ML20012D778

Proposed Tech Specs Re Limiting Condition for Operation & Surveillance Requirements Re Borated Waste Source - Shutdown & Borated Water Sources - Operating

ML20012D778
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	03/13/1990
From:	DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20012D777	List: ML20012D776 ML20012D778
References
NUDOCS 9003280360
Download: ML20012D778 (13)

Text

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i a s ATTACIIMENT I PROPOSED TEC11NICAL SEPCIFICATION C11ANGES

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9003280360 900313

[,'DR ADOCK 03000413 PDC a

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B0 RATED WATER SOURCE - SHUTDOWN LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. A Boric Acid Storage System with:

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1) A minimum contained borated water volume of-0100 gallons,

2) A minimum boron concentration of 7000 ppa, and

3) A minimum solution temperature of 65'F.

b. The refueling water storage tank with:

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Aminimumcontainedboratedwatervolumeof.-l5, 867 ooc)900 gallons,

2) A minimue boron concentration of 2000 ppm, and

3) A mininium solution tempergture of 70'F.

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTF.P.ATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ._

4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1) Verifying the boron concentration of the water,

2) Verifying the contained borated water volume, and

3) Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the refueling water storage tank temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is less than 70*F.

CATAWBA - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 1-11

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. REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS. l

. i 80 RATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING  !

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

3.1.2.6 As a minimum, the following borated water source (s) shall be OPERABLE i as required by Specification 3.1.2.2:

s. A Boric Acid Storage System with.

1) A minimum contained borated water volume of Q..,.00 000 gallons, 2)- A minimum boron concentration of 7000 ppe, and- i

3) A minimum solution temperature of 65'F.

b. The refbeling water storage tank with:  !

1) A contained borated water volume of at least 363,513 gallons,

2) A minimum boron concentration of 2000 pps,

3) A minimum solution temperature of 70'F, and

4) A maximum solution temperature of 100'F.

. y APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, snd 4.

f ACTION:

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a. With the Boric Acid Storage System inoperable and being used as one of the abcve required borated watt.r sources, restore the system to L OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within L the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a SHUT 00WN MARGIN equiva' lent to at .

least 1% ak/k at 200*F; restore the Boric Acid Storage System to  !

OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

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b. With the refueling water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. '

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l i-CATAWBA - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 1-12 <

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O r- ATACIMENT II JUSTIFICATION AND NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS ANALYSIS i

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Discussion. No Significant Hazards Analysis and j j

> Environmental Impact Statement U ,

L The proposed amendment to Technical Specifications (TS) 3.1.2.5 and 3.1.2.6 will change the required volume of the Boric Acid Tank (BAT) from 5100 ,

gallons to 12,000 gallons in Modes 5-6, and 19,500 gallons to 22,000 gallons

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!- in Modes 1-4. The required volume of the Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) will change from 26,000 gallons to 45,000 gallons in Modes 5-6. J

! The volume required for the FWST in Modes 1-4, 363,513 gallons, will not

.. change. This level provides the maximum available volume to account for ,

F shutdown margin, worst case single failure. adequate containment sump volume j for transfer to sump recitculation, and sufficient volume abovn the switch  !

over initiation level such that no operator action is required prior to ten minutes after the initiation of the accident.

During the review of a plant modification for necessary procedure changes, it was found that the TS values for BAT volume in TS 3.1.2.5 and 3.1.2.6 did not appear to account for unusable volume in the BAT as is assumed in Basis  :

3/4.1.2, Boration Systems. This basis, in fact, states: "The contr.ined water voltme limite include allowance for water not available becasse of discharge line location and other physical characteristics." A Duke Power Problem Investigation Report was initiated and a calculation was done to determine the necessary contasned volume to meet the TS Basis for the BAT. ,

As part of the resolution to this Problem Investigation Report a calculation was also completed to verify the IVST volumes required in Modes 1-6.

