ML19329E729

Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law in Form of Initial Decision.Orders AEC to Issue CP to CPC & That Initial Decision Constitutes Final Decision

ML19329E729
Person / Time
Site:	Midland
Issue date:	08/15/1972
From:	Restrick J CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML19329E728	List: ML19329E727 ML19329E729
References
NUDOCS 8006170886
Download: ML19329E729 (268)

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f UNITED STATES OF A!EBICA ATOMIC ENERGY C0!41ISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING B01RD In the Matter of )

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CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-329 and 50-330

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(Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2)

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APPLICANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE FORM OF AN INITIAL DECISION INTRODUCTION

1. This proceedin6 has been commenced pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, h2 U.S.C. $2011 et seq., (hereinafter the "Act") for the purpose of considering issuance of a construction permit for a nuclear plant. The Act provides for a twg-step licensing procedure involving issuance of a construction permit prior to con-struction of a plant and issuance of an operating license following completion of construction (h2 U.S.C. $2235) . An application for a construction permit presents the technical and financial information regarding an applicant and sets forth preliminary design criteria and analyses (k2 U.S.C. $2235; 10 CFR $50 34) . It is furnished to local governmental officials and made available to the public (10 CFR $2.101).

The application is reviewed by the Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC)

He6ulatory Staff (" Staff") and by the Advisory Committee on Reactor, i

~ Safeguards ("ACRS"), a body of independent experts (42 U.S.C. $2232b) .

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In such review, the Staff visits.the proposed site cnd ensures the k

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2 completeness of the information furnished by the applicant and the Staff and the ACRS review the material to ensure that the proposed plant can be constructed and operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

2. Prior to the effective date (January 1,1970) of the National

-Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (nEPA) (42 U.s.c. 54321 et seq.), AEC jurisdiction was limited to those issues, primarily matters of radio-logical health and safety, prescribed in the Act and the AEC's regula-tions. NEPA, however, requires the AEC to make an environmental evaluation of its major actions having a significant effect on the environment. The AEC promulgated regulations designed to implement the requirements of ITEPA (35 F.R. 5M3; 35 F.R.18469) . Rovever, on July 23, 1971, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found such regulations to be in noncompliance with the requirements of NEPA (Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Connittee, Inc. v AEC, 449 F2d 1109, (D.C. Cir 1971)) . Subsequent to that decision the AEC prcmulgated its presently effective regulations implementing NEPA (10 CFR 550 App. D) . Under the effective regulations, an appli-cant files an environmental report, which is made available to the public,-detailing the envircmmental impacts of the proposed action and alternatives available and makes a cost-benefit analysis of the project and alternatives; the Staff reviews the information furnished, makes independent investigation and issues a draft environmental statement which is made available to the public and Federal, state and local agencies for comment;-and on receipt of comments the Staff a

3 evaluates them and iscues a final environmental statement which details the impact and alternatives and presents a cost-benefit analysis (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix D).

3 Following favorable Staff review of the application and the environmental aspects of the plant, a mandatory hearing is held before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (42 U.S.C. 52239; 42 U.S.C. $2241).

Public notice of the hearing is given and interventions are permitted by interested persons. The hearing board does not conduct a de, novo review of the application in uncontested proceedings, but detemines whether the application and record of the proceeding contain sufficient information on radiological health and safety, whether the Staff Ie-view has been adeauate and whether the requirements of NEPA and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix D, have been complied with, and makes an independent final environmental balancing among any conflictin6 factors in the record. In a contested proceeding the hearing board additionally makes a de novo determination of any matters in controversy between the parties. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the hearing board issues its initial decision which, if favorable, empowers the Staff to issue a construction permit and which modifies the final environmental state-ment to the extent its conclusions differ with those of the final state-ment. I

4. Following receipt of a construction permit, an applicant must apply for an operating license setting forth final design and analyses and identifying any differences from the construction pemit.

Additionally, the applicant must file an environmental report discussing l only those matters that differ from the construction permit stage report. l i

4 Review by the Staff and ACRS is conducted and new environmental state-ments are prepared and circulated on matters contained in the operat-ing license stage environmental report and other matters that the Staff believes should be included. However, a public hearing is no't required on the operating license application unless a person whose interest may be affected requests one. If, followind notice of in-tent to issue a license, no intervention is received, the AEC can pro-ceed to issue a license after it has satisfied itself that the plant as designed and constructed can be operated so as not to create an 4

undue risk to the health and safety of the public and that environ-mental factors have been adequately considered. If, however, an intervention is received, a hearing vill be held before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to detemine the matters in controversy.

Following a favorable decision, the operating license will be issued.

PRELIMINARY STATEMElff 5 On January 13, 1969, ConsumersPowerCompany(" Applicant")

filed with the Atomic Energy Commission ("AEC" or "Comission") an application for a license to construct and operate a dual purpose pres-surized water nuclear power plant (" application" or "PSAR"). The pro-

, posed plant, designated the Midland Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

(" Plant"), would produce approximately 1300 megawatts of electricity and 4,050,000 pounds of process steam for use by the Dow Chemical Cca-pany. It is to be located on Applicant's approximately 1200-acre site on the south shore of the Tittabawassee River in Midland County, Michigen.

6. The application has undergone an extensive and continuous review by the Comission's Regulatory Staff (" Staff") since its filing.

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Even prior to the filing of the application, the Staff connnenced the regulatory review with a number of informal site discussions. The Staff met with the Applicant on numerous occasions to discuss the application and made a number of requests for additional information. The applica-tion was amended twenty-one times to provide such additional informa-tion and to update previously supplied information. Copies of the application and each amendment were served on the Mayor of the City of Midland, the Township Supervisor of Midland Township and the Chair-man of the County Board of Supervisors by the Applicant as they were filed. Additionally, copies of the application and amendments were transmitted by the AEC to the Governor of the State of Michigan and were placed in the AEC's Public Document Room in Washington, D. C.

as they were received.

7 In its review of the application, the Staff consulted with numerous independent experts on specialized subject matters, e.g.,

climate and meteorology (Air Resources Environmental Laboratory, National Oceanic and Atmospherie Administration, Department of Commerce); seis-micity (U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, Environmental Science Services Administration, Departme:nt of Commerce and John A. Blume & Associates, Engineers); fish and vildlife (U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Depart-ment of the Interior), and geology and hydrology (U. S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior) (Staff Safety Evaluation, p. 2, and Appendices C, D, E, F and G, following Tr. 1674). The Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards ("ACRS") also reviewed the application and held six sub-committee meetings including a site visit and four full committee meetings regarding the

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6 application (Applicant's Ex. k and Ex. 5) . After identifying a number of items to be resolved during construction of the Plant, the ACRS in its reports, ' dated June 18, 1970 and September 23, 1970, reached a favorable decision and concluded that the Plant, Units 1 and 2, "can be constructed with reasonable assurance that they can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public." (Appli-cant's Ex. 4 and Ex. 5) After almost two years of review, the Staff in its Staff Safety Evaluation ("SSE"), dated November 24, 1970, con-cluded, ancog other things, that ". . ., the proposed facility can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public;" (SSE, p. 87, following Tr .

1674). By Amendments Nos. 20 and 21, dated April 2,1971 and July 6, 1971, respectively, Applicant modified its liquid radwaste system to reduce rvleases to very low levels and to update financial and corporate information. On November 3,1971, Applicant incorporated as part of its application Babcock & Wilcox Company Topical Reports BAW-10015; BAW-10015, Supplement 1; and BAW-loo 34 to demonstrate compliance of l

the Plant's proposed emergency core cooling system with the AEC's Interim Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems For Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors. By letter, dated January 6, 1

1972, Applicant incorporated in its application Revision 1 to BAW-LOO 34.

Following review of these various filings, the Staff issued a supple-

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ment, dated January 14, 1972, to its Safety Evaluation, dated November 12, i

1970. The Supplemental Safety Evaluation concluded that "the conclu- l sions reached in our Safety Evaluation . . . are still valid and that N

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7 the proposed facility can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public."

(Staff Ex. 8)

8. By letter dated July 30, 1970 from the Director, Division of Reactor Licensing, Applicant was granted an exemption authorizing it to perfonn certain below grade construction activities at the site. In November,1970, because of the prolonged hearing that appeared to be inevitable, Applicant suspended all site activity except for necessary material preservation and material receiving. Such suspension has con-tinued in effect to the present time. As of the present, the following site activities which vere performed pursuant to the previously effective 10 CFR $50.lO(b)(1) and (3) and the exemption are at the following stages of completion:

Clearing and preparation of site (80% complete);

site excavation, preliminary construction activities for nuclear facilities and construction work on non-nuclear facilities (5% complete);  :

concrete placement for substructure of auxiliary I building (75% complete), for tendon galleries (65% complete), and for reactor building foundations (20% ccuplete) (Applicant's letter, dated April 18, 1972).

Pursuant to 10 CFR $50.12(b), Applicant by letter dated April 18, 1972 requested the Ccanaission to consider granting an exemption authorizing Applicant to engage in certain activities previously allowed by its regulations but prohibited by 10 CFR $50.10(c) [ adopted effective March 11, 1972], and to allow Applicant to retain the construction exemption dated July 30, 1970. In Applicant's letter of April 18, 1972, Applicant stated that it had no intent 1on to resume work at that time and therefore requested that the Commission hold in abeyance any au-s thorization to resume construction pursuant to $50.12(a) until such

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8 time as the approximate date of receipt of a construction pemit might be predictable and, Applicant might make a supplemental filing specifying the desired date for the authorization.

9 At the time the application was filed the jurisdiction of the AEC was regarded by AEC as limited to matters of financial and techincal competence and protection of the health and safety of the public against radiological hazards (State of New Hampshire v Atomic Energy Commission, 395 U.S. 962, 406 F2d 170 (1 Cir 1969) cert. denied).

However, with the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.s.C. 54321 et seq.) ("NEPA"), effective January 1,1970, all Federal agencies were required to make an environmental evaluation of major actions having a significant effect on the environment. The AEC, on April 2, 1970, was the first agency to promulgate a regulation designed to provide for environmental review pursuant to NEPA (35 F.R.

5463). This regulation provided for circulation of the application to Federal agencies for coment and for preparation of an environ-mental statement by the AEC following receipt of such comments. On 4

June 3,1970, the AEC proposed revised environmental regulations to reflect recently issued guidance of the Council on Environmental Quality and enactment of the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 (33 U.S.C.

$1171; 35 F.R. 8594). The proposed regulation provided for submission ol .nvironmental reports by applicants, circulation of such reports to Federal agencies and noticing availability of such reports to the public and state and local agencies, preparation of a detailed state '

-ment by the agency following receipt of ecxmnents and treating certificates i

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of compliance with the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 as satis-fying concerns as to environmental effects on water quality.

10. On request of the AEC, Applicant filed an environmental report, dated July 24, 1970, in compliance with the proposed regulations.

The environmental report was circulated to Federal agencies for emunents and the public and state and local agencies were given notice of its availability and requested to comment on it (35 F.R.12795, August 12, 1970). Coments were received from the U. S. Departments of Defense, Housing are Urban Developnent, Interior and Agriculture, the Federal Pcwer Corsnission and the Michigen Department of Natural Resources (Draft Environmental Statement, Appendices A-G, F bruary 5,1971) .

Applicant filed its responses to the coments received and requested the AEC to circulate its draft environmental statement for co::nnent in compliance with the then in effect guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality.

11. On December 4, 1970, the AEC issued effective revised environmental regulations (35 F.R. 18469, December 4, 1970). The re-vised regulations provided for suhnission by applicants of environmental reports presenting the applicants' assessment of environmental impact and possible alternatives to alter the impact, preparation and circu-lation of a draft environmental statement by the Staff, and preparation of a final environmental statement by the Staff following receipt and consideration of comments received. The revised regulations also provided, among other things, that environmental factors need not be considered by

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10 Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards at hearings unless affinnatively raised by parties or the Staff, prohibited the raising of nonradiological environ-mental matters in hearings noticed prior to March 4, 1971, and provided that no independent evaluation need be made of environmental factors that

, had been certified by other Federal agencies as complying with their standards.

Applicant furnished additional environmental information on January 19, 1971 in response to a request from the Staff and the Staff on February 5, 1971 issued its Draft Detailed Environmental Statement for circulation to Federal agencies and state and local agencies and the public were given notice of its availability and an opportunity to comment (36 F.R. 3080, February 17, 1971). Coonents were received frca the U. S. Departments of Interior, Transportation (U. S. Coast Guard), Health, Education and Welfare (Bureau of Radiological Health and Food and Drug Administration) and Commerce, the Environmental Protection Agency and the' Environmental Defense Fund.

On May 20, 1971 and June 21, 1971, Applicant filed responses to the cca-ments received.

12. On July 23, 1971, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit required the AEC, inter alia, to revise its regulations to require consideration of environmental matters at all hearings before Atomic Safety and Licensin6 Boards and to perform an independent evaluation of environmental factors even where other Federal agent- s had certified their compliance with applicable standards (Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F2d 1109 (D.C. Cir 1971)) . The AEC, on September 9, 1971, revised its regulations to reflect the decision of the Court (36 F.R.18071) and this, with several s

subsequent amendments, constitutes the present AEC regulations,10 CFR Part So, Appendix D.

11 13 Following issuance of the new regulations, Applicant filed its Supplemental Environmental Report, dated October 19, 1971, with amendments in response to questions from the Staff, dated December 10, 1971, December 24, 1971 and January 7, 1972 (Applicant's Exhibits 38F-1, 38F-2,

. - 38F-3, 38G, 38H and 38I, hereinafter collectively "ASER" or " Supplemental EnvironmentalReport"). The availability of the ASER was noticed in the Federal Register for January 5, 1972 (37 F.R. 104). The AEC employed the expert services of personnel at Argonne National Laboratory to aid them in their environmental evaluation. Staff and Ale;onne personnel visited the site and its environs and contacted many of the local and state agencies in their evaluation (Final Environmental Statement, Appendix A; Tr. 7618-7624). The AEC circulated for ccanment and noticed the availability of a new Draft Environ-mental State:nent, dated January 7, 1972 (36 F.R. 410, January 11,1972).

Consnents were received from the Department of Transportation (United States Coast Guard); Department of Consnerce (Bureau of Domestic Ccramerce, the National Bureau of Standards and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration); Department of Health, Education and Welfare; Federal Power Commission; United States Department of the Interior; Department of Agriculture (Soil Conservation Service and Forest Service); Depart-m ut of Housing and Urban Developnent; Environmental Protection Agency; Midland Township Supervisor; Midland Public Schools; East Central Mic'aigan Eccalamic Developnent District; Greater Midland Area Chamber of Consnerce; Midland United Conservation Clubs; and the utility boards sf the Cities of Grand Haven, Holland, Coldwater, Traverse City and Zeeland, Michigan and the Northern Michigan ani Wolverine Electric A

Cooperative (Staff Ex. 6, Appendix E) .

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14. Following evaluation and review by the Staff of the numerous, generally favorable comments received from various agencies and the public and of responses by Applicant to such ccaments, the Staff in March 1972 issued its Final Environmental Statement (FES) e which concluded "that the benefits to be derived from operation of the Midland Plant Units 1 and 2 outweigh the adverse effects identi-fied in this statement." (Staff Ex. 6) The Final Environmental State-ment, the availability of which was noticed in the Federal Register on April 7,1972 (37 CFR 7012), further concluded that if certain ad-ditional actions were taken by Applicant, "frcm the standpoint of environmental effects the action called for is the issuance of a con-struction permit . . . ."

15 Under AEC regulations, including 10 CFR Parts 2 and 50, and the notice of hearing in this proceeding, the responsibilities of this Board with respect to radiological safety differ depending on whether this is a contested or uncontested proceeding. If this is a contested proceeding, the Board is charged with the responsibility to adjudicate all contested nuclear safety issues. "As to matters not in controversy", the Board is "neither required nor expected to dupli-cate the review already performed by the Commission's regulatory staff and the ACRS; the Board is authorized to rely upon the testimony of the regulatory staff and the applicant, and the conclusions of the ACRS, which are not controverted by any party." (10 CFR 2, App. A,

$VI(b)(k)). The Board has found that certain issues were contested and has so conducted this proceeding. By various orders and requests to the opposing intervenors, the Board attempted to obtain frcn them

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prior to the oral hearing a reasonable specification of the matters they controverted and a description of the evidence upon which they

relied. The efforts of the Board were unsuccessful.

16. Insofar as radiological safety matters were concerned, Saginav and Mapleton Intervenors made or filed only general statements of contention without the specification or description of supporting facts. The issues they. raised at the hearing itself seemed to bear til.y a coincidental relationship to the statements of contention pre-viot. sly made. At the hearing, Saginaw Intervenors presented no affirma-tive case other than a single witness, a police official from East Lansing, who testified in connection with the matter of Applicant's emergency procedures. Mapleton Intervenors presented no vf tnesses other than two individuals on meteorological matters. Except with re-spect to the testir'ny of those three witnesses, opposition intervenors attempted to contest the adequacy of the application solely by cross-exnmina+ don of the Applicant and Staff. Thousands of pages of testimony and weeks of hearings in 1971 on radiological matters were thus occupied by cross-examination of Applicant and Staff, which, in the opinion of the Board, was primarily in the nature of discovery and was largely unproductive.

The cross-examination of Staff and Applicant by Saginav and Mapleton Intervenors was ' addressed principally to the following subjects:

(1) Meteorology and the adequacy of related

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dose calculations.

(2) Quality assursnee.

(3) Emergency procedures.

. (4) Sodium thiosulfate iodine spray removal.

Since much time was devoted to cross-e:: amination on these subjects, and intervenors presented witnesses as to two of them, the matters have been

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traated by the Board in these findings as cor. tested although, in a strict sense, it is questionable whether (except as te wteorology) sufficient evidence was adduced by intervenors to create any substantial issues.

Consequently, the Board, as to each of these subjects, in addition to deciding the " contested" issues, has considered the adequacy of the record and of the Regulatory Staff review.

17 With respect to these matters, therefore, the members of the Board frequently asked questions of the Applicant and Staff in,an attempt

- to develop a full record and to determine whether there was a basis for intervenors' concern. By asking such questions, the Board sought also to establish with regard to these matters whether there was sufficient infomation in the record and whether or not the Staff had performed an adequate regulatory review.

18. Under the AEC regulations, including 10 CFR Parts 2 and 50, Appendix D, and the Supplemental Notice of Hearing in this proceeding, dated November 29, 1971 (36 F.R. 23169), the Board's re-sponsibilities with respect to environmental matters also differ depending upon whether the proceeding with respect to such matters is contested.

As in the case of nuclear safety matters, the Board found certain issues to be contested and has so conducted this proceeding. Under the Supplemental Notice and 10 CFR Parts 2 and 50, it is the responsibility of the Board to decide all contested matters and whether the pemits should be issued as proposed. In addition, it is the responsibility of the Board, re-gardless of whether the proceeding is contested, to " determine whether the requuements of Sections lO2(2)(C) and (D) of NEPA and Appendix D . . .

have been ecaplied with"; to " independently consider the final balance g i --

15 among conflicting factors contained in the proceeding with a view toward determining the appropriate action to be taken"; and to " determine whether the construction permits should be granted, denied or appro-priately conditioned to protect environmental values" (Supplemental Notice, Par. No. 3; 10 CFR 2, Appendix A, $VI(c); 10 CFR 50, Appendix t

D). From this statement it is evident that the Board has responsibilities under the Supplemental Notice and Connission regulations which impose upon it responsibilities " independently to consider the balance among conflicting (environmental] factors".

19 The Board has been impressed by the work done both by Applicant and Staff since the Court of Appeals decision in the Calvert Cliffs case in July 1971. Comprehensive inforntion was included in the.\SER and in the amendments thereto in which Applicant responded to

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requests from the Staff for additional information. The comments filed by other egencies (FES Appendix E, Staff Ex. 6) show that the Staff's Draft Detailed Environmental Statement (Staff Ex, 5) was given extensive I

consideration by many agencies of government. It is clear fr a Appli-cant's responses (Applicant's Exhibits 38K and 38L) to those comments and from the FES that the agency cm ments received extensive consideration by both Applicant and Staff.

20. The Board is also impressed by the scope and depth of the AEC Regulatory Staff review. Expert consultants from the Argonne National j Laboratory and elsewhere were retained to assist the Staff in their review, in the preparation of Draft Detailed Environmental Statement and the FES and in the furnishing of information to the Board at the hearing.

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It is clear to the Board frcan its review of the Staff request to Applicant for additional infomation, from the Board's review of agency ccumnents and the FES, and frca the testimony of the Staff and its consultants at the hearing, that the Staff and its con-sultants carried out a conscientious and competent review of environmental matters under NEPA and Appendix D,10 CFR 50.

21. Intervenors' participation in the environmental aspects of the proceeding since the Calvert Cliffs decicion was not character-ized by the same earnestness and effort to frame issues and 1\trnish infomation for the record. In particalar:

A. Saginav and Mapleton Intervenors failed to pursue their rights of discovery and deposition.

(Paragraphs 143, 150, 151 and 154);

B. For the most part, Saginav and Mapleton Inter-venors failed repeatedly to identify in good faith the nature and basis for their contentions.

(Paragraphs 143, 148, 149, 150, 153 and 154);

C. Neither Saginaw nor Mapleton Intervenors filed comments on the Draft Environmental Statement.

D. On April 28, 1972, Mapleton Intervenors stated they had no direct testimony or witnesses and then produced seven witnesses at the hearing on matters as to which all significant information had been available to them for many months.

..s 17 E. Testimony of Mapleton Intervenors' witnesses and cross-eynmination by counsel for Mapleton Inter-venors may generally be characterized as not reflecting careful preparation. Their testimony for the most part was either of little probative value or bore only remote relevance to significant issues in the case.

As in the hearings in 1971, the members of the Board frequently asked questions of the Applicant and the Staff in an attempt to devriop a full record and to determine whether there was a basis for intervenors' contentions. By asking such questions, the Board also sought to carry out its responsibilities under the Supplemental Notice of Hearing and 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix A, $VI(c) .

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22. By publication in the Federal Register, 35 F.R. 16749, October 29, 1970, the Consnission announced that a public hearing would l l

be held before this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (hereinafter l l

" Board") to consider whether a construction pemit should be granted i to Applicant. The notice of hearing established the time and place of hearing and the time and place of a prehearing conference. It also explained how interested persons could petition for leave to intervene in the proceedings as parties and how persons wishing to express their views at the hearing could do so without becoming intervening parties.

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The Applicant and Staff made timely notices of appearance in this pro-ceeding. Applicant was represented by Lovenstein, Newman & Reis (pri- l marily Robert Lowenstein, Esq.), Smith & Brooker, P.C. (primarily Richard G. Smith, Esq.) and John K. Restrick, Esq.; and the Staff was represented primarily by David E. Kartalia, Esq. and Thomas F. Engelhardt, Esq.

Within the time pemitted for intervention by the notice of hearing, petitions to intervene in the proceeding were filed by the Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF") represented by the fim of Berlin, Roisman and Kessler (primarily by Anthony Z. Roisman, Esq. and Gladys Kessler, Esq.), by the Dow Chemical Company ("Dov") represented by the firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hayes and Handler (primarily by Milton R.

Wessel, Esq.) and James N. O'Connor, Esq. and by the Midland Nuclear Power Comittee represented by the firm of Kendall and Curris (James A.

Kendall, Esq.) and a joint petition to intervene was filed by the Saginaw Valley Nuclear Study Group, Citizens conmittee for Environmental Protection of Michigan, Sierra Club, United Auto Workers of America, Trout Unlimited, West Michigan Environmental Action Council and University of Michigan Environmental Law Society ("Saginav Intervenors") all represented by Myron M. Cherry, Esq. These petitions were granted by the Board in its Order dated November 24, 1970. Trout unlimited subsequently withdrev frca the proceeding (Tr. 5685-86). A late petition to intervene, filed by six residents of the community of Mapleton ("Mapleton Intervenors")

represented by William J. Ginster, Esq. (subsequently with Irving Like, Esq.

as co-counsel), was pemitted by the Board's Order of December 8,1970.

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19 23 The State of Kansas filed a petition to intervene, dated September 13, 1971, on environmental matters, particularly ultimate dis-posal of high level vastes from reprocessing of spent fuel from the nuclear plant. Over objection from the Applicant, the State of Kansas was permitted to intervene initially only on the legal issue of whether the environmental effects of such vaste disposal was a proper issue in the proceeding. By publication in the Federal Register (December 4,1971, 36 F.R. 23169), the AEC issued a Supplemental Notice of Hearing on Ap-plication for Construction Permits to reflect revised regulations,10 CFR 50, ' Appendix D, in implementation of NEPA. Mr. Steve Gadler filed a petition to intervene pursuant to the Supplemental Notice. The peti-tion to intervene was opposed by the Applicant and the Staff and the Board in its Order, dated February 9, 1972, concluded that there was doubt that he satisfied the minimal requirements of standing and that the public interest which he claimed to represent was adequately repre-sented by the three groups of intervenors participating in the proceed-ing. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, in its Order of March 31, 1972, denied Mr. Gadler's petition to review the Board's Order of February 9, 1972.

RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PREHEARING PROCEDURES

24. Prehearing conferences were held on November 17, 1970, December 1,1970, January 21,1971, April 2 and 3,1971, May 1,1971, and June 7, 1971. The Board attempted to use the prehearing confer-ences as a means of developing an orderly discovery process ~and de-fining the matters in controversy between the parties. However, the e

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Board was continually frustrated in its attempts by the repeated delays of the Saginav and Mapleton Intervenors in commencing discovery, and by their repeated failures to comply with Board orders and Cc:221ssion regulations or to make any effort to convert their general unsupported s contentions into any meaningfully specific contentions that would ap-prise the Board and other parties as to their position on various issues or their basis for challenging the proposed construction permit.

25 The Board, in its Order of December 8,1970, ordered Mapleton Intervenors to file a statement of their legal issues by December 11, 1970 and a preliminary list of witnesses and scope of their testimony by December 15, 1970. Mapleton Intervenors de-faulted en both of these obligations and continued to default on

< the Board's repeated orders to them to provide specific contentions (TR 546, 1218-10, order of March 3, 1971). Mapleton Intervenors did finally furaish a statement of contentions on June 8, 1971 in response to the Board's Order of May 18, 1971 requiring such filing by June 7,1971.

Applicant by motion, dated June 19, 1971, moved the Board for an order striking the contentions of Mapleton Intervenors, revoking their inter-vention and dismissing their petition to intervene. This motion was denied by the Board (Tr. 1519-20) which at the June 24, 1971 hearing informed Mapleton Intervenors that their contentions were insufficiently specific and ordered further specification (Tr. 2295-2298). At the hearing of July 7,1971, the Board again found it necessary to inquire of Mapleton Intervenors when they would specify their contentions (Tr.2690). On July 8,1971, following a further filing of Mapleton s

Intervenors, the Board indicated that it did not find the further filing

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much of an improvement over previous filings (Tr. 2951) . Following this, the Mapleton Intervenors did in fact present two witnesses on meteorology.

Mapleton Intervenors did not actively participate in the radiological health and safety prehearing processes and made their presence known primarily through a series of defaults ani lame excuses.

26. The Midland Nuclear Power Connittee intervened in favor of the Plant and did not participate actively in the prehearing pro-cedures or at the hearing. The Environmental Defense Fund raised no radiological health and safety questions, conducted no discovery on such matters, and did not appear at the radiological health and safety hearing.

27 All of the remaining parties: The Applicant, the Staff, i Dow and Saginaw Intervenors, pa-ticipated in the prehearing procedures.

l The major portion of the Board's and the parties' efforts between the '

first prehearing, November 17, 1970, and the ecxnmencement of the evi-dentiary hearing, June 21, 1971, was devoted to attempting to secure frcxn Saginaw Intervenors some meaningful specification of their con-tentions and to attempting to get them to conduct discovery. Saginaw Intervenors refused to specify their contentions on the ground that '

they did not have enough information (Tr. 98) and yet refused to re-view documents which Applicant voluntarily made available to them on December 1,1970 (Tr.122, 389, W3, 612) until April 5,1971 and I

failed to file any interrogatories until March 22, 1971 in spite of a Board order, dated November 24, 1970, requiring such filing by l

January 7, 1971 and in spite of a " good faith" obligation to " serve a substantial batch of interrogatories" by February 11, 1971 (Tr. 600, l l

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m 22 606-607). ~ Saginaw Intervenors' reason for not filing any interroga-tories by the February 11, 1971 " good faith" date was that the appli-cation relied on documents, including proprietary documents, not readily available. (See letter dated February 12,1971.) Yet all of these documents had been made available to Saginav Intervenors two months earlier on December 1,1970 and they had refused to look at them. (See letter of Applicant dated February 23, 1971.) The Board in its Order of March 3, 1971 stated:

". . it is cause for concern that although the petitions for intervention were granted on November 17, 1970, and interrogatories originally required by January 7, nothing has been produced to date by intervenors except briefs on questions of law -- most of which are frivolous or clearly controlled by previous court or Atomic Energy Commission decision." p.1 On March 22, 1971, Saginaw Intervenors served lengthy interrogatories i

on Applicant, the Staff, Dow and the Midland nuclear Power Committee.

A large. number of those filed on the latter three were duplicates of those filed on Applicant. Applicant promptly answered most of the in-terrogatories, Dov answered a few and objected to the remainder and the Midland Nuclear Power Conunittee and the Staff objected to all as being unreasonable and burdensome. The Board in its Order of May 13, 1971 sustained most of Applicant's and Dov's objections and found that because of the Midland Nuclear Power Co::nittee's limited role in the proceedings the interrogatories directed to it seemed " intended more to harass than enlighten." In its Order of June 1,1971, the Board, after extensive briefing by all concerned parties, determined that, apart frcan those interrogatories that it had specifically ordered the Staff to answer, it needn't answer most of the interrogatories directed to it. Those that did not need to be answered included all of those

23 that were duplicative of those asked of Applicant. The basis of the Board's decision was that the interrogatories were burdensome, both as a result of their number and of the type of infomation they sought to elicit. The interrogatories did not seek facts but sought instead to explore the thou6ht processes of the Staff over the previous two years. As stated in the Order of May 13, 1972:

"It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that com-plete ansvers to these interrogatories would require the staff to prepare a justification, intelligible to laymen, of the whole history of the developnent of pressurized water reactors, without, in the Board's view making a significant contribution to safety." p. 3

28. At the conclusion of the radiological health and safety prehearing procedure, Saginaw Intervenors, the only active opposition intervenors, had received at least the following documentation and in-i fomation:

1. Four-volume application - Available beginning January 13, 1969 with amendments thereto available as filed.

2. Applicant's files frcxn which Saginav Intervenors ,

had received copies of in excess of 8,000 pages of docu- l ments, viewed over double that number of pages and had available to them an even greater quantity of material -

Available to intervenors beginning December 1,1970, but i not viewed until early April 1971.

l 3 Applicent's two-volume set of ansvers to ap-proximately 210 interrogatories filed on April 13 1971 in response to interrogatories filed March 22, 1971 (originally ordered by Board on November 25, 1970 to be filed by January 7,1971 but deadline extended on request of Saginav Intervenors to March 22,1971).

4. All documents on file in the AEC Public Docu-ment Room - Available at all times.

5 The Staff Safety Evaluation - Available begin-ning November 12, 1970.

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6. A list of 159 documents upon which the Staff re-lied in preparation of the Staff Safety Evaluation, all but eight of which were publicly available (the eight being available in the documents Applicant made available December 1, 1970) - List furnished to intervenors in early December 1970.

7 Collection of 136 documents furnished by AEC to intervenors in April of 1971.

8. List of 51 documents in the possession of Dow Chemical Company - List furnished December 3,1970 but no motion for production supported by good cause made.

9 Answers by Dow Chemical Company, filed March 30, 1971, to 25 interrogatories received March 22, 1971 (originally ordered by Board on November 25, 1970 to be filed by January 7,1971 but deadline extended on request of Saginaw Intervenors to March 22, 1971).

Althou6h Saginaw Intervenors had stated at the beginning of the prehearing procedure that they could not make contentions in the absence of the various documents underlying the application (Tr. 69), they still refused to furnish the Board with any meaningful contentions beyond a brief, self-styled non-exclusive listing of areas of cross-examination, dated June 10, 1971. They primarily based their refusal on the refusal of the Staff to produce certain internal documents and memoranda that the Board had ordered them to produce in its Order of May 19, 1971 and on the delay by the Staff in answering those interrogatories that the Board had ruled should be answered.* The Board had permitted all interventions although

• The Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board in its Order, dated September 3,1971, upheld the Board's ruling that certain Staff documents could be withheld and reversed the ruling of the Board ordering certain documents produced on the basis that such documents were privileged under 10 CFR $2 744 and such disclose e would be con-trary to the public interest. Additionally, the Staff did file ansvers to the required interrogatories during the course of the hearing, which filings resulted in no additional areas of concern from Saginaw Inter-Venors.

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25 one was untimely and the demonstration of interest in all of them was not very clear. However, the Board viewed the granting of the intervention l not as the end, but only the berluning of the process of defining the I i 1 I proper role of intervenors in a proceeding of this kind. The Board in l its Order of March 3,1971 infomed the intervenors that they would be  ;

i

'given a fair opportunity to make their case but that the primary function l of intervenors is to assist the Board in making its safety evaluation. As a corollary of the Board's view that at the time of intervention intervenors l

had not had time to adequately prepare, the Board is of the opinion that with 1 adequate time for preparation the intervenors should have availed themselves of the opportunity to secure a technical evaluation of the documents pub-licly available and made available to them by the parties. In light of the amount of n%cerial available to them, Saginaw Intervenors' refusal to specify i l

their contentions and the bases of such contentions could only be viewed as indicating a lack of any substantive contentions, an unwillingness to put in the effort necessary to fomulate contentions or an attempt to delay the proceeding or create a confused record. Althou6h Saginaw Intervenors had 1 refused to specify their contentions or file any affirmative evidence in compliance with the Board's Order of March 3, 1971, the Board denied Appli-cant's motion to dismies the intervention (Tr. 1519-20) and in the interest of maintainir.g public participation in the proceeding permitted them to par-

~ ticipate in the hearing by way of cross-examination of Applicant, Dow and 7

Staff witnesses. However, the Board made it clear that there vould have to be sane specification by Saginav Intervenors why a particular kind of inquiry ought to be made before it would be allowed (Tr. 1383) and if, after preliminary inquiry in an area, the Board felt that further inquiry would not be fruitful, it would require that Saginav Intervenors justify continu-ance of cross-examination-(Tr. 1524-25).

. - . . . , - , _ . . . . , . - - . - . . ~ . . - . - . - -

26 29 In addition to the matters of specification of conten-tions, discovery and determination of the handling of environmental matters related to the radiological health and safety hearing, numerous other legal issues were brought to the Board's attention.from time to time. The AEC regulations,10 CFR $2 7h3(g), provide that the application, Staff Safety Evaluation and other official filings shall be offered as evidence at the hearing. Saginaw Intervenors " objected" that offer does not mean " received" and that their rights would be adversely affected if they were denied the right to cross-examine witnesses on these documents. The Board in its Order of March 3, 1971 ruled that the application and certain other documents in the docket of this pro-ceeding vould be received in evidence on the understanding that all parties vould be permitted to cross-examine witnesses in support of the documents to the extent deemed fruitful by the Board.

30. At the December 1, 1970 hearing, Saginaw Intervenors filed eight motions requesting that the hearing be adjourned on the bases, inter alia, that (1) there had been failure to comply with the Atomic Energy Act in that the Plant was being licensed as a research and developnent reactor rather than a commercial reactor, (2) that there was no final design for the reactor, (3) that the notice of hearing failed to set forth the issues required by the National Environmental Policy Act, (l+) that the standard of operation without undue risk was contrary to the Atomic Energy Act, (5) that the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board should be disqualified because of prejudice, because one of its members is an employee of the AEC, because its members are inherently biased toward nuclear power and because the technical members are not techni-cally qualified in all environmental areas, (6) that the AEC regulations were obsolete due to passage of the National Environmental Policy Act,

27 (7) that the Cczanission's regulations under the National Environmental Policy Act were illegal, (8) that the Ccanission failed to comply with the Water Quality Improvement Act, (9) that the Commission's standards for protection against radiation were illegal, and (10) that the siting of the Plant was in violation of the siting guideline 10 CFR Part 100 and TID 14844. It was agreed that argument on the motions relating to environmental aspects be postponed until the Final Environmental Statement was issued (Tr. 409) .

31. The issuance of the Calvert Cliffs decision prior to is-suance of a Final Environmental Statement mooted the necessity for further consideration of the environmental portions of the Saginav Intervenors'

, motion. The Board at the January 21, 1971 prehearing after considering the briefs of all parties denied Saginav Intervenors' nonenvironmental i motions as being contrary to established precedent and legislative his-tory as set forth in the briefs of Applicant, the Staff and Dov (Tr.

508-537). Saginaw Intervenors voluntarily withdrew their last motion which related to the Ccanission's siting guideline 10 CFR Part 100 and TID 14844 (Tr. 537) . While the Board denied Saginaw Intervenors' motion challenging the radiation standards prescrit$d in 10 CFR Part 20, it left open the opportunity for them to make an offer of proof as to the invalidity of that regulation in accordance with the standards provided in the Ccamission's memorandum decision In the Matter of Baltimore Gas &

Electric Company (ra lvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant), 2 CCH Atomic Energy L. R. Par.11,578, August 8,1969 (Tr. 517) .

LIMITED APPEARANCES

, 32. Limited appearances were heard by the Board at the hear-

's ing held on December _1, 1970. Limited appearances in favor of the Plant

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28 i were made by the following individuals and organizations: Harold Krefft for Federal Power Comission (Tr.197); Winism G. Turney for Michigan Water Resources Comissioc. (Tr. 206); Donald E. VanFarove for Michigan State Air Pollution Control Commission (Tr. 229); Ja:nas Woodruff for Michigan Public Service Comission (Tr. 236); John A. Rapa..m (Tr. 241);

Franklin E. Braman for Board of Directors of Downtown Bay City, Inc.

(Tr. 246); Hon. Julius Blasy, Mayor, City of Midland (Tr. 248); Frank Olds, Chaiman, Board of Comissioners, Midland County (Tr. 253);

Robert B. Chatterton, Supervisor Midland Township, Midland County (Tr.

256); Dr. Sidney Smock for Midland Hospital Association (Tr. 258);

Fred L. Yockey, City Manager, City of Midland (Tr. 261); Dr. Edvard L.

Kern, President, Hi$ h Perfomance Technology, Inc. (Tr. 265); Clifford Mapes, Vice Chairman, Midland County Road Commission (Tr. 269); Ned Arbury, President, Arbury & Sons Insurance (Tr. 271); Milton Getzendaner, President, Midland Nature Club (Tr. 276); H. C. Allison, Vice President, Alden B. Dov Associates, Inc. (Tr. 279); Fred Minzer for Minzer Realty (Tr. 283); J. R. Buckley, Vice President, Mutual Savin 6s and Loan Associa-tion (Tr. 285); Roy lenh==, President, Brown Lumber, Inc. (Tr. 289);

John A. Miller (Tr. 291); Alan Ott, Vice President and Director, Chemical Bank and Trust Company (Tr. 294); Rev. Theodore M. Greenhoe for Memorial Presbyterian Church (Tr. 296); Robert Ferries, President, Ferries and Maxwell Insurance Agency, Inc. (Tr. 297); James G. Bandeen, President, Bandeen Chevrolet (Tr. 299); Arthur E. Maass, Superintendent, Waste-water Department, City of Midland (Tr. 301); Miss Lyn DeVries for Midland Business and Professional Womens Club (Tr. 303); Rcbert Parker, Executive Vice President, Midland Area Chamber of Commerce (Tr. 306); William H.

29 Meier, President, Meier Studio and Camera Shop (Tr. 307); Robert Kingsley, Director of Elementary Education, Midland Public Schools (Tr. 308);

Mrs. George B. Ulmer (Tr. 309); Robert Copeland, Chairman, Midland Sec-tion, American Institute of Chemical Engineers (Tr. 311); Lewis Warren, Executive Vice President, Greater Saginaw Chamber of Commerce (Tr. 317);

William Deme,rs, President, Lumber Dealers Association (Tr. 320); Robert R.

Denison, Airport Manager, Tri-City Airport Co:nmission (Tr. 322); Bruce R.

Benway, Vice President, First National Bank (Tr. 333); Larry Reed, Execu-tive Vice President, Bay Area Chamber of Consnerce (Tr. 335); George Elleson, Bay County Industrial Developnent Corp. (Tr. 3ho); and James L.

Collison, Executive Director, East Central Michigan Economic Developnent District (Tr.342).

33 Limited appearances opnosing issuance of the construction pemit were made by the following individuals: Mrs. Georgena Goff (Tr. 342) and Wendell Marshall (Tr. 345) .

34. Limited appearances expressing interest in procedural or safety matters related to the Plant but not opposing issuance of a construction pemit were made by the following: Thomas Doyle for Michigan Departnent of Natural Resources (Tr. 233); Mrs. Judith Boli for Saginaw YWCA (Tr. 245); William Foster (Tr. 326); and Frederick L.

Brown, President, Michigan United Conservation Clubs (Tr. 347).

RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH AND SAFETY HEARINGS AND FINDINGS 35 The Board held 18 days of public hearings on the radio-logical health and safety questions relating'to the Plant. These hear-ings were held on December 1,1970; June 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25,1971;

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July 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, el and 23, 1971. These hear-ings dealt with all issues relating to the Plant except environmental issues, for the reasons explained above, and those issues relating to perfonnance of the Plant's emergency core cooling system (ECCS), which subject is discussed subsequently in this decision. Although a number of matters were left open following adjournment of the hearing on July 23, 171, these matters were settled by subsequent filings or defaults over the next several months and the Board in an order dated March lo, 1972 closed the record on radiological issues, except for ECCS and iodine spray removal which were subsequently concluded.

Technical Qualifications

36. The Applicant is one of the nation's largest electric power generating and marketing investor-owned utilities. It has ccan-petently built and operated an integrated bulk power system consisting primarily of fossil and nuclear fueled thermal generating facilities.

It has built and operated the Big Rock Point and Palisades Nuclear Plants. The Applicant has a staff of experienced and qualified person-nel which vill oversee engineering, construction and operation of the Midland Plant. In addition to the experience gained in constructing and operating two light water nuclear generating plants, Applicant has gained experience in nuclear technology through its participation in the Power Reactor Develo;xnent Company (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-D, Ap-pendixE). Plant operation will be the responsibility of the Plant Superintendent who oversees the Plant operating, technical and main-tenance staffs. Key members of the Plant staff vill have received

( extensive experience in Applicant's Palisades and Big Rock Point Plants

31 in addition to other specific training conducted by Applicant and Babcock & Wilcox. An experienced General Office technical staff will conduct independent off-site review of Plant operation and maintenance (PSARApplicant' sex.1-B,$12).

37 Bechtel corporation, one of the world's largest engineer-constructors for industrial facilities and for development of natural J

resources, and its affiliate, Bechtel Company, as engineer, hue direct responsibilityforthedesignand/orprocurementofequipment,systemsand structures not furnirhed by the Babcock & Wilcox Company and will perfom the on-site construction of the entire Plant. Technical advice and consulta-tion will be provided Bechtel by the Babcock & Wilcox Company for the in-sta11ation of the nuclear steam supply system (NSS) (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-A, 1.7). Bechtel has been actively engaged in the study, design and construction of nuclear installations over the past 20 years and has a broad experience in providing engineering and construction services for over 166 power generating units. Some of the most recent installations in which Bechtel has had major responsibility include the following nuclear power plants: San Onofre, Point Beach, Monticello, Turkey Point, Russellville, Rancho Seco, Peach Bottom, Davis-Besse, and Palisades (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-D, Appendix D).

38. The Babcock & Wilcox Company (B&W) will supply the nu-clear steam supply system. B&W's participation in the development of nuclear power dates from the Manhattan Project. B&W's nuclear activities are broad and include applied research to develop fundamental data, design and manufacture of nuclear systems components, and design and

(

32 manufacture of ccamplete nuclear steam generating systens. B&W carries on its nuclear activities through several divisions and subsidiaries.

B&W nuclear steam supply systems will be used in the following installa-tions: Oconee Nuclear Station, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Crystal River Station, Russellville Nuclear Unit and Rancho Seco (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-D, Appendix C).

39 The Staff in its review concluded that the Applicant and its contractors, B&W and Bechtel, are technically qualified to design and construct the Midland Plant (SSE, $13 1). The Board finds that Applicant has furnished sufficient infomation, that the Staff review has been adequate and that Applicant and its contractors, Babcock &

Wilcox and Bechtel, are technically qualified to design and construct the Plant.

Site

40. Site Location - The Plant site is located on the south shore of the Tittabawassee River in Midland County, Michigan. The site consists of approximately 1200 acres of which a relatively few acres along the river will be utilized for Plant buildings and about 880 acres to the south of the area occupied by the Plant itself vill be used for a cooling pond. The site is bounded on the north and east by the T1ttabavassee River, on the south by Gordonville Road and on the vest by farmland and scattered residences (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, $2 and Figure 2-1). tihen the Application was filed and during most of the period of review and hearings the Plant site was located in Midland' Township with the Tittabavassee River serving as the boundary with the

, City of Midland (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-A, $2). However, the Board

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33

's takes official notice that the Michigan State Boundary Comission has recently ruled that Midland Township shall be annexed to and become a part of the City of Midland (Orders of State Boundary Commission, Dkt.

Nos. 71-AT-7 and 71-AR-11, June 27, 1972), that this matter is presently in litigation and that the effectiveness of the order has been temporarily restrained. (Ingham County Circuit Court, File No.14596C, July 21,1972)

Thus, the City of Midland's boundaries may shortly be extended to include all of the Plant site.

41. Population a-A Use Characteristics - AEC Regulations contain Reactor Site Criteria,10 CFR Part 100, which describe criteria to be used in evaluating the suitability of a given site. One set of criteria in evaluating sites relates to consideration of population density and use characteristics of the site environs, including the exclusion area, low population zone and population certi:r distance (10 CFR $100.10(b)). Applicant has described the population density and use characteristics in the site environs (PSAR Applicent's Ex.1-A,

$$2.2 5 and 2.2.6). The areas directly across the river frcn the Plant to the north and east are occupied primarily by the industrial com-plexes of the Dow Chemical Company and the Dow Corning Company for a mile to 1-1/2 miles. The area beyond these industrial complexes to the north is occupied by the commercial and residential areas of the City of Midland and the area to the east is a sparsely populated resi-dential area containing many forested areas and scattered farms. The area to the south of the Plant is occupied by the cooling pond and other portions of the site for about one mile, is primarily forested for an additional two miles and primarily farming for another two miles.

31+

The first mile to the east of the Plant is industrial property owned by Applicant and Dow, the next mile is mostly residential and light farming and the next three miles are sparsely populated and primarily

, agricultural. The area 5 - so miles from the site is primarily used for farming, where not forested, except for the industrial co== uni-ties of Bay City, Saginav and Flint (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, $2.2.0) .

Projections of population growth have been made by Applicant for Midland County and surrounding counties based on material supplied by the Michigan Department of Commerce (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, $2.2 5) .

!+2. Exclusion Area and Low Population Zone - The AEC Reactor Site Criteria require that an applicant have an area around its reactor in which the applicant has the authority to determine all activities, including exclusion or removal of personnel and property frcxn the area (10 CFR $100.3(a)). This area is called the " exclusion a*ea" and it must be of sufficient size so that the calculated radiation dose to an individual at the boundary of the exclusion area in the event of a hypothesized fission product release from the reactor will be within certain defined limits using extremely conservative assumptions (10 CFR $100.11(a)(1)). Additionally, a low population zone, an area immediately surrounding the exclusion area which contains residents, the total number and density of which make it re-sonably probable that protective measures can be taken on their behalf in the event of the hypothesized fission release from the reactor, must also be determined (10 CFR $100.3(b)). The low population zone is also detemined on the basis that the calculated radiation dose to an individual remaining at its outer boundary during the course of the hypothetical fission release vill be within defined limits using extremely conservative assumptions

35 L ' (10 CPJ $100.ll(a)(2 Applicant and the Staff have calculated the size of the exclusion area and iow population zone for this site. on the basis of radiation do a the Board in the safety analysis section of this

, decision has detemined that such calculations were properly perfomed.

43 Exclusion Area - The required exclusion area for the Plant has a radius of 0 31 miles (500 meters) . The land within this area vill be owned by Applicant except for a small portion which con-sists of a fenced-in vaste treatment area owned by Dov. However, Dov employees visit this site only occasionally and Dov has agreed that Applicant may exercise the right to remove persons from this property when required (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, $2.2.4; Response to Staff Ques-tion 2.8, PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-C, p. 2.8-1) . The Staff reviewed and concurred in the Applicant's evaluation (SSE p. 8). The Board con-(

cludes that Applicant has the authority to determine all activities in the calculated exclusion area as required by 10 CFR Part 100. Of additional interest is the fact that the actual exclusion distance around the reactor vill, in several directions, be significantly larger then the required exclusion area, e.g., the exclusion distance to the south is in fact 1800 meters rather than the required 500 meters, and that the total exclusion area vill be 1200 acres (Applicant's Ex. 13; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, $2.2.4) . The Applicant has presented suffi- -

cient infomation and the Staff has adequately reviewed the Applicant's 1 l

deteminations with respect to the exclusion area. .

