ML15231A192
| ML15231A192 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 08/19/2015 |
| From: | Frank Ehrhardt NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB1 |
| To: | Joel Munday Division Reactor Projects II |
| References | |
| Download: ML15231A192 (20) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 August 19, 2015 MEMORANDUM TO: Joel T. Munday, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
Tony Gody, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
Jimi Yerokun, Director, Division of Construction Inspection FROM: Frank Ehrhardt, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1, DRP /RA/
Jonathan Bartley, Chief, Engineering Branch 1, DRS /RA/
SUBJECT:
INSPECTION OF OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION MAJOR PROJECTS The purpose of this memorandum is to revise the subject memorandum dated June 9, 2009.
The 2009 memorandum identified the estimated Region II inspection effort over six years with respect to major modifications at the Oconee Nuclear Station. These modifications involve tornado and high energy line break (HELB) mitigation, and protected service water (PSW) system project expansion due to a notice of violation and confirmatory order related to a fire protection program license condition (EA-13-010). This revision of the 2009 memorandum covers the modifications that have not been completed during the last six years.
Beginning in 2009, Region II conducted and documented inspections listed in the inspection plan enclosed in the June 9, 2009, memorandum. This inspection plan was implemented in parallel with NRRs review of the license amendment requests (LARs) discussed below in the background section. In 2011-2012 the tornado and HELB LAR reviews were suspended because the PSW LAR review was given a higher priority, due to the overall risk reduction provided by the system, and the fact that its completion was made a license condition in the NFPA-805 amendment issued in December 2010. The licensee previously indicated that they would resubmit the tornado and HELB LARs in March 2012, but their current schedule is for resubmittal in the first quarter of 2017. Based on the licensees updated schedule, the 2009 inspection plan has been revised. Because the licensee has not established firm dates for some of the modification work, this revised memo does not contain a specific completion date.
Background:
HELB: Following a 1998 self-assessment of Oconees licensing basis for HELB events outside containment, the licensee notified the NRC in January 1999 that it was initiating a project to reconstitute the design and licensing basis for HELB events outside the reactor building.
Tornado: As a result of a 95002 supplemental inspection of two White Mitigating System tornado-related findings in 2001, the NRC determined that Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 had a number of tornado-related vulnerabilities that collectively represented a deficient tornado mitigation strategy. In 2008, the licensee submitted two LARs requesting revision to the HELB licensing basis of Unit 1 and to the tornado licensing basis of the site. Both LAR reviews were discontinued in 2011-2012 by the NRC due to the higher priority of the PSW LAR.
2 On November 30, 2006, the licensee submitted a letter describing strategies and listing commitments to address tornado/HELB. (ML070290328 and ML12066A037)
PSW: On December 29, 2010, the NRC issued Amendments Nos. 371, 373, and 372 to renewed facility operating licenses DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 for the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (ML103630612). The amendments imposed new License Condition 3.D., which required among other items, implementation of the PSW modifications. On July 31, 2012, Duke Energy submitted a LAR to extend full PSW implementation by two years. On January 15, 2013, the NRC denied the July 31, 2012, LAR application (ML12345A204). On July 1, 2013, the NRC issued an NOV and Confirmatory Order to Duke Energy specifying a schedule for implementing the PSW modifications (ML13114A941).
Inspection Plan:
Region II conducted a review of the completed inspections and the open activities included in the original inspection plan. A revised inspection plan for the remaining activities related to the tornado and HELB commitments and the PSW work is enclosed. Several factors were used to select the activities listed in the revised inspection plan. A Region II senior reactor analyst provided risk assessments of the remaining activities. Additionally, the licensee provided information regarding the priority and risk impact of each activity. The enclosed inspection plan is subject to further revision based on NRRs review of future tornado and HELB LARs.
