D. RN is aligned to the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond Page 99 of 100

Catabwa Nuclear Station Question: 100 ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following:

  • A General Emergency has been declared.
  • The TSC, OSC, and EOF have NOT been activated.

In accordance with RP/0/A/5000/005 (TSC Activation Procedure):

The SM/Emergency Coordinator's responsibility of making Protective Action Recommendations _____(1)_____ be delegated.

Turnover of command and control to the TSC or EOF_____(2)_____ relieve the SM of classification, notification, and Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) responsibilities.

A. 1. can

2. does B. 1. can
2. does NOT C. 1. can NOT
2. does D. 1. can NOT
2. does NOT Page 100 of 100

Examination KEY for: ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examin Question Answer Number 1 C 2 C 3 B 4 C 5 C 6 C 7 C 8 D 9 A 10 C 11 C 12 B 13 D 14 B 15 B 16 D 17 A 18 D 19 A 20 A 21 D 22 B 23 B 24 C 25 C Printed 5/6/2015 2:51:19 PM Page 1 of 4

Examination KEY for: ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examin Question Answer Number 26 C 27 B 28 B 29 C 30 B 31 A 32 C 33 C 34 C 35 A 36 B 37 D 38 A 39 C 40 B 41 D 42 B 43 B 44 D 45 D 46 D 47 B 48 B 49 C 50 B Printed 5/6/2015 2:51:19 PM Page 2 of 4

Examination KEY for: ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examin Question Answer Number 51 C 52 B 53 D 54 B 55 C 56 A 57 B 58 B 59 D 60 D 61 A 62 C 63 A 64 D 65 C 66 A 67 D 68 C 69 B 70 C 71 C 72 B 73 D 74 B 75 C Printed 5/6/2015 2:51:19 PM Page 3 of 4

Examination KEY for: ILT15 CNS SRO NRC Examin Question Answer Number 76 B 77 A 78 B 79 B 80 C 81 A 82 D 83 D 84 B 85 C 86 C 87 A 88 C 89 B 90 C 91 A 92 A 93 B 94 C 95 C 96 B 97 B 98 A 99 D 100 C Printed 5/6/2015 2:51:19 PM Page 4 of 4

Unit 1 Data Book Source: CNM-1300.00153, Fig. 17-3, Dwg 435HA148 (Rev. 2)

ATB 4 POLE, 1,450,000 KVA, 1800 RPM, 2200 VOLTS 0.9 PF, 0.50 SCR, 75 PSIG HYDROGEN PRESSURE, 545 VOLTS EXCITATION 1500 1250 0.6 PF 1000 0.7 PF A 0.8 PF A 0.85 PF 750 A 0.9 PF A B 500 B 0.95 PF B

250 B 0.98 PF 1000 kVARS 0

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800

-250 C C C

-500 C D 0.95 PF 0.9 PF

-750 0.85 PF 0.6 PF 0.7 PF 0.8 PF

-1000 1000 kilowatts 30 PSIG 45 PSIG 60 PSIG 75 PSIG Figure 43 - Generator Capability Curves Page 1

Unit 1 Data Book Source: CNM-1300.00153, Fig. 17-3, Dwg 435HA148 (Rev. 2)

ATB 4 POLE, 1,450,000 KVA, 1800 RPM, 2200 VOLTS 0.9 PF, 0.50 SCR, 75 PSIG HYDROGEN PRESSURE, 545 VOLTS EXCITATION 1500 1250 0.6 PF 1000 0.7 PF A 0.8 PF A 0.85 PF 750 A 0.9 PF A B 500 0.95 PF 1000 kVARS B

B 250 B 0.98 PF 0

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800

-250 C C C

-500 C D 0.95 PF 0.9 PF

-750 0.85 PF 0.6 PF 0.7 PF 0.8 PF

-1000 1000 kilowatts 30 PSIG 45 PSIG 60 PSIG 75 PSIG Figure 43 - Generator Capability Curves Page 1

Duke Energy Procedure No.

Catawba Nuclear Station 0 RP/ /A/5000/001 Classification of Emergency Revision No.

033 Electronic Reference No.

CN005GNK Reference Use PERFORMANCE

  • * * * * * * * *
  • UNCONTROLLED FOR PRINT * * * * * * * * * *

(ISSUED) - PDF Format

RP/0/A/5000/001 Page 2 of 4 Classification of Emergency

1. Symptoms 1.1. Notification of Unusual Event 1.1.1 Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated.

1.1.2 No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety occurs 1.2 Alert 1.2.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION.

1.2.2 Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

1.3 Site Area Emergency 1.3.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for protection of the public.

1.3.2 Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

1.4 General Emergency 1.4.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.

1.4.2 Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

RP/0/A/5000/001 Page 3 of 4

2. Immediate Actions

_____ 2.1 IF performing this procedure due to security-related event(s) considered to be a CREDIBLE THREAT or HOSTILE ACTION, perform the following.

  • IF Security reports that a SECURITY CONDITION or HOSTILE ACTION is imminent (15 minutes) or in-progress, notify station personnel via the plant page to take the appropriate protective actions. Refer to RP/0/B/5000/026, Site Response to Security Events, as soon as possible for scripted message.
  • Perform accelerated notification to the NRC within 15 minutes of the occurrence of the event.

_____ 2.2 Assessment, classification and declaration of any applicable emergency condition should be completed within 15 minutes after the availability of indications or information to COGNIZANT FACILITY STAFF that an EAL threshold has been exceeded. (Refer to Enclosure 4.9, Emergency Declaration Guidelines, as needed)

_____ 2.3 Determine operating mode that existed at the time the event occurred prior to any protection system or operator action initiated in response of the event.

_____ 2.4 IF the plant was in Mode 1-4 and a valid condition affects fission product barriers, proceed to Enclosure 4.1 (Fission Product Barrier Matrix).

_____ 2.5 IF a General Emergency is NOT declared in Step 2.4 OR the condition does not affect fission product barriers, review the listing of enclosures to determine if the event is applicable to one the categories shown.

_____ 2.6 Compare actual plant conditions to the Emergency Action Levels evaluated in step 2.4 and/or 2.5 and declare the appropriate Emergency Class as indicated.

_____ 2.7 Document the declaration time. __________________

_____ 2.8 Activate the ERO per the appropriate Response Procedure (RP) utilizing the Control Room ERO Notification Job Aid.