I

44. Lov Population ' Zone - The low population zone proposed by Applicant has a radius of approximately one mile (1600 meters) frca the reactors. The area encompasses property owned and controlled by

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36 Applicant south of the reactors, a part of the Dov and Dow Corning Company complexes to the north and east and a few residences in the southwest (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, $2.2 5 5) . The residential popu-lation within this zone-is approximately 38 and the transient industrial or business population, primar3 4 employees of Dov and Dow Corning, is about 2145 (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, $2.2.4; Tr. 3103, 3119, 3295) .

The Staff reviewed the Applicant's submissions and determined that the low population zone was acceptable because of the small residential population and the well-structured evacuation plans of Dov and Dow Corning which would cover the business population (SSE p. 8, Tr. 3294-95). The Board finds that sufficient infomation has been furnished by Applicant and that the Staff has adequately reviewed this material.

45 Population Center Distance - A third populatica dis-tribution factor to be evaluated pursuant to 10 CFR 100 is the popu-lation center distance. The regulation provides that the distance from the reactor to the nearest boundary of a densely populated center containing more than about 25,000 residents should be at least one and one-third times the distance from the reactor to the outer boundary of the low population zone. In applying this guide due consideration shall be given to the population distribution within the population  ;

i center (10 CFR Part 100.11(a)(3)) . Evaluation of the Plant siting by the Staff and Applicant was made while the site was in Midland Township and bordered on the City of Midland, the nearest population center over 25,000. This evaluation showed the distance to the nearest corporate

. boundary of the City of Midland to be 0.21 miles and one and one-third

(, times the low popula+1on zone distance to be 1-1/3 miles. However, on l

37 consideration of the population distribution in the City of Midland, primarily that the population within 1-1/3 miles was largely limited to a transient population which is more mobile than vould be a resident population, and that populous areas of Midland were sufficiently removed from the site vicinity, it was determined that the reduced population distance was acceptable (SSE, p. 9; Tr. 2135-39, 2145, 2165) . The re-cently ordered annexation of Midland Township by the City of Midland would place the Plant site within the corporate boundary of the popula-tion center. The Board has reviewed this occurrence, in light of the guidance of 10 CFR Part 100 and the evidence presented in this proceed-ing. It is the conclusion of the Board that the important consideration for health and safety evaluation is still the population distribution within the population center. The annexation does not affect this and the site vill be as acceptable subsequent to annexation as it was prior thereto. Of particular interest is the fact that the population dis-tribution at this site is more favorable than that of at least two larger reactor cczaplexes (Indian Point and Zion) which have received con-construction pennits (Applicant's Ex.13). It is the Board's opinion that population distribution surrounding this site is acceptable (particu-larly considering :he relatively large actual exclusion area) .

46. Surface Water Hydrology - The Plant site lies in the Tittabavassee River Basin which includes ten counties which are drained by the Tittabavassee River and five principal tributaries (PSAR Appli-cant's Ex.1-A, $2.4 and Appendix 2B) . The Tittabavassee River is' not a known source of dar:wstic or irrigation water supply downstream l

l.

! (

-f- m _ _. _ , ._m ,,_, r ,. , .. __. - . - . , _ _ _ , _.

38 5

of the Plant (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 38E, p 11.8-12; ASER Applicant's Ex.

38H, p 4.2-4; FES Staff Ex. 8, p V-27) . Several municipalities and water districts obtain their water supplies from a portion of Saginaw Bay which is within 50 miles of the Plant site (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, pp2-10).

47 The Midland Plant is designed to withstand the probable maximum flood (PMF), which is the largest flood conceivable for the river based upon extreme rainfall plus melting snow plus the unlikely effect of breaching of the four upstream dams on the Tittabavassee River. It is unlikely that a fifth upstream dam which is on the Chippewa River would be breached coincident with breaches of the Tittabavassee dams. However, Applicant did consider the effect of such a breach and it was found to be negligible (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, $2.4.4 and

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Appendix 23, pp. 23-3 and 2B-4; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-C, p. 2.4-2; Staff Ex. 4, p. 4, Pars. 2 referencing Staff Response to Saginav Inter-venors' Interrogatory 250).

50. The PMF was computed according to calculational tech-niques utilized by the Applicant and approved by the Staff (Staff Ex. 4, p. 4, Para. 2, referencing Staff Response to Saginav Intervenors '

Interrogatory 250). The Staff is satisfied with the Applicant's calcu-lational techniques (Tr. 2458) and agrees that the PMF flood evaluation is accurate t- "ithin 1 or 2 feet which would not affect siting of the Plant (Tr.2459). All equirment required to protect public health and safety or for safe shutdown vill be designed to withstand and be operable during the PMF (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-C, p 2 3-1) . The Board finds that L

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39 the Applicant presented sufficient information, and that the Staff adequately reviewed the surface water hydrology, including consideration of the PhT.

49 Ground Water Hydrology - The ground water hydrology for the Plant is set forth in detail in the PSAR (Applicant's Ex.1-A, $2.6) .

There are two ground water-bearing zones underlying the site area. These are a shallow sandy zone which has a perched veter table and a deeper zone of sand and gravel which is an artesian aquifer. These two zones are separated by an impemeable clay aquiclude ranging in thickness from 124 to 187 feet (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 2-18; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-C, p.2.12-1). The quantity of water in the surface sands is limited and therefore they are not a source of domestic supply in the site area.

Small domestic supplies are obtained from the underlying confined aquifer.

If accidental discharge of contaminated water occurred at the site, it would flow throu6h the surface sands at a rate of about five feet per year down gradient toward the river because of the natural hydraulic gradient toward the river. Accidental contamination of the surface sand

, vould have no effect on the artesian aquifier below the thick, impemeable clay layer because this layer acts as a confining medium preventing the upward flow of the artesian water and the downward percolation of sur-face water from the site area. Because domestic wells in the a m a are up-gradient from the site and obtain their water from the underlying srtesian zone, they will be unaffected by any accidental discharge.

All exploration holes and water wells located within the cooling pond area have been sealed as a prelimmary phase of the dike construction program. This sealing vill ensure that cooling pond water does not seep into the domestic supply and that no artesian ground water leaks

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m 40 into the cooling pond water (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 2-19; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-C, pp. 2.2-2 and 2.2-3 and pp. 2.12-1 through 2.12-8) .

A system of monitoring wells vill be installed to maintain L surveil-1u ce of both the upper and lover ground water horizons in the vicinity of the Plant (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 6-18-1). The Staff re-viewed the record regarding hydrology and found the infomation to be acceptable for issuance of a construction pemit (SSE $3.4~and Appendix D). The Eoard concludes that sufficient infomation was supplied re-garding hydrology, that the Staff review was adequate, and that the site hydrology is acceptable for location of a nuclear plant at this site.

50. Geology - The Plant vill be located on a glacial lake plain having a ground elevation varying from 600 to 625 feet above mean sea level (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 2-14) . Plesitocene glacial deposits about 350 feet thick overlie bedrock of the Saginav fomation of lower Pennsylvanian age. The bedrock at the site con-sists of closely interbedded shale, sandstone and siltstone of con-tinantal origin (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 2-16) . Salt horizons occur in the Silurian and Devonian rocks of Michigan, and brine is ex-tracted from the Devonian strata at depths of frca 4100 to 4300 feet by the Dow Chemical Company's plant near the site (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B,p.2.17-1). Careful analysis was made of the possibility of subsidence due to salt extraction, and the effect it might have on the Plant. Separate analyses were made by independent consultants Woodward-Clyde & Associates and General Analytics, Inc. (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B,

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41 p.2.17-6). In addition to these analyses, ground surface observations by Dov in the area of the salt extractions show no change in ground elevation, within the accuracy limits of the survey, since 1958 (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-C, General Analytics Report p. 27) . The subsidence analyses as well as actual field surveys indicate that no surface displacement vill occur as a result of negligible settlements, if any, from the existing cavities (PSAR Applicant 's Ex.1-B, p. 2.17-7) . No future salt cavities will be mined within 0 5 miles of the Plant (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-C, pp. 2.17-10a), and Applicant has agreed prior to operation of the Plant to establish an extensive surveillance program to monitor for potential subsidence (Staff Safety Evaluation, p.12) .

Applicant fumished sufficient information as to site geology. The Staff adequately reviewed the site geology and confirmed that the

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potential for subsidence would be very lov (Staff Safety Evaluation, pp. 11-12). The Board concludes that the geology of the site is satisfactory.

51. Soils and Plant Foundations - The soils at the Plant site overlie bedrock of glacial origin and consist of glacial tills, glacial outvash, and glacial lake deposits (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p.2-16). Applicant's soil consultant expert for the foundation in-vestigation made an investigation of the site and concluded that the 1 site is suitable for the support of the proposed structures under both static and seismic loading (Dames & Moore Letter to Bechtel Corpora- )

tion, dated June 28, 1968; Dames & Moore Report, dated June 28, 1968.

and Supplement to Report, dated March 15, 1969, PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-B).

. . The AEC Consultant, U. S. Department of Interior, Geological Survey,

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. . _ i

l+2 confirmed that the drological conditiens pertinent to the safety evalua-tion of the site had been adequately assessem sy the Applicant (SSE, Ap-pendixD,p.109). Accordingly, the Board finh that the soils end Plant foundations at the site have been properly described, investi-gated and reviewed and that there is adequate soil support for the pro-posed structures.

52. Seismology - The Plant site is in a quiet seismic region for which there is no known geologic correlation between earthquake distri-bution and known faults. No faults have been detected in the surficial deposits of the southern peninsula of Michigan, although there is a re-note possibility of an inactive fault zone 55 miles south of the site.

Althou6h earthquakes generally occurring in other regions have been ex-perienced in this regica of the United States, their intensity in the Midland a*ea has been extremely low (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, pp. 2-21 through 2-25). The maximum intensity assumed to have bec experienced at the site is V (Madified Mercali) which occurred as a result of the February 6,1872 earthquake (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 2-25) . In-tensity V corresponds to a surface acceleration of 0.03g on Hershberger's (1956) curve. Plant equipnent necessary to pemit continued operation is designed to remain functional during surface accelerations of 0.06g

(" operating basis earthquake") (OBE) and equipnent required to protect the health and safety of the public or for. safe shutdown is designed for surface accelerations of 0.12g (" design basis earthquake") (DBE)

(PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 2-25; SSE, p.13). The Staff and the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey (USC&GS) agree that seismic l

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43 design accelerations for the site of 0.06g and 0.12g are appropriate for the OBE and DBE earthquakes, respectively, and Applicant has agreed to design to these accelerations (SSE pp.12-13) . Sufficient infomation has been supplied by the Applicant and the Staff has performed an adequate review with respect to seismology. The Board finds that the seismic design accelerations are sufficiently conservative in light of the seismic history of the area.

Meteorology 53 The AEC requires that data as to site meteorology be in-cluded in the PSAR for a construction permit, or in the PSAR for an operating license. This infomation is used by AEC at the construction permit stage in evaluating the adequacy of plant site and design and at

(* the operating stage in evaluating the adequacy of plant operating pro-cedures and technical specifications. At both the construction pemit and the operating license stage, the meteorological information provides data to be used in calculating the dose which might be received over any given period of time by a person at the site boundary from normal operating or accidental airborne releases. Typically, at the construc-tion pemit stage extensive on-site meteorological data is not available and is therefore not included in the PSAR. In the absence of such infor-mation, the AEC will make very conservative assumptions as a basis for evaluating the adequacy of the site and of the reactor design as long as sufficient other information is provided in the PSAR to demonstrate.that the assumptions as applied to the particular site and design are highly conservative. In other words, in the absence of on-site meteorological l

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44 E

measurements AEC will assume poor diffusion characteristics and low wind speed, provided that information furnished in the PSAR demonstrates a high probability that when on-site meteorological data has been collected, the actual site diffusion characteristics will be more favorable than the given assumptions. The assumptions to be made for this purpose are set forth in Safety Guide No. 4. Safety Guide No. 4 provides (1) calculational methods; and (2) assumptions to be made in absence of on-site meteorological infonnation. In the present case, no issue is presented as to the adequacy of the data for plar.t design purposes. Intervenors did raise questions as to the adequacy of the meteorological data with respect to the evaluation of the adequacy of the site under 10 CFR Part 100 and the balance of our meteorological findings consider this subject from that standpoint.

54. Pursuant to AEC requirenents, Applicant extensively in-(

vestigated site meteorology for the Midland Plant and presented a sum-mary of its investigation as a part of its PSAR (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, Appendix 2A). The scope of Applicant's meteorological investigation

. included: (a) a description of general weather conditions, (b) an analysis of diffusion climatology of the site based on available data from nearby sources, (c) developnent of two-hour, ene-day, 30-day and annual diffusion models for the purpose of calculating off-site radiation doses for these periods, (d) discussion of stonns and tornadoes (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, Appendix 2A). Two main sources of data were used by Applicant in its re-port. The first was from the Dov Plant, nearby, which had recorded weather records for over ten years. The other source of data was 'he t Saginav (Tri-City) Airport, about eight miles southeast of the site.

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45 A third source of scue upper air data is U. S. Weather Bureau infoma-tion from Flint, Michigan, which is about 50 miles southeast of Midland (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, pp. 2A-3 to 2A 4) .

55. There were two types of veather data available from Dov.

In 1925, the local Weather Bureau Station recording precipitation an?.

temperature for Midland was moved to Dov. Currently, a weighing raie gauge with a seven-day recorder, a seven-day themograph, maximum and minimum thermcmeter, a U. S. Weather Bureau rain gauge of the dipstick type and a seven-day dev-point recorder are on Dov property. This station is within the Dow plant complex. In the past ten years Dov has also maintained two Bendix-Friez Aerovane vind systems (PSAR Appli-cant's Ex. 1-A, pp. 2A-3 to 2A-4). Weather records began in Saginav in 1896, the same starting date as Midland, and since 1947 have been t~

taken by FAA personnel at.Tri-City Airport. Besides the usual climato-logical data on precipitation and temperature, there are also hourly airway observations of sky condition, visibility, weather and winds.

At Saginav, vind sensors are located on a 20-foot mast well away frca any obstructions and on very flat grass-covered land. Temperature and dev point are measured at the same location, but precipitation is measured with a standard dipstick type of rain gauge on top of the flight service building (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 2A-4) . The Applicant in its PSAR acknowledged that, although the Dow climatological data are the closest to the proposed nuclear site, the Saginav data was also used to provide general site climatology since it was more adaptable for analysis (PSAR Applicant 's Ex.1-A, p. 2A-4) .

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46

56. The Midland site is on the flat land of the Lower Peninsula of Michigan. While it is too far from Lake Huron and Saginew Bay to be significantly affected by land-sea breezes, it is close enough to the Great Lakes to have a higher than average amount of cloudiness in the late fall and early winter. About 30 inches of precipitation fall per year. Some of this is from en average annual snowfall of 33 inches.

Mean monthly temperatures range from 25 F in January and February to 72 F in July. The highest and lowest recorded temperatures are 106 F and -305', respectively. Cloudiness is the greatest in the late fall and early vinter, a condition accentuated in Michigan's Lower Peninsula by the presence of Lake Michigan on the vest and, to scane extent, Lake Huron on the east. Prevailing vind direction in the area is southwest and average hourly velocity is greatest in the early spring and lowest in late summer and early fall (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, Appendix 2A,

p. 2A-5) .

57 Diffusion characteristics for a site are analyzed for various time periods. The results of applying the diffusion models are called " relative concentrations" or simply X/Q, and are appli:able at certain distances, usually the site boundary, downwind from the Plant. WhentheX/Qismultipliedbytheamountoftheradioactive release and properly adjusted for breathing rate, isotopic half-life, etc., the dose to an individual at the site boundary can be calculated.

In developing diffusion models, the Applicant in its PSAR relied pri-marily.on the data from Tri-City Airport located only eight miles away (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 2A-32) . The diffusion models created

'(- were conservative-in that no credit vas taken (a) for vind direction

47 chwges (in the two-hour model), (b) for the greater dilution which i vould occur due to the Dov buildings, or (c) for the themally induced turbulenceduetoabout1-1/3squaremilesofvarmcoolingpondwater around the reactor site (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 2A-23 and 2A-32) .

Therefore, the PSAR contained data and models which Applicent believed to provide a sound basis for the design of the reactor facility. In creating a two-hour diffusion model, five years of hourly wind data at Midland were analyzed and nine months were identified from Dov data as having the greatest air pollution potential.* (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, pp. 2A-28 to 2A-32) Hourly data from the Tri-City (Saginav) Airport for these nine months were placed into Pasquill stability categories (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 2A-36) . The Dov data were not amenable to this method of treatment. Each night of these nine months was examined to is find the two consecutive hours having the highest stability category (poorest diffusion). From these data, the occurrence of the worst first and second hour diffusion conditions were detemined. The stability applicable to the two worst bours was primarily that of Category F, the most stable (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 2A-36) . The average vinds associated with each category were used to calculate relative concentrations, X/Q, as a function of distance. The relative concen-tration for each category was then weighted by its frequency of occurrence

• Dov data were found by Applicant and the NOAA vitness not to be useful in calculating diffusion models for the site because they included no cloud cover or cloud ceiling data, had incomplete "gustiness" detail, and were too inecanplete (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. *2A-32; SSE p.10) .

\ The data vere useful, however, in selecting the nine-month perict of greatest air pollution potential (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 2A-28 and 2A-36).

,weem . + w '.-ee-. _ _ , _ .

48 i and divided by a dilution factor of 4.2, due to the cavity di-lution effect of the building, to give an average hour X/Q of 19 x

. lO-b sec/m3attheexclusionboundary(500 meters)(PSARApplicant's Ex.1-A, pp. 2A-36 to 2A-37) . From the some nine months, 18 days were selected from which to develop the 24-hour model (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, pp. 2A-37f to 2A-38), selection was based on those days hav-ing the highest frequency of Pasquill Category F and the hi hest 6 frequency of cabus. This was to establish conservative worst-day conditions.

Pasquill categories and winds for these days were averaged for each direction. That direction with the highest stability category (poorest diffusion) and the lowest vind speed (lovest dilution) was chosen. The X/Q for that vind direction was calculated, multiplied by the ratio of the average number of hours of continuous vind in one direction, from

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18-day sample, to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (7 5/24) and divided by the cavity dilution factor of 4.2 at the exclusion boundary of 600 meters to give an average hourly X/Q of 31 x 10-5 sec/m3 (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, pp. 2A-37f to 2A-38) . The nine months of data were also used to obtain an aver-age stability category and vind speed for each direction for the thirty-day model; this is similar to the 24-hour model (PSAR Appli-I cant's Ex. 1-A, p. 2A-40). That direction with the highest stability i category and the lowest vind speed was chosen to calculate relative concentration,X/Q. Frcan five years of monthly vind data at Saginaw, l the highest monthly frequency of any one wind direction was 19 per- .

cent. Thus, the calculated relative concentration was multiplied by 0.19 and divided by a cavity dilution factor of 2.6 (for stability

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49 Category D) at the exclusion boundary (500 meters) to give an aver-age hourly X/Q of 1.1 x 10-5 sec/m3 (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 2A-h0) .

An annual model also was devised for purposes of scheduled normal re-leases, but this model is not required in safety analyses (PSAR Appli-cant's Ex. 1-A, p. 2A !+2) . The 2-hour, 21+-hour and 30-day models evaluated provided the Applicant a basis for estimating the effects of exposure from a postulated accident. However, because of the ab-sence of on-site data, the Applicant in the PSAR indicated that it would conduct a meteorology program with a continuous recording of meteorological data (wind direction, velocity and temperature lapse rate) until at least a year's history was obtained. The data would be used to farther evalu-ate and, if necessary, upgrade the meteorological data used in the dif-fusion models previously presented (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-C, p.1.00-1) .

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58. The Staff analyzed the meteorological analysis presented by Applicant (SSE pp. 9-11 and Appendix C). In this regard, the Staff relied upon reports prepared by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) formerly the Environmental Science Service Ad-ministration (ESSA) and others (SSE pp. 9-11 and Appendix C). The Staff stated that available data indicated the Midland site to be situated in a flat terrain where atmospheric flow is largely governed by large-scale continental pressure patterns, and where, in winter, frequent storm tracks pass through the area resulting in a high venti-lation rate and relatively good atmospheric diffusion (SSS p. 9).

The Staff, however, questioned Applicent's technique for characteriza-tion of available weather data. The Staff reported in its Safety Evaluation that the technique used by Applicant resulted in data in i

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50 the fom of gross frequency distributions rather than joint frequency distributions between stability, vind speed and direction (SSE p. 9).

This objection was raised by NOAA in Appendix C of the Safety Evalua-tion where NOAA stated that without joint frequency data between gusti-ness and vind speed, it is not possible to quantatively assess the probability of specific diffusion rates. Secondly, NOAA agreed with the Applicant that insufficient on-site data was available to accu -

ately analyze the diffusion climatology of the site (SSE p. 102).

However, rather than using the Tri-City Airport data as an alterna-tive to the actual on-site data, the Staff analyzed the diffusion based upon the meteorological model which the Staff normally uses to determine the two-hour and longer tem diffusion characteristics where adequate on-site data is unavail.able (SSE p.10) . As indicated pre-viously, the stimanrd model utilized by the Staff incorporates ex-tremely con 9arvative assumptions of weather data. That model is the NOAA standard meteorological model (Safety Guide No. k model) and like the Applicant's models based on Tri-City Airport data, uses the Pasquill Category F but with a 1 meter per second vind speed (SSE p. 102). As part of that model the Staff assumed the following meteorological con-ditions.

(1) For the first eight hours: Pasquill Type F stability, a one meter per second wind speed, nonvarying wind direction, and a volumetric building vake correction factor of one-half used with the cross-sectional area of the containment structure to detemine the building vake reduction factor, with a maxi-mum building vake dilution factor of three.

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51 (2) From eight hours to twenty-four hours: Pasquill Type F

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stability, one meter per second wind speed with meander ina22-1/2 sector.

(3) Frcat one to four days: Pasquill Type F stability and a two meter per second wind speed with a frequency of 6c%, and Pasquill Type D stability and a three meter per second wind speed with a frequency of 40%, with meander in the same 22-1/2 sector.

(4) From four days to 30 days: Pasquill Type C, D, and F sta-bility each occurring 33-1/3% of the time with wind speeds of three meters per second, three meters per second, and two meters per second, respectively, and with meander in the same22-1/2 sector,33-1/3%ofthetime. (Safety Guide No . 1+)

61. The Staff noted that the Applicant agreed to conduct an on-site meteorological measurecents program to obtain a min bum of one year's data including (1) continuous time-history measurements of wind velocity and direction at an elevation of 100 feet above the general terrain and (2) differential temperature measurements made at the 10-foot and 90-foot levels (SSE p. 10). Based on the Staff's evaluation of the proposed program, the Staff and its meteorological consultant, NOAA, concluded that the measurements proposed vill be adequate to determine the diffusion characteristics of the site prior to issuance of an operating permit (SSE p. 10). Applicant in calculating site boundary doses for purposes of determining whether the site meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 100 used different assumptions and calcu-

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lations than the Staff and calculated lover doses at the site boundary l

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than did the Staff. Since the Staff calculations are however within Part 100 and Safet,y Guide No. 4 and the Staff properly concluded that the requirements of Part 100 are met, we do not need to choose between the approach of the Staff and that of Applicant and hence we do not need to consider the validity of the Applicant's dose calculations to the extent they might differ frc:n those of the Staff.

60. The Mapleton Intervenors' vitnesses, Mr. Watson and Dr.

Epstein, consulting meteorologists, contended that Applicant's meteorol-ogical analysis of the proposed site in evidence was inadequate (Mapleton Ex.23,Tr.3432-36). However, it is clear to the Board that both opinicus were based on the erroneous assumption that Applicant had used Dov data directly in detemining diffusion motels for the Midland site. It was clear that Mr. Watson had no concept of the manner in which the Dow data had been used (Tr. 3569-74). Although Dr. Epstein, in his appearance on the stand following Mr. Watson, indicated that he was at that tbne aware of the use made of the Dov data, it is clear from reading his previously filed affidavit that he had not understood

, such use at the time he signed it (Tr. 3638-39). The Board is particu-larly puzzled by the fact that all of the major objecticms to Applicant's analysis were to items which Applicant explicitly hadn't utilized in its meteorological model or taken any credit for. The Staff's NOAA consul-tant, Dr. Van Der Hoven, testified, however, that he considered the Saginaw (Tri-City) Airport data provided in the Applicant's PSAR to be the best data available (Tr. 3698). The PSAR vith respect to meteorology was prepared under the supervision of the Applicant's consulting meteorol-( ogist, Dr. T. V. Crawford, an experienced, qualified and competent meteorologist,

53 well versed in diffusion meteorology. Dr. Crawford, a meteorologist with the U. S. Air Force for four years, also taught at the Uni-versity of California at Davis for seven years. In addition he has con-sulted on five power plant meteorological site reports (Tr. 6206) . The Board has considered the testimony and finds that the contention was not vell supported and is without merit.

61. The Saginav and Mapleton Intervenors argued that the Applicant's and the Staff's analyses should have assumed that the radio-active release frcm the accident would be depleted by a rainstom or fog from the cooling pond, deposited on the ground end then resuspended rather than assuming that all of the releases were available to be in-haled by a given individual (Tr. 3791-97). In pursuing this contention they found it necessary to use a number of quotations out of context (Tr.

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3785-87). The Staff's meteorological consultsnt, Dr. Van Der Hoven, testified that from deposition of radioactivity. any subsequent inhaled dose could not be larger than the original NOAA diffusion model with-out deposition and that only a portion of deposited material is ever resuspended in the atmosphere and that at a very slow rate (Tr. 3799-3800,3807). The Board has c.ansidered the testimony, agrees with Dr. Van Der Hoven and finds that the Staff Safety Guide No. 4 assump-ticn represents the most conservative credible meteorological mechsn-ism for calculating dose to an individual at the site boundary.

62. In direct testimony, the Mapleton Intervenors' meteorol-ogist consultant, Mr. Bruce Watson, argued that the Dow wind data'vas erroneous and should not be used (Tr. 3435). Applicant had previously y stated that the Dow wind data vas' not ecmsidered suitable to use in

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4 e m~,+* wet *Db ' ="#hI &

54 p' the diffusion analysis (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, Appendix 2A, p. 32) .

The Staff NOAA' witness also testified that he had problems with the Dow wind data and did not use it (Tr. 3593-95). The Board has con-sidered this subject and finds that the usefulness of the Dow data is not an issue in these findings.

63 The Mapletoa Intervenors' witness testified that Pasquill atmospheric stability categories are not accurate (Tr. 3465). The Staff's meteorological censultant, Dr. James C. Carson of Argonne National Laboratory, testified that Pasquill Categories are the best available for diffusion analyses (Tr. 7702). The Board finds that

~ Pasquill Categories are the best stability categories available. The Board takes official notice that the Pasquill Categories are generally recognized by scientists in the field as providing reliable categories

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for atmospheric stability characteristics. They are also used by the AEC in Safety Guide No. 4.

64. The Mapleton Intervenors contended that no reliable data was presented in the meteorological study (Tr. 3447) . Applicant's PSAR shows that the data are reliable since Tri-City (FAA) Airport data were used and are obtained from hourly recording by trained

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Federal Aviation Agency observers (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, Appendix 2A,p.32). Furthermore, the Staff's con::ultant, NOAA, considered the Tri-City Airport data to be the best available (Tr. 3698) . The Board finds the Mapleton Intervenors' contention to be unsupported.

65 The Mapleton Intervenors contended that the varm cooling pond created an element of unpredictability of climatological effects

, 4 (Tr. 3465). The Applicant previously had stated that no credit is

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taken in the diffusion analysis for the considerable enhancement of turbulence due to the varm cooling pond (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, Appendix 2A, p. 23) . Likewise, the Staff's NOAA consultant did not assume any credit for the hot pond, the Dow Chemical complex and the heated buildings of the City of Midland but stated that these could only enhance the diffusion (Tr. 3701-02). The Board firds that' the Applicant's and Staff's analyses are conservative with regard to the effects of the vam cooling pond, the Dov complex and the City of Midland on diffusion.

66. The Mapleton Intervenors contended that the site mete-orological conditions assumed by the Staff from Safety Guide No. 4 may not be sufficiently conservative based on actual Midland site data (Tr.3532-33), and that the Midland site meteorology may be more ad-x verse about 2 or 3 percent of the time (Tr. 3541) . The Mapleton In-tervenors' witness, however, characterized the site as "being rather good frca the point of view of diffusion by and large." (Tr. 3659) l The Applicant's PSAR shows that the vorst 2-hour data (mainly Cate-gory F vith mean vind speed of 2 5 meters /sec) is considerably better from a diffusica viewpoint than Safety Guide No. 4 (Category F sud 1 meter /see vind speed) (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, Appendix 2A, p. 36c) .

Nevertheless, the Staff's NOAA vitness stated that conditions could be worse than Safety Guide No. 4 approximately 5 percent of the time (Tr.3704). He also stated that data of the type compiled at the Tri-City Airport has been used in the past with very good success when' later on-site data was presented, and that he saw no evidence which 7

would lead to a conclusion that more restrictive meteorological assump-

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tions should be used than those presented in Safety Guide No. 4 (Tr.

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56 m

3699-3700). Even the Mapleton Intervenors conceded that the NOAA-Safety Guide No. k models were good in the absence of on-site data (Tr. 3684). The Board finds that the use of Safety Guide No. 4, with-out the application of special restrictive conditions, is sufficiently conservative when applied to the Midland Plant site, in view of the explicit conservatisms in the Safety Guide No. 4 method, the well venti-lated atmospheric characteristics of the site as implied by the analy-sis of the Tri-City Airport data, the favorable experience with this type of analysis at other sites and the absence of any unusual site-sensitive topographical or meteorological problems which would impede, diffusion.

67 The Board also notes that the acceptability of the pro-p.1.00-1) was generally confirmed by the Mapleton Intervenors ' wit-A nesses, Mr. Watson (Tr. 3471) and Dr. Epstein (Tr. 3646), with minor reservations regarding whether the tower used for meteorological measure-ments would be operated with the cooling pond in place, the proper height of the tower, whether multiple towers were desirable and whether a vind tunnel model should be built. With regard to one of these reserva-tions, the NOAA vitness concluded that a vind tunnel model of the Plant and cooling pond as proposed by Dr. Epstein vould not produce useful re-sults (Tr. 3723). Since the conclusion of the hearing, the AEC has pro-mulgated Safety Guide No. 23, Onsite Meteorology Programs. This guide describes the requirements of an acceptable onsite meteorological pro-gram. Such a program is considerably more extensive than that pro-posed by Applicant in the PSAR. The Board concludes that the Staff should

( . require Applicant to conduct a meteorological program of the scope described

57 in Safety Guide No. 23 such a meteorological program shall be sufficient to validate the conservatism of the meteorological assumptions made and can be developed and executed during the construction phase.

Plant Description

68. Reactor and Reactor Coolant Systems Description - The reactors for the Plant are of the pressurized water type. They have an initial core rating of 2452 Wt and vill have an ultimate power level of 2552 Wt each and together vill produce approximately 21 x 10 6 lb/hr steam for production of electricity and use as process steam (PSAR Ap-plicant 's Ex.1-A, pp.1-1 and 4-32) . The nominal operating pressure for the reactor is 2185 psig, with an average core outlet temperature of 60kOF (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 3-7) . The reactor coolant sys-( tem is designed for a pressare of 2500 psig at a nominal temperature of 650 F (PSAR Applicant's Ex. A-A, p. 4-13) . The Board takes official notice that these reactors and reactor coolant systems are similar to nine other Babcock & Wilcox units which have previously received con-struction pemits (Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287, Oconee Plant Units Nos. ' 1, 2 and 3; Docket No. 50-289, Three Mile Island Unit No.1; Docket No. 50-320, Three Mile Island Unit No. 2; Docket No. 50-312, Rancho Seco Unit No. 1; Docket No. 50-313, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit No. 1; Docket No. 50-346, Davis Eesse Unit No. 1; and Docket No. 50-302, Crystal River Unit No. 3) . The fuel for the reactor is sintered pellets of lov enriched uranium dioxide clad in Zirealoy-4 tubing. (PSAR Appli-cant 's Ex.1-A, p. 3-71) Each complete core has 177 fuel assemblies which are arranged on a tquare lattice to approximate the shape of a

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cylinder. The basic fuel assembly has 208 fuel rods, 16 control rod' guide tubes, one instrumentation tube, eight spacer grid.s and two end ,

7 fittings (PSAR Applicant 's Ex.1-A, p. 3-71) . The assemblies are de-signed to operate safely during steady state and transient conditions under the ccanbined effects of flow induced vibration, cladding strain caused by reactor pressure, fission gas pressure, fuel growth and dif-ferential thermal expansion (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, 53 1.2.4.2, 532.4.2,533). The themal and bydraulic design limits of the the core are conservative, and are consistent with those of other pres-surized water reactors currently in operation or under ennstruction (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p.1-9, 53 2 3) . The Staff has concluded that the Midland Plant design is acceptable with regard to core physics, core themal and hydraulic design, and core mechanical de-t sign (SSE,p.18). Core reactivity is controlled by a combination of 49 movable control rod assemblies, a neutron absorber dissolved in the coolant, and burnable absorber rod assemblies. Upon trip, all control rod assemblics required for shutdown fall into the core by gravity causing imediate reactor shutdown (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, 53 2.2, pp. 3-5 and 3-9). Eight-part length axial power shaping rod assemblies are provided to minimize axial power shifts resulting from a redistribution of xenon (PSAR Applicent's Ex.1-A, $3 2.2, p. 3-9) .

69 The core is contained within a cylindrical reactor ves-sel having intemal dimensions of 14 feet 3 inches in diameter and 37 feet 4 inches in height (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, 54.2.2.1, p. 4-31).

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The reactor vessel is manufactured under close quality control, and several types of nondestructive tests are performed during fabrication.

These tests include radiography of welds, ultrasonic testing, magnetic particle examhtion, and dye penetrant testing (PSAR Applicant's Ex.

l-A, $$4.5 1 and 4 5 2). Surveillance specimens consisting of excess material from the reactor vessel vill be inserted in the reactor ves-sels to confirm the predicted value of neutron induced material nil-ductility transition temperature shift (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-A, 64.2.5.2). The two coolant loops are connected to the reactor vessel by nozzles located near the top of the vessel. Each loop contains one steam generator, two motor-driven coolant pumps, and the interconnecting piping (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-A, Figures 4-2 and 4-3). The steam generator i is a vertical straight tube-and-shell heat exchanger which produces super-heated steam at constant pressure over the power range. Reactor cool-ant flows downward through the tubes and steam is generated on the shell side (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 4-7) . The operating pressure of the system is maintained by the pressurizer which is a surge tank partially filled with steam connected to the reactor coolant system.

Self-actuated safety relief valves connected to the pressurizer pre-vent overpressurization of the reactor coolant system (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-A, p. 4-6).

70. Reactor and Reactor Coolant Systems Criteria - The re-actor vessel, steam generator, and pressurizer vill be designed, manu-factured and tested in accordance with Section III of the ASME Code.

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6o The reactor coolant piping vill conform to the nuclear power piping code, USASI B317, and the reactor coolant pump casings will be manu .

factured in accordance with Section III of the ASME Code, where appli-cable (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-A, $4 5). All system ccaponents will be designed to withstand normal loads of mechanical, hydraulic and thennal origin plus the forces that would result fran the blowdown of the re-actor coolant system as a result of a design basis loss-of-coolant ac-cident, concurrent with the design basis earthquake loads (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-A, Appendix 5A). The proposed codes and standards for reactor cool-ant system components and piping comply with 10 CFR $50.55a (SSE p. 20 and Applicant's Ex. 25). The Staff has reviewed the codes, the plans for design and fabrication, and the quality specified for the reactor vessels and coolant piping and concluded that the reactor vessels and i

coolant piping as planned are acceptable (SSE p. 20). In addition, the quality assurance program calls for verification by the Applicant of the analytical and empirical methods used by the vendor to certify that this equipnent meets the specifications developed on the above bases (Applicant's Ex.1-C, QA Program Plan p. Sg; SSE p. 22) . The Staff and their consultants have reviewed and found the seismic design methods acceptable (SSE p. 22; SSE Appendix G). Majcr core and core support components will be designed to provide assurance that they are not vulnerable to vibratory excitation (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-B,

p. 4.3-1). Confinnatory vibration testing vill be conducted as part of the preoperational start-up program (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-C, p.500-1). The Staff has found the Applicant's plans and methods r for limiting internals vibration acceptable (SSE p. 23) . The Board

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finds that Applicant has adequately described the reactor and reactor coolant system and that the Staff conducted an adequate review.

71. Leak Detection - Applicant vill provide redundant and diverse leak detection systems within the reactor building to provide timely alam of significant leakage from the reactor coolant system (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, $4.2 7; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, p. 4.13-1; SSE $5 6). The Staff in their review has concluded that these systems are acceptable and that limits on pemissible leakage rates from the reactor coolant system vill be established at the operating license stage (SSE 65.6). The Board finds that the Applicant has furnished suffi-cient infomation on the leak detection systems and the Staff has conducted a proper review. Furthermore, the Board finds that limits on pemissible leakage rates is a matter which can reasonably be left for later considera-tion in the preparation of technical specifications at the operating license stage in accordance vitti 10 CFR 50.35 and customary AEC practice.

72. Seismic Design Methods - The Applicant has defined 1 i

Class I structures, systems and equipment cs those whose failure could l cause a release of radioactivity that would result in calculated con-centrations at the site bmndary in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits, and those necessary for safe shutdown of the facility. Class I structures, systems and equipment must be designed so as not to fail in the event of the design basis earthquake. Class II structures, systems and equipnent are those whose failure vould not result in a release of radioactivity which would exceed 10 CFR 20 levels at the site boundary and those not necessary for safe shutdown (PSAR Appendix l-A, Appen-dix SA). The Staff has reviewed the Applicant's categorization of

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Plant structures and components and considers the categorization proper (SSEpp.26-27). Applicant supplied satisfactory detail of its proposed seismic design methodology, including se.ismic acceleration criteria and site response spectra (PSAR Applicant's E;. 1-A, p. 2-25 and Appendix 5A; PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-C, pp. 9.00-3 and 9 00 4). The Staff's consultants reviewed the seismic acceleration criteria and the site response spectra which the Applicant proposes to use and considers the criteria to be satis-factory (SSE pp. 29, 125). The Board finds that the seismic design methods utilized have been properly reviewed and approved by the Staff.

73. Reactor Buildings - The reactor buildings provide con-tainment for the reactors and reactor coolant systems. Applicant has described the reactor buildings as fully continuous reinforced concrete structures in the shape of right cylinders with shallow-domed roofs and flat foundation slabs. The cylindrical portions are post-tensioned in two directions and the domes are post-tensioned with three-way systems (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-A, p. 5-1). The proposed prestressing system is essentially the same as that which the Staff reviewed for the Arkansas Nuclear one-unit 1 and found acceptable (SSE p. 29). The foundation slabs are conventionally reinforced with high-strength re-inforcing steel. The inside faces of the concrete shells are steel-lined to insure a high degree of leak tightness (PSAR Applicant's

, Ex. 1-A, $5 1.1.1) . The Staff found that the materials proposed to be incorporated into the reactor buildings are consistent with current design practice and are acceptable (SSE p. 29). Each reactor buil' ding is designed to safely contain or withstand internal and external load-ings which may occur during the life of the Plant or which could re-(

sult from postulated ' accidents to the reactor's primary coolant system

w 63 (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-A, $5 1.1.2). The proposed design loads and load combinations considered include nomal operation loads, accident conditions and extreme environmental conditior.s due to earthquakes, tornadoes and probable maximum flood. The Staff adequately evaluated the proposed design loads and load combinations, seceptance limits and design techniques for the Plant and found that the proposed de-sign is acceptable (SSE pp. 29-30). The Applicant will design the reactor buildings for a pres :ure of 67 psig, which exceeds the peak calculated pressure due to a loss-of-coolant accident by more than 10% (PSAR Applicast's Ex. 1-A, p. 1C-24; SSE p. 28). Analysis of reactor building pressure time history during and after a loss-of-coolant accident was calculated using the Bechtel computer code COPAITA utilizing conservative input assump u ns (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-B, $14.2.2.3.5). In analyzing the spectrum of break sizes in the reactor coolant system, the Applicant found that a loss-of-coolant accident involving a five square foot break imposed the most stringent requirements on the reactor building (Tr. 2384; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, $14.2.2 3 5,14.2.2 3 6) . The Staff adequately reviewed the design of the reactor buildings and perfomed an inde-pendent calculation using the Idaho Nuclear Corporation's CONTEMPT code. The Staff confimed by independent calculations the Applicant's choice of the reactor building design basis accident anu *ts result-ant calculated peak containment pressure (SSE p. 28).

74. As a part of the containment design, piping lines whrh penetrate the reactor building are to be equipped with double isolation

( barriers such that no single failure or component malfunction vill y , .--

64 result in leakage frca the reactor building to the atmosphere. These barriers consist of closed piping systems and isolation valves where applicable (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, $515; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, pp. 5 4.1-1 and 5 4.1-2; SSE p. 27).

75 The Applicant will also install two accident mitigating sys-tems. The first is an isolation valve seal water system which provides additional assurance of the effectiveness of the containment isolation valves located in lines connected to the reactor coolant system or which could be exposed to the containment atmosphere (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A

$51.5.3). The second system is a containment penetration and leak chase channel pressurization system which provides for continuously pressuri-zing the positive pressure zones incorporated into the containment penetrations and the channels over the velds in the steel liner. Al-f thouGh no credit is taken for the operation of these systems in cal-culating off-site accident doses, they do provide assurance that the containment leak rate would be lover than that assumed in the safety analysis (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, $515 3; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B,

p. 5 1.19-1; Tr. 2'+88) . Further, the Applicant will conduct a pre-operational structural integrity test of the reactor buildings (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, pp. 5B-1 and 5H-1), pre-operational and periodic l 1

integrated leak rate tests on the reactor buildings (PSAR Applicant's  !

Ex. 1-B, p. 5-53), and periodie structural surveillance tests of the post-tensioning systens (SSE p. 30; PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-B, p. 5-52).

The Staff has evaluated the Applicant's pre-operational testing pro-gram and has concluded that it is acceptable and contains adequate k

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65 provisions for conducting acceptable post-operational testing so as to assure safe operation (SSE p. 30).

76. The Board finds that the Applicant has submitted suffi-cient information and the Staff has conducted an adequate review as to Applicant's plans for the design, construction and testing of the re-actor buildings.

77. Auxiliary Building - The auxiliary building is located adjacent to the reactor buildings. It contains the following systems and facilities related to Plant safety: (1) New and spent fuel handling storage facilities, (2) Control room and related facilities, (3) Radio-active vaste decontamination facilities, (4) Radioactive vaste, and the reactor plant chemical and volume control facilities, (5) Access control, (6) Engineered safeguards systems, and (7) Reactor building penetration areas. The building is desi 6ned for normal external and internal loads, accident loads, and extreme environmental conditions, such as earthquake, tornado, and probable evim= flood (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, 55 2.1) .

The Board concludes that Applicant has furnished sufficient information and the Staff has performed an adequate review with respect to the ce-sign of the auxiliary building.

78. Service Water Pump Structure and Diesel Generator Building -

The Service water pump structure is designed to house the service water and fire water pumps. The diesel generator building houses the two-

-emergency diesel generators. These structures are designed for nor-mal operating loads, accident loads, and to protect their cantents against extreme environmental conditions, such as tornadoes, earth-

quakes, and probable maximum flood (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 5-64;

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66 PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 5-65). The Board concludes that the Appli-cant has furnished sufficient information and the Staff has performed an adequate review with respect to the service water pump structure and diesel generator buildirg.

79 Missile Protection - Applicant will protect the primary system and all engineered safety features from riannge that might be caused by missiles generated as a result of equipment failures within the containment structure or by external missiles generated by tornadoes.

Protection against nissiles and pipe whip vill be provided by physical separation, restraints and missile shields, such as the containment structure, the auxiliary buildings, external valls and internal sepa-ration valls (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 5-5; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B,

$5 1.1.4.10; PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-B, pp. 4.11-1 through 4.11-3 and 4.14-1). The Staff found the Applicant's des 61 n criteria for protection against missiles and pipe whip consistent with AEC criteria and accept-able (SSE p. 23-24). The Board finds that sufficient information has been furnished and the Staff's review has been adequate to provide for sufficient protection against missiles and pipe whip.

80. Radiation Shielding - The Applicant will design the Plant to include shielding throughout, primarily in the fom of heavy concrete valls, so as to ensure that radiation exposures to the general public and .to operating personnel are within applicable radiation limits as prescribed in 10 CFR 20 and as required by the proposed Appendix I to 10 CFR 50 when in effect and as applicable to the Plant (PSAR Ippli-cant's Ex.1-A, 55.4.2.1; Applicant's Ex. 38-M) . No objections to Ap-

-( plicant's proposed shielding design vere raised. The Board concludes

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that sufficient infomation has been presented by Applicant and an ade-quate review has been conducted by Staff with respect to radiation shielding.

81. Instrumentation and Control - Redundant networks of in-strumentation and controls will de provided to ensure the safe opera-tion of the Plant. The reactor protection system and the engineered safeguards actuation system are being designed, as required by 10 CFR

$50 55a, to meet the requirements of the " Standard for Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems," IEEE-279, in effect twelve months prior to issuance of:the construction permit (Applicant's Ex. 25) . The engi-neered safety features actuation cystem monitors Plant conditions and automatically initiates operation of the engineered safety features systems, if required (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, $71) . In the event k

of a loss-of-coolant accident reactor trip vill be initiated by low reactor coolant pressure. The Staff vill require Applicant to pro-vide initiation of reactor trip from high containment pressure or other suitably diverse signal in addition to the low reactor coolant pressure trip (SSE pp. h0-41). The Staff reviewed the reactor protection in-strumentation and control systems, and the instrumentation systems which initiate and control the engineered safety features (SSE p. 39) and concluded that these systems provide added redundancy compared to previously licensed plants and are acceptable (SSE p. 40).

82. Ccamon Mode Failure - The Applicant is performing studies of means of preventing common mode failures in the reactor protection system from negating reactor trip. Studies are also being perfomed

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of the . consequences of failure to trip in the event of anticipated

68 transients. The Applicant has stated that it vill maintain flexibility in the engineering design in order to tolerate the consequences of a failure to trip during anticipated transients. The Staff vill, if necessary, require modifications to the Plant to make tolerable the consequences of failure to trip during these transients (SSE pp.1+7-

18) . The Board concludes that this is an item that can be satisfactor-4 ily resolved during construction.

83 Radiation Monitoring and Control Room - Radiation moni-toring systems are provided to monitor all systems which could release radioactivity to the environment, to record a continuous indication of the gamma radiation levels in selected Plant areas and to provide protection to operating personnel from exposure to radiation levels or radioactive concentrations in excess of the maximum permissible

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limits of 10 CFR 20 (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, $7 5 1) . The Applicant states that it vill use radiological monitoring of personnel and radio-logical contamination control procedures similar to those it has de-veloped and used successfully in its Big Rock Point Plant and have been adapted for its Palisades Plant (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, $7 5 5) .

A centrally located control room for both units is provided which con-tains all of the control stations, switches, controllers, and indica-tors necessary to start up, operate and shut down the nuclear units.

Additionally, the capability is provided for taking the Plant to, and l

maintaining the Plant in, a safe shutdown condition from other loca- l tions in the Plant should occupancy of the control roca be temporarily denied (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-B, pp. 7 16-1 and 7 19-1). l

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84. Instrumentation and Control Adequacy - The Applicant's design of_ instrumentation and control systems (including radiation monitoring systems and the control room) was not contested. The Staff adequately reviewed the Application and record regarding instru-mentation and control systems, and this Board finds that with the ad-dition of a diverse reactor trip signal and further analysis of common mode failure the described instrumentation and control systems are adequate for safe operation of the Midland Plant. Applicant's com-mitment to add such a signal and to analyze cocnon mode failures is sufficient for the construction pemit stage and can be satisfactorily resolved during construction. The Board concludes that Applicant has presented sufficient infomation and the Staff has performed an ade-quate review with respect to instrumentation and controls.

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85 Electrical Systems Descriptions - Electric power generated by the Plant is to be fed through separate connections to a main transfomer for each unit. There, it is stepped up to 345 kV and delivered to a switchyard on separate overhead lines.

The units and associated switchyard will be part of the Applicant's integrated electric system. The Plant electrical output also feeds the Plant station power transfomers. The five 345 kV transmission lines which terminate at the Midland switchyard vill provide start-up and standby power from the system throu6h a step-down substation (to change the voltage from 345 kV to 138 kV) and a plant start-up i

transfomer. A second Plant start-up transfomer vill provide an alternate off-site power source via another 138 kV substation (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, $8.2.1; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, p. 8.2-2; SSE

p. 41-42). The Plant has an auxiliary power distribution system which

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is a two-bus system for each unit. The engineered safeguards system bus sections are electrically separate and redundant and will be located in separate rooms of the auxiliary building to provide physical isola-tion. The redundant safeguard bus sections vill have access to (a) the Plant electrical output throu6h the station power transformers, (b) the Applicant's off-site area transmission network, and (c) the on-site emergency diesel Generators. Operation of either of the two redun-dant bus sections vill supply the mini == engineered safeguards load requirements. Distribution equipnent and viring for redundant chan-nels of the engineered safeguards system vill be installed to protect against the loss of redundant counterparts frcza any single event, such as fire 'or mechanical failure (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, $8.2.2; PSAR

Applicant 's Ex.1-C, p. 8.2 8.3-1; SSE p. 42 h3) . There is also a standby alternating-current power supply consisting of two redundant emergency diesel generators which are electrically and physically independent. Each diesel generator vill have sufficient capacity to start and supply the minimum engineered safeguards load in one unit and the minimum safe shutdown load in the other unit. Automatic and manual controls vill be provided for starting and loading the diesel generators (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, 58.2 3; SSE p. 43) . The Plant's direct current power supply for safeguards systems consists of two 125-volt batteries located in separate rooms. Two separate 125-volt d-c power distribution buses vill be provided to supply redundant safety related loads in each unit. These batteries vill have the capacity to provide a cafe and orderly hot shutdown in the event that l

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all a-c power is lost. Separate 250-volt batteries vill supply non-safety related loads on site (SSE, p. 44-45). The independence be-tween redundant standby power sources and their distribution systems complies with AEC Safety Guide No. 6 (Staff Ex. 4) .