As described in the 2009 memo, inspections will be conducted by DRP and DRS (with assistance from DCI) under baseline inspection procedures (IP) 71111.01 (Adverse Weather Protection), 71111.04 (Equipment Alignment), 71111.06 (Flood Protection Measures), 71111.08 (In-Service Inspection), 71111.17T (Evaluation of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications), and 71111.18 (Modifications).
Consequently, normally allotted inspection times and/or sample sizes for some of the above baseline IPs will be exceeded. In order to minimize the impact of the excess samples on ROP assessments, the Task Code for the time charged against the IP in HRMS will be recorded as Other Routine (OA) versus Baseline Inspection (BI). In addition, inspection preparation and documentation for the excess samples will be charged to OAP and OAD.
If you have any questions regarding the enclosed Inspection Plan, please contact the Inspection Plan Coordinator, Ms. Jannette Worosilo.
Enclosure:
Oconee Nuclear Station Major Projects Inspection Plan cc w/encl: R. Pascarelli, NRR/ DORL R. Hall, NRR/ DORL J. Whited, NRR/ DORL L. Lund, NRR/DORL C. Regan, NRR/DIRS E. Crowe, RII N. Childs, RII G. Croon, RII CONTACT: Ms. Jannette Worosilo, RII/SPE (404) 997-4485
_________________________ SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE FORM 665 ATTACHED OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:DRP SIGNATURE JGW1 JHB1 FJE NAME J. Worosilo J. Bartley F. Ehrhardt DATE 7/30/2015 7/30/2015 7/30/2015 8/ /2015 8/ /2015 8/ /2015 8/ /2015 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION MAJOR PROJECTS INSPECTION PLAN SEQ Responsibility, DCP # Brief Description Inspection Scope
- Status, IR PSW Project and Other Items 3 OD102148 Siding and Girts Installation [See notes 1, 2, 3 & 5] Physical work OD202149 completed at the plant.
OD302150 New girts and siding will be added to CDTR & Waiting for WPR exterior walls, designed to meet tornado Tornado LAR to be loading criteria. In addition, steel plates will completed.
be added to the exterior walls to shield the Confirm SSF ASW guard pipe DRP, existing SSF cabling located within the CDTR exists and affords piping missile
& WPR. protection consistent with LAR OPEN, IP - 71111.04 (Equip. Align.) TBD
[Commitment 5T]
Ref- 48051, 48053, 48055, 55100, 70370 Notes:
- 1. Verify that mod is performed during non-tornado period and/or appropriate compensatory measures in place.
- 2. During potential tornado periods, verify Tormis missile assumptions for SSF related equipment.
- 3. Verify new passive barrier is incorporated into passive barrier program and maintenance rule (risk rank, a(4), monitoring)
- 4. Verify that any breaches created in support of mods have been assessed with respect to flood, ventilation, and fire impacts
- 5. Verify risk impact of mod activities are accounted for, compensatory actions are implemented as needed, and contingency actions are pre-planned per NSD-213, Risk Management Process. This note applies to all sequences.
- 6. Verify adequacy of Administration Controls (e.g., TS, PMs, surveillances, APs, EOPs, etc) on plant operations and SSCs are appropriately captured.
3 PSW Project and Other Items 5 OD102154 BWST and SSF Trench Superstructure [See notes 3 and 5] Physical work OD202155 completed at the plant.
OD302156 A 12 foot high steel superstructure will be Waiting for tornado provided to tornado protect the BWST and LAR Auxiliary Building West Wall. In addition, the superstructure will protect the above ground Verify UFSAR is revised to clarify DRS, portion of the SSF Trench. the tornado LB to reflect: (1) elimination of SFP to HPI for OPEN, Modify to protect against class 1 missiles; (including valves, piping, instrumentation) RCMU; (2) applicable TORMIS TBD BWST itself protects west wall of the CDTR for methodology results; and (3)
SSF piping and cables running through CDTR. accurate tornado design information Eliminate SFP to HPI flow path for RCMU (Rx for the AB cable and electrical Coolant Make Up). equipment rooms
[Commitment 4T] IP - 71111.18 (MODS)
[Commitment 18T]
PSW Project and Other Items OD100924 400 kW Pressurizer Heaters and CA & [See notes 4, 5, 6 & 7]
Notes:
- 1. Verify that mod is performed during non-tornado period and/or appropriate compensatory measures in place.