_____ 2.9 IF the declaration is made in the Control Room, announce the classification and declaration time to the Control Room Crew at the first opportunity that will not interfere with the performance of the crew or the flow of the Emergency Procedure.

_____ 2.10 IF the declaration is made in the TSC or EOF, announce the classification and declaration time to the applicable facility personnel.

RP/0/A/5000/001 Page 4 of 4

_____ 2.11 Implement the applicable Emergency Response Procedure (RP) for that classification and continue with subsequent steps of this procedure.

Notification of Unusual Event RP/0/A/5000/002 Alert RP/0/A/5000/003 Site Area Emergency RP/0/A/5000/004 General Emergency RP/0/A/5000/005

3. Subsequent Actions

_____ 3.1 To escalate, de-escalate, or terminate the Emergency, compare plant conditions to the Initiating Conditions of Enclosures 4.1 through 4.9.

_____ 3.2 Refer to enclosure 4.9, Emergency Declaration Guidelines, as needed.

_____ 3.3 Refer to Section D of the Catawba Emergency Plan for basis information about the Emergency Classification System as needed.

_____ 3.4 Refer to RP/0/A/5000/020, "TSC Activation Procedure" concerning the use of 10CFR50.54(x). If the TSC is activated, contact the TSC Emergency Coordinator (EC) for concurrence when using 10CFR50.54(x).

4. Enclosures 4.1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix 4.2 System Malfunctions 4.3 Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent 4.4 Loss of Shutdown Functions 4.5 Loss of Power 4.6 Fires/Explosions and Security Events 4.7 Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety 4.8 Definitions/Acronyms 4.9 Emergency Declaration Guidelines 4.10 Radiation Monitor Reading for Enclosure 4.3 EALs

Enclosure 4.1 RP/0/A/5000/001 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Page 1 of 5

1. Use EALs to determine Fission Product Barrier status (Intact, Potential Loss, or Loss). Add points for all barriers. Classify according to the table below.

Note 1: An event (or multiple events) could occur which results in the conclusion that exceeding the Loss or Potential Loss thresholds is IMMINENT (i.e., within 1-3 hours). In this IMMINENT LOSS situation, use judgment and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.

Note 2: When determining Fission Product Barrier status, the Fuel Clad Barrier should be considered to be lost or potentially lost if the conditions for the Fuel Clad Barrier loss or potential loss EALs were met previously validated and sustained, even if the conditions do not currently exist.

Note 3: Critical Safety Function (CSF) indications are not meant to include transient alarm conditions which may appear during the start-up of engineered safeguards equipment. A CSF condition is satisfied when the alarmed state is valid and sustained. The STA should be consulted to affirm that a CSF has been validated prior to the CSF being used as a basis to classify an emergency.

Example: If ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power Procedure, is implemented with an appropriate CSF alarm condition valid and sustained, the CSF should be used as the basis to classify an emergency prior to any function restoration procedure being implemented within the confines of ECA-0.0.

IC Unusual Event IC Alert IC Site Area Emergency IC General Emergency 4.1.U.1 Potential Loss of 4.1.A.1 Loss OR Potential Loss 4.1.S.1 Loss OR Potential Loss 4.1.G.1 Loss of All Three Barriers Containment of of Both Nuclear Coolant System Nuclear Coolant System AND Fuel Clad 4.1.U.2 Loss of Containment 4.1.A.2 Loss OR Potential Loss 4.1.S.2 Loss 4.1.G.2 Loss of Any Two Barriers of Fuel Clad AND AND Potential Loss Potential Loss of the Third Combinations of Both Nuclear Coolant System AND Fuel Clad 4.1.A.3 Potential Loss of 4.1.S.3 Loss of Containment Containment AND AND Loss OR Potential Loss Loss OR Potential Loss of Any Other Barrier of Any Other Barrier

Enclosure 4.1 RP/0/A/5000/001 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Page 2 of 5 NOTE: If a barrier is affected, it has a single point value based on a "potential loss" or a "loss." "Not Applicable" is included in the table as a place holder only, and has no point value assigned.

Barrier Points (1-5) Potential Loss (X) Loss (X) Total Points Classification Containment 1 3 1-3 Unusual Event NCS 4 5 4-6 Alert Fuel Clad 4 5 7 - 10 Site Area Emergency Total Points 11 - 13 General Emergency

1. Compare plant conditions against the Fission Barrier Matrix on pages 3 through 5 of 5.
2. Determine the potential loss or loss status for each barrier (Containment, NCS and Fuel Clad) based on the EAL symptom description.
3. For each barrier, write the highest single point value applicable for the barrier in the Points column and mark the appropriate loss column.
4. Add the points in the Points column and record the sum as Total Points.
5. Determine the classification level based on the number of Total Points.
6. In the table on page 1 of 5, under one of the four classification columns, select the event number (e.g. 4.1.A.1 for Loss of Nuclear Coolant System) that best fits the loss of barrier descriptions.
7. Using the number (e.g. 4.1.A.1), select the preprinted notification form OR a blank notification form and complete the required information for Emergency Coordinator approval and transmittal.

Enclosure 4.1 RP/0/A/5000/001 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Page 3 of 5 4.1.C CONTAINMENT BARRIER 4.1.N NCS BARRIER 4.1.F FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS - POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS - POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -

(1 Point) (3 Points) (4 Points) (5 Points) (4 Points) (5 Points)

1. Critical Safety Function Status 1. Critical Safety Function Status 1. Critical Safety Function Status
  • Containment-RED
  • Not applicable
  • NCS Integrity-Red
  • Not applicable
  • Core Cooling-
  • Core Cooling-Red Orange
  • Core cooling-RED
  • Heat Sink-Red Path is indicated
  • Heat Sink-Red for >15 minutes
2. Containment Conditions 2. NCS Leak Rate 2. Primary Coolant Activity Level
  • Containment
  • Rapid unexplained
  • Unisolable leak
  • GREATER THAN
  • Not applicable
  • Coolant Activity Pressure > 15 PSIG decrease in exceeding the available makeup GREATER THAN containment capacity of one capacity as 300 µCi/cc Dose
  • H2 concentration > pressure following charging pump in indicated by a loss Equivalent Iodine 9% initial increase the normal of NCS subcooling. (DEI) I-131 charging mode
  • Containment
  • Containment with letdown pressure greater than pressure or sump isolated.

3 psig with less than level response not one full train of NS consistent with and a VX-CARF LOCA conditions.

operating after actuation.

