ML20052B571

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Response to B Stamiris Supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law Re QA & Mgt Attitude Issues. Certificate of Svc Encl
ML20052B571
Person / Time
Site: Midland
Issue date: 04/26/1982
From: Fitzgibbons R
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.), ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE
To:
Shared Package
ML20052B565 List:
References
ISSUANCES-OL, ISSUANCES-OM, NUDOCS 8205030304
Download: ML20052B571 (91)


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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

)

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-329-OL

) 50-330-OL CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY ) 50-329-OM

) 50-330-OM (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2 )

)

CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY'S RESPONSE TO STAMIRIS SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW w

ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE

One First National Plaza Suite 4200 Chicago, Illinois 60603

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DATED: April 26, 1982

' 820 5 0 3 0so'f a

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, .O 1V o i INDEX  !

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Page l The' National SALP Report . . . . . . . . . 'l >

MPQAD Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 f i

Audit F-77-32. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 l Quality Control Inspector Qualifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 i Management Attitude. . . . . . . . . . . . 62 t

Summary Quality Assurance Findings . . 72 i . .

5 Stamiris Contention No. 1 . . . . . . 75 e

Conclusions of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 .

, APPENDIX A: Index of Exhibits  ;

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'w) UNITED STATES OF AMER'CA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

)

In the Matter of )

)

Consumers Power Company ) Docket No. 50-329 OM & OL

) 50-330 OM & OL

[ Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2])

)

CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY'S RESPONSE TO STAMIRIS SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.754, Consumers Power Company

(" Consumers Power") submits the following response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") Staff's Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Cc;clusions of Law.

THE NATIONAL SALP REPORT Paragraph 1. The claim that the SALP Reports identified " functional weaknesses" in the Midland facility is not entirely correct. Neither the Regional nor the National SALP report used that exact phrase. The National SALP report found " evidence of weaknesses in three functional areas".1/ The Regional SALP report emphasized that the weakness in each of these areas was not systemic; it pin-pointed only three specific araas of concern.2/

1/ NRC Exhibit No. 7, Appendix B, at p. B-2.

2/ Id., at p. B ,3; NRC Staff Exhibit No. 8, SALP Evaluation Enclosure at section (E).

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Paragraph 2. Mr. Wessman explained that Region l III's evaluation of Midland's overall performance as "ade-quate" M meant that the facility's performance was above a threshold that was " set quite high" because of the "very high performance" expected of nuclear power plants by the NRC Staff.M Although Mr. Wessman also claimed that Region III considered Midland to be "below average",M neither the Regional SALP report, nor Mr. Keppler, the Director of Region III, expressed such an opinion. I Mr. Keppler and the Regional SALP report both concluded that Midland's performance was in fact " adequate",M the equivalent of

" average".8I Nor did the SALP input document prepared by Darl Hood, NRR Project Manager for the Midland plant, give Midland an overall "below average" rating. That document rated Midland as above average in working knowledge of l licensing matters, below average to average in timely res-ponsiveness to the NRC Staff, average to above average in technical competence, and improving from below average to above average in the quality of its responses to the NRC l

3/ NRC Staff Exhibit No. 8, NRC Inspection Report Nos.

80-35 and 80-36, at pp. I and 3. -

y Wessman, Tr. 6221.

5/ M., Tr. 6220, 6388-89.

,. 6/ NRC Staff Exhibit No. 8, at p. 1; Keppler, Tr. 2036.

I s V y ,

8f Cook, Tr. 6455-57.

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'- Staff.E/ Mr. Davis, Mr. Keppler's assistant at Region III, told Mr. James Cook that Region III had recommended an

" average" rating for Midland to the National SALP staff, but the National SALP Staff had ignored it.1S/ Indeed, the overall rating of "below average" first appears in the Work Paper for the SALP review group prepared, not by Region III personnel, but by the National SALP Staff under Mr. Wessman's supervision.11/

Paragraph 3. The assertion that the " summary statements about Midland remain valid and true especially with the minor corrections made by Mr. Wessman," is not supported by the record. The " summary statements" referred to are apparently the evaluation of Midland in the National SALP report. Mr. Wessman's corrections to these statements were not " minor". The National SALP report noted weaknesses in only three areas of the Midland's program,12/ and cited very limited evidence in support of its evaluation in each area. Mr. Wessman's corrections change this evidence signifi-cantly in Consumers Power's favor in two of the cited areas.

2he first correction conceded that most of the quality assurance problems associated with materials and placement of soils were identified before the evaluation period,13/

9/ NRC Staff Exhibit No. 10, at pp. 1-4.

10/ Cook, Tr. 6458, 6463.

t

(~} 11/ NRC Staff Exhibit No. 9; Wessman, Tr. 6170-72.

v 12/ See supra at paragraph 1.

13/ Wessman, Tr. 6162-63.

and not during the period as . originally claimed.1S/ The second correction recognized that it was Consumers Power,  !

and not the NRC Staff, which issued a stop-work order.11/

These two changes reveal a far more effective quality assur-ance program and greater responsiveness to the HVAC problems than was acknowledged in the published version of the National SALP report. Given the limited evidence cited by the report in support of its criticism of Midland, and the fundamental changes these corrections make in the nature of that evidence, the corrections cannot be called " minor".

Paragraph 4. As explained in Consumers Power Pro-posed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, i

the National SALP report's calculation of Midland's relative number of noncompliances per inspection man-hour is unreliable for several reasons. First, the method used by the National SALP Staff in computing the number of noncompliances per inspection man-hour was highly questionable.15/ Second, the National SALP report inaccurately counted the number of noncompliances which occurred at Midland.11/ Finally, the National SALP appraisal conflicts with the Region III conclusion 14/ NRC Staff Exhibit No. 7, Appendix B at pp. B-2 to B-3.

15/ Wessman, Tr. 6163; NRC Staff Exhibit No. 7, Appendix B at p. B-3.

16/ Consumers Power Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact l and conclusions of Law, at pp. 199-201, paragraph 307.

12/ .I.d.

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that the number of noncompliances per inspection man-hour at Midland is ccaparable to that of other sites.1_8f Paragraph 5-6. [not included in Stamiris Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.]

Paragraph 7. The evidence cited by Ms. Stamiris does not support her claim that the NRC " caused the stop-work

[ order to Zack Company] to happen." Mr. Keppler prefaced his testimony that the NRC Staff told Consumers Power "we think you ought to stop the work", with several disclaimers, emphasizing that he really did not remember who had initiated the stop-work order.E/

The assertion that Consumers Power was aware of the Zack problems investigated in March, 1980, "for almost a year" after they were identified is also incorrect. Ms.

Stamiris has confused two separate Zack incidents. Consumers Power was aware of the initial Zack problems which arose in May-October, 1979. Consumers Power at that time issued several nonconformance reports against the Zack Company.

Zack then committed to 100% reinspection of work as correc-tive action. When Zack had not completed the corrective action by January, 1980, Consumers Power issued a Management Corrective Action Request (MCAR) to Zack. b Consumers Power also acted to ensure changes in Zack management. b 18,/ J,d .

M/ Keppler, Tr. 1936-37.

2_0/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 2, at p. 3.

21/ Keepler, Tr. 2052.

The second Zack problem arose in March 1980 without notice to Consumers Power. Zack quality control inspectors were required by Consumers Power quality assurance procedure to report nonconforming conditions by utilizing the noncon-formance system provided by the quality assurance program, so that Consumers Power could act to correct any noncompliances.2_2/

However, when three Zack quality control inspectors discovered a second set of Zack problems, different from the first,E in March, 1980, they did not utilize the Zack nonconformance system to notify Consumers Power. b Instead, they directly informed the NRC Staff, who then informed Consumers Power.b l Since the actions of the Zack inspectors short-circuited the Consumers Power quality assurance channels of information, Consumers Power had neither prior notice of, nor opportunity to correct, this second Zack problem. E The work did not continue "for almost a year" after the March, 1980 problems were identified, as Ms. Stamiris claims. Consumers Power was informed of the second Zack problem in March, and issued its stop-work order that same month. E

, 22/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 3, at p. 2; see Keppler, l Tr. 2050-51.

2y Keppler, Tr. 2051-52.

24/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 3, at p. 2; see Keppler, Tr. 2050-51, 25/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 2, at p. 3.

p 6 2_6/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 3, at p. 2.

l0 l- 2y Consumers Power Exhibit No. 2, at p. 3.

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() Paragraph 8. The National SALP ranking of Midland and the period upon which the ranking was based do not undermine the judgment of " reasonable assurance". First, the "below average" national rating does not mean that the quality assurance program at Midland was inadequate during 1979-1980, as Ms. Stamiris implies. This in no way under-mines a finding of reasonable assurance. The national rating includes the year preceding the Modification order; Consumers Power has agreed not to contest the existence of quality assurance problems during tnis period.E / The SALP Staff Work Paper and the National SALP report note that Consumers Power showed improvement in many areas, including quality assurance, during the latter part of the evaluation period,22/ after the date of the Modification Ordar.

Third, the National SALP report cannot be taken as a basis for a current judgment on the existence of reasonable accur-ance at Midland. The Commission itself warned that the report does not reflect current conditions at the evaluated plants.}0/ This is confirmed by Mr. Keppler's testimony that Midland has demonstrated further improvement since the issuance of the SALP report.51I 28/ Joint Exhibit No. 1, at p. 2.

29/ NRC Staff Exhibit No. 9, at p. 3, and Exhibit No. 10.

30/ NRC Staff Exhibit No. 7, at p. 1.

73 31/ Keppler, Tr. 7037, 7093.

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Paragraph 9. As Ms.. Stamiris correctly states, Mr. Hood, both in his SALP summary 32/ and in his December testimony,21/ noted the improvement in Consumers Power's responsiveness to the needs and requests of the NRC Staff. i He attributed the improvement in part (but not totally, as Ms. Stamiris suggests) to Consumers Power's " realization that the licensing review stands a very high probability of being a controlling factor in the completion" of the Midland facility.SA/ Ms. Stamiris insinuates that this realization reflects some improper motivation on the part-of Consumers Power. It is difficult to understand how a recognition of the importance of the role of the NRC licensing process in '

the construction of a plant, and a concomitant desire to cooperate with that process, can be said to be improper. ,

Paragraph 10. Contrary to the implication of this paragraph, Mr. Hood thought that the voluntary stop-work  ;

decision spoke well of the managerial attitude at consumers Power.SE/ Although he agreed that the decision was made "in part" because Consumers Power knew that the NRC Staff would try to stop the work,25/ he emphasized that Consumers Power's voluntary commitment not to go forward with soils settlement 32/ NRC Staff Exhibit No. 10.

33/ Hood, Tr. 6854. - 1 31/ 14 35/ Hood, Tr. 6894.

31/ Id., Tr. 6899 (emphasis added).

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() remedial work, even though it has the right to do so under i the Modification Order, "refle' cts an attitude that is to the Applicant's credit".32/ When asked why his SALP summary did not note Consumers Power's voluntary cessation of soils work, Mr. Hood did not reply that "the voluntary work stop...

was 'not all encompassing as the Order would imply,'" as is claimed. His actual reply was that he could give no reason ,

why the stop-work was not included in his SALP summary.38/

Mr. Hood's "all-encompassing" comment was part of his explanation that Consumers Power's voluntary work stop plays an important role in protecting public health and ,

safety:

t I believe that the situation as it exists today does not hamper public health and safety. The reason for that reply is that...this applicant is voluntarily hold-ing up on any construction activity of that type that we would care about, at least for the most part.

I don't mean to imply that his voluntary agreement is all encompassing as the order would imply, but for the most part, the kind of activities that we would care about are not going forward and it's not goingforwardonavogtarybasison the applicant's part.

Paragraph 11. Mr. James Cook testified to a far broader response by Consumers Power to the recommendations of the Regional SALP report than this paragraph suggests.

37/ Id., Tr. 6881.

M/ M-V 3y M ., Tr. 6863.

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k-)s Region III first advised Consumers Power of its Midland SALP evaluation at a meeting on November 24, 1980.SA/

Ac that meeting, the Regional SALP Staff's conclusions and recommendations wer9 discussed.A1/ In response to the information conveyed at that time, Consumers Power scheduled three meetings with the Region III personnel. These meet-ings examined the information from the SALP meeting, to assure that Consumers Power understood all of the elements of the SALP evaluation, so that Consumers Power could act on them to the fullest extent.12/

On January 2, 1981, Mr. James Keppler forwarded a copy of the Regional SALP report to Consumers Power.33/

The report's recommendations on qua).ity assurance and quality control did not surprise Consumers Power, because Consumers Power had been told of these recommendations at the November, 1980 meeting.AS/ Accordingly, when Mr. Cook was asked if reading the Regional SALP report " raised a red flag in his mind", he replied:

No more so than I had gotten at the meet-ing which we needed to, as fast as possi-ble, get with the Region III staff, get more specifics and to try to make sure 40/ NRC Staff Exhibit No. 8, attached letter dated Decem-ber 12, 1980 at p. 1, and attached NRC Inspection Report 80-35/80-36 at p. 1, Cook, Tr. 6455.

41/ Cook, Tr. 6455, 5468.

42/ Id_., Tr. 6469-70.

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(_ 43/ NRC Staff Exhibit No. 8, at p . 1.

44/ Cook, Tr. 6470.