86. ' Electric Systems Adequacy - The Sa61naw Intervenors questioned whether there was sufficient redundancy and electrical in-dependence in order to assure that electrical power would always be available to operate required safeguards equipnent. In this regard, testimony indicated that the design criteria for the two-unit Plant is satisfied by the two shared diesel generators and that their ability to perform their safety functions is not significantly impaired by such sharing. The Staff concurred in this conclusion (Tr. 2330-2340, 2497; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, pp. 8.4-1 and 8.5-1). The Board asked Applicant to indicate the experience of other industries with emergency generation and their redundancy requirements (Tr. 2920-21). Applicant infomed the Board that no industry, except the nuclear industry, re-quires redundant emergency power sources although scxne airports have redundant systems. The absence of such a requirement appears to be based on the satisfactory performance of emergency power systems over the past twenty years (Testimony of Mr. Castleberry, filed August 16, 1971).

87. The Board questioned the adequacy of the installation criteria for circuit and component protection. (Written Questions, June 1971) Testimony indicated that circuit installation will be different than at the Applicant's previously built Palisades Plant due to both a f

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71 all a-c power is lost. Separate 250-volt batteries vill supply non-safety related loads on site (SSE, p. 44-45). The independence be-tween redundant standby power sources and their distribution systems complies with AEC Safety Guide No. 6 (Staff Ex. 4).

86. Electric Systems Adequacy - The Saginav Intervenors questioned whether there was sufficient redundancy and electrical in-dependence in order to assure that electrical power would always be available to operate required safeguards equipnent. In this regard, testimony indicated that the design criteria for the two-unit Plant is satisfied by the two shared diesel generators and that their ability to perform their safety functions is not significantly impaired by such sharing. The Staff concurred in this conclusion (Tr. 2330-23ho, 2497; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, pp. 8.4-1 and 8.5-1). The Board asked Applicant to indicate the experience of other industries with emergency Generation and their redundancy requirements (Tr. 2920-21). Applicant infomed the Board that no industry, except the nuclear industry, re-quires redundant emergency power sources although sme airports have redundant systems. The absence of such a requirement appears to be based on the satisfactory performance of emergency power systems over the past twenty years (Testimony of Mr. Castleberry, filed August 16, 1971).

87. The Board questioned the adequacy of the installation criteria for circuit and component protection. (Written Questions, June 1971) Testimony indicated that circuit installation will be different than at the Applicant's previously built Palisades Plant due to both a

72 different equipment configuration and new industry criteria (Tr. 2351-52).

The reactor protection systems vill be designed to satisfy the require-ments of the IEEE criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Protective Systems (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-B, 57.1.1.2; PSAR Applicant's Ex. -B, pp. 7.1 7.13-1; Applicant's Ex. 25).~

88. Cable installation design criteria vere presented during the Staff review (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-C, p. 8.6-1) and this was supplemented by specific quantitative design guide rules (Applicant's Ex.37,pp.3-5). The Board concludes that Applicant has presented sufficient infomation and the Staff has conducted an adequate review with regard to electrical systems.

89. Auxiliary Systems - Auxiliary systems are provided to supply reactor coolant makeup and pump seal water, to cool the reactor during shutdown, to cool components, to ventilate station spaces, to handle fuel, to cool spent fuel, to adjust the concentration of various chemicals in the reactor coolant and to provide for fire protection.

The systems include (1) the reactor coolant makeup and purification system, (2) the chemical addition system, (3) the decay heat removal system, (4) the fuel pool cooling system, (5) the shield cooling system, (6) the component cooling system, (7) the service water system, (8) the auxiliary feedvater system, (9) the fuel handling system, (10) the sampling system, (11) the instrument and service air system, (12) the heating, ventilating and air-conditioning systems, and (13) the fire protection system (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-B, $$ 9). The Staff reviewed the design basesi, mechanical design and redundancy require-ments of those systems, found the design bases to be similar to those

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73 on other pressurized water reactor plants approved for construction and found the systems adequate to perfom their intended functions (SSE

$10.0) . The Board concludes that sufficient infomation has been sup-plied on these systems and that they were properly evaluated by the Staff.

90. Turbine and Process Steam System - The steam and power conversion system is designed to accept steam from the reactors which produce approximately 21 x 106 lb/hr of steen (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, Table 4-5) . Part of this steam (approximately 75 percent) is then con-verted to electrical energy by turbine-generators. A second part is used in the process steam reboilers (also termed tertiary heat exchangers (THX)) to generate process steam for Dov Chemical (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-C, pp. 11.00-1 to 11.00-5). The balance is rejected by the turbine condensers and dissipated to the closed-cycle cooling system (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-B, pp. 10-2 and 10-4). The steam produced in the secondary side of the steam generators is routed through main steam headers to two 1800 rpm, tandem-camp iund indoor turbines (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, p.10-2). Normally, the process steam will originate in Unit 1. On Unit 1, a portion of the steam produced, 400,000 lb/hr,isrouteddirectlyfromapointupstreamof the #1 turbine stop valves to the high pressure (HP) reboilers in which the high pressure process steam for Dov is generated. After expansion' in the high pressure turbine and subsequent passage through the moisture sepa-rator reheaters between the high and low pressure stages of the turbine, approximately 3,650,000 lb/hroflowpressure(LP)steamisextracted to the LP process steam reboilers. The remainder of steam produced in

( the Unit 1 steam generators is further expanded through one double-flow l

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low pressure turbine which exhausts to the main condenser (PSAR Appli-cant's Ex.1-A, p.1-5; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, p.10-2; PSAR Appli-cant 's Ex.1-C , pp. 11.00-1 and 11.00-2) . The steen produced in the Unit 2 steam generators is entirely routed through a double-flov high pressure turbine and through moisture separator reheaters to two double-flow low pressure turbines which exhaust to the two main condensers.

High pressure steam is removed directly upstream of the two turbine stop valves by cross-connection lines and through reducing valves to the ex-tent necessary to supply the heating steam to the HP and LP rebailers during the periods when the Unit 1 turbine may be shut down for maintenance purposes. Additionally, when the Unit i nuclear steam system is shut down for annual refueling, cross-connections are provided between the f main-steam headers, such that steam from Unit 2 can directly supply the HP reboilers and the Unit 1 turbine. This provision allows for the more efficient use of steem produced and requires shutdown of the

' Unit 2 turbine (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-B, p. 10-1). Process steam pro-duced on the secondary side of the reboilers is transported to the Dow complex via a single 675 psia steam header and two 197 psia headers (PEAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, p.10-1) . The condensate produced by the 1

process steam after use in the Dow processes, plus makeup as necessary I

to provide for system losses, is returned to the Plant as feedvater j for the reboilers. The design of the turbine and process steam sys-tem has been analyzed and evaluated by the Applicant and the Staff (SSE p. 57). The Board finds that the Applicant presented sufficient

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75 f^ ~ information and the Staff performed an adequate review as to the pro-posed turbine and process steam system.

91. Process Steam Monitoring - The process steam will be monitored for radioactivity with an on-line gross gamma monitoring sys-tem and with grab samples for gross beta. Within the detection limits and turn-around time required to achieve the detection level, the terti-ary steam to Dov vill be compared with and will not contain more radio-activity than the Lake Huron makeup water supplied to the tertiary heat exchangers (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-C, p.11.00-2) . The Board questioned the Applicant as to its ability to monitor the process steam at the low levels required to insure radioactivity levels comparable to Lake Huron background (Tr. 2478-2481). The Applicant described this in more detail and showed that it was capable of monitoring at these low levels with equipment commercially available (Applicant's Ex. 36).

All Dow products which come in contact with contaminated process steam vill be monitored and in the event the radioactivity in the product exceeds the inherent natural background radioactivity, the product will be decontaminated or disposed of as necessary. (Applicant's Ex. 38c, Response to Comment of Department of Health Education and Welfare)

The Staff analyzed the monitoring system and ecncluded that it would ade-quately ensure levels of radioactivity essentially equivalent to natural background (SSE pp. 57-58). The Board finds that the system provides adequate assurance that leakage of radioactivity into the process steam will be an extremely remote possibility and that the radioactivity of the process steam will be essentially at natural background levels and

, is acceptable. The Board further finds that Applicant has submitted

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sufficient information and Staff has performed an adequate review with respect to process steam monitoring.

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92. Cooling System - Cooling of the two turbine generator condensers is provided by circulating water from the closed cycle 880-acre cooling pond which has been si::ed to satisfy Plant cooling needs during a LOO-day drou6 ht. Service water, which is water used to re-move vaste heat from both nuclear and turbine auxiliary systems during norma', shutdown or emergency conditions, is cooled by circulation through the cooling pond and, when necessary, by circulation through a service water cooling tower. A depressed area vill be created in the cooling pond to provide for storage of a sufficient supply of water for reactor decay heat removal in the unlikely event of a fail-ure of the pond dike (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, 59 7 and pp. 2.2-1 through 2.2-3). The Staff has reviewed the design of the cooling pond and service water systems and has concluded that they are ade-t quate to protect the public health and safety (SSE pp. 54-56). The Board finds that Applicant has furnished sufficient information and the Staff review has been adequate in regard to the health and safety aspects of the cooling facilities.

93 Engineered Safeguards - Engineered safeguards in each nuclear unit are provided to protect the fuel cladding, maintain reactor building integrity, reduce the driving force for reactor building leak-age and reduce iodine in the reactor building atmosphere in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, 56) . All active engineered safeguards are redundant and independent systems with redundant pcwer sources (Tr. 2390-91). The major engineered safeguards are described in the following paragraphs.

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@. Emergency Core Cooling System Description - The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) is comprised of the high pressure injection system, the low pressure injection system, and the core flooding system.

The emergency core cooling system is provided to prevent fuel clad melt-ing for the entire spectrum of postulated reactor coolant system breaks from the smallest leak to the complete severance of the largest pipe (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, 56.1) . The high and low pressure injection systems are subdivided such that there are two separate and independent strings, each including h16h and low pressure injection and each string capable of providing 100 percent of the required core injection in con-

-junction with the core flooding tanks. If a postulated break in the reactor coolant system piping occurs, the high pressure injection sys-tem vill be actuated if the reactor coolant system pressure decreases to 1500 psig or the reactor building pressure exceeds a preset limit.

The two core flooding tanks inject water directly into the reactor ves-sel when the pressure has decreased to 600 psig. This injection does not require any electrical power, automatic switching or operator action.

The low pressure injection system is the emergency mode of operation of the nomal decay heat removal system and is actuated when the reactor coolant system pressure decreases to 200 psig or the reactor buildin6 pressure exceeds a preset limit. The borated water storage tank supplies water to the low pressure injection system until a tank low level signal is received, at which time the pump suctions will be switched to the re-actor building sump and the system vill operate in the recirculatio$1 mode with the decay heat coolers cooling the recirculation flow. The decay heat coolers have a heat transfer capability in excess of the heat

(

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78 generation rate of the core in the recirculation phase (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, $6.1.2; Tr. 2371-81) . Decay heat removal pumps and reactor building spray pumps are located and the piping sized such that adequate pump net positive suction head is assured in acccrdance with AEC Safety Guide 1 (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, pp. 6.2-1; Staff Ex.  !+, Response No.1) .

Capacity is provided in the borated water storage tank to provide a suf-ficient source of water for emergency injection for a postulated LOCA in one unit even when the tank level has been reduced by an amount neces-sary to fill the reactor building refueling canal of the other unit dur-ing refueling of the other unit (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, p. 6.6-1) .

Because of the complex history of the analysis of the ECCS system in this proceeding, the subject is treated separately in Paragraphs 123 through 128.

i

95. Reactor Building Air Recirculation & Cooling System -

The reactor building air recirculation and cooling system which cen-sists of four separate cooling units, is designed to remove heat and vapor from the reactor building atmosphere during normal operation and, in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident, this system by itself can limit reactor building pressure rise in order that the containment pressure and temperature will not exceed the design values of 67 psig and 297 F. Each unit consists of a roughing filter, fin tube cooling coils and two direct driven fans. One fan motor per unit is rated for post-accident. conditions. The reactor building air recirculation sys-tem is redundant to the reactor building spray system for purposes of heat and vapor removal as discussed below under the reactor building spray system (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p.1C-2 +;1 PSAR Applicant 's Ex.

(

e F

79 7

1-A,$6.3.1). The Staff reviewed this system and found it acceptable 1

(SSE pp. 36-37). Applicant has presented sufficient infomation and the Staff has performed an adequate review concerning the reactor building air recirculation and cooling system.

96. Reactor Buildirig Spray System - The reactor building spray system is provided to remove heat and fission products fra the reactor building atmosphere following a loss-of-coolant accident in order to limit the reactor building pressure to the design value and to reduce the post-accident level of fission producta it the reactor building at-mosphere. Chemicals are added to the water eming from the borated water storage tank after a loss-of-coolant accident to establish a basic pH by addition of sodium hydroxide and to provide for iodine retention by addition of sodium thiosulfate.(PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, $6.2) .

- Each reactor unit has a sprav system consisting of two independent re-actor building spray headers, one sodium thiosulfate tank, and one sodium hydroxide tank. Each header contains one spray pmp, one thio-sulfate injection pump, one hydroxide injection pump and the necessary piping, instrumentation, and controls (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, p. 6-10; Applicant's Ex. 23) . Interlocks vill be provided to insure that, in the event of malfunction of any chemical injection pump or other active

- component, the solutions entering the building are of an alkaline pH (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, $6.2.2; Tr. 2855-63; Applicant's Ex. 23).

Operation with only one spray header is sufficient to control fission product relea'ses as discussed in the safety analysis section. Applicant

~

has demonstrated the effectiveness of the spray system in removing .

. fission products and the stability of the solution (PSAR Applicant's

.(

80 Ex.1-B, $14, Appendix 14A; Applicant's Ex.10; Tr.1624-28, 2033-38, 2836-52). For heat removal the system provides the cooling capacity necessary to limit the reactor building pressure below the design value, and together with the reactor building air recirculating and cooling

-s ystem provide the required redundancy and diversity as any of the following canbinstions is capable of providing the cooling capacity required: (1) tun reactor building spray headers, (2) four air cooling units, and (3) ene spray header and two cooling units. The Staff evalu-ated the reactor building spray system and, in view of the research and developnent effort being conducted on the long-te m stability of sodium thiosulfate and the fact that using the Staff's extremely conservative assumptions the system would perfom its function (See para-graphs 112-111., infra), the Staff concluded that the system was acceptable 1

(SSE pp. 35-37). Applicant's testimony at the hearing demonstrated that its research and development program had been completed and had confirmed the long-term stability of sodium thiosulfate solutions (Tr. 2836-55). The Board concludes that Applicant presented sufficient infomation and the Staff has conducted an adequate reviev vith respect to the reactor building spray system, including the Applicant's system for removal of iodine-from the containment atmosphere after a LOCA.

97. Hydrogen Control System - Applicant's proposed hydrogen purge system would operate to limit the reactor building hydrogen con-centration belov 3 5 percent by volume, thereby precluding hydrogen ignition as an energy source subsequent to a loss-of-coolant accident and assuring that reactor building integrity vill be maintained. This is a conservative limit because the lover flammability limit of hydro-i gen is considered to be 4.1 percent by volume (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, I

81

$9 12.2.1 and p.14-63d; FSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-B, Enclosure B, Item No.8). The Staff concluded that, while hydrogen purging should not be the primary means of limiting hydrogen buildup, the purge system should be a backup to a positive hydrogen control system (SSE p. 38) .

Applicant is presently funding a research and developsent program in-vestigating various types of hydrogen recombiner systems (PSAR Appli-cant's Ex. 1-B, Encicsure B, Item No. 8). Applicant will be required to install a redundant (2-Unit) catalytic recombiner system or other adequate system, as required by AEC Safety Guide 7, as a means of preventing the hydrogen concentration in the reactor building from reaching 3 5 per-cent by volume in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. The Staff vill review the plans for this system as a part of their operating 11-cense review of the Plant and vill require that en acceptable hydrogen control system be provided prior to issuance of an operating license (SSE p. 38; Staff Ex. 4) . The Board has found that the Applicant has presented sufficient information and the Staff has conducted an adequate review of Applicant's hydrogen purge syr. tem and program for develop-ment and installation of a hydrogen catalytic recombiner system.

98. Liquid Radioactive Waste Treatment System - The liquid vaste treatment system is designed to collect, process and reuse or dispose off-site all liquid vastes, except for laundry vaste, contain-ing radionuclides generated during nomal operation of the Plant (PSAR Applicant's Exhibit 1-B, $11; ASER Applicant's Ex. 38-F, $4.2) . The clean liquid vastes (liquids which are relatively low in chemical im-  !

purities and suspended solids) vill normally be processed throu6ha degassifier to remove radioactive gases and through filters and de-

\

mineralizers to remove suspended or dissolved radionuclides. At this

82 point lov boron vastes are processed throu6h an additional demineralizer

~

for reuse and high boron vastes are separated by evaporators into two reusable constituents: demineralized water and concentrated boric acid.

These constituents can be further decontaminated by icn exchange if necessary (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, pp 11-6 cnd 11-7 and Figure 11-1) .

The dirty liquid vastes (liquids containing rather high concentrations of chemical impurities) are passed through a filter and an evaporator or two demineralizers in series, the purified water is reused and the con-centrated vasten, depending on their quality, are either reused or disposed of off-site (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, p.11-7 and Figure 11-2). The laundry waste of about 120 gallons per day will be the only waste containing radio-nuclides from the Plant that will be released to the Tittsbavassee River during nomal operation (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, Table 11-1; PSAR Ap-plicant 's Ex. 38-E, p.11.1-1) . The Applicant conservatively estimates that the gross activity in the dilution stream frcm the laundry vaste based on operation with 1% failed fuel for a full year shall not exceed 25 pico curies per liter on an annual average. This is equivalent to about two curies per year (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 38-E, p.11.1-1) . Using this upper limit concentration, the Applicant calculates a potential dose to a hypothetical individual who consumes 2200 cc's per day of water frca the river and eats 37 lb of fish per year from the river to be about 0.8 mrem / year, using standard factors for reconcentra-tion of radionuclides in fish (PSAR Applicent's Ex. 38-E, p.11.8-11).

This calculation yields a very conservative value because the nearest municipal water supply is 40 or 50 miles from the discharge (SSE p. 51) and it is very unlikely that either unit vill experience 1% failed

83

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fuel for a full year (Tr. 7590,7599). The liquid radioactive vaste system is located in Class I structures and outside water tanks through c which the recycled tritium vill pass are designed to seismic Class I standards (Applicant's Ex. 38-E, p. 11 3-1). The staff reviewed Ap-plicant's liquid radioactive vaste system including its proposed recycle of a tritium. The Staff found that the liquid radioactive effluent system i

vould pemit effluent releases to be held at a small fraction of 10 CPR Pcrt 20 limits and within the numerical guidelines of proposed Appen-dix I to 10 CFR Part 50. The Board finds that Applicant has supplied 9

sufficient infomation regarding its radioactive vaste treatment sys-tem, the E,taff review was adequate, and that liquid discharges from the Plant will be a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 20 limits and well within the guidelines ~in 10 CFR Part 50, proposed Appendix I, published

\

in the Federal Register June 9, 1971. Although the application was filed prior to January 1, 1971, the Board has concluded that the Applicant has adequately identified the design objectives and the means to be employed for keeping levels of radioactive materials in effluents to unrestricted areas "as low as practicable" in accordance with 10 CFR 950.34a.

99 Gaseous Radioactive Waste Treatment System - Potentially high activity vaste gas is routed to the waste gas surge tank where.

its activity is monitored. Ususily the activity in such gas is low enough so that it can be released to the atmosphere tbrough high ef-ficiency filters. However, in the event of high levels of radioactivity the vaste gas is routed to vaste gas decay tanks where such gases can be stored for up to sixty days. to permit decay of all of the radio-

1. active gases, other than Krypton-85, to essentially zero (PSAR Appli-cant 's Ex. 1-B, p. ll-7; :ASER Applicant's Ex. 38-F-1, p. 4.2-kA) .

l

.r., .,,e - .. ,..v,_,,,n- y, , . - m -

84 Applicant estimated that using its previous design which allowed for 30-day holdup, the Plant would release about 63,500 curies of Krypton-85, 48 curies of xenon-133m and 26,000 curies of xenon-133 in the event both units operated for a full year with 1% failed fuel and the gases were stored 30 days prior to release (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 38-E,

p. 11.1-1). Subsequently, Applicant upgraded the radwaste system to allow for 60 days' holdup of gases instead of 30 days (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38-F-1, p. 4.2-1). Based on the extended holdup and more exacting calculation of Kr-85 generation, the Applicant estimated that in the event both units operate for a full year with 0.1% failed fuel, the quantity of Kr-85 and Xe-133 released through the radwaste treatment system will be about 1224 curies and 50 curies, respectively (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38-F-1, $4.2; ASER Applicant's Ex. 38-G, p. 6.7-1) . The Applicant further calculated the dose to an individual contincously pres-ent at the site boundary for a full year to be about 0.46 mrem / year (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38-F-1, $4.2) . A conservative calculation of the dose using 60 days' holdup and the extremely conservative 1% failed fuel would be approximately 4.6 mrem /yr. This dose is a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 20 and is less than the dose specified in the proposed Ap-pendix I to 10 CFR Part 50. The Staff evaluated the proposed 30 days' holdup assuming 0.25% failed fuel and concluded that the gas release will be well within 10 CFR Part 20 and the proposed Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 (Staff Ex. 8, p.10) . The Board finds that sufficient information has been furnished and the Staff has adequately reviewed the information. The Board concludes that the releases from a system which allows for 60 daye ' holdup will be only a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 20, and within the guidelines in the proposed Appendix I to

85 10 CFR Part 50. Although the application was filed prior to January 1, 1971, the Board has concluded that the Applicant has adequately identi-fied the design objectives and the means to be employed for keeping levels of radioactive materials in effluents to unrestricted areas "as low as practicable" in accordance with 10 CFR $50 3f+a.

100. Solid Radioactive Waste System - The solid vaste treat-ment system consists of tankage and facilities for collecting and pack-aging spent demineralizer resins and evaporator bottoms and for packaging contaminated items such as spent filter elements, rags, clothin6, etc.

All radioactive material frcx2 the solid vaste system will be shipped off-site for storage by AEC licensed contractors (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-B, p. 11-8). No radioactivity will be released to the environ-ment. The Staff reviewed the f.pplicant's solid waste design infoma-( tion and concluded it was adequate (SSE p. 53). The Board ccncludes that sufficient information has been furnished and that the Staff re-view has been adequate.

101. Radioactive Release Regulations '1here was no challenge made to the conformity of the Plant releases with applicable regulations governing release of radioactive materials and resultant d.ses to the public. However, Saginaw and Mapleton Intervenors repeatedly raised the issue of whether the calculated doses, although substantially within the limits of the AEC Standards for Protection Against Radiation, 10 CFR Part 20, constituted an undue risk to the public and whether the radionuclide i

releases in combination with chemical releases from Dow might result in biological effects greater than one would expect from the addition of the biological effects of the radiation and the biological effects of

( .the chemicals. The AEC has previously ruled in regard to a challenge l

l

86 to its radiation standards in an individual licensing proceeding that,

". . . the Consnission's licensing regulations establish the standards for reactor construction pemit deteminations; and . . . the findings in

, proceedings such as the instant one must be made in accordance with those regulations. Further, it should be clear that our licensing regulations -

which are general in their application and which are adopted in public rulemaking proceedings wherein the Comunission can draw on the vie;is of all inter-ested persons - are not subject to amendment by boards in individual adjudicato! / proceedings."

In the Matter of Baltimore Gas & Electric Company; Memorandum, Docket Nos. 50-317, 50-318, August 8, 1969 However, the AEC did provide in that memorandum that challenges to the validity of the radiation protection standards could be permitted in individual licensing proceedings on the limited grounds of (1) whether the regulation was within the Commission's authority, (2) whether it

/ vas promulgated in accordance with applicable procedural requirements, and (3) whether the standards are a reasonable exercise of the AEC's broad discret'on. The AEC in its Memorandum further indicated that if intervences did raise a substantial question as to the validity of a regulation, it should be certified to the Cnrmnission for guidance.

102. On the basis of that decision, the Board detemined that compliance with the effective provisions of 10 CFR Part 20 suffi-ciently demonstrated that radionuclide releases during normal operation would not create an undue risk to the public health and safety in'the absence of a showing by intervenors of the type permitted under the AEC memorandum decision (Tr. 517,1074-75). The Board, however, on numerous occasions extended to both Saginav and Mapleton Intervenors an opportunity to make a showing of any serious question as to the

(. validity of the AEC's regulations (Tr. 517,1074-75).

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4 87 I

103 Following completion of the radiological health and safety portion of the hearing, the Board in its Order of August 26, 1971 provided that Saginav and Mapleton Intervenors should file their vritten evidence with respect to the validity of Part 20 on or before September 15, 1971. Saginav filed only a letter, dated September 30, 1971, objecting to the Board's ruling. Mapleten Intervenors filed a letter, dated September 14, 1971, objecting to the September 15, 1971 due date and on September 28, 1971 an affidavit by Dr. Charles Huver, dated September 14, 1971 which purported to discuss the effects of radiation from the Plant. Subsequently, Mapleton Intervenors filed affidavits by Dr. Orie Loucks (dated October 22, lgr[1, filed December 13, 1971), Dr. Ernest Sternglass and Dr. Richard Meierotto (both dated December 17, 1971, filed December 22,1971). The Board reviewed the i

various affidavits in order to determine if they raised any substantial question as to the validity of the AEC 's radiation standards. The af-fidavit of Dr. Huver appeared to deal with a different plant than that of Applicant's and discussed levels of radiation releases unre-lated to those projected to be released by the Plant. Dr. Meierotto's affidavit was a general statement of concern unsupported by any evi-dence. Dr. Louck's affidavit expressed concern over concentration of radionuclides in living organisms. His basic premise appeared to.be that more knowledge.is needed regarding concen' ration of certain un-specified radionuclides. His affidavit revealed unfamiliarity with much of the Plant's design, particularly in his statements that radio-nuclides were to be released to the cooling pond, contrary to the un-

_ disputed filings of Applicant (Applicant's Exhibits 1-B p. 2.10-1, and

88 38-E) and that relatively large quantities of radioactive material were to be released from the Plant. The Board is well aware that the releases from this Plant relative to the present generation of reactors will be mall and that the dose to the public from the releases will be very small in relation to the nor..41 background dose. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38-F-1, pp. 4.2-4 and 4.2-7) Of particular interest is the fact that the article appended to Dr. louck's affidavit upon which he placed great reliance clearly states:

". . ., controlled releases of radioactive ma-terials into the general environment up to the present time have been restricted to such low 4 levels that the health and safety of the public apparently are adequately protected." Reichle, Dunaway and Nelson " Turnover and Concentration of Radionuclides in Food Chains" Nuclear Safety Vol. 11, No. 1, Jan-Feb. 1970.

(. 104. Dr. Sternglass' affidavit, to which was attached a paper on the general subject of radiation effects,* merely stated that he did not believe that a construction permit should be issued un-til a calculation of the environmental radiation and its corresponding effect on human health had been ' included in a cost-benefit analysis of the Plant. The Board is of +he opinion that the general statistical study presented by Dr. Sternglass is not sufficient to indicate that releases of the mall quantity of radioactive materials permitted under'10 CFR Part 20 and 10 CFR, 50 34a can be expected to result in any adverse effect on the public. The Board notes that the sole scientific basis cited by Dr. Sternglass that low level radiation. can cause injury is the work of Dr. Alice Stewart. Since her work is not before the Board, it takes official notice that Dr. Stewart at the y

A

• " Environmental Radiation and Human Health" Ernest J. Sternglass.

89 Shoreham Plant proceeding repudiated Dr. Sternglass' use of her data, stating that his " approach is null and void." (Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Plant) Dkt. No. 50-322, Tr. 7483-84). He postulates no credible connection between the releases of radioactive material and his claimed consequences. He does not correlate release levels, vind directions, water consumption and other important factors with the sup-posed consequences of the releases in most instances. Being devoid of any basis in scientific research or credible connection between releases and consequences, his papers and conclusions must stand on his statistical methodology. However, the Board takes official notice that in other statistical studies by Dr. Sternglass, he has been found to use "sta-tistical methodology and selective sampling techniques [which] are not scientifically credible and, indeed, raise serious questions as to whether his presentation is consistent with even a moderate degree of scientific responsibility." (In the Matter of Columbia University, Memorandum and Order, Dkt. No. 50-308, May 18, 1972) Dr. Sternglass' testimony at the environmental portion of this hearing confirmed the Board's opinion that his paper cannot be accepted as proof of effect of low level releases. The very paper which was attached to Dr. Stern-glass' affidavit has been entered into the record of the AEC's Effluents from Light Water Reactors rulamaking proceeding (Dkt. No. RM-50-2) by the Consolidated Intervenors through which group Mapleton Intervenors are participating in that rulemaking. Thus whatever merit Dr. Stern-glass' views may have will be fully evaluated in a rulemaking proceeding in which all persons interested in the controversial subject of the

~ ~

90 effects of radiation will have had their full say. The Board on the basis of what Mapleton Intervenors have filed does not consider it fruitful to further pursue that issue in a duplicative proceeding here.

None of these four affidavits indicated in any way that the AEC had abused its discretion in promulgating its standards for protection against radiation. 'Ihe Board in a March 10, 1972 Order found:

"The evidence subnitted by Mapleton Intervenors

. . . is not sufficient to raise a substantial challenge to the validity of Part 20 of the AEC regulations within the meaning of the Calvert Cliffs opinion and, therefore, the Board will not refer the question to the Ccumission."

The releases having been found to be small fractions of 10 CFR Part 20 limits and well within the guidelines of proposed Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 are clearly acceptable.

Safety Analysis 103 In order to assure that the Plant can be constructed and operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public, the Applicant and Staff made detailed safety evaluations and analyses, which were reviewed by the ACRS, of a variety of postulated accidents and equipnent failures. Two categories of incidents were analyzed:

(1) Those abnormalities and accidents in which the integrity of fuel rods and the reactor coolant system pressure boundary is maintained and (2) those accidents in which one or more of the barriers to fission product' release are not effective and operation of engineered safe-guards systems is required. The results of these analyses demonstrate that the radiation doses to the public resulting from all such credible accidents and from a maximum hypothesized accident are well within the s

q-

)

91 i F,

guideline values established by the AEC (10 CFR Part 100; PSAR Appli-cant's Ex.1-B, $$14.1 and 14.2; SSE $12.0) .

106. The first category analyzes those abnomalities and accidents that are either inherently teminated or require operation of a normal protection system in order to maintain the integrity of thefuelrodsand/orthereactorcoolantsystem. These include:

(a) Uncompensated reactivity changes resulting from fuel depletion and changes in fission product poison concentrations; (b) Control rod withdrawal during startup and at pover; (c) Dilution of the boron con-centration in the reactor coolant; (d) Startup of an inactive coolant loop (cold-water accident); (e) Loss of cc,olant flow; (f) Malposition-ing of a control rod; (g) Loss of AC electric power; (h) Loss of electrical load; (1) Steam line failure and (j) Steen generator tube failures. The analyses' indicate that no fuel damage vill occur and that there vill be no exposures to the public that would exceed very small fractions of the guideline limits of 10 CFR Part 100 (PSAR Ap-plicant's Ex.1-B, $14.1) . The Staff concluded, based on their analy-sis of Applicant's infomation and evaluation of other pressurized water reactor ("PWR") designs during operating license review, that transients (a)-(h) can be teminated by the Plant protection and con-trol system design without damage to the core and reactor coolant boundary and with no significant off-site radiological consequencee (SSE, pp. 59-60). These transients will be analyzed again prior to is-suance of an operating license to verify their accuracy in light of final design infomation (SSE, pp 59-60) . The Staff's evaluation of ll accidents (i) and (j), steam line failure and steam generator. tube

92

' failure, on the basis of their experience with analysis of those ac-cidents for PWR's of similar design, resulted in a conclusion that the consequences of these accidents can best be controlled by limiting the primary and secondary coolant system radioactivity concentrations.

The Staff stated that they would include technical specification limits on radioactivity concentrations in reactor coolant to limit the potential 2-hour dose from these incidents to well within 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines as has been recently done in several operating PWR's (SSE, pp. 60-61). These analyses were not contested. The Board ceacludes that Applicant has furnished sufficient infonnation and the Staff has adequately reviewed such information so as to provide reasonable assurance that the occur-rence of any of the first category abnormalities and accidents will not create any undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

I 107 The second category accidents analyzed were those in which one or more of the nonnal protection systems were not effective and therefore operation of engineered safeguards systems is required (PSAR Applicant's Exhibit 1-B, $14.2). The accidents analyzed con-sisted of serious but extremely unlikely accidents (loss-of-coolant accident, failure of a gaseous vaste decay tank, fuel handling acci-dent resulting in damage to a fuel assembly during refueling and a control rod e,jection accident) and an extremely se ious but not cred-ible mavim= hypothetical accident. Of these accidents evaluated, it was determined that of the credible accidents the loss-of-coolant ac-cident yielded the most severe consequences. The analysis of all of these accidents indicated that even vben using extremely conservative assumptions, the consequences to the public were well within the guide-line values of 10 CFR Part 100 (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, $14.2).

1

93 l

108. Because the primary purpose of engineered safeguards sys-tems is to limit the consequences of accidents, the accidents assumed for the purpose of analysis astablish the functional requirements for such systems and are connonly referred to as " design basis accidents."

The most severe accident analyzed and designed for is the postulated loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) resulting from the rupture of a pipe in the reactor coolant system. This accident has been analyzed assuming various sized ruptures up to sad including a hypothetical double-ended napture of the largest reactor coolant pipe. These analyses show that of the spectrum of possible break sizes in the reactor coolant system a 5 0 sq. ft. hot leg break (Tr. 2382, 2384, PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B,

$14.2.2 3.6) sna an 8.55 sq. ft. split in the cold leg (B&W Topical Report BAW-10034, p. 2-1) result in imposing the most stringent re-quirements on the reactor building and the emergency core cooling sya-tem, respectively. Hence, the 5 0 square foot break has been defined as the " Design Basis Accident" for the reactor building (Tr. 2320) and I _ the 8 55 square foot break has been defined as the " Design Basis Ac-cident" for assessing the effectiveness of the emergency core cooling system (Tr. 2382; BAW-10034, 52).

109 Applicant has analyzed LOCAs for the complete spectrum on breaks and has discussed the sequence of occurrences in the Plant following a LOCA (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-B, $14.2.2 3 and pp. 13 7 1 3-1 through 13 7 3 7-2; Tr. 2311-2400). Following the pipe break, the emergency core cooling systems, consisting of the core floc, ding system and two independent strings of equipnent, each capable of providing sufficient high-pressure and low-pressure coolant injection, are acti-vated in order to prevent significant chemical reactions and excessive

94 core temperatures. Operation of the reactor building spray system com-mences to remove heat ara liesion products from the containment atmos-phere. The air recirculation system is also activated to remove heat from the reactor atmosphere. Release of heat to the reactor building co.itainment results in an increase in reactor building pressure. Opera-tion of either the reactor building spraf system or the air recircula-tion and handling system is sufficient to . educe the reactor building pressure to less than one-half of its peak value in one hour and to near atmospheric pressure within approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (PSAR Appli-cant's Ex.1-B, pp 14-34,13 7 3.4-1 and 13 7 3.4-2, Figure 14-54).

In calculating the resultant dose frca this accident, Applicant in-corporated conservatisms regarding activity release from the core to the reactor containment atmosphere, removal of radioactive iodine from the containment atmosphere by plate-out on surfaces within the reactor building and operation of the chemical sprays, containment leakage rate, meteorological assumptions and the recipient. Since similar or greater conservatisms were utilized in'the calculation of dose from the maxi-mum hypothetical accident, it is unnecessary to discuss the conserva-tisms used in the Applicant's LOCA dose analysis. The Applicant's analy-sis does, however, demonstrate that the dose to the public from a IOCA, the largest credible accident, will be an insignificant fraction of the 10 CFR Part 100 guideline doses.

110. In order to demonstrate that the operation of a nuclear plant at a proposed site does not present a hazard to the genera] public, 10 CFR Part 100 requires that a major hypothetical accident be assumed and analyzed. The resultant dose calculated from this analysis should be such that an individual on the boundary of the exclusion area for two

95 hours0.0011 days <br />0.0264 hours <br />1.570767e-4 weeks <br />3.61475e-5 months <br /> would not receive a total radiation dose to the whole body ex-ceeding 25 rem or a total radiation dose in excess of 300 rem to the thyroid from iodine exposure (10 CFR $100.11(1)). Additionally, the analysis should show a resultant dose not in excess of the same limits to an individual on the boundary of the low papulation zone exposed to radioactive releases frcan the accident (10 CFR $100.11(2)). The regu-lation provides that the evaluation should ae conducted by assuming a fission product release rate frce the core based on:

"a major accident, hypothesized for purposes of site analysis or postulated from consideration of possible accidental events that would result in potential hazards not exceeded by those from any accident considered credible. Such accidents have generally been assumed to result in substantial melt-down of the core with subsequent release of appreciable quantities of fission products."

(10 CFR $100.ll(es) fn.1)

The regulation provides in a note at the end that the calculational method used in AEC Technical Infomation Document 14844 (" TID 14844")

may be used as a point of departure for making such analyses (10 CFR Part 100) and this document was in fact utilized as a starting point (Tr. 1809-10). The Applicant and Staff assumed as their maximum hypo-thetical accident (" MEA") (the Staff calls it the design basis acci-dent (DBA) but to avoid confusion with Applicant's DBA ve vill herein refer to it as an MHA) a LOCA which released to the reactor building the amount of fission products utilized in the TID 14844 assumptions:

100% of the noble gases, 50% of the halogens (e.g., iodine) and one percent of the fission product inventory (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B,  !

p.14-63c; SSE pp 63-64; Tr. 1594-95). Saginaw Intervenors argued l

i that some greater accident equivalent to a complete mcltdown of the core should be utilized in the analysis rather than that recournended

96 4

in TID lh8 W (Tr. 1737). However, the Staff made it clear that it considered an accident resulting in a release of the magnitude of the TID lh8 % release to be incredible (Tr. 19h6-50) and a Staff vitness testified that, although the Staff analysis did not postulate a mech-anism c ausing the release, e.g., meltdown, in his opinion the TID lh8W 4

fission product releases were a fairly realistic approximation of the releases thc.t might be expected from a complete meltdown of the core (Tr. 1867-6/>) . The Board, after pemitting extensive cross-examination which prwed unfruitful, teminated cross-examination and requested Saginaw Intervenors to present some affirms.tive case as to why the technical judgments of the Staff as evidenced by the witnesses, the AEC regulations, TID 1484 , and AEC Safety Guide No. 4 were not an adequate basis for concluding that the fission product release utilized was repre-sentative of a major accident not exceeded by any accident considered credible (Tr. 1890-93). This they failed to do. It is the conclusion of the Board that the fission product release utilized for the MIA analysis is in fact a release representative of a major accident which exce de s any accident considered credible. While other incredible accidents may perhaps be hypothesized which would result in greater releases, re-leases of the type hypothesized here are clearly of the magnitude con-templated by the regulation for conservative evaluation of a site.

111. Applicant and Staff, in making their analyses of the MEA, assumed for added conservatism that concurrently with the LOCA, the Plant lost all off-site power and one of the two emergency genera -

tors failed to perform. This assumption. results in half of all the

, active engineered safeguards in the Plant being unavailable to limit

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the consequences of the accident (Tr. 2320) . Both the Applicant and

97 the Staff analyzed the 1DIA utilizing the method of analysis prescribed in TID 14844 with variations based on developnent of technology since TID 1484k was authored and based on different meteorological assump-tions (Tr. 1828,1829,1838-1840). The Staff analysis was done by the method prescribed in Safety Guide No. 4 and the variations from TID 14844 utilized, were those prescribed therein (Tr. 1714-1722). Following re-lease of the fission products from the core, TID 14844 assumes that 50%

of the iodine in the release instantaneously plates out on the surfaces of the reactor and that the remainder beccanes part of the reactor build-ing atmosphere where it becomes available for leakage from the reactor building (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, p.14-63c; SSE p. 64; Tr.1595). The Staff pointed out that this is a non-mechanistic assumption which when compared to actual data is conservative. Actual data of course does not support the instantaneous nature of the assumption, but does indi-cate plate-out removal on the order of a half-life in 10 minutes (i.e.,

half the remaining iodine is removed every 10 minutes) (Tr. 2881-2887).

Thus while in the assumption half of the iodine plates out instantaneously and then there is no more plate-out, experimentation indicates that over the first thirty minutes of an accident plate-out would be expected to remove 7/8 of the iodine released (Tr. 2885) .

112. Of the iodine initially available for leakage following 50% plate-out, Applicant calculated 5% to concist of organic and par-ticulate forms of iodine and the remaining 95% to be elemental (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, pp lk-63; Tr.1599) . The Staff, however, assumes, in accordance with Safety Guide No. 4, that 85% is elemental, 10% organic

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, and 5% particulate (Applicant's Ex. 6). Because the Staff assumes that

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only elemental iodine is removed by spray systems and the Applicant's

98 analysis utilizes much slower removal rates for particulate and organic forms of iodine than for the elemental form, the Staff's use of 85%

elemental iodine rather than 95% represents a conservative factor (Tr.

1926-27,2040). The chemical additive in the reactor building sprays rapidly reacts with the airborne iodine to fom iodide ions which remain in solution in the building and, thus, cannot contribute to the off-site dose calculations (Tr. 1613). Applicant calculated a removal rate of 41.1 per hour for elemental iodine and 0.81 per hour for organic and par-ticulate forms while the Staff utilized a removal rate of 2.5 per hour for the elemental iodine and no removal of organic and particulate forms (Applicant's Ex. 6). Applicant's testimony explained in detail the experi-mental basis underlying its calculatec iodine removal rates (Tr. 1624-28, 2033-2038, 2836-2853; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, pp.14-63 to 14-63d and

\ 14A-1 to 14A-4; Applicant's Ex.10, BAW-10024 " Effectiveness of Sodium Thio-sulfate Sprays for Iodine Removal,") and the fact that its model had a 97%

confidence level for predicting conservative removal rates (Tr. 2036-1 38). The Staff described its basis for calculating the much reduced removal rate which it utilized in its analysis and enumerated the con-servatisms in this analysis (Tr. 1927,2024-2027). The Staff indicated that its calculation rather than reflecting expected performance of the iodine spray removal system was a conservative number which re-sulted in a doce that it would not expect to see exceeded under any circumstances (Tr. 2025) . Essentially, the Staff calculated the io-dine' removal rate by the same method as Applicant, but applied larger margin of safety factors, and assumed only one spray header working

, as opposed to the two assumed by Applicant (Tr. 2024-2027, 2030-31,

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99 2049). The Staff e.lso indicated that its calculational model is be-

, ing reviewed to reflect recent industry-wide experimentation and is being revised to show faster iodine removal (Tr. 2038-39). If iodine removal rates were the only differences between the eniculations of the Staff and Applicant, the Staff's dose calculations would be approxi-mately 14 times greater than Applicant's as a result of the numerous conservatisms employed by the Staff (Tr. 2034,20h4).

113 Saginaw Intervenors sought to cross-examine witnesses for Applicant and Staff regarding the (1) comparative effectiveness of the iodine spray removal systems of the Babcock & Wilcox Ccapany (B&W) (the system being used in the Plant) and Westinghouse Electric Corporation and (2) the adequacy of the B&W spray system on the basis of Westinghause reports which Westinghouse claimed to be proprietary.

Saginav Intervenors' counsel had acquired such reports in the Point Beach f2 proceeding (AEC Docket No. 50-301) under a protective order which did not permit their disclosure in this proceeding (Tr. 2050-2062). The Board ruled that it did not need to evaluate the compara-tive effectiveness of the two systems in order to determine the "best available technology" and that instead its duty was to detemine that Applicant had established that its system would meet applicable AEC cafety standards (Tr. 211h) . This decision was upheld by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board (Order of September 21,1971).

Westinghouse objected to use of its documents to cross-examine into t

the adequacy of the B&W system on the grounds that there would be no way to protect the documents frca disclosure to B&W and other competi-tors (Tr. 2060). The Board after reading the Westinghouse reports,

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100 the B&W reports and articles from the available literature concluded, without deciding whether the Westinghouse documents were in fact proprietary, that the information in the Westinghouse reports was unnecessary for purposes of cross-examination (Tr. 2301). The Appeals Board upheld the Board's ruling on the mistaken imprer.sion that the Board had found the Westinghouse reports to be proprietary (Order of Appeals Board, September 21,1971). The Board, therefore, ordered Westinghouse to demonstrate the proprietary nature of its re-ports, which it did by filing the affidavit of Robert A. Wieseman.

The Board after hearing arguments from all interested parties con-cluded on the basis of its own examination of the documents and the available literature that the information contained in the Westinghouse rehrts had in fact been developed as a result of its own experimenta-tion and expense and on the basis of Mr. Wieseman's affidavit that the documents are customarily held in confidence by Westinghouse and not customarily made available to the public (Board Order of March 16, 1972). The Board therefore found the documents to be in fact pro-prietary in accordance with applicable AEC regulations (10 CFR $2 7.44) .

Saginaw Intervenors having shown no need for the documents ire spite of several Board invitations to demonstrate such need (Tr. 2058, 2726-27, 2734-35) were not pemitted to use them.

114. The TID 14844 analysis does not include a reduction factor based on the use of iodine spray removal systems because use of a reagent in spray cooling systems to remove iodine was not an engi-neered safeguard that was, employed at the time TID 14844 was written (Tr.1785,1839). In line with the direct!'n of 10 CFR Part 100 that

( the AEC take into account in evaluating a site the safety features

101 that are engineered into the facility (10 CFR $100.10(a)(h)), the Board concludes that the extremely conservative analysis of iodine removal capabilities presented by the Staff and used in Staff Safety Guide No, k is a reasonable deviation from the TID 14844 calculational methed and results in calculation of a dose much greater than that which could be expected from the unlikely fission product release postulated.

115 A leakage rate of 0.1% by weight of the total free volume of the reactor building for the first twenty-four hours of the accident and 0.05% per day for any renaining period analyzed was used by both Applicant and the Staff. The 0.1% figure is in agreement with TID 14844 calculational methods, however, TID 14844 assumes continua-tion of the 0.1% leakage rate throughout the course of the analysis (Tr.1840). The deviation is , justified on the basis that during the first twenty-four hours of the accident the building pressure. will be reduced from a mav4== of 58 7 psig to about 4 psig, thus greatly re-ducing the leakage rate and that TID 14844 assumed a steel reactor building shell rather than the massive steel lined concrete reactor buildings in use today (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, pp.14-55 to 14-60; SSE pp. 63-64; Tr. 1837). ' Itis is particularly conservative because no credit was taken for penetration pressurization, weld pressurization and isolation valve seal water systems which have been developed since TID 14844 and would significantly reduce leakage rates and, thus, the resultant dose: (SSE pp. 65-66).

i 116. The meteorology used by Applicant and Staff for calcu- '

lating the transport of radioactivity released frca the reactor building differed in that Applicant used meteorology developed from evaluations

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102 of data gathered near the Plant site and the Staff used the more con-servative Staff Safety Guide No. 4 model (Applicant's Ex. 7) . The significant difference between the meteorology used by the Staff in calculating the two-hour dose and that used in TID 14844 is applica-tion of a building vake factor which has the effect of reducing the 2-hour dose by a factor of 3 (Tr.1834-1836) . Use of a building vake factor was based on experimentation performed by the National Oceanic andAtmosphericAdministration(Tr. 3774-78). In calculating the 30-day dose the Staff further deviated from TID 14844 assumptions, which as-sume that the conditions of Pasquill Type F vith one meter per second wind speed blowing in one direction vill persist for 30 days, by as-suming varying vind speeds and directions over the 30-day period (SSE

p. 64-65; Tr. 1810-12). Extensive testimony was heard regarding the sub-

! ject of the proper mateorology to utilize in this analysis as discussed in Paragraphs 53 through 67 above. As stated there, the Board finds that the meteorology used by the Staff was appropriately conservative and in accordance with AEC Safety Guide No. 4 117. The Staff analysis furth::r conservatively assumes an accelerated inhalation rate in the postulated individual at the ex-clusion area boundary during the first eight hours of the accident (Tr. 1805-06, 1853). The calculations of the dose to a postulated in-dividual assumes he remains at the same location at the edge of the exclusion area for the duration of the two-hour period and at the edge of the low population zone for a 30-day period (Tr. 1807-08; 10 CFR>

$100(a)(2)). The unlikelihood of an individual standing at the same location even for two hours following a major accident is obvious and

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103 the assumption of an individual remaining at one location 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day for thirty days is clearly sufficiently conservative.