NOTE: Refer to Emergency Plan, Sect. D, 4.1.C.2, last paragraph for inability to maintain normal annulus pressure.

CONTINUED CONTINUED CONTINUED

Enclosure 4.1 RP/0/A/5000/001 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Page 4 of 5 4.1.C CONTAINMENT BARRIER 4.1.N NCS BARRIER 4.1.F FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS - POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS - POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -

(1 Point) (3 Points) (4 Points) (5 Points) (4 Points) (5 Points)

3. Containment Isolation Valves Status After 3. SG Tube Rupture 3. Containment Radiation Monitoring Containment Isolation Actuation
  • Not applicable
  • Containment
  • Primary-to-
  • Indication that a
  • Not applicable
  • Containment isolation is Secondary leak SG is Ruptured and radiation monitor incomplete and a rate exceeds the has a Non-Isolable 53 A or 53 B direct release path capacity of one secondary line fault Reading at time from containment charging pump in since Shutdown.

exists to the the normal

  • Indication that a environment charging mode SG is ruptured and 0-0.5 hrs > 99 R/hr with letdown a prolonged release 0.5-2 hrs > 43 R/hr isolated. of contaminated 2-4 hrs > 31 R/hr secondary coolant 4-8 hrs > 22 R/hr is occurring from >8 hrs > 13 R/hr the affected SG to the environment
4. SG Secondary Side Release With Primary-to- 4. Containment Radiation Monitoring 4. Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Secondary Leakage Judgement
  • Not applicable
  • Release of
  • Not applicable
  • Not applicable
  • Any condition, including inability to monitor secondary side to the barrier that in the opinion of the the environment Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director with primary to indicates LOSS or POTENTIAL LOSS of the secondary leakage fuel clad barrier.

GREATER THAN Tech Spec allowable END CONTINUED CONTINUED

Enclosure 4.1 RP/0/A/5000/001 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Page 5 of 5 4.1.C CONTAINMENT BARRIER 4.1.N NCS BARRIER 4.1.F FUEL CLAD BARRIER POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS - POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS - POTENTIAL LOSS - LOSS -

(1 Point) (3 Points) (4 Points) (5 Points) (4 Points) (5 Points)

5. Significant Radioactive Inventory In 5. Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Containment Judgement
  • Containment Rad.
  • Not applicable
  • Any condition, including inability to monitor Monitor EMF53A or the barrier that in the opinion of the 53B Emergency Coordinator /EOF Director Reading at time since indicates LOSS or POTENTIAL LOSS of shutdown: the NCS barrier.

0 - 0.5 hr > 390 R/hr 0.5 - 2 hr > 170 R/hr 2 - 4 hr > 125 R/hr 4 - 8 hr > 90 R/hr

> 8 hr > 53 R/hr END

6. Emergency Coordinator /EOF Director Judgment
  • Any condition, including inability to monitor the barrier that in the opinion of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director indicates LOSS or POTENTIAL LOSS of the containment barrier.

END

Enclosure 4.2 RP/0/A/5000/001 System Malfunctions Page 1 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.2.U.1 Inability to Reach Required 4.2.A.1 Unplanned Loss of Most or All 4.2.S.1 Inability to Monitor a END Shutdown Within Technical Safety System Annunciation or Significant Transient in Specification Limits. Indication in Control Room Progress.

With Either (1) a Significant OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 Transient in Progress, or (2)

Compensatory Non-Alarming OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 4.2.U.1-1 Plant is not brought to required Indicators Unavailable.

operating mode within Technical 4.2.S.1-1 The following conditions Specifications LCO Action Statement OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 exist:

Time.

4.2.A.1-1 The following conditions exist: Loss of most (>50%)

4.2.U.2 Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety Annunciators associated with System Annunciation or Indication in Unplanned loss of most (>50%) safety systems.

the Control Room for Greater Than annunciators associated with safety 15 Minutes. systems for greater than 15 minutes. AND OPERATING MODE: 1 , 2, 3, 4 AND A SIGNIFICANT PLANT TRANSIENT is in progress.

4.2.U.2-1 The following conditions exist: In the opinion of the Operations Shift Manager/Emergency AND Unplanned loss of most (>50%) Coordinator/EOF Director, the annunciators associated with safety loss of the annunciators or Loss of the OAC.

systems for greater than 15 minutes. indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift AND AND compliment) to safely operate the unit. Inability to provide manual AND monitoring of any of the In the opinion of the Operations Shift following Critical Safety Manager/Emergency Coordinator/EOF EITHER of the following: Functions:

Director, the loss of the annunciators

  • A SIGNIFICANT PLANT or indicators requires additional TRANSIENT is in progress
  • subcriticality personnel (beyond normal shift
  • core cooling compliment) to safely operate the unit.
  • Loss of the OAC.
  • heat sink
  • containment.

END END CONTINUED

Enclosure 4.2 RP/0/A/5000/001 System Malfunctions Page 2 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.2.U.3 Fuel Clad Degradation.

OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 4.2.U.3-1 Dose Equivalent I-131 greater than the Technical Specifications allowable limit.

4.2.U.4 Reactor Coolant System (NCS)

Leakage.

OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 4.2.U.4-1 Unidentified leakage > 10 gpm.

4.2.U.4-2 Pressure boundary leakage > 10 gpm.

4.2.U.4-3 Identified leakage > 25 gpm 4.2.U.5 Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Communications.

OPERATING MODE: ALL 4.2.U.5-1 Loss of all onsite communications capability (internal phone system, PA system, onsite radio system) affecting the ability to perform routine operations.

4.2.U.5-2 Loss of all offsite communications capability (Selective Signaling, NRC ETS lines, offsite radio system, commercial phone system) affecting the ability to communicate with offsite authorities.

END

Enclosure 4.3 RP/0/A/5000/001 Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent Page 1 of 5 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.3.U.1 Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or 4.3.A.1 Any Unplanned Release of 4.3.S.1 Boundary Dose Resulting 4.3.G.1 Boundary Dose Resulting Liquid Radioactivity to the Gaseous or Liquid from an Actual or from an Actual or Environment that Exceeds Two Times Radioactivity to the Imminent Release of Imminent Release of the SLC Limits for 60 Minutes or Environment that Exceeds Radioactivity Exceeds 100 Radioactivity that Exceeds Longer. 200 Times the SLC limits mrem TEDE or 500 mrem 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 for 15 Minutes or Longer. CDE Adult Thyroid for mrem CDE Adult Thyroid OPERATING MODE: ALL the Actual or Projected for the Actual or OPERATING MODE: ALL Duration of the Release. Projected Duration of the 4.3.U.1-1 A valid Trip 2 alarm on radiation monitor Release.

