ML20113G443

Proposed Tech Specs 8.3 Re Onsite Power Systems

ML20113G443
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	09/21/1996
From:	DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20113G434	List: ML20113G432 ML20113G443
References
NUDOCS 9609270217
Download: ML20113G443 (6)

Text

- - - - _ -_ - . -. . . - - -. ._ . _ - . _ ,

d

. .' MC dMTdfdT 8.3 Onsite Power Systems Catawba Nuclear Station l

I 1

I 8.3.2.2.4 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.32, IEEE Standard 308-19 74, and IEEE Standard I

450-1975 and IEEE 450 1980 -

j _--- -

3081974 as augmented j e design Class . de power syst s co . es with the requirements e 1.32. The Class tteries are given a service te interval not to exceed 18 by Regulatory v, the Class IE ba rformance and accep e tests ply with Section 5 of months. Ad

, IEEE 450-1 andi etion 6 of IE 450-1 8.3.2.2.5 Class 1E Equipment Qualification Requirements The seismic and environmental qualifications of Class IE de power system equipment are discussed in Sections 3.10, " Seismic Qualification of Seismic Category 1 Instrumentation and Electrical Equipment" on on page 3-219 and 3.11, "Emironmental Design of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment" page 3-223, respectively.

8.3.2.3 Physical identification of Class 1E Equipment l

The physical identification of the Class IE de systems equipment is discussed in Section 8.3.1.3, " Physical Identification of Class IE Equipment" on page 8 38.

8.3.2.4 Independence of Redundant Systems The independence of redundant Class lE de systems is discussed in Section 8.3.1.4, " Independence of Redundant Systems" on page 8 38.

THIS IS THE LAST PAGE OF THE CHAPTER S TEXT PORTION.

Replace UFSAR section 8.3.2.2.4 with the following: _

"The design of Class 1E DC power systems complies with the requirements of IEEE 308-1974 as augmented by Regulatory Guide 1.32 with the following clarification:

In general, protective devices on the 125 VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System (EPL) are selected and set so that a minimal amount of equipment is isolated from the system for adverse conditions such as a fault.

Protective devices protect cable and equipment. In the case of DC distribution system breakers that may not fully coordinate, the resulting ar.ount of equipment isolation is acceptable, such that there is no impact on the UFSAR Chapter 15 safety analyses and redundant egyipment is not .

affected. l The Class 1E batteries are given a service test at an interval not to exceed 18 months. Additionally, the Class 1E battery performance and acceptance tests comply with Section 5 of IEEE 450-1975 and/or section 6 of IEEE 450-1980." -

g (30 NOV 1995) 9609270217 960921 PDR ADOCK 05000413 P PDR

~

8.3 Onsite Power Systems k The631 l Catawba Nuclear Station

1) 50/51 (Instantaneous / Time 50-1.73 X Iocked Rotor Current Delayed OC) 51 125 to 200% Full Load Current

' f (Coordinated with Motor Starting and Thermal Damage Curve) hh di Oni Y'

2) 50G (Ground Overcurrent) 5 Amps at 6 Cycles i 111. Transformer Protection 4)0 g 4"Ko l ANSI Number and Function Setting pqc '5

1) 50/51 (Inst./ Time Delayed OC) 50-1.73 X Maximum low Side Fault Curren ()R.- 51-125 to 150% Transformer Full load Current

2) 50G (Ground Overcurrent) 5 Amps at 6 Cycles To avoid protective relay trip setpoint drift problems, all Class IE relays are tested periodically to verify the relays are within specified limits and are re-calibrated if required.

8.3.1.1.2.2 600VAC Essential Auxiliary Power System 2 Note:

2 This section of the FSAR contains information on the design bases and design criteria of this 2 system / structure. Additional information that may assist the reader in understanding the system is 2 contained in the design basis document (DBD) for this system / structure.

The 600VAC Essential Auxiliary Power System supplies power to the 600 volt essential motor control centers which are located in load concentration areas throughout the plant. Connected to the essential motor control centers are all of the 600 volt essential loads which require power during accident l conditions and non-essentialloads which are required to be disconnected during accident conditions. Two essential motor control centers (IEMXG and 2EMXH) are provided to supply power to loads which are  ;

shared between the two units, e.g. Control Area Chilled Water System. The Train A loads, fed from motor control center IEMXG, are identified in Table 8-6 in the remarks column. The corresponding Train B loads are fed from 2EMXH. This system is shown on Figure 8-21.

The only non-Class IE loads which can be powered from the Class IE AC systems during an accident are the AC emergency lighting transformers and the hydrogen igniter transformers. These loads are automatically disconnected on a LOCA signal and are given a permissive signal which allows manual connection after all LOCA loads are sequenced on. The AC emergency lighting transformers are powered from 600 volt Class IE motor control centers IEMXA, IEMXJ,2EMXA and 2EMXJ. The hydrogen igniter transformers are fed from 600 volt Class IE motor control centers IEMXI, IEMXB,2EMXI and 2EMXB.

The 600VAC Essential Auxiliary Power System is divided into two redundant and independent safety trains, each of which consists of two load centers and their associated motor control centers. Each load center normally receives power from its associated 4160 volt essential switchgear via a separate 1500KVA, 4160/600 volt essential load center transformer. The two load centers in each safety train are provided with a spare transformer which can be manually connected to either load center should the normal load center transformer be unavailable. A key interlock scheme is provided to prevent the spare transformer frorn being connected to both load centers simultaneously.

g.24 (30 NOV 1995)

o -

-: ~

TT Ac-es tot Catawba Nuclear Station 8.3 Onsite Power Systems in the event of a blackout or blackout coupled with a LOCA, the diesel generator load sequencer automatically sheds the load centers by tripping the load center incoming breakers. Essential loads required during the bid.out or blackout /LOCA condition are then automatically sequenced onto their respective bus by tb see,uencer. __

Prot ion dei s on the 600VA .ssential 'ary Power System sele and set to achieve a selecth ripp' g scheme so that a al ount of equipment is isolat m the system for adverse conditio 5 h as a fault. The load r breakers are set to protect ble feeding the essential motor con centers and coordinate w' sential motor control center eder reakers. The relays on the essen al center transformer f ders set to protect the tr ormers coordinate with the load ce er bre s.

The protective relay settings for essential systems! equipment are calculated based on equipment

/ manufacturers data and system parameters. The initial setpoints are verified during system W pre operational testing. The setpoints are determined as follows:

{ ANSI Number and Function Se_tting

1) load Center Incoming Breakers Set to protect the cable and equipment

%t and coordinate with feeder breaker settings.

( 2) load Center Feeder Breakers Set to protect the cable and equipment.

To avoid protective relay trip setpoint drift problems, all Class lE relays are tested periodically to verify the relays are within specified limits and are re-calibrated if required.

Refer to Section 8.3.1.4, " Independence of Redundant Systems" on page S 38 for a description of the separation of redundant equipment in the 600VAC Essential Auxiliary Power System and to Section 8.3.1.3, " Physical Identification of Class IE Equipment" on page 8-38 for a detailed description of the physical identification of safety-related equipment.

The instrumentation and control power for each redundant train of the 600VAC Essential Auxiliary Power System is supplied from the corresponding train of the 125VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System as shown in Table 8-7. For a further discussion of the 125VDC vital system, refer to Section 8.3.2.1.2.1, "125VDC and 120VAC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System" on page S-44.

B.3.1.1.2.3 Testing 8.3.1.1.2.3.1 Preoperational Testing Preoperational testing of the Class IE ac system is performed in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.41 to verify proper design, installation, and operation. The preoperation test program for the emergency diesel generators is described in Section 8.3.1.1.3.10, " Prototype Qualification Program" on page S-33.

8.3.1.1.2.3.2 Periodic Testing Inspection, maintenance, and testing of the Class IE ac systems are performed on a periodic testing program in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 1.22 and 1.118. The periodic testing program is scheduled so as not to interfere with unit operation. Where tests do not interfere with unit operation, system and equipment tests may be scheduled with the nuclear unit in operation.

(30 NOV 1995) 8-25

. -. . . . -. - - . . ~ . . . - - - . .-- _. -_- . - - - - _ . . _

W t

i T'T A <.M m1radT e L i 4

? h) SER T '

1

Revise. the indicated portions of UFSAR section 8.3.1.1.2.2 as follows

"In general, protective devices , on the 600 ~ VAC Essential l Auxiliary Power System (EPE) are selected and set so that a j minimal-amount of equipment is isolated from the system for adverse conditions such as a fault. Protective devices  ;

protect cable.and equipment. In the case of essential motor >

control center equipment, incoming breakers may not fully coordinate with motor control center load breakers. I However, the resulting amount of equipment isolation is  :

acceptable, such that there is no impact on the UFSAR f Chapter 15 safety analyses and redundant equipment is not  :

affected. The load center breakers are set to protect the cable feeding the essential motor control centers and ,

coordinate with the breakers that feed motor control center loads. The relays on the essential load center transformer feeders are set.to protect the transformers and coordinate with the load center breakers."

1 I

- - +e,

n Table 8-8 (Page 5 ef 5). Single Failure Analysis of the Onsite Power Systenes 5 s

Cosuponent Malfunction Safety Significance /Cosnments -

T

12. 600 Voh Essential Load Fault on one breaker No safety significance:

Center Source Breaker

[

M-Same as 10 above. g

13. 600 Voh Essential Load Bus fault No safety significance: y He 600 volt essential load center source breaker trips. The 3 loads supplied by the affected load center are lost, but the rufundant loads of the other train remain available. p;

14. 600 Volt Essential load Breaker fault No safety significance:

Center Feeder Breaker

.Same as 13 above. p

15. 600 Volt Essential load Cable fault No safety significance: h He 600 volt essential load center-feeder breaker trips. The 3 loads supplied by the affected motor control center are lost, #g but the redundant loads of the other train remain available. .-i

16. 600 Volt Essential Motor Bus fault No safety significance:

Contml Center Bus

, .Same as 15 above.

' 17. 600 Volt Essential Motor Cable fault No safety significance: >

j Control Center Feeder C .E m- . n . .

. __._ ll CC Cable p,1 .'2":;'M, T:l"1";M, w"";;".; a .~. . . ..n. .

,. .. . - . , ,e..

w _

Inter ock Armor &le. heaNn gnlQe 0 i

however some. kl+s heyend 4he.motorcon+

trip 4Ae mdur-Nt cen%I cenke ineom'm3 cente b

=

f 3 ) suphed b 1he. aHeded molar con %lcenler- a 3

( .are lost, hat +he. rvknitnf loads & the.

R

=

(o%er +ndn reman <ailable-. _ _ _

e a

_ ___e _

,e v

~. .

i t

Talde 8-10 (Page I of 3). Single Faelure Analysis of the 125VDC Vital Instrumentation and Controi Power Systeni E

• t Ceniponent Malfunction Safety Significance /Conunents -

T

1. Battery Charger loss of 600 volt ac power . No safety significance - Associated 125 volt battery is available [

supply to one battery to supply power to the 125 volt de distribution center without R-interruption. An annunciator in the' control room alerts the 4 charger operator to the malfunction.

No safety significance - Associated 125 volt battery is available ff Imss of charge'r output i to supply power to the 125 volt de distribution center without *  ;

interruption. An annunciator in the control room alerts the operator to the malfunction. Additionally, a spare battery

~

charger is readily available to replace the non-functional l' charger. , ___ __

p p ,

Intemal battery charger No safety significanc .

' ^ ^

"---T----l_:#2:c-y fault r-7 f. ..y 2:,ch ,.. 5 e g y .m. ht.mi 3

{ r._ p =6- -

erS- @

u M am, y=- '!- ,n.. *' n _. ^. af a b :R. A. E_ i -- .' a

,t- -

r-..i.

• g

• i eL hee ,'...*n-. .W - =

,k ,,

~a*m-i"-1.^_.. .e - ,Mn annu'nciator in the control --

room alerfs the operator to the malfunction. Additionally, a

- spare batte:y charger is readily available to replace the faulted charger. >

2. 125 solt Battery Battery fault No safety significance - Power is lost to the instrumentation and control channel served by the faulted battery; however, ;r the redundant channels continue to operate unaffected. An on annunciator in the ctmtrol room alerts the operator to the n malfunction. He faulted battery is isolated from its dc

• distribution center by the distribution center circuit breaker.

Power is restored to the affected distribution center by ,,

manually connecting it to its train associated distribution 4 center. -

g_- - - -

g

('If Ac. bdery chge.c ou.+p.& breaker- does

.I nsut not clear Ae klF Ae beery breaker my ,

3 -h4p 4.lso. Power is lost To ne. Msfr weiddion

= svtd control eknned served b9 %e. kned l

(charcodinue 3er; hheiaever, operde ne redandant unafAded. _ channe.Is.

w

- n_