As part of the problem-resolution, the Design Bases requirements for BAT and l FWST level were researched and reconstructed based on the required safety i je.

function of the tanks. The Bl.To are designed to store sufficient boric acid for a cold shutdown fro:a full p>wer operation immediately in11owing refueling with the most reactive control rod not inaerted, plus opero',ing margins-(FSAR Section 9.3.4). Additionally, conditions at Cold Shutdown require the reactor to be shutdcwn by at lear,t 1.6% AK/K (FSAR Section-15.4). .The FVST is required to provide a source of borated water at refueling water boron concentration for use during refueling or a postulated loss-of-coolant accident. The FWST must contain enough inventory to bring the reactor to a safe shutdown through all six modes of operation (FSAR Section 9.27). The Design Bases volumes for these tanks account for tank specific characteristics including:

1. Tank tolerances

2. Suction line locations above the tank bottom

3. Vortex allowance for maximum outflow expected for each TS Mode.

4. System specific NPSH requirements and tank outlet piping considerations.

5. Instrument loop error based on Total Loop Accuracy to the Control Room, and

6. Any temperature, specific gravity, or other variables not included in the Total Loop Accuracy Calculation.

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The results of the calculations were compared to the existing values in TSs  :

and the TS Basis to evaluate the differences. per Design Engineering calculations, the minimum volume for the BAT during Modes 5-6 should be l 12,000 gallons and during Modes 1-4 it should be 22,000 gallons.

The existing TSs require a BAT volume of 5100 gallons in Modes 5-6 (TS o n 3.1.2.5) and 19,500 gallons in Modes.1-4 (TS 3.1.2.6) The current required '

l' volume for the FWST is 26,000 gallons in Modes 5-6 (TS 3.1.2.5). The above F tank volumes required per TSs for the BAT and the FWST do not meet Design L Bases, and are not conservative because they do not account for unusable L tank volumes. This proposed change to TSs will correct the volumes required l for the BAT and FWST to account for unusable tank volumes. .

t 10 CFR 50.92 states that a proposed amendment. involves no significant hazards considerations ~if operation in accordance with the amendment would ,

nott b 1)' Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequunces of

[ of an accident previously evaluated; or  !

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2): Create the por.sibility of a new or different kind of accident from any '

accident prevf.ously evaluated; or

3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

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The proposed amendment.will change the required volumes for the BAT and the .

FWST-to account for unusable tank volumes. This change will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evalur.ted, the BAT

-and FWST required volumes are being increased to meet current Design Bases i forithe tanks.

Tha proposed amendment will'not increase the possibility of a new or L dif ferent kind of accident f rom any previously evaltuated. Current TS required volumes are not conservative because they do not take into. account  ;

musable tank volunes. The proposed amendment will change TS tequirements -

to reflect the Design Bases of the tanks.

The proposed amenduent does not involve a reduction in the margin of safety.

Current TS requirements do not reflect the Design Bases of the tanks because unusabic tank volumes are not accounted for. The proposed amendment-reflects Design Bases by accounting for unusable tank volumes, and is therefore more conservative.

For-all-the above reasons, Duke power concludes that this proposed amendment does not involve any Significant Hazards Considerations.

The proposed Technical Specification change has been reviewed against the

criteria of 10 CFR 51.22 for environmental considerations. As shown above,

.the proposed change does not involve any significant hazards consideration, nor increase the types and amounts of effluents that may be released offsite, nor increase the individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposures. Based on this, the proposed Technical Specification change meets the criteria given in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) for categorical exclusion from the requirement for an Environmental Impact Statement.

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ATTACitMENT III 9 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES CilANGE

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. REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS  !

u BASES .

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MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued) involved subtracting the incremental change in the MDC associated with a core condition of all rods inserted (most positive MOC) to an all rods withdrawn >

condition and, a conversion for the rate of change of moderator density with temperature at RATED THERHAL POWER conditions. TbjsvalueoftheMOCwasthen  ;

transformed into thg limiting MTC value -4.1 x 10 Ak/k/'F. The MTC  ;

value of -3.2 x 10 ak/k/*F represents a conservative value (with corrections for burnup and soluble boron) at a core condition of 300 ppm equilibriumboronconcentrationand.jsobtainedbymakingthesecorrectionsto the limiting MTC value of -4.1 x 10 ak/k/*F. l .