EMF-49L or EMF-57 for > 60 minutes or 4.3.A.1-1 A valid indication on radiation OPERATING MODE: ALL will likely continue for > 60 minutes monitor EMF- 49L or EMF-57 of OPERATING MODE: ALL which indicates that the release may have 1.2E+05 cpm for > 15 minutes 4.3.S.1-1 A valid indication on exceeded the initiating condition and or will likely continue for 15 radiation monitor EMF- 4.3.G.1-1 A valid indication on indicates the need to assess the release minutes, which indicates that the 36L of > 2.7E+06 cpm radiation monitor EMF-36H with procedure HP/0/B/1009/014. release may have exceeded the sustained for > 15 of > 8.3E+03 cpm initiating condition and indicates minutes. sustained for > 15 minutes.

4.3.U.1-2 A valid indication on radiation monitor the need to assess the release with EMF- 36L of 3.00E+04 cpm for > 60 procedure HP/0/B/1009/014. 4.3.S.1-2 Dose assessment team 4.3.G.1-2 Dose assessment team minutes or will likely continue for 60 calculations indicate dose calculations indicate dose minutes, which indicates that the release consequences greater than consequences greater than may have exceeded the initiating 100 mrem TEDE or 500 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 condition and indicates the need to assess (Continued) mrem CDE Adult Thyroid mrem CDE Adult Thyroid the release with procedure AD-EP-ALL- at the site boundary. at the site boundary.

0202.

(Continued) (Continued)

(Continued)

Enclosure 4.3 RP/0/A/5000/001 Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent Page 2 of 5 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.3.U.1-3 Gaseous effluent being released 4.3.A.1-2 A valid indication on radiation 4.3.S.1-3 Analysis of field survey 4.3.G.1-3 Analysis of field survey exceeds two times SLC 16.11-6 for > monitor EMF- 36L of results or field survey results or field survey 60 minutes as determined by RP 5.4E+05 cpm for > 15 minutes samples indicates dose samples indicates dose procedure. or will likely continue for 15 consequences greater consequences greater minutes, which indicates that than 100 mrem TEDE or than 1000 mrem TEDE 4.3.U.1-4 Liquid effluent being released the release may have exceeded 500 mrem CDE Adult or 5000 mrem CDE exceeds two times SLC 16.11-1 for > the initiating condition and Thyroid at the site Adult Thyroid at the site 60 minutes as determined by RP indicates the need to assess the boundary. boundary.

procedure. release with procedure AD-EP-ALL-0202. Note 1: These EMF readings are Note 1: These EMF readings are Note: If the monitor reading is sustained calculated based on average calculated based on average for the time period indicated in the 4.3.A.1-3 Gaseous effluent being annual meteorology, site annual meteorology, site EAL AND the required assessments released exceeds 200 times the boundary dose rate, and boundary dose rate, and (procedure calculations) cannot be level of SLC 16.11-6 for > 15 design unit vent flow rate. design unit vent flow rate.

completed within this time period, minutes as determined by RP Calculations by the dose Calculations by the dose declaration must be made based on procedure. assessment team use actual assessment team use actual the valid radiation monitor reading. meteorology, release meteorology, release 4.3.A.1-4 Liquid effluent being released duration, and unit vent flow duration, and unit vent flow (Continued) exceeds 200 times the level of rate. Therefore, these EMF rate. Therefore, these EMF SLC 16.11-1 for > 15 minutes readings should not be used if readings should not be used as determined by RP dose assessment team if dose assessment team procedure. calculations are available. calculations are available.

Note: If the monitor reading is Note 2: If dose assessment team Note 2: If dose assessment team sustained for the time period calculations cannot be calculations cannot be indicated in the EAL AND the completed in 15 minutes, then completed in 15 minutes, required assessments valid monitor reading should then valid monitor (procedure calculations) be used for emergency reading should be used for cannot be completed within classification. emergency classification.

this time period, declaration must be made based on the END END valid radiation monitor reading.

(Continued)

Enclosure 4.3 RP/0/A/5000/001 Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent Page 3 of 5 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.3.U.2 Unexpected Increase in Plant 4.3.A.2 Major Damage to Irradiated Radiation or Airborne Fuel or Loss of Water Level Concentration. that Has or Will Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated OPERATING MODE: ALL Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel.

4.3.U.2-1 Indication of uncontrolled water Does not apply to spent fuel in dry cask level decrease of greater than 6 storage. Refer to EPLAN Section D inches in the reactor refueling cavity basis document with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by water. OPERATING MODE: ALL 4.3.A.2-1 An unplanned valid trip II 4.3.U.2-2 Uncontrolled water level decrease of alarm on any of the greater than 6 inches in the spent fuel following radiation pool and fuel transfer canal with all monitors:

irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by water. Spent Fuel Building Refueling Bridge 4.3.U.2-3 Unplanned valid area EMF reading 1EMF-15 increases by a factor of 1,000 over 2EMF-4 normal levels as shown in Enclosure 4.10. Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation 1EMF-42 END 2EMF-42 Reactor Building Refueling Bridge (applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only) 1EMF-17 2EMF-2 Containment Noble Gas Monitor (Applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only) 1EMF-39 2EMF-39 (Continued)

Enclosure 4.3 RP/0/A/5000/001 Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent Page 4 of 5 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.3.A.2-2 Plant personnel report that water level drop in reactor refueling cavity, spent fuel pool, or fuel transfer canal has or will exceed makeup capacity such that any irradiated fuel will become uncovered.

4.3.A.2-3 NC system wide range level <95% after initiation of NC system make-up.

AND Any irradiated fuel assembly not capable of being lowered into spent fuel pool or reactor vessel.

4.3.A.2-4 Spent Fuel Pool or Fuel Transfer Canal level decrease of >2 feet after initiation of makeup.

AND Any irradiated fuel assembly not capable of being fully lowered into the spent fuel pool racks or transfer canal fuel transfer system basket.

(Continued)

Enclosure 4.3 RP/0/A/5000/001 Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent Page 5 of 5 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.3.A.3 Release of Radioactive Material or Increases in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE: ALL 4.3.A.3-1 Valid reading on 1EMF-12 greater than 15 mrem/hr in the Control Room.