(] we all understood eac 4gpherandthento go forward from there He then described the extensive additional efforts Consumers Power undertook in response to the report: I went twice to Region III headquarters in the month of December to discuss spe-cifics of the kind of things that were talked about at this SALP meeting. We then spent the better part of the six to eight weeks preparing a detailed pre-sentation to Mr. Keppler and his staff to show him what we thought were specific activities we had and were taking that would be responsive to the kind of con-cerns that his staff were raising. We then took my staff and Bechtel's staff to Region III in the first week in March of 1981 and made that presentation to Mr. Keppler and gave him and also NRR per-sonnel a full briefing and documentation of what we were trying to tell them; and as an outgrowth of that particular session, I invited Mr. Keppler to come to the Midland site to specifically inspect in person some of the activities we were describing to him in his headquarters. And I believe that his team inspection inMayof1981wasanouggpwthofthat particular March meeting Paragraph 12. See response to paragraph 11. Paragraph 13. The conclusions in paragraph 13 of Ms. Stamiris' Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and conclusions of Law are not supported by the evidence. Region III evaluated Midland as " adequate", not es "below average".$2/ The National SALP report did not identify a 4El O' ,(V3 . 46/ M., Tr. 6470-71. 1 47/ See supra at paragraph 2.

    " functional weakness" in the Midland quality assurance program.S8/    Finally, Ms. Stamiris cites no examples to support her assertion that the Region III SALP assessments contradict the prepared testimony of NRC witnesses regarding quality assurance improvements after December 6, 1979.

Paragraph 14. The Regional SALP ccnclusions re-garding the quality assurance program at Midland, and Con-sumers Power's response to the SALP recommendations, do not contradict the reasonable assurance conclusion in the NRC Staff - Consumers Power Company Quality Assurance Stipula-tion.SE/ The record shows that the NRC Staff knew of the Regional SALP report and its recommendations when the Quality Assurance Stipulation was entered into.EE/ As explained

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above, the Region III SALP assessments prompted an intensive programmatic response by Consumers Power.E1/ Further, the record is clear that the 1981 NRC Inspection Report No. 81-12, based on an investigation conducted by the NRC Staff's most critical team of inspectors, did not diminish the reasonable assurance conclusion of the stipulation, but provided the basis for that conclusion.}2/ 48/ See supra at paragraph 1. 49/ Joint Exhibit No. 1, at p. 2.

   }0/   Gilray, Tr. 5348-49; Joint Exhibit No. 1.
   }1/   See supra at paragraph 11.

'() }2/ Gilray, Tr. 5317-20, 5324, 5326-27; Keppler, Tr.1975-76,2179-82; Keppler, prepared testimony at pp. 5-8, following Tr. 1864, i (

1 Paragraph 15. Quality assurance problems which may have existed at Midland prior to 1974 do not undermine the NRC Staff's current judgment of reasonable assurance. Moreover, Ms. Stamiris neglects to note that Mr. Keppler stressed that Consumers Power had honored all of the commit-ments it made at the 1974 hearings.ES/ Paragraph 16. There is no evidence to support the claim that the evaluation of Midland in the National SALP report " serves as a better indicator of actual QA performance" than other testimony before the Licensing Board. The National SALP evaluation was written by persons with no first hand knowledge of conditions or activities at Midland,ES/ and its conclusions were developed in an unsystematic and inscrutable manner, as its authors admitted.EE/ MPQAD MODIFICATION Paragraph 17. Ms. Stamiris criticizes Consumers Power for implementing a modification of the MPQAD (1) "without seeking NRC concurrence" and (2) allegedly without working out the " functional details". There is no requirement that a utility must await NRC Staff approval, or even notify the NRC Staff, before instituting an organizational change.EE/ Generally, utili-53/ Keppler, Tr. 1911, 1918. 51/ Wessman, Tr. 6180, 6212-13, 6229-30. }}/ Id., Tr. 6217-18. l }6/ Keppler, Tr. 7043. i

l l l () (_/ ties do not notify the NRC Staff of such changes; the NRC Staff discovers them only thro' ugh the inspection process.E2/ Although Mr. Keppler agreed that it would have been " prudent" for Consumers Power to have consulted with the NRC Staff prior to instituting the change,EE/ he refused to agree that Consumers Power was required or expected to get prior NRC Staff concurrence.EE/ No adverse implication can be drawn from the fact that Consumers Power informed the NRC of and instituted the MPQAD changes before every detail was final. It would have been unwise for Consumers Power to commit itself irrevocably to every detail of a modification plan before it had a chance to see how the plan worked in operation. Some details of the plant were necessarily left open to allow for flexi-bility in adapting the new organization to the Midland quality assurance program, in order to achieve maximum effectiveness.bE/ Consumers Power did not wait until all the details had been worked out through the process of evaluating the program in action before it drew up an organi-zational chart to present to the NRC Staff, because it did not want to delay notifying the NRC Staff. As Mr. James l Cook explained, Consumers Power felt there was "a need to notify the Board immediately of the change as opposed to

     }7/   Id.

p }8/ Jd. , Tr. 7044, V Sy J_d. d , Tr . 7048. {0/ Cook, Tr. 6551-52, 6673-74, 6453.

em (s- ) Waiting until all the detail had been completely worked out."NA/ Paragraph 18. Ms. Stamiris is incorrect in claim-ing that the "only communication between Consumers Power and the NRC regarding this MPQAD reorganization consisted of several 2 or 3 minute phone calls." The record establishes that the NRC Staff was fully informed of the details of the MPQAD modification before its implementation. Consumers Power discussed all of the proposed changes, including the elimination of the position of Site Quality Assurance Super-intendent, with Ron Cook, the resident NRC Staff inspector.p2/ Mr. Ron Cook reports to Mr. Keppler on all important matters at Midland through a chain of command within the NRC Staff.55/ Mr. James Cook, a vice-president of Consumers Power,5A! called Mr. Keppler, and told him that changes were being made to MPQAD, which Consumers Power believed would enhance the MPQAD by putting more management support in the site.bEI The conversation was short because Mr. Keppler was busy with other matters; he did not ask any questions about the changes.55/ pl/ Id., Tr. 6526. 12/ Keppler, Tr. 7086-87. 11/ Id., Tr. 7087. 64/ Cook, Tr. 1690. I p5/ Keppler, Tr. 7035, 7048-49. 55/ 1$- i  : l

Paragraph 19. All of Mr. Gallagher's concerns with the intial MPQAD modification in December, 1981 have been answered or eliminated, and Mr. Gallagher finds the current MPQAD organization acceptable. b (1) Mr. Keppler testified that the actual working relationships within the organization are more important than the organization charts. E He then affirmed that the MPQAD, as it is presently organized, was the functional equivalent of the organization which he had reviewed, and approved, in 1981. E He added that Mr. Gallagher's concern about " fragmentation" was answered by the presence of the full time superintendent on site. E (2) Midland now has a full time Site Quality Assurance Superintendent. b (3) The December modification of the MPQAD was adequately discussed with the NRC prior to its implemen-tation. E Paragraph 20. Although Mr. Gallagher was an NRC Staff witness in December, Mr. Keppler emphasized that Mr. 67/ Keppler, Tr. 7093. 68/ Jd. , Tr. 7090. 69/ J_d., d Tr. 7090-91. 70/ Id., Tr. 7094. l 1 7_1/ Marguglio, Tr. 6926; see also Keppler, Tr. 7094-95. y See supra, at paragraphs 17-18. G l l l 4

t'~h V Gallagher's conclusion on the'MPQAD modification was his own, and not that of the NRC Staffb or Region III. b No one on the NRC Staff, including Mr. Gallagher, testified that the MPQAD in December,1981 did not meet re-gulatory requirements. Mr. Gallagher's testimony was that  ; he was uncertain whether the actual working relationships within the MPQAD, as it was organized in December, were acceptable under the NRC regulations.2E/ He testified that the organizational structure would probably satisfy NRC regulations.25/ Mr. Keppler stated specifically that nothing about the MPQAD modification violated the NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 50.22/ All members of the NRC Staff agree that the MPQAD is acceptable as presently organized.2S/ Paragraph 21. Ms. Stamiris mischaracterizes the NRC Staff's evaluation of the December, 1981 MPQAD modifica-tion and Consumers Power's reason for implementing the modification. The NRC Staff never rejected the December organi-zation, as Ms. Stamiris claims they did. As Ms. Stamiris' record citations show, Mr. Keppler felt that he did not have 73/ Keppler, Tr. 7101, 7106, 7089. 74/ Id., Tr. 7089. 25/ Gallagher, Tr. 6759-62. l 7s/ Id., Tr. 6760. ({} 72/ Keppler, Tr. 7103. 78f Id., Tr. 7093-94. 1

O enou2h information on the oreenizetion to come to any con-clusions as to its acceptabili'ty. b Mr. Keppler's criterion of acceptability was whether the MPQAD was the " functional equivalent" of the organization approved by the NRC Staff in spring of 1981.8_0/ The key to functional equivalence was the presence of a full-time quality assurance supervisor at the site. b Consumers Power believed that the presence of Mr. Marguglio would serve as such an equi ralent, but Mr. Keppler was uncertain. b Finally, Consumers Power and the NRC Staff agreed that the best way to allay Mr. Keppler's uncertainty about the new organization was to add a full-time supervisor to the December structure. b The agreement was reached as a result of consultations between the NRC Staff and Consumers Power. b The NRC Staff's desire to see a full-time super-visor on site at Midland is not indicative of their serious doubts about the quality assurance program at Midland, as Ms. Stamiris suggests. Their true motivation, as explained above, was to ensure a functional equivalence to the program 79/ Id., Tr. 7036-37, 7105-06. 8_0/ I_d., Tr. 7035-37.

81) 0-W E-8,3/ g.

O 8y M., Tr. 7037; Marguglio, Tr. 6926.

(] approved earlier. Although a full time supervisor has not been " required" at other plants, it has been recommended by the NRC Staff and accepted by other utilities, as was the case with Midland. E Paragraph 22. No response. Paragraph 23. Mr. Keppler did not need to observe the actual functioning of the modified MPQAD in order to conclude that it was the funcional equivalent of the plan he had approved earlier. As explained above, b the key to functional equivalence in Mr. Keppler's mind was the presence of a full-time quality assurance supervisor. The inclusion of the position of supervisor satisifed this. Paragraph 24. Contrary to Ms. Stamiris' claim, Mr. Keppler did not reserve final judgment on the current MPQAD structure. He stated positively that the new organi-zation was an improvement over the one he had approved in 1981. b His intention to monitor the program was not a reservation of present judgment, but an explanation that his present assessment of adequacy could be withdrawn if the program did not function as well as he expected.88/ l Paragraph 25. The May, 1981 NRC inspection found that the MPQAD program was " working quite well." b 85/ Gallagher, Tr. 6769-71. 86f See supra at paragraph 21. By Keppler, Tr. 7037. 88/ M., Tr. 7099. 8_9f Id_., Tr. 1883. l

l l l o (,) Paragraph 26. No one ever testified that Mr. Bird had no authority to make decis' ions unless Mr. Marguglio was out of the state. Mr. Marguglio testified that Mr. Bird has full authority to direct the site superintendent on a day-to-day basis.EE/ Furthermore, the record explicitly contradicts > the claim that decisions will have to be made from off site. Mr. Curland as Site Quality Assurance Superintendent has all the authority he needs to make decisions.E1/ As explained above, Mr. Keppler did not reserve judgment on the program, but only vowed to monitor its development.22/ He approved , of the modification and apparently anticipated a satisfactory finding by the Licensing Board.23/ Paragraph 27. There is no need to delay a decision on the adequacy of the present MPQAD. The present MPQAD is exactly like the organization previously approved by the NRC, with the addition of enhanced management presence on-site.EA/ The functional effectiveness of the organization has already been observed, inspected, critiqued, and found acceptable.EE/ 90/ Marguglio, Tr. 7023. 91/ Keppler, Tr. 7097-98. 92/ Id., Tr. 7099. - 93/ Id., and 7037. 94/ Id., Tr. 7037. ,_ 95/ See supra at paragraphs 19-26. U

Paragraph 28. Therg is no support in the record for the claim that the December modification demonstrated a hasty and careless attitude toward changes in quality assur-l ance. As noted above, NRC Staff concurrence was not required 1 before the modification was implemented.E5/ The testimony of the Consumers Power witnesses showed that they understood how the program was to function.E2/ Paragraph 29. The evidence contradicts Ms. Stamiris' I claim that Consumers Power was insensitive to the need for a full-time Site Quality Assurance Superintendent. The December adjustments in the MPQAD were enacted in response to Consumers Power's desire for a more rigorous and effective on-site quality assurance overview than even that which the NRC Staff had approved. Accordingly, the MPQAD was modified so that senior management would spend a greater amount of time on site personally directing quality assurance activity, the channels of communication between management and on-line quality assurance personnel would be shortened, and the duties assigned to each person would be modified so that each person could perform his assigned duties more effec-tively.38/ Paragraph 30. The evidence reveals no pattern of Consumers Power acquiescence to the NRC Staff despite dis-9p/ See supra at paragraph 17. 97/ See Marguglio, Tr. 7022; Bird, Tr. 7028. 98/ Marguglio, Tr. 6980-82.

l l (n_) Mr. Keppler testi-agreement with the NRC Staffs requests. fied that Consumers Power did not acquiesce more than any  ! other licensee.EE/ He specifically denied the existence of a " pattern of acquiescence" by Consumers Power.100/ (1) Mr. i Keppler denied that the decision to take additional borings was part of a pattern of acquiescence.101/ (2) Consumers Power did not " acquiesce" to hiring a qualified geotechnical soils engineer in 1981; it has employed such an engineer since 1979.102/ (3) Proper FSAR re-review procedures were being followed in 1981.35E/ (4) Consumers Power never held differing views on the need to overinspect the work of Bechtel electrical quality control inspectors.104/ (5) The Zack immediate action letter was issued by the NRC Staff in confirmation of a previous stop-work order issued by Consumers Power.105/ When Consumers Power accepts NRC Staff suggestions, Ms. Stamiris charges them with " acquiescence". When Con-sumers Power disagrees with NRC Staff suggestions, she 99/ Keppler, Tr. 7062. I 100/ Keppler, Tr. 7053-55, 7061-63. 1 l 101/ Id., Tr. 7054. I l 102/ See Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and conclusions of Law, at p. 168, paragraph 270. 103/ Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Con-clusions of Law, at pp. 162-66, paragraphs 259-66. l () 104/ Marguglio, Tr. 7014; Gardner, Tr. 8035-36. 105/ NRC Staff Exhibit No.-7, Appendix B at p. B-3.