The Surveillance Requirements for measurement of the MTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the MTC remains within its limits since this coefficient cnanges slowly due principally to the reduction in boron concentratton a!,sociated wf th fuel Nrnup.

3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 551*F. This (,

limitation is required to ensure: (1) the meders. tor temperature coefficient L i

is within it analyzed tempe sture range (2) the trip instrumentation is within its normal operating range, (3) 'che P-12 interlock is above its setpoint, (4) the pressurizer is capable ef being in an CPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and (5) the reacter vessel is above its minimum RT temperature.

NOT 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS ,

The Boron Injection System ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to g perform this function include: (1) borated water sources, (2) charging pumps, l

(3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid transfer pumps, and (5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

I With the coolant average temperature above 200*F, a minimum of two boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable. The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTOOWN l

CATAWBA - UNITS 1&2 8 3/4 1-2 Amendment No. 14(Unit 1)

Amendment No. 6 (Unit 2)

e REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

! BASES B0 RATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.3% Ak/k after xenon decay and cocidown to 200'F. The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs at E0L from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires l 995/ ,4679 21 gallons of 7000 ppe borated water from the boric acid storage tanks l

l LM # I or tank.-73,4 ,1c> 70v0 gallons of 2000 ppe borated water from the refueling wate I(~o m @ Ched Wi the coolant temperature below 200*F, one Boron Injection Shw /pysts PA is ig$g acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Boron b

l Injection fyjtf ecomes inoperable.

-The-limitatterrfcr a maximummf one esntrifugal-charging ~ pump to^be

-OPEAARLE.and-the-Surveillance-Requiresent-to-verify a11 charging pumps-axcapt,

_the. required OPERASLE. pump-to be-inoperable-below-285'Fyrovides-essutence---

4 hat 4Laass aedit4en-preew+-transient een bc Hered+y-the-operatie-of-a-single-PORE The boron capability required below 200'F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% Ak/k after xeno ay and cooldown fron 200'F to 140'F, This condition requires eithe gallons of 7000 ppm barated water  ;

from the boric acid storage tanks or 3M O-ge11ons of 2000 ppe borated water '

from the refueling water storage tank. W 7

c\ The of s' C , m % t u because contained water volume limits include allowanco for water not available discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

Thelimitsoncontair.edwatervolumeandboronconcentrationgfthe ,

rafueling water storage tank also ensure a pH value of between-84 and led 9 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

The OPERABILITY of one Boron Injection System during REFVELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTA0L ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that: (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is main-tained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits. Verification that the Digital Rod Position Indicator agrees with the demanded position within i 12 steps at 24, 48, 120 and 228 steps withdrawn for the Control Banks and 18, 210 and 228 steps withdrawn for the Shutdown Banks provides assurances that the Digital Rod Position Indicator is operating correctly over the full range of indication.

. Since the Digital Rod Position System does not indicate the actual shutdown rod

' position between 18 steps and 210 steps, only points in the indicated ranges are picked for verification of agreement with demanded position.

CATAWBA - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 1-3

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1.- The Technical Specification requires 22,000 gallons of 7000 ppm borated ,

water from the boric acid tanks to be available in Modes 1-4. This  !

volume is based on the required volume for maintaining shutdown margin, r unusable volume (to allow for a full suction pipe), instrument error,.  :

y and additional margin to account for different cores and conservatism ,

[ as follows.  ;

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[ ' Modes 1-4 Boric Acid Tank f

L Required volume for maiutaining SDM 9,851 gallons  ;

i 5% Additional Margin 496 gallons Unusable Volume (to maintain full suction pipe) 7,230 gallons j c 14" of water equivalent Vortexing (4" of water. above top of suction pipe 2,066 gallons Instrumentation Error (Based on Tot 21 Loop Acc. 1,550 gallons  ;

for 1&2 FV5740 loops) - 2" of water equivalent 21,193 gallons This value is increased to 22,000 gallons for additional margin.

A similar approach is taken for calculating tba required Refueling Water Storage Tank volumet When the temperature ci one or moro cold legs drops below 28b*F in Mode 4, the potential for low temperature overpressurization of the reactor vcasol makes it necessary to render one charging pump INOPERABLE and at least one safety injection pump INOPERABLE. The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to 4

. verify all-charging pumps except the required CPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 285'F provides assurance that a mass nddition nrossure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single 70RV.

Refueling Water StoraRe Tank Requirements For Maintaining SDM - Modes 1-4 ,

Required Volume for Maintaining SDM 57,107 gallons Unusable Volume (below nozzle) .13,442 gallons Instrument Inaccuracy 11,307 gallons Vortexing 13,247 nallons 95,103 gallons The Tech Spec Volume 363,513 gallons was determined by correcting the tank's low level setpoint (level at which makeup is added to tank) for instrument inaccuracy. This level provides the maximum available volume to account for shutdown margin, worst case single failure, adequate containment sump volume  !

for transfer to recirculation, and sufficient volume above the switchover initiation level such that no operator action is required prior to ten minutes after the initiation of the accident.

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i' 2. The. Boric Acid Tank.and Refueling Water Storage Tank volumes required ;i O ,

in Modes 5-6 to provide necessary SDM are based on the following inputs j

, as discussed previously .

Boric Acid Tank i I: L i Required Volume for maintaining,SDM 585 gallons .

[: Unusable Volume, Vortexing, Inst. Error. 10,846 gallons ,

h 5% additional margin 33 na11ons l

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This:value in increased to the Tech.. Spec. value of 12,000 gallons for l r

additional margin; .

,t pp .Refuelina Water Storage Tank

• " . Required Volume'for Maintaining SDM 3,500 gallona f Water.Bolow the Nozzle 13.442 gallons 1 g .

Instrumr.nt inaccuracy 11,307 gallons j "ft , Vottexing 13,247 gallons ,

41,496 gallons 'f D -: .

fi This value=is; increased to the. Tech. Spec. value of 45,000 gallons for it ,

additional r.argin.  ;

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ATTACIIMENT IV

(. JUSTIFICATION FOR BASES CilANGE

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l 5 Justification for Basee Change The existing Bases, 3/4.1.2 Boration Systems, does not ac :urately reflect l' required tank volumes to maintain shutdown margin for the BAT and the FWST.

The bases t.lso states an incorrect pil value for the solution recirculated in containment after a LOCA. ,

L L_ This proposed amendment changes the. required volume for maintaining shutdown margin for the Boric Acid Storage Tank, and the RefueliDg Water Storage Tank. The required boration capability to provide a snutdown margin frota ~ l expected operating conditions of 1.36% K/K after xanon decay'and cooldown to 200*F changes from 16,321 gallons to 9851 gallons of 7000 ppm borsted  ;

= water from the boric acid storage tank and from 75,000 gallons tc 57,107 L gallons of 2000 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank. ,

The required boration capability belou 200*F whi,:h till provide a shuti'own-L:  !

f marginal 1% K/K af ter xenon tacaf and cooldovn frota 200* to 140* chans;es l I from 90f gallons to 5?5 gallons of 7000 priu borated water from the boric acid storage tank and f rom 3170 gallons to 3500 gr,11ons of 2000 ppm be:ated i water from the refueling unter storage tank. These changen reflect the most t recent Design Engineering calculat. ions which have been corapleted for the--

volumes required in the BAT, and the FW37. l g Ta5s proposed amendaent also changes the range for the pH vilue of t.he1  !

solut. ion recirculated-in containment after a LOCA. Currently the stated .

range is 8.5 to 10.5. Thia propose.1.smendment changes the pH range to 8 to  !

9. This pil range is consistent with Catawba FSAR Section-6.1.1.2.2 aad has i been verified by a Design thgineering calculation to be corr'2ct.

i This proposeA-amendment'also adds sec*. ions which clarify the margins which >

were taken into account in arriving at the final TS requirements for the RAT and FWST in TSs 3.1.2.5 and 3.1.2.6. The text which has been added make it -!

clear what itcms were actually taken into account in Easign Engineering l calculations and how much margin was added for each inaccuracy.  ;

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