ML19327C270

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LER 89-020-00:on 891011,pressure Spike in Reactor Vessel Ref Leg Resulted in ESF Actuation During Filling & Venting of Pressure Transmitter.Caused by Personnel Error.Technicians Counseled & Retrained in Venting procedures.W/891113 Ltr
ML19327C270
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 11/13/1989
From: Cowles R, Hagan J
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-020-01, LER-89-20-1, NUDOCS 8911220100
Download: ML19327C270 (5)


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Pubhc Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box ?36 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 L' Hope Creek Operations l l' ..

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November 13, 1989  !

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk

,. , Washington, DC 20555 '

Dear Sir:

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354 UNIT NO. 1 .;

LICF.NSEE EVENT REPORT 89-020-00 ,

This Licensee Event Report is being submittod pursuant to ,

< the requirements of 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv) .

l Sincerely, ,

.J. a an  !

General Manager -

Hope Creek Operations ,

5 RBC/

1 Attachment SORC Ntg.89-131 f C Distribution l i

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ABSTRnCT (16) i on October 11, 1989 during performance of an IEC sensor calibration .

procedure, a pressure spike in the associated reactor vessel level 1 reference leg resulted in an Engineered Safety Features (ESP) actuation of  :

coveral plant systems / components. The pressure spike was induced in the i reference leg during the process of filling and venting a recently replaced pressure transmitter. The root cause of this incident was a  ;

personnel error on the part of the technicians performing the sensor '

calibration in not properly following the associated procedure for the filling and venting evolution. Corrective actions consist of counselling for the technicians involved in the incident.  :

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0 0 0 2 7 0 4 I PLANT _AND_ SYSTEM _ IDENTIFICATION l General' Electric - Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)

Reactor instrumentation (EIIS Designation: IG)

Filtration, Recirculation, and Ventilation system (EIIS: VA)

Reactor Recirculation (EIIS: AD)

Torus Water Cleanup (EIIS: CG)

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Actuation during Performance  !

of Sensor Calibration Due to Personnel Error Event Date: 10/11/89 i Event Time: 0228 i This LER was initiated by Incident Report No.89-134 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE {

i Plant in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 (Refueling) i DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE j On 10/11/89 at 0228, control room personnel received  :

indications that the following ESF functions had occurred:  !

"A" and "E" Filtration, Recirculation, and Ventilation i system (FRVS) recire fans started l "A" FRVS Vent fan started t

- Reactor Recirculation system sample valve closed ,

- Torus Water Cleanup system inboard and outboard  ;

containment isolation valves closed.

7mmediate investigation by control room personnel determined  ;

that the above actuations / isolations were the result of an ,

invalid reactor vessel low level signal generated during the performance of an I&C department sensor calibration on a vessel level reference leg. All actuations were verified as having '

properly occurred, with the exception of equipment and components which were cleared and tagged due to the refueling outagc. After resetting the invalid low level signals, all ,

affected equipment was returned to a normal status.

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APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The root cause of this occurrence was a personnel error on the I part of.I&C technicians performing a calibration procedure on t a vessel level reference leg pressure transmitter (PT).  !

Following replacement of the PT during corrective maintenance, c

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the technicians did not properly follow the associated t procedure for the filling and venting of the PT. These actions i resulted in a pressure spike in the associated reference leg,  ;

causing the level transmitter nearest the PT to sense a false low vessel level, and initiated the previously discussed system responses. j During the performance of the subject calibration procedure, the technicians attempted to fill the PT by opening the PT ,

isolation valve and venting the PT through a vent plug. The  ;

procedure steps call for filling / venting through the vent and  ;

drain valves of the PT.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES  ;

t A search of previous occurrences determined that five i reportable events since 1986 have been attributed to hydraulic transients in the vessel level reference legs (reft LERs ,86-043,'86-054,86-055, 86-093, and 87-030). None were as a  :

result of personnel error while filling and venting  !

instrumentation, however, the backfilling procedure for ,

reference leg instruments was modified as a result of these events.  ;

i SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE t i

This incident posed minimal safety significance, as the station was in a refueling outage at the time of this event, and .

primary. containment integrity was not required to be in place.

Additionally, this incident is normally performed only during L

outage conditions, and would not have been performed during normal power operation except in the event of failed ,

instrumentation.

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1. The technicians involved were counselled with regard to their actions which led to this event. Additionally, the I technicians- have been retrained in the correct instrumentation fill and vent procedure for vessel reference leg instrumentation.
2. The Nuclear Training Department will review this incident .

for incorporation into I&C technician training curriculun ,

on filling and venting instrumentation. Additionally, the l technicians involved will, during a monthly Maintenance l Department review of station events, present the '

circumstances of this incident and their involvement t o' all personnel in their department.

i Since oly, i n

General Manager -

Hope Creek Operations f RBC/

SORC Mtg.89-131 l t

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