O labels it " resistance."106/ Mr. Keppler testified that Consumers Power was not trying to get by with minimum effort but is giving fair regard to quality assurance concerns on its own initiative.107/ Ms. Stamiris' characterizations of Consumers Power responses obscure the quality of the substan-tive actions taken by Consumers Power, 08/ which the Licens-ing Board should judge on their own merits. Paragraph 31. The present MPQAD organization has not had a "short existence", as claimed. It is essentially the same organization that the NRC Staff approved in 1981, which had been in existence since 1980.109/ The reasonable assurance which was given by that organization continues, and has been reaffirmed by the NRC Staff. AUDIT F-77-32 Paragraph 32. No response. Paragraph 33. This paragraph suggests that Audit F-77-32 was a self-interested attempt by Consumers Power to produce documentation which showed that all soils tests reviewed were passing. The evidence is to the contrary. The purpose of the 1977 audit was to discover whether documentation existed which demonstrated the status 106 / Stamiris Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 21, paragraph 64. 107/ Keppler, Tr. 7061-63. 108/ See Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at pp. 26-43, paragraphs 50-60. 109/ Id., Tr. 7037. 1

                                     ,n, V   of soils placement as a precondition to acceptance of the soils.110/   Ms. Stamiris mistakenly reads prejudgment into Consumers Power's use of the word " verify" in the Audit Report. Mr. Margoglio testified that there was no attempt and no intent to prejudge the status of the soils or to steer the results of the audit.111/ Audit F-77-32 was not undertaken in response to the settlement of the grade beam at the administration building.112/

Paragraph 34. No response. Paragraph 35. There is no support for the state-ment that Audit F-77-32 " confirmed" that "the soils documen-tation did not conform to C210 and C211 specifications as required." The use of the word " confirmed" implies that Consumers Power had some prior knowledge that specifications were not met. There is no evidence of such prior knowledge. The extent of the problems with soils testing was not discovered until the July, 1978 investigation.113/ Audit F-77-32 did not reveal that U.S. Testing was using the wrong proctor.114/ The 1977 audit only discovered errors in some of U.S. Testing's calculations: the wrong factor was used for certain protors.115/ These tests were recalculated l , 110/ Marguglio, Tr. 6517-18; Board Exhibit No. 3, at p. 1. i l 111/ Marguglio, Tr. 6517. 112/ Horn, Tr. 7992. 113/ Marguglio, Tr. 6503-04. d 114/ I_d. 115/ M., Tr. 6505-06.

I O usine the proper factor." The rece1cu1ated test reeu1ts showed that compaction requirements had been met in all but four instances.117/ Consumers Power concluded that the tests and retests showed that the passing soils had been placed in conformance with requirements.118/ The U.S. Testing error was regarded as an isolated mistake.119/ At the tirr.e of the audit, Consumers Power informed U.S. Testing of the error, and instructed them in the proper method of calculation.120/ Paragraph 36. Consumers Power was aware that U.S. Testing had made an error in relation to the administration j building before construction began on the diesel generator building. Consumers Power did not ignore this information in beginning work on the diesel generator building. Before any such work was begun, an investigation into the settlement at the administration building was conducted,121/ and concluded that the problem was localized.122/ Therefore, no connection was made between the U.S. Testing error at the administration 116/ M. 117/ Id.; Board Exhibit No. 3, at pp. 2-4, 7-8. 118/ Marguglio, Tr. 6505. 119/ M., Tr. 6504. [ 120/ M., Tr. 6505. 121/ Keeley, prepared testimony at p, 5, following Tr. 1163; see Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Con-clusions of Law, at pp. 91-93, paragraph 124; Keeley, O Tr. 1312-14.  ! 122/ M. l

building and the soils beneath the not-yet begun diesel generator building. Paragraph 37. Ms. Stamiris misreports Mr. Horn's testimony on compliance with compaction specifications and the audit report. Mr. Horn was asked at his deposition: Q. Did those tests [ referred to in Audit Report F-77-32] show compliance with the... applicable compaction requirements? A. No.1  ! Later at the February, 1982 hearing, he testified that he did not believe that "the audit report itself" indicated a lack of compliance with the compaction requirements.124/ l Both statements are true and they do not conflict. Out of 2000 records examined, Audit F-77-32 recorded only 17 "failing" tests of soils in Q areas for which subsequent ,

  " passing" tests could not be found.125/    The "failing" label meant that at the time the original test was taken, these soils did not meet applicable requirements.126/ However, the auditors were unable to determine the present status of these soils; from the records available, the auditors could not tell whether the original problem lay with moisture or        ;

compaction, or whether the problem had been cured by subsequent l reworking of the soils.127/ Hence, the audit report could [ 123/ Id_. 124/ Horn deposition, at p. 77. 125/ Board Exhibit No. 3. I{ 126/ Horn, Tr. 7993. 127/ Horn, Tr. 7963, 7965, 7993.

( not conclude that these soils were inadequately compacted in October, 1977; they could only conclude that the condition of these soils was " indeterminate".128/ Paragraph 38. Mr. Horn explained why he did not perceive the link between the grade beam settlement and the results of Audit F-77-32 in 1977. An investigation into the grade beam failure had concluded that it was an isolated problem.129/ Moreover, the grade beam was located in an area that had not been inspected by quality control and survived by quality assurance.130/ Q-area soils, on the other hand, had been inspected by quality control and over-viewed by quality assurance.131/ They exhibited no settle-ment problem in 1977.132/ And Audit F-77-32 did not provide proof of soils problems in Q-areas; it simply concluded that, because of problems with soils test reports, the present status of certain soils in Q-areas was undetermi-nate.133/ The connection between the grade beam failure and the results of Audit F-77-32 is easier today to perceive in light of events which have occurred since 1977. However, , P given the information available in 1977, Mr. Horn's inter-128/ Id. 129/ Id., Tr. 7960, 7964. 130/ Id., Tr. 7964, 8010. 131/ Id. i 132/ _Id., Tr. 7961.

    )

! s ' 133/ Id., Tr. 7963. I  ! l l

i () pretation of the relationship between the two events was not l I unreasonable. There is no evidence to support the assertion that Mr. Horn still believes Audit Report F-77-32 and the grade beam failure were unrelated. Mr. Horn testified that the connection between them would be picked up by the quality assurance program operating at Midland today. If an event such as the grade beam failure occurred today, it would come to his attention through review of on-site technical soils engineer reports, management meetings, construction meetings and awareness of failures. If Mr. Horn received a report not-ing problems such as those documented in Audit Report 77-32, he would now take a more active interest in it, and would cause broader investigations to be made than occurred in 1977.134/ Mr. Horn testified that a non-Q structure which experiences soils problems can be an indicator of problems for Q-listed structures.135/ He also explained that the quality assurance program at Midland has been adjusted so that the linkages between Q and non-Q areas are more readily perceived. In the remedial soils areas, specifications and procedures, whether Q or non-Q, are reviewed to see whether any problems exist which could have implications for the Q areas.136/ 134/ Horn, Tr. 8024-25. [ 135/ Jd., Tr. 7974-75. l 136/ Id., Tr. 7964; see also Consumers Power Proposed Supple-l mental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at pp. l- 219-220, paragraph 327. l l

Ms. Stamiris is incorrect in claiming that Mr. Horn believes today that the Q and non-Q areas are irrele-vant to one another. The only testimony she cites for this claim is an explanation by Mr. Horn that, in hindsight, he , did not think it unreasonable to have weighed the fact that the administration building was non-Q in concluding that its settlement problem was an isolated incident.137/ Paragraph 3_9_. Mr. Keeley testified that the fill at the diesel generator building were subject to different placement procedures than the soils at the administration building.138/ The cause of the grade beam settlement at the administration building was inadequately placed fill.139/ The Midland quality assurance department was informed of the grade beam failure when it occurred. Mr. Keeley, the Midland Project Manager,140/ learned of the grade beam settlement in September, 1977.141/ The Midland Project Organization then told Mr. Horn, who was quality assurance engineering supervisor at that time.142/ Mr. Horn was kept fully informed of the administration building investigation and its results.143/ Mr. Bird, the quality 137/ Horn, Tr. 8009-11. 138/ Keeley, Tr. 1263. 139/ Id,., Tr. 1258. 140/ M., prepared testimony at p. 1, following Tr. 1163. 141/ Id., Tr. 1195. , lO j 142/ Horn, Tr. 7959. l l 143/ M., Tr. 7959-60.

( engineering section head,144/'was also informed of the grade beam prcblem.145/ Thus, the persons within the quality assurance department who were directly responsible for dealing with the grade beam problem were properly and timely informed. Paragraph 40. This paragraph misinterprets testi-mony in an attempt to prove that Mr. Marguglio's attitude toward quality assurance was poor in 1974 and has not improved today. Mr. Marguglio did not testify that "Mr. Keeley acted professionally in not telling him about the administra-tion building".146/ Rather, the testimony cited in support of this allegation shows that the action of Mr. Keeley which Mr. Marguglio commended, and said he would duplicate in a similar situation, was the initiation of an investigation to determine whether the grade beam failure had plant-wide implications.147/ Mr. Marguglio's approval of an attempt to discover whether a problem in a non-Q structure had implica-tions beyond the pan-Q area demonstrates a good attitude toward quality assurance. l i There is no evidence which shows that Mr. Marguglio l now has, or ever had, a bad attitude toward quality assurance. l l 144/ Bird, professional resume, following Tr. 3059. 1 145/ Horn, Tr. 7959. () 146/ Marguglio, Tr. 6586. 147/ Id., Tr. 6586-87.

() Mr. Gallagher's criticism of Mr. Marguglio arose from two T sources: (1) his disapproval'of the strict division within  ! the Midland quality assurance department in 1977 between Q and non-Q areas, and (2) his belief that Mr. Marguglio approved of such a division.148/ But both bases of criticism i are groundless. Mr. Marguglio did not justify the lack of communication between the Q and non-Q areas.149/ And improved communications between Q and non-Q personnel has been esta- > blished in the remedial soils work, so that the problems which arise in non-Q areas are studied for their possible implications in Q areas.150/ Paragraph 41. Ms. Stamiris does not specify what soils questions were "open" in 1977, so as to mandate post-ponement of construction of the diesel generator building.  ; Audit Report F-77-32 and the grade beam failure did not  : indicate that the construction should be postponed.151/ The b grade beam failure was considered, after investigation, to be an isolated incident. The audit did not demonstrate that soils in Q areas were questionable.152/ The audit concluded r that problems existed with the handling of soils testing reports; corrective actions were taken immediately to cure I t l 148/ Gallagher, Tr. 6718-19. 149/ Marguglio, Tr. 6586-87. l 150/ See supra at paragraph 38. 151/ Id. 152/ M.  ;

( such problems.153/ Mr. Bird was not Quality Assurance Manager in 1977.154/ Paragraph 42. This paragraph misconstrues Consumers Power's Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclu-sions of Law and the testimony of Consumers Power witnesses. Neither Mr. Horn, Mr. Marguglio, nor Consumers Power Pro-posed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law stated or implied that the 1977 soils problems would be handled the same way today. Consumers Power Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law explained how the 1977 informa-tion would be evaluated by different and greatly improved quality assurance and quality control procedures today.155/ Consumers Power neither defends nor affirms the 1977 conclu-sions on soils problems; it merely points out that the con-clusions were not so unreasonable as to demonstrate a poor management attitude towards quality assurance.156/ i Mr. Horn testified that the only item which'he would handle similarly to what was done in 1977 would be the results of the October, 1977 audit.157/ The results of that l 153/ Horn, Tr. 8031. i ~ 154/ Bird, Tr. 3060. 155/ Consumers Power Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact i and Conclusions of Law, at pp. 219-20, paragraphs 326-27. 156/ Id., at pp. 221-22, paragraphs 328-29. () 157/ Horn, Tr. 8003.

l O d audit mandated corrective action to clear all failing tests 158/ and to preclude the repetition of the documentation problems which prompted the audit.159/ The corrective actions ensured that no soils questions by the audit would be left unresolved.160/ Mr. Marguglio described the revised procedure for handling test documentation that had been developed as a result of the audit.161/ Mr. Horn testified to extensive changes in both his evaluation of soils information and in quality assurance procedures since 1977 which would ensure that the 1977 actions would not be repeated.162/ As explained above, the only 1977 action which Mr. Marguglio specifically approved and said he would repeat was the initiation of an investigation to determine whether a soils problem had generic implications.163/ Paragraph 43. As corrective action for failing tests, the Audit F-77-32 required a determination of whether ' documentation existed to show that subsequent passing tests in the area had " cleared these failing tests."164/ The proce-dure to clear a failing test with a passing test was not to 158/ Board Exhibit No. 3, at pp. 8, 10, and 11. 159/ M.; Horn, Tr. 8031. 160/ Horn, Tr. 8031. 161/ Marguglio, Tr. 6519. 162/ M., Tr. 7978, 7961-64, 7974-78, 8017-18, 8022-25. p) 163/ See supra at paragraph 40. v 164/ Board Exhibit No. 3, at pp. 6-10.