4.3.A.3-2 Valid indication of radiation levels greater than 15 mrem/hr in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) or Secondary Alarm Station (SAS).

4.3.A.3-3 Valid radiation monitor reading exceeds the levels shown in Enclosure 4.10.

END

Enclosure 4.4 RP/0/A/5000/001 Loss of Shutdown Functions Page 1 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY END 4.4.A.1 Failure of Reactor 4.4.S.1 Failure of Reactor 4.4.G.1 Failure of the Reactor Protection System Protection System Protection System to Instrumentation to Complete Instrumentation to Complete Complete an Automatic Trip or Initiate an Automatic or Initiate an Automatic and Manual Trip Was NOT Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Trip Once a Successful and There is Reactor Protection System Reactor Protection System Indication of an Extreme Setpoint Has Been Exceeded Setpoint Has Been Exceeded Challenge to the Ability to and Manual Trip Was and Manual Trip Was NOT Cool the Core.

Successful. Successful.

OPERATING MODE: 1 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3 OPERATING MODE: 1 4.4.G.1-1 The following conditions exist:

4.4.A.1-1 The following conditions exist: 4.4.S.1-1 The following conditions exist:

Valid reactor trip signal Valid reactor trip signal Valid reactor trip signal received or required and received or required and received or required and automatic reactor trip automatic reactor trip automatic reactor trip was not successful.

was not successful. was not successful.

AND AND AND Manual reactor trip from the Manual reactor trip from the Manual reactor trip from the control room was not control room is successful and control room was not successful in reducing reactor reactor power is less than 5% successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and and decreasing. power to less than 5% and decreasing.

decreasing.

(Continued) AND (Continued) EITHER of the following conditions exist:

  • Core Cooling CSF-RED
  • Heat Sink CSF-RED.

END

Enclosure 4.4 RP/0/A/5000/001 Loss of Shutdown Functions Page 2 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.4.S.2 Complete Loss of Function 4.4.A.2 Inability to Maintain Plant Needed to Achieve or in Cold Shutdown.

Maintain Hot Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE: 5, 6 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 4.4.A.2-1 Total loss of ND and/or RN 4.4.S.2-1 Subcriticality CSF-RED.

and/or KC.

4.4.S.2-2 Heat Sink CSF-RED.

AND 4.4.S.3 Loss of Water Level in the One of the following: Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the

  • Inability to maintain Reactor Vessel.

reactor coolant temperature OPERATING MODE: 5, 6 below 200ºF 4.4.S.3-1 Failure of heat sink causes loss

  • Uncontrolled reactor of cold shutdown conditions.

coolant temperature rise to

>180ºF. AND Lower range Reactor Vessel Level Indication System END (RVLIS) decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

4.4.S.3-2 Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

AND Reactor Coolant (NC) system mid or wide range level less than 11% and decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

(Continued)

Enclosure 4.4 RP/0/A/5000/001 Loss of Shutdown Functions Page 3 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.4.S.3-3 Failure of heat sink causes loss of cold shutdown conditions.

AND Either train ultrasonic level indication less than 7.25% and decreasing after initiation of NC system makeup.

END

Enclosure 4.5 RP/0/A/5000/001 Loss of Power Page 1 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.5.U.1 Loss of All Offsite 4.5.A.1 Loss of All Offsite 4.5.S.1 Loss of All Offsite 4.5.G.1 Prolonged Loss of All Power to Essential Power and Loss of All Power and Loss of All (Offsite and Onsite) AC Busses for Greater Than Onsite AC Power to Onsite AC Power to Power.

15 Minutes. Essential Busses During Essential Busses.

Cold Shutdown Or OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 Refueling Mode. OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 4.5.G.1-1 Prolonged loss of all 4.5.U.1-1 The following conditions OPERATING MODE: 5, 6, No 4.5.S.1-1 Loss of all offsite and offsite and onsite AC exist: Mode onsite AC power as power as indicated by:

indicated by:

Loss of offsite power to 4.5.A.1-1 Loss of all offsite and Loss of power on essential essential buses ETA and onsite AC power as Loss of power on essential buses ETA and ETB for ETB for greater than 15 indicated by: buses ETA and ETB. greater than 15 minutes.

minutes.

Loss of power on essential AND AND AND buses ETA and ETB.

Failure to restore power to Standby Shutdown Both emergency diesel AND at least one essential bus Facility (SSF) fails to generators are supplying within 15 minutes. supply NC pump seal power to their respective Failure to restore power to injection OR CA supply essential busses. at least one essential bus (Continued) to Steam Generators.

within 15 minutes.

AND (Continued) (Continued)

(Continued)

Enclosure 4.5 RP/0/A/5000/001 Loss of Power Page 2 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY OPERATING MODE: 5, 6, No 4.5.A.2 AC power to essential 4.5.S.2 Loss of All Vital DC At least one of the Mode busses reduced to a Power. following conditions single power source for exist:

4.5.U.1-2 The following conditions greater than 15 minutes OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 exist: such that an additional

  • Restoration of at least Loss of offsite power to single failure could 4.5.S.2-1 The following conditions one essential bus essential buses ETA and result in station exist: within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is ETB for greater than 15 blackout. NOT likely minutes. Unplanned loss of both AND OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4 unit related busses: EBA
  • Indication of One emergency diesel and EBD both <112 continuing generator is supplying 4.5.A.2-1 The following condition VDC, and EBB and EBC degradation of core power to its respective exists: both <109 VDC. cooling based on essential bus. Fission Product AC power capability has AND Barrier monitoring.

4.5.U.2 Unplanned Loss of been degraded to one Required DC Power essential bus powered Failure to restore power to END During Cold Shutdown or from a single power at least one required DC Refueling Mode for source for > 15 min. due bus within 15 minutes Greater than 15 Minutes. to the loss of all but one from the time of loss.

of:

OPERATING MODE: 5, 6 END SATA SATB 4.5.U.2-1 The following conditions ATC ATD exist: D/G A D/G B Unplanned loss of both unit END related busses: EBA and EBD both <112 VDC, and EBB and EBC both <109 VDC.

AND Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss.