118. Applicant's calculated dose to the hypothetical indi-vidual remaining at the exclusion area boundary for two hours during the accident is 8.7 Rem to the thyroid and less than 0.46 Rem to the whole body. Applicant's calculated 30-day dose to a similar individual located at the low population zone boundary for 30 days is 8.8 Rem to the thyroid (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, p.14-64). The Staff-calculated doses for the same individuals, utilizing Safety Guide No. 4, were 270 Rem to the thyroid and 4 Rem to the whole body for the 2-hour dose and 280 Rem to the thyroid and 4 Rem to the whole body for the 30-day dose (SSE p. 65 and Errata, dated June 21,1971). Testimony at the hearing indicated that radia-tion doses to the thyroid calculated strictly according to TID 14844

( would exceed those calculated by the Staff by a factor of 9 in the case of the 2-hour dose (Tr. 1828-29,1838-39) and a factor of 86 for the 30-day dose (Staff Ex. 3). The Board finds that all of the deviations from TID 14844 suggestions utilized by the Staff in calculating the radia-tion doses resulting from an NHA are justified, and that the factors l utilized by the Staff and in Safety Guide No. 4 in place of those proposed in TID 14844 contain substantial margins of safety. Additionally the Board concludes that even the much lower doses calculated by Applicant i 1

are conservative. The Board further concludes that calculations of the '

radiation dose with the use of these conservative factors, in conjunction with the extremely conservative factors provided in TID 14844 and 10 CFR Part 100, demonstral.c that the Plant can be located at the proposed site in conformance with the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 and that there is

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104 reasonable assurance that the Plant can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

119 Because of the fact that there are two reactors at the proposed site, Applicant considered the possibility of an accident at one reactor causing an accident in the other. Tne reactors, with some minor exceptions, are not interconnected and there are no shared active ccuponents in the engineered safeguards system (Tr. 2334). Applicant's design criteria prcvides that shared systems or interconnections be-tween units will only be pemitted when analysis of such sharing shows tList such sharing vill not affect the functional capability of the sys-tems or components to perform adequately in the separate units (PSAR Applicant 's Ex.1-A, p. Ic-5) . The effect of a LocA in one unit on the other would be to require the other unit to shut down. Loss of avail-ability of sufficient capacity in the three important shared systems, emergency generator, borated water storage tank and control rocm, as a result of an incident in one unit could require shutdown of the other unit (Applicant's Ex. 36). These are the only examples of significant shared systems between the Plants where an incident in one unit could have an effect on operation of the other unit. The Staff concluded that simultaneous LOCA's were so unlikely that they couldn't be con-sidered as a design basis (Tr. 2497). The Board concludes that the reactors are sufficiently independent that an accident in one reactor vill not initiate an accident in the other and that pursuant to 10 CFR

$100.ll(b) it is not necessary to evaluate the site on the basis of concurrent accidents.

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105 b 120. In addition to accidents originating in the Plant, Ap-plicant has evaluated the potential effects on the Plant of hypotheti-cal accidents at the adjacent Dow Chemical Plant. All potential ex-plosive hazards in the Dov Plant are located at least one mile from the reactor buildings and none of the potential accidents vould cause measurable damage at distances greater than 1,000 feet from location of the maximum explosion hypothesized (PSAR Applicant's Ex l-B, pp 13 5 1-1 and 13 5 1-2). Quantities of toxic chemicals are stored at the Dov Plant. Applicant has analyzed hypothetical accidental re-1 Leases of these chemicals which might have detrimental physiological effects on the Plant operating personnel which would interferc with the safe operation of the Plant and has detemined that chlorine in the most dangerous of the chemicals stored at Dov. Applicant has calculated under maximum conditions of chlorine release and worst case meteorology that a peak chlorine concentration of 3.6 parts per million could occur in the Midland Plant control room. The threshold limit value (TLV) established by the American Conference of Govern-mental Industrial Hygienists for continuous 8-hour exposure by in-dustrial workers is 1.0 part per million for chlorine (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-B, pp 13 5 2-1, 13 5 2-2 and 13 5 3-1, 2.00-1, 2.00-2 and 2.00-3).

The Staff reviewed Applicant's infomation and has stated that it vill require the Applicant to limit the concentration in the control room to less than the TLV at all times following a chlorine release at Dow (SSE pp. 15-17). The Board finds that the Applicant has provided ade-quate information and the ' Staff has conducted adequate analyses of ,

) ~a ccidents which might occur at Dov Chemical Company and affect the

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Midland Nuclear Plant. In view of the improbability of such accidents a

106

(. at Dow resulting in dangerous concentrations at the Plant and the Staff requirement that the control room be desi6 ned to limit concentrations to safe levels, the Board concludes that the accidents at Dow will not present a hazard to safe operation of the Plant. The Board particularly notes that Scott Air-Paks (self-contained breathing apparatus) will be available to Plant personnel in the event of any excessive concentra-tion (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-B, p. 13 5.3-1).

121. The Board has concluded that Applicant has presented sufficient information and the Staff has conducted an adequate review with respect to the analysis of potential consequences of various abnormali-ties and accidents.

Emergency Core Cooling System 122. The issue of the performance of the emergency core cool-ing system (ECCS), described in paragraph 94 was not heard at the radio-logical health and safety portion of the hearing held during the summer of 1971, because on June 29, 1971 the AEC issued its Interbn Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light-Water Power Reactors (36 F.R.122h7).

The criteria themselves were similar to those that the AEC had been using for several years for evaluating performance of ECCS (Staff Ex. 8, p. 8) .

However, as a result of improvement of analytical techniques for analy-sia of performance over the previous five years, and as a result of small-scale experiments performed at the Naticnal Reactor Testing Station which indicated that certain analytical models might not have accu-rately forecast test results, the AEC promulgated the for=al interim cri-teria incorporating conservative assumptions and procedures to be used in

( order to detennine if a given systen meets the Interim Criteria (Staff Ex. 8, pp. 2-5). Appendix A to the Interim Criteria specified three

107 t

, analytical techniques with appropriate conservative assumptions that were designated as acceptable evaluatien models for determining ccmpli-ance with the Interim Criteria. The emergency core cooling system used in Babcock & Wilcox Company (B&W) plants had not been evaluated using any of the three acceptable evaluation models but had been evalu-ated using B&W evaluation models. The AEC's statement of June 29, 1971 stated that the B&W evaluation model was under review by the AEC.

(36 F.R.12248) The Board, therefore, deferred further consideration of the performance of the Plant ECCS until such time as the AEC com-

pleted its review of the B&W evaluation model (Tr. 1920, 1924, 2362-63, 4426). On December 18, 1971, the AEC determined that the B&W evaluation model was acceptable and amended Appendix A to the Interim Criteria to include the B&W evaluation model (36 F.R. 24082) . Intervenors up to that time and for some time thereafter were challenging compliance of the Plant ECCS system with the Interim Criteria and the validity of the Interim Criteria.

123. Applicant in letters dated November 3,1971 and January 6, 1972 incorporated in its application the analysis of ECCS performance contained in (1) the Babcock & Wilcox Company Topical Re-port BAW-10034, " Multi-node Analysis of B&W's 2568 WE Nuclear Plants During a Loss-of-Coolant Accident", and (2) Supplement'10 in the Matter l of Duke Power Company oconee Station (Rev.1 to BAW-10034), respectively.

These topical reports were received in evidence by the Board's Order of

. Jane 28, 1972. The Staff evaluated these analyses and concluded that they had been perfonned using the B&W evaluation model described in Japendix A, Part 4 of the Interim Criteria (Staff Ex. 8, p. 5) . The

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results of the analyses centained in BAW-loo 34 as revised demonstrated l l

108 i that the ECCS system would perform so as to meet the Interim Criteria.

Analysis of a spectrum of accidents, including double-ended rupture of the largest coolant pipe, indicated that the worst accident would have a peak cladding temperature of 2177 F (2300 F limit imposed by the Interim Criteria) and a maximum core metal water reaction of 0.26%

(1% limit imposed by Interim Criteria) . Analyses further indicated that the cladding temperature transient would terminate while core gecnetry was still amenable to cooling and that the core temperature is reduced and decay heat removed for an extended period of time. The Staff confinned the results of the analysis and concluded:

"the predicted functional performance of the Midland Emergency Core Cooling System for the full spectrum of postulated break sizes up to and including a double-ended break in the largest coolant pipe is in accord with the Commission's Interim Policy Statement and Acceptance Criteria and is acceptable." (Staff Ex. 8, p. 8)

The Snginaw (Tr. 5297) and Mapleton Intervenors (confirmed at post-hearing conference June 26, 1972, no transcript made) did not challenge the compliance of the Plant ECCS with the Interim Criteria. The Board has reviewed Applicant's and the Staff's submissions and concludes that all elements of the Interim Criteria have been adequately considered and complied with.

124. The AEC published in the Federal Register (36 F.R. 22774, November 30,1971) a notice scheduling a rulemaking hearing concerning its Interim Criteria (AEC Docket No. RM-50-1). This provided in gener-al tems how the hearing should be conducted. By its supplemental no-tice issued January 6, 1972 (37 F.R. 288, January 8, 1972) the AEC provided more detailed procedures and particularly provided:

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" Notice should also be taken that the conduct of a r@ making hearing on the subject matter of this notice vill not affect the orderly resolution,

109

! under the Comission's existing regulations, of the matter of emergency core cooling, in hearings on applications for light water-cooled power re-actors pending before atomic safety and licensing boards." 37 F.R. 288, January 8,1972 both the daginav Intervenors and the Mapleton Intervenors are partici-pating as parties at the rulemaking proceeding as part of the Consoli-dated National Intervenor Group. The proceedings have proceeded with testimony frm the Staff, various national laboratories, the various utility vendors, intervening groups and utilities. An extremely com-plex record has been produced with a transcript numbering 17,033 pages as of August 3, 1972. The rulemaking proceeding is continuing and no l

decision has been made by the AEC.

125 Saginav and Mapleton Intervenors repeatedly indicated their intent to challenge the validity of the Interim Criteria in the

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Plant licensing proceeding. In its Order of March 10, 1972 the Board informed the parties of its views on challenges to the validity of the 1

Interim Criteria:

l "The question of validity raises more diffi-cult questions. As a result of the national hearing the interim criteria vill either be re- ,

prmulgated or changed. It is inconceivable to )

the Board that changed criteria vill not be ap-plied at least to reactors under construc. tion which vill almost certainly -- at the most opti-mistic schedule for applicants -- include this reactor. If the interim criteria are repromul-gated after the hearing, the question of validity vill ipso fseto be settled (subject of course to judicial review). Under the Calvert Cliffs doc-trine the most that could be accomplished by a hearing as to validity would be for the Board to receive evidence to the end of decidin6 whether there is a substantial case for reference to the Comission. In view of the fact that the ' case '

to be made vill be a substantial duplicate of the l

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case being made at the natioral hearing, already 1 being considered by the Comission, it would seem a logical absurdity for the Board to say that the

110 i showing is too insubstantial for Commiscion atten-tion. The logical solution vould be for the par-ties .to stipulate to accept the national hearing as being in lieu of this proceeding. We are aware, however, that intervenors ' counsel are afraid to do so would vaive rights which they would have had in the adjudicatory proceeding.

"In order to take maximum advantage of the pendency of the national hearing and preserve the intervenors ' claim to additional ' rights,' the Board has tentatively concluded to proceed as fol-lovs.

"1. We assume that the intervenors are chal-lenging the validity of the regulations.

"2. We further assume that the challenge con-sists of at least the showing being made in the national hearing.

"3 on or before March 31, 1972 or such later date as shall be fixed by the Board, opposing in-tervenors shall make such requests for documents, subpoenas etc., denied to them in the national hearing cs they deem necessary in this proceeding together with a statement as to their need and en-titlement. Within fifteen days thereafter other parties shall serve objections etc. and the Board vill rule thereon."

The intervenors, however, filed no requests for materials in addition to those permitted them in the national hearing and Saginav Intervenors, in a letter dated March 27, 1972, asked for an extension and at the April 28 prehearing (Tr. 5281) indicated that they would probably not seek further documents regarding ECCS. Saginav Intervenors in their March'27, 1972 letter attempted to incorporate into the record of the Midland proceeding the first 6333 pages of the ECCS proceeding and all documents that had been marked as exhibits or received in evidence in that proceeding. Subsequently, by motions dated May 8,1972, Saginaw

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111 Intervenors sought orders (1) accepting as an offer of proof, taking official and judicial notice of and accepting as admissions against a the interest of Applicant, Staff, Dov and the Midland th. clear Power Comittes, all oral, written and documentary testimony on file in the ECCS proceeding (including testimony) and i'?) the. Applicant and Staff had failed to demonstrate reasonable assurance as to effective-ness of ECCS cnd that therefore thy applicaticn be dismissed. The Board denied each of these motions (Tr. 7083,7085). The Board is of

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the opinion, for the reasons expressed in its Order of March 10, 1972, that there is no useful purpose to be served in incorporating into the record of this proceeding the over 17,000-page ECCS transcript with the thousands of pages of exhibits. There are questions involved in the ECCS proceeding that will be determined in that proceeding. Re-ceipt of an incomplete record in this proceeding and certification of that record to the Con: mission to what it is already destined is a fu-tile exercise. If, following review of the record in the ECCS rule-making, the Con: mission detemines to modify the Interin Criteria such action may or may not require modification of the Plant. To the ex-tent such action requires modification, the AEC has all necessary powers to require modification (10 CFR 550 51+(h)) . Additionally, Ap-plicant in response to questioning from the Board has committed itself to meeting any applicable ECCS regulation forthcoming from the proceed-ing and has furnished the Board with a compilation of dates by which u.ajor components twolved in ECCS analysis are needed at the site in order to meet a schedule of commercial operation in May 1977 (Appli-( cant's letter of June 6,1972) . This schedule indicates tnat no

112 major components involved in ECCS analysis are needed at the site prior to the spring of 1974. Applicant in furnishing the list also agreed that unless the ECCS rulemaking had been completed earlier, none of such major ccanponents would be shipped prior to the date needed on site without prior AEC approval (Applicant's letter of June 6,1972) . This indicates to the Board that -if any modification in equipnent is necessary, the equipnent will still be in the shop where it can be more readily modi-fied than if it had been shipped or installed. In addition to find-ing incorporation of the 17,000 plus pages of ECCS transcript and thousands of pages of exhibits into this proceeding to be useless, the Board finds Saginav Intervenors' use of the concept of " admission against interest" to be absurd. The Board further finds that although every opportunity has been extended to intervenors to challenge the

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Interim Criteria in this proceeding, in a meaningful way, intervenors have made no such challenge.

126. The Interim Acceptance Criteria are an effective regu-lation of the AEC. As such, evaluation of performance of the ECCS in this proceeding consists of determination of whether the ECCS system will meet the Interim Acceptance Criteria unless it is detemined the criteria are invalid (In the Matter of Baltimore Gas

• Electric Company);

AEC Memorandum, Docket Nos. 50-317, 50-318, August 8, 1969). The only challenge to the validity in this proceeding has consisted of reference to the inecznplete record in te ECCS rulemaking proceeding. As dis-cussed abova, the Board does not believe it to be useful to certify this record to the AEC for review. The issue of the validity of the Interim Acceptance Criteria has been raised in numerous hearings as '

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113

( ' vell as the question of whether individual Atomic Safety and Licens-ing Boards can continue to make decisions while the ECCS rulemaking continues. The AEC in initiating the ECCS proceeding made its position very cient:

" Notice should also be taken that the conduct of a rulemaking hearing on the subject matter of this notice vill not affect the orderly resolu-tion, under the Comission's existing regulations, of the matter of emergency core cooling, in hear-ings on applications for light water-cooled power reactors pending before atomic safety and licens-ing boards." 37 F.R. 288, January 8, 1972 The Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board has ruled on these ques-tions. In the Indian Point #2 proceeding, the Appeals Board concluded that the Interim Acceptance Criteria had been validly promulgated in cecordance with the Administrative Procedures Act. (In the Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point #2), Docket No. 50-247, ASIAB i

MemorandumandOrderMarch3,1972.) The Appeals Board in the Point Beach #9 proceeding, on being confronted with a challenge based on tS record of the ECCS proceeding, determined:

"The'other substantive issue raised by inter-venors is the Licensing Board's refusal to grant intervenors ' request for the record in the ECCS rulemaking proceeding to be incorporated into the record in this proceeding. We fail to see how evidence in an ongoing'rulemaking 'iroceeding should be given any consideration by the sicensing Board in this proceeding, particularly inasmuch as the evidence has not been fully presented and at best can only present a partial picture of the ECCS controversy. We held in our Memorandum of March 10, 1972, in the Indian Po2nt'f2 proceeding, that the Interim ECCS Criteria were required to be followed by Licensing Boards until superseded by a later issuance. The Commission has thus far not taken action to supersede the Interim Criteria." (In the Matter of Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (P Ent Beach f2), Docket No. 50-301, ASLAB Memorandum and Order, May 25,1972) and in the Vemont Yankee proceeding the Appeal Board ruled:

l n4 "There has been extensive testimony in the rulemaking proceeding supporting and attacking the criteria in a considerable number of respects.

The existence of differences of opinion on such complex and novel technical questions involving a rapidly developing technology would be no basis for a conclusion that these elaborate criteria are either in whole or in part to be declared invalid in this reactor licensing proceeding.

The Coalition asserts that it challenges the criteria 'as applied to this plant *, but it has presented no material fact or argument related to this plant as distinguished fran others.

"As the Licensing Board correctly assumes in its first question, duplication with the pending emergency core cooling rulemaking pro-ceeding is to be avoided. That pending pro-ceeding, where the inquiry can be thorou6h and interested parties can participate, is the proper forum for a challenge to the regulation rather than an individual licensing proceeding such as this.

"The validity of the Interim Criteria, in whatever fom may emerge from the pending rule-( making proceedings, vill be considered by the Commission as part of its ultimate determination of that proceeding, and the Coalition and others may address to the Commission in that proceeding any arguments that could be raised here - The Cor: mission's decision vill of course be sub,)eci, to , judicial review, ~42 U.S.C. 2239, 28 U.S.C. 2342, 5 U.S.C. 701-706. To allow the Coaltion to con-duct in this proceeding a simultaneous parallel attack on the Interim Criteria vould serve no use-ful purpose and muld obstruct enomously the Com-mission's performance of its duty that it 'shall

. . . Within a reasonable time . . . act and com-plete proceedings . . . .' Administrative Procedure Act, Sec. 9(b), 5 U.S.C. 558(c). The Interim Cri-teria may well be modified to some extent as a result of the rulemaking proceeding. The Coc: mis-sion has explicitly reserved the power to modify any pemit or license at any time (10 CFR Sec.

50 54(h)) and will be in position to apply to existing reactors, as appropriate, any new re-quirements which may be adopted. Under these cir-cumstances the Licensing Board should not consider any challenge to the Interim Criteria in this pro-ceeding or admit any evidence directed toward such

( an attack." (In the Matter of Vemont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., Docket No. 50-271, ASLAB Memorandum and Order, June 20,1972.)

J

. - ~ . _ _

115 I Of particular significance is the fact that all of the above-quoted decisions dealt with operating license proceedin6s where plant opera-tion is imminent rather than with construction pemit proceedings where there is a great deal of time in which to revise systems prior to op-eration. The. Interim Acceptance Criteria are a valid existing regu-lation of the AEC which the Board is required to follow. It cannot determine that they are insufficient based on an incomplete record in a rulemaking proceeding. The AEC has determined that individual licensing proceedings should continue under the effective regulations. If the AEC considered the incomplete record of the ECCS proceeding suffi-cient grounds to revoke its present regulation, it could do so at any time. It has not chosen to do so.

127 The Board finds that Applicant has presented sufficient infomation and the Staff has conducted an adequate review with respect to Applicant's compliance with the interim ECCS acceptance criteria.

The Board further concludes that because the ECCS meets the Interim Criteria, because the AEC is making a thorough evaluation of ECCS which can be ccupleted well in advance of operation of the Plant and because the AEC has the power to compel any modification deemed nec-essary to protect the public health and safety, there is reasonable assurance that the Plant can be constructed and operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

Quality Assurance 128. Applicant has developed an e:. tensive overall quality assurance program specifically for the Plant and has unaertaken the

. ultimate responsibility for its execution (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A,

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Appendix B; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-C, Amendment No. 6; Tr. 4350-51) .

116 The objective of the quality assurance program is to yield maximum confidence that the Plant is designed and constructed so that it can and will be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the general public and Plant operating personnel (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-A , p. 1B-1; Tr. 3954 ) . Functionally, responslcL11 ties under the quality assurance program are allocated among Applicant, Bechtel and B&W as detailed on Table I of the PSAR (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-C, Amendment Nos. 6 and 8, pp. 5-5g; Tr. 4076-77). The development, imple-mentation, coordination and documentation of the quality assuraee program from design through construction are the responsibility of Applicsnt (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-C, Amendment No. 6, p. 4), and, in addition to programs and plans described in the PSAR, it has promulgated de-tailed manuals for carrying out the programs: Midland Plant Project I

Procedures Manual (Saginaw Intervenors' Ex. 31) and Midland Plant Audit and Inspection Manual (Saginaw Interveno s' E c. 33). Bechtel will perform the quality assurance for Plant enginee ing, shop fab-rication (including the nuclear steam supply system, except fuel),

. field fabrication and construction (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A,1. 1B-4; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-C, Amendment No. 6, p. 4), and its program is described in the PSAR (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-C, Amendment No. 6, pp.

B-1 through B-ll). Manuals detailing the implementation of the pro-gram as they existed at the time of the hearing vere reviewed at the hearing (Saginaw Intervenors ' Ex. 2 5,16 and 28) . B&W's program pro-

- vides quality assurance for design,1%brication, construction and pie-operational testing of the nuclear st.eam supply system (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-C, Amendment No. 6, p. 4) and is described in the Application T _ .- - = , y+- p., - w y- v' m+e % wm"i' *v

117 (PSAR Applicant 's Ex.1-A, pp.1B-5 through 1B-121) . Detailed manu-als implementing the program as they existed at the time of the hearing were discussed at the hearing (Saginaw Intervenors ' Ex.12 and 13) .

Applicant and Bechtel personnel vill audit the Bechtel program and the B&W program (See p. 73). Applicant will conduct a comprehensive field testing program to insure equipnent and systems perform in accordance with design criteria. Applicant is responsible for preparing prc-operational test procedures and vill be responsible for running the tests (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-3. $13) .

129 The quality assurance progrcm of Applicant and its con-tractors has been and will continue to be under surveillance by the AEC Directorate of Regulatory Operation (Division of Compliance) which will audit the implementation of the quality assurance programs to ensure

i. theireffectiveness(Tr.h018-20,4505-4569). The Staff reviewed the quality assurance programs of the Applicant, Bechtel and B&W and concluded that the Plant quality issurance programs meet the requirements of the

" Nuclear Power Plant Quality Assurance Criteria" Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 (SEE p. 72-73).

130. Over Applicant's strenuous objections, Saginaw Inter-venors introduced a series of exhibits (Saginaw Intervenors' Exs.17-27) in an attempt to assert a deficiency in the Plant quality assurance pro-gram based upon certain problems which allegedly occurred at Applicant's Palisades Plant. 'The Board, however, is satisfied from a comparison of the quality assurance programs of Applicaat and Bechtel for the Plant with Applicant's quality assurance program for Palisade: and Bechtel's quality assurance program for Palisades (Saginaw Intervenors' Exs. 30 and

32) that quality assurance programs of Applicant and Bechtel have under-gone substantial expansion and revision since the construction of the I

o .

n8 Palisades Plant was completed both as an evolutionary response to ex-perience at Palisades and to conform with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B* (Tr.

4236-4241; written testimony of Dr. Sidney A. Bernsen, Manager of Quality- Assurance for Bechtel dated July 29, 1971, p . 1-2, 14-17).

Furthermore, Bechtel has established training programs for its qual-ity assurance engineers and other employees which provide for indoc trination and training of Dechtel employees performing activities affecting quality so as to. assure that proper proficiency is achieved and maintained (written testimony of Dr. Sidney A. Bernsen, dated July 29,1971, pp. 4-9; PSAR Applicant's Exhibit 1-A, Appendix 1B).

While the Board has reviewed Saginaw Intervenors' Exs. 17-27, the Board has also reviewed the testimony at the hearing and Applicant's filed responses (Letters dated July 30, 1971, including written testimony of

(

Dr. Bernsen and reference and testimony from Palisades proceeding),

taken official notice of the fact that Applicant's Palisades Plant has been licensed and is operating at power levels up to 60% of power (AEC Docket No. 50-225), and concludes that any alleged problems un-covered at Palisades by virtue of the quality assurance program of Applicant or its contractors were adequately resolved and that the Palisades record does not support the many allegations made by counsel for Saginav Intervenors. The Board also concludes for these same.

reasons that further review of alleged problems at Palisades is

- unwarranted and on that basis did not receive in evidence Saginaw Intervenors' proposed Exs. 37 and 38.

• This is not intend. I to suggest that the Board finds any inadequacy in the Palisades quality assurance program which was developed prior to the promulgation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

119 131. Mapleton Intervenors, although the area was totally unrelated to any of their sketchy contentions, probed into the. matter of quality assurance of the Plant's reactor vessel. Fabrication of the reactor vessel had been cocanenced and the vessel was approximately 50% complete at the time of the hearing (Tr. 3923-26). At that time, the AEC's Divisien of Compliance had not inspected the reactor vessel for this Plant nor made audits of the documentation of this particu-lar reactor (Tr. 3925-27). Testimony revealed that Applicant had inspected the reactor vessel (Tr. 4021) and had audited B&W's quality assurance program'(Tr. 4340,4542), and found it in compliance with AECCriteria(Tr.4340). It is ccanmon for the Division of Compliance not to have inspected a reactor vessel or audited the documentation for a reactor vessel only $Of complete (Tr. 4509,4568). The

( Division of Compliance does, however, frequently inspect the B&W fabrication facilities and its quality assurance program (Tr. 4508) and the B&W quality assurance program is satisfactory (Tr. 4510) . A vitness from the Division of Compliance described generally the steps involved in reactor vessel fabrication, the documentation accompany-

, ing each step and the testing of the reactor vessel at the end of fabrication (Tr. 4539-41). At the end of this procedure the Division of C6mpliance audits the documentation and makes a physical inspec-tion of. the vessel (Tr. 4541,4568-69). Any deficiencies would be brought' to the attention of Applicant and it would be required to correct them (Tr. 4569). The Board concludes that the quality as- -

surance program relative to the reactor vessel meets the AEC's regu-

,latory requirements contained in Appendix B to 10 CFR 50, that Applicant has been diligent in auditing B&W's fabrication and quality assurance w w-- -- e- , - . r-

120 program on the vessel and that the AEC Division of Compliance has properly maintained its review of B&W's quality assurance program and vill make a final inspection to confirm proper fabrication. Mapleton Intervenors' argument that the AEC must inspect the reactor vessel as it is being fabricated is without merit.

132. The AEC's Division of Compliance audited Applicant at the Plant site, where initial construction activities were being per-formed pursuant to a construction exemption (Tr. 4513-29), and at the Applicant's offices (Tr. 4578-4625, 4779-81; Saginav Intervenors ' Ex.

36). A number of deficiencies were noted in various ' compliance reports.

Although tnere were some probl*:ms with the pouring of concrete, the final structure was sound and free of significant voids (Tr. 4629) .

Most of the deficiencies were of a minor nature which were described

{

as being typical problems in construction activities (Tr. 4608) . The Compliance Division in the seventh and final report on site work found no nonecrapliance items (Tr. 4629) . The Board is satisfied that the site work perfomed prior to Applicant's temination of such work in December of 1970 is of satisfactory quality.

133 Numerous other detailed areas of the quality assurance program were covered in the cross-examination, often involving differ-ences of opinion between Applicant's witnesses and the attorney for Saginav Intervenors as to whether various areas of the quality assur-ance program complied with Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. saginav inter-venors indicated that they intended to offer direct testimony regarding quality assurance (Tr. 4671). However, they failed to file any such testimony in spite of opportunities extended in the Board's Orders of

\

August 26, 1971 and December 22, 1971. The Board on review of all of l

n_,,, ,

-,-p,., r -

122 no-detailed arrangements with local agencies nor made any specific

~ _ studies relating to evacuation beyond the low population zone (Tr. 2235-36,2244-47). The Board made an initial determination that the emer-gency plan. contained in the application was not sufficiently detailed and needed further fleshing out (Tr. 2258,2271).

135 In response to this conclusion of the Board, Applicant completed revision of its emergency plan based on its Palisades Plant operating license stage emergency plan and on more detailed contact with local agencies (Tr. 2604-2615). The revised plan contains and incorporates the State of Michigan emergency plan, the Midland County Civil Defense Plan and Dow Chemical evacuation procedures (Applicant's Ex.22). Applicant presented a detailed table demonstrating how the revised plan conformed with the requirements of Appendix E to 10 C"R

( Part 50 (Applicant's Ex. 21). Testimony of the Applicant indicated that in preparation of the revised plan, it had had emergency planning discussions with various organizations who could be of potential as-sistance in the event of an emergency. These organizations included the Michigan State Police, county and city a v enforcement agencies, five area hospitals and two ambulance services (Tr. 2620, 3056-68; Applicant's Exa. 15 to 20). A representative of one of the local hospitals testified as to its capability and willingness to respond to emergencies (Tr. 2757-2813). Extensive testimony was heard re-garding the ability of the Dow Chemical complex to be evacuated (Tr.

2664-83,3096-3266). Dov has in existence detailed emergency plans which are reviewed at least every two years and for which scme kind of practice run is made four times a year (Tr. 2668-69,3103). That i

I 123 l

portion of the Dov complex within the low population zone can be rapid- -

- ly evacuated by foot. Ninety percent of the employees of the whole Dov complex can be evacuated to their cars and out of the parking lot in about 20 minutes and all of the employees can be so evacuated in about 47 minutes (Tr. 2673-74,3107-3131,3262?. Dov has had actual experience with evacuating portions of its complex under emergency con-ditions but has never had to evacuate the whole complex (Tr. 2671-73,

, 2682). A witness for Saginaw Intervenors questioned the ability of Do.r to evacuate as rapidly as estimated, basing his criticism primarily on the possibility of traffic tie-ups (Tr. 4729-37), a major chemical accident concurrently with the nuclear accident (Tr. 4761-64), adverse weather conditions (Tr. 4748-49) or panic (Tr. 4751-52). He concluded thatitwouldtakefrom2-1/2to4hourstoevacuatetheDowcomplex

(

(Tr.4774-75). He was, however, unable to break his estimate down into ccaponents so that one could detemine what steps vould occupy the time (Tr.4816-19). In light of the extensive planning and drill. that has gone into the Dow plan and the fact that there are many years over which the Dow and Plant plans can be refined, the Board finds Mr. Holmes' hypotheses unpersuasive.

136. The staff had reviewed the original emergency plan and found it acceptable (SSE pp. 69-71). The staff witness explained that the guide for preparation of emergency plans was merely a guide designed to assist Applicant in preparing a plan and the fact that Applicant's original plan did not contain at the construction permit stage all the information suggested in the guide was not a problem (Tr.3276-77,3296-3305). Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 became an ef-fective ree;.tlation after the Staff approval of Applicant's original

12+

3 emergency plan. The Staff made a general determination that for pre-viously approved construction permit applications amendment would be required only ir the emergency plan as outli' led was incompatable with the characteristics set forth in the preamble to Appendix E (Tr. 3281-82). The preamble provides that:

"The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report shall contain sufficient information to assure the cor-patability of proposed emergency plans with fa-cility design features, site layout, and site  ;

location with respect to such considerations as  !

access routes, surrounding population distribu-tions, and land use." 10 CFR $50, Appendix E.

Upon reviewing Applicant's original plan, the Staff concluded that al- l though it omitted some of the details contained in Appendix E, it did not reflect any inecmpatability with the characteristics set forth in the preamble (Tr. 3282). The Staff therefore did not require Applicant i

to amend the original plan, particularly because the three Appendix E items which were not addressed in sufficient detail, facilities for on-site emergency first aid and emergency transportation of individuals, emergency treatment of individuals at off-site facilities, and train-ing programs for employees and other persons, lent themselves very well to resolution during the Plant construction phase (Tr. 3283). At the construction permit stage, the Staff is basically interested in re- I ceiving general information which indicates that preparation of a.vi-able emergency plan is feasible (Tr. 3286-87,3397-3h00). The Staff indicated that the original plan satisfied it of the feasibility of evacuation of low population zone in event of accident. Its view is that advance planning should be done to protect populations in low population zones, however it can't envision a situation vbere it would

(

r 1

125 be necessary to evacuate all of the low population zone and the prot-ability of having to evacuate people outside the low population zone is so lov that advance planning is not required (Tr. 3331-3339). Al-though the Staff had not completed evaluation of Applicant's revised emergency plan, the Board infomed it that it did not require such an evaluation (Tr. 3356).

137 Based upon review of both emergency plans and the tes-timony given, it is the Board's opinion that there are no substantial obstacles to emergency evacuation of the low population zonc curround-ing the Plant. In view of the fact that the Dov and Dow Corning com-plexe s have relatively sophisticated emergency plans in existence at this time and that in order to rapidly evacuate employees fran the low population zone it is only necessary for them to walk out, a maximum distance of 3/4 or a mile with over 80% having less then 1/A mile to walk and only 144 having more than 1/2 mile (Applicant's Ex. 22 Appendix K, 3

Attachments 7 and 8), it does not appear that there should be any great difficulty. While the Dov estimates of evacuation time cannot be con-sidered exact, the Board deems them to be reasonable approximatiops of the times necessary to evacuate the whole complex. Although Ap-plicant's original emergency plan was lacking in details required by Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, it does appear to have generally de-scribed a feasible plan. In any event, Applicant's revised plan : lear-ly filled in the necessary details and is certainly acceptable at the construction pemit stage. In fact, in the Board's opinion it is probably more complete than most construction pemit stage plans and in many ways ccanparable to a final operating license stage plan. Applicant hals pro-( vided sufficient infomation and Staff has perfomed an adequate l review

126 with respect to Applicant's emergency plans. The Board finds also that Applicant has complied with Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and that the site is acceptable from the standpoint of ability to implement an emergency plan.

Research and Developnent 138. The application listed several research and developnent projects to confirm various aspects of Applicant's desien or to confirm predictions of behavior (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, $15; PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-B, Amendment 5, Item 1.1, pp. 1.1-1 to 1.1-11). These projects included once-through steem generator tests, control rod drive line tests, self-powered detector tests, process steam monitoring tests, a core themal and hydraulic test program, blowdown forces on reactor r internals analys'is, fuel rod clad failure tests, xenon oscillation analysis, iodine spray removal analysis (see paragraphs 97 and 113-115),

catalytic hydrogen recombiner program, and internal vent valve testing.

139 In addition, the ACRS in its favorable review of the Plant listed the following items for further consideration during con-struction: (1) control rocra ventilation in the event of a chlorine spill; (2) improved multinode analysis techniques for ECCS evaluation; (3) addition of a diverse reactor trip signal; (l+) mere detailed pro-cedures for installation and maintenance of independence of protection and emergency power systems; (5) effects of melting and subsequent disintegration of portion of a fuel assembly; (6) instrumentation for prompt detection of fuel failure; (7) developnent of systems to control post-accident buildups of hydrogen; (8) perfomance of studies on com:non t

mode failures; (9) developnent of detailed process steam monitoring

127

. system and; (10) a number of generic items that the ACRS had listed in previous letters on other plants (ACRS letters, dated June 18, 1970 and September 23,1970). Items (1), (3), (4), (7), (8) and (9) have been discussed in paragraphs 120; 81 and 84; 85-88; 97; 82 and 84; and 91 respectively, of this decision. In regard to item (2) above, the Babcock & Wilcox Ccanpany has done significant further developnent of multinode analysis techniques for ECCS evaluation (See BAW-10034) . - The Board is in agreement with the statement of the ACRS that the matters identified by the ACRS can be satisfactorily resolved during construction of the Plant.

140. The Staff reviewed Applicant's proposed areas of research and developnent and the programs of Applicant and B&W intended to implement them. It indicated that several of the programs had been completed, al-thou6h Stsff review was still under way, and that several others were well under way (SSE pp. 74-80). The Staff concluded that the programs are thnely, are reasonably designed to accomplish their respective develop-ment objectives, vill provide adequate infomation on which to base analysis of of design and perfomance and should lead to acceptable design of the systems involved (SSE p. 80). The Board concludes that the Applicant has provided suf-ficient information concerning and adequately identified the research and developnent programs being conducted, that the Staff has adequately reviewed such programs and that research and development programs reason-ably designed to resolve any safety questions associated with reactor safety features and components have been or vill be conducted; and that such programs of Applicant vill be completed well before completion of construction of the Plant.

~

128 Financial Qualifications of Applicant 141. Applicant is a ccabination electric and natural gas utility incorporated under the laws of the State of Michigan. The Applicant vill finance the total costs to construct the Midland Plant as an integral part of its norms 1 construction progrcm, using funds internally generated (cash on hand, undistributed earnings and de-preciation and other accruals) and frcm the sale of securities (debt,.

equity and short-tem notes) when and as required, in the same general manner as it finances other plant additions. It has a strong finan-cial position, sound financing, adequate resources, a high level of earnings, excellent credit and bond ratings and a proven ability to borrow on a short-tem basis (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-D and 38E; SSE Ap-pendix H, and Staff Ex. 8) . Although Saginav Intervenors initially I

indicated that they were contesting this issue, they abandoned their attack prior to the cocuencement of the radiological health and safety hearing and this is, therefore, an uncontested issue.

Conmon Defense and Security 142. The application reflects that the activities to be con-ducted would be within the jurisdiction of the United States and that all of the directors and principal officers of the Applicant's organi-zation are citizens of the United States. Applicant is not owned, con-trolled, or dominated by an alien, a foreign corporation, or a foreign government. The activities to be conducted do not involve any restiicted data, but the Applicant has agreed to safeguard any such data which might become involved in accordance with Paragraph 50 33(J) of 10 CFR I

(

129 Part 50. Applicant's activities vill also be subject to AEC regula-tions for the safeguarding of special nuclear material. The applicant vill rely upon obtaining fuel as it is needed frcs sources of supply available for civilian purposes, so that no diversion of special nu-clear material needed for military purposes is involved (PSAR Appli-cant's Ex.1-D; SSE p. 83, following Tr.1674) . Saginav Intervenors

~ at one time in the proceeding sought to investigate the possibility of industrial sabotage of the Plant. The Board, however, has deter-mined that developnent of an industrial security program is a matter for consideration at the operating license stage and not in the con-struction permit proceeding. In re Florida Power & Light Co, AEC Memorandum and Order, February 20, 1967; see also Siegal v AEC, 400 F2d 778 (D.C. Cir.1968); In re Virginia Electric & Power Co, CCH Atomic

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Energy L. Rep. Par. 11,593 at P. 17,733-6, Initial Decision ASLB, February 9,1971; In re Pacific Gas & Electric Co, CCH Atomic Energy L. Rep. Par. 11,950, Initial Decision, ASLB, December 8, 1970. The Board concludes that the activities to be performed vill not be inimical to the common defense and security.

y 4

+ vW '

130 ENVIRONMENTAL PREHEARING PROCEDURES 11+3 As a result of the July 23, 1971 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia invalidating the AEC regulations regarding the scope of and procedures for review pur-suent to NEPA, it became necessary for the AEC to issue new regulations, for the Applicant to file additional environmental material, for the Staff to further review the environmental aspects of the Plant and for the Board to hold environmental hearings and make environmental findings.

The additional filings made by the Applicant and review by the Staff are described above in paragraph 13 The AEC issued proposed new environmental regulations on September 9,1971. Althou6h it was clear that additional filings would be required of Applicant and further

(_ review by the Staff, the Board, in an attempt to secure an expeditious proceeding and to avoid an unstructured hearing of the type held on radiological health and safety issues, ordered in its Order of August 26, 1971 "that all parties serve and file all motions for discovery con-cerning issues arising under the National Environmental Policy Act permitted under 10 CFR 662.7h0, 2.7 h l, and 9.?hh by nn later than Scrtember 30, 1971." In addition, the Board requested that all opposing intervenors file a preliminary statement of their views by September 30, 1971 in some detail. Mapleton and Sagicaw Intervenors responded to the order by filing objections that they could not he expected to commence discovery or submit any contentions until the AEC's final environmental statement had been prepared. Saginaw Intervenors did set forth some very general statements of concern, filed a motion for production of

( documents that was " burdensome on its face" (Board Order of December 22, 1971) and a few interrogatories that largely repeated interrogatories

131 previously answered in the proceeding or as to which objections had previously been sustained without any statement of good cause as re-quired by the regulations, 10 CFR $2.740 (Board Order of December 22, 1971). Of particular interest as regards the sincerity of Saginaw Intervenors' participation in the proceeding, Applicant, in an attempt to expedite the proceeding, did not object to a large number of Saginaw Intervenors' burdensome document requests and agreed to make such docu-ments available to Saginaw Intervenors (Tr. 5047) only to have Saginaw Intervenors not avail themselves of the opportunity.

144. The Petition to Intervene of the State of Kansas, see paragraph 23 above, and the contentions of various opposing inter-venors (Tr. 4848-53; Saginaw Statement of Environmental Contentions, Contentions 17-23, February 6, 1972) raised questions concerning the environmental affects of all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle from the n.ining of uranium to the ultimate storage of high level waste.

Both Applicant and the Staff opposed consideration of these questions at t.he hearing. (See " Applicant's Answer to the Petition to Intervene of the State of Kansas," dated October 11,1971; " Answer of AEC Regu-latory Staff to Petition of State of Kansas," dated September 29,1971)

Applicant basically argued that the various major steps of the nuclear fuel cycle were subject to specific licensing review by the AEC and would be subject to appropriate environmental review under NEPA.

Additionally, Applicant pointed out that this Plant's contribution to the environmental effect of the various stages of the fuel cycle will be an insignificant increment and that Applicant has no control over the manner in which most steps of the fuel cycle are performed. The Board found Applicant's arguments persuasive, but finding the existence

132 of a substantial question certified the question to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board. . (Order of March 10,1972) 145 The Appeals Board, (July 19,1972) on the basis of its previous decision regarding consideration of reprocessing of spent fuel and ultimate storage of high level waste (In the Patter of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. , Docket No. 50-271, Memorandum and Order, June 6, 1972) determined that the Board need only review the operation

~

and construction of the Plant and the transportation of new fuel to the Plant and spent fuel and waste from the Plant. The Appeals Board de-scribed the various processes involved in the fuel cycle: mining, milling, refining, enrichment, conversion, fabrication, irradiation anu reprocessing. In order to illustrate the nature of the problem, the Appeals Board pointed out that there are over 200 uranium mines, of i

several different types, 20 mills, 4 conversion plants (as .cil as additional foreign plants), 3 enrichment plants, 9 processing plants and 14 fabrication plants. (p. 6) All of these facilities are s'ubject l

to AEC licensing'and environmental review. The Board concluded that NEPA  !

l did not place on the individual hearing boards the duty to conduct "envi- l l

ronmental study of the present and future operations of an entire industry, '

including emplex and perhaps unidentifiable operations performed by un-identifiable persons at unidentifiable locations under unidentifiable conditions," in each individual reactor licensing proceeding. (p. 12)

Mapleton Intervenors have filed a notice of appeal frm the Appeals l

Boe.tt decision (August 9, 1972).

Ih6. On October 19, 1971, Applicant filed its three-volume, approximately 1000-page, Supplemental Environmental Report (ASER). Fol-lowing a prehearing held on November 23, 1971, the Board in its order 1

i 1

1 l

133 With Respect To Various Motions Filed in This Proceeding, dated December 22, 1971, set forth a prehearing schedule, which required the Staff to file its draft and final environmental statements by specififed dates and requi.ed intervenors to file contentions and requests for discovery based'on the ASER, draft environmental statement, agency comments on the draft environmental statment and the final environmental statement, within specified periods following the availability of each of such documents. The Staff's Draft Environmental Statement was filed in advance of the deadline and its Final Environmental Statement was filed shortly after the deadline.

147 EDF failed to file any factual contentions by the December 31, 1971 deadline and on February 4, 1972 indicated that its remaining interest in the proceedings was related to legal issues. In

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the Board's Order of March 27, 1972, EDF was ordered to file by April 25, 1972 a brief supporting its contentions relating to the treatment of electrical demand. However, in late April 1972, EDF fomally withdrew frca the proceeding (Tr. 5337).

148. The purpose of the December 22 Order was "to encourage all parties to exercise their best efforts in good faith to refine contested environmental issues". On December 29, 1971, Mapleton Inter-venors filed vague and general contentions that totally failed to apprise the Board or parties of their basis. Mapleton Intervenors' December 29, 1971 filing, contrary to the Board's December 29, 1971 order, made no request for discovery. Mr. Like, attorney for Mapleton Intervenors, had at the November 23, 1971 prehearing informed the Board that Mapleton t

Intervenors opposed issuance of a permit (apparently without regard to

l 134 i

l merits) and that if required to supply contentions, he would fall back on merely asserting the negative of every proposition advanced by Ap-plicant (Tr. 4903). It is clear that this is all that had been done in their December 29, 1971 filing. Mapleton filed four further general contentions regarding the Draft Detailed Statement, which was issued s January 7,1971, before the deadline of February 4,1971. The Board in its Order With Respect To Environmental Issues, dated March 27, 1972, l

struck three of Mapleton Intervenors' contentions, dated December 29, )

1971, found that most of the remaining contentions in the December 29 '

filing were relevant to the proceeding but were " generally vague and conclusionary and . . . very much in need of additional specification" and found scene of the remaining not germane to the proceeding. Of the four additional contentions, dated February 4,1972, the Board

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excluded one, found one unintelligible ano permitted the other two.

Ih9. Saginav Intervenors on December 24, 1971 filed their l

" Motion for Reconsideration of Certain Portions of Board Order Dated '

De'cember 22, 1971" wherein they requested that the Board not require 1

them to file their contentions and requests for discovery by December 31, 1971 and not set any further deadlines until the next prehearing con-i ference because they had not completed review of the ASER and that Saginaw Intervenors' counsel, Mr. Cherry, would be on a trip until.

January 6,1972 and would be " busily engaged in preparation for upcoming i ECCS Rule Making Hearings" (AEC Dkt. No. RM-50-1) thereafter. The Board

- in its Order of January 6,1972 granted saginaw Intervenors an extension until February 4, 1972, the due date for their contentions on the Draft Detailed Statement and noted its unhappiness with the implications of s

m ,.,7., -.

135 the request. The Board at that time point.d out that it was aware counsel for intervenors was thinly spread over a number of cases and that the Board had attempted to accomodate him on previous occasions to the great inconvenience of the Board and parties (e.g. , permitting default en January 7,1971, date for fi?.ing interrogatories, and per-mitting extension until March 22, 1971 as a result of his involvement in the Palisades proceeding and a Court case, postponement of the January 6, 1972 prehearing because of a hearing in the Point Beach No. 2 proceeding and prehearing conferences held in Chicago and Washington for his con-venience). The Board then stated:

"There are limits to the concessions which can properly be made. Unlike lawsuits the conse'-

quences of delay and postponement of this type of proceeding are potentially very serious. We will continue to try to accomodate hearing dates within reason but we cannot in good conscience regard participation in othcz pro-ceedings to be justification for not meeting deadlines. If counsel are to participate in more than one case at a time they simply must be prepared to make arrangements for handling the case load."

150. On February 6, 1972, two days after the February 4 due date, Saginaw Intervenors filed 119 contentions covering some seventy pages attached to which was an Exhibit A which in essence stated that since there was at that time an unresolved controversy as to whether certain areas would be heard in the environmental hearing that they be per-mitted until fourteen days after resolution of any such matters to file any detailed discovery requests. Applicant on February 18, 1972 filed detailed responses to each of Saginaw Intervenors' contentions and stated:

\

"In replying to these contentions Applicant has attempted to provide additional information in l

136 those few areas that were not in fact covered in the prior environmental filings and to reference previous filings that answer the many contentions that ignored auch filings. Applicant has found these contentions in many cases to relate to matters which are not properly issues in this proceeding, in a number of cases to be frivolous, almost uniformly to fail to set forth any facts in support of broad conclusionary statements, in many cases to be clearly contrary to and to ignore facts already on the record, generally lacking in the specificity required by AEC regulations and in a number of instances to misrepresent Applicant's statements in previous filings. Applicant is par-ticularly shocked by Saginaw Intervenors' repeated intimation of misfeasance and falsification di-rected at the Michigan Water Resources Commission and the Dow Chemical Company. The bulk of Saginaw Intervenors' contentions being mere conjecture, unsupported by any facts or scientific bases are an unworthy reply to the great bulk of data and detailed presentation made available to them in the numerous filings of the Applicant and the Staff."

Applicant in a filing, dated February 25, 1972, recognized that as to those matters which appeared at that time to be outside the scope of the hearing, Saginaw Intervenors had no obligation to seek their discovery prior to February 4,1972 but stated that Saginaw Inter-venors' continued refusal to seek discovery "with respect to those environmental matters discussed in applicant's environmental report and the Staff's draft statement is in flagrant disregard of the Board's earlier ruling since no valid justification for its failure has been set forth."