keep taking tests until passing results were obtained.165/ Mr. Horn testified that, to his knowledge, the clearing process always required recompaction or reconditioning of the soils in question before retesting them.166/ The correc-tive action required by Audit Report F-77-32 sought confirma-tion of this process through documentation.167/ For those tests for which clearing documentation could not be found, the audit requested that Project Engineer-l ing " justify" the in-place soils.168/ This required Project Engineering to examine, in the field, the actual condition of the soils through borings and other means.169/ If the engineering examination found the soils inadequate, the corrective action always required the reworking or the replacement of the failed soils.1 0/ Mr. Gallagher explained that the " justification" of soils was not an indication of poor management attitude. " Justification" is simply a term for determining whether an engineering basis exists for accepting soils which do not meet acceptance criteria.171/ 165/ See Marguglio, Tr. 6513-15. 166/ Horn, Tr. 7965. l 167/ Board Exhibit No. 3, at p. 6. l 168/ M., at pp. 8, 10. l 169/ Horn, Tr. 7965. 170/ M., Tr. 8018-19, 8026-27. l 171/ Gallagher, Tr. 6805-07. i t

m U Mr. Marguglio's testimony does not contradict Mr. , Horn's description of the clearing process, or indicate that the process is flawed. He specifically prefaced his testi-mony with the warning that he was not familiar with the process and was not the proper witness to answer questions regarding it.172/ Paragraph 44. Audit F-77-32 did not detect U.S. Testing's use of the wrong proctor in compacting and testing soils. It only discovered that U.S. Testing was using the wrong quantitative factor for a given proctor, which resulted in a miscalculation of a few test results.173/ In recalculat- i

                                                                        )

ing the test results, the proper factor was used. Although the recalculation changed the results of all the recalculated tests, the new results showed that most of the soils were within the acceptable range.174/ Mr. Gallagher criticized Consumers Power's pro-cedure of clearing a failing test with a passing test, because he was not aware of the clearing procedure. Mr. Gallagher explained that he did not like the process of l simply running a second test "without some remedial action" , to assure that the material had been adequately compacted.175/ l . 172/ Marguglio, Tr. 6514-15. t 173/ Marguglio, Tr. 6504-05; Board Exhibit No. 3 at p. 4; Stamiris Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 12, paragraph 36. l 174/ Board Exhibit No. 3, at pp. 2-4. 175/ Gallagher, Tr. 6803. I l

l However, the process used by Consumers Power to clear a failing test never involved simply re-running a test until acceptable results were achieved.176/ To Mr. Horn's knowledge, remedial action was always taken to assure that the material had been adequately compacted before it ran a second test.177/ Paragraph 45. See response to paragraph 43. Paragraph 46. Ms. Stamiris mischaracterizes the purpose and results of Audit F-77-32. As explained above, the purpose of the audit was not to " verify" that soils documentation conformed to specifications.178/ Nor did the audit results conclusively " establish nonconformance."179/ Corrective actions were taken for all deficiencies identi-fied by the audit.180/ Paragraph 47. Subsequent to the discovery of the settlement problem, the two specifications referred to in Audit Report F-77-32 were reviewed and revised to provide a better definition of the requirements.181/ Paragraph 48. The allegation that Consumers Power is upholding its 1977 soils decisions and refusing to admit that certain of its 1977 practices were deficient is in-176/ See Marguglio, Tr. 6513-15. 177/ Horn, Tr. 7965, 8018-19, 8026-27. 178/ See supra at paragraph 33. 179/ See supra at paraoraph 37. 180/ See supra at paragraph 42. (-) N _) 181/ Marguglio, prepared testimony, Attachment No. 9, at

p. 1-5, following Tr. 1501.

correct. Consumers Power has agreed not to contest that soils quality assurance deficiencies existed at Midland before December 6, 1979.182/ Moreover, Consumers Power witnesses repeatedly refused to defend certain 1977 practices, and admitted that some of them were indeed deficient.183/ Paragraph 49. Consumers Power is not attempting to defend the decision which concluded that the problem at 4 the administration building was localized. It is simply trying to explain why and how the decision was made. To accomplish this, Consumers Power witnesses attempted to put themselves back into the positions they occupied in 1977, to give themselves the knowledge they had then, and to recreate the bases for their decision. This attempt to honestly reconstruct their 1977 decision processes is not a sign of a poor management attitude. With the benefit of perfect hindsight, it is easy to critize decisions made by qualified professionals nearly five years ago. Mr. Gallagher admitted that his criticism of the 1977 administration building investigation was based on the information available in 1981.184/ Mr. Hood agreed that, in retrospect, the borings were not sufficient to shcw that the grade beam problem was localized.185/ The important 182/ NRC Staff / Consumers Power Joint Exhibit No. 1. 183/ Marguglio, Tr. 6583-84, 6586-87; Horn, Tr. 7978, 8022-25. J

  -) 184/ Gallagher, Tr. 2569-70.

185/ Horn, Tr. 7978.

1 i l

                                     /~N k-) question, however, is not how reasonable certain 1977 decisions look now, but how reasonable they were in 1977.        Consumers Power witnesses explained that, given the information available to them in 1977, their conclusion about the extent of the soils problem was not unreasonable.186/ Mr. Kane agreed.187/

Their conclusion does not demonstrate the kind of casual inattention and callous disregard of facts which would lead us to infer a poor attitude with respect to quality assurance on the part of past or present consumers Power management. Paragraph 50. There are differences in soils placement processes and inspection programs between Q and non-Q areas.188/ These could have provided a reasonable basis for concluding that problems with inadequately placed non-Q soils, whose placement had not been inspected by quality control and overviewed by quality assurance, would not be relevant to Q area soils, which had been placed according to different processes and subject to inspection and overview.189/ Although these differences between Q and non-Q were not unreasonable distinctions to draw in 1977, it is likely that the similarities between the two areas would be more appreciated today.190/ 186/ Consumers Power Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at pp. 216-17, 221-22, para-graphs 323, 328-29. 187/ Kane, Tr. 4300-01. l 188/ Keeley, Tr. 1262-63. !s 189/ See Horn, Tr. 7962-64; Keeley, Tr. 1258. l l 190/ See supra at paragraph 38. l l

                                                                                                            )
                  Paragraph 51.                                                                  There is no contradiction between the fact that Audit F-77-32 was a record review and Consumers Power's answer to 10 CFR $50.54(f), Question 23, which recognized that the adequacy of soils cannot be independently verified once structures have been built on the fill.191/

The answer to Question 23 was written two years after Audit l F-77-32.192/ The answer reflects the greater understanding l of soils work gained by Consumers Power in the intervening years. Paragraph 52. Mr. Horn's testimony that no other structures exhibited settlement in 1977 193/ is uncontradicted. Mr. Keppler confirmed in a letter to Mr. Myron Cherry on December 14, 1978, that no safety related structures at Midland exhibited excess settlement.194/ Paragraph 53. Ms. Stamiris provides a list of events which she apparently believes shows a pattern of soils errors by Consumers Power Company. The list does not show such a pattern, and every item listed is irrelevant to the subject of Audit Report F-77-32. Audit Report F-77-32 did not involve in-field moisture control tests. The Modification Order's citation . 191/ Marguglio, prepared testimony, Attachment No. 10, at

p. 23-51, following Tr. 1501.

192/ Marguglio, prepared testimony, Attachment No. 10, at

p. 23-1, following Tr. 1501.
 '3       193/ Horn, Tr. 7961.
    )

194/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 5, Enclosure 1 at p. 3.

I

      of failure to perform such tests is not relevant to the         ,

l issues of how the results of t'he audit were handled in 1977 or how they would be handled today. Ms. Stamiris claims that " Consumers Power witnesses testified to soils improvements and corrective actions instituted since 1977, yet deficient soils practices continued through 1979 and 1980 despite identification of the problem." The very sources she cites as support prove her claim is wrong. The problem identified and corrected in Audit F-77-32 was the treatment of documentation of soils tests.195/ No one ever alleged that mishandling of soils test documents recurred in 1979-80; Mr. Gallagher specifically testified that it had not.196/ Ms. Stamiris provides no support for her assertion that the three noncompliances involving U.S. Testing identified in NRC Inspection Report No. 81-02 were related to U.S. Testing errors identified in Audit Report F-77-32. Moreover, Mr. Gallagher testified that any problems that may have arisen in the past with U.S. Testing, such as the ones detected in Audit F-77-32, would be prevented from recurrence by safeguards set up by Consumers Power in 1979.197/ Soils work did not continue in 1979 and 1980; by 1980, Consumers Power committed to suspend soils work until the soils compaction equipment used was properly qualified.198/ , 195/ Marguglio, Tr. 6519; Horn, Tr. 8031. l 196/ Gallagher, Tr. 6813. ' (r-)S 197/ Id., Tr. 2575. 198/ Gallagher, Tr. 2604. l

l () The position of full time geotechnical engineer has been filled since 1979,199/ not 198'l. There is no connection between the permanent dewatering wells and the results of Audit F-77-32. The qualifications of the 1981 quality assur-ance staff to do remedial soils work are also unrelated to Audit Report F-77-32. Moreover, Ms. Stamiris fails to note that Consumers Power committed to acquire additional qualified staff for the remedial soils work.200/ There is no evidence that this commitment has not been kept. This string of unconnected incidents does not show a pattern of poor soils practices which continued despite identification and correction. Like much of the oral exami-nation of witnesses in these hearings, it focuses exclusively on relatively minor incidents and gives them an importance wholly disproportionate to their effect on the implementation of the quality control program at Midland. It ignores the uncontradicted written evidence of the improvements and successes of the quality assurance program provided by Mr. Marguglio's prepared testimor.y and by Consumers Power's response to 10 CFR 550.54(f) Question 23.201/ It ignores the findings of the May,1981 NRC Staff inspection of Midland, which concluded quality assurance implementation is adequate 199/ Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclu-sions of Law, at p. 168, paragraph 270. 200/ NRC Staff Exhibit No. 1, at p. 17. ) !f 201/ Marguglio, prepared testimony at pp. 3-50 and Attachment No. 10, following Tr. 1501. i

[ O k> and that Consumers Power is ip control of the project.202/ l The Licensing Board will consider all of the evidence before it, both oral and written, and will arrive at its decision by giving proper weight to all evidence and events. Board Findings Paragraph 54. Consumers Power has agreed not to contest that soils quality assurance at Midland was deficient prior to December 6, 1979. Ms. Stamiris has adduced no evidence which even tends to show that present quality assurance attitudes are "just as deficient" as they were prior to December, 1979, or even deficient at all. See the response to paragraph 49 above. Paragraph 55. Consumers Power's explanation of the way information was handled in 1977 and the very different way that such information is handled today gives reasonable assurance that soils settlement problems will not be repeated. Consumers Power Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law merely assert that the information available in 1977 was not conclusive proof of a site-wide soils problem. The failure to recognize such a problem, given the procedures and resources available in 1977, was not so unreasonable as to demonstrate such casual inattention and callous disregard of facts as would call for an inference of poor management attitude with respect to quality assurance.203/ j I 202/ Consbaers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclu-O(_/ sions of Law, at pp. 56-57, paragraphs 78-79. 203/ See Consumers Power Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at pp. 219-20, parag aphs 326-27; and supra, at pp. 37-38, paragraphs 48-49.