END

Enclosure 4.6 RP/0/A/5000/001 Fire/Explosion and Security Events Page 1 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.6.U.1 Fire Within Protected Area 4.6.A.1 Fire or Explosion Affecting 4.6.S.1 HOSTILE ACTION within 4.6.G.1 HOSTILE ACTION Boundary NOT the Operability of Plant the PROTECTED AREA Resulting in Loss of Physical Extinguished Within 15 Safety Systems Required to Control of the Facility.

Minutes of Detection OR Establish or Maintain Safe OPERATING MODE: ALL Explosion Within the Shutdown. OPERATING MODE: ALL Protected Area Boundary. 4.6.S.1-1 A HOSTILE ACTION is OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 occurring or has occurred 4.6.G.1-1 A HOSTILE ACTION has OPERATING MODE: ALL within the PROTECTED occurred such that plant 4.6.A.1-1 The following conditions exist: AREA as reported by the CNS personnel are unable to operate 4.6.U.1-1 Fire in any of the following (Non-security events) Security Shift Supervision equipment required to areas NOT extinguished Fire or explosion in any of the maintain safety functions.

within 15 minutes of control following areas: END room notification or y Reactor Building 4.6.G.1-2 A HOSTILE ACTION has verification of a control room y Auxiliary Building caused failure of Spent Fuel fire alarm. y Diesel Generator Rooms Cooling Systems and y Control Room IMMINENT fuel damage is y Reactor Building y RN Pumphouse likely for a FRESHLY OFF-y Auxiliary Building y SSF LOADED REACTOR y Diesel Generator Rooms y CAS CORE in pool.

y Control Room y SAS y RN Pumphouse y FWST y SSF y Doghouses (Applies in END y CAS Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 only).

y SAS y Doghouses AND y FWST y Turbine Building One of the following:

y Service Building y Monitor Tank Building

  • Affected safety system y ISFSI parameter indications show y Unit 1/2 Transformer Yard degraded performance Areas (Continued) (Continued)

Enclosure 4.6 RP/0/A/5000/001 Fire/Explosion and Security Events Page 2 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.6.U.1-2 Report by plant personnel of

  • Plant personnel report an unanticipated explosion visible damage to within protected area permanent structures or boundary resulting in visible equipment within the damage to permanent specified area required to structure or equipment or a establish or maintain safe loaded cask in the ISFSI. shutdown within the specifications.

4.6.U.2 Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or Threat Note: Only one train of a system Which Indicates a Potential needs to be affected or Degradation in the Level of damaged in order to satisfy this Safety of the Plant. condition.

OPERATING MODE: All 4.6.A.2 Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant 4.6.U.2-1 A SECURITY CONDITION Safety Systems Required to that does NOT involve a Establish or Maintain Safe HOSTILE ACTION as Shutdown.

reported by the CNS Security Shift Supervision. OPERATING MODE: No Mode 4.6.U.2-2 A credible site-specific 4.6.A.2-1 The following conditions exist:

security threat notification. (Non-security events)

Fire or explosion in any of the 4.6.U.2-3 A validated notification from following areas:

NRC providing information of y Spent Fuel Pool an aircraft threat. y Auxiliary Building.

y RN Pump house END AND One of the following:

  • Spent Fuel Pool level and/or temperature show degraded performance (Continued)

Enclosure 4.6 RP/0/A/5000/001 Fire/Explosion and Security Events Page 3 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

  • Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment supporting spent fuel pool cooling.

4.6.A.3 HOSTILE ACTION Within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or Airborne Attack Threat.

OPERATING MODE: ALL 4.6.A.3-1 A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the CNS Security Shift Supervision 4.6.A.3-2 A validated notification from NRC of airliner attack threat within 30 minutes of the site.

END

Enclosure 4.7 RP/0/A/5000/001 Natural Disasters, Hazards, And Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Page 1 of 4 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.7.U.1 Natural and Destructive 4.7.A.1 Natural and Destructive 4.7.S.1 Control Room Evacuation 4.7.G.1 Other Conditions Existing Phenomena Affecting the Phenomena Affecting the Has Been Initiated and Plant Which in the Judgement of Protected Area. Plant Vital Area. Control Cannot Be the Emergency Established. Coordinator/EOF Director OPERATING MODE: ALL OPERATING MODE: ALL Warrant Declaration of OPERATING MODE: ALL General Emergency.

4.7.U.1-1 Tremor felt and valid alarm on 4.7.A.1-1 Valid OBE Exceeded Alarm the Syscom Seismic on 1AD-4,B/8 4.7.S.1-1 The following conditions OPERATING MODE: ALL Monitoring System (OAC exist:

C1D2252).

4.7.A.1-2 Tornado or high winds: Control Room evacuation has been 4.7.G.1-1 Other conditions exist which initiated per in the Judgement of the 4.7.U.1-2 Report by plant personnel of Tornado striking plant AP/1(2)/A/5500/017 Emergency Coordinator/EOF tornado striking within structures within the vital AND Director indicate:

protected area area: Control of the plant cannot be boundary/ISFSI.

established from the ASP or (1) actual or imminent 4.7.U.1-3 Vehicle crash into plant

  • Reactor Building the SSF within 15 minutes. substantial core degradation structures or systems within
  • Auxiliary Building with potential for loss of protected area
  • FWST 4.7.S.2 Other Conditions Existing containment boundary/ISFSI.
  • Diesel Generator Rooms Which in the Judgement of
  • Control Room the Emergency OR 4.7.U.1-4 Report of turbine failure
  • RN Pumphouse Coordinator/EOF Director resulting in casing penetration
  • SSF Warrant Declaration of Site (2) potential for uncontrolled or damage to turbine or
  • Doghouses Area Emergency. radionuclide releases. These generator seals.
  • CAS releases can reasonably be
  • SAS OPERATING MODE: ALL expected to exceed 4.7.U.1-5 Independent Spent Fuel Cask Environmental Protection tipped over or dropped greater OR 4.7.S.2-1 Other conditions exist which Agency Protective Action than 24 inches. in the Judgement of the Guideline levels outside the sustained winds 74 mph for Emergency Coordinator/EOF site boundary.

4.7.U.1-6 Uncontrolled flooding in the > 15 minutes. Director indicate actual or ISFSI area. likely major failures of plant END (Continued) functions needed for 4.7.U.1-7 Tornado generated missiles(s) protection of the public.

impacting the ISFSI. END (Continued)

Enclosure 4.7 RP/0/A/5000/001 Natural Disasters, Hazards, And Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Page 2 of 4 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.7.U.2 Release of Toxic or 4.7.A.1-3 Visible structural damage Flammable Gases Deemed caused by either:

Detrimental to Safe

  • Vehicle crashes Operation of the Plant. OR
  • Turbine failure generated OPERATING MODE: ALL missiles, OR 4.7.U.2-1 Report or detection of toxic or
  • Other catastrophic events flammable gases that could enter within the site boundary on any of the following plant in amounts that can affect safe structures:

operation of the plant.