- 2. During potential tornado periods, verify Tormis missile assumptions for SSF related equipment.
- 3. Verify new passive barrier is incorporated into passive barrier program and maintenance rule (risk rank, a(4), monitoring)
- 4. Verify that any breaches created in support of mods have been assessed with respect to flood, ventilation, and fire impacts
- 5. Verify risk impact of mod activities are accounted for, compensatory actions are implemented as needed, and contingency actions are pre-planned per NSD-213, Risk Management Process. This note applies to all sequences.
- 6. Verify adequacy of Administration Controls (e.g., TS, PMs, surveillances, APs, EOPs, etc) on plant operations and SSCs are appropriately captured.
4 14 OD200925 CB Battery Charger Power Feed from the Verify power cables to all three DRS, OD300926 PSW Building Units PZR heaters and the 1CA and 1CB battery chargers are OPEN, The objective of this modification is to install protected from fire/tornado/HELB PSW power as an alternate (back-up) effects, consistent with the NLT FEB. 2016 PSW source of electrical power for operation of assumptions of the respective LAR Milestone 5 the Unit #1, 2 & 3 Pressurizer Heater and NFPA-805.
equipment and CA & CB Battery Charger Power Feeds. IP - 71111.18 (MODS)
Ref- 50100, 51061, 51063, 51065, Install power feeds from the new 600 VAC, Verify sufficient heater KW available DRS, load center located in the new PSW building for each Unit to ensure PZR steam to selected pressurizer heater loads. Install bubble. OPEN, power feeds to the 1CA & 1CB.
IP - 71111.17 (50.59) NLT FEB. 2016 Battery Chargers from the new 600 VAC, Ref - 71111.21, 51061, 51063, motor control center (MCC) located in the 51065 Auxiliary building. The load swap from the primary to the back-up (PSW) power feeds from the PSW MCC will be accomplished Notes:
- 1. Verify that mod is performed during non-tornado period and/or appropriate compensatory measures in place.
- 2. During potential tornado periods, verify Tormis missile assumptions for SSF related equipment.
- 3. Verify new passive barrier is incorporated into passive barrier program and maintenance rule (risk rank, a(4), monitoring)
- 4. Verify that any breaches created in support of mods have been assessed with respect to flood, ventilation, and fire impacts
- 5. Verify risk impact of mod activities are accounted for, compensatory actions are implemented as needed, and contingency actions are pre-planned per NSD-213, Risk Management Process. This note applies to all sequences.
- 6. Verify adequacy of Administration Controls (e.g., TS, PMs, surveillances, APs, EOPs, etc) on plant operations and SSCs are appropriately captured.
5 by installing automatic transfer switches. Verify the battery chargers DRS, automatically swap to the PSW
[Commitment 7T and 8T] [Commitment 22H, alternate source with the normal OPEN, 23H and 24H] power supply removed.
NLT FEB. 2016 IP -71111.18 (MODS)
Ref- 64051 Notes:
- 1. Verify that mod is performed during non-tornado period and/or appropriate compensatory measures in place.
- 2. During potential tornado periods, verify Tormis missile assumptions for SSF related equipment.
- 3. Verify new passive barrier is incorporated into passive barrier program and maintenance rule (risk rank, a(4), monitoring)
- 4. Verify that any breaches created in support of mods have been assessed with respect to flood, ventilation, and fire impacts
- 5. Verify risk impact of mod activities are accounted for, compensatory actions are implemented as needed, and contingency actions are pre-planned per NSD-213, Risk Management Process. This note applies to all sequences.
- 6. Verify adequacy of Administration Controls (e.g., TS, PMs, surveillances, APs, EOPs, etc) on plant operations and SSCs are appropriately captured.