While the Board, in general, agreed with most of Applicant's points quoted above, it is of the opinion that some of Saginaw Intervenors' contentions provided scue enlighterment as to their concerns and thus in its Order of March 27, 1972 permitted Saginaw Intervenors' conten-tions dealing with Plant thermal dissipation, discharge of chemical i

vastes (although requiring that these contentions be revised in light

137 of additional information furnished to Saginaw Intervenors by Applicant in response to them), decommissioning of the reactor, fuel and waste transportation accidents, reliability of nuclear plants, need for power generally and need for the specific plant and effects on domestic water supply. The Board found a number of areas to be without significant effects and ruled them out at least until Saginaw Intervenors could demonstrate some significance. A number of others were found wanting for dealing with matters unrelated to the issues before the Board, e.g. had Michigan Water Resources Commission properly issued its certificate, did Michigan Public Service Commission rate structure encourage growth of nuclear plants, or as being overly abstract or unintelligible. The Board's March 27, 1972 order required Saginaw Intervenors to file by April 15, 1972 a revised statement of their contentions on chemical vastes in light of additional information supplied by Applicant, contentions on fuel supply other than on the AEC's breeder reactor program, on trans-portation accidents and any amended contentions concerning ECC3.

)

151. Numerous matters in addition to the acceptability of contentions were dealt with in the Board's Order With Respect to En-vironmental Issues, dated March 27, 1972. None of the intervenors had i

made any reasonable request for discovery pursuant to the Board's Orders i

of August 26, 1971 and December 22, 1971. The Board therefore found:

l "As a general rule, there would seem to be little purpose to be served by tradi-tional pre-hearing discovery at this time.

Applicant has filed its Environmental Report, '

its Supplanental Environmental Report, and responses to various questions and conten-tions. The Staff has filed its Final State-ment with cormnents of various agencies. By

,\

and large, opposing intervenors know, or should know, Applicant's ' case' and the basis

i 138

' of the Staff position. Opposing intervenors have not, with minor exceptions, paid any attention to the Board's order that a good faith effort be made to make discovery re- i quests as the environmental reports were j filed. For the Board to allow, as Saginaw l now requests, discovery to begin ik days j after the entry of this order would be to permit intervenors' intransigence to acccm-plish what their arguments did not.

"In the circumstances, the Board will not pemit the process of discovery to delay the proceeding. On the other hand, written detailed questions would undoubtedly be use-ful in further refining the issues to be con-tested by intervenors and answers to these questions may save hearing time. Accordingly, intervenors may serve and file detailed, spe-cific questions and requests for documents within fourteen days following the date of this order. It should be clearly understood that the preparation of such requests is not to delay the filings provided for elsewhere in this order, and that such requests bear a

( heavier burden of showing ' good cause' than would have been the case a few months ago.

Notwithstanding that burden, the parties to whcm the requests are made shall exert their best efforts to comply with reasonable requests."

Additionally, the Board set a hearing date of May 17, 1972 and a pre-hearing date of April 28, 1972. The March 27 Order provided that by April 25,1972 the staff would file its views on deconmissioning and that Saginaw Intervenors would file briefs regarding alleged procedural inadequacies and allegedly inadequate cost-benefit analysis with re-spons'es due by May lo,1972. The order also provided that opposing intervenors would file their written evidence in support of their con-tentions and detailed written specifications of areas as to which they intended to cross-examine.

152. In his letter of April 15, 1972, Mr. cherry responded

\

to the Board Order of March 27, 1972 by indicating that he did not

139 O intend to comply with any of the deadlines set forth in that Order and by requesting that the May 17. date for the hearing be adjourned indefi-nitely. His letter set forth a decidedly biased and basically inaccurate statement of the history of the proceeding to date. The major basis of Mr. Cherry's request was that he was " unable to relieve myself of my duties in the ECCS hearings", and that "there is no other lawyer that knows the case [ Midland) and the Intervenors' position as I do" and that:

"If I were coming to this case without the back-ground that I have set forth here and claiming that I have other work which prevents me from meeting the Board's schedule here, I could seu such a motion being denied upon the grounds that lawyers should not take on too much work; but that is not the situation here."

He additionally urged that the Staff, Dow and Applicant had unclean hands because they had previously accepted the AEC environmental regu-lation that was overturned by the Court of Appeals, that there were nu-merous important issues outstanding and no permit could be issued in any case prior to resolution of such issues, that Saginaw Intervenors had made diligent, good ' faith efforts in the proceeding and that much needed to be done in the way of discovery. In letters dated April 20, 1972 av April 21+,17(2, respectively, Dov and Applicant vigorously opposed Mr. Cherry's requests. At the April 28, 1972 prehearing, the Staff joined in opposing indefinite adjournment of the hearing:

"I would like to say, if there is any possibility of working out a reasonable compromise date where-by Mr. Cherry could remain fully active in both l

cases, that'I would certainly be in favor of ex- 1 ploring it. I think he is entitled to that con-sideration. But that really does not seem to be possible in this case. So I would urge the Board

( to deny the motion." (Tr.5253)

lI 40 t

Mr Cherry at the April 28, 1972 prehearing reiterated the points con-tair.ed in his letter of April 15, 1972 and made the additional conten-tions that because a construction permit could not be issued prior to completion of the AEC's emergency core cooling system rulemaking pro-ceeding, adjournment would not cause any overall delay (Tr. 5255) and that Applicant had made no showing of prejudice from adjournment.

(Tr.5259-5263) Following argument by the parties present, the Board decided to deny the motion and to proceed on the schedule previously postulated (Tr. 5285) . The Board gave consideration to each of Mr. Cherry's arguments for adjourning the proceeding. As discussed elsewhere in this Order, the Board is of the opinion, contrary to Mr. Cherry's assertion that a construction permit cannot issue prior t,o conclusion of the ECCS rulemaking proceeding, that the AEC has effective regulations relating to the performance of the ECCS and that it is the Board's duty to proceed prior to conclusion of the rulemaking proceeding, which may well not occur for more than a year. While'it is true that a number of unresolved issues were oucatanding at that time, particularly certification to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Ap-

. peals Board of the Board's exclusion of environmental effects of cer-tain portions of the uranium, coal and oil fuel cycles, this was certainly no reason not to proceed with those issues that were ripe for consideration. Mr. Cherry's alleged inability to appear at the hearing as scheduled could only be attributed to his taking on too E

much work or his intransigence. He has been employed on the Midland proceeding since fall 1970. Subsequent to that date he became involved

( in the Point Beach No. 2 proceeding (AEC Dkt. No. 50-301) and in

141

(* December 1971 or January 1972 in the ECCS rulemaking proceeding. Cer-tainly at the time he became involved in the ECCS rulemaking he was fully aware of the intent of this Board to continue the hearing on a tight schedule. (See Orders of August 26, 1971 and December 22,1971.)

As early as January 6,1972 the Board infomed Mr. Cherry that he should not let himself become so involved in other proceedings that he could not properly perform his duties in the Fidland proceeding:

"We vill continue to try to accommodate hearing dates within reason but we cannot in good con-science regard participation in other proceedings to be justification fer not meeting deadlines.

If counsel are to participate in more than one case at a time they simply must be prepared to make arrangements for handling the case load."

(Order dated January 6, 1972)

At that time Mr. Cherry's letter of April 15, 1972 indicates that he had capable ec-counsel in the ECCS rulemaking proceeding. Mr. Cherry, at the January 19, 1972 prehearing, clearly recognized that environmental issues should continue to be heard even while the ECCS proceeding con-tinued (Tr. 51!4) . Yet in spite of the Board's varning of January 6, 1972 and Mr. Cherry's representations at the January 19, 1972 prehearing Mr. Cherry apparently, accont 4 to his letter of April 15, 1972 and his statements at the April 28, 1972 prehearing, had permitted himself to beccxne the sole person capable of handling the ECCS proceeding and the Midland proceeding. As indicated by Mr. Cherry, it was apparently his clients ' desire that he remain involved in the ECCS rulemaking proceeding at the expense of their participation in the Midland preceeding (Tr. 5310).

Were this. a case of Mr, Cherry needing a week or two weeks' adjournment, some reasonable acccanodation might have been made. However, Mr. Cherry made it clear that only an indefinite adjournment vould be acceptable.

An additional comunentary on Mr. Cherry's allegations that he could not

142 r

appear at Midland because he was indispensable at the ECCS proceeding is provided by the fact that the Consolidated National Intervenors were represented by Mr. Arnold, not Mr. Cherry, on the following days: June 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15 and 16, and the ECCS proceeding was adjourned on May 30 and 31 and June 1 and 2, a period of time conte =poraneous with hearings at Midland. In regard to his statements that Saginav Inter-venors had been reasonably diligent .in this prcceeding and that the period of adjournment could be usefully employed for discovery pur-poses, the Board can only point to s record thu shows their refusal to make any reasonable attempt to seek disecvery over an eight-month period in spite of the Board's continuing encouragement. The final argument that no prejudice vill result fran an indefinite adjourn-g ment is without merit. Both the ASER cnd the Steff Final Environtental Statement clearly demonstrated the need for the power that the Plant is to furnish and the increased cost of generating power from replace-ment units. Additionally, as made clear in Applicant's Ex. 38L, which was before the Board at that time, delay can increase Plant costs by in excess of $1,000,000 per month. It is the Board's opinion that both Mr. Cherry and his client villfully became involved in a proceeding know-ing that their involvement vould render them unable to continue meaning-ful participation in the Midland proceeding. The Board was unable.to justify indefinite adjournment of the proceedings to suit their conven-ience. On May 8,1972, Mr. Cherry requested certification of the Board's ruling. The Board denied the request on the basis that there was no novel issue involved and that it, being the body most familiar with the record, is the proper party to judge the matter (Tr. 7086) . Saginaw

II+3 t

Intervenors did not in fact appear at or participate in the environmental hearings.

153 On April 17, 1972, in an attempt to correct the deficien-cies found by the Board in Mapleton Intervenors' first three contentions of their December 29 filing, Hapleton Intervenars filed thirty-six addi-tional contentions which largely consisted of a point-by-point break-down of radiological health and safety affidavits which Mapleton Intervenors had previously filed. Attached to the /,pril 17, 1972 contentions was a motion which stated that the AEC's Draft and Final Environmental Statements had cuitted reference to and discussion of the findings and opinions of the witnesses subscribing to the various affidavits previously filed by Mapleton Intervenors and, therefore,

( moved the Board to order the Staff to circulate the affidavits to agencies to whom the statements vere circulated asking for their com-ments, amend the Final Statement by including discussion of the named affidavits and any ccanments received thereon and postpone the hearing pending completion of the circulation of the affidavits and amendment of the Final Statenent. The Board in its Order of May 17, 1972 denied the motion. The Board found that Mapleton affidavits consisted of some hundreds of pages, much of it reprints of articles appearing in the general literature and much of it bearing no specific relationship to the proposed project. No request was made by Mapleton Intervenors that the Staff include such affidavits in its Draft Statement nor did Mapleton Intervenors file any coments with respect to the Draft En-vironmental Statement. The Board in its Order found,

. . - - . ~

. ~ .

14 0 "In the ciretanstances, its [Mapleton's] position amounts to a claim that t,he staff is either re-quired to circulate anything, no matter how repet-itive or irrelevant it may be, which a party chooses to put in the record in the pending proceeding, or that the staff at its risk, must cull the material to see whether it centains any ' respectable scien-tific opinions.'"

The Board concluded that under any circumstances that proposition is of doubtful validity and that under the circumstances of this case where the information in the affidavits is before the " person making the de-cision" and that pursuant to Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 50 any decision the Board makes based on the affidavits will automatically amend the Final Statement to the extent it varies from the Final Statement that proposition is without any merit. Although not spelled out in the Boards April 17 Order, the Board since viewing the various witnesses I

who signed the affidavits is now of the opinion that most of the affi-davita did not contain " respectable scientific opinions" and those that did contain such opinions, i.e., Dr. Eckert and Dr. Epstein, were not substantially at variance with the contents of either the Draft Statement or the Final Statement.

154. Although rapleton Intervenors filed no " detailed, specific questions and requests for documents" within the fourteen days pemitted in the Board's Farch 27 Order, Applicant made available to them the documents listed on its list of documents relied upon in preparation of its environmental reports even though many of them were already in Mapleton Intervenors' possession or readily available to them (Tr. 5301,5303,5306-07). At the April 28, 1972 prehearing Mapleton Intervenors stated that they had no direct testimony beyond i the previously discussed affidavits and that they would be filing I

l-

~

145 C their detailed list of areas of cross-examination (Tr. 5325). Maple-ton Intervenors filed a partial list of areas of cross-examination, dated May 1, 1972. Applicant responded with n motion, dated May 4,

~1972, asking the Board to strike all or part of fifteen of Mapleton Intervenors' 32 areas of cross-examination, to preclude Mapleton Intervenors' cross-examination on the other areas until they filed a description in confomance with the Board's March 27 Order and for an additional prehearing conference to consider these matters. Appli-cant's motion was based on the fact that fifteen of the areas of cross-examination related to areas either previously covered in the radiological health and safety portions of the hearing or previously ruled upon by the Board and on the failure of Mapleton Intervenors to ex: ply with the following directive in the Board's Order of March 27, 1972:

"In order to focus the issues as precisely as possible, the specification of areas of cross-examination should, where feasible, be in the form of written questions capable of factual answer."

The Board, in its Order of May 9, lW2, stated:

"The Board agreed with Applicant that Mapleton's specifications of areas of cross-examination is not in compliance with the spirit of the Board's earlier order and includes matters already ntled out of the proceeding."

The Board however did not grant Applicant's motion except as to the pre-hearing conference and urged Mapleton to provide a detailed specification of some of its areas of cross-examination before May 13,1W2. Subse-quently, because of the difficulty of meeting on May 13, the Board re-quested that Applicant and Mapleton Intervenors agree on some initial areas of cross-examination so that the hearing could commence as directed.

An initial area of cross-examination was identified and the hearing commenced as scheduled on May 17, 1972.

146 ENVIR0 DENTAL HEARINGS A!L FINDINGS 155 The Board held 14 days of public hearings on environ-mental matters relating to the Plant. These hearings were held on l'ay 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24. 25, 30 and 31 and June 1, 12, 13, 14 and 15, 1972. The record in this proceeding was closed on June 15, 1972 (Tr. 8945) except for those items remaining open as described in the Board's Order of June 28, 1972. All of these items were completed by July 24, 1972 and the record officially closed.

Site Characteristics 156. Applicant in its evaluation of the site for radiologi-cal health and safety purposes evaluated many of the important aspects of the site and these aspects were considered by the Board in the radiolog-ical heslth and safety hearing and are discussed in that portion of this decision: geology, paragraph 50; soils and plant foundations, paragraph 51; surface water hydrology, paragraphs 46-48; pjound water hydrology, paragraph 49; meteorology, paragraphs 53-66; seismology, paragraph 52; and population distribution and land use, paragraph 41 (See also ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-3, Appendix 0). In addition, for purposes of the environmental review, the Applicant and Staff investigated other para-I meters of the site as discussed in the following paragraphs, l Terrestrial Ecology 157. Applicant had an ecological survey made of the site by i

Dr. Leslie Gysel and Mr. Tim Reichard of Michigan State University (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, following p. 3-1, hereinafter cited as " Ecological Survey"). The Ecological Survey generally described the location, topog-

'raphy, climate and soils at the site (Ecological Survey, pp.1-3). It i

147 then described the vegetation communities estirated to have been at the site prior to commencement of preconstruction activity and found to be at the site at the time of the survey, with an emphasis on the diversity of the plant species (Ecological Survey, pp. h-8). Having identified the common plant species the survey discussed the potential value of such species for wildlife food and cover (Ecological Survey, pp. 9-18). The

~

survey identified dominent wildlife present at the site based on direct observation, observation of animal signs such as tracks, seats, den sites, and feeding activities and information received through conversation with plant security guards and local residents (Ecological Survey, pp. 19-21). The survey further discussed the interrelationship of the plant communities and wildlife species in. relation to the overall ecology, both prior to construction activities and at the time the survey was made (Ecological Survey, pp. 22-24).

158. The Ecological Survey showed that prior to purchase of the site for the Plant the area was occupied by rural homes and farms and concisted primarily of cropland, pastures and old fields of various successional stages, interspersed by forest and predomonately second growth timber land (Ecological Survey, pp. 4-5). The site prior to preconstruction activities contained the basic components for a variety of animal species and was a moderately good site for vildlife (Ecologi-cal Survey, p. 22). Following preconstruction activities, most of the vegetation had been stripped from the site, except for a few isolated areas and a 120 acre parcel not yet acquired, and had been succeeded by a monoculture of an early stage forb community (Ecological Survey, pp. 5, 22-23). The survey concluded that the present condition of the

148 site results in it being a fairly unproductive vildlife area except

, for vario'us seed-eating and insect eating birds (Ecological Survey, p.

24).

159 Midland Intervenors' witness, Dr. Holcomb, claimed that tne Ecological Survey was incomplete or inadequate because (a) other nearby sites had not been surveyed, (b) the survey was condu;;ed over a short period of a few weeks, (c) precise population estimates were not involved, and (d) the survey was done by inexperienced field personnel (Tr. 8522-8523). Further, Mapleton Intervenors' witness critized the survey for its failure to include three divisions of plants.

containing twelve classes, including algae, bacteria, molds, other fungi, liverworts and mosses; several phyla of animals, including sponges, in-sects, one-celled animals, hydra, wrms, amphibians and reptiles (Tr. 8521.

(,

8524-25,8527-29). He also criticized +he survey for not listing as animals found at the site, species of birds and animals listed in reference books as appearing in this region of Michigan (Tr. 8529-42). As to Dr. Holcomb's point that the survey was conducted by inexperienced field personnel, the Board does not agree with this conclusion. Mr. Reichard, who acted as field biologist, has a Bachelor of Arts degree in biology and chemistry and is working on his Master of Science degree in wildlife (Tr. 66c8-09 and -

6611). The field survey was performed under the direction of Dr. Gysel, who is a Professor in both the Department of Forestry and the Department of Fisheries and Wildlife at Michigan State University (Tr. 6603-05). In addition to the survey conducted for this site, Mr. Reichard has conducted numerous surveys at potential power plant sites throughout the United States (Tr. 6609,6611). The Board finds nothing in the record to indicate that he was not fully competent to perform an adequate survey.

149 160. The adequacy of a survey is to a great extent a matter of philosophy, It is the opinion of the Applicant and its witnesses that the purpose of the site survey was to characterize the site through identification of dominant species and their ecological relationships to the site environment (Written testimcny of Dr. Gysel, dated July 8,

'1972 p. 1). Applicant did not seek to create a definitive listing of every creature present at the site and does not feel that such a study would be particularly useful (Written testimony of Dr. Gysel, July 8, 1972,p.2). It is the opinion of Dr. Gysel that the study performed was moderately detailed and sufficient to evaluate the plants and ani-mais that might inhabit the site (Tr. 6639). Dr. Holcomb on the other hand clearly believes that it is necessary to have a de-tailed census of the animals at the site in order to evaluate the ef-fects of Plant operation.

161. Regarding Dr. Holcomb's criticism of the survey for omitting various plants and lower orders of animals, Dr. Gysel indicated, even had all such plants and animals (including insects) been identi-fled, the present state of scientific knowledge regarding food chain relationships would not permit meaningful evaluation of the roles of most of such plants and animals or the consequences of their removal from the ecosystem (Written testimony of Dr. Gysel, July 8,1972, p. 4) .

Dr. Holcomb's further criticism that the study did not include various mammals and birds indicated in various wildlife manuals to occur in this region of Michigan does not appear valid. As pointed out by Applicant and stated in one of the manuals utilized by Dr. Holcomb, the fact that a map shows large areas in which certain animals occur does not mean that

\

such animals can be expected at any particular site (Written testimony

150 of Dr. Gysel, July 8,1972, p. 5; Tr. 6693, 6701-02). Applicant's survey

. was based on evaluation of the habitat, use of some of the manuals cited by Dr. Holcomb, direct observation of the animals and expert interpretation of animal signs .such as tracks, seats, den sites and feeding activities (Ecological' Survey, p.19; Written testimony of Dr. Gysel, pp.1-2: Tr.

6631). Additionally, the Michigan Department of Natural Resources field biologist in the area was consulted and was in general agreement with the content of the lists compiled on this basis (Applicant's Ex. 38K, p. 79; Written testimony of Dr. Gysel, July 8, 1972, p. 1). Based on their ex-perience and the information available to them, Applicant's witnesses made population estimates according to the following general categories: ,

abundant, common and rare. They did not deem more definite popalation estimates to be necessary because of the lack of unique site features (Tr.

(

6770). In addition to his consultation of manuals, Dr. Holcanb visited the site on only two occasions and testified that the only animal he saw at the site was a 13-lined ground squirrel (Tr. 8586-87). He then made numerous specific population estimates of the number of each species he would expect to find on the site. His estimates, however, are riddled with obvious errors indicating extreme lack of care on his part in compiling the list. He includes two mammnis, the least shrew and boreal redback vole, which the area maps contained in his reference manuals do not in % te to occur at the Midland site (Writ-ten testimony of Dr. Gysel, July 8, 1972, p. 5). Although Dr. Holcomb's reference manual indicates that grey fox and badgers are very rare in the Great Lakes area [a fact that he misrepresented at the hearing (Tr. 6701, 6696, 6695)], he places 5 grey fox and 36 badgers at the

(

site (Written testimony of Dr. ' Gysel, July 8,1972, p. 6). He lists

151

( 4800 deer mice, 2400 prairie deer mice and 2400 woodland deer mice although his reference manual for mammals of the Great Lakes region clearly indicates that all deer mice present in Michigan's lower pen-insula are either prairie deer mice or woodland deer mice (Written testimony of Dr. Gysel, July 8,1972 p. 6; Burt. Mammals of the Great Lakes). His compilation additio6 lly includes listing of tree swallows in two places and barn swallows in two places (Tr. 8554,8555,8605).

Dr. Holcomb was unaware of any detailed census of a large site indicating the existence of the quantities of birds which he listed (Tr. 8619). His estimates of animal populations made no allowance for natural mortality factors (Tr. 8594-97; Written Testimony of Dr. Gysel, July 8, 1972, pp.

6-7) or territorial competition between species (Written testimony of Dr. Gysel, July 8,1972, p. 7). The Boarc does not feel that it can place any confidence in th; species or population projections made by Dr. Holcomb.

Impact of Site Occupation

^

162. While the Board is aware that more detailed estimates of site populations can be made than those made by Applicant, the Board does not believe that there is any particular use in making more de-talied estimates. This reflects the basic difference of opinion between the parties as to how one evaluates the effect on the terres-trial wildlife and how one quantifies that effect. The Applicant -

and the Staff relied on a characterization of the site, related such characterization to the surrounding community and generalized the effect in terms of the effect it vould have on the surrounding com '

nunity. Dr. Holcomb, on the other hand, made his estimates of the numbers of birds and mammals, assigned an arbitrary dollar value to each animal and calculated his total value for the number of animals l

152 lost from construction. He then multiplied this number by thirty to reflect loss of this amount of habitat for thirty years.

163 The Applicant's evaluation basically concluded that the animal populations lost had little value because (1) the site had no unique wildlife habitat and no rkre or endangered species populations, (2) the site was not the type to be frequented by bird watchers, hunters or other nature enthusiasts (the Board notes in this connection that Dr. Holcomb, an experienced wildlife observer, only observed one animal on his two visits to the site (Tr. 8586-87)),(3) the site is located

.near a large industrial complex and is in fact partially zoned indus-trial and (4) the type of habitat available at the site is extremely common in Midland County, the county being approximately 50% orested and 39% devoted to agriculture (Written testimony of Dr. Gysel, July 8, 1972, pp. 9-10; Tr. 6640-41, 66h2, 6692). Dr. Gysel summarizedi "My conclusion remains that there is nothing unique or particularly desirable about the ma-jority of the proposed site and that removal of the wildlife populations previously resident there vill have no noticeable effect on vildlife popu-lations in the Midland area." (Written testimony of Dr. Gysel, July 8,1972, p.10)

In particular reibrence to Dr. Holcomb's method of assigning a dollar value to each individual animal at the site and then calculating the loss for thirty years because of the lost habitat, Dr. Gysel, in addi-tion to his objections to the manner in which the basic population esti-mates-vere made, indicated that he considered the valuation method used to be meaningless (Dr. Gysel's written testimony, July 8,1ST/2, p. 8) .

He thought that replacement cost was not a measure of value of some-( thing that nobody wished to replace and which couldn't be replaced (Dr. Gysel's written testimony, July 8, 1972, p. 8). He thought possibly

153 that a measure of the value of habitat might well be the value which the marketplace put on land of thic type for use as habitat (Dr. Gysel's written testimony, July 8, 1972, pp. 8-9).

16k. The Staff concluded that the major testrestrial impact of the Plant had already been realized as a result of preliminary site preparation and construction (FES, Staff Ex. 6, p. V-12) . These activi-ties had resulted in loss of 90% of the native vegetation cover and habitats (PES, Staff Ex. 6, p. V-12) . The Staff stated the greater portion of native wildlife had been displaced and that the areas ad-jacent to and south of the site contained all of the habitats previous-ly comprising the site, as well as the size and diversity necessary to support the displaced fauna (FES, Staff Ex. 6, p. V-13) . However, the Staff recognized that, except for the larger and mom mobile wildlife, i

territorialism and campetition for suitcble habitat would be expected to prevent the displaced fauna from establishin6 itselfelsewhere(FES, Staff Ex. 6, p. V-13) . The Staff concluded that as a conservative esti-mate all wildlife formerly and presently at the site should be con-sidered lost an a result of the loss of habitat (FES, Staff Ex. 6, p.V-13). The Staff concluded that the effect vould be a small loss of small mnmmnis and birds which is unmeasurable (FES, Staff Ex. 6, p.X1-8;Tr.7889).

165 Dr. Holcomb, whose methodology has been described pre-viously, concluded that an annual value of $524,100 should be assigned for the loss of bird habitat (based on $10 per bird and all potential offspring for most birds and $20 for a few), $352,880 for loss of mammal habitat (varying cost per animal and all potential offspriny) and $23,500 for amphibians and reptiles (at $5 each) (Tr. 8551-61).

154 p Of his estimate of bird costs, $103,000 has been placed. on six co:nnonly recognized pest species: coc: mon grackle, crow, red-winged blackbird, starling, brown-headed cowbird and house sparrow (also called English sparrow) (Tr. 8555-58, 8610-12; Written testi .ony of Dr. cysel, July 8, 1972, p. 8). The Board takes note that Dr. Holcomb assigns an annual value of $160,000 for four other types of coc: mon sparrows alone. Dr.

Holcomb's list of rnammals includes $5,000 for house mice, $60,000 for assorted shrews (including $12,000 for the least shrew discussed above),

$48,000 for Dr. Holcomb's mistake in double counting deer mice and a num-ber of other costs that the Board finds it very difficult to accept as a -

meaningful evaluation of the impact of the Plant (Tr. 8559-60).

166. Dr. Holcomb does not identify any unique habitat at the site. In fact, his testimony indicates that studies of adjacent areas

( would give a good indication of the character of the site before construc-tion (Tr. 8522,8568). He does not indicate that there would be any mean-itigful impact from the Plant on the wildlife populations lit surrounding areas or Midland County. In fact, he indicates quite to .,he contrar/ that all surrounding habitat is probably fully occupied (Tr. 8569) and thus one would expect that following operation of the Plant, the numbers of animals in surrounding territories would be at least as great as at present.

167 The Board has concluded that Dr. Holcomb's population estimates are greatly overstated due to his failure to include cultural mortality factors, his apparent failur-e to take full account of all aspects of territorialism on the site and his numerous errors. Addi-tionally, the Board does not believe that the dollar costs he assigns represent a meaningful evaluation of the environmental impact. Without k questioning the subjective nature of his replacement cost figures. the Board is of.the opinion that replacement cost is not a proper value to

155 l

assign to the number of animals that could have occupied the habitat I

had the Plant not been built. A meaningful value for habitat might well ,

i be the cost of such land. However, to the extent that this is the proper I measure, it is already included in the Plant cost. Certainly the costs utilized by Dr. Holcomb have no relation to value of the animals in-volved to the surrounding community. Because of the inability to place any meaningful dollar figure on the animal losses and because the Board believes that the ecological impact of the Plant can be evaluated with-out detailed population estimates, the Board concludes that no further population estimates are necessary.

168. It is the Board's opinion that the impact of destruc-tion of wildlife habitat at the site is an unmeasurable loss of srall

( mammals and birds which is not quantifiable in dollar tems. The Board believes such cost to be insignificant in terms of any impact on the overall ecosystem of the area and in tems of any impact on the human community in the area. The Board accepts the opinion of Dr. Gysel, based on his extensive experience in Michigan and his view of the site, that it does not contain unique habitat and is very unlikely to contain any rare or endangered species. The Board particularly notes that even had such species been present, they have clearly been 2emoved or de-stroyed by preconstruction site clearing activities (see paragraph 8 above). The area is partially zoned industrial with the rest resi-dential. The Boerd has visited the site and concurs in the opinions expressed that it is not a particularly attractive wildlife habitat and that it is closely situated to several industrial ecx::plexes.

( The Board concludes that Applicant's site survey was sufficiently

156

(

detailed to characterize the site and pemit evaluatica of the impact of the Plant on the environment. The Board further concludes that the Staff adequately reviewed sue: information.

169. Mapleton Intervenors also alleged that some cost should be placed on the amount of oxygen that would no longer be put into the atmosphere as a result of the removal of most of the vegetation from the site (Tr. 85!4-49). Applicant's vitness said he found it hard to believe that Mapleton Intervenors were serious in light of the fact that about 90% of Midland County is covered with vegetation, either in the form of forests (50%) or agriculture (39%) (Written testimony  !

of Dr. Gysel, July 8, 1972, pp. 4-5). The Board concludes that the removal of vegetation from the site vill have no significant effect on the atmospheric oxygen resources of the l'idland area.

k Aquatic Ecology 170. While no aquatic environmental studies have been con-ducted by Applicant or the Staff, there have been numerous studies con-ducted by the Michigan Water Resources Commission, Michigan Department of Natural Resources and by the Dow Chemical Company over the years (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, 53 2.2). Applicant attached many of these studies to its ASER as the best available indicators of Tittabawassee River quality (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, 53 2.2. ; ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-2, Appendices C-L; Tr. 5752): " Report on Waste Assimilation Capacity - Tittabawassee River Below I'.idland, l'ichigan. " C. J. Velz, November 1958; " Water Resource Conditions and Uses in the Tittabawassee River Basin," Michigan Water Resources Comission,1960; " River BOD Abnormalities," John J. Gannon, The University of Michigan, november 1%3;

" Biological Survey of the Pine, Chippewa, and Tittabawassee Rivers,"

l

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157 The Dow Chemical Company, September 6,1%3; " Biological Survey of the Pine, Chippewa, and Tittabawassee Rivers,1968," The Dow Chemical Company, September 23,1%9; " Fish Kill in Tittabawassee River caused by Discharge From Dow Chemical," !*ichigan Water Resources Commission l

memorandum, September 23,1969; " Report of a Fish 1*ortality in the Tittabawassee River Below Dow Chemical Company, !*idland, liichigan,"

liichigan Water Resources Commission memorandum, July 27, 1971; Plans for 1971 Surveys of the Tittabawassee River and Associated Waters by the ::ichigan Water Resources Commission and The Dow Chemical Company; Water Quality Data,141chigan Water Resources Commission; Physical Description of Intake Water and Discharge From The Dow Chemical Company.

Subsequent to the filing of the ASER, the preliminary data on the

!*ichigan Water Resources Commission's latest study of river water

(

quality was made available to the Staff (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. II-18 through II-32). The Staff of th'e 141chigan Department of Natural Resources concluded from this recent study that the water quality parameters indicate generally good water quality in the Tittabavassee River, with the exception of high ammonia levels and high temperatures.

Notwithstanding these indications, biological parameters of the river indicate poor water quality. Possible factors relating to depressed biolegical conditions (particularly in the vicinity of Dow Chemical) include low level discharges of chronically toxic materials, residual  ;

toxicity in stream sediments, marked fluctuation in rate of river flow and water levels, high heat loadings, and insufficient stream habitat and cover (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. II-23 & Appendix D).

( -171. While it appears that the biological productivity it.

l the_ vicinity of the site is low and will not support a diverse resident

~

158

( tich population at the present time (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-lk), it is an-ticipated that the river will be substantially improved (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-3, Appendix N; FES Staff Ex. 6. p. V-15). The Michigan Water Re-sources Commission is implementing a program to improve discharges into the river and improve river water quality. The Tittabawassee River from Midland to its confluence with the Saginaw River is designated to be up-graded not later than January 1,1974 for intolerant fish - warmwater species and agricultural uses (ASER, Appendix N; Tr. 5664-65). To meet this requirement dissolved oxygen must be present at levels above 5 ppm on a daily average and 4 ppm as an instantaneous value when the river flow is at the average low flow of 7-day duration expected to occur once in 10 years (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-3, Appendix N). 'Ihis low flow would correspond to a river flow of about 240 cfs at Midland (ASER Appli-

• cant's Ex. 38F-2, Appendix E, p. 47), but the Midland Plant would not withdraw water from the river at flows below 350 cfs (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 4.4-4). Only 40 cfs would be withdrawn at river flows

. between 390 cfs and 650 cfs and at no time would more than 200 efs be withdrawn- (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 4.4-3).

172. In June 1972 Dow chemical initiated cortinuous bio-monitoring of the general vastewater effluent with fish and macroin-vertebrates to identify any chronic toxicity aspects of the waste (FES Staff Ex. 6, Appendix D).

173 construction of cooling facilities at Dow chemical is currently under way that will reduce the existing heat load to the river

. which is presen'ly about 1.8 billion Btu / hour maximum, to about 380 million Btu / hour (Tr. 6368,.6379-6381). Further a stipulation exists between Dow Chemical and the State of Michigan that by January 1,1974 the temperatu.re

159 rises due to Dow ond all other sources will be less than five degrees l- . Fahrenheit at the edge of a prescribed mixing zone (Tr. 6379-6381; Maple-ton Ex. 26).- The final Dow treatment plant will include a tertiary facil-ity to both stabilize vastes and dissipate heat (Tr. 6386-6389).

1 174. In addition to the modifications of the Dow wastewater discharges, others discharging wastes upstream will be required to pro-i vide additional treatment to meet water quality standards of the State of Fichigan and projections have been made of improved water quality conditions by 1974 In particular, there is expected to be a sig-nificant reduction in total dissolved solids (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. II-23, II-24; Tr. 5611, 5663-5667).

'175. Opposing intervenors claimed that the aquatic data are inadequate and noted that where certain organisms are not found in the Tittabawassee River, data should have been extrapolated from other rivers (Tr. 8525). Data have been presented which detail the compo-sition of phytoplankton and benthic organisms (numerous surveys over

, several years) both in the vicinity of the Midland site, downstream of the site, and in upstream tributaries that could be considered characteristic of clean water communities (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. II II-31; ASER Applicant.'s Ex. 38F-1, 53 2-2). Applicant's witness, Dr. Reynolds testified that it is not necessary to sample every type of aquatic organism at all times of the year to adequately characterize the l

condition of the aquatic environment; that selective sampling and analysis at specified times of the year can provide sufficient information for a thorough evaluation (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. II-31; ASER Applicant's Ex.

38F-2 Appendix A; Tr. 5831).- P!he best qualitative indicator, the resi-dent fish population, was sampled quite thoroughly by the Michigan Water 1

=xc 16 0 Resources Commission in 1971, both in the immediate vicinity of the site and in upstream and downstream control areas (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. II II-32). Subsequent to a fish kill that occured on July 27, 1971, there were no significant resident game fish populations in the river from the Dow Chemical Company to the confluence with the Saginaw River (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. II-31 and II-32). The Bureau of Water Management and the Water Resources Commission indicate that the earliest date in which fish could be successfully planted would be in the fall of 1972 or spring of 1973 pending reassessment of water quality and productivity (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. II-31, Appendix D). Benthic production in the area of the Midland site appears to be insufficient at the present time to support a resident fishery (EES Staff Ex. 6, p. II-31). In light of the presently

( depressed quality of the river and the extensive plans to improve its condition, it is clear that a further survey of present water quality would be neither useful nor desirable at this time. Applicant vill be required to conduct a thorough ecological study of the site and its environs prior to Plant operation to catablish base line values as recommendedbytheStaff(FESStaffEx.6,pp.iii-iv,V-21andV-22).

The Board concludes that with the numerous proposed changes in river quality and population, the most mear.ingful data would be that col-lected just prior to Plant operation.

Uater Resources Commission 176. The Michigan Water Resources Commission (WRC) is charged with establishing pollut!on standards for Michigan waters, making regu-lations and orders restricting the pollution content of waste material i

or polluting substances discharged or sought to be discharged into state

161 waters and to take all appropriate steps to prevent pollution which WRC deems unreasonable and against public interest. (ASERApplicant's Ex. 38F-3, Appendix S, p. 8) On June 9, 1970, Applicant filed with the WRC a Statement of !Tew or Increased Use of Waters of the State for Waste Disposal Purposes. Following discussions and public hearing the WRC issued an Order of Determination, dated October 15, 1970. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-3, Appendix S, pp.10-11) The Order of Detemination required that all Plant discharges be treated or controlled so that, inter alia, they shall not contain solids, other substances or heat in amounts sufficient to create conditions which are or may become injurious to public health, safety and welfare or, to other uses of the river or to livestock, wild animals, birds, fish or aquatic life and not raise

the river temperature outs.ide a zone of mixing more than 5 F nor above specified levels. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, Appendix S pp.11-12 and Appendix II) The order additionally required processing of Plant sanitary sewage at the licensed facilities of Dow, submission of design criteria I

to and approval of such criteria by the WRC chief engineer and the per-1

formance of pre- and post-operational acquatic environmental studies, i

177 The WRC has promulgated water quality standards applicable to the Tittabawassee River which provide that by January 1,1974 the quality of the river will be upgraded to the classification agricultural i -use-intolerant wann-water species. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-3, Appendix NandAppendixSp.9) These standards provide specific limits on coliform count, dissolved oxygen, suspended materials, floating material, toxic and

t. -deleterious substances', total dissolved solids, nutrients, temperature X -and hydrogen ions. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-3 Appendix II) The WRC

...._,%- . m .-r-= . , , _ - . , , --.,m . , . . ...,-_e.w., ,, -

162 e .

has certified, in accordanca with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 USCA $1171(b), that there is reasonable assurance, as determined by the WRC, that the construction and operation of the Plant will be con-ducted in a manner which will not violate applicable water quality stan-dards. (ASERApplicant' sex.38F-3AppendixN) Applicant has committed to discharges that are significantly lower than those permitted by the standards for thennal releases and total dissolved solids. As discussed in the following paragraphs, the Staff and the Board have independently considered the effects of Applicant's discharges on the aquatic environ-me'2t .

River Water Usage 178. The water used for the Plant comes from two sources:

the Tittabavassee River and Lake Huron. The water from the Tittabawassee River is utilized as cooling water for the Plant condenser cooling system and the Plant service water system (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, $2.2.8 and Appendix 2B; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, $$9.7,10.2 5). As a means of cooling the river water after use and of providing storage of water during periods of low flow in the river, Applicant intends to install

-an 880-acre cJosed cycle cooling pond (PSAR Applicant's Ex. 1-A, Appendix 2B; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, $10.2 5) . The pond dissipates heat primarily by evaporation, conduction and heat radiation. Any de-crease in the pond level due to water losses (evaporation, seepage, vindage, etc.) would nomally be made up by water drawn from the river during periods of adequate flev (PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-A, $2.2.8; hSER Anplicant'a Ex. 38F-1, p. 4.4-1) . Water vill be withdrawn frca the t

river at rates up to 200 cfs (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 4.4-3)

~ -

- -~ - .- .

163

( and introduced into the cooling pond through the Plcnt condenser inlet structure (ASER Applicant's Ex. 380, p. 6.10-2).

17,0 Because of the marked fluctuations in river flow and in order to prevent its actions from seriously affecting such flow, Applicant hos designed the pond to store water to reduce the need for make-up water from the river during extended periods of low river flow and has imposed the following limitations on its withdrawal of water: Vith river flow in exvss of 650 cfs, Applicant can withdrav 40 cfs plus the excess river flow above 650 cfs up to the capacity of the pumps (200 cfs); with river flow be-tween 350 cfs and 650 cfs, Applicant may withdraw the flow in excess of 350 cfs up to a maximum of 40 cfs; and with flow belos 350 cfs, Applicant may not withdraw any water from the river (ASER Appliccnt's Ex. 38F-1, pp. 4.4-3,

, 4.4-4) .

180. The Depcrtment of Interior (Applicant's Ex. 38A), indicated its concern for water supply and refc enced a 1960 study by the Michigen Water Resources Cornission (WRC) (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-2, Appendix D) rhich indicated that water requirements in the Midland area had already exceeded the supply. The Michigan United Conservation Clubs, Water Resources

- Ccamittee (FES Staff Ex. 6, Appendix E, pp. 55-63), the Environmental Pro-tection Agency and the Mapleton Intervonors (Tr. 5972) indicated a similar concern. An Applicent has pointed out, its manner of operation and develop-ments since the 1960 report obviate any concern regarding this matter (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1,_ pp. 3 2-2 and 3 2-3; Applicant's Ex. 38K, pp.1-2) .

The 41RC 1960 report indicates that any problems are with usage during low flow periods and that the best means of alleviating tne problem is through

_( the use of reservoirs that store water during periods of abundance (ASER

- . . _ . ~ . . _ _ _ _ _ __. . . _ _ .

P 164 1

Applicant's Ex. 38F-2, Appendix D pp. 112-114), which is exactly what Applicant proposes'to do. Additionally, Dow and Applicant are making use of water frasa Lake Huron as a means of decreasing their demands on river water (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 3 2-3) . The WRC vho pre-pared the 1960 report and reached the conclusion contained therein has reviewed Applicant's plan for use of the river water, including its staged withdrawal plan,' and has issued an Order of Determination and has certified that Applicant's discharges will comply with applicable water quality standards (ASER Applicant'c Ex. 38F-3, Appendix N) . The URC filed ccmunents on the Draft Detailed Statement indicated no concern over depletion of flow by Applicant (Staff Ex. 7). No evidence has been brought before the Board to indicate that Applicant's proposed usage will affect s'ny other uses of the river. It is the opinion of Applicant - '

that it has taken proper precautions and that its usage is reasonable in ,

light of other uses of the river (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, pp. 3 2-2 .

4 and 3 2-3; Applicant 'c Ex. 38K, pp.1-2) . The staff reviewed Applicant's

proposed method of withdrawal and found no problems (FES Staff Ex. 6, p.

V-lO) . The Board concludes that Applicant has furnianed sufficient in-formation, the Staff review has been adequate, and that Applicant, through f its' staged withdrawal plan, has properly acted to prevent significant effect on the river flow..

Impact of Intake of Water 181. The; intake structure through which river water is with-drawn vill be located in a ~ stilling basin and vill include a trash rack and adjustable weir for control of silting.- Make-up flow-is by gravity from the intake structure to the make-up pump structure. The intake  ;

Y o

! j i

1 2 ~,+c _ -. ,. ._ _ ;,_. _ - . _ . . _ . _ . _ . , _ , ,_ .a., _ _ . . ., u

165 structure vill have a traveling screen with 3/8 inch mesh (ASER Appli-cant' sex.38G,p.6.10-1,6.10-2). Although Applicant had proposed that the maximum velocity through the traveling screen be 2 feet /second (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38G, p. 6.10-2) , adverse comment on this velocity was received from the Environmental Protection Agency (I'l.S Starf Ex. 6,

p. 48) and the Department of Interior (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. 27) . Appli-cant indicated that its intake structure was a preliminary design and that following receipt of more infomation on reestablishment of fish populations in the river, it vould develop final design criteria including fish pro-tection criteria which would take into account the size and species of the fish expected to be present in the river (Applicant's Ex. 3BK, p. 52; Tr. 7402) . The Staff extensively considered the question and concluded ,

7 that the intake structure should be desigt.ed to have an intake flow velocity of less than one foot per second (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. iii, V-16;Tr.7249). The biological witness for the Staff, Mr. Grube, testi-fled that he had reviewed the scientific literature on sustained aviming speeds of fish and concluded that reduction of the velocity to below one foot per second would minimize impingement on the screen (Tr. 7400; 7251-52). Although Mapleton Intervenors objected to the fact that no final design of_the intake structure has been completed, they had not read the Staff's recommendation in the Final Environmental Report and were unable to indicate to the Board any factors of concern other than those that had already been evaluated by Applicant and Staff (Tr. 6732-34).

Mapleton Intervenors further argued that they couldn't determine whether the intake design was acceptable until they could judge the relative effects of

\.

diiTerent designs on zooplankton, phytoplankt.on, benthic organisms.

~

~

E' 166 fish eggs and fish fry (Tr. 7251) . The Staff patiently pointed out that the design of the intake structure was important in evaluating damage to fish but that organisms of the type described by Mapleton Intervenors

. vere going to be taken in through the intake with the flow of water to the some extent regardless of intake design (Tr. 7251) . It is the opinion of the Beard that Applicant and Staff have cdequately evaluated the de-sign of the intake structure and that a proposed limitation on flow velocity of less than one foot per second vill adequately minimize in-pingement of fish on the screen.

182. Mapleton Intervenors further contended that a cost must be assigned to loss of zooplankton, phytoplankton, benthic organisms and small fish as a result of being taken in through the intake and f throu6h the Plant condenser (Tr. 8548,8549-51). Their vitness, Dr. Holcomb, estimated that losses of phytoplankton and zooplankton each year might be about 4400 tons each, that such weight should be converted to fish weight at a ratio of 1000/1 and that the fish should bevaluedat$300/lb.(Tr.8548,8549). This calculation resulted in a cost of $26,400 per year for each type of plankton. Dr. Holcomb's methodology was the same as that prescribed for phytoplankton in a Staff Guide to Preparation of Environmental Reports issued in December 1971 that was used by Applicant in an amendment to its ASER (Applicant's Ex.

38H) except that he inexplicably increase / % e value per pound of fish frca $1.00 to $3.00. He then assumed $ M ti mt statement of any reason, that benthic organism loss vould a u q .

$26,400 (Tr. 8549). He also estimated an annual value of $18,900 for the ic,se pf fish one inch or

( under (Tr. 8551). The AEC abandoned use of this methodology prior

167 to the hearing on the basis that the plankton loss would not affect the fish populations (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. XI-lO; Tr. 7368-72). It is the opinion of the Staff's biological witness and Applicant's aquatic biologist that although the plankton would be killed, their nutrients would be returned to the river and the remaining plankton in the river would receive such nutrients and rapidly reproduce to restore concentrations in the river to normal levels (Tr. 7368-72; Written testimony of D. J. Seeburger, July 7, 1972, pp. 1-2). Mr. Seeburger stated that the quantity of plankton available was seldom the control-ling factor on fish populations (Written testimony, July 7,1972) and both witnesses agreed that no measurable loss of fish would occur as the result of the loss of plankton (Tr. 7372; written testimony of D. J. Seeburger, pp. 1-2, July 7, 1972). Mr. Seeburger also stated that because benthic organisms were by definition bottom dwelling organisms, they could not be expected to become entrained in the in-take with any frequency and that, therefore, Dr. Holcomb's cost was unreasonable (Written testimony of D. J. Seeburger, pp. 2-3, July 7, 1972). The Board finds that because of the uncertainty of the types and quantities of fish that will exist in the river following replant-ing that no mean' ;;ful estimates can be made of the quantity lost or the cost thereof. The Board concludes that the losses postulated by Dr. Holeceb will have no measurable effect on the aquatic ecology and that there vill be no measurable loss of fish. The Board therefore does not find that any cost should be assigned to entrainment of organisms in the intake and passage through the condenser.

.g

168 (E

Use of Lake Huron Water 183 The other major source of water is from Lake Huron.

This water is utilized for initial filling and make-up of steam systems and other auxiliary systems; continuous mndensate return to the process steam system; potable water. Lake Huron water is brought to Midland by the existing Saginav-Midland water system pipeline where a portion is delivered to Dow who in turn vill supply an appropriate amount to Applicant. The Plant vill use about 400,000 gallons per day of Lake Huron water for make-up and potable water and another 5,000,000 gallons per day will be used for the continuous condensate retum to the process steam system. An equivalent amount of water is presently being used by Dow for its exist-ing process steam system (Applicant's Ex. 38K, p.11) . The Staff re-viewed this use of water and concluded that it would. create no net change in water usage (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-10). Mapleton Intervenors argued that the Board ought to evaluate the environmental costs of the vit'iraval of water from Lake Huron (Tr. 7892) . The Board, however, is of the opinion that because the Lake Huron water system is a presently existing municipal water system which had and will have whatever effects it has whether the Plant is built or not, that any environmental costs of the withdrawal are not attributable to the Plant.

The Board finds that Applicant has adequately described the proposed system, that the Staff has adequately reviewed the infomation and that the proposed use of Lake Huron water by the Plant will not create any incremental environmental effects.

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169

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Cooling pond Size 18 4. The Environmental Protection Agency questioned the j= adequacy of the proposed cooling pond for drought years (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. 45), as did the Saginav and Mapleton Intervenors (Sagirs.