A V Paragraph 56. No support is cited for the pro-position that a change in managerial attitudes and quality assurance approaches can be proven only if Consumers Power admits that the evidence available in 1977 should have prevented soils problems. First, no witness has ever claimed that the evidence of soils problems available in 1977 was so obvious and unequivocal that only one conclusion could be drawn from it. Second, it is unreasonable to suggest that a change in managerial attitudes and quality assurance ap-proaches can be proven only by an admission that wide-spread soils problems should have been detected in 1977. The most obvious way to prove a change in quality assurance approaches is to demonstrate the ways that those approaches have in fact been improved since 1977. Consumers Power witnesses testified to numerous changes in the quality assurance program at Midland which ensure that, if new soils problems arise, they will be properly handled.204/ Paragraph 57. Ms. Stamiris provides a list of 1977 actions which she claims Consumers Power is " defending" today. Testimony shows that it is incorrect.  ; Mr. Horn admitted that, with the benefit of hind-sight, the borings taken outside of the administration building did not appear to be a sufficient investigati:n. 3/ l ! us (-] 204/ Id. 205/ Horn, Tr. 7978. l l l

(h' Consumers Power does recognize that problems in non-Q areas may be indicators of potential Q-area soils problems.206/ Soils record reviews are indicative only of documentation problems. The 1977 documentation audit did not examine actual in-field soils placement.207/ The connection between  ! the administration building problem and the settlement of  ! the diesel generator building was not " obvious". There were many indications in 1977 that the problems at the adminis- l tration building was localized.208/ Paragraph 58. No witness has ever even suggested , that Consumers Power deliberately denied or covered up an , identified soils problem. The evidence directly contradicts this. First, there was no major soils problem " identified" in 1977. All witnesses agreed that Consumers Power believed that any soils problems that were detected in 1977 were localized and unconnected.209/ Moreover, the witnesses specifically denied that there had been a coverup or that information had been deliberately withheld from the NRC. 10/ 206/ Id., Tr. 7974-75. 207/ Board Exhibit No. 3, at p. 1. 208/ See Consumers Power Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and conclusions of Law, at pp. 215-17, paragraphs . 322-23. 209/ Keeley, prepared testimony at p. 5, following Tr. 1163; Horn, Tr. 7964; Marguglio, Tr 6504; Gallagher, Tr. 2556-57. 210/ Consumers Power Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact l(~} l u/ and Conclusions of Law, at p. 95, paragraphs 127-28. l

O v Nor do Consumers Power's 1977 actions represent a tendency to push ahead in the face of unresolved questions. The information available to Consumers Power in 1977 seemed to indicate no major soils' problems.211/ Consumers Power today recognizes that soils pro-blems were not in fact resolved in 1977. Its attempt to explain its 1977 actions is not an attempt to justify or defend them. The fact that Consumers Power acknowledges its past mistakes and has instituted changes to ensure that those mistakes will not recur gives reasonable assurance that quality assurance matters will be properly handled in future soils work. Paragraph 59. Ms. Stamiris has produced no evi-dence to support her claim that Messrs. Horn, Bird and Marguglio lack " conservatism and care". Their willingness to investigate their own actions, to admit mistakes where they were in fact mistaken, and to institute corrective actions to ensure that those mistakes will not recur demon-strates that they do have a careful, conscientious attitude toward quality assurance.212/ Mr. Cook's quoted testimony e es not defend the 1977 soils decision as " reasonable". Rather, it demon-strates a belief in the importance of a quality assurance 211/ See supra at paragraphs 37-39. () 212/ See Stamiris Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 12, paragraph 34; see also Marguglio, prepared testimony, Attachment 10. j

f (]) program doing things right the first time, and a regret that Consumers Power failed to anal'yze properly the information available in 1977: I believe anything that we would have done that would have identified the fact that there were soils problems present before we built any of the structures that were built would have been fabulous. If we could have detected that problem , before we went further and corrected it, we would have been in so much better shape than we are today. It would be a tremen-dous difference. We all devoutly wish we could have identi-fied thabigy blem before we are where we are now Paragraph 60. The testimony of Consumers Power managerial and quality assurance personnel demonstrates that they objectively reviewed their own 1977 actions and deci-sions, concluded that some of them were inadequate and acted both to correct the inadequacies and to make certain they would not recur. QUALITY CONTROL INSPECTOR QUALIFICATIONS Paragraph 61. This paragraph misstates the findings of the May 1981 NRC Inspection Report No. 81-12. During the May 1981 Inspection, the Region III inspectors reviewed the qualifications and training records of three Bechtel quality control inspectors.214/ Based on a review of these records, the Region III inspection team could not certify that the l f 213/ Cook, Tr. 6630. I s 214/ NRC Staff Exhibit No. 1, at pp. 25, 27 and 28. l r l l l i

i () inspectors were properly qualified under Regulatory Guide 1.58 and ANSI N45.2.6.215/ TbeBechtelqualitycontrol inspectors were not " accepting NCRs", as Ms. Stamiris claims. Nor did NRC Inspection Report No. 81-12 characterize the length of on-the-job training time as " minimal".216/ Paragraph 62. NRC Inspection Report No. 81-12 explained that "the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.58 and ANSI N45.2.6 is that the individual [ inspector] have the required education and prior related experience in quality assur-I ance, . . . or documented objective evidence . . . demon-strating that the individual indeed does have ' comparable' or ' equivalent' competence."217/ ' Bechtel's training program for quality control inspectors accomodates the ability to demonstrate compliance with the " comparable competence" requirement of the ANSI standard and Regulatory Guide.218/ The program certifies quality control inspectors on the basis of oral examinations plus observations of the individual in the field.219/ NRC Inspection Report No. 81-12 noted that the oral examination and the lack of documentation of each inspector's trainina did "not provide for an after-the-fact evaluation of the 215/ Id. , 216/ Id., at p. 28. 217/ Id., at p. 27. l 218/ Id.

          ~
  # 219/ Id.

() inspector's knowledge or thoroughness of the examination."220/ Since the Region III team was unable to determine the extent i of each inspector's knowledge, they could not verify that Bechtel's training prcgram met the " comparable competence"  ; ANSI standard. Accordingly, they requested Consumers Power to perform an audit to verify the adequacy of training, qualification and examination" of inspectors prior to certifi-cation.221/  ; This paragraph misinterprets the NRC Inspection  : Report No. 81-12 comment regarding the performance of an ' after-the-fact evaluation of the qualifications of quality control inspectors. NRC Inspection Report No. 81-12 does not mention set criteria as a requirement under the ANSI standard. Nor does it request Consumers Power or Bechtel to establish set criteria for the certification program.222/ Mr. Gardner, a member of the Region III inspection team and the author of the quality control section of the NRC Inspec-tion Report No. 81-12,223/ testified that standardized criteria for the certification of quality control inspectors were not necessary.224/ 220/ Id. t 221/ Id., at p. 28. t 222/ Id. i 223/ Gardner, prepared testimony at p. 2, following Tr. 8037. l 224/ Gardner, Tr. 8051, 8055-56.  : l (1)  ! ! 1 l t s

     -                                                       -_   ,- - y

() Paragraph 63. The NRC Staff Inspection team concluded in October, 1981 that only one item, Unresolved Item 3, remained unsettled from the July 1981 Audit.225/ Paragraph 64. Consumers Power's July, 1981 audit determined that the "Bechtel Quality Control Training Program and its implementation, in general, meets the requirements of PSP G-8.1 and ANSI N45.2.6."226/ It also noted several areas "where clarifications and improvement would help clearly demonstrate compliance to the ANSI requirement."  ! The report did not conclude, however, that these areas

   " compromised the effectiveness of the QC certification process", as Ms. Stamiris claims.

No witness suggested that Bechtel's responses to the July audit's recommended corrective action compromised safety. Bechtel believed that its training program was already in compliance with applicable regulations.228/ Mr. Gardner saw nothing amiss with Bechtel's actions in this regard. He characterized the incident as a " difference of opinions".229/ Bechtel, he noted, was now complying with the suggested corrective actions.230/ Mr. Marguglio con-225/ Gardner, Tr. 8040-41, 8043-44; see infra at paragraph 60. 1 226/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 23, at p. 3. 227/ Id., at pp. 3-4. 228/ Id., at pp. 12, 24. 229/ Gardner, Tr. 8066, 8062. O'd 230/ I_d.

I l

 /"T I   firmed Mr. Gardner's observation. He testified that Consumers Power and Bechtel had simply experienced an " honest difference   [

of opinion" on a very " nebulous" area.231/ Mr. Turnbull's change in duties was a by-product of the December,1981 MPQAD modification. The Site Quality Assurance Superintendent position was reconstituted as part of the modification.232/ Mr. Turnbull was given authority over special projects, along with the significant adminis-trative responsibilities he had before December.233/ The modification of Mr. Turnbull's duties was not related in any l way to his follow-up activities on the July, 1981 audit and no evidence suggests this.234/ Mr. Marguglio in fact com-mended Mr. Turnbull's qualifications and his handling of the audit.235/ , Paragraph 65. Ms. Stamiris has pointed to no "eventr' which " demand a careful examination of the July i audit findings and their manner of resolution." The findings refer only to a professional difference of opinion between i Bechtel and Consumers Power regarding the ANSI standard, and to the December MPQAD modification. Neither of these raise questions about the resolution of the July audit findings. 231/ Marguglio, Tr. 6984. 232/ Id., Tr. 6949, 6980-81. ! 233/ Id., Tr. 6950, 6982. s 234/ ~Id., Tr. 6980, 6992-93.

(.)

235/ Id., Tr. 6950,;6979-80. l l l l t I

I l I () s The July audit report listed two observations.236/ Observation No. 1 contained two items. First, the auditors , i found no evidence of a minimum training requirement, and  ! observed that the amount of training in quality control instructions varied among trainees.237/ However, Mr. Marguglio and Mr. Gardner both testified that variance in training among individuals was necessary and expectable, because of the different amounts of training differently qualified individuals would need.238/ Second, the auditors found no documented evidence of credit taken for previous experience or certifications. The report noted that the lack of docu-mentation for large amounts of on-the-job training gave the erroneous impression that the training was less than was actually being performed.239/ This part of Observation No. 1 was embodied in Audit Finding No. 1, requesting that Bechtel document on-the-job training as part of the certifi-cation process.240/ Observation No. 2 listed in the July audit report observed that Bechtel was no longer evaluating the effective-ness of its inspector training program by means of a review of the Corrective Action Log.241/ 236/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 23, at p. 2. 237/ Id. 238/ Marguglio, Tr. 6990; Gardner, Tr. 8055-56. 239/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 23, at p. 2. ' p>

 \-  240/ Id., at p. 5.

241/ Id., at p. 2.

i

                                                                          )

1 i o

 ' _)

( Paragraph 66. The deletion of the review of the Corrective Action Log did not eliminate Bechtel's evaluation of its on-the-job training program. Bechtel continued to evaluate its program through several previously established procedures.242/ It believed that an additional layer of review was unnecessary.243/ Mr. Turnbull accepted this position, and closed out Observation No. 2 of the July audit.244/ The basis of his decision to close out the item was concisely explained in his letter of notification to Bechtel.245/ Ms. Stamiris neither explains nor supports her claim that the basis of his decision was " vague". Paragraph 67. Unresolved Item 1 of the July audit did not state that the training of uncertified quality control engineers should be the responsibility of Level II personnel rather than Level I personnel. Unresolved Item 1 merely provided that Level II personnel should also have such training as a job responsibility.246/ Bechtel responded that training of such personnel was already part of the job responsibility of Level II employees.247/ In closing the i item, Mr. Turnbull accepted this response.248/ 241/ 14., at p. 2. ! 242/ Id., at pp. 30, 32. 243/ Id., at p. 32. 244/ Id., at p. 29, 245/ Id., at p. 30. 246/ Id., at p. 2. 247/ Id., at p. 32. 248/ Ig., at pp. 29-30.

Paragraph 68. Mr. Turnbull accepted Bechtel's response to Unresolved Item 2'of the July audit, and closed out the item.249/ Paragraph 69. The NRC Staff inspectors were not concerned about everything listed in Unresolved Item 3 of the July audit. Mr. Gardner explained exactly why Unresolved Item 3 was considered inconclusive: Unresolved Item No. 3 states in part:

             "it is not clear that successfully com-pleting the certification process is a satisfactory substitute for education and experience." Since our request was that the licensee establish the adequacy of the certification process, with a                ,

statement such as this being unresolved, > we could only determine h t in fact the audit was inconclusive.2 , Mr. Gardner did not consider set criteria for certification to be a significant concern.251/ Paragraph 70. See response to paragraph 69 above. Paragraph 71. Unresolved Item 3 of the July audit did not " originally seek" a revision of specifications to provide more objective criteria for certification.252/ Mr. Turnbull accepted the MPQAD's commitment to an ongoing evaluation of the inspector training program as an acceptable resolution of Unresolved Item 3, and closed out 249/ M. ] 250/ Gardner, Tr. 8040-41. l 251/ M., Tr. 8051, 8055-56. I 252/ See Consumers Power Exhibit No. 23, at p. 3.  ; l 1

1 l l i

.( ) the item.253/ There is no basis in the record for the claim thatthedecisionwasoneofbhelastMr.Turnbullmadein his position as Site Quality Assurance Superintendent.      Nor is there any basis for the insinuation that the modification of Mr. Turnbull's duties was a result of this decision.254/

Paragraph 72. This paragraph misstates Unresolved Item 4 of the July audit. This item questioned whether one quality control inspector had received the necessary training in a new quality control instruction.255/ Bechtel verified that this instructor had been properly trained.256/ Mr. Turnbull accepted this response and closed out the item.257/ Paragraph 73. The corrective action recommended by Audit Finding No. 1 in the July audit was to " document on-the-job training as part of the certification process."258/ Bechtel committed to document such training.  ! Bechtel did not commit to establishing objective criteria for certifi-cation or minimum training requirements because that was not requested.260/ The responsibility for identifying the 253/ Id., at p. 29. 254/ See supra at paragraph 64. 255/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 23, at p. 3. 256/ Id., at p. 33. 257/ Id., at pp. 29, 33. 258/ Id., at p. 5. 259/ Id., at pp,. 5, 7-9. '(~T NJ 260/ Id., at p. 5.

4 c) L training activities to be documented was given to Level I and Level II personnel.261/ This was in line with the suggestion in Unresolved Item 1 that Level II should share responsibility for inspector training with Level I.262/ Paragraph 74. In the July audit report, Audit Finding No. 2 expressed concern that Level I personnel performing duties reserved exclusively for Level II per-sonnel. 63/ The ANSI Code provides that only Level II employees may " evaluate" inspection cnd test results.264/ The Audit Finding noted that a Bechtel Level I employee had reviewed a test report to verify that all applicable blanks had been filled in, and the date, location and quantity of fines were properly recorded.265/ Audit Finding No. 2 questioned whether this act violated the ANSI Code.  ! Paragraph 75. Bechtel maintained that the ANSI code had not been violated by the action documented in Audit Finding No. 2 of the July audit report.267/ Mr. Turnbull agreed.268/ He explained that the responsibility exclusively 261/ M., at p. 8. l 262/ I_d., at p. 2; supra at paragraph 67. 263/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 23, at pp. 16-17.

  • l 264/ M.

265/ M. 266/ Id. 267/ M ., at p. 20.

          -268/ M ., at p. 18.