6 PSW Project and Other Items 16 OD100937 125VDC Vital I&C Primary and Backup [See notes 4, 5, 6 & 7] Physical work OD200938 Cable Re-Routes completed at the plant.
A number of vital safety related cables that are part of the 125VDC Vital I&C Battery Observe PMT (continuity) to DRP, System are routed through Turbine Building. ensure proper termination This package will replace and reroute all the OPEN, 125VDC Vital I&C cables outside of the IP - 71111.18 NLT FEB. 2016 Turbine Building.
Ref - 51051, 51053, 51055, 51061, All of the Unit 1 125VDC Vital I&C Battery 51063, 51065, 71111.19, 71111.21, System primary cables and Unit 1 125VDC 71111.22, 72701 Vital I&C Battery System backup cables to Unit 3 will be replaced with new cables routed outside of Turbine Building through areas protected from HELB and Tornado design basis events. The new cable routing will not affect the system functional characteristics and the termination points.
[Commitment 7T and 8T]
[Commitment 22H, 23H and 24H]
Notes:
- 1. Verify that mod is performed during non-tornado period and/or appropriate compensatory measures in place.
- 2. During potential tornado periods, verify Tormis missile assumptions for SSF related equipment.
- 3. Verify new passive barrier is incorporated into passive barrier program and maintenance rule (risk rank, a(4), monitoring)
- 4. Verify that any breaches created in support of mods have been assessed with respect to flood, ventilation, and fire impacts
- 5. Verify risk impact of mod activities are accounted for, compensatory actions are implemented as needed, and contingency actions are pre-planned per NSD-213, Risk Management Process. This note applies to all sequences.
- 6. Verify adequacy of Administration Controls (e.g., TS, PMs, surveillances, APs, EOPs, etc) on plant operations and SSCs are appropriately captured.
7 PSW Project and Other Items 21 OD500920 Design and Erection of [See notes 3 & 5]
Protected Service Water Verify adequate facility ventilation to DRS, Building support housed electrical equipment This package has been developed to design heat loading and freeze protection. OPEN, and erect a new Protected Service Water Building. This building will house the new IP - 71111.17 (50.59) READY major electrical equipment needed for this system. This DCP will design and install a new Ref -50100, 71111.21 reinforced concrete building south of Oconee Unit 3 in the yard area between the Radwaste Facility and the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP)
Motor Refurbishment Building adjacent to the existing CCW pipes.
[Commitment 7T and 8T]
[Commitment 22H, 23H and 24H]
Notes:
- 1. Verify that mod is performed during non-tornado period and/or appropriate compensatory measures in place.
- 2. During potential tornado periods, verify Tormis missile assumptions for SSF related equipment.
- 3. Verify new passive barrier is incorporated into passive barrier program and maintenance rule (risk rank, a(4), monitoring)
- 4. Verify that any breaches created in support of mods have been assessed with respect to flood, ventilation, and fire impacts
- 5. Verify risk impact of mod activities are accounted for, compensatory actions are implemented as needed, and contingency actions are pre-planned per NSD-213, Risk Management Process. This note applies to all sequences.
- 6. Verify adequacy of Administration Controls (e.g., TS, PMs, surveillances, APs, EOPs, etc) on plant operations and SSCs are appropriately captured.
8 PSW Project and Other Items 22 OD500921 PSW Building Equipment Installation [See notes 5, 6 & 7]
The objective of this package to support the installation and testing of the equipment in the Verify installed equipment is DRS, new PSW building. The equipment includes seismically qualified and afforded switchgear, MCCs, breakers and transfer appropriate fire protections (hose OPEN, switches. reels and detection) READY Provide the engineering and design documentation to support the installation and IP - 71111.17 (50.59) testing of the equipment in the new PSW Ref -50071, 50073, 50075, 64051, building. The equipment will not be energized by this modification. This package only installs 93811, 71111.21 the equipment necessary to provide power under other modification packages.