Intervenors' Contentions No. 2 and 3; Tr. 5970-71) . Applicant indicated that it had sized the cooling pond to provide sufficient storage capa-city with no makeup additions from the river so as to provide sufficient water for continuous full power operation of the Plant during a one-hundred-day drou6 h t with continuous river flow below 350 cfs (PSAR Ap-plicant's Ex.1-B, $10.2 5; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, p. 2.6-1; ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, $4.4.1; Applicant's Ex. 38K, p.41) . Historical data on the river indicated that a 90-day drought with river flow less than 350 cfs has a probability of occurrence of one in five years (PSAR Applicant 's Ex.1-B, p. 2.6-1) . However, this historical data was f

based on flow records which included years that did not reflect the recent upstream developnent of major storage dams (Applicant's Ex. 38K, p.41). These storage dams result in storage of water, some regulation of river flov and increased river flow during droughts (Applicant's Ex. 38K, p. 41; Tr. 6122). Had only the later years of data, which re-flected this developnent, been used, the probability of drought calcu-lated by Applicant would have been lower and, thus, Applicant's estimate in conservative. In sizing the pond to meet a one-hundred-day period with river flow below 350 cfs, Applicant assumed that the Plant would operate at full power for the entire period, that it would get no makeup water from the river and that evaporation and seepage losses vould average ho efs (Applicant's Ex. 38K, p. 41) . The evaporation rate utilized was based on adding conservative margins to the maximum

4 170 i'

monthly evaporation rates calculated (315 cfs) (Tr. 7521) using a generally recognized mass transfer equation (Tr. 6139-4o; 6134). Plant operation would not have to be curtailed in the event of a drou6h t for one hundred days (Tr. 6131-32) and only at the end of such period with no alternative eu'eply of pond makeup water available m1 ht6 it become necessary to cu d ii Plant operation (Tr. 6115-18). The Board con-

- cludes that the Applicant has furnished sufficient information regarding water usage and the Staff has adequately reviewed such information (FES Staff 2x. 6, p. III-7; Tr. 7524-26). The Board further finds that the pond has been reasonably and conservatively sized as a result of the in-clusion of conservative data in the Applicant's calculation of drought periods and the conservative estimate of water loss. Because of these con-servatisms, the conservative assumption of continuous full power operation

(

for 100 days (Tr. 6132) and the possibility of getting some additional water from Dow or the City of Midland, either from the existing Lake Huron pipe-line or the City's vaste water plant, in the event of a drought (Tr. 6796, 7525-26), the Board does not believe it likely that the Plant vill have to reduce power as a res'ilt of lov flov in the river. The Board recognizes the possiblity of some temporary restrictions on occasion but believes that because of the reserve margins Applicant maintains, temporary small power reductions, less often than once every five years, vill not have any significant impact on Plant reliability or econamics.

185 The Saginav and Mapleton Intervenors contended, but offered no evidence, that the proposed cooling pond would be too small to adequately dissipate the heat rejected to it from the Plant during normal operations so as to result in adverse themal loading of the Tittabavassee River and that

171 alternative cooling methods should be considered (Tr. 5901-5903). The pro-posed cooling pond is to be part of a closed-cycle cooling system from which discharges (blovdown) would be made only when necessary to con-trol any dissolved solids built up in the pond (ASER Applicant's Ex.

38F-3,AppendixN,AttachmentA,p.1). Since it is a closed-cycle pond, it adjusts its temperature to the heat load (Tr. 6151-6192), and vill

- reject all of the heat put into it. The resulting pond surface tempera-ture is a function of the imposed heat load (Tr. 6151, 6189-92) and the area of the pond (Tr. 6344) . The pond is loaded at 8.75 x 106Btu /hr/ acre (Applicant's Ex. 38P, p.14) . Any discharges from the pond would be cooled through use of an additional cooling system (such as a cooling tever, heat exchanger or spray pond) to within approximately 10 F of the temperature of the river (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, $4.4.1; Tr.1493-95) and therefore the size of the pond will have a negligible effect upon thermal loading of the river. Applicant had cooling pond model studies perfonned at Alden Research Laboratories (Applicant's Ex. 39) frcm which model cooling pond temperature differentials were scaled to the full-size pond. The studies optimized the pond baffle for heat load distribution and cooling effectiveness and data summarizing the procedures for cal-culating heat dissipation from the cooling pond and adjusting the model was utilized by Applicant and reviewed by the Board (Tr. 6320-6321 and 6565-68). The Board concludes that the cooling pond is adequately sized to reject the heat load imposed upon it.

Supplemental Cooling System.

186. Applicant has ccumitted to installation of a cooling tower or other appropriate cooling system to cool the pond blowdown to vithin approximately 1 F of the ambient temperature of the river water

, , ma m

~

172 r

k (ASER Applicant's Ex. ? LF-1, 4.4.1; FES Staff Ex. 6, p. III-8) . This

~

criterion is subste :.. .y msre stringent than state water quality standards which permit discharges which do not increase the temperature of the river by more than 5 F outside of a mixing zone (ASER Applicent's Ex. 38F-3, Appendices M and N; FES Staff Ex. 6, p. III-20) . Testimony indicated that Applicant has not settled on a final design for this cooling system but has established that it is feasible to desira a system to achieve the criteria set forth (Tr. 5675). Mapleton Intervenors agreed that limitation of discharges to within 1 F of ambient water temperature would not cause adverse themal effects (Tr. 5903) . This themal increment is within the variation of the natural stream tempera-ture and below levels which could cause any measurable changes or detri-mental effects to aquatic organisms (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-17) . The

(

Environmental Protection Agency cc::nended Applicant for anticipating environmental requirements in this respect (FES Staff Ex. 6, Appendix E,

p. 44). Because of the supplementary cooling system, the pond discharge vill be es::entially saturated with oxygen and therefore vill not violate any water quality standards for oxygen or interfere with the need of fish for oxygen (Applicant's Ex. 38K, p. 43). The Board concludes that Applicant has furnished sufficient information, that the Staff has adequately reviewed the information and that the ther=al discharge standard that Applicant has imposed on itself is more than adequate to protect the )

aquatic environment.

l Impact of Nonradioactive plant Effluents on River 187 Applicant has identified the nonradioactive Plant effluents in great detail. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, 4.4; ASER Applicant's s

Ex. 38G, pp. 6.3-1 to 6.3-3, 6.4-1 to 6.4-5, 6.11-1 to 6.11-2, and 6.14-1 to l

- ~

173 6.14 4 ; Applicant's Ex. 38K, p. 51) . The projected usage of chemicals in the Plant was determined from evaluations of similar operations in the industry using conservative assumptions (Tr. 5530) and therefore the listed quantities are hia;her than those actually expected to be necessary for Plant operation (Tr. 5531) . Applicant, u. its evaluation, considered Plant materials balances and chemical reactions which vill occur in the Plant (Tr. 5529; FES Staff Ex. 6, p. III-31) . During norm 9 opera-tion, the chemical composition of the effluent discharged into the Tittabavacsee River is primarily the result of the following processes:

(1) Evaporation of water from the cooling pond; (2) Condensate deminera-lizer regeneration; (3) Makeup demineralizer regeneration; (4) Laundry operations; (5) Tertiary system blowdown into the pond from heat ex-changers and auxiliary boilers; (6) Injection of chlorine into the circulating vater system for control of slime growth in the condenser and the cooling tover; (7) Injection of sulfuric acid into the circu-lating water system for control of carbonate scaling in the condenser; and (M Chemical treatments of system components during maintenance

, periods (ASER Applicant's Ex. 380, pp. 6.3-1 to 6.3-3, 6.4-1 to 6.h-3, 6.14-1 to 6.14-4; FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. III-30 and III-31) . The major chemical vastes discharged to the Tittabavassee River during normal opera-tion of the Midland Plant (FES, Table III-7) are: Amonium sulfate and sodium sulfate from regeneration of demineralizers; sulfates frcra the addition of sulfuric acid for pH adjustment; chlorides from chlorination procedures; phosphates in blevdown from the process steam reboilers and the Plant auxiliary boilers; laundry vastes; and a dissolved solids s increment attributed to concentration of the river water due to

174 evaporation (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. v-19; ASER Applicant's Ex. 380, pp. 6.3-1 to 6 3-3, 6.4-1 to 6.4-5., 6.11-1 to 6.11-2).

188. The various processes can be categorized in three groups.

The first process merely reflects the fact that there will be evaporation in the cooling pond and that therefore the normal chemical constituents (dissolved solids) of the river water will become more concentrated in the pond water and the discharge water fran the cooling pond will have a higher total dissolved solids content than will the intake water (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, $4.4; FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. III-31 and III-37).

In addition to the concentration resulting fran evaporation, a second categorization is processes (5) through (8) above which result in direct addition of chemicals and waste effluents to the cooling pond (FES Staff

, Ex. 6, p. III-31). Ihe third group of processes (2) through (4) are l

those that are discharged directly to the River following dilution in either the cooling pond discharge or when conditions are such that there is no pond discharge in a dilution stream (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. III-31).

189 The majority of the chemicals involved reach the river culy as neutral salts or in some other form which naturally occurs in the river water (Tr. 5464). The Plant is designed to prohibit discharge of any chemicals into the environment in their raw form (Tr. 5416,5417).

l Testimony indicated that the principal area of interest was the increase  !

in total dissolved solids (TDS) resulting from pond concentration and addition of chemicals (Tr. 5853-57) and that only the specific chemical discharges discussed in the following two paragraphs might be of addi-tional interest.

( 190. Chlorine will be used for biological control of the water c;rculating through the condenser and at the service water cooling tower l

l

175 (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38G, p. 6.4-1 to 6.h-2, 6.11-1 to 6.11-2; FES Staff Ex. 6, III-38 and III 40). The chlorine will react with the water to form chloride and hypochlorite ions although scxne of the chlorine and hypo-chlorite will react with manonium and amines precent in the vr.ter to pro-duce chloramines (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38G, p. 6.11-2; Applicant's Ex. 38K,

p. 85; FES Staff Ex. 5, p. III-38; Tr. 5532, 7384-90). Both hypochlorite ions and chloramines are oxidizing biocides that will react with organic matter to produce chloride ions (Tr. 5533). Reaction rates are not well defined and the time required for the residual chierine to dbninish cannot be accurately predicted (Tr. 5532). However, the range of reaction rates involved (reaction time - 31 seconds to 100 minutes) and catalysis of the ,

oxidation reactions of chlorine by light clearly indicate that the deten-tion tLne in the cooling pond (three to five days) will be sufficient to

(

reduce residual chlorine below the limits of detectability prior to entering the river as part of the cooling pond blowdown (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38G, pp. 6.11-1 to 6.11-2;-FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. III-38 to III-39 and V-20; Tr. 7388-7390; Staff Ex. 9). The Staff has proposed that the cooling pond discharge be limited to 0.05 ppm of chlorine (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. iv; Tr. 7391-7394). The Board probed the Staff's basis for this (Tr. 7397) and has been informed by the Staff that because of the operational characteristics of the cooling pond, the limitation on the discharge to 0.05 ppm chlorine effectively limits the maximum concen-tration in the river to 0.008 ppm with a blowdown of 100 cfs. Under the conditions of the discharge no significant kills of aquatic organisms or measurable adverse effect on the aquatic ecology is to be expected.

(Staff letter of July 24,1972). This conclusion agrees with other s-opinions expressed that no effects are to be expected at that level of u _

~ _. .

176 discharge (ASER Applicant's Ex. 380, p. 6.15-3; Staff Ex. 9). The Board concludes ths' sufficient information has been furnished and that the Staff review has been adequate. With a limitation of 0.05 ppm chlorine in the discharge, there will be no significant effect.

191. The primary use of phosphates is to control total dis-solved and suspended solid buildup in the process steam reboilers (terti-ary heat exchangers) (ASER Applicant's Ex. 380, p. 6.4-2) . The National Technical Advisory Ccamittee to the Secretary of Interior reccxamended "as a guideline that the concentration of total phosphorous should not be increased to levels exceeding 100 micrograms /l (0.1 ppm) in flowing streams or 50 micrograms /l (0.05 ppm) where streams enter lakes or res-ervoirs" (Tr. 7134-35; FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-18). The current chemical parameters of the river exceed these levels in the vicinity of the Plant s

and are much higher downstream (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-18). The Staff ini-tially recommended that Applicant limit its discharge of phosphates so that the resultant concentration of phosphorous in the river does not exceed 0.05 ppm (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. iv, V-20) . In response to Board questions, the Staff indicated that its only real concern with Appli-cant's phosphate discharge was the relatively large quantity (174 lb) per day) being discharged from the eboilers during low flow periods and that it assumed the restriction would be reasonable in light of the improvements being made in the river water quality (Tr. 7412).

Because of possible uncertainties beyond Applicant's control in the f

quality of the river water in 1977 and because the criteria for correct water management appears to be essentially that of minimizing phosphate

, discharges from any facility to decrease loadings, the Staff deter-

• mined that placing a limitation on Applicant's discharge so that it

- =

177 I won't make a significant contribution to the phosphorous content in the river would be a more reasonable limitation (Staff letter dated July 24, 1972; Tr. 7418). The Applicant and Staff have reached agreement that phosphates discharged including laundry waste and startup waste based on the actual average shall not exceed 35 pounds per day exclusive of pond reconcentration of existing phosphate levels in the river (Tr.

7428; Staff letter dated July 24,1972). This quantity of discharge will reduce the concentrations calculated by the Staff on page III-33 of the Final Environmental Statement by 80% to .032 ppm phosphates in the river during lowest river flow and .004 ppm during average flow (Staff letter dated July 24,1972). Because the concentration of pnosphates is a factor of three higher than the concentration of phos-pharous which is the important parameter (Tr. 7415; Staff letter dated

(

July 24, 1972) the increase in concentration of phospnorous in the river under worst theoretical conditions would be only about .01 ppm and under average conditions only .0013 ppm (Staff letter cated July 24,1972).

The Staff estimate for worst conditions is clearly excessive because it assumes pond blowdown during periods of a very low flow (200 cfs) (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. III-33). However, the testimony clearly indicates that because of Applicant's TLs limitations it cannot discharge from the pond at such low river flowa (Tr. 5808-09). The Board finds that sufficient information has been furnished, that the Staff has made an adequate con-servative review and concludes that such discharges will protect the quality of the river. Intervenors took no position on this matter.

192. -The Michigan Water Resources Commission requires, be-

. ginning in 1974, that discharges of wastes not be made when the effect

(-

would be to increase tne total dissolved solids (TDS) content of the

~

+

178 river above 700 ppm outside of a mixing zone (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-3.

, Appendices M and N; FES Staff Ex. 6, p. III-30; Tr. 5666). Applicant has committed itself to the much stricter limit of not discharging from its cooling pond when the effect would be to increase TDS above 500 ppm (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 4.4-4; FES Staff Ex. 6, p. III-30; Tr.

5672). Based on projected water quality, beginning in 1975, the largest increase in river TDS during the average year wculd be 10 ppm in the month of October and the largest increase in the drought year would be 18 ppm in April. However, both of these increases would be subject to the everall 500 ppm limitation and in most months the increases would be much less (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, 64.4; FES Staff Ex. 6, p. III-37; Tr. 5671-72). These projections take into account projected discharges from the Dow Chemical Company in ensuring that the river will remain below 500 ppm (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 4.4-3).

233 Intervenors argued that Applicant should have knowledge of the specific contents of all Dow Chemical releases in order to be able to evaluate possible synergism between Applicant's and Dov's chemical releases (Tr. 5599,5772). However, it was the view of Ap-plicant that because of the innocuous nature of its releases and the fact that the materials it released were basically identical to ma-terials already present in the river, that there could be no adverse synergistic effects of any consequence (Tr. 5450,'5469). However, knowledge _ of Dow's discharges could be desirable at a later date ao that Applicant's monitoring program could distinguish between any effects of Applicant's discharge and any effect of Dow's discharges (Tr. 5455-61, Sk80-81,5483-84). Intervenors presented no evidence regarding chemical N

interaction and in cross-examination displayed a lamentable lack of

179 p

understanding of the behavior of chemicals, even alleging that or-dinary chemicals present in concentrations of parts per billion could have some significant interaction (Tr. 5518-20, 5449-50, 5790-5802, 5857-5860). Additionally, their cross-examination constituted extensive discovery of matters already plainly on record that they apparently had never seen before (Tr. 5444-49,5467,5470-72).

194. A witness for Mapleton Intervenors, Dr. Orrie Loucks, discussed total dissolved solids concentrations in Saginav Bay and their effects (Tr. 8718-93). He indicated that the Saginav River to which the Tittabavassee River is a major tributary is the largest source of total dissolved solids to Saginaw Bay (Tr. 8732-33) and expressed his concern about the effect of Plant discharges on the ecology of

, Saginav Bay (Tr. 8732) . He advocated that there be a leveling off in the discharges of chlorides, sulfates, total dissolved solids, phosphorous and other chemicals (Tr. 8732-33). He specifically as-cribed the decline in fishing in Saginav Bay over the fifteen-year period from 1952-1967 to environmental contamination and stated that the Plant discharges vould hasten such contamination (Tr. 8733,8771).

He stated that Applicant could not predict the effects of its dis-charge unless it did a complete materials balance study of the Saginav Bay drainage system (Tr. 8743). His testimony as to the quality of Saginaw Bay was based primarily on two papers: " Physical Limnology of Saginaw Bay-Lake Huron" by Beaton, Smith and Hooper and " Changes in the Environment and Biota of the Great Lakes" by Beaton. included in the symposium " Eutrophication: Causes, Consequences and Cures" (Tr. 8768).

The Board has evaluated the various statements of Dr. Loucks in light

180 of the information contained in his references and infomation con-tained in the filings and testimony of other parties. Contrary to Dr. Loucks' statement, it appears from his references that environ-mental contamination is not the primary cause of decline of fishing in Saginaw Bay but that the sea lamprey is the major culprit (Tr. 8771-72; 8951-8953). Additionally, as noted in his principal source, over-fishing has been another major factor (Tr. 8772,8951-53). His source does indicate that environmental contamination may be of importance but that similar declines have also been experienced in the relatively unpolluted Georgian Bay area of Lake Huron (Tr. 8951-53). It is clear that the inflow into the Bay from the Saginaw River has not been of good quality and that its effect has probably been detrimental (Tr. 8735).

However, the biological indications to which the witness directed the i

Board do not appear to have resulted primarily from the pollution. Par-ticularly when specifically questioned about this and after he admitted that sea lamprey and overfishing might also have contributed to some de-clire, he stated that sea lamprey and overfishing had not been a factor J

in the decline of sauger, walleye and whitefish in Saginaw Bay (Tr. 8772, 8735). Yet his main reference states that the whitefish's initial decline resulted from overfishing (Tr. 8951) and "The continued decline of the whitefish was probably caused by heavy sea lamprey predation." (Tr. l l

8952) Dr. Loucks references the sauger fishing as being an important  !

industry (Tr. 8735) and yet his reference states "The Sauger (. . . )

has not been an important commercial species . . . . " (Tr. 8952) The Board was also disturbed by the manner in which the witness presented his discussion of Plant discharges to the river. The witness stated

\

that Saginaw Bay had approximately 200 parts per million of chloride l

l

181 and then stated the Plant would discharge 1440 pounds per day of chlor-ine (Tr. 8721-22). If he were actually attempting to make a valid comparison, it should not have been to the pounds of chlorine which are all converted to chloride but to the fact that the chloride dis-charge from the Plant would increase the concentration in the river only 0.17 ppm, less than 1% of the Tittabawassee River chloride content which will be further reduced by dilution in the Saginaw River and Saginaw Bay (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. III-32 and III 40). Again in comparing sulfates, he compared a Saginaw Bay concentration of 28 ppm with a Plant release to the cooling pond of 1175 pounds of sulphuric acid (Tr. 8729-30).

Such release must be converted to sulfates and combined with other sul-fate releases to make a meaningful comparison. Sul. fate discharges will result in an increase in Tittabawassee River sulfates of about 1.5 ppm l under average conditions and of about 2.5 ppm during low river flow and which are further diluted downstream (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. III-32 and III-33). clearly his testimony was not designed to make any meaningful comnarison. Even if he had directly compared the Plant discharge in terms of concentrations with Saginaw Bay water, the comparison would suffer as not accounting for dilution in the Saginaw River and Saginaw Bay. Dr. Loucks did not offer the Board any guidance as to how to evaluate the effect of the relatively small release being made by the Plant or why it should be concerned about the sulfate or chloride levels in tenns of fishing in Saginaw Bay. Dr. Loucks had not bothered to read the numerous references regarding the Saginaw River nr.d the Saginaw Bay contained in Applicant's Supplemental Environmental Report, Sections 3.2.2 and 3 2.3 (Tr. 8769). The Board does not believe that the burden cf doing a materials balance of the 2620 sq. mi. Tittabawassee River

182 Basin (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-2, Appendix C, p.18) and the much larger Saginaw River Basin of which it forms a part should be placed on the shoulders of an insignificant contributor to that watershed. While such a study may be a scientifically desirable and useful tool for other purposes, it does not appear to the Board to be necessary to evaluate the impact of the Plant.

195 Where total dissolved solids are ccaposed of innocuous materials, as are those which Applicant discharges, hamful effects are limited to osmotic effects that only occur at very high concentrations (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-19). Limiting concentrations for fresh water fish appear to range above 5000 ppm (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-19). The National Technical Advisory Connittee to the Secretary of the Interior reccamended that relatively innocuous dissolved caterials not be in-(

creased by more than one-third of the concentration that is character-istic of the stream in its natural condition and in no instance above a concentration equivalent to 1500 pin Nacl (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-19) .

The proposed Plant TDS discharge vill increase river TDS less than 2% on the average and result in a, total concentration at which no measurable changes or detrimental effects have been reported or anti-cipated (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-19) . The average river concentrations of TDS, sulfates and chlorides pro,jected for the river at the time of Plant operation are within the ranges which have been noted for support-ing good mixed fish population in 95% of U. S. inland waters (FES Staff Ex.6,pp.V-19 tov-20). Applicant's aquatic biologist, who spenE, many years with the Michigan Water Resources Cornission, stated that the chemicals to be discharged were in concentrations too insignifi-(

cant to have any adverse effect on the ecosystem (Tr. 6780-82). The

183 Board further notes that while Dr. Loucks merely proposed a leveling off in discharges of chlorides, sulfates. TDS, phosphorus and other chemicals (Tr. 8732-33), the Michigan Water Resources Commission in conjunction with Dow and others is engaged in an extensive program to significantly reduce thesc 'iecharges (Mapleton Ex.' 26; FES Staff Ex. 6 pp. II-23 and II-24; Tr. 56u, 5663-67, 6368-81). Dr. Holcomb, Mapleton Intervenors' biological witness, was requested by the Board to provide it with just one citation indicating that reteases of TDS ccanparable to Applicant's could cause an adverse biological effect (Tr. 5813-15).

He failed to produce any citation to this effect. The Board concludes that Applicant has furnished sufficient infomation on its chemical dis-charges and the aquatic ecology and that the Staff has adequately re-viewed this information. The Board further concludes that the chemical t

discharges from the Plant will have no significant effect.

Radiological Impact from Nomal Operation 196. As discussed in Paragraph 101 supra, Applicant's liquid 1

)

radioactive vaste system is designed to collect, process and reuse or j l

dispose of off-site all liquid vastes, except for laundry vaste, con- ,

l taining radionuclides generated during normal operation of the Plant.

l The gaseous radioactive waste system, as discussed in Paragraph 102 l

supra, is designed to provide for holdup of radioactive gases for up '

to sixty days to permit decay of all radioactive gases, except Krypton-85, to essentially zero. Since the filing of its application in January 1969, Applicant has modified the designs of these systems to incorporate the most effective technology currently available in order to keep re-leases of radioactivity in Plant effluents as lov as practicable (PSAR l l

1

184 Applicant's Ex.1-B, $11.0; PSAR Applicant's Ex. 38E; ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, $h.2; Staff Ex. 8, pp. 8-11; FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. III-21 to III-30). Analysis of the resultant dose of releases from these systems v4re calculated for purposes of health and safety analysis using ex-tremely conservative assumptions. For purposes of analyzing the en-vironmental impact of these releases, Applicant used more realistic assumptions.

197 Applicant for purposes of calculating a realistic radiation dose from release of laundry vastes during normal Plant opera-tion assumed 0.1% failed fuel instead of the previously assumed 1.0%

and conservatively estimated the resultant radioactivity content of its laundry vaste on the basis of experience at its Big Rock Point

, Plant (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 4.2-4; Applicant's Ex. 38K, p.15) .

('

After making appropriate adjustment for dilution in the river and re-concentration in fish, Applicant calculated the dose to an individual eating 37 pounds of fish a year from the river to be o.006 mrem /yr.

Assuming 1% of the population within a thirty-mile radius eats 37 pounds of fish annually a potential exposure of 0.03 man-rem /yr was calculated.

This was compared to an estimated population exposure from natural.

background radiation in the area and other sources of 215 mrem /yr and 90,000 ms 2-rem /yr (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 4.2-4) . No dose was

. assumed for the consumption of water since the Tittabavassee River is not a known source of drinkin6 vater.

198. Applicant's calculation of exposure to radioactive '

4 gases was based on exposure from the release of Krypton-85 from

, the radvaste system, purging of the containment building during re-s fueling and purging of the auxiliary building for one year with a

185 reactor coolant leakage rate of 8 gal / day (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38H, ,

$4.2.1.2 and pp. 6.16-1, 6.16-2 and 6.21-4; ASER Applicant's Ex. 380, pp. 6.7-1 to 6.7-2, 6.21-1 to 6.21-3 and 6.21-5, Tables 21-1 to 21-7 follovimg p. 6.21-5). The site boundary doses calculated were 0.46 mrem /yr to the whole body for the vaste gas release, 0.04 mrem /yr to thewholebodyforthecontainmentbuildingpurgeando.03 mrem /yrto the whole body and 0.0003 mrem /yr to the thyroid from the auxiliary building purge. Calculating the dose in tems of man-rem to the popu-lation within a thirty-mile radius results in a figure of 2.01 man-rem (Applicant's Ex. 38H, p. 4.2-7) . Again these doses compare to natural backgroundandothersourcedosesof215 mrem /yrand90,000 man-rem /yr within 30 miles.

199 The Staff made its analysis assuming releases essentially equivalent to the guidelines of proposed Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 I

(Applicant's Ex. 38M; FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. V-24 and V-25). This is an extremely conservative assumption because it assumes that 75% of the i

dose from the gaseous release is caposed of radioactive gases that vill decay prior to release during the 60-day holdup period. Thus no credit has been given for 60-day holdup and the gaseous release doses are in effect four times greater than would be expected using 60-day holdup (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-25). Additionally, the Staff calculation is

. based on the assumption that the radioactive waste system will not be rhle to operate at all times at peak efficiency (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. III-21, V-23, V-26) and therefore apparently assumes s e e liquid releases other than laundry wastes, including release of tritium. Ap-plicant disagreed with this philosophy because of the fact that its sys-tem is designed not'to discharge radioactive vastes other than laundry

dw eem'M wir a-+ , ,,,g g 186 wastes, including recycle of tritium (Applicant's Ex. 38K, pp.15-17) .

While the Board finds that Applicant's proposed system is likely to oper-ate with much smaller releases than those utilized by the Staff, it is of the opinion that because the guidelines of proposed Appendix I ex-ceed the releases calculated by Applicant and that these guidelines are likely to be the standard to which Applicant will be held, the Plant should be evaluated at the levels permitted by proposed Appendix I.

200. Utilizing the releases assumed, the Staff calculated doses to the surrounding populaticn. The Staff calculated the dose from liquid releases to an individual who ate 20 g of fish per day from the Tittabavassee River and Saginaw Bay, who drank water from the Tittabavassee River and Saginav Bay, who svam 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> per year in Saginaw Bay and picnicked on its shores for 500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> per year. Appropriate dilution and bioaccumulation factors were applied. Presently there is extremely little fishing in the Tittabavassee River below the Plant site and it is not used for drinking water supply. The Staff, however, conservatively as-l sumed that at some time in the future the river might be used for these pur-poses-(FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. V-26, V-27). It is interesting to note that the individual assumed spends 75 8-hour days swimming and picnicking on the bay.

The calculated doses are well within.the guidelines to proposed Appendix I l

to 10 CFR Part 50 and only a very small fraction of 10 CFR Part 20 limits.

l The resultant dose from gaseous releases was also calculated. The site boundarydosecalculatedwasonly1+.0 mrem /yr(FESStaffEx.6,p.V-28).

201. The dose to the general population in terms of man-rem was calculated in order to evaluate the effects of the Plant on the j general environment. Using conservative assumptions, the Staff calcu-( ,

- lated a total annual dose in 1980 from gaseous releases of about 25 l

l

187

( man-rem, which corresponds to en average individual dose of about 0.002 mrem /yr(FESStaffEx.6,p.V-30). This can be put into per-spective when one realices that a conservative figure for background radiation exposure to a given individual in the same area is in excess of 100 mrem (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-30) and that Applicant has assumed a total exposure from natural and other radiation sources of 215 mrem (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38H, p. 4.2 4). The Staff calculated inte-grated doses for the consumption of fish to be about 3 man-rem and for drinking of water to be 1.3 man-rem. The integrated dose figures of 25 man-rem, 3 man-rem and 1 3 man-rem compare to an integrated dose to individuals within a fifty-mile radius of the Plant from natural back-ground radiation of 112,000 man-rem (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-30). The Staff concluded that since fluctuations of the natural background dose i

may be expected to exceed the small dose increment contributed by the Plant, this increment will be unmeasurable in itself and will consti-tute no demonstrably meaningful risk to be balanced against the bene-fits of the Plant (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-30).

202. The Board throughout the radiological health and safety portion of the hearing sought to have intervenors set forth the basis for their concern that releases within the limits of the AEC's 10 CFR Part 20 and that met the " low as practicable" test of 10 CFR $50 34a and the proposed guidelines contained in Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 would constitute sczne risk to the health and safety of the public. (See paragraphs 98 and 99 supra) The Board as early as April 2, 1971 made it clear that issues of radiation effects were issues for the radiation 7

health and safety proceeding and intervenors should at that time ccane i

forward with any evidence on radiological matters (Tr. 659,662,664).

188 The Board further indicated that it did not expect that there were any radiological issues that were not properly at issue in the radiological health and safety portion of the hearing and that failure to deal with such issues might well be considered as foreclosure (Tr. 721). The only radiological issue any group of intervenors argued to be uniquely envi-ronmental at that time was the effect of radioactive material releases on animals (Tr. 708). Mapleton Intervenors did not present any radio-logical evidence at the hearing but following repeated opportunities offered by the Board did belatedly respond with four affidavits which have been discussed above (paragraphs 101 to 104) and which the Board found insufficient to raise any significant question as to radiation effects. The Board in its Order of March lo, 1972, therefore closed the record as to all radiological issues except two enumerated issues. At 4

the comencement of the radiological health and safety proceeding, Mapleton Intervenors indicated their intent to cross-examine on radio-logical matters. The Board infomed them as it had previously, in its Order of March 30, 1972 and its Order of April 27, 1972, that as parties to the radiological health and safety hearing they had had an opportunity to presen: evidence on radiological matters, the evidence they had filed had not been adequate and that the record on such matters was now closed (Tr. 6021). The Board is of the opinion that, in the absence of any unique site feature or any responsible evidence to the conwary, radiation releases at the lowest levels practicable in accord-ance with the AEC's 10 CFR 50.34a and with the AEC's guidelines in proposed Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 will result in no meaningful cost

. frce releases of radioactive material from the Plant. The releases k

projected for the Plant will be such a small increment to doses presently

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189 r '

t received from natural background radiation in the area that one must strain credibility to expect any significant or measurable impact. The Board did however, as discussed below, permit exploration of whether there were any unique aspects of the site that could create concern regarding the low levels of radiation.

Synergism 203 Intervenors alleged that because of the unique lo-cation of the Plant adjacent to a large chemical complex that the effects of radioactive effluents from the Plant might ecubine with the effect of chemical effluents to produce a ccabined effect greater than the sum of the separate effects of each (Tr. 4185,4188-90,5584-86).

During the proceeding, this was called a synergistic effect or syner-i gism. The synergistic effects considered included both the physiologi-(- .

cal effect of combined dosage of the chemical and radiological effluents on tne tissue of human recipients and the interaction of the radiologi-cal and chemical effluents in the environment to produce a reactant which could have a different effect on the human recipient.

204 As discussed herein in Paragraphs 102 and 103, the Board repeatedly offered Saginav Internnors opportunities to make a showing that there might be questions as to the validity of AEC radiological regulations on any basis including the basis that synergistic effects would significantly alter the effects of otherwise insignificant re-lenses of radioactive materials. In an apparent effort to develop such a showing, Saginaw Intervenors requested a list of all chemical effluents discharged to both the air and water frca the Dow ccuplex (Tr.1500) and

( the Board ordered Dow to suhit - such a list (Tr.1502) . . Dov subitted its list based on effluents to be discharged from their facilities in

190 1975, the year in which the Plant vas then scheduled to start operation (MapletonEx.40). Both Saginav and Mapleton Intervenors failed to ecue forth with any sort of evidence during the 1971 sessions of the hearing which would indicate that the combination of radicactive and chemical effects were a matter for concern. Even though the Board foreclosed most non-environmental issues (Board's August 26, 1971 order), both Saginav and Mapleton Intervenors were allowed to file written evidence of synergistic effects as a challenge to the regdlations up to December 31, 1971 (Board's December 22, 1971 order). Saginav and Mapleton Intervenors both again failed to file any written evidence on synergism.

905 Even though the Board had procedurally foreclosed the synergism issue on December 31, 1971,.the Board remained willing and anxious to hear anything the intervenors could provide which might show that synergistic effects exist at radiation levels lov enough to be of concern with this Plant (Tr. 5498) . When the Board expressed this dur-ing the 1972 evidentiary hearing sessions, Mapleton Intervenors produced an unpublished draft of a paper by a Dr. Most which discussed synergism and had handwritten across it "This is in process of being revised." (Maple-ton Ex. 41) The Board thereupon determined that witnesses on synergism would be permitted.

206. Mapleton Intervenors produced three witnesses on syner-gism, Dr. Meierotto, a biologist, Dr. Nordahl, a biologist, and Dr. Sternglass, a physicist. Dr. Meierotto included as synergism any interactions that produced additive, substractive or no changes in effects (Tr. 8263). Dr. Meierotto made numerous general statements about interactions between radiation and chemicals, radiation and temperature

. 191 and radiation and fogs and inversions. He did not provide any detail re-garding these interactions and could not cite any concentrations which could produce measurable effects '(Tr. 8248-8265,8299-03). Dr. Meierotto cited as a specific example of a synergistic reaction at the Plant the possibility of zine released from the Dow plant to the river being sub-jected to neutron bombardment in the reactor resulting in the discharge of radioactive cine-65 to the environment (Tr. 8266) . Dr. Meierotto was unaware of the location of the Dow discharge in relation to the Plant intake (Tr. 8268), was unaware that the primary coolant water that came into contact with the core came from Lake Huron, not the river (Tr. 8288),

was unaware that river water was separated frcm the core and primary cool-ant water by a separate secondary steam cycle within the Plant (Tr.

8267-69) and was unable to postulate any realistic mechanisms by which releases of zine frca Dow mi 6 ht get concentrated to the level where they would be a hazard even if it could be assumed that all of the zine were activated (Tr. 8269-72).

207 Dr. Meierotto had no experience in this area, had con-ducted no research and based his testimony re6arding synergism primarily on Dr. Most's paper (Mapleton Ex. 41, Tr. 8274-77) . The Board reviewed Dr. Most's paper and found that it cited a great many references and that it expressed a lot of hypotheses and concerns. The Board considered it l a research proposal at most and nothing more (Tr. 8278). Dr. Frigerio, the Staff witness, found that the Most paper reached no conclusions and after checking each of Dr. Most's references, found t, hat none of them were pertinent. Dr. Frigerio added that if Dr. Most's paper f

_ vere considered to have any relevance it was only in regard to ex-t tremely high radiation doses (Tr. 8938-39). The Board is unavsre of

192 Dr. Most's credentials and Mapleton Intervenors were unable to explain why the paper, dated Au6ust,1971, had not yet been revised or published by June, 1972 or even what revisions vere contemplated (Tr. 5500, 5680-84). In short, Dr. Most's paper, rather than providing any useful information to the Board and parties, was merely an unsubstantiated reiteration of the concerns previously expressed by attorneys for intervenors. The Board concluded that Dr. Meierotto's testimony was worthless (Tr. 8292). It was clearly a mass of hypotheticals not based on any direct knowledge or research or any extensive analysis of the literature in this area and clearly based on misunderstandings of reactor design and ignorance of proposed radiological releases (Tr. 8292).

208. Dr. Nordahl, Assistant Professor of Biology, University of Nebraska, testified that he vould expect anywhere from zero percent to a i

hundred percent synergistic effects between the levels of radiation from the Plant and the anticipated Dov effluents. His testimony dealt with the effects of these substances at a biological cell level. Dr. Nordahl testified that en the basis of the expected effluents from both facilities, he felt there was a possibility of synergistic reactions based on evidence in the literature. He cited a list of substanccs which could produce synergistic effects as follows: (1) Bromouracil and other halogenated uracil compounds are X-ray sensitizers; (2) Pyrimadine analogues in-

.corperated into DNA molecules make them more vulnerable to breakage by radiation; (3) Purine analogues are radiation sensitizers; (4) Cigarette smoke and polonium 210 can initiate bronchosenic carcinoma; (5) Polyaromatic hydrocarbons have carcinogenic effects which can be augmented by radiation; (6) Carbon tetrachloride performs necrogenic activity in

(

the presence of radiation; (7) Phenols have carcinogenic effects which

193 might be increased by radiation; (8) Additive concentrations might produce concentration gradients that vould cause one of the low con-centration hamful constituents to act as if at higher concentration (Tr.8498-8512). Dr. Nordahl testified that he had not made any cal-culations and be was not aware of the concentration limits which would be applicable to the effluent releases (Tr. 8515) . In the Board's opinion, Dr. Nordahl had merely researched the literature for mate-rials that had been found to have synergistic effect with radiation.

Although Mapleton Intervenors had a list of the Dov effluents, Dr. Nor-dahl was still villing to imply that chemicals not listed were of con-cern because Dov is a large cmpany (Tr. 8501,8516-17). His was again merely a statement of general concerns without any basis in the actual releases and concentrations involved.

E 209 Dr. Sternglass, Professor of Radiation Physics, Univer-sity of Pittsburgh, defined synergism as any physical, chemical or bio-logical interaction between various substances which tends to enhance or mutually prmote their effectiveness in producing a certain health effect (Tr. 8389) . Dr. Sternglass in his testimony cited examples of synergism possibilities in the same way as Dr. Most did in his paper, that is, by reviewing the literature. He is a physicist and engineer with no apparent training in biological sciences although he does teach one health physics course. He does not indicate that he has been in-volved in any biological or medical research on synergism. He said that radioactive material can be concentrated by rainfall vashout and dust trapping of radioactive gas molecules. He also said that radio-active gases increase the fomation of liquid aerosol droplets by x

194 electromagnetic ionization. Dr. Stemglass listed a group of sub-stances that facilitate the effects of radiation. They were: (1)

Dust particles acting to carry chemical or radioactive particles into the body; (2) Hematite and low doses of polonium -21 produce can-cer in hamsters; (3) Uranium ore dust and lov doses of radioactive radon gas produced lung cancer in uranium miners; (4) Cigarette smoke and radon gas increased the likelihood of lung cancer; (5) Nitrogen oxides and carbon dust produce lung damage; (6) Sulfur dioxide and polynuclear hydrocarbons produce lung cancer; (7) Polynuclear hydrocarbons with radioactive particles can hypothetically produce lung cancer; (8) Vola-tile aldehydes, hydrogen cyanide, nitrogen oxides, volatile acids and volatile phenols with radioactive particles in the lungs can hypotheti-cally produce higher radiation doses; (9) Respiratory infections cca-( bined with radioactive elements increase the radiation dose up to ten

, times;(10)EstrogenichormonescombinedwithStrontium-90 increases bone tumors in mice (Tr. 8367-8385). Dr. Sternglass additionally ex-

. tensively discussed his views on low level radiation effects. Dr. Sternglass was asked if the effects he was discussing occurred at low concentrations which could be applicable in analysis of releases from the Plant (Tr. 8419).

He stated that the experiments he was discussing did indeed involve low doses making specific references to a number of articles in his possession (Tr.8419-28). Dr. Sternglass concluded that:

". . ., the Plant at Midland, Michigan, being proposed for construction in close proximity to a large chemi-cal plant and urban area introduces the potentially serious cczaplications of possible synergistic effects between the chemical emissions and the radioactive gases discharged from nuclear plants in the nomal course of operation which could increase the effect on health of the population' well beyond that pro-

.s~ duced by either the chemical or rtsdioactive air pol-lutants alone." (Tr.8367-68)

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195 210. . Applicant presented three witnesses on this issue:

Dr. John H. Rust, Professor of Phamacology and Radiobiology, University of Chicago (Tr. 8796-8816); Dr. Merrill Eisenbud, Professor of Faviron-mental Medicine, New York University Medical Center and Director of the

, Laboratory of Environmental Studies, Institute of Environmental Medicine (Tr. 8773-74; 8817); and Dr. G. Hoyt Whipple, Professor of Radiological Health, Department of Environmental and Industrial Health, School of Industrial Medicine, University of Michigan (Tr. 8818-21). Dr. Rust holds doctorates in veterinary medicine and phamacology and is on the World Health Organization's Expert Cocuittee - Radiation, on the National Academy of Science's Comittees on Food Protection (Chaiman of subecm-mittee on radiation in foods) and Radioactive Waste Disposal and Chairman -

of the U. S. Public Health Service's Long-Tem Radiation Effects Advisory Ccemittee.(Tr. 8796-8800) He has extensively publisb>.d the results of his many studies on radiation effects and the ccabined effects of radiation and chemicals. (Tr.8801-14) He has spent the past 25 years working on the effect of ionizing radiation on man and animals frca internal and ex-ternal sources. (Tr. 8825-26) Dr. Eisenbud's doctorate is honorary, his academic degree being in electrical engineering. (Tr.8773) He has been involved in the environmental field for 36 years. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, is on the World Health Organization Expert Panal on Radi-ation, vsa Chaiman of the Public Health Service Committee on Environ-mental Radioactivity E nosure, was alternate U. S. Representative on a Board of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atanic Radiation, was President of the American Health Physics Society, was on the Board of Govemors of the American Public Health Association,

196

.,~

t was on the Board of the American Nuclear Society and on the Board of the American Industrial Hygiene Association. (Tr.8773-8774) In addition, he was the first Environmental Protection Administrator for the City of New York. (Tr.8774) Dr. Whipple has degrees in chemistry and bio-physics, has had extensive experience in radiation protection and has been a consultant to the U. S. State Department, the AEC and the World Health Organization. (Tr. 8818-8821) 211. Dr. Rust had filed prepared testimony that was included in thetranscriptasifread(Tr. 8873-8900). Dr. Rust's testimony was based on extensive review of the scientific literature on the subject and his extensive personal experimentation in this area. Dr. Rust stated that based en his personal testing of several thousand agents (Tr. 8832) the i interaction most to be expected between radiation and chemical agents is one in which the radiation effect is reduced (Tr. 8831). He did however state that there had been extensive searches for chemicals that would enhance the effects of radiation and that a few such chemi-cals had been found (Tr. 8333,8894-95). However, again based on his own experimentation and h'.3 search of the literature, none have been shown to have enhancing effects at low levels of radiation (Tr. 8833-34,8895). Dr. Rust concluded:

"In summary there is no direct or indirect evidence that vill lead to the conclusion that the effluents of either the Dov plant or the Midland nuclear power station vill interact in any way to make the very minimal ionizing radiation release or the minimal chemical effluents expected, hamful to man in the ecosystem or the biosphere in general now or in the future." (Tr.8835,8895-96).

212. Dr. Rust and Dr. Eisenbud vere asked if they had heard Dr. Sternglass' testimony and if they had any comments thereon. Dr. Rust

197 indicated that he had heard Dr. Sternglass ' testimony and that he had read the references in the volume " Inhalation Carcinogen 1 sis" on which Dr.Sternglasshadrelied(Tr.8835). Dr. Sternglass stated that these studies involved " levels of radiation, and effluent close to those that would be expected or have actually been encountered in the case of nu-clear plants . . . ." (Tr.8390-91) Dr. Rust proceeded through the cited experiments sequentially t inting out that none of them involved low level radiation even remotely resembling releases from a nuclear plant and that in fact they involved surgical implantation of radiation sources in the animals with resultant doses in a range of 600 rem to 50,000 rem (Tr.

8835-8839). By way of caparison, the Staff's conservatively calcu-lated dose from gaseous releases from this Plant is about .004 rem per year (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-28) . Thus the lovest dose in the experi-ments cited by Dr. Sternglass was almost 180,000 times greater than the calculated dose frca the Plant. It must also be noted that the experimental doses are administered at one time while the Plant doses are spread over a whole year. Dr. Rust was a particularly appropriate individual to discuss Dr. Sternglass' use of referenced experiments in that he has been personally involved in a . number of the miscited experi-ments (Tr. 8851) . Dr. Rust concluded that he found Dr. Sternglass' use ,

of the referenced material very misleading and scientifically irrespon-sible(Tr.8840).

213 Dr. Eisenbud e. greed with Dr. Rust that Dr. Ste:mglass had made a number of misstatements of fact and that he was surprised at a number of things that are familiar to people who work with radiation that Dr. Sternglass did not appear to be aware of (Tr. 8843-44).

Dr. Eisenbud was surprised at the importance Dr. Sternglass appeared to

198 give to hypothesized interactions of radioactive gases with dust, ex-plaining that this is a well-known phenomenon (Tr. 88M) . He pointed out that the major gaseous release frcm the Plant is made up of noble gases (krypton and some xenon) which do not adsorb on dust and therefore cannot result in any potentiation of the type described by Dr. Sternglass (Tr. 88k4). The other class of gases that may be released are halogens, particularly I-131, which is readily adsorbed by dust and upon being taken into the body 30% goes to the thyroid gland and the rest is elimi-nated. This fact is taken into account in making standard dose calcu-lations(Tr.8845). Dr. Eisenbud also took issue with Dr. Sternglass' description of an experiment ccabining radon gas with what Dr. Sternglass described as a relatively low concentration of uranits ore dust cca-parable to the concentrations of organic dust from Dov (Tr. 8848, 8373-

74) . Dr. Eisenbud pointed out that the concentrations of dust used in the experiment were nowhere near that which could be expected from Dov (over one hundred times more concentrated) and even more importantly that the dust used was not an inert dust of the type Dow emits but was carnotite which contains uranium, silica and vanadiun and produces sili-cosis and thermal pneumonitus (Tr. 8848-51). Dr. Eisenbud pointed out that Dr. Sternglass' statement that uranium miners showed excess cancers at levels of experience as lov as 40 rads represented a lack of under-standing of the calculational technique (Tr. 8851-55). correct calcu-lation of the actual dose results in a minimum figure of 2800 rem (Tr.8855). Althou6h both Applicant and the Staff vare. prepared to continue through Dr. Sternglass' paper point by point to explain its misrepresentations and inaccuracies, the Board ruled that it had heard

9 199 s

enough about Dr. Steruglass' testimony and the technical members vould examine it themselves (Tr. 8870-71).

214. Dr. Frigerio, the Staff witness from Argonne National

] Iaboratory, also examined interaction between effluents frim Dov and the Plant and concluded that there vill be no synergistic effect (Tr.

7564). 'Dr. Frigerio is employed by Argonne National Laboratory and has a Phd in biophysical chemistry. (Tr.7467) He has published extensively in the areas of biology, biophysics and medicine. (Tr.

7505-11) He also agreed that the most likely effect of the Dov ef-fluents on the Plant effluents would be to reduce the radiation effect(Tr.7560).

215 Mapleton Intervenors cross-examined Drs. Rust, Eisenbud,

(

Whipple and Frigerio as a group, spending an inordinate amount of time proving that there vere no significant differences between Dr. Rust's

. filed testimony (Tr.8873-8900) and an earlier draft (Mapleton Ex. 43)

(Tr.8914-27). The testimony of Dr. Frigerio and Dr. Rust indicated that they would expect no effects from interaction of Dow effluents and radioactive effluents from the Plant in excess of mere addition until the concentrations of both- approached near lethal levels (Tr. 8929-37).

216. The technical members of the Board have reviewed Dr. Sternglass' testimony and his references and have reviewed the testimony of the other witnesses. The Board takes official notice that the Atanic Safety and Licensing Board in the Davis-Besse decision found Dr. Sternglass' testimony unconvincing (In the Matter of Toledo Edison, DktNo.50-346, March 23,1971), and that the Atomic Safety and Licensing

1. Appeals Board in the Columbia reactor decision spent many pages giving a detailed analysis of Dr. Sternglass' testimony and concluded that

-~ - - . . . . - . , - . . -, . , .

200 his ". . . statistical methodology and selective sampling techniques are not scientifically credible and, indeed, raise serious questions as to whether his presentation is consistent with even a moderate de-gree of scientific responsibility." (In the Matter of Columbia Univer-sity, Dkt. No. 50-308, May 18, 1972). The Board finds that Dr. Sternglass in his testimony consistently misrepresented or misunderstood the con-tent and import of the references that he used. The Board further finds that Dr. Sternglass failed to support his position in a scienti-fically credible manner and that the Board can give no credence to his conclusions. The Board must unfortunately conclude that the repu-tation that preceded Dr. Sternglass is justly deserved.