  • Reactor Building
  • Auxiliary Building 4.7.U.2-2 Report by Local, County or
  • FWST State Officials for potential
  • Diesel Generator Rooms evacuation of site personnel
  • Control Room based on offsite event.
  • RN Pump House
  • SSF 4.7.U.3 Other Conditions Existing
  • Doghouses Which in the Judgement of
  • CAS the Emergency
  • SAS Coordinator/EOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Unusual Event.

(Continued)

OPERATING MODE: ALL 4.7.U.3-1 Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

END

Enclosure 4.7 RP/0/A/5000/001 Natural Disasters, Hazards, And Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Page 3 of 4 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.7.A.2 Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Within a Facility Structure Which Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE: ALL 4.7.A.2-1 Report or detection of toxic gases within a Facility Structure in concentrations that will be life threatening to plant personnel.

4.7.A.2-2 Report or detection of flammable gases within a Facility Structure in concentra-tions that will affect the safe operation of the plant.

Structures for the above EALs:

  • Reactor Building
  • Auxiliary Building
  • Diesel Generator Rooms
  • Control Room
  • RN Pumphouse
  • SSF
  • SAS (Continued)

Enclosure 4.7 RP/0/A/5000/001 Natural Disasters, Hazards, And Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Page 4 of 4 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4.7.A.3 Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated.

OPERATING MODE: ALL 4.7.A.3-1 Control Room evacuation has been initiated per AP/1(2)/A/5500/017.

4.7.A.4 Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Warrant Declaration of an Alert.

OPERATING MODE: ALL 4.7.A.4-1 Other conditions exist which in the Judgement of the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director indicate that plant safety systems may be degraded and that increased monitoring of plant functions is warranted.

END

Enclosure 4.8 RP/0/A/5000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 1 of 4 ALERT- Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of hostile action. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA protective action guideline exposure levels.

ALL (As relates to Operating Mode Applicability) - Modes 1, 2, 3,4,5,6 and No Mode (Defueled)

BOMB - Refers to an explosive device suspected of having sufficient force to damage plant systems or structures.

CARF - Containment Air Return Fan.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE - A group of ten (10) or more people violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. A civil disturbance is considered to be violent when force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.

COGNIZANT FACILITY STAFF - Any member of facility staff, who by virtue of training and experience, is qualified to assess the indications or reports for validity and to compare the same to the EALs in the licensee's emergency classification scheme (Does not include staff whose positions require they report, rather than assess, abnormal conditions to the facility.).

CREDIBLE THREAT - A threat should be considered credible when:

  • Physical evidence supporting the threat exists.
  • Information independent (law enforcement) from the actual threat message exists that supports the threat.
  • A specific group or organization claims responsibility for the threat.

EPA PAG - Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guidelines for exposure to a release of radioactive material.

EMERGENCY RELEASE - Any unplanned, quantifiable radiological release to the environment during an emergency event. The release does not have to be related to a declared emergency.

EXPLOSION - A rapid, violent unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment (e.g., a steamline or feedwater line break) that imparts energy sufficient to potentially damage or creates shrapnel to actually damage permanent structures, systems or components. An electrical breaker flash that creates shrapnel and results in damage to other components beyond scorching should also be considered.

EXTORTION - An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat of force.

FIRE - Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. An electrical breaker flash that creates high temperatures for a short duration and merely localized scorching to that breaker and its compartment should not be considered a fire.

Enclosure 4.8 RP/0/A/5000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 2 of 4 FRESHLY OFF-LOADED REACTOR CORE - The complete removal and relocation of all fuel assemblies from the reactor core and placed in the spent fuel pool. (Typical of a "No Mode" operation during a refuel outage that allows safety system maintenance to occur and results in maximum decay heat load in the spent fuel pool system.)

FUNCTIONAL - A component is fully capable of meeting its design function. It would be declared INOPERABLE if unable to meet Technical Specifications.

GENERAL EMERGENCY- Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or hostile action that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA protective action guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

HOSTAGE - A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure demands will be met by the station.

HOSTILE ACTION - An act toward an NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidates the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILES, vehicles or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA).

HOSTILE FORCE - One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming or causing destruction.

IMMINENT - Mitigation actions have been ineffective, additional actions are not expected to be successful, and trended information indicates that the event or condition will occur. Where IMMINENT time frames are specified, they shall apply.

INOPERABLE - A component does not meet Technical Specifications. The component may be functional, capable of meeting its design.

INABILITY TO DIRECTLY MONITOR - Operational Aid Computer data points are unavailable or gauges/panel indications are not readily available to the operator.

INTRUSION - A person(s) present in a specified area without authorization. Discovery of a BOMB in a specified area is indication of INTRUSION into that area by a HOSTILE FORCE.

ISFSI - Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Includes the components approved for loading and storage of spent fuel assemblies.

LOSS - A component is INOPERABLE and not FUNCTIONAL.

NO MODE - Defueled.

OWNER CONTROLLED AREA - Area outside the protected area fence that immediately surrounds the plant. Access to this area is generally restricted to those entering on official business.

Enclosure 4.8 RP/0/A/5000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 3 of 4 PROJECTILE - An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability or personnel safety.

PROLONGED - A duration beyond normal limits, defined as "greater than 15 minutes" or as determined by the judgement of the emergency Coordinator.

PROTECTED AREA - Typically, the site specific area which normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security PROTECTED AREA fence.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS/NCS) LEAKAGE - RCS Operational Leakage as defined in the Technical Specification Basis B 3.4.13.

RUPTURED (As relates to Steam Generator) - Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE - Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable. Equipment found tampered with or damaged due to malicious mischief may not meet the definition of SABOTAGE until this determination is made by security supervision.

SECURITY CONDITION - Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.

SIGNIFICANT PLANT TRANSIENT- An unplanned event involving one or more of the following: (l)

Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip, (4) Safety Injection, (5) Thermal power oscillations >10%.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY - Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines to exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

SITE BOUNDARY - That area, including the protected area, in which Duke Energy has the authority to control all activities, including exclusion or removal of personnel and property.