This equipment will be located inside the New PSW Building to protect against design basis tornado and provide a source of safety related electrical power for operation of the safety related loads associated with the new PSW equipment.
[Commitment 7T and 8T] [Commitment 22H, 23H and 24H]
Notes:
- 1. Verify that mod is performed during non-tornado period and/or appropriate compensatory measures in place.
- 2. During potential tornado periods, verify Tormis missile assumptions for SSF related equipment.
- 3. Verify new passive barrier is incorporated into passive barrier program and maintenance rule (risk rank, a(4), monitoring)
- 4. Verify that any breaches created in support of mods have been assessed with respect to flood, ventilation, and fire impacts
- 5. Verify risk impact of mod activities are accounted for, compensatory actions are implemented as needed, and contingency actions are pre-planned per NSD-213, Risk Management Process. This note applies to all sequences.
- 6. Verify adequacy of Administration Controls (e.g., TS, PMs, surveillances, APs, EOPs, etc) on plant operations and SSCs are appropriately captured.
9 PSW Project and Other Items 28 OD500933 Replace the ASW System with the New [See notes 5 & 6] Seismic review PSW System done. Waiting for tornado and HELB The existing ASW pump/motor will be replaced LARs.
by separate PSW Booster and Primary Verify piping/components/control and DRS, Pumps/motors to provide the injection power cables are seismic and pressure range required of the new PSW protected from HELB/tornado/fire OPEN, System. New manual transfer switches for I&C effects per applicable LAR.
power, the new exhaust fan and the new pump TBD minimum flow valve, as well as a new PSW IP - 71111.17 (50.59)
Instrument and Control Panel will be installed.
Associated power and control cables, instruments and controls will be provided and Ref - 71111.05, 50075, 55100, connected as part of this package. The DCP 64051, 71111.21 will provide all the activities required to install and put into service the new PSW Pump. The following tasks will be performed:
Notes:
- 1. Verify that mod is performed during non-tornado period and/or appropriate compensatory measures in place.
- 2. During potential tornado periods, verify Tormis missile assumptions for SSF related equipment.
- 3. Verify new passive barrier is incorporated into passive barrier program and maintenance rule (risk rank, a(4), monitoring)
- 4. Verify that any breaches created in support of mods have been assessed with respect to flood, ventilation, and fire impacts
- 5. Verify risk impact of mod activities are accounted for, compensatory actions are implemented as needed, and contingency actions are pre-planned per NSD-213, Risk Management Process. This note applies to all sequences.
- 6. Verify adequacy of Administration Controls (e.g., TS, PMs, surveillances, APs, EOPs, etc) on plant operations and SSCs are appropriately captured.
10 Install a 2000 hp primary pump and a booster pump. Install the PSW pipe, valves and instruments. Terminate power cables (installed by other DCPs) at PSW booster and primary pumps and Electro- Mechanical Operated (EMO) valves Install and terminate control cable from breakers (PSW Bldg) to EMO valves Install and terminate instrumentation cable from Main Control Room (MCR) ATC cabinet to instruments and EMO valves. Perform integrated system testing of the PSW system, including primary and backup power and response to system inputs When installed and tested, the PSW system will be operable. This is the last modification to be completed for the PSW Project.
[Commitment 7T and 8T] [Commitment 22H, 23H and 24H]
Notes:
- 1. Verify that mod is performed during non-tornado period and/or appropriate compensatory measures in place.
- 2. During potential tornado periods, verify Tormis missile assumptions for SSF related equipment.
- 3. Verify new passive barrier is incorporated into passive barrier program and maintenance rule (risk rank, a(4), monitoring)
- 4. Verify that any breaches created in support of mods have been assessed with respect to flood, ventilation, and fire impacts
- 5. Verify risk impact of mod activities are accounted for, compensatory actions are implemented as needed, and contingency actions are pre-planned per NSD-213, Risk Management Process. This note applies to all sequences.