217. The Board having examined all of the evidence presented regarding possible interactions between chemical effluents from Dow and radioactive effluents frca the Plant concludes that there is no evidence to support a conclusion that there will be. any interaction which would tend to increase radiation effects. To the contrary the record before the Board clearly indicates that the most likely interaction between the Dow chemicals and radioactivity is a reduction in radiation i

effects. The witnesses for Applicant and the Staff unifomly had ex-tensive experience and knowledge in the area of radiation effects and were familiar with the vast experimentation which has been undertaken regarding the effects of the interaction of radiation and chemicals.

Witness for Mapleton Intervenors had apparently just discovered the possibility of such a phenomenon and were clearly not knowledgeable as to the details or important parameters of the experimentation that they were discussing. Dr. Rust concluded that with the chemicals and radio-activity involved there would be no synergism at any concentration l

~ _ __ - -

201 (Tr.8930,8932). Dr. Frigerio testified that "the probable radiation effects can honestly be considered negligible" (Tr. 7561) and that with the radiation levels expected for the Plant he would not expect to see any significant stannation of effects at any level of chemical emission i (Tr. 8935). It is the Board's opinion that there is nothing unique about this site which would indicate that radiation would have any different effect here than anywhere else.

Radiological Impact from Plant Accidents 218. In addition to assessing potential radiological im-pact from nomal operation, Applicant furnished infomation with re-spect to potential public exposures to radioactivity from postulated accidents in the course of Plant operation (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1 as amended by Applicant's Ex. 380, 9 .2.2). The information submitted by Applicant was in accord with guidance issued generally to appli-cants by the Comission on September 1,1971 (" Scope of Applicants' Environmental Reports With Respect to Transportation, Transmission Lines and Accidents," September 1,1971) . Accidents at the Plant in relation to the health and safety aspects of siting the Plant were thor-ougly covered in the radiological health and safety hearing (Paragraphs 105 through 121 supra) . The accidents evaluated for environmental pu -

3 poses utilized more realistic assumptions than the extremely conserva-tive assumpticus utilized in evaluating the accidents for public health and safety purposes. As in the case of estimated exposure from nomal

. operation, the Staff estimates of exposures due to accidents are some-what higher than Applicant's estimates (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. VI-l to VI-6). The Staff estimates utilized the standard accident assumptions and guidance contained in the presently proposed annex to Appendix D

~ _ . . , _ _ , - __ _

202

/

to 10 CFR Part 50 (36 F.R. 22851, December 1,1971) . Nine classes of postulated accidents and occurrences ranging in severity fra trivial to very serious are identified in the proposed annex. The Staff esti-mates are tabulated on Table VI-2 and range fran less than 0.1 man-rem to 750 man-rem (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. VI-3 and VI-4) . Again this can be ccupared to an integrated population dose to the population within a 50-mile radius from natural background radiation of 110,000 man-rems.

Isovever, in order to make an analysis of the environmental risk in-volved frca these possible accidents, the Staff found it necessary to take into account their probabilities of occurrence. The classes of accidents range from those that can be expected to occur during the life of the Plant and have trivial consequences to those that are never expected to occur but could have more severe consequences (FES 4

Staff Ex. 6, p. VI-3). However, those accidents with more severe consequences have a probability of occurrence so small that their environmental risk is extremely low (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. VI-3). The Staff concluded tnat when one took into account the probability of oc-currence, the annual potential radiation exposure to the population due to accidents is well within naturally occurring variations in natural bar:kground radiation (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. VI-6). Intervenors furnished no evidence with respect to the reasonableness of the esti-mates. The Board finds that Applicant submitted sufficient informatial and Staff has conducted an adequate review with regard to the potenti,al radiological impact of accidents in reactor operation. The Board further finds the Staff's estimates to be reasonable and conservative estimates of radiological exposures to the population as the result of operating and transportation accidents.

203 g.

t 219 Mapleton Intervenors argued that the accident to be evaluated for its environmental effects is an accident in which the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) fails to function and there is a ccuplete meltdown of the core (Tr. 5354-55). Mapleton Intervenors argued that in light of the testimony at the ECCS rulamaking proceeding (Dkt.

RM-50-1; see Paragraphs 124 to 127, supra) failure of the ECS to pre-vent meltdown must be considered a credible accident (Tr. 5354-55).

The AEC in its proposed Annex to Appendix D, 10 CFR Part 50, has classified this accident as a Class 9 event. This means that it is so improbable as to not even be used for safety analysis and that be-cause of this improbability of occurrence the environmental risk is so low that it cannot meaningfully be evaluated in an environmental con-text. The Board takes official notice that Mapleton Intervenors are parties to the ECCS rulemaking and that the AE plans to circulate a draft detailed environmental statement and issue a final environmental statement regarding the ECCS rulemaking proceeding in compliance with NEPA. It is the Board's opinion, as discussed above in Paragraphs 122 to 127 that the proposed ECCS system complies with the existing regu-lation and that until such time as the regulation is modified by the AEC as a result of the rulemaking proceeding, the ECS must be con-sidered to perform prcperly. Because the AEC in issuing its new regu-lations will prepare an environmental statement including a cost-benefit analysis, the Board believes that Mapleton Intervenors' concerns will be adequately satisfied in that proceeding to which they are a party.

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204 Cooling Pond Atmospheric Effects 220. Applicant has evaluated possible fogging and icing effects arising from operation of the Plant's cooling pond (ASER, Applicant's Ex. 38 F-1, $4.3; ASER, Applicant's Ex. 38-G, Response to Question 22; Applicant's

, Ex. 38-P, "The Environmental Effects of the Midland Plant Cooling Pond -

Su::rnary Report," dated April 28,1972). The Sumary Report incorporated the data contained in the Interim Report, which was included with Section 4.3 of the ASER, and contained additional data gathered during the fall and winter of 1971-72 and thus superseded the Interim Report (Applicant's Ex. 33-P).

221. The Summary Report describes field studies of cooling pond fog made at the Coffeen Plant cooling pond in central Illinois and at the Four Corners Plant cooling pond in northwest New Mexico (Applicant's Ex. 38-P,

p. 6). The principal source of data for the Summary Report was the Four

~

Corners Plant cooling pond and the data were collected mainly in the early sun-rise hours from midfall through early winter (Applicant's Ex. 38-P, Table 3).

The winter air temperatures, the humidities, cooling pond heat loading and surface water temperatures at the Midland and Four Corners plants are similar 3

(Tr.6222-6226,6415-16). The Sumary Report examines the major physical factors related to fog occurrence for the purpose of determining in connection with ambient air data,-the probability of steam fog occurrence. On the basis of observation of fc6 occurrence and the atmospheric characteristics present at the time of such occurrences, the Summary Report develops the concept of a fog index number to provide a method for statistical analysis of all fog, fog-stratus, stratus, slight-fog and no-fog situations (Applicant's 5:x. 38-P,

p. 25). The fog index number is used to predict the occurrence of fog on the

(

basis of. temperature differences between the pond and the ambient air with

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i 205 r

consideration given to atmospheric humidity (Tr. 6211-12). The Summary Report indicates that the fog index nu=ber concept is considered generally applicable for cooling ponds at all geographical locatiens for all seasons of the year (Applicant's Ex. 38-P, p. 1; Tr. 6226).

222. Applicatien of the fcg index number analysis to the Plant cool-ing pond yielded estimates of the frequency of occurrence of eccling pend steam fcg nuc coincident with natural fog with the wind from varicus directions. This analysis showed a maximum annual occurrence of steam fog not coincident with na-tural fog when the wind was from any one direction of 3 3% (Applicant's Ex. 38-P,

p. 52). When natural fog is present, the intensity of the fog may be increased but its duration and extent are not increased (Applicant's Ex. 38-P, p. M).

This analysis does not, however, indicate that because pond steam fog may occur with a certain frequency when the wind is from a given direction that areas down-wind of the site will receive the fog. Applicant used three methods to calculate the extent of the fog and all yielded similar results (Applicant's Ex. 38-P, pp.

53-57;Tr.6231). Studies of fog extent indicated that the fog could extend from the pond about 600 feet on the average winter morning and from 1600 to 5000 ft.

on extremeV cold winter mornings (a few mornings a menth) (Applicant's Ex. 38-P,

p. 59). In order to determine the impact of such fog, taking into acccunt the shifts of wind and factors influencir.g extent, Applicant made frequency esti-mates for the few nearby populated areas during winter months when fogging would be most frequent. These estimates indicated that fog in winter would be expected at the nearest residences on Stewart Read 0.2 miles west of the pond only about one hour per month, at the nearest school 0 5 miles from the pond only about one or two hours per month, on Gordonville Road just south of the

, pond 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> per .7onth, and at Mapleton 1.6 miles east of the pond no fog

206

/

would be expected (Applicant's Ex. 38-P, pp. 62-65 and Figures 17-22; Tr.

6324-35). Light friable frost or ice could deposit on upright objects in conjunction with the fog, generally only a few times a month and limited to within 600 feet of the pond on the typical winter morning (Applicant's Ex.

38-P, p. 59). Icing at the various locations would not be expected to have any significant effect in light of its frosty nature and the fact that natural fog in winter occurs much more frequently than would the steam fog (Applicant's Ex. 38-P, pp. 43, 62-66) . AppHcant's witness stated that the evidence at the other cooling ponds did not iralicate any damage to plant or bird life from pond fog or ice (Tr. 6250-52). "Jne pond fog or ice would not be expected to increase the breakage of transmission wires (Tr. 6254).

223 Applicant also evaluated the effect that operation of the 1

service water cooling tower and the proposed auxiliary cooling system on the pond blowdown might have on fogging effects (Applicant's Ex. 38-P, p. 68).

This analysis indicated that the service water cooling tower, which would only operate during the summer months when fog was at a minimum, is such a small source of water vapor compared to the cooling pond that it would have no effect on the results of the cooling pond analysis (Applicant's Ex. 38-P, p. 68). The auxiliary cooling system is not of sufficient size to alter the results calcu-lated for the cooling pond although it will produce a small plume which may on occasion merge with that from the cooling pond (Applicant's Ex. 38-P, p. 68),

224. The Staff has reviewed the Summary Foc Report, and, according to its witness, Dr. J. C. Cars';n, who gave testimony as to his extensive re-search and numerous on-site visits to operating cooling ponds, the Summary Report overpredicts fog (FES, Staff Ex. 6, pp. V-1 through V-6; Tr. 7363-64,

! '7455-61). Dr. Carson agreed that the Su=cary Report is the first systematic

207

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study of steam fog frem a cooling pond that attempted to relate data to at-mospheric conditions for the purpose of prediction of fos formation (Tr. 7M1-42). While Dr. Carson disagreed with many of the factors which went into the report, he stated that, en the whole, use of these factors resulted in over-prediction of fogging (Tr. 7 M2-55, 7461-62). He questioned the ability of a medel developed on the basis of winter data to predict fcgging at all times of year and the fact that the definition of fcg used in the report would tend to resu3 in the reporting of fog when there was really no significant decrease in visibility (Tr. 7W2-47). It was the conclusion of Dr. Carson that the Sum-mary Report is conservative in nature and that the fog and icing effects due to the cooling pond would not significantly affect the surrounding area with respect to potential damage to existing structures, residential occupancy, air traffic from nearby airports or traffic on nearby roads, except pessibly some

(

increase in fcgging on Gordonville Road immediately to the south of the pond (Tr. 7462). However, fogging on Gordonville Read would not be expected to de-crease visibility below 200 feet (Tr. 7699).

225. The Board also considered varicus agency ccaments which had been based on the Interim Report contained in the ASER. The National Weather Service of the Department of Commerce for the most part supported the Bechtel Interim Report (which was superseded by the Summary Report), but expressed concern about the frequency of steam fog at airports (FES, Staff Ex. 6, Ap-pendix E, p. 10). Ecwever, this concern is not significant because the steam fog plume would reach the Midland (Barstow) Airport no more often than 0.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> per month during winter and it is uncontested that there might be stratus plumes (low altitude clouds) for only about 8.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> per year at the Tri-City

(. (Saginaw) Airport (Applicant's Ex. 38-P, p. 66, Tr. 6333). The Environmental

, ---.y _--

208 Research Laboratories of NCAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-tion) agreed that the 3echtel Interim Report was conservative but were con-

<erned that steam fog could extend eastward for one-quarter mile and westward for one-half mile from the pond and onto Gordonville Road on the south (FES, Staff Ex. 6, Appendix E, p. 13). However, NOAA agreed that any occurrences would be rare and limited to below freezing temperatures. Applicant's esti-mates discusud in Paragraph 222 above demonstrate the infrequent nature of such occurrences (Applicant's Ex. 38-K, p. 20; Applicant's Ex. 38-P, pp. 62-65). Additionally, the testimony of Dr. Carson indicated that visibility never decreased to below 200 feet on a road whose situation in relation to the Dresden Plant cooling pond is very similar to that of Gordonville Road at Midland (Tr. 7699-7700). The Environmental Protection Agency commented that the high heat load of the pond may have some relation to the fogging issue and desired further amplification regarding pond site location and its relation to fogging (FES, Staff Ex. 6, Appendix E, p. 55). Applicant explained that although a larger pond might slightly reduce fcgging, it would evaporate more water, resulting in a greater makeup requirement from the river, would consume added acreage of land and would not be economically desirable. The pond design followed correct calculating procedures, and was based upon model studies at Alden Laboratories and the pond arrangement maximized heat rejection (Appli-cant's Ex. 38-K, p. 75-77; Applicant's Ex. 39). The Environmental Protection Agency also noted that Midland is a Priority 1 air pollution region with respect to nitrogen oxides and a Priority 2 air pollution region with respect to sulphur dioxide and particulates and thus consideration should be given to the possibil-ity of interaction of these chemicals and fog produced at the cooling pond to produce acid mists (FES, Staff Ex. 6, Appendix E, p. 54). Applicant and the

209 Staff pointed out that the major source of these pollutants would be elimi-nated on operation of the Plant and that, therefore, it was not to be ex-pected that acid mists would be a problem (Applicant's Ex. 38-K, p. 74; Tr.

7886). The Staff also concluded that if any real problem were to be ex-pected, it would have already manifested itself in the Midland area where natural fog is a frequent occurrence and air pollution is presently high (FES, Staff Ex. 6, p. XII-4; Tr. 7264). There is, however, no indication of such a problem in the Midland area at the present time (FES, Staff Er.

6, p. XII-4).

226. The Saginaw Intervenors, on February 6, 1972, made various cen-tentiens and listed nine hypothetical adverse effects of cooling pond fog.

However, none of the hypotheticals were ever supported by evidence, many ig-'

nored facts contained in the record, most lacked the specificity required by AEC regulations and rany misrepresented Applicant's statements in previous filings. All those of concern were adequately covered in the filings by the Applicant and Staff and in testimony at the hearing.

227. The Mapleton Intervencrs, prior to seeing Applicant's fogging studies, asserted that cooling pond fcg and icing would create a safety and traffic hazard to the residents of Mapleton, Michigan (Sworn Affidavit of Biward Epstein, July 11, 1971, contention 2). Dr. Epstein subsequently testi-fled that the Bechtel Summary Report was a unique study of cooling pond fogging (Tr. 8314), and that there was a lot of subetance in the Report (Tr. 8315). He contended that questions do exist as to the definition of fog and the timing of some observations, but stated that he did not know how to study the question of fog density (Tr. 8316). He did, however, agree that steam fogs are generally characterized by wispiness (Tr. 8348). He added that the fog index number

210 created by the Report was reasonable (Tr. 8317) and that the report of fog frequencies was acceptable (Tr. 8322). Indeed, he felt that the definition of fog in the Su= mary Report, to the extent that it was used, would overpre-ulet (Tr. 8327). Dr. Epstein did admit that he has performed no fogging studies on ponds (Tr. 8338), that he is not familiar with the Four Corners Plant (Tr. 8339) and that he had not studied fog reference literature (Tr.

8348). He stated that the trees near the pond would likely act as a barrier and prevent shallcw fcg from spreading (Tr. 8341). Thus, the fog index, which was developed on the basis of data frem the Four Corners Plant where vegetation is lacking, would be conservative with respect to shallow fog. He stated that Mapleton (1.6 miles fr m the perd) may expect a few hours of fog on one or two days per year with 40-50 yards of visibility (Tr. 8351), but that a good part

, of the time there would not be a fog / ice effect on the rads a mile from the

(

pend (Tr. 8352). The Papleton Intervenors' witness contended that the appli-cation of the fog index nu=ber derived at the Four Corners Plant cooling pond

- and applied to the Plant cooling pond may be difficult because the Midland area is more humid (Tr. 8319) and the air contains more hygroscopic particles to aid the growth of fog particles (Tr. 8319). Applicant's expert testimony, by Dr. Crawford, however, showed that the fog index number did contain a humidity term that accounted for the excess water holding capacity of the air (Tr. 6211) and that the fog study did not include a study of hygroscopic par-ticles (Tr. 6243) because the condensation nuclei were sufficient at both Midland and Four Corners (for a full fcg) and consideration of the effect of hygroscopic particles would not change the conclusion (Tr. 6248).

228. Testimony by Dow indicated that Dow would be constructing cool- l ing tcwers and air-cooled condensers (hereinafter " cooling towers") to dissipate 1

l

211 heat from their operatiens and that following cperation of the Plant, these '

cooling towers would be dissipating from 2.2 to 2 5 billion Btu per hour (Tr.

6389-90). Prior to the operation of the Plant, Dow would be installing cool-ing towers to handle 1.8 to 2.o billion Btu per hour and the re=aining cool-ing tcwers would be added at the time the Plant became operable (Tr. 6389-90).

Dow has concluded, on the basis of experience with presently operating towers and the fact that large 1. umbers of small, spread-out towers would be used in-stead of a few large towers, that fog creation would be limited to the imme-diate vicinity of the individual cooling towers (Tr. 6392,6395,6402).

Testimony by Dr. Epstein indicated that he believed that the moisture added to the air by the proposed cooling towers might have some effect on the fre-quency of fogging from the Plant cooling pond (Tr. 8324). However, he also

, agreed that he would make no significant changes in the estimates of fog fre-quency contained in the Summary Report (Tr. 8322,8339). While the Board agrees that the proposed cooling towers might have some effect, the effect cannot be quantified and it is the Board's conclusion that because the small cooling towers are spread over the vast area of the Dow complex, any effect on fogging frequency at the cooling pond will be insignificant.

229 The Board in reviewing the testimony and filings presented at the hearing, the contentions of intervenors and the ecmments of various agen-cies finds '. hat Applicant properly set forth the design of the proposed cocl-ing pond and identified and thorcughly studied the fcgging characteristics of the pond. The Staff adequately reviewed the Applicant's studies and. concluded, on the basis of extensive investigation into the area, that the Sumr.ary Report 1

over-predicts fogging and is conservative. The opinions of Dr. Epstein must be I

(

212 1

disecunted on the basis that he had not visited or studied any cooling ponds nor had he researched any scientific literature en cooling pond fogging. The Board concludes that the Applicant's study represents a censervative projec-tion of the potential fogging effects from the eccling pond and accordin6 to it the most significant recipient of fog might be Gordonville Read south of the pend. In light of the fact that Applicant's study is clearly conserva-tive and that the Staff witness, Dr. Carson, testified that similar roads ad-jacent to similar ponds have not had any significant problems, the Board con-cludes that foggin6 and icing effects from the pend will be infrequent and are not likely to be significant.

Effects of Decommissioning 230. In considering the effect of the Plant upon the environ-ment and making a cost-benefit analysis of the desirability of authoriz-i ing 1.9suance of a construction permit, the Board has evaluated considerable data regarding the possible decommissioning of the Midland Nuclear Plant after thirty to forty years of use. Although none of the witnesses pre-sented had personal experience with decommissioning nuclear facilities, Bechtel Corporation has had experience in the dismantling of non-nuclear structures (Tr. 6897). The AEC has actually decommissioned a number of nuclear facilities. In addition numerous facilities will be com-missioned prior to commissioning of the Plant and it is to be expected that they will be decommissioned prior to the Plant (Tr. 6893-6894).

231. Decommissioning would probably involve: (1) the removal of all fuel, radioactive and chemical wastes from the Plant site; (2) the decontamination of structures, equipment and components; (3) the isolation, sealing, and barricading of the nuclear steam system (NSS);

(

. _ . _ ~_

213 i

and (4) the grading of the cooling pond (Tr. 6891-6892; 10 CFR 50.82).

The initial step in decommissioning would be removal of spent fuel.

Removal of the spent fuel would not be a unique undertaking because the fuel removed has the same activity level and make-up as the fuel removed during normal refueling operations and removal would be by the same pro-cedure's utilized approximately 40 times during the life of the Plant (Tr. 6915-6922). The fuel pool has the design capability of storing and cooling the spent fuel of one and two-thirds of the fuel elements of one reactor vessel (Tr. 6920; PSAR Applicant's Ex.1-B, $$ 9 4.1 and 9 9 2 3) and there is thus adequate fuel per capacity to unload the reactors one at a time. Personnel would be fully protected during fuel removal (Tr.

6916-6922).

232. The next step would be removal of the coolant water and decontamination of irradiated systems and components.to remove residual radioactivity. Based upon present-day knowledge and technology, the methods of decontamination include chemical as well as mechanical means such as flushing with acids, bases or plain water, mopping, scrubbing, and even the physical removal of surface layers. The total amount of decontami-nation liquid used for flushing was estimated at 240,000 gallons. Its handling, concentration and off-site removal would be completed in the same manner as the general liquid radwaste would be handled during the 40-year life of the Plant (Tr. 69e3-6927). Removal of the concentrated and drummed radwaste would be carried out by government-licensed corjtrac-tors (Tr. 6926-6927). Following decontamination procedures, the only l

remaining radioactivity would be various neutron activation products in-I k cluding Iron-59, Iron-60, Nickel-49, cobalt-58, cobalt-59, Zine-60, j l

l

, - - .. - ..l

214 Cobalt-60, Zine-65, and Manganese-54, which remain in the inetal of the reac-ter vessel, reactor vessel internals, the primary loop, the steam generators, and the concrete shield surrounding the reactor vessel (Tr. 6907-6912).

Parts of the turbine could be slightly contaminated at the time of de-commissioning; however, special handling would most likely not be required and they could be decontaminated (Tr. 8190-8191). The equipment necessary for supplying process steam to Dow would not be affected by residual radio-activity and would not require decontamination (Tr. 6914-6915).

233. Although most of the NSS will be below ground level, it will be isolated by capping and sealing all, pipes and sealing building openings (Tr. 6929-30; 6891). Inside the reactor building, a concrete slab shield several feet thick would most likely be placed above all parts protruding above ground level (Tr. 6929-6930; 8197-8198). The entombment of the remaining radioactive Plant parts would be so safe that exposures to individuals would be not more than natural back-ground levels (Tr. 6938). only if an individual brcke in through locked fenses and doors and removed or excavated into the large and extremely heavy concrete cover shielding could overexposure occur (Tr.8157-8177). The facility would be monitored regularly and sur-veillance would be maintained following decommissioning to ensure that i

no problems developed (Tr. 6936,8195,8215). The radioactivity re- 1 maining in the facility would be contained in big chunks of concrete ,

l and steel and thus seepage is not a problem (Tr. 8217-18). If there were a possibility of containment foundetion contamination due to fluid leaks, surveillance and corrective actions could be taken (Tr.

l.

N-8190-8193). It is estimated that the tools used in the decommission-l ing would also become contaminated but these could be easily cleaned

+ f" 215

( (Tr. 8221). Removal of non-radioactive superstructures would be' by conventional methods.. The ' Staff estimated that this decon:raissioning procedure could be accomplished within six months to a year, the actual 4

time required being a function of Applicant's desires (Tr. 8193). ,

234. Alternate methods of decommissioning the Plant were also l

presented by th'e Applicant and Staff. The complete removal of the NSS with complete demolition of all superstructures would be one alternative.

This would involve burial of some components of the system, such as the reactor vessel and internals, biological shield and the steam generators (Tr. 8198), and removal of other components to governmental burial sites (Tr. 6971-78). A large concrete shield would cover the entrabment (Tr.

. 8198). This alternative would take longer than the first (Tr. 8203).

Another alternative would involve the complete dismantling of all struc-tures. The' reactor vessel would be cut up and removed in pieces, or it would be taken out in one piece and buried nearby. Dismantling time for this alternative would be estimated at about two years (Tr. 8204-8209).

235 In general, it would be Applicant who would determine to what extent the Plant was to be dismantled (Tr. 8161,8215-16). It is Applicant's duty to submit an application to the AEC, containing its dismantling plan, for a license permitting deccounissioning pursuant to lo CFR 550.82. The application for permission to deconunission the facil-

- ity would be reviewed by the Staff prior to the granting of authority (Tr. 8161-62).. Staff inspectors would also visit the site and make periodic inspections during the dismantling program (Tr. 8162). The-different costs of the different schemes of deconunissioning were compared and possible large cost differences recognized. Applicant's estimate for- l l

decomunissioning under the first alternative was $35 million (Tr. 6980-l 1

7006). 'That cost would be present cost and would include removal of the i

y, e e -, -w n ,~v , - - . - - - - , e-- - - - - , - - . , - - = - --.----we -a--- ,--+ - --

216

/

turbine building and other auxiliary buildings which are non-nuclear portions of the Plant and filling and grading the cooling pond (Tr. 6945-6946,6990). It would not include future surveillance nor the loss of the productive use of the land during the sealed facilities existence (Tr. 6945-6946). Testimony indicated that surveillance and land costs would be Q minimis (Tr. 7852-7856). The Board particularly notes

.that only 'a few acres would be occupied by the sealed buildings and no credit was made in the estimate for the fact that approximately 1000 acres of the site will be made available for other productive use (Tr. 7863). Testimony indicated that application of escalation to the

$35 million figure for inflationary increases over 35 years could in-crease it to about $90 million, but that when present worthed to make it comparable to the other costs evaluated in the cost-benefit analyses it would come to a figure of only about $8 million (Tr. 7820-21). The estimate was not contradicted and the Staff, based on its review of actual costs at other facilities, concluded that the Applicant's esti-mate of the $35 million was satisfactory and that $8 million was a reasonable present worth value (Tr. 7824-7826,8195-96). The testimony indicated that no significant environmental effects could be expected from decommissioning of the facility (Tr. 8157). The AEC has had exten-sive experience with the decommissioning of nuclear facilities (Tr. 8222-8237) and between now and the year 2010, when decommissioning might be expected to take place, it will acquire much more experience (Tr. 8238-40). The Board finds that decommissioning will be subject to thorough AEC regulatory review and approval at the end of the 30 to 40 year Plant N

life and there is reasonable assurance that it will have no significant

217 environmental effects. The Board concludes that an adequate presenta-tion of this distant occurrence has been made and that the best estimate of the cost of deccmunissioning is a present worth value of less than

$8 million.

Impact from Transportation of Fuel 236. Transportation of unirradiated fuel elements to the Plant, spent fuel elements from the Plant and packaged radioactive vaste from the Plant vill be made in shipping containers approved and licensed by the Department of Transportation and vill be made in ac-cordance with detailed regulations of the Department of Transportation and the AEC (ASER Applicant's Ex. 3EF-1, pp. 4.5-1 to 4 5-11) . Such regulations limit external radiation to the public from containers used in transport to extremely low levels (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, s

pp. h.5-2, 4 5.-7 and 4 5-10). Applicant pointed out that since 1962 it had made more than 50 shipnents of fuel elements to its facilities and 17 shipnents of spent fuel from such facilities without incident and with negligible effects on the environment (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 4 5-1) . The Staff evaluated exposures that could be expected under non-accident conditions. For transport of new fuel the Staff concluded that the dose that could reasonably be expected to a member of the public could be about 0.005 mrem per shipnent and that therefore there vould be no effect during nomal transportation (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-36). Evaluation of transport of spent fuel yielded a potential doce to a member of the public of only about 13 mrem and an integrated population dose along the route of the shipnent of about 0.2 man-rem (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-37) . In view of natural n

background levels and other ordinary exposures to radiation, this must

218 be viewed as negligible. The Staff also evaluated the potential heat

^

release from spent fuel shipnents and found it to have negligible en-vironmental effects (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-37) . Estimated dosages from shipnent of radioactive vaste would be equivalent to those from spent fuel, except that transportation of recycled tritium would result in no external dose (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-38) . The Board concludes that the Applicant furnished adequate information regarding nomal trans-portation and the Staff adequately evaluated the information. Inter-venors did not participate in this matter. The Board concludes that the environmental effects of fuel and vaste transportation under non-accident conditions are negligible.

237 The environmental effects of transportation accidents were also evaluated. Applicant described the detailed accident analyses and tests that are performed on shipping containers to ensure that they meet the stringent criteria prcmulgated by the Department of Transporta-tion (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, pp. 4 5-4 to 4.5-6) . The Staff analyzed the potential consequences from accidents to new fuel, spent fuel and vastes (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. VI-6 to VI-8). Because of the design of the container and limitations on quantities transported, it is considered extremely improbable that new fuel could beccane critical even in the event of an accident (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. VI-6) . Even if it were to become critical, the serious exposures vould be limited to about 100 feet from the accident (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. VI-6) . Evaluation of spent fuel shipnents indicated that under extremely improbable circumstances an accident could result in the release of scue of the gases and some'

. of the coolant frca ' the containers which would result in exposures of a few hundred millirem within about 100 feet downvind from the cask (FES

219

~

( Staff Ex. 6, p. VI-7). Solid vaste shipnents vould be unlikely to cause any significant exposure in the event of an accident because of the fact that the solid materials, even in the remote probability of a breach of packaging, would not spread as would liquid or gases (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. VI-8). Liquid vaste shipments are of such a low level of activity that even in the highly unlikely event of an accident it would not be expected that any significant exposure could result (FES StaffEx.6,p.VI-8).

238. The Staff indicated that the consequences of such ac-cidents must be evaluated in the context of the probability of an ac-cident (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. VI-6 to VI-8) . In response to the Board's inquiry on the likelihood of an accident to a shipnent from the Plant (Tr. 7613), the Staff indicated that radioactive shipnents over the life of the Plant could be expected to approximate 930,000 miles by truck (StaffletterdatedJuly24,if(2,p.2). Recent accident sta-tistics indicate one truck accident per 750,000 shipnent-miles which would indicate the possibility of one truck accident over the life of the Plant (Staff letter, dated July 24,1972,p.3). In the event of accident, depending on packaging, the probability of any release of radioactive material ranges from 1 in 10 to 1 in 100 (Staff letter, dated July 24,1972, p. 3) . It is therefore extremely unlikely that there vill be any transportation accident that vill have any environ-mental significance.

239. The Environmental Protection Agency generally agreed with the Staff conclusion that postulated transportation accidents are highly unlikely and that environmental risk is extremely lov (FES Staff

220

( Ex. 6, Appendix E, p. 37) but encourage analyses of accidents on a generic basis. The Sta rt indicated that it did have such an analysis under way and that results have progressed to the point that it appeared that the results of the study would be in agreement with the conclusions contained in the FES (Staff letter, dated July 24,1972,p.1). In re-sponse to Board questions regardin6 the use of the most direct rail routes and the interstate highway system for fuel shipnents (Tr. 7610, 7611), the Staff concluded that there were offsetting considerations in use of various routes and that it did not believe that any special routing would be indicated (Staff letter, dated July 24,1972,p.2).

The Mapleton Intervenors did not involve themselves in this matter.

The Board finds that the Applicant supplied sufficient information and the Staff adequately evaluated it. The Board is of the conclusion that the probability of any significant effect from a transportation accident is so lov as to~ not be meaningfully quantifiable in terms of environ-mental cost.

Effect of Thennal Releases to Dov 2h0. Much discussion was had at the hearing as to whether it is necessary to consider the impact of Applicant's thennal releases to Dow(Tr.5917-44). As described in paragraph 90 above, Applicant utilizes the heat in steam in the Plant to make process steam which is sent to Dov. Applicant argued that the manner in which the heat put into the process steam is utilized or eventually dissipated is not a legitimate concern of this Board. Applicant analogized the situ-ation to evaluation of the ultimate disposition of electricity generated at the Plant and sold to its customers throughout the state (Tr. 5924).

('

Mapleton Intervenors, on the other hand, argued that all heat releases l

l 1

221 e should be accounted for in considering the effect on the environment and the fact that the heat is released in the tonn of the commercial product, process steam, rather than as discharge to the cooling pond was irrelevant (Tr. 5920,5930). All parties agreed that the disposition of electricity and its specific uses was not in issue (Tr. 3922). The Board concluded that it would inquire into the environmental effects of the thennal dissipation of the process steam (Tr. 5950,6273).

241. Mr. Edwin Shannon, Manager of the Waste Control Depart-ment, Midland Division, Dov Chemical (Tr. 6356-6359) testified on the manner in which the thermal content of the process steam would be dis-sipated and as to how such dissipation related to Dov's present use of process steam (Tr. 6363-64n;6431-40). Presently Dow utilizes process steam containing a maximum of 3 2 billion btu per hour (Tr. 6369). This heat is roughly dissipated to the vaste treatment pond (200 million Btu per hour), to the No. 6 brine pond (300 million Btu per hour), through building vents and heating (700 million Btu per hour) and to the Tittabavassee River (1.8 billion Btu per hour) (Tr. 6369) . Following operation of the Plant a marimum of 4.8 billion Btu per hour would be sent to Dov. Of this 300 million would be returned to the Plant as condensate (Tr. 6376) . The remainder, except for 380 million Btu per hour discharged to the river, would be dissipated to the atmosphere by the vaste treatment plant (200 million Btu per hour), tertiary treatment pond (400 million Btu per hour), No. 6 brine pond (300 million Btu per hour), building vents and heating (700 million Btu per hour) and cool-ing towers or air cooled condensors (2.2 to 2 5 billion Btu per hour)

(Tr.6373-74,6377-78). Dow vill thus be disposing or 1 3 million Btu

\

per hour more than presently, an approximately 40% increase. All of

. - ~ - .

222 6' this increase will apparently be dissipated to the atmosphere through ponds and towers, because of the dramatic decrease to the river. Dow has stipulated with the Water Resources Commission to reduce its themal discharge to the river so as not to increcce the temperature in com-bination with others more than 50F above ambient outside of a mixing zone (Tr. 6379-80; MapletonEx.26). The Board ic of the opinion that this discharge, within water quality standards and only about 1/6 of the present discharges, will not cause any significant adverse impact on the river. (See written testimony of D. J. Seeburges, dated July 7, 1972) Heat dissipated to the atmosphere from the various ponds does not change significantly between the two periods of time and thus no significant effect can be assigned to Dow's increased usage of process steam. It is clear from the testimony that the cooling towers will produce some fog in their immediate vicinity (Tr. 6392), but that they will be spread out over a large area so that no significant effect should result (Tr. 6395). Additionally, a major portion of releases from cooling towers will come from towers being installed to handle present needs and thus only an increment is attributable to the in-creased usa 6e of process steam (Tr. 6389-90). The relationship be- <

tween the Dow cooling towers and the Plant cooling pond has been discussed above at paragraph 228.

2M. The Board concludes that transfer of heat to Dow will not significantly affect the river and will cause some environmental fogging from cooling towers at the Dow Plant. However, much of the heat to be dissipated results from usage of process steam at Dow's l present level of use and it could well be that even if the Plant were not built at Midland Dow would increase its usage of process steam and i l

l w ww -e -en

9p- U ,u 9 223 need to dissipate heat. There is no reason to suppose that the fogging will be of any significance and because of the spread out location of the towers and the productive use made of the steam sent to Dow it is clear that-this means of dissipation is superior to any method that could be employed at the Plant site to dissipate this heat.

Impact of Transmission Lines 243. All transmission lines associated with this project have been routed, designed and vill be constructed and maintained according to Environmental Criteria for Electric Transmission' Sys-tems developed by the United States Departments of Interior and Agriefiture; Guidelines for the Protection of Natural, Historic, Scenic and Recreational Values in the Design and Location of Rights of Way and Transmission Facilities published by the Federal Power Comission; Transmission and Distribution Rights of Way Selection and Develoment and Substation Site Selection and Develo; ment devel-oped by Jobnson, Johnson and Roy, Inc, landscape architects, specif-ically for Consumers Power Company (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, 4.6.1; ASER Applicant's Er. 38F-3 Appendices P, Q and R; FES Staff Ex. 6, III-3, III 4). The energy generated at Midland will be delivered to the Appli-cant's existing system at Tittabawassee Substation through two, 2.3 mile, single circuit, 345 kV lines. There will be from 13 to 15 towers over the 2.3 mile stretch (Tr. 6751 and 6757). The route for these lines is over land whien is generally flat in nature and best described as in-dustrial or waste land. The route does not pass throu6h areas with natural, historic,. scenic or recreational value (ASER Applicant's Ex.

38F-1, $$4.6.2.1 and 4.6.4). A second line will be constructed in con-( junction with the Plant in order to tie the Plant into the existing system.

ypm z.. . , - . - - -_ . - - - - - - , . , -

224 f This line vill extend south from the Tittabavassee Substation to loop the existing Kenewa-Thetford 345 kV line into the Tittabavassee Substation.

Route selection for the above 28 miles of line avoids areas with natural, historic, scenic or recreational value. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, pp. 4.6-2 and 4.6-3) The 28-mile line from Tittabavassee Substation to the Kenova-Thetford 345 kV line vill have approximately 140 towers installed (Tr.6751). The maximum height of these towers vill be about 133 feet (Tr. 6752) . The lands covered by these rights of way do not lend themselves to secondary uses with exception of that land which is used for farming. In the latter case, farming is allowed to continue in the right of way and is restricted only around the immediate base of the towers. This results in essentially no loss of land productivity because of the transmission line (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, $4.6.3 3) .

A 138-kV startup line vill cross the river from the Plant to a proposed Dov substation (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-8) . Because of the industrial nature of the area it vill have no environmental effect; however the Staff has proposed that it be relocated so as to use the same river crossing as the 3h5 kV lines (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. iii, V-8). The Ap-plicant has agreed to relocate this line (Tr. 7155) .

244. A number of municipal utilities and elective coopera-tives (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. 75-79) and the Mapleton Intervenors (Tr.

6756) stated that they thought that various large transmission lines from the Tittabavassee Substation north should be evaluated for their environmental impact. However, the evidence clearly indicates that those lines are part of Applicant's over-all system, vill be constructed and operated well in advance of Plant operation to meet system needs and vill be constructed and operated whether'or not the Plant is ever built.

(ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 4.6-2; Tr. 6754; FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-7)

225 f' Mapleton Intervenors' theory that they should be evaluated because they vill eventually carry energy from the Plant is without merit as every line on Applicant system vill eventually carry electricity from the Plant (fr. 6756 ).

During the hearing the question of the adverse environmental impact of transmission lines on birds was raised by the Mapleton Intervenors. Dr. Larry Holcomb (Tr. 8517), an Associate Professor of Biology at Creighton University in Canaha, Nebraska, testified for the Mapleton Intervenors and also examined witnesses during the environmental hearing. Although Dr. Holcomb had taught courses in ornithology (Tr. 8518) he was unable to supply the Board with any evidence that birds would be endangered by the type of towers Applicant intended to build (Tr. 8628-41). The Board accepts .the testimony of Dr. Lesl'ie Gysel, Professor in the De-partments of Forestry and Fisheries and Wildlife of Michigan State University (Tr. 6604), that the probabilities of birds striking the towers are remote (Tr. 6758). Professor Gysel's testimony was supported by Mr. Donald D. Grube of Argonne National Laboratory (Tr. 7148), a biologist who testified that his research on the subject caused him to conclude that there would be no large or material impact on bird-life as a result of the towers of the height contemplated to be built by the Applicant (Tr. 7215-16). In the opinion of the Board, the criteria and guidelines to which the towers vill be designed and con-structed are satisfactory to prevent significant impact on the en-

- vrionment and the Board further finds that Applicant's manner of land use vill minimize the omount of land lost from other uses and that

' birdlife vill not be endangered by the structures. Applicant has furnished sufficient infonnation in this area and the Staff hns ade-k quately reviewed the matter.

l l

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226 C'

Plant Construction Effects 245 Applicant has described the construction activities that vill be performed at the site (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, 54.1) .

Some noise, dust and traffic can be expected during normal operation of the Plant as -vould be the case of any large construction project. These effects are temporary and should be minimal because of the location of the Plant with respect to the surrounding population and the preventive measures to be taken during the construction period (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 4.1-1). Measures to reduce or limit the impact of Plant construction on the surrounding population include: control of dust by means of water sprinklers; control of earthmoving equipnent near the site boundaries; prohibition of blasting of rocks and tree stumps and construction of a temporary access road to avoid interference with traf-1 fic along Miller Road (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, pp. 4.1-1 and 4.1-2; FESStaffEx.6,p.IV-3). During construction of the Plant, approxi-mately 700 construction workers will be employed, most of them residents of the tri-cities (Midland, Saginaw and Bay City) area (FES Staff Ex. 6, p.IV-1). Staff investigation confirmed that adequate housing is avail-able in the Midle.nd area to handle the projected influx of new workers and that the Midland school system can acecxamodate any likely increase in school population (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. IV-1 and IV-3) . The capacity of the school system was confirmed in the comments from the Midland Public Schools (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. 59). Applicant has supplied suffi-cient information regarding construction activities and the Staff has adequately reviewed such information. The Board concludes that the effects l

\

u. _ . _ . ~ _ _ _ .

227 of construction activities will be temporary and that proper precaution-ary measures have been taken to minimize these temporary effects.

Aesthetics 246. Applicant has given consideration to the aesthetics of the Plant and vill set the cooling pond back frce the site boundary a minimum distance of 160 feet (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-1), plant appropriate trees and shrubs along the pond dike to screen the pond and fence from nearby residences (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 4.1-5; FES Staff Ex. 6,

p. IV-4, V-1), relocate its start-up transmission line frcan the Dov Sub-station to minimize its visual impact (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. iii, Tr. 7155),

design the Plant buildings to be functicnally attractive (FES Staff Ex. 6,

p. III-2) and leave a several-acre parcel of land which would have been contained in the northwest corner of the cooling pond in its natural state (ASER Applicant 's Ex. 38F-1, p. 4.1-5) . The Board concludes that Applicant and the Staff have given adequate consideration to the aesthetic impacts of the Plant.

Noise 247 Applicant, in response to a question from the Staff, has estimated the noise levels at the Dow Ccaplex and the nearest residences resulting from Plant operations (ASER Applicant's Ex. 380, p. 6.23-1) . ,

The estimated noise levels were equivalent to that of moderate traffic in the case of Dov and light traffic at the nearest residence (ASER Ap-plicant's Ex. 380, p. 6.23-1). The average combined noise level at the nearest residence falls within the Housing and Urban Develoixaent's clas-sification "normally acceptable" (ASER Applicant's Ex. 380, p. 6.23-2) .

k'.

M8

(.

'- Applicant will also monitor noise levels as required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. V-9) . Applicant has furnished sufficient information and the Staff review has been adequate. The Board concludes that noise levels from the Plant vill not create any significant effects.

Historical and Archeological Considerations 248. There are no historic sites listed on the State or National Registers in the area of the Plant site (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, 53 3). Because the Tittabavassee River is associated with sites of the Woodland's Indians, Applicant has extended permission to the local archeological society to inspect the site (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 3 3-1). The Department of Interior indicated that its i

concerns for historical and archeological resources had been satisfied but requested that Applicant cooperate with interested agencies to the extent deemed appropriate by the AEC (FES Staff Ex. 6, Appendix E,

p. 26). Applicant agreed to immediately notify the AEC and take all reascnable actions in the event of any discovery (Applicant's Ex.38K,pp.88-89). Applicant provided sufficient infor, nation and the Staff adequately reviewed such information (FES Staff Ex. 6, p.11-8) .

The Board concludes that historical and archeological matters have been properly considered and vill be adequately protected.

Monitoring 249 Applicant has described a comprehensive environmental and radiological monitoring program (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-2, Appendices A and B; Applicant's Ex. 38K, pp. 62-71) . The preoperational radiological environmental monitoring program will be conducted for a minimum of two

229 years prior to operation in order to establish base line values for radiation levels in the area. Operational radiological environmental surveys will be made around the site and the results thereof will be ecm-pared with the base line data and with data obtained from similar surveys that Applicant will conduct at reference areas beyond the Plant's poten-tial influence (Applicant's Ex. 38K, pp. 62-71) . Samples will be taken of river water, Saginaw Bay water, well water, air and aquatic organisms (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, Appendix A; Applicant's Ex. 38K, pp. 62-71) .

Applicant's preoperational environmental surveys will include analyses of fish and benthic populations at the site and will be used as background data for later operational surveys (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-3, Appendix A).

In addition, Applicant will maintain at least two continuous water temperature monitors to insure that its discharge is within approximately 1 0F of ambient i i river water temperature (Applicant's Ex. 38K, p. 63). Applicant will also maintain monitors on numerous other parameters of its discharges (Applicant's Ex. 38K, p. 63; Tr. 7479-82). The Staff has reviewed Applicant's monitoring programs and has detemined that such programs should provide for the following:

"c) At least two years prior to plant operations, initiate an ecological (including radiological) study of the site and environs to establish base line values. The study should have a scope and frequency which will:

"l) Identify the economically and environ-mentally important species. Determine l their abundance and life history when pertinent to the site, and define the t extent and location of their habitat, "2) Characterize the ecological community, defining the community structure with

[' special attention to stability or fluctuations, and

230 "3) Obtain background data on the radio-activity in important indicator organisms (See Section V., pages 13, 21 and 33).

"d) Develop a surveillance and monitoring program of significant parameters based upon the ecolog-ical study which will document the impact of the plant operations upon the ecology of the site and errtirons. The ecological surveillance and moni-toring program actions to be developed should serve to identify actual effects on the environ-ment frca plant operations (See Section V., pages 13,21and33)." (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. iii-iv)

Applicant has agreed to make the necessary modifications when it details its program (Tr. 7155). The Board concludes that an adequate detailed pro-gram to monitor radiological and environmental effects can be developed on the basis of the criteria contained in the record (including the Staff re-quirements) and building on the programs as proposed.

Adverse Effects That Cannot Be Avoided 250. The Staff summarized the adverse effects of the proposed action which cannot be avoided (FES Staff Ex. 6, $VII). The Staff con-cluded that the minimal adverse environmental effects of cooling pond fog, displacement of wildlife and aesthetic impact of transmission lines cannot be avoided (FES Staff Ex. 6, $VII). All of the other environmental effects either have an impact so small as to be undetectable or ere not adverse.

Many of the potential adverse impacts will be avoided as a result of the actions of the Applicant and Staff to protect the environment. The Board concurs in the Staff's enumeration of unavoidable adverse effects.

Short-Term Uses and Long-Term Productivity 1

251. Both the Applicant and the Staff discussed the relation-ship between local short-tem uses of man's environment and the maintenance ,

, and enhancement of long-tem productivity (Applicant's Ex. 38, p.10; FES i

l

.=mim,-

231 f'

StaffEx.6,p.VIII-1). The Staff took into account the present industrial and residential zoning of the site and the land's previous and potential uses (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. VIII-1). The portion zoned industrial would probably have developed in an industrial manner in any event in that it is only marginally productive for agriculture and is adjacent to areas of heavy industry. The pond area is zoned residential and could support agriculture on about- 50% of its soil. It can be restored for residential

, use on decommissioning of the facility. Neither the site nor'the river shore area had been used for recreational purposes and the river is not presently of a quality that would support meaningful recreational use (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. VIII-1).

252. While, as discussed above, potential short-tem uses of the site will not be adversely affected by the Plant, it is clear that the existence of the Plant which will provide both electricity and process steam at a reasonable cost will have a beneficial effect on long-term I l

productivity (Applicant's Ex. 38, p.10). In view of the type of site involved, its past manner of usage and its likely potential uses, the pro-posed use of this site for the Plant would appear to maximize its potential for productivity.

Irreversible and Irretrievable Ccanmitment of Resources 253 There are only two irreversible and irretrievable commit-ments of resources associated with the Plant (FES Staff Ex. 6, $IX). On I

deccanissioning of the facility, Applicant may choose to seal it off and pemanently restrict access to it. In such event the small portion of the site on which it is located would be lost to almost all productive use

( (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. IX-1). The remainder of the site, however, can be l

232

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(

returned to other productive use. Additionally some of the nuclear fuel is irretrievably consumed. This could total approximately 900 metric tons of uranium fuel. However, plutonium will be produced frcm the fuel and see urarium is recoverable (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. IX-1) . The Staff also lists the water consumption as irretrievable, but points out that the con-sumption is not really a loss but a redistribution (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. IX-2).

The Board concurs with the Staff's analysis of the irreversible and irre-trievable comitments of resources.

