ML14183A695

Safety Evaluation Approving Relocation of Technical Support Ctr

ML14183A695
Person / Time
Site:	Robinson
Issue date:	09/18/1995
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML14183A694	List: ML14183A693 ML14183A695
References
NUDOCS 9509210273
Download: ML14183A695 (2)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 ENCLOSURE SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO THE LOCATION OF THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-261

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 24, 1995, as supplemented May 24, 1995, Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L or the licensee) proposed to revise the H. B.

Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 (HBR), Emergency Plan by relocating the Technical Support Center (TSC) outside the protected area. This revision will be an exception to the TSC location guidance in Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, Requirements for Emergency Response Capability." Specifically, the proposed revision would eliminate the current Emergency Plan commitment to incorporate the TSC, upon activation, into the protected area.

2.0 EVALUATION The HBR Emergency Plan currently indicates the TSC is to be incorporated within the site protected area, upon activation. Prior to activation of the TSC, the security force members must realign the protected area boundary to encompass that portion of the Training Building that currently houses the TSC facilities. The realignment normally involves a search of all areas of the TSC and compensatory measures added to enhance intrusion detection.

Currently, upon declaration of an emergency, the time needed to activate the TSC is approximately 50 to 60 minutes. With the proposed revision, the time required to activate the TSC is reduced to approximately 35 to 45 minutes.

With the TSC not in the protected area, the need to search and secure the TSC is not required, resulting in a 15-minute reduction in activation time.

The licensee has provided methods to ensure the availability of specific data and information from the control room, thus, limiting the need to send TSC personnel to the control room. Data is available from the Emergency Response Facility Information System/Electronic Display System (ERFIS/EDS) and the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), a subset of ERFIS. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) communicator transmits selected ERFIS data points from the control room indicators to the TSC in the event of ERFIS failure.

Information may be transferred from the TSC by existing communication systems that include the site telephone system, radio system, and the site-wide Local Area Network computer system. A dedicated Hot Line telephone is provided from the Shift Supervisor's desk in the control room to the Plant Operations Director in the TSC. As a means to verify that the information available in the TSC provides accurate plant status, a camera that is remotely controlled from the EOF can be used by EOF and control room personnel to view data available to personnel and briefings held in the TSC.

9509210273 950918 PDR ADOCK 05000261 P PDR

-2 Under the 0prIop d revision, personnel in the TSC travelling to the control room must ingress to, and egress from, the protected area through the secured gate in the protected area boundary fence, which increases the transit time.

The increased transit time, 3.5 minutes, from the TSC to the control room exceeds the guidance in NUREG-0696, Section 2.2, that states, "The walking time from the TSC to the control room shall not exceed 2 minutes." However, the difference in the transit time, 1.5 minutes, is offset by the reduction in the time to activate the TSC, and the enhanced communications capabilities available between the TSC and the Control Room. Two additional routes have also been established and with estimated times of transit of 5.0 and 7.5 minutes.

Protective measures are currently established to limit the radiation dose received by personnel travelling between the TSC and the control room under severe accident conditions. Both the control room and the TSC are stocked with emergency kits that include anticontamination clothing, respirators, and dosimetry. This equipment, as well as consideration of the optimum travel route between the facilities, will serve to minimize radiation dose received by personnel travelling between the TSC and the control room under emergency conditions that involve releases of radioactive materials. Non-design verified dose estimates were performed for the longest and shortest access routes, 7.5 and 3.5 minutes, respectively. The estimated total effective dose equivalent incurred for transit along the longest route between the TSC to the control room is 8.0 mrem versus 3.0 mrem for the currently available route.

Although the estimated dose incurred for the new route is greater than the dose projected for the current route, neither dose is considered significant in this context.

3.0 CONCLUSION

The NRC staff has evaluated CP&L's proposed revision to the HBR Emergency Plan. Based on a review of the licensee's submittal and on the basis that the revision does not decrease the effectiveness of the Plan, the staff recommends that the licensee's proposed revision to eliminate the commitment to require incorporation of the TSC into the protected area be approved.

Principal Contributor: N. Stinson Date: September 18, 1995