- 6. Verify adequacy of Administration Controls (e.g., TS, PMs, surveillances, APs, EOPs, etc) on plant operations and SSCs are appropriately captured.
11 PSW Project and Other Items 36 Modifications Modify Valves HP-103 and 107 (Suction [See notes 5 & 6]
numbers have lines to HPI Pumps) Verify valves are safety-related, DRS, not been with operation protected from assigned for Will allow remote operation with reach rod. HELB effects. OPEN, these mods. Mod to include two new valves in series with HP 103 and 107. IP - 71111.18 (MODS) READY However, the engineering Following HELB on discharge of HPI, Assess effect of mod on DRP, change remotely isolate damaged HPI such that HPI during/after installation.
request has other HPI remains available. OPEN, been IP - 71111.18 (MODS) originated. Maintain availability of LDST. READY This request is Single Failure vulnerability being addressed. Observe PMT and assess adequacy DRP, tracked in PIP of Administrative controls (e.g.,
O 5293, CA [Commitment 28H, 36H and 42H] PMs, surveillances, EOPs, APs, OPEN,
- 53. etc.)
READY IP - 71111.18 (MODS)
Ref -71111.19, 71111.21, 71111.22, 72701 Notes:
- 1. Verify that mod is performed during non-tornado period and/or appropriate compensatory measures in place.
- 2. During potential tornado periods, verify Tormis missile assumptions for SSF related equipment.
- 3. Verify new passive barrier is incorporated into passive barrier program and maintenance rule (risk rank, a(4), monitoring)
- 4. Verify that any breaches created in support of mods have been assessed with respect to flood, ventilation, and fire impacts
- 5. Verify risk impact of mod activities are accounted for, compensatory actions are implemented as needed, and contingency actions are pre-planned per NSD-213, Risk Management Process. This note applies to all sequences.
- 6. Verify adequacy of Administration Controls (e.g., TS, PMs, surveillances, APs, EOPs, etc) on plant operations and SSCs are appropriately captured.
12 PSW Project and Other Items 37 Replace CCW Discharge Stop Gates [See note 6]
Enable termination of reverse flow through HELB Observe PMT and assess use DRP, damaged CCW and LPSW piping. TB flood control.
OPEN, Required to recover from TB flood caused by IP - 71111.18 (MODS)
HELB. TBD Ref - 71111.06, 50090, 55100
[Commitment 31H] - 551501, 73753, 73755, 73756 Verify during modification DRS, review that this modification use in TB flood control is OPEN, adequate.
TBD Notes:
- 1. Verify that mod is performed during non-tornado period and/or appropriate compensatory measures in place.
- 2. During potential tornado periods, verify Tormis missile assumptions for SSF related equipment.
- 3. Verify new passive barrier is incorporated into passive barrier program and maintenance rule (risk rank, a(4), monitoring)
- 4. Verify that any breaches created in support of mods have been assessed with respect to flood, ventilation, and fire impacts
- 5. Verify risk impact of mod activities are accounted for, compensatory actions are implemented as needed, and contingency actions are pre-planned per NSD-213, Risk Management Process. This note applies to all sequences.
- 6. Verify adequacy of Administration Controls (e.g., TS, PMs, surveillances, APs, EOPs, etc) on plant operations and SSCs are appropriately captured.
13 PSW Project and Other Items 43 Modification is Control Room Complex HVAC Mods [See notes 3, 5 & 6]
still in design phase. Serve to isolate control room from steam/air Verify duct registers covered and DRP, environments. new structural barrier or HELB actuated dampers installed. OPEN, MS or MFDW break in EPR causes steam/air intrusion into Aux Bldg. IP - 71111.18 (MODS) TBD Duct Registers located in rooms adjacent to Ref -48051, 48053, 48055 EPR that could carry steam/air into control room. These will be covered to prevent Observe PMT and assess adequacy of DRP, possible migration into control room Administrative controls (e.g., PMs, surveillances, EOPs, APs, etc.) if OPEN, A block wall adjacent to EPR that is not dampers installed.
reinforced may collapse following HELB and TBD affect HVAC ductwork and allow steam/air to IP - 71111.18 (MODS) enter the control room. A new structural barrier will be built to protect the ductwork or Ref -71111.19, 71111.22, 72701 HELB actuated dampers will be installed.
[Commitment 27H, 35H and 41H]
Notes:
- 1. Verify that mod is performed during non-tornado period and/or appropriate compensatory measures in place.
- 2. During potential tornado periods, verify Tormis missile assumptions for SSF related equipment.
- 3. Verify new passive barrier is incorporated into passive barrier program and maintenance rule (risk rank, a(4), monitoring)
- 4. Verify that any breaches created in support of mods have been assessed with respect to flood, ventilation, and fire impacts
- 5. Verify risk impact of mod activities are accounted for, compensatory actions are implemented as needed, and contingency actions are pre-planned per NSD-213, Risk Management Process. This note applies to all sequences.
- 6. Verify adequacy of Administration Controls (e.g., TS, PMs, surveillances, APs, EOPs, etc) on plant operations and SSCs are appropriately captured.
14 PSW Project and Other Items 45 Upgrade TB Structural Support Columns D-29 [See note 5]
and 31 (Unit 2) to prevent potential failure Inspection sample accomplished via DRS, Activity 44, unless inspection results Prevents loss of routing to get temporary revealed the need for additional oversight. OPEN, cabling to LPI and LPSW motors.
[Commitment 38H]
Ref- 48051, 48053, 18055, 71111.21 48 Unit 1 - 2020 Physically protect the ADVs per UFSAR Class [See notes 3, 5 & 6]
1 tornado criteria.
Verify doing IP 71111.17 review that DRS, Unit 2 - 2021 modification tornado missile protection afforded. OPEN, Unit 3 - 2022 [Commitment 16T]
TBD Notes:
- 1. Verify that mod is performed during non-tornado period and/or appropriate compensatory measures in place.
- 2. During potential tornado periods, verify Tormis missile assumptions for SSF related equipment.
- 3. Verify new passive barrier is incorporated into passive barrier program and maintenance rule (risk rank, a(4), monitoring)
- 4. Verify that any breaches created in support of mods have been assessed with respect to flood, ventilation, and fire impacts
- 5. Verify risk impact of mod activities are accounted for, compensatory actions are implemented as needed, and contingency actions are pre-planned per NSD-213, Risk Management Process. This note applies to all sequences.
- 6. Verify adequacy of Administration Controls (e.g., TS, PMs, surveillances, APs, EOPs, etc) on plant operations and SSCs are appropriately captured.
15 Notes:
- 1. Verify that mod is performed during non-tornado period and/or appropriate compensatory measures in place.
- 2. During potential tornado periods, verify Tormis missile assumptions for SSF related equipment.
- 3. Verify new passive barrier is incorporated into passive barrier program and maintenance rule (risk rank, a(4), monitoring)
- 4. Verify that any breaches created in support of mods have been assessed with respect to flood, ventilation, and fire impacts
- 5. Verify risk impact of mod activities are accounted for, compensatory actions are implemented as needed, and contingency actions are pre-planned per NSD-213, Risk Management Process. This note applies to all sequences.
- 6. Verify adequacy of Administration Controls (e.g., TS, PMs, surveillances, APs, EOPs, etc) on plant operations and SSCs are appropriately captured.
16 PSW Project and Other Items 49 Modification MSIVs and Power Atmospheric Dump Valve [See notes 3, 4, 5 & 6]
numbers (PADV) have not Assess seismic effects and DRS/DCI, been Currently the Main Turbine Stop Valves are adequacy of AB roof/support assigned for the first pressure boundary. structure to support MSIVs OPEN, these mods. IP - 71111.17 (50.59)
MSIVs and branch line containing the MSRVs TBD Ref -48051, 48053, 48055, 55100, However, the and PADVs are to be installed just outside TB 55150, 71111.21 engineering (on top of Aux Bldg).
change Assess adequacy of MSIVs, PADVs, DRS, request has MSIVs will provide assured means of MS and MSRVs to support SSF and PSW been pressure boundary control (this will include operations. OPEN, originated. new branch with PADV and MSRVs)
IP - 71111.17 (50.59) TBD Serves to prevent the use of TB equipment while providing stable platform for SSF and Ref - 71111.21 PSW.
Notes:
- 1. Verify that mod is performed during non-tornado period and/or appropriate compensatory measures in place.
- 2. During potential tornado periods, verify Tormis missile assumptions for SSF related equipment.
- 3. Verify new passive barrier is incorporated into passive barrier program and maintenance rule (risk rank, a(4), monitoring)
- 4. Verify that any breaches created in support of mods have been assessed with respect to flood, ventilation, and fire impacts
- 5. Verify risk impact of mod activities are accounted for, compensatory actions are implemented as needed, and contingency actions are pre-planned per NSD-213, Risk Management Process. This note applies to all sequences.
- 6. Verify adequacy of Administration Controls (e.g., TS, PMs, surveillances, APs, EOPs, etc) on plant operations and SSCs are appropriately captured.
17 This request Verify operation (via PMT) of MSIVs from DRP, is tracked in The MSRVs will be flanged. MSIVs and PADVs CR and SSF and administrative controls PIP O to be operated from CR and SSF CR. change, (e.g. TS, SLC, PMs, surveillances, EOPs, OPEN, 4733 CA 11. and could change a lot if the licensee moves to APs, etc?).
24 month fuel cycles. TBD Unit 1- IP - 71111.17 (50.59) 2021 [Commitment 11T, 12T and 13T] Verify MSIVs, PADVs, MSRVs and DRS,
[Commitment 22H, 23H and 24H] associated piping/controls are adequately protected from tornado, HELB, seismic, OPEN, Unit 2- and fire effects.
2022 TBD IP - 71111.17 (50.59)
Unit 3- Ref -49061, 49063, 49065, 50090, 70370, 71111.21, 73053, 73055, 2023 73753, 73756 Verify the effects on time critical operator DRS, actions are achievable OPEN, TBD Notes:
- 1. Verify that mod is performed during non-tornado period and/or appropriate compensatory measures in place.
- 2. During potential tornado periods, verify Tormis missile assumptions for SSF related equipment.
- 3. Verify new passive barrier is incorporated into passive barrier program and maintenance rule (risk rank, a(4), monitoring)
- 4. Verify that any breaches created in support of mods have been assessed with respect to flood, ventilation, and fire impacts
- 5. Verify risk impact of mod activities are accounted for, compensatory actions are implemented as needed, and contingency actions are pre-planned per NSD-213, Risk Management Process. This note applies to all sequences.
- 6. Verify adequacy of Administration Controls (e.g., TS, PMs, surveillances, APs, EOPs, etc) on plant operations and SSCs are appropriately captured.
18 PSW Project and Other Items 56 Verify NFPA 805 requirements have been met PSW based on approved LAR Verify that the cables rerouted to DRS, Milestone 6 areas with protection consistent with the assumptions of NFPA-805. OPEN, NLT NOV 2016 Notes:
- 1. Verify that mod is performed during non-tornado period and/or appropriate compensatory measures in place.
- 2. During potential tornado periods, verify Tormis missile assumptions for SSF related equipment.
- 3. Verify new passive barrier is incorporated into passive barrier program and maintenance rule (risk rank, a(4), monitoring)
- 4. Verify that any breaches created in support of mods have been assessed with respect to flood, ventilation, and fire impacts
- 5. Verify risk impact of mod activities are accounted for, compensatory actions are implemented as needed, and contingency actions are pre-planned per NSD-213, Risk Management Process. This note applies to all sequences.