Need for Power 254. Applicant presented extensive detailed electric sales forecasts through 1980, converted these sales forecasts to estimates of peak demand for electricity and related such projections to its existing generation, its construction and retirement program and pro-jections for the Michigan Electric Power Pool to demonstrate the need for electricity frca the Plant. ( ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, $2; Ap-plicant's Ex. 38G, revised Ex.1 to $2; Applicant's Ex. 38K, pp.108-114)

Applicant projects sales growth by class of service based primarily on historical trends modified to reflect other data indicating changes in these trends such as population forecasts, projections of various economic indicators, projected energy use, customer saturation for major appliances and other factors judged to have an effect on future sales. (ASER Applicant's Exhibit 38F-1, $2.2) Applicant's past pro-jections have been extremely accurate. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38G, Appendix B to Ex. 1 of $2) A witness from the Federal Power Commission

-(FPC) testified regarding factors to be considered in determing the i

1_ _ ._ _

233 1

need for power, testified as to the FPC's review of projections for Ap-plicant and the Michigan Electric Power Pool (Tr. 8012-8149),testi-fied that the differences between the FPC projections and Applicant's are insignificant (Tr. 8148-49) and confirmed that historically Appli-cant's projections had been accurate (Tr. 8093). The Staff compared Applicant's projections with data gathered from other sources, including trends shown for population increases in the United States, and concurred in the reasonableness of Applicant's projections. (FES Staff Ex. 6,

$X;Tr.3090-91) The projected increases in sales over the next ten years result from population increases, particularly large increases in the adult population which result in increased household formation, and increased usage per consuming unit, including a significant increase in electricity being used for control or elimination of air and water pollution (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, pp. 2-6 to 2-9; Tr. 6528-33).

The Board concludes that projections of 5,500,000kW, 6,020,000 kW and 6,920,000 kW (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38G, Table DDi-1 to revised Ex.1 to Section 2; Applicant's Ex. 38K, pp.109,111), respectively, for Appli-cant's sumer peak load in 1W7, lW8 and 1980 are reasonable and that projections of 14,845,000 kW, 16,075,000 kW (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38G, Table DDI-l to revised Ex.1 to Section 2; Applicant's Ex. 38K, pp.109, 111) and 18,450,000 kW (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 2-5), respective-ly, for the Michigan Electric Power Pool's summer peak load in 1977, 1978 and 1980 are reasonable. Projections of 5,720,000 kW, 6,230,000 kW ' (Ap-plicant's Ex. 38K, pp. 109,111) and 7,150,000 kW (ASER Applicant's Ex.

38G, revised Table Dai-1 to revised Section 2) are reasonable for Appli-cant's peak loads for the winters of 1W7-78,1W8-79 and 1980-81, re-spectively.

A 234 l'

255 The present installed capacity of Applicant's system is approximately 3,897,000 kW plus 114,000 kW from the Thetford Plant and approximately 400,000 kW for the Palisades Plant (60% of capacity, AEC Docket No. 50-255) and, less retirements in 1972 of 126,000 kilo-watts totalling 4,285,000 kilowatts (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1 $ 2.1 and p. 2-12; Tr. 6537). This indicates a need for additional capacity of 1,435,000 kW Just to meet its projected peak load in the winter of 1977 and 1,945,000 to meet its load in the winter of 1978. Howeve",

Applicant in addition to its need to install capacity to meet its peak load must install additional capacity to provide reserves in the event of unscheduled Plant outages and scheduled Plant refueling and mainte-nance (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 2-9). Also, Applicant being a member of the Michigan Electric Power Pool (" Pool") is fully integrated with The Detroit Edison Company (Detroit Edison) and must schedule its units in conjunction with Detroit Edison so that the Pool will also have adequate reserves (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, pp. 2-4, 2-9; Applicant's Ex. 38K, p. 108). Applicant aad the Pool seek to maintain an 18% reserve to provide sufficient additional capaci,ty against outages (ASER Appli-cant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 2-9). Applicant has detailed its construction  !

schedule through 1980, including in its schedule addition of the 485,000 kW Midland Unit No. 1 in 1977 and the 815,000 kW Unit No. 2 in 1978 (ASER i l

Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, pp. 2-12 through 2-13; Applicant's Ex. 38K, p.108).  :

l Applicant's calculations show that unavailability of the Midland Unit No.  !

l 1 in the summer of 1978 will result in a reserve margin on the Applicant's system and on the Pool system (taking into account reserve sharing) of

~I 9.8% (Applicant's Ex. 38K, p.113). With the Midland units in operation 1

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o -s. A nma 235 C

' this reserve margin would be 17 9% (Applicant's Ex. 38K, p.113). This reserve margin assumes that other plants scheduled for completion between now and 1978 are completed on schedule and are operable in lgr/8 (ASER Ap-plicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 5 3-1).

256. In planning generation additions, Applicant not only takes into account the quantity of generation needed but also must provide a proper generation mix in terms of meeting the various portions of its load (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, pp. 2-9 through 2-11). As explained by Applicant, a utility has a fluctuating demand over the course of a day and the course of a year. Thus, system peaks occur during the coldest parts of the year and the warmest parts of the year and at certain times of day (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 2-9). It is to these peaks which Applicant must design its total capacity, but in addition Applicant must have different types of generation to meet portions of this peak (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, pp. 2-5 and 2-10). Base load units are designed to operate twenty-four hours a day to meet the portion of the demand that is always present. Such units are characterized by high capital costs which can be spread over many units of production and low oper-ating costs resulting in the lowest cost production of electricity on the system (ASER Applicant's Ex. 3BF-1, p. 2-10; Tr. 6571). Intermedi-ate load units meet the intermediate portion of the demand, i.e., when the load increases above base load, and are designed to operate from 10 to 60 percent of the time. Such units because they operate less frequently can be economical with somewhat higher fuel costs than base load units but must have lower capital cost (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1,

(

p. 2-11). Peaking units are designed to operate infrequently and for L j

236 C

short periods of time to meet the peak of the demand curve and to replace forced outages. These are usually high fuel cost, low capital cost units although they may also be older, less efficient base load and intermedi-ate load units (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 2-11). In order to maxi-mize system efficiency and reliability and create the most economical generation, a proper balance of these three types of generation must be maintained (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 2-10). Applicant has indi-cated that because of the delay in licensing the Plant, several inter-mediate load units (because of their shorter lead time from planning to operation) have been moved forward into the time period for which the Plant was originally intended (1974-75) (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, pp. 2-13 through 2-14; Tr. 6572-73). This will result in a situation in which Applicant has too much intermediate load capacity and too little base load capacity and is thus required to utilize intermediate load units with their higher fuel costs as base load units. This will result in a less effecient system producing higher cost electricity (ASER Appli-cant's Ex. 38F-1, pp. 2-13 through 2-14; Tr. 6572-73).

257. The Board queried Applicant as to its basis for an 16%  ;

reserve margin (Board Order of March 27,1972). Applicant stated that the criterion for Applicant and the Michigan Pool is to maintain a level ,

l of reserve such that the probability of loss of load is once in 20 years l l

(Applicant's Ex. 38N, p. 1). It is their judgment that such a criterion '

l is sufficiently conservative to provide reasonable assurance that reli-able electric service will be available. Based on probability studies run by Applicant utilizing the various system parameters in 1978, an i 18% reserve maigin equates with loss of load ence in 20 years. Appli-cant stated that reduction of reserves to 15% increased loss of load l

237 C

\ probability to once in five years and a decrease in reserves to 10%

increased loss of load probability to once in seven months (Applicant's Ex. 38N).

258. A witness from the Federal Power Commission (FPC) testi-fied that Applicant's load projections were reasonable (Tr. 8148-49),

and demonstrated that the FPC projected reserve margins for the Pool similar to those projected by Applicant (Tr. 8026). He further testi-fied that the FPC generally uses a guideline for reserve margins of between 15 and 25 percent with utility systems of Applicant's type (i.e., a system characterized by large coal-fired units) being recom-mended to be in the higher end of the range (Tr. 8080-8136-38). The FPC witness also discussed the consequences of failure to maintain an adequate reserve margin and the steps that utilities would take before interrupting customers' servise (Tr. 8023). He agreed with Applicant that for the Michigan Pool the Midland Units No.1 and 2 or equivalent base load caTacity is required in 1977 and 1978 (Tr. 8143) and recog-nized that lead times for constructing nuclear plants are now from seven to ten years and that even construction of fossil fired base load units is subject to delays and vagaries (Tr. 8146).

259 Mapleton Intervenors argued that the Plant was being built to supply power to Canada (Tr. 6550-51; 8064-65). Applicant's contract with the Ontario Hydro-Electric Commission provides for ex-change of several types of energy, (emergency, economy and diversity) but provides for interruption of any transaction when the energy is needed on the sender's system (Mapleton Intervenor's Ex. 38 and 39; Tr.

( 6541-42,8040-51). Applicant's witness testified that all of the ca-A pacity being installed at Midland is for Applicant's and the Pool's

.-r e

=.

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l 239 i

r

\ letter of June 7, 1972). cross-examination by Mapleton Intervenors was lengthy and, while this is not intended to be criticism, primarily re .

vealed their lack of understanding of utility operations. They tried to compare kilowatts directly to kilowatt hou*s (Tr. 6530), they con-fused transmission capacity with generating capacity (Tr. 8065), and apparently misunderstood the concept of circulating power and the bases of utility planning (Tr. 8061-65).

260. Based on the exhibits and testimony presented, it is the Board's conclusion that Applicant has demonstrated its need for 486,000 kW of base load generation in 1977 and 815,000 kW of base load generation in 1978 to meet its projected demand and Pool obligations and to provide adequate reserve margins to protect against forced outages and permit scheduled outages. Applicant has justified the need for this amount of capacity on the basis of the needs of its own system and the Pool system and not on the basis of the need to have power available to export to other systems.

Alternatives 261. Applicant has extensively considered alternative means of satisfying its need for 1,300,000 kW of base load capacity in 1977-78 including alternate means of generation (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1,

$$ 5.1 and 5 2, as amended by Applicant's Ex. 38n and 38I), purchase of the capacity from another utility (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, 6 5.3) and location of generation at another site. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, 5 5.4; Applicant's Ex. 38L, pp 72b-72f.) Applicant's consideration ex-tended to construction of the Plant as a single purpose Plant with Dow

(. constructing its own plant to meet its process steam and electrical needs.

L ,.

240 (Applicant's Ex. 38L,-pp 72-72f.) In addition, Applicant considered al-ternate cooling systems (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, 5 5 5), alternate radioactive waste disposal systems (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, $ 5.6) and alternate chemical waste systems (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38K, p 45).

The Staff thoroughly evaluated the various alternatives available to Applicant including comments of other agencies. (FES Staff Ex. 6, $ XI; Tr. 7624-29, 7721-28, 7775-77, 7818-19, 7914-58, 7736-92.)

Alternative Means of Generation 262. The Applicant discussed and evaluated alternate sources of power including hydroelectric, pumped storage, fossil-fired conventional plants, ccabustion turbine generators, _ combined cycle plants and diesel generating units. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, $5.2. ) There are no poten-tial sites in Applicant's service area for developing 1,300,000 kW of hydroelectric generation. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p 5 2-1.) Pumped storage plants rely upon base load units for pumping power in off-peak hours and therefore are not alternatives for base load capacity. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p 5 2-1.) Problems, such as ncise and magnitude of numbers of units, as well as highly unfavorable economics, make diesel-

~

generating units undesirable alternatives for base load (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, $ 5 2.1.6). Therefore, only fossil-fired conventional units and oil-fired combined cycle units are alternatives to the Midland Plant.

263. Evaluation of alternate means of generation was based on analysis of the cost of electricity generated (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, s'5.2.1), the availability of fuel (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, 6 5.2 3) and the environmental effects of the alternatives (ASER Applicant's Ex.

(

38F-1, 5 5 2.2.). Applicant summerized its evaluation in an elaborate l

l

241

( cost benefit analysis prepared according to a model issued by the Staff as a proposed guide in December 1971. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38H and 38I, pp 5 1-11 to 5.1 46.) ,

264. Both Applicant and the Staff concurred that gas is not a feasible alternate fuel because it is in short supply in Applicant's area and there are presently restrictions on its use. (ASER Applicant's Ex.

38F-1, $ 5.2.3.2; FES Staff Ex. 6, p XI-1; Tr. 6559, 6583, 7919.) Appli-cant considered a number of alternative means of acquiring gas; importation of natural gas, importation of liquified natural gas, coal gasification, and reformation of liquid bydrocarbons, and found all such possible remedies to be inadequate or too remote for purposer, of an alternate to this plant.

(ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, pp. 5.2-11 and 5.2-12.)

P65. oil is still available as an alternative, however domestic oil reserves have decreased nine cut of ten years between 196o and 1970 (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p 5.2-13; Tr. 6578-79), and domestic oil  !

production is expected to peak in the next two to three years with domes-tic production decreasing thereafter (Tr. 6578-79). With domestic oil in short supply, the National Petroleum Council projects dependency on foreign l oil to increase from the present 23% to 56.5% in 1985 (ASER Applicant's Ex.

38F-1, p 5.2-15, Tr. 6579). Under the present Federal Oil Import Program, Applicant, in the past, has not been permitted to import offshore foreign oil.

(ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 5.2-15. ) Applicant in addition to consider-ing the possibility of importation of offshore oil, evaluated the potential

~a lternatives of synthetic petroleum from coal liquefaction processes, pro-duction'from western oil shale deposits, and production from tar sands.

(ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, pp 5.2-13 and 5.2-14.) While the two former

242 O

possibilities hold out great potential, neither are commercially feasible in the near future and the third alternative, while technically feasible, cannot be expected to be of sufficient magnitude to resolve supply prob-lems. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, pp 5.2-13 and 5 2-14.)

266. Iow-sulphur coal is available at relatively high cost which, with electrostatic precipitators, would meet Environmental Protection Agency 4

requirements (Tr. 6577,6583). However, technology is lacking to use high-

-sulphur coal in an acceptable manner (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p 5.2-17; Tr. 6578). A considerable portion of the low-sulphur coal is presently committed to the metallurgical and export markets (ASER Applicant's Ex.

38F-1, p 5.2-17; Tr. 6578).

267. The Staff pointed out that uranium is not a rare element; its availability being more a matter of economics than a matter of deple-tion. (FES Staff Ex. 6, p XII-5.) Proven uranium reserves at a cost of production of $8 per pound will expire before 1985 (Tr. 6590), but addi-tional proven recerves are available at $10 a pound or $15 per pound (Tr.

6589). The Staff witness stated that there is still a lot of exploration to be conducted for uranium and that uranium is available from foreiEn sources if the domestic supply should diminish (Tr. 7920). The testimony revealed that uranium reserve projections are developed on a more meaning-ful basis that includes cost of production and cumulative future require-ments than are the reserve projections for coal, oil and gas (Tr. 6587- )

l 94).

268. The Board also thinks that it is important in evaluating the availability' and desirability of utilizing various fuels to take into account their potential uses. Uranium has little or nc, usefulness out- I

{

side of its present application for base load electric generattag plants

243 h (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 5 2-21). However, gas and oil are used in a wide variety of-applications including hee heating, industrial processing and transportation as well as electric generation (ASER Ap-plicant's Ex 38F-1, p. 5.2-21). Coal is primarily used only as a fuel for base load generation (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 5 2-21) . However, its potential for conversion to oil and gas cannot be ignored (ASER Ap-plicant's Ex. 38F-1, pp. 5 2-11, 5 2-13). Thus, all of these dwindling fuel resources have valuable empeting uses except for uranium. Any decision to utilize these other resources should keep such fact in mind.

269 comments received from other agencies generally took no issue with estimates of fuel availability. (FES Staff Ex. 6, Appendix E.)

However, the United States Department of Interior indicated that it thought that Applicant had overestimated Michigan oil and gas production and recov-erable oil from oil shale and tar sands. (FES Staff Ex. 6, Appendix E, pp22-23.)

270. Fuel cost projections for coal, oil and nuclear fuel were presented by Applicant (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, 5 5 2.1.3, pp 5 2-2 and 5 2-5). Applicant's witness and the Staff's witness detailed the vari-ous components of the fuel cycle that they had considered in making their cost projections and the manner in which they escalated the component costs.

(Tr.7011-42,7917-23.) The record of this proceeding reflects extensive cross-examination on fuel availability and fuel costs of both the Appli-

cunt's witness (Tr. 6577-94, 7010 42) and the Staff's witness (Tr. 7911-73).

l_

271. It is projected that the Plant will generate about 8.9 bil-lion kilowatt hours per year. Alternative plants were evaluated by replac-

. ing the Plant with each alternative one at a time in the computer model of l

l

~ ~

2%

the Michigan Power Pool utilizing projected capital, fuel and generating costs. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38H, p 5 1-12.) Because of the high fuel costs of the alternatives, much of the replacement electricity would not, in fact come from the alternate plant but would instead come frem other plants on the system. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38H, p 51-12.) The results of this analysis showed that over the life of the plante, the closest alter-nate plant would result in a total system cost fcr the 8.9 billion kilowatts per year of electricity which exceeded the cost of the same amount of elec-tricity from the Plant by over $200 million. (ASERApplicant' sex.38I,p.

51-35.)

272. The Staff utilized similar methodology in evaluating the alternatives. The Staff utilized the same capital costs as Applicant and calculated fossil fuel costs both without escalation and with 2% per year escalation. (FES Staff Ex. 6, p XI-6.) The calculations resulted in a cost for the proposed Plant of $859 million; for a single purpose coal-fired steam plant, $903 minion (without escalation) and $1,013,000 (with escalation); for a single purpose oil-fired steam plant, $927 million (with-out escalation) and $1,061,000 (with escalation); and for a single purpose oil-fired combined cycle unit, $821 minion (without escalation) and $948 million (with escalation). (FES Staff Ex. 6, Table XI-1.) Because the alternatives are all single purpose plants, the comparison understates the cost differential. A single purpose nuclear plant to produce 1,300,000 kW of electricity would have a cost of only $678 minion (FES Staff Ex. 6, TableXI-1). This figure can be calculated by using the Staff cost for a i

single purpose nuclear plant with a natural draft cooling tower and sub-l (v tracting the price of the cooling tower ($36 minion). Thus even without i

2h5

? assuming escalation, the nuclear alternative result in costs over 30 years which are at least $125 million lower than the nearest alternative. The Board, however, oelieves on the basis of the testimony at the hearing re-garding escalation and the growing scarcity of oil and dependence on for-eign sources, that fossil fuel should be escalated by at least a 2% annual differential from nuclear fuel and that the cost advantage to nuclear is closer to $200 million.

273. The Board is satisfied from its review of the data submitted by Applicant (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38H, 5 5.1.3, as amended by Agplicant's Ex. 38I; ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, 5 5 2) and the Staff (FES Staff Ex. 6, 5 XI), and the testimony of Applicant and Staff at the hearing (Tr. 6577-97, 7011-43,7914-58) that these estimates are reasonable and that the Applicant and Staff correctly concluded that the cost of fossil-fuel alternatives vould greatly exceed the cost of the proposed nuclear plant. No evidence was sub-mitted by intervenors which tends to impeach these conclusions.

274. In addition to the economic comparison, Applicant and the Staff estimated that a coal-fired plant could be expected to release, even with a 99% efficient precipitator system, 4,500 tons per year of fly ash and approximately 65,000 tons per year of sulphur dioxide when using low sulphar coal. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p 5.2-7; FES Staff Ex. 6, TableXI-8.) In addition, it would be necessary to dispose of the 500,000 tons /yearofflyashcollectedbytheprecipitatorsandthecoalplant woul<i release a sizeable amount of radioactivity. (ASER Applicant's Ex.

38F-1, p. 5.2-7 and Applicant's Ex. 380, Response to Department of Interior; FES Staff Ex. 6, Table XI-8) Oil could, under present Federal emission

( standards,releaseupto43,000 tons /yearofsulphurdioxideand10,700

l 1

246 s

tons / year of particulate matter. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p. 5.2-8; FES Staff Ex. 6, Table XI-1.) While the constanption of water and occupation of land for each alternative may vary scmewhat, the effects are similar as are the effects relating to transmission lines (FES Staff Ex. 6, Table XI-8).

The Board concludes that there are no environmental advantages to fossil fired alternatives and that there may well be environmental disadvantages.

Alternative Production of Process Steam 275 Applicant submitted substantial information as to the alter-natives available to the Dow Chemical Company for obtaining process steam.

(ASER Applicant's Ex. 38L, pp 72-72f.) The requirements of Dow Chemical Company for process steam are 2 9 million pounds per hour in 1972 and in 1980, the average consumption on an annual basis will be approximately 3.5 million pounds per hour. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38L, p. 72a. ) This represents a 90f, demand factor for a total capability of 4.05 million pounds per hour.

Dow's requirements for electric power are 160 megawatts in 1972 and 200 megawatts in 1980. The figures for 1980 are related to the prices for steam and electricity to be charged by the Applicant in connection with operation of the first nuclear unit of the Midland Plant starting in 1977 (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38L, p 72a.) An alternative to the construction by the Applicant of a dual-purpose plant for providing both electricity and process steam is for Dow to continue to operate and later replace its own plants in order to meet its process steam and electricity requirements and for the Applicant to construct single-purpose plants to provide electricity

- only. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38L, p 72a.) In order to reduce air pollu-tion, Dow would need to change from burning coal to burning low-sulphur oil. This would result in annual emissions of approximately 2,500 tons of

247 particulates and 10,000 tons of sulphur dioxide when and if steam genera-tion reached the ultimate rate of approximately 3.5 million pounds per hour. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p 5.2-8; Tr. 7785-87.)

276. A comparison of the costs of process steam and electricity to Dow from Dow-owned generating facilities and from the Plant is given below. (Applicant's Ex. 38L, pp 72a-72b; FES Staff Ex. 6, p XI-2.) The figures for 1972 and 1980 include the costs of fuel, labor, and other operating expenses but not any return on investment in existing Dow facil-ities. The figures for 1980 have been adjusted for assumed escalation of operating costs and include the cost of converting existing facilities from coal to oil. The figures for new Dow facilities, which would have to be constructed to replace existing facilities soon after 1980, include a re-turn on the investment in new facilities at a rate of 8% per year after i

taxes.

New Dow Midland Existing Dow Facilities Facilities Nuclear Cost to Dow Burning Coal Burning oil Burning 011 Plant Chemical Co. 1972 1980 1980 1980 _

Process Steam 0.71 1.145 1.6 0.62

($/1000lb)

Electricity 1.08 15 2.1 1.(T/8

(/ kW-hr)

The Staff evaluated the 1980 cost for fuel oil to be $0 92 per 1000 pounds i

of process steam produced without allowing for thermal losses during com-bustion. Excluding the costs for operation, maintenance and plant amortiza-tion, the cost of producing 3.5 million pounds per hour of process, steam in an oil-fired plant would be approximately $9,500,000 a year more than the total cost of process steam produced by the Plant. Taking into account the I

248 C

\

adverse effect of increased air pollution from an oil-fired steam plant, in addition to the added cost of steam production, this is not considered a viable alternative by the Staff. (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp XI-2 and XI-3; ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p 5 2-6 and Applicant's Ex. 38L, pp 72a-72b; Tr. 7736-92.) No evidence was submitted by intervenors on this matter.

The Board finds that Applicant submitted sufficient infor:::ation and the Staff conducted an adequate review with regard to alternatives for produc-tion of process steam. The Board finds that the production of process steam by the proposed Plant is preferabic to production of process steam by Dow in fossil-fueled production plants.

Alternative Sites 277 There are other sites in the Applicant's service area where power plants could be built, but there is no other site for a dual-purpose plant which not only generates electricity but supplies econcxnical process steam to the Midland Division of Dow. (Tr.6857-60) The problem of thermal losses in transmitting steam makes the cost prohibitive if the steam is not used near 1

where it is produced. As discussed by Applicant, the costs of moving the Plant one, five and ten miles from the present location are approximately

)

$80 million, $170 million and $300 million, respectively. (ASER Appli-cant's Ex. 38C, p 2 of Response to Assistant Secretary of Commerce; ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p 5.4-1.) Evidence at the hearing clearly estab-lished that the proposed dual purpose Plant could not economically be con-structed at alternate sites and economically serve its intended purposes.

Applicant's witness, William Dunlop, Bechtel's Chief Cost Engineer, who has had extensive cost estimating experience (Tr. 6865-66), testified

(

that moving the Plant one mile would entail $80 million extra cost,

- 249 r.

I five miles would cost $170 million and ten miles $300 million. These costs include the differential costs for transmission of steam, condensate, cooling make-up and blowdown, electrical auxiliaries and start-up, site costs of the cooling system, and some miscellaneous other cooling systems items (Tr. 6867-68). Included also are some unrecoverable costs due to delay and to completed work already at the present site. These costs do not include any cancellation cost which might be incurred if the nuclear steam system and turbine ordered had to be changed because of a change in Plant location (Tr. 6869). No costs resulting from decreased electrical output from the Plant are included (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p 5.1-12).

278. Intervenors' witness, Dr. Ernst R. G. Eckert (Tr. 8668-8673), contended that it was technically feasible to locate the Plant at a greater distance from the Dow Plant. He offered three alternatives for locating the nuclear Plant one or more miles away from the proposed site but did not evaluate costs of his alternatives (Tr. 8666-8686). He indi-cated that he considered Applicant's estimate of capital costs of the various alternative sites to be somewhat high. He further indicated that in his review of Plant location he did not address himself to the environ-mental effects, operating problems, and routing problems involved with )

l proposed long steam lines (Tr. 8699-8703). He also agreed under question-1 ing by Dr. Hall that he did not have any reason to doubt that the Appli-cant did a responsible engineering job and made responsible ccJt estimates in connection with alternate siting (Tr. 8698-99). Although the parties could not agree on a specific figure, it is clear that movement of the Plant pursuant to Dr. Eckert's proposals would reduce the electrical out- l

\ l put by from 5 to 10% (Tr. 8713-15). No witness indicated any good reason for making such a move.

l

a- m 250

. (~ '

279 In addition to consideration of the possibility of moving the dual purpose plant some distance from its present site, Applicant considered the possiblity of abandoning the Plant's dual nature and con-structing a nuclear plant at another site (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, 5 5.4; Applicant's Ex. 38L, pp 72b-72f. ) This alternative would of course require Dow to pursue the alternative discussed above (paragraphs 275 and 276) of continuing to operate fossil-fired units to satisfy its own needs.

Because of Applicant's projected power needs and the possible licensing ,

delays in building the proposed units at another location, Applicant in-dicated that-it would probably move the larger unit (815,000 kW) to its existing Palisades site to minimize licensing delays and build a fossil fir % unit to produce the rest of the power needed.(Applicant's Ex. 38L, p 72b.) Part of the reason for the abandonment of the smaller electrical capacity unit (485,000 kW) would be the fact that it was designed as a 1

dual purpose unit and in order to use it at another site it would be necessary to redesign it as a single purpose unit producing 815,000 kW which is more electricity than Applicant can use (Applicant's Ex. 38L, p 72b.) Applicant evaluated the costs of such a move, assuming unrea-sonably short delays (estimated in excess of $1,000,000 per month) which tended to understate its costs, and concluded that the minimum cost of such an alternative would be:

"1. Capital costs of in excess of $29,600,000 resulting in higher cost of producing electricity than the l Midland alternative. j

2. Fixed charges during first 22 months totaling

$13,7000,000.

. 3 Need for Applicant to construct fossil-fired unit ff to make up for cancellation of second nuclear unit: I

251

a. Higher cost of producing electricity than Midland alternative. ASER Sections 5 1 and 5 2.

b. Resultant increases in fossil emissions. Section 5 2.2.

4. Need for Dow to continue producing process steam and perhaps electricity.

a. Increasein1980priceper1000/1oofprocesssteam of in excess of $0.50. Assuming Dow continues to use even 3,000,000 lb/hrthisisanincreasedcostof

$1500 per hr and into the tens of millions over the life of the plant. This cost would increase another 40% when, because of obsolescence, Dow is required to replace its present units. [ Staff estimate $9,500,000 Per year (FES Staff Ex. 6, p X1-3)]

b. Increase in Dow's cost of electricity to the ex-tent it continued to generate its own. Possible increase in Dov's cost of electricity from Appli-cant, depending on effects on rates as a result of increased costs of producing electricity.

c. Continued emissions from Dow's fossil units. See ASER Section 5.2.2.

/

5 Necessity to operate Applicant's older less efficient units greater percentages of the time, resulting in increased emissions and increased costs." (Appli-cant's Ex. 38L, pp 72e-72f)

Applicant concluded that in light of the nonexistent environmental bene-

, fits of such a move, there would be no justification for the enormous costs (Applicant's Ex. 38L, p 72f.) The Staff reviewed the Applicant's projections and agreed that any such move would involve augmented gene-ration costs and enhanced air pollution, including those costs applicable to co'ntinued operation of fossil facilities by Dow (FES Staff Ex. 6, p X1-3.) Mapleton Intervenors argued that the $13,700,00 cost in Applicant's estimate attributable to the fix6d charges on constructing a transmission line 22 months early should have reflected escalation that was saved as a result of the early construction (Tr. 6852-6857.) Applicant supplied a

{ _ calculation of $4,385,000 for the escalation saved by early construction

252 (Applicant's letter dated June 8,1972.) The Board believes that Mr. Like is correct in this point and that such saving should be taken account of in evaluating the move. The Board concludes that, aside from the correc-tion proposed by the Mapleton Intervenors, Applicant supplied sufficient information on the matter of alternate sites and the Staff adequately re-viewed such information. The Board finds that construction of the Plant at an alternate site either as a single purpose plant, with Dow constructing its own plant or as a dual purpose plant would result in significant in-creases in economic and environmental costs and is clearly a less desirable alternative than that chosen.

Purchase of Power 280. Applicant evaluated the possibility of purchasing 1,300,000 kW of power as an alternative to constructing the Plant. Applicant's sys-tem is integrated with that of The Detroit Edison Company to form the Michigan Power Pool which in turn is interconnected for emergency an'd diversity power with adjacent utilities in the United States and Canada (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, 5 5 3. ) Applicant, on the basis of reserve margins projected for adjacent systems and construction and licensing delays that all generating plants are facing, concluded that the necessary amount of power would not be available on a basis comparable to base lead (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, $ 5 3-4. ) Applicant also pointed out that any such alternative would merely export any environmental problems of generating electricity, would require construction of numerous additional transmission lines, and would most likely require adjacent systems to operate older less efficient plants more often thus increasing pollution (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p 5 3-5.) The Federal Power Commission also l

253 reviewed the availability of surplus power of this magnitude and conclud-ed that there was no such spare capacity that Applicant could hope to utilize on a regular basis in lgr/7 and 1978 (Tr. 8070-71, 8076-78. ) The Staff reviewed Applicant's information and concluded that there were not adequate power supplies available for purchase (Tr. 7727, FES StCf Ex. 6, pX1-1.) The Board concludes that Applicant supplied sufficient infor-mation and the Staff made an adequate review. It is clear that there is not sufficient capacity available for Applicant to consider purchase of power as a viable alternative to the Plant.

Alternative Cooling Systems 281. Applicant evaluated the possibility of using alternative ecoling systems to cool water discharged frem the Plant (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, $5 5 as amended by Applicant's Ex. 38H revised page 5 5-4).

Because of river flow characteristics, any alternate means of ecoling chosen would still require construction of a large pond to store water.

(ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, pp. 5 5-3 and 5 5-4 as amended by Applicant's Ex. 38H). The possibility of using once through cooling and discharging the heated water directly to the river was rejected because of river flow fluctu-ation and the resultant high river temperature rise (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, page 5 5-1). Dry cooling systems were rejected because of high capital and operating' costs and lack of industry experience with large size systems (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, page 5.5-1). Spray pond and mechanical draft cooling tcwers were rejected because the environmental effects would be so similar to those of the cooling pond as to offer no significant advantage (ASER Appli-cant's Ex. 38F-1, page 5 5-1). The remaining alternative studied was natural

(, draft cooling towers (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, page 5 5-1). Applicant's t

- n

254 p

evaluation demonstrated that natural draft cooling towers could be expected to eliminate the potential for ground fogging although they could be expected to create visible vapor plumes extending up to 3,500 feet, create drizzle of 0.37 thousandths of an inch per hour up to 1,500 feet with some drizzle out to 6,500 feet and deposit salts from the river water at distances up to 6,500 feet with the maximum deposition at 1,500 feet (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, pages 5.5-2 and 5 5-3). Additionally, natural draft cooling towers would be about 500 feet in height (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, page 5 5-2) and could be expected to have a significant visual impact. (See drawing fol-lowing ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, $5.5.) The estimated capital cost of such a system was about $36,000,000. Applicant concluded that such an expenditure was not justified (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38H, page 5 5-4).

282. The Staff evaluated both dry cooling towers and wet cooling towers (i.e. mechanical draft and natural draft) (FES Staff Ex. 6, $XI.A.4,

$XII.F). Dry coo."ng towers would eliminate problems of fos formation and alleviate problems of river water usage (FES Staff Ex. 6, page XI-4). Hew-ever, dry towers would result in higher approach temperatures to the turbine condensers with a resultant loss of themal efficiency (FES Staff Ex. 6, p.

XI 4). Overall the use of dry cooling towers results in a less efficient sys-tem at higher capital costs. The use of wet cooling towers would increase the censumption of water both from increased evaporation and from the increased need to blowdown TDS (FES Staff Ex. 6, page XI h). The Staff doubted that the Tittabawassee River could acccannodate the increased usage resulting from use of wet cooling towers (FES Staff Ex. 6, page XII-8). In addition, the Staff found that wet cooling towers would entail a larger pond storage capa-b city than presently required, substantial addition of capital costs, possible I

L _-

255 f small improvement in thermal efficiency, greater total fog femation and chem-ical drift resulting in a minimum deposition in surrounding areas of 70 tons per year (FES Staff Ex. 6, paEes XI-4 and XI-5). The increased fog from the mechanical draft cooling towers would be a ground level while that from the natural draft tcwers would be in the fem of an elevated plume (FES Staff Ex.

6,pageXI-4).

283 The Beard concludes that Applicant has furnished sufficient information regarding alternate cooling syste=s and that the Staff review of such systems has been adequate. The Beard does not find any significant ad-vantage to using an alternate cooling system and finds that use of any alter-nate system would entail sizable increases in capital costs: $36,000,000 being the cost of the most feasible alternative.

Alternate Radicactive Waste Systems 284. Applicant considered two potential alternates to eliminate the radioactivity release in the laundry waste (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, page5.6-1). Use of disposable clothing over regular clothing would reduce the level in laundry waste by as much as a factor of 10 although the disposable clothing would have to be shipped offsite at a total cost of about $20,000 per year. Offsite laundering of clothing at a cost of about $8,000 if fa-cilities were available would be the other possible alternative (ASER Appli-cant's Ex. 38F-1, page 5.6-1). The Staff reviewed these alternatives and concluded that neither of them are necessary to keep releases within the guide- 1 l

lines of proposed Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. XI-5). The Board concludes that Applicant has furnished sufficient information and the Staff review has been adequate. Because of the minimal amounts of present l releases there appears to be no advantage in fvMher reductions. The Board 1

256 c

notes that either of these alternatives can be initiated at any time and there is no reason to atte=pt to reach a final decision at this time.

Alternative Treatment of Chemical Discharges 285 Applicant considered the possibility of adding additional chemical treatment systems to reduce the quantities of chemicals discharged to the river (Applicant's Ex. 38K, pages 47-50). The alternatives studied were (1) removal of most of the solids frem Plant discharges, (2) removal cf chlorine and sulphuric acid constituents from cooling pond water, and (3) removal of practically all dissolved solids, including those native to the river, from the cooling pond water. All of these methods would consu=e large amounts of energy (Alternative (3) utilizing 18,000 kW) and would gen-erate concentrated streams of slurry ranging from 70,000 pounds per day for alternative (1) to 890,000 pounds per day for alternative (3) (Applicant's Ex. 38K, pages 40-49). In addition, alternative (2) would require addition of large quantities of chemicals and alternative (3) would increase heat rejection to the environment by 60 x 106 Btu per hour (Applicant's Ex. 38K, pages48-49). Applicant stated that the alternatives studied are theoretically possible but have never been used in the size required for these applications.

Considerable research and development would be necessary and capital and operating costs for such systems are presently pure conjecture (Applicant's Ex. 38K, pages 47 and 50). Because of the insignificant consequences of Applicant's present chemical discharge and the uncertainty, cost and adverse effects of the alternatives available, Applicant determined that all of the alternatives should be rejected (Applicant's Ex. 38K, page 50). Th'e staff, however, found that releases of phosphates should be reduced and Applicant b has agreed to reduce auch releases as discussed in paragraph 191, supra.

257 (FES Staff Ex. 6, page iv). The Board concludes that Applicant has fur-nished sufficient information regarding alternati.e methods of treatment of chemical wastes and that the Staff has properly reviewed such alternatives.

Additionally, the Board finds that in light of the insignificant impact frc: prc ently prepcsed discharges and the devel:,pmental nature and pretable larr,e expense of alternate systems, the _ chemical unste treatment as modi-fied by Staff requirements, is the preferable alternative.

Cost-Benefit Analysis 286. Applicant submitted a cost benefit analysis as part of its environmental report (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, $5.1, as amended by Ap-plicant's Exhibits 38a and 38I) and the Staff submitted its cost benefit analysis in the Final Environmental Statement (FE~ Staff Ex. 6, $XI-B).

Fapleton Intervenors input into a cost-benefit analysis consisted primarily of the testimony of Dr. Holcomb discussed above in paragraphs 162 to 169 and 182. As discussed in those paragraphs the Board is unable to accept the costs proposed by Dr. Holcomb or his proposed methodology for calcu-lating such costs. Even assuming the Board were able to consider his

$1,196,680 (Tr. 8563) annual cost to be credible, his total cost for 30 years of $35,900,400 (Tr. 8563) is an incorrect figure. All costs in the cost-benefit analysis have been converted to their present worth for com-parability purposes. (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. XI-6) Computations of the present worth of Dr. Holcomb's figure from a series of compcund interest tables results in a figure of $12,530,000. The Board also, concludes that if one uses Dr. Holcomb's method almost all alternatives to the Plant would have similar costs.

258 C

287 Both Applicant and the Staff have made reasonable efforts to quantify the principal factors which should enter into the cost-benefit analysis. As might be expected, there are differences in the kinds of quantified values, and in the degree or amounts of value, placed upon particular elements of the analysis by Applicant and Staff.

These differences do not represent a conflict in evaluation but rather the kinds of differences which should be expected to occur in any ef-fort to assign objective or specific values to factors which are in-herently highly subjective. As we read the National Environmental Policy Act and the AEC's regulations under which Applicant's and Staff's cost-benefit analyses were prepared, a precise reduction to objective values of all the many potential environmental cost-benefits is not what is req,uired or expected of either the parties or the Board, but rather a reasonable quantification which is useful as an aid in deter-mining, and in aiding reviewing bodies such as this Board to determine, how to strike the final cost-benefit balance so as to assure that appropriate consideration and weight is given in decision making to en-vironmental amenities and values. We think that both Applicant and Staff have prepared cost-benefit analyses which are useful for this purpose and which comport with the requirements of NEPA. The record in this proceeding clearly denonstrates that the information of the kinds described in Sec-tions 102c and d of NEPA and applicable regulations and guides of the AEC have been developed and filed in this proceeding and have been ap-propriately considered by Applicant and Staff in the development of their 7

cost-benefit analyses.

L.

259 288. The Board, therefore concludes that, in accordance with the testimony and evidence in this proceeding, the Staff cost-benefit ?nalysis (FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. E-5 to H-11) adequately assesses and balances the costs and benefits of the proposed Plant except that:

a. The Staff estimate of a cost for decomissioning of

$3,000,000 would more conservatively be $8,000,000 (see paragraph 235) . This would increase the Staff's estimated operating costs of the facility (ES Staff Ex. 6, p. XI-6) by $5,000,000 with no significant effect on the comparison of alternatives.

b. The _ Staff estimate that 958 acres of fam or un-developed land will be reassigned for 28 miles of transmission line (FES Staff Ex. 6, Table H -1,

p. ii) is inaccurate. Although Applicant will ac-quire 958 acres of farm and undeveloped land for transmission line right-of-way (Applicant's Ex. 38K,

p. 5), Applicant pemits the use of such land for faming purposes and there is essentially no loss of productivity (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-1, p.4.6-4).

The Board finds that the principal costs associated with the Plant are:

a. Total cost for construction and operation of the facility of $864,000,000 made up of $554,000,000 in capital costs and $310,000,000 (including

$8,000,000 for decomissioning) in present-worthed operating costs. (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. XI-6 and

'~

-Table H -1)

260 C b. Transfer of 1,200 acres of land (zoned industrial and residential) from agricultural and residential use (the cost of land is reflected in the $55+,000,000 1

capital cost calculated for the Plant) resulting in a dislocation of approximately 25 residences, reloca-tion of the Midland County fam and a small loss of mammals and birds. The loss of mar.nnals and birds should have no significant hnpact on the surrounding areas. (See paragraphs 162 to 169; FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. XI-10 and XI-11, Table XI-1)

c. Consumption of water through evaporation and seepage in an amount not exceeding 3% of the average river flow. Because most of this water will be with-drawn from the river during periods of high flow, this should have no significant impact. (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. XI-7)

d. Use of about 380 tons of nuclear fuel per year (this cost is included in the operating cost estimate of $310,000,000) (FES Staff Ex. 6, p.XI-7).

e. Small increase in steam fog and some occasional icing in areas adjacent to the cooling pond which should not significantly affect surrounding areas. (See paragraphs 220 to 229 supra; FES Staff ,

j Ex.6,p.XI-9).

f. Small release of radioactive material to air and water being of small fraction of the limits of

~ ~ ~ .

261 V 10 CFR Part 20, well within proposed Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 and resulting in a dose of about 30 man-rems per year to the population within a 50 mile radius of the Plant (this can be compared with a natural radiation background dose in the same area in excess of 100,000 man-rems per year)

(see paragraphs 201 and 202; FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. XI-5 andXI-6).

g. Destruction of aquatic life in intake water from river, largely phytoplankton but possibly including zooplankton, fish eggs and some fish fry. This is expected to have no measurable effect on aquatic ecology and quantities destroyed are subject to conjecture as a result of the present depressed quality of the river (see paragraph 182; FES Staff Ex. 6, pp. XI-9 and XI-lo).

h. Increase of a few percent in tot,a1 dissolved solids 1 in river with no significant effects on the en-l vironment (see paragraph 195; FES Staff Ex. 6, l

p. XI-10).

i. Creation of a very low probability risk of an ac-cident in the Plant or during transportation of radioactive material (see paragraphs 218 and 239; FES Staff Ex. 6, p. XI-11). ,

289 The Board further finds that the principal benefits of the Plant consist- of production of 1,300,000 kW of base lead electricity, and l 1

h,050,ooo lb/hr of process steam for use by The Dow Chemical Company. In

262 f addition the Plant will provide Dow with an acceptable means of replacing its present fossil fueled facilities which are not in compliance with air pollu-tion standards, provide e=ployment for up to 700 men during construction and about 100 men during operation and result in payment of local property taxes of around $10,000,000 per year. (FES Staff Ex. 6, p. XI-10) These local benefits although not determinative are of si5 nificance. Applicant and the Staff considered several alternatives to providing these same or similar benefits and conclusively demonstrated that all available alternatives are much more expensive than the proposed Plant. Additionally because of the in-significant environmental cost associated with the proposed Plant, it is clear that none of the alternative means of supplying power could produce any significant environmental advantages. In fact, all of the proposed alternatives because they eliminata the dual purpose feature of the Plant would of necessity result in increases in the cost of process steam in excess of $9,500,000 per year and would ensure continuance of Dow's fossil-fired units in Midland. The Board concludes that the enormous benefits from the Plant far exceed the comuined economic and environmental cost and that the Plant, as proposed, is clearly the preferable alternative for providing these benefits. The Board further concludes that both Appli-cant and Staff have given full and thoughtful consideration to environ-mental impact and that the Plant as proposed has been designed to limit environmental impact to insignificant levels.

Other Agencies 290. In addition to the approvals necessary from the AEC, the Plant is sub, ject to regulation by numerous other agencies and under numerous statutes. Applicant coc:menced its efforts to satisfy these requirements as

. early as 1%8 and has described in detail the various approvals required and e-- 6

263 V has furnished ccpies of those received. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-3, Ap-pendices N and S; Applicant's Ex. 383) As described above in paragraphs 176 and 177, Applicant has received an Order of Detemination regulating its discharges to the river from the Michigan Water Resources Comission and the Water Resources Cocnission has certified, pursuant to Section 21(b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, (33 USC 1171(b)) that there is reasonable assurance that construction and operation of the Plant can be conducted in a =anner which will not violate water quality standards.

(ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-3 Appendices N and S) Additionally, the United States Amy Corps of Engineers has approved Applicant's dredging and installation of inlet and outlet structures and widening of the channel of the river, and the United States Coast Guard approved the construction of the proposed railroad bridge associated with the Plant. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-3, Appendix S pp.1-3, 6-7; Applicant's Ex. 383) The Plant's liquid discharges will be subject to Ar=y Corps of Engineers' approval under the Refuse Act of 1899 (33 USC $407) and Executive Order 11574 (35 F.R.

1%27) and the Plant's gaseous discharges must comply with the Federal Clean Air Act of 1970 (P.L.91-604). (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-3, Appendix S, pp. 3-6) In addition to the previously described actions of the Michigan Water Resources Comission, it has given Applicant pemission to perfom various construction activities in the flood plain of the river subject to conditions and restrictions to prevent ero'sion and protect public health and safety. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-3 Appendix S, pp. 9-lo; Applicant's Ex.38B) The Michigan Department of natural Resources pursuant to the Inland Lakes and Streams Act pemitted dredging of a portion of the river.

k (ASER Applicant's Ex. -38F-3, Appendix S, pp.14-15; Applicant's Ex. 383)

264 C

The Itichigan Public Service Cecnission has approved the Plant railroad spur, as has the Midland City Council, and the Midland Township Board ap-proved the videning of the river channel to minimize flooding potential.

(ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-3, pp.15-16, 20-21; Applicant' sex.38B) The Plant proper is located in an industrial zone and the cooling pond is located in a residential zone pursuant to a special exception from the Midland Township Zoning Board of Appeals which placed several limitat1ons arid conditions on the use of the property. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-3, Appendix S, pp.16-20; ASER Applicant's Ex. 38H, Appendix T) The Midland County Road Comission evaluated the abandonment of roads at the site, the Midland County Board of Supervisors approved construction of the rail-road bridge and the Midland County Drain Comissioner appreved relocation of site drains. (ASER Applicant's Ex. 38F-3, pp. 22-23, Applicant's Ex.

383) 291. I:umerous ec=ents were received from many agencies. The Applicant and Staff gave consideration to the coments in their filings.

(Applicant's Ex. 38K and 38L; FES Staff Ex. 6, SXII) The Board has also given consideration to all coments received and has mentioned a number of them specifically in the text of this decision. However, because of the number of the coments received the Board has not attempted to repeat every cornent and respond to it. The Board does, however, find that the Staff has in the Final Environmental Statenent taken into account the various coments received from other agencies and the public.

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. CONCLUSIONS 292. Upon consideration of the entire record of this proc.eeding and the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions, the Board has de-termined that:

(1) In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50 35(a):

(a) The Applicant has described the proposed design of the facility, including, but not limited to, the princi-pal architectural and engineering criteria for the design, and has identified the major features or components incorpo-4 rated therein for the protection of the health and safety of the public; (b) Such further technical or design information as may be required to ecmplete the safety analysis and which can reasonably be left for later consideration, will be supplied in the final safety analysis report; (c) Safety features or components which require re-search and development have been described by the appli-cant and the applicant has identified, and there will be conducted, a research and development program reasonably de-signed to resolve any safety questions associated with such features and components; and

-(d) On the basis of the foregoing, there is reason-able assurance that:

(i) such safety questions will be satisfacto-( rily resolved at or before the latest date stated in

r-266 g-- the application for completion of construction of the proposed facility, and (ii) taking into consideration the site criteria contained in 10 CFR Part 100, the proposed facility can be constructed and operated at the proposed loca-tion without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

(2) The Applicant is technically qualified to design and con-struct the proposed facility; (3) The Applicant is financially qualified to design and con-struct the proposed facility;

4) The issuance of a permit for the construction of the facil-ity will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

293 Upon consideration of the entire record of this proceed-ing and the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions, the Board has in accordance with the provisions of Section A.ll of Appendix D, 10 CFR 50:

(1) Determined that the requirements of Section 102(2)(C) and (D) of the National Environmental Policy Act and Appendix D of 10 CFR 50 have been complied with in this proceeding; (2) Independently considered the final balance among conflict-ing factors contained in the record of the proceeding with a view to determining'the appropriate action to be taken; ,

(3) Determined that the appropriate action.to_be taken is to

-authorize issuance of the contruction permit; f

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267 (h) Determined that the record of the proceeding demonstrates that:

(a) Applicant has given appropriate consideration to environmental values in developing plans for the location, design, construction and operation of the proposed Midland Plant;

(b) The Applicant has provided sufficient information and the Regulatory Staff has performed an adequate review with re'spect to environmental matters under 10 CFR 50, App. D; (c) The proposed facility and plans set forth for its design, construction and operation include appropriate facilities, equipment and programs to protect envirorimental values; (d) That operation of the facility will be subject to ,

the regulatory authority and licensing approval of the Atomic Energy Commission under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the National Environmental Policy Act; and that (c) No further conditions be imposed at the construc-tion permit stage to protect environmental values.

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ORDER 294. Based on its findings and conclusions in both the radiological and environmental phases of the hearing and pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act and the AEC regulations, IT IS ORDERED that the Director of Regulation issue a construction permit to Consumers Power Company. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED in accordance with 10 CFR 2 760, 2.762, 2.764, 2.785 and 2.786 of the AEC Rules of Practice that this Initial Decision shall constitute the final decision of the AEC subject to the review thereof pursuant to the above cited rules.

( Respectfully submitted,

/s/JohnK.Restrick John K. Restrick Counsel for Consumers Power Co=pany Of Counsel:

Robert Lowenstein Richard G. Smith Dated: Au6ust 15, 1972 l'

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