SLC - Selected Licensee Commitments.

SUSTAINED - A duration of time long enough to confirm that the CSF is valid (not momentary).

TERMINATION - Exiting the emergency condition.

TOTAL EFFECTIVE DOSE EQUIVALENT (TEDE) - The sum of external dose exposure to radioactive plume, to radionuclides deposited on the ground by the plume, and the internal exposure inhaled radionuclides deposited in the body.

TOXIC GAS - A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g. chlorine).

UNCONTROLLED - Event is not the result of planned actions by the plant staff.

Enclosure 4.8 RP/0/A/5000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 4 of 4 UNPLANNED - An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNUSUAL EVENT- Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

VALID - An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by: (l ) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant instrumentation, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel such that doubt related to the instrument's operability, the condition's existence or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

VIOLENT - Force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.

VISIBLE DAMAGE - Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected structure, system, or component. Example damage: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering.

VITAL AREA - Areas within the PROTECTED AREA that house equipment important for nuclear safety.

Access to a VITAL AREA is allowed only if an individual has been authorized to be in that area per the security plan. Therefore, VITAL AREA is a security term.

Enclosure 4.9 RP/0/A/5000/001 Emergency Declaration Guidelines Page 1 of 2 THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS TO BE USED BY THE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR IN ASSESSING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.

  • Assessment, classification and declaration of any applicable emergency condition should be completed with 15 minutes after indication or information is available to COGNIZANT FACILITY STAFF that an EAL threshold has been exceeded.
  • The Emergency Coordinator shall review all applicable initiating events to ensure proper classification.
  • The BASIS Document (located in Section D of the Catawba Nuclear Site Emergency Plan) is available for review if any questions arise over proper classification.
  • Emergencies are declared for the site. If an event results in multiple emergency action levels on a unit or different emergency action levels on each unit, then the emergency declaration shall be based on the higher classification. Information relating to the unit with the lesser classification will be noted as additional information on the Emergency Notification Form (ENF).
  • If an event occurs, and a lower or higher plant operating mode is reached before the classification can be made, the classification shall be based on the mode that existed at the time the event occurred.
  • The fission product barrier matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at (Mode 1-4) hot shutdown or higher. An event that is recognized at cold shutdown or lower (Mode 5 or 6) shall not be classified using the fission product barrier matrix. Reference would be made to the other enclosures that provide emergency action levels for specific events (e.g. severe weather, fire, security).
  • If a transient event should occur, the following guidance is provided.
1. Some emergency action levels specify that a condition exist for a specific duration prior to declaration.
a. For these EALs, the classification is made when the Emergency Coordinator assessment concludes that the specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded (i.e. condition cannot be reasonably corrected before the duration elapses),

whichever is sooner.

b. If a plant condition exceeding EAL criteria is corrected before the specified duration time is exceeded, the event is NOT classified by that EAL. Lower Severity EALs, if any, shall be reviewed for possible applicability in these cases.

Enclosure 4.9 RP/0/A/5000/001 Emergency Declaration Guidelines Page 2 of 2

2. If a plant condition exceeding EAL criteria is not recognized at the time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g. as a result of routine log or record review) and the condition no longer exists, an emergency shall NOT be declared.

Reporting under 10CFR50.72 may be required. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a follow-up evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier believed.

3. If an emergency classification is warranted, but the plant condition is corrected prior to declaration and notification, the Emergency Coordinator must consider the potential that the initiating condition (e.g. Failure of Reactor Protection System or earthquake) may have caused plant damage that warrants augmenting the on-shift personnel via activation of the Emergency Response Organization. The following action shall be taken:
a. For UNUSUAL EVENTS, the condition shall be declared and notifications made. The event may be terminated in the same notification or in a follow-up notification.
b. For ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, and GENERAL EMERGENCY, the event shall be declared and the emergency response organization activated.

DETERMINATION OF "EVENT TIME" (TIME THE 15 MINUTE CLOCK STARTS)

1. Event time is the time at which indications become available that an EAL has been exceeded.
2. Event time is the time the 15 minutes clock starts for classification.
3. The event classification time shall be entered on the emergency notification form.

MOMENTARY ENTRY INTO A HIGHER CLASSIFICATION If, while in an emergency classification, the specified EALs of a higher classification are met momentarily, and in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator are not likely to recur, the entry into the higher classification must be acknowledged. Acknowledgment is performed as follows:

If this condition occurs prior to the initial notification to the emergency response organization and off site agencies, the initial message should note that the site is currently in the lower classification, but had momentarily met the criteria for the higher classification. It should also be noted that plant conditions have improved and stabilized to the point that the criteria for the higher classification are not expected to be repeated.

Enclosure 4.10 RP/0/A/5000/001 Radiation Monitor Readings for Enclosure 4.3 Page 1 of 1 Note: These values are not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g. incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.).

Detector Elevation Column Identifier Unusual Event Alert mR/hr mR/hr 1EMF-1 522' FF, 57 Auxiliary Building Corridor 500 5000 1EMF-3 543' GG, 55 Unit 1 Charging Pump Area 100 5000 1EMF-4 543' GG, 59 Unit 2 Charging Pump Area 100 5000 1EMF-7 560' NN, 55 Unit 1 Auxiliary Building Corridor 1500 5000 1EMF-8 560' NN, 59 Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Corridor 500 5000 1EMF-9 577' LL, 55 Unit 1 Aux. Building Filter Hatch 100 5000 1EMF-10 577' LL, 58 Unit 2 Aux. Building Filter Hatch 100 5000 1EMF-22 594' KK, 53 Containment Purge Filter Area 100 5000 2EMF-9 594' KK, 61 Containment Purge Filter Area 100 5000

RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL CNS PAGE NO.

SHOCK CONDITION EP/1/A/5000/FR-P.1 18 of 48 Revision 25

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c. Verify RVLIS indication adequate as c. RETURN TO Step 14.

follows:

IF all NC pumps are off, THEN verify "REACTOR VESSEL LR LEVEL" -

GREATER THAN 61%.

IF any NC pump is on, THEN verify "REACTOR VESSEL D/P" -

GREATER THAN REQUIRED D/P FROM TABLE BELOW:

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d. Dispatch operator to restore power to all CLA discharge isolation valves.

REFER TO EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 9 (Power Alignment for CLA Valves).

e. Maintain NC pressure greater than CLA pressure until the CLAs are isolated or vented.