1 l 1 i G b reserved for Level II personnel by the ANSI Code involved "a measure of judgment requiring experience."269/ It did not include activities which involve "only comparing a characteris-tic with a specification or a pre-established criterion."270/ The Bechtel Level I employee, he found, had only "inspec-t[ed] a piece of paper to determine its compliance with specific accept / reject criteria."271/ Paragraph 76. Mr. Turnbull did not " dismiss" the Audit Finding No. 2 of the July audit; he closed it out after accepting Bechtel's response. / His explanation shows that he looked to the purpose and intent of the ANSI standard, and found that the restricted duties performed by the Bechtel Level I employee did not violate them.2 3/ Since it had been determined that the ANSI requirements had been met, none of the corrective actions originally proposed were found necessary.274/ Paragraph 77. Compliance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.58 is not required if an acceptable alternative method of compliance is submitted.275/ Consumers Power pre-269/ M. 270/ M. 271/ M. 272/ M ., at p. 16, 18. 273/ M , at p. 18; supra, at paragraph 75. p 274/ See Consumers Power Exhibit No. 23, at pp. 16, 18. O 275/ Gardner, Tr. 8058-59.

1

  N g_)  sented an alternative compliance plan.276/     In February,                     ;

I 1982, the NRC Staff had not yet ruled on the acceptability l of this response.277/ Mr. Gardner, however, found it acceptable.276/ The MAC Report studied the qualifications of Bechtel inspection personnel. The personnel were found to meet the qualifications of applicable standards and procedures.279/ - Paragraph 78. The Consumers Power November audit was not undertaken as a follow-up to the July audit.280/ The November audit was undertaken in response to an un-resolved item in NRC Inspection Report No. 81-20, which noted that the results of the July audit were "inconclu-sive".281/ The NRC Staff believed that the portion of Unresolved Item 3 which states "it is not clear that success-fully completing the certification process is a satisfactory substitute for education and experience" had not been fully resolved.282/ Paragraph 79. No response. 276/ Id., Tr. 8059. . i 277/ Id., Tr. 8060. 278/ Id.

            ~

l 279/ NRC Staff Exhibit No. 4, at pp. 7-8. 280/ Marguglio, Tr. 6955. 281/ Tr. 5414 (October 1981 NRC Inspection Report No. 81-20, Item "j"). () 282/ See supra at paragraph 69.

1 t i Paragraph 80. The November audit, performed for a specific purpose, was quite extensive.283/ It did not address all of the concerns of NRC Inspection Report No. 81-12 and the July 1981 audit because those concerns were not within its purpose and scope.284/ Paragraph 81. No response. Paragraph 82. Mr. Gardner found that the original concern raised in NRC Inspection Report No. 81-12 about the adequacy of inspector training had been answered. NRC Inspection Report No. 81-12 sought an objective means of determining the adequacy of a quality control inspector's training and certification.285/ The changes instituted in the Bechtel quality control training program after NRC Inspection No. 81-12 provided that means. MPQAD site personnel now overview Bechtel's training and certification of quality control inspectors to assure that they meet all applicable requirements.286/ Bechtel now documents on-the-job training as part of the certification process.287/ These procedures ensure that training and certification of 283/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 22, at pp. 2-3; see also Consumers Power Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at pp. 226-27, paragraph 334. 284/ See supra at paragraphs 69, 78. 285/ See supra at paragraphs 61-62; Gardner, Tr. 8041-42. 286/ Gardner, Tr. 8051, 8057, 8044-45, and prepared testimony at p. 3, following Tr. 8037. N s ) 287/ Gardner, Tr. 8060-61 and prepared testimony at p. 3, following Tr. 8037; Consumers Power Exhibit No. 23, at pp. 5, 7-9.

1 1 I () quality control personnel meet the " comparable competence" requirement of the ANSI code, and that objective evidence of such competence is available.288/ Paragraphs 83-84. No response. Paragraph 85. See response to paragraph 82. Paragraph 86. The NRC Staff did not resolve its concern with Unresolved Item 3 "on the basis of Mr. Turnbull's closure of the item." The NRC Staff did not unquestioningly rely on Mr. Turnbull's reasons for closing out Unresolved Item 3; Mr. Gardner simply asked him how he closed it out.289/ Mr. Gardner resolved the NRC Staff's concern with Unresolved Item 3 on the basis of the audits, Bechtel's documentation commitment, MPQAD overview of the training and certification process, and his own examination of Bechtel quality control inspectors.289/ Ms. Stamiris admits as much.291/ The NRC Staff did not express concern with the portion of Unresolved Item 3 that dealt with set criteria for inspector certifica-tion. 2/ uEquivalent competence" sufficient to satisfy the ANSI Code is established by the training program, the MPQAD overview and the Bechtel documentation process.293/ 288/ Gardner, prepared testimony at p. 3, following Tr. 8037; see NRC Staff Exhibit No. 1, at p. 27; Gardner, Tr. 8095-96, 8057, 289/ Gardner, Tr. 8048. 290/ Gardner, prepared testimony at p. 3, following Tr. 8037. 291/ Stamiris Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of () Law, at p. 27, paragraph 81. 292/ Gardner, Tr. 8051, 8055-56; see supra at paragraph 69.

293/ See supra, at paragraph 82.

l

(} Paragraph 87-88. S e response to paragraphs 77 and 82. Paragraph 89. No response. Paragraph 90. Mr. Gardner testified that he had not made a study of the correlation between an inspector's compliance with the formal ANSI requirements and the number of nonconformances written against him.294/ However, when he returned to Midland to review the results of the November 1981 Audit, he selected three quality control inspectors, and tested their knowledge of the two quality control instruc-tions (QCI's) in which the highest number of nonconformances had occurred. Each of the three inspectors satisfactorily responded to Mr. Gardner's questions and demonstrated accept-able knowledge in the QCIs.295/ He also noted that data from the recent overinspections suggested that there was no correlation between an inspector's experience and education and his job performance.296/ Paragraph 91. Mr. Gardner testified that the  ; i MPQAD overview of the Bechtel certification process is j acceptable.297/ l Paragraph 92. See response to paragraph 64. 294/ Gardner, Tr. 8094. . 295/ Id., prepared testimony, at p. 3, following Tr. 8037. 296/ See Gardner, Tr. 8091-92. 297/ Gardner, Tr. 8096. t

The 1973 version of the ANSI Code {} Paragraph 93. had inflexible educational and experience requirements for quality control inspectors. From 1975 through 1977, Mr. Marguglio was chairman of the work group which had pro-mulgated the standard in 1973. In his position as chairman, Mr. Marguglio learned that the nuclear power industry found the inflexible standard unworkable.298/ Mr. Marguglio was not chairman of the committee when it introduced the present 1980 standard, which allows for a certain amount of flexi-bility in the certification process.299/ It was the 1973, not the 1980, standard that " industry couldn't live with."300/ Paragraphs 94-97. No response. Paragraph 98. See response to paragraphs 69 and 78. Paragraph 99. The record directly contradicts the claim that the July audit issues were resolved "by avoidance or dismissal of the original concerns." See the response to paragraphs 67-76. Paragraph 100. See response to paragraphs 62, 69, 78 and 86. The November audit report did not attempt to change the inspection program, because it identified no findings or unresolved items which required corrective action.301/ t i __ 298/ Marguglio, Tr. 6985. l 299/ Id.

  ) 300/ M.

301/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 22, at p. 2.

O r r or on 1o1- see re vo==e to ver 9r a n 82 69 67, 78 and 82. Paragraph 102. There is no support in the record for the allegations in this paragraph regarding the depth and approach of the November audit. The audit was thorough and attentive to detail. The audit team reviewed records of inspection personnel for accuracy and completeness in seven areas of training and certification, for each of four disci-plinary areas.302/ 173 records were inspected.303/ The Audit Team also observed seventeen oral / performance demon-stration examinations in four disciplinary areas.304/ Finally, the Audit Team witnessed the actual inspections by i recently certified inspectors.305/ No specific corrective actions were recommended, because the audit identified no deficiencies.306/ Mr. Gardner testified that the procedure and the results of the November audit were satisfactory.307/ Mr. Marguglio confirmed that the November audit was just as thorough as the July audit. 6/ Paragraph 103. The evidence contradicts the assertion that the November audit and the inspector training 302/ M. 303/ M. 304/ M. 305/ M., at p. 3. l 306/ M., at pp. 2-3. ! 307/ Gardner, Tr. 8045-46. 308/ Marguglio, Tr. 6955.

                                        -63 .

( process were " subjective judgments". The November audit employed a checklist of requirements to be used by the audit team inspecting the certification program.309/ It listed sixteen requirements and characteristics against which the program was measured, and gave the auditor explicit instruc-tions on how compliance with the requirements should be d' ~ ined.310/ Mr. Gardner explained that the adequacy of L. _ certification and training process was not in question because of an alleged lack of objective criteria for mea-suring competence.311/ He noted that the MPQAD overview would ensure that inspectors are not unevenly or subject-ively evaluated.312/ Paragraph 104. There are at present no " identified weaknesses" in the Bechtel quality control inspector train-ing and certification program. All of the findings and un-resolved items of the July audit have been closed out. s The November audit contained no findings or deficiencies that needed correction.314/ Mr. Gardner is satisfied that the present Bechtel program meets all applicable require-309/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 22, at pp. 6-8. 310/ Id. 311/ Gardner, Tr. 8051, 8055-57. 312/ Id., Tr. 8056-57. 313/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 23, at pp. 5, 16, 29. 314/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 22. w w V -

(~') ments.315/ The record contradicts the claim that the November V audit was subjective.316/ . Paragraph 105. The NRC Staff review of the quality control certification process was not " cursory". Mr. Gardner performed independent tests on quality control inspectors to determine the adequacy of their knowledge in the area for  ! which they were certified.317/ He also examined the certifi-cation process itself to determine its adequacy.318/ The NRC Staff has not simply " accepted Consumers Power's current program as is". The NRC Staff performed several independent inspections of the program 319/ and concluded that it was adequate.320/ There is no evidence that the effectiveness of this program presently needs to be improved.321/ Paragraph 106. No response. Paragraph 107. The present Bechtel quality control inspector training program, in combination with Bechtel documentation and MPQAD overview of the program, resolve the concerns raised by item "j" of NRC Inspection Report No. 81-20, and give reasonable assurance that the quality assurance program will function adequately in the future. 315/ Gardner, prepared testimony at p. 3, following Tr. 8037. 316/ See supra at paragraph 103. . 317/ Gardner, prepared testimony at p. 3, following Tr. 8037. 318/ Id., Tr. 8056. 319/ Staff Exhibit No. 1; [NRC Inspection Report No. 81-20]; , (~N Gardner, prepared testimony at p. 3, following Tr. 8037.

 \]

320/ Gardner, prepared testimony at p. 3, following Tr. 8037. i l i 321/ See supra at paragraph 104. I

MANAGEMENT ATTITUDE Paragraph 108. No response. I Paragraph 109. The evidence concerning Consumers Power's management attitude towards quality assurance was extensively reviewed in Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. It shows that Consumers Power's present management attitude is consistent with the implementa-tion of quality assurance regulations.322/ Paragraph 110. No response. Paragraph 111. Mr. Marguglio's 1981 testimony describing the 1980-81 MPQAD program as "among the best in the industry" does not conflict with his 1982 testimony that the recent modifications improved the program. Even the best program can be improved. A quality assurance program must be flexible enough to respond to changes in on-site conditions and to incorporate the greater understanding which the quality assurance management has gained through experience.323/ Mr. Marguglio explained that the recent modifications were prompted by the recognition, based on observations of the MPQAD in action, that the program would benefit from a few adjustments.324/ He did not express

  " criticism" of the 1980-81 MPQAD organization. He acknow-l 322/ Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at pp. 144-189, paragraphs 238-299.

() 323/ Cook, Tr. 6551-52, 6673-74, 6453. 234/ Marguglio, Tr. 6949-50.

ledged that there was room for improvement, then acted to improve it.325/ Mr. Turnbull never " headed" quality assurance at Midland. He held the position of Site Quality Assurance Supervisor.326/ Mr. Bird was manager of MPQAD and Mr. Turnbull was a supervisor below him.327/ One of the reasons for the December MPQAD modifi-cations was the belief that the position of Site Quality Assurance Superintendent, as then constituted, was too large for one person to handle effectively.328/ Ms. Stamiris attempts to cast doubt on the sincerity of this belief by claiming that the modification greatly increased Mr. Margu-glio's duties. In his new position, Mr. Marguglio has no project cost or scheduling duties, and has delegated his environmental and non-Midland related quality assurance activities to subordinates. 29/ The December modification reconstituted the posi-tion of Site Quality Assurance Superintendent. Only the title was eliminated. All duties and functions of the superintendant's position remained, and divided between by Mr. Turnbull and Mr. Marguglio.330/ 325f Id. 326/ Marguglio, Tr. 6945. 327/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 13. 328/ Marguglio, Tr. 6949. 329/ Gallagher, Tr. 6759; Cook, Tr. 6451. 330/ Marguglio, Tr. 6982.

