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Exan Final Itens 2B - Delay Release 2 Yrs
	ML17191B482
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Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	07/10/2017
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NRC EXAM SECURE INFOMATION Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L-16-1 N1 (Rev-0)

Facility: Turkey Point Nuclear (PTN) - Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 2016-301 Units 3 and 4 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RCO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 75% power (MOL). Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units.

Turnover: The 3A RHR pump and 3A1 Circulating Water pump are OOS.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description TFH1TU59 I-RCO LT-3-459, PZR Level Transmitter, Fails High 1

I-SRO (TS)

TAKPXA2 R-RCO 3A2 Intake Screen Blockage (Load reduction required) 2 TAKPXB1 R-SRO TAKPXB2 N-BOP TVS1MWED I-BOP FT-3-474, 3A S/G Steam Flow Transmitter, Drifts High 3

I-SRO (TS)

TFH1TV44 I-RCO PT-3-444, PZR Pressure Transmitter, Fails Low 4

I-SRO TFFVP6A C-BOP 3A Condensate Pump Sheared Shaft 5

C-SRO TVHHCLB M-RCO Large Break LOCA 6 M-BOP M-SRO 7 TFQ6A2BF P-RCO 3B RHR Pump Fails To Auto Start TFCVVSO5 P-BOP CV-3-2826/2819, Containment Isolation IA Bleed Valves, Fail To Auto 8

TFCVOSV6 Close

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (P)ost Trip NRC EXAM SECURE INFOMATION Page 1 of 3

NRC EXAM SECURE INFOMATION Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L-16-1 N1 (Rev-0)

Scenario Summary Event 1 Shortly after taking the watch, LT-3-459, PZR Level Control Transmitter, fails high causing charging flow to reduce to the minimum and Pressurizer level to start trending down. The US will enter 3-ONOP-041.6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction, and direct the RCO to place Pressurizer Level Control Transfer Switch to position 3, CH.2&3. Once Pressurizer level is stabilized the US will enter 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels. The RCO will verify the Pressurizer Level Control Transfer Switch has been switched to position 3 and Pressurize level control is in automatic.

Event 2 After the US evaluates Tech Specs for LT-3-459, the Intake Screen differential level will start rising on all running Circulating Water Pumps. The US will enter 3-ONOP-011, Screen Wash System/Intake Malfunction. The screen differential level on the 3A2 screen will require the 3A2 Circulating Water Pump be secured. Prior to securing the 3A2 CWP Circulating Water Pump Reactor power must be reduced to less than 60%. The crew will reduce power to less than 60% using 3-GOP-100, Fast Load Reduction, and then secure the 3A2 Circulating Water Pump.

Event 3 After the crew stops the 3A2 Circulating Water Pump FT-3-474, 3A S/G Steam Flow Transmitter, will drift high. The BOP will take manual control of the 3A S/G level and restore the 3A S/G level to normal. The US will enter 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, direct the BOP to select an operable channel, and restore 3A S/G level control to automatic.

Event 4 Once the US completes the Tech Spec evaluation for FT-3-474, Pressurizer Pressure Control Transmitter PT-3-444 fails low. The PZR Sprays will close and all PZR Heaters will turn on causing Pressurizer pressure to rise. The US will enter 3-ONOP-041.5, PZR Press Control Malfunction. The RCO will take manual control of PC-3-444J, PZR Press Controller, and restore PZR pressure to normal.

Event 5 After the crew restores Pressurizer Pressure the crew will start the 3C Condensate pump and secure the 3A Condensate pump due to a sheared shaft on the 3A Condensate Pump.

Event 6 Once the crew completes swapping condensate pumps a Large Break LOCA will occur. The crew will manually trip the Reactor and enter 3-EOP-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection. When RCP Trip Criteria are the met the RCO will trip the RCPs.

Event 7 When SI actuates the 3B RHR pump fails to auto start. The RCO will start the 3B RHR pump following the Immediate Operator Actions of 3-EOP-E-0.

Event 8 When Phase A actuates, CV-3-2826 and CV-3-2819, IA Bleed Valves, fail to auto close. While performing 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verifications the BOP manually closes CV-3-2826 however 3-CV-3-2819 is failed open and will not close in auto or manual.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFOMATION Page 2 of 3

NRC EXAM SECURE INFOMATION Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L-16-1 N1 (Rev-0)

Scenario Summary The crew will transition from 3-EOP-0 to 3-EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. During or shortly after the transition to 3-EOP-E-1 the crew will be required to go to 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition due to a RED path on the Integrity Status Tree. They will verify RHR flow greater than 1100 gpm, and then return to 3-EOP-E-1.

The scenario may be terminated after the crew transitions from 3-EOP-FR-P.1 to 3-EOP-1 at the Lead Evaluator's discretion once all Critical Tasks have been evaluated.

Event Critical Tasks 6/8 CT1 Start 3B RHR Pump During a Large Break LOCA start at least one RHR pump to provide core cooling to avoid transition to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

Safety Significance -- Failure to manually start at least one low-head ECCS pump prior to the transition to a contingency procedure constitutes misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system capacity that may lead to or prolong core uncovery.

6/7 CT2 Close CV-3-2826 During a Large Break LOCA close containment isolation valves such that at least one valve is closed on each critical Phase A penetration before whichever of the following occurs first:

The completion of 3-EOP-0 Attachment 3.

Within 60 minutes of the Phase A actuation signal.

Safety Significance -- Failure to perform the critical task leads to an unnecessary release of fission products to the auxiliary building, increasing the potential for release to the environment and reducing accessibility to vital equipment within the auxiliary building.

High radiation in the auxiliary building can lead to increased doses to personnel.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFOMATION Page 3 of 3

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Site: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 (PTN)

Title:

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 LMS #: NRC 21 LMS Rev Date: 6/6/16 Rev #: 0 SEG Type: Training Evaluation Program: LOCT LOIT Other Duration: 120 minutes Developed by: Tim Hodge / Luis Sagion 8/4/16 Instructor/Developer Date Reviewed by: Brian Clark 8/4/16 Instructor (Instructional Review) Date Validated by : Sean Bloom 8/5/16 SME (Technical Review) Date Approved by: Mark Wilson 8/5/16 Training Supervision Date Approved by: Sean Bloom 8/5/16 Training Program Owner (Line) Date NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SCENARIO REFERENCES DOC NO. TITLE REV PTN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 300 3-EOP-E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION 12 3-EOP-E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT 8A 3-EOP-FR-P.1 RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION 3 3-GOP-100 FAST LOAD REDUCTION 12A 3-ONOP-011 SCREEN WASH SYSTEM/INTAKE MALFUNCTION 7 3-ONOP-041.5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL MALFUNCTION 1 3-ONOP-041.6 PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL MALFUNCTION 2 DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR 3-ONOP-049.1 PROTECTION CHANNEL 4 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 2 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REQUIREMENTS Terminal Given this simulator scenario and resources normally found in the Control Room, the Objective operating crew will perform Control Room operations IAW approved plant procedures in order to maintain the integrity of the plant and the health and safety of the public.

Enabling Given this simulator scenario and resources normally found in the Control Room, Objectives: operate in accordance with approved plant procedures, Operations Department Instructions, and management expectations:

1. (ALL) Demonstrate personnel SAFETY awareness in interactions with plant staff and outside agencies.

2. (ALL) Demonstrate ALARA awareness in interactions with plant staff and outside agencies.

3. (ALL) Exchange correct information using 3-point communication/Repeat-backs with Control Room personnel and other plant staff.

4. (ALL) Inform plant personnel and System of plant conditions, as needed.

5. (US) Employ timely and concise crew briefs where appropriate.

6. (ALL) Maintain awareness of plant status and control board indication.

7. (ALL) Correctly diagnose plant situations.

8. (ALL) Solve operational problems as they arise.

9. (RCO/BOP) Manipulate plant controls properly and safely.

10. (ALL) Demonstrate self-checking using STAR and peer checks(when required)

11. (US) Demonstrate command and control of the crew.

12. (US) Coordinate the input of crew members and other plant staff.

13. (US) Utilize the input of crew members and other plant staff.

14. (ALL) Demonstrate conservative decision making.

15. (ALL) Demonstrate teamwork.

16. (ALL) Respond to plant events using procedural guidance (OPs/ONOPs/EOPs) as applicable in accordance with rules of usage.

17. (RCO/BOP) Implement any applicable procedural immediate operator actions without use of references.

18. (SRO) Maintain compliance with Tech Specs.

19. (ALL) Identify/enter applicable Tech Spec action statements.

20. (ALL) Respond to annunciators using ARPs (time permitting).

21. (ALL) Maintain written communication, logs, and documentation as needed to permit post-event reconstruction.

Continued on the next page:

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 3 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REQUIREMENTS While addressing the following events:

1. LT-3-459, PZR Level Transmitter, Fails High

2. 3A2 Intake Screen Blockage (Load reduction required)

3. FT-3-474, 3A S/G Steam Flow Transmitter, Drifts High

4. PT-3-444, PZR Pressure Transmitter, Fails Low

5. 3A Condensate Pump Sheared Shaft

6. Large Break LOCA

7. 3B RHR Pump Fails To Auto Start

8. CV-3-2826/19, Containment Isolation IA Bleed Valves, Fail To Auto Close Prerequisites: None Training PTN Unit 3 Plant Simulator Resources:

Development

TR-AA-220-1003, Initial NRC and Audit Exam Process

References:

TR-AA-230-1003, SAT Development

TR-AA-230-1007, Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation

0-ADM-232, Time Critical Action Program

OP-AA-100-1000, Conduct Of Operations

OP-AA-103-1000, Reactivity Management

0-ADM-200, Operations Management Manual

0-ADM-211, Emergency and Off-Normal Operating Procedure Usage

WCAP-17711-NP, Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group Westinghouse Emergency Response Guideline Revision 2-Based Critical Tasks Protected N/A Content:

Evaluation Performance Mode Method:

