ML20024D591

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Part 21 Rept Re Failure of nonsafety-related Cables & Components Possibly Resulting in Loss of Secondary Containment Pressure Control.Review of Cable Routing Will Be Performed
ML20024D591
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 07/25/1983
From: Conn W
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, BURNS & ROE CO.
To: Martin J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
REF-PT21-83-942-000 10CFR-50.55E, BRGO-RO-83-008, BRGO-RO-83-8, PT21-83-942, PT21-83-942-000, NUDOCS 8308050295
Download: ML20024D591 (5)


Text

/ y@f (0' W Ij'E0 Burns and Roe,Inc. j 601 Wdliams Blvd. m Richland, Washington 99352 m Tel. (509) 943-8200 23 i// //,. ,-

Subject:

Work Order 3900-4000 5dl: t '

9 Washington Public Power Supply System WNP-2 Secondary Containment Pressure Control Responds to: NA July 25, 1983 BRGO-RO-83-008 Response Required: NA U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94956 Attention: Mr. J.B. Fbrtin Gentlemen:

This letter is to report to you a condition we have deemed reportable under 10CFR21. This was discussed with R. Dodds of your staff on July 25, 1983.

The concern is that failure of non-safety related cables and components could result in loss of secondary contain-ment pressure control which could allow an unfiltered release from the Reactor Building to the environs during an accident.

Complete details are contained in the attached evaluation.

If you have any questions, please contact W.G. Conn at (509) 943-8241.

Very truly yours, WGC:MCD:lvs Attachment W.G. Conn cc: W.S. Chin, BPA Senior Group Supervisor B.A. Holmberg, SS w/a L.T. Harrold , SS w/a J.G. Tellefson, SS w/a R.T. Johnson, SS w/a L.C. Floyd, SS w/a 8308050295 830725 PDR ADOCK 05000397 PDR

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1. Description of Potential Defect or Noncompliance See attached memo EMR-83-1014 and attached sketch.
2. Date and Method of Discovery

, June.22, 1982 during design review for Class lE List update.

3. Analysis of Safety !molication i

A. As described in the attached memo, failure of non safety related cables and components could result in loss of secondary containment pressure control which could allow an unfiltered release from the reactor building to the environs during an accident. This is considered poten-tially reportable under both 10CFR50.55(e) and Part 20.

B. Cause of Deficiency: A single control system controls

! both the ClE SBGT System Flow and the non CIE Reactor Building ventilation system flow.. We belie're the designer did not recognize that the CIE System requirements should govern possibly due to the control system equipment iden-tifications which list the equipment as part of the non-Class LE Reactor Building HVAC System. Cables routed to the CIE equipment were identified and terminated as non ClE. No complete list of CIE equipment down to the component level existed at the time of design.

4 Corrective Action PEDS will be issued to correct the above deficiencies. In addition, a review of cable routing to and from all CIE instru-I ments will be performed in order to assure that this problem

! does not exist elsewhere.

l There should be no re-occurrence of this type of deficiency because Burns and Roe now has a CIE Equipment List.

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@d em. r- t.-.1 = s ac e r" Aperture Card

b~ EMR-83-1014 MMORANDUM -

ca co ro, JURheS and RCE, Inc. caiu June 22, 1983 J.A. Forrest A.I. Cygelman S.N. Satpute TO G.W. Brastad Responds to: NA - c

-L.C. Gonzalez PMOM # "

A.J. ThielG. Response Required: NA I U E'.J G C T Work Order 3900-4000 Project Files h hington Public Power Supply System s s

Potential Deficiency Secondary Containment EDS/lb Pressure Control 10CFR50.55(e)/Part 21

Reference:

EWD80I004 Rev. 1 EWD80I005 Rev. 1 E538 sh. 30 Rev. 9 M634 Sh 45-R7 Rev. 2 M634 Sh. 45-R56 Rev. 2

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The following deficiencies were found in the circuitry for Secondary Containment Pressure Control:

1. Class-lE devices REA-DFr-1Al, IA2, lA3, IA4, IB1, 1B2, IB3, and IB4 are wired with non-divisional cables which terminate in non-Class-lE control panels (RBHV-A and RBHV-B). These devices are then connected to Class-lE devices in the control room with division 1 and 2 cables.
2. Non-Class-lE devices REA-E/P-1A and REA-E/P-1B are directly wired to Class lE Secondary Containment Pressure Control devices REA-DPIC-1A and IB. These E/Ps are also located in non-Class lE control panels RBHV-A and RBHV-B.

The Secondary Containment Pressure Control System is required to operate for automatic control of the Standby Gas Treatment System which is required to maintain the reactor 'ouilding at a negative pressure of 0.25 inches w.g. post accident.

The control signals from the differential pressure transmitters REA-DPT-1A1 thru 134 can be lost with present non-divisional cabling resulting in total loss of Secondary Containment Pressure Control.

Failure of REA-E/P-1A and IB would result in failure of REA-DPIC- 1A and IB which send control signals to the Standby Gas Treatment System for Secondary Containment Pressure Control.

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