Paragraph 112. Mr. Marguglio has shown no insensi-tivity to the need for a Site ' Quality Assurance Supervisor.331/ The record contradicts the claim that Mr. Marguglio's attitude toward compliance with specifications is " casual": Mr. Marguglio was instrumental in the initiation of the FSAR re-review, whose purpose was to identify and correct any , inconsistencies in the Midland FSAR.332/ Dr. Landsman and  : Mr. Gilray agreed that the single noncompliance identified in the ent" ire FSAR re-review was minimal.333/ , Paragraph 113. Ms. Stamiris cites no evidence to support the claim that Mr. Marguglio attempted "to justify rather than correct identified weaknesses" during the November, 1981 audit. The audit report itself shows no attempt to i

  " justify" any of the questioned practices. Rather, it reveals a thorough investigation of the quality control inspector certification process.334/      It also demonstrates Mr. Marguglio's commitment to ensuring that any weaknesses in the program which may arise in the future will be promptly identified and corrected; the report recommended that the MPQAD continue its overview of the Bechtel inspector certi-i fication process to assure that the program continues to 331/ See supra at paragraph 29.

332/ Marguglio, prepared testimony at pp. 19-25, following Tr. 1424, and Attachment No. 10 at p. 23-36, following Tr. 1501. 333/ Landsman, Tr. 4907; Gilray, Tr. 3742-43. !A IU 334/ See supra at paragraph 102.

meet Midland requirements.335 The record also contradicts the claim that Audit Report F-77-32 attempted "to justify rather than correct identified weaknesses". The 1977 soils records audit did not attempt to prove that the in-place soils were adequate, as Ms. Stamiris suggests.336/ It sought only to discover whether documentation existed which I demonstrated the status of soils placement in designated areas of the plant.337/ When documentation of a passing l test could not be located, corrective action was taken. 8/ Paragraph 114. The " examples" cited by Ms. Stamiris do not support her claim that Mr. Marguglio always assumes "the best possible interpretation of information instead of conservatively assuming the worst." The testimony of Mr. Marguglio cited by Ms. Stamiris does not express " disregard for the relationship" between Q and non-Q areas. The cited testimony is simply Mr. Marguglio's guess as to why Mr. Keeley did not personally inform him of the grade beam failure in 1977.339/ Mr. Marguglio did not justify or defend any supposed lack of communication between Q and non-Q.340/ He did not testify that "only failing tests 335/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 22, at p. 3. 336/ See supra at paragraph 33. 337/ M. 338/ See supra at paragraphs 42-43, i 339/ Marguglio, Tr. 6658-59. lO l l 340/ I_d., Tr. 6586-87. i

                                    "T are subject to scrutiny."341/ Mr. Marguglio was correct in (G

suggesting that a passing tesE can clear a failing test, under the proper circumstances.342/ Mr. Marguglio did not testify that "the 1977 soils  : information did not warrant prevention of the diesel generator building construction in October 1977."343/ Ms. Stamiris asked him whether "all unresolved soils questions..., especially taking into consideration...the knowledge you had of the administration building problem and of the U.S. Testing procedures,...should have been completely answered beyond the shadow of a doubt before you began construction of the diesel generator building."344/ Mr. Marguglio testified that, when work on the diesel generator building was begun, he did not know of the existence of the administration building problem or the extent of the U.S. Testing errors.345/ Paragraph 115. Because Audit F-77-32 was only a record review and did not involve field tests on actual soils placement, it did not inform Mr. Marguglio of "the failure to compact the soil to the required density."346/ 341/ Id., Tr. 6507. 342/ See supra at paragraph 43. 343/ Marguglio, Tr. 6583-84. 344/ Id., Tr. 6585-86. 345/ Id., and Tr. 6504. 346/ See Consumers Power Proposed Supplemental Findings of t Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 217, paragraph 323. br-

l () Nor did Audit F-77-32 indicate the " failure of the testing process to detect the poor com'paction." The only error in l i i the U.S. Testing process revealed by Audit F-77-32 was the use of an improper factor in the calculation of certain test results.347/ The broader problems with soils testing were not discovered until 1978.348/ Paragraph 116. There was only one nonconformance report which documented a U.S. Testing error like one detected in Audit F-77-32. In 1975, a compaction test had been calculated using incorrect maximum lab dens ty.349/ The other nonconformances listed in NRC Inspection Report No. 78-20 are unrelated to the error detected by Audit F-77-32.350/ Mr. Marguglio testified in July, 1981 that Midland's trend analysis program "may well be the best trend program in the industry, as it now exists."351/ He did not apply this judgment to the trending program as it existed in 1974-78. He explained that the earlier trending analysis was not as sophisticated as the present program, and would not have detected a trend from the soils nonconformances in 347/ See supra at paragraphs 35-38; Marguglio, Tr. 6505-06. 348/ Marguglio, Tr. 6504. 349/ Stamiris Exhibit No. 3, Attachment No. 7, at p. 17. 350/ Id., at pp. 17-19. 351/ Marguglio, Tr. 1430 (emphasis added). (3 sj

                                      /-

1974-78.352/ The trend program was modified in 1979 to improve its ability to pick up repetitive nonconformances.353/ Paragraph 117. Contrary to the assertion in this paragraph, there was no indication in 1977 that the soils testing problems at Midland were significant. Mr. Marguglio testified that the few testing errors known to Consumers Power at that time appeared to be individual, isolated cases. 354/ It was not until the July 1978 Consumers Power investigation that widespread errors were discovered in the testing process.355/ There is no evidence to support the claim that Mr. Marguglio's response to the findings of Audit F-77-32 was

     " casual". The testimony cited as justification for the claim is Mr. Marguglio's explanation that information indicat-ing the extent of the soils testing and placement problems was not available to him in 1977.      6/  Consumers Power conducted an audit of soils testing records in 1977; because it was only a records review,357/ it did not uncover signifi-cant present problems with soils placement or testing.358/

352/ Id., Tr. 1431. 353/ Marguglio, prepared testimony, Attachment No. 10 at pp. 23-32 to 23-33, following Tr. 1501. . 354/ Marguglio, Tr. 6504. 355/ Id. s 356/ Id., Tr. 6583. i 357/ Board Exhibit No. 3, at p. 1. 358/ See supra at paragraphs 37-39.

O Mr. Marguglio did not testify,that it was "too late to correct placed soils by October, 1977". He simply explained that he could not know such correction was necessary, given the limited information available to him at that time.359/ , Paragraph 118. Ms. Stamiris cites no examples of specific corrective actions which were ignored in the November audit.360/ Paragraph 119. Bechtel did not eliminate the requirement to evaluate on-the-job training. As it stated in its response to the July audit, it had only deleted the requirement to evaluate the training program by review of the Corrective Action Log. 61/ As Mr. Marguglio testified, there was still a commitment to an ongoing evaluation. i Because a written requirement exists to perform training under the quality assurance program, quality assurance ' mandates a follow-up procedure to assess compliance with the requirement.362/ Mr. Marguglio affirmed the necessity of an on-going assessment of the effectiveness of the training, and testified that it would be accomplished by audits,  ! overviews and overinspections.363/ i 359/ Id.; Marguglio, Tr. 6583. . i r 360/ See supra at paragraph 80. 361/ Consumers Power Exhibit No. 23, at p. 2. 362/ Marguglio, Tr. 6987-88. 363/ Id., Tr. 6991.

 }}

l

() Paragraph 120. Mr. Marguglio's satisfaction with the quality control and qualit'y assurance programs clearly derives from an assessment of their performance. The November audit involved a detailed observation of the actual function-ing of the quality control certification and training program to determine whether its procedures and results were in compliance with requirements.364/ Mr. Marguglio commended the 1981 trending program, l not the 1974-78 program.365/ Mr. Marguglio defended the quality control inspector certification program as it pre-1 sently exists.366/ Mr. Gardner, a member of the NRC Inspec-tion No. 81-12 inspection team, is also satisfied with the 2 present Bechtel program.367/ The NRC Inspection No. 81-12 team did not identify any deficiencies in the Bechtel pro-grams. 368/ Only " potential" conditions were identified.369/ The inspectors believed that these warranted a second audit.370/ Mr. Marguglio agreed, and scheduled the November audit.371/ There is ne evidence that Mr. Marguglio disagreed with the 364/ See supra at paragraph 102. 365/ See supra at paragraph 116. 366/ Marguglio, Tr. 6953. 367/ Gardner, prepared testimony at pp. 3-4, following Tr. 8037. 368/ Gardner, Tr. 8041-42 and prepared testimony at p. 2, following Tr. 8037. 369/ Id. 370/ Gardner, Tr. E045.

  }

371/ Marguglio, Tr. 6958-59. a

i 1 l O conc 1usions of unc inspection aeport no. 81-12 . hen it wes published. Paragraphs 121-122. The record disproves the claim that Mr. Marguglio has a " broad brush approach to QA". He shows great appreciation of the importance of daily detail to quality assurance: one of the reasons for the December modification of the MPQAD was Mr. Marguglio's desire to be more involved in the detailed day-to-day quality assurance activities.372/ He also shows a great concern with rigorous adherence to specifications: he was instru-mental in instigating the FSAR re-review, 3/ he directed an in-depth investigation of quality control inspector qualifi-cations 374/ and he instituted a more rigorous certification process for inspectors.375/ The depth and detail of the November 1981 audit show that he does not accept subjective judgments as a substitute for objective criteria.376/ The detail and throughness of Consumers Power's response to 10 CFR 550.54(f) Question 23,377/ prepared under Mr. Marguglio's supervisor, also shows the depth of his commitment to an effective quality assurance program. l l 372/ Marguglio, Tr. 6981. t l 373/ Marguglio, prepared testimony at pp. 19-25, following Tr. 1424. l 374/ Marguglio, Tr. 6957, 6959; see supra at paragraph 102. l 375/ Marguglio, Tr. 6538. ) O 376/ See supra at paragraphs 102-03. 1 l 377/ Marguglio, prepared testimony, Attachment No. 10, follow- ) ing Tr. 1501. l 1

Paragraph 123. Mr. Marguglio's concern with identifying and correcting deficiencies is borne out by his participation in the quality assurance program. Among other things, he reads all audit reports, identifies any finding which is of major consequence, and lists the item in his own personal action follow-up list. He follows up with the supervisor or section head involved with the closure of each item to insure the item is resolved properly; at times, he provides additional advice on the best corrective action.378/ He is also responsible for the establishment and enforcement of quality assurance standards. These standards prescribe the systematic actions which the design, construction and procurement organizations at Midland must take in order to prevent deficiencies. He also sets and enforces standards which the quality assurance and quality control organizations must adhere to in order to assure that any nonconformances are accepted and corrected.379/ His personal commitment to curing and preventing problems at the plant and his profes-sional commitment to the establishment and enforcement of quality assurance standards set a positive example for his subordinates and ensure a thorough and effective quality assurance program. Ms. Stamiris cites no evidence in support of her assertion that Mr. Marguglio's actions are characterized by a " push to proceed", to the detriment of quality assurance. 378/ Marguglio, Tr. 6937. 379/ Id., Tr. 6511-12.

A (-) Paragraph 124. Contrary to the implication of this paragraph, there is no evidence that Mr. Bird or anyone else at Consumers Power decided to proceed with construction of the diesel generator building knowing that it was built on " questionable soils". The information available to Consumers Power in 1977 did not demonstrate the existence of a soils problem in Q-areas.380/ Paragraph 125. As explained above, Consumers Power's response to the SALP report was quite extensive.381/ The NRC Staff's 10 CFR 550.54(f) Question 23 did not reject Consumers Power's response to 10 CFR $50.54(f) Question 1; it elicited more information.382/ Paragraph 126. Mr. Cook's response to the SALP report did concentrate on correcting identified weaknesses in the Midland program. The whole purpose of the meetings with the NRC Staff and the concentrated effort to prepare a response to the SALP findings was to draw up a program of activities to respond to the concerns raised by the Region III Staff. 83/ Mr. Cook even invited an NRC Staff inspec-tion of Midland to determine the adequacy of Consumers Power's response to the SALP concerns.384/ 380/ See supra at paragraphs 36-38, 41. 381/ See supra at paragraph 11. 382/ Marguglio, prepared testimony, attachment No. 10, at

p. 23-1, following Tr. 1501.
 ) 383/ Cook, Tr. 6470-71.

384/ Id.; Cook, prepared testimony at p. 11, following Tr. 1693.

() Paragraph 127. Consumers Power did not hire a geotechnical soils engineer in' response to pressure from the NRC Staff. Consumers Power has employed a full time geo-technical soils engineer at Midland since 1979.385/ Nor did Consumers Power " fail to institute a program to effect improvements suggested by the MAC findings". Mr. Bird described the Consumers Power response to the MAC Report at length.386/ Paragraph 128. Ms. Stamiris has confused the Crosby philosophy of "upfront" expenditures to ensure quality with the NRC Staff preference for "upfront" criteria. The Crosby philosophy is not concerned with "upfront" criteria or with the most conservative approach. Rather, it emphasizes that quality can be best assured by a strong commitment to doing a project correctly the first time.387/ Consumers Power adhered to the Crosby philosophy in choosing a remedy for the soils settlement problem at Midland: it hired soils experts to study the soils problems and followed their advice regarding the best remedy.388/ Paragraph 129. Mr. Cook's affidavit, attached to Consumers Power's Seismic Deferral Motion, notes that pro-385/ Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 168, paragraph 270. 386/ Bird, Tr. 5122-47. 387/ Cook, Tr. 2517. ' I^'t 388/ Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions

 \#        of Law, at pp. 103-125, paragraphs 142-190.

l l

O ceeding with construction would present some financial risk (_/ to Consumers Power.389/ But this is nothing unusual: Darl Hood testified that "any action an applicant takes in con-structing its plant is taken at its own risk."390/ There is no support for characterizing the Seismic Deferral Motion as an " extreme request". The Licensing Board has ruled that the legitimate exercise of Consumers Power's legal rights or processes under the law is not subject to scrutiny at these hearings.391/ Paragraph 130. Mr. Cook did not " defend past QA  : decisions about remedial choices." The testimony cited in support of the claim is Mr. Cook's assent to the statement that "a basic component of the observational or proof test approach is to go ahead with the actions and then wait until the end of those actions to observe and evaluate the extent of those actions."392/

SUMMARY

QUALITY ASSURANCE FINDINGS Paragraph 131. This paragraph introduces a conten-tion which has never been at issue in these proceedings. ! 389/ See Affidavit of James Cook dated March 16, 1981, attached to Applicant's Motion to Defer Consideration of Seismic Issues Until the Operating License Proceed-ings, dated March 18, 1981. 390/ Hood, Tr. 2678-79. 391/ Prehearing Conference Order ruling on Contentions and on Consolidation of Proceeding (October 24, 1980), pp. 5-6. Os 392/ Cook, Tr. 6615.

() The only contention relating to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion I was Ms. Stamiris Contention No. 3(b): Consumers Power Company has not imple-mented its Quality Assurance Program re-7 garding soil settlements issues according to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B regulations, and this represents a repeated pattern of quality assurance deficiency reflecting a managerial attitude inconsistent with implementation of Quality Assurance Regu-lations with respect to soils settlement problems, since reasonable assurance was given in past cases (ALAB-100, ALAB-106 and LBP-74-71) that proper quality assur-ance would ensue and it has not. I l The Quality Assurance Deficiencies regard-ing soils criteria denoted by roman numerals j , below: l I. The Applicant has failed to assume responsibility for execution of the QA program through its failure to verify and review FSAR statements (pp. 6-8 and p. 21, Keppler Report) and through its reliance on final test results not in accordance with specified requirements (p. 16, Keppler Report). There has never been an allegation that Mr. Cook's financial and scheduling responsibilities bear a relation to this contention. Mr. Cook was not employed by Consumers Power at the time of the incidents described in this contention.393/ Indeed the position he now holds had not yet been created at that time.394/ Morcover, Mr. Keppler testified that Mr. 393/ Cook, prepared testimony at pp. 1-2, following Tr. 1630; Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at p. 19, paragraph 40, 394/ Id. em l - l

l Cook's responsibilities did not violate 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion I. 95/ . Paragraph 133. Bechtel's quality control inspector training and certification program complies with all applic-able requirements.396/ Paragraph 134. No response. Paragraph 135. Consumers Power's quality assur-ance program promptly acts to correct deficiencies, once they are identified, and to preclude their repetition.397/ Paragraph 136. Current managerial attitudes to-wards the findings of Audit F-77-32 and the July and November 1981 audits are consistent with the implementation of an effective quality assurance program.398/ Paragraph 137. The evidentiary record in these proceedings fully supports Part 3 of the NRC Staff / Consumers Power Company Quality Assurance Stipulation.399/ Paragraph 138. No response. 395/ Keppler, Tr. 2053-54. 396/ See supra at paragraphs 61-107; Consumers Power Pro-posed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions l of Law, at pp. 222-230, paragraphs 330-336. 397/ Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at pp. 13-60, paragraphs 33-84. 398/ See supra at paragraphs 54-60. ! 399/ Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions j of Law, at pp. 13-60, paragraphs 33-84.

( STAMIRIS CONTENTION NO. 1 The NRC Staff / Consumers Power Company Stipulations do not constitute an admission that Consumers Power had a less than complete and candid dedication to providing informa-tion to th? NRC Staff at any time. In the Quality Assurance Stipulation, Consumers Power merely agrees not to contest the existence of soils quality assurance deficiencies prior to December 6, 1979, relating to the Modification Order.400/ The Modification Order did not describe any quality assurance deficiencies concerning Consumers Power's provision of information to the NRC Staff during that period.401/ In the two other stipulations, Consumers Power agrees not to contest that as of December 6, 1979, the NRC Staff had insufficient information to evaluate the underground piping, the borated water storage tanks and the technical adequacy of proposed remedial measures.402/ Neither of these stipulations addresses the issue of Consumers Power's attitude toward providing information to the NRC Staff.403/ The actions of Consumers Power, taken singly or as a whole, do not " represent a tendency to push ahead which unduly considers time schedule pressures." l t l j 400/ NRC Staff / Consumers Power Company Joint Exhibit No. 1. 401/ Modification Order. 402/ NRC Staff / Consumers Power Company Joint Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3. I 403/ _Id_. l l l l

(1) The resolution.of the loose sands question had no relationship to financial and time pressures.404/ (2) Consumers Power's alleged failure to follow Dames and Moore soils specifications was not part of any acontention in these proceedings. In any event, there is no evidence that Consumers Power failed to follow the specifica-tions of the original dewatering plan.405/ (3) The failure to prevent construction of the diesel generator building is not a contention in these pro-ceedings. Moreover, the information available to Consumers Power in 1977 seemed to indicate no major soils problems.406/ (4) The FSAR as submitted was sufficiently com-plete. The early submittal of the FSAR was not based on improper motives.407/ (5) There was no decision in November, 1978 to resume construction of the diesel generator building.408/ The surcharge application did not begin in November, 1978; it began in January, 1979.409/ There were many meetings I 404/ Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at pp. 132-32, paragraphs 206-210. 405/ See Tr. 2486-99. 406/ See supra at paragraph 41.  ! 407/ Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclu-sions of Law, at pp. 125-29, paragraphs 191-98; NRC Staff Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at pp. 40-42, paragraphs 419-21. 408/ Keeley, prepared testimony at pp. 8-10, following Tr. l (_-) 1163. l 409/ Id.; Howell, Tr. 2885-87; Keeley, Tr. 1243; Hood, Tr. 2676; Stamiris Exhibit Nos. 1, 7, 10 and 13.

3% (,) between the NRC Staff and Consumers Power regarding soils before December, 1978.410/ '. (6) None of the actions regarding the condensate line, mudmat, grouting of gaps or the filling of the cooling pond were failures to follow suggestions of consultants.411/ Nor were any of these actions related in any way to timing or scheduling.412/ (7) The decision to remove the surcharge on the diesel generator building was unrelated to time and financial

       . considerations. 413/

(8) The allegation that "the choice to proceed with construction of the borated water storage tanks on f questionable soils" represented a tendency to push ahead is not a contention in these proceedings. Moreover, there is

;       no evidence that Consumers Power believed that the tank was      t built on questionable soils.414/                                 ;

(9) There is no evidence that Consumers Power i undertook soils-related work despite its voluntary stop-work order.415/ There is no support in the record for the claim 410/ Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at pp. 52-55, paragraphs 72-74. 411/ Id., at pp. 106-109, 113-17, paragraphs 149-56, 164-74. 412/ Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions ' of Law, at pp. 106-109, 113-17, paragraphs 149-56, 165-74. 413/ Id., at pp. 109-13, paragraphs 157-63. 414/ Id., at pp. 83-87, paragraphs 115-17.

]
     ,  415/ Hood, Tr. 6863.

P

I I l ! i m that Consumers Power's contract with Dow is a source of time pressure, or has caused any hasty decisions by consumers Power. There is no contention relating to the Dow contract. l CONCLUSIONS OF LAW A. The soils-related quality assurance deficien-cies set forth in Appendix B of the Modification Order were an adequate basis for the issuance of that order. B. The 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion I requirement relating to freedom from cost and scheduling responsibilities has not been violated.416/ C. Consumers Power's quality assurance program adequately assures that quality control inspectors are trained and certified in compliance with all applicable requirements.417/ D. Consumers Power's quality assurance program complies with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI with regard to adequate corrective actions.418/ E. There is reasonable assurance that quality control and quality assurance programs will be adequately implemented with respect to future soils construction activi-416/ See supra at paragraph 132. 417/ See supra at paragraph 104. 418/ See Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclu-sions of Law, at pp. 152-53, paragraphs 248-49. l I l - .-

j ties, including remedial action taken as a result of inade-quate soil placement.419/ F. Consumers Power's present managerial attitude provides reasonable assurance of an ability and willingness to give sufficient attention to the details of quality assurance operation.420/ G. Consumers Power has kept its past quality assurance commitments.421/ H. " Sunk costs" are not a part of any contention in these proceedings. 419/ See Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclu-sions of Law, at pp. 21-29, paragrapht. 44-53; Consumers Power Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclu-sions of Law, at pp. 204-212, paragraphs 310-318. 420/ See supra paragraphs 108-130; Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at pp. 45-47, paragraphs 62-65. l(~l 421/ See Consumers Power Proposed Findings of Fact and Con-ix_/ clusions of Law, at pp.176-81, paragraphs 280-87.

p V Appendix A INDEX OF EXHIBITS A. Licensing Board l Exhibit No. 3: Audit Report F-77-32 regarding October 3-7, 1981 audit of soils placement records. B. Consumers Power Exhibit No. 2: Letter from Keppler to Cook, dated 1/12/81, transmitting NRC Inspection Report Nos. 80-10 and 80-11 regarding Zack allegations. Exhibit No. 3: Letter from Cook to Stello, dated 1/30/81, responding to Zack allegations. Exhibit No. 5: Letter from Keppler to Cherry, dated 12/14/81. Exhibit No. 13: MPQAD organization chart, dated 7/31/81. Exhibit No. 22: Audit Report dated 12/14/81, regarding i audit of Bechtel QC inspector training and certifi-cation. Exhibit No. 23: Audit Report dated 7/24/81, regarding audit of Bechtel QC inspector training and certifi-cation. C. NRC Staff Exhibit No. 1: Letter from Keppler to Cook, dated 7/13/81, transmitting NRC Inspection Report No. 81-12 regarding NRC Staff's May, 1981 assessment of MPQAD. Exhibit No. 4: MAC Final Report, dated 5/27/81. Exhibit No. 7: NRC SALP Staff Final Report on Licensee Assessments (NUREG-0834), dated August, 1981. Exhibit No. 8: Letter from Keppler to Moseley, dated

 ^

1/2/81, transmitting Action Plan resulting from ,(27 l meeting of 11/24/80 and NRC Inspection Report Nos. 80-35 and 80-36. i 1

pq GJ . Exhibit No. 9: Working Paper prepared by SALP Staff, dated May, 1981. Exhibit No. 10: SALP Input Memo prepared by NRR Project Manager, Midland. D. Joint NRC Staff / Consumers Power Exhibit No. 1: Quality Assurance Stipulation. Exhibit No. 2: Stipulation regarding sufficiency of information provided to the NRC Staff by Consumers Power with respect to auxilary building proposed remedial measures. Exhibit No. 3: Stipulation regarding sufficiency of information provided to the NRC Staff by Consumers Power with respect to BWSTs and underground piping. E. Intervenor Stamiris Exhibit No. 1: Memo prepared by Keeley and T. Cooke, dated 12/4/78, regarding diesel generator building settlement meeting on 11/2/78. Exhibit No. 3: Attachment No. 7: NRC Inspection Report No. 78-20, dated 3/22/79. Exhibit No. 7: Meeting Notes prepared by B. Dhar, regarding diesel generator building settlement meeting on 12/4/78. Exhibit No. 10: Memo from Marshal (Bechtel) to Afifi, dated 11/6/78, regarding 10/18/78 meeting and planned diesel generator building surcharge instrumentation. [Not in evidence). Exhibit No. 13: Letter from Martinez (Bechtel) to Keeley, dated 11/1/78, confirming 10/25/78 meeting discussion of diesel generator building. v

(q) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

                                )    Docket Nos. 50-329-OM CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY    )                 50-330-OM
                                )                 50-329-OL (Midland Plant, Units 1   )                 50-330-OL and 2)                     )                                   :

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Robert G. Fitzgibbons, Jr., one of the attorneys for Consumers Power Company, hereby certify that a copy of

     " Consumers Power Company's Response to Stamiris Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Law for Partial Decision on Quality Assurance and Management Attitude Issues" was served upon all persons shown in the attached service list by deposit in the United States mail, first class, this 26th day of April, 1982.

1} LLk-8.4r4)n . .

                                           'RobertGQFitgibbons, fr.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before lae this Jg day of Om u h , 1982. ' Yula , Notary Public l l

    )
 \;'

SERVICE LIST Steve Gadler, Esq. Frank J. Kelley, Esq. Attorney General of the 2120 Carter Avenue State of Michigan St. Paul, Minnesota 55108 Carole Steinberg, Esq. Atomic Safety & Licensing Assistant Attorney General Appeal Panel Environmental Protection Div. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. 720 Law Building Washington, D.C. 20555 Lansing, Michigan 48913 Mr. C. R. Stephens Myron M. Cherry, Esq. Chief, Docketing & Services One IBM Plaza U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. Suite 4501 Office of the Secretary Chicago, Illinois 60611 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Wendell H. Marshall Ms. Mary Sinclair RFD 10 5711 Summerset Street Midland, Michigan 48640 Midland, Michigan 48640 Charles Bechhoefer, Esq. Atomic Safety & Licensing William D. Paton, Esq. Board Panel Counsel for the NRC Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety & Licensing Dr. Frederick P. Cowan Board Panel 6152 N. Verde Trail U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. Apt. B-125 Washington, D.C. 20555 Boca Raton, Florida 33433 Admin. Judge Ralph S. Decker Barbara Stamiris Route No. 4, Box 190D 5795 North River Road Cambridge, Maryland 21613 Route 3 Freeland, Michigan 48623 Carroll E. Mahaney Jerry Harbour Babcock & Wilcox Atomic Safety & Licensing P.O. Box 1260 Board Panel Lynchburg, Virginia 24505 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. James E. Brunner, Esq. Washington, D.C. 20555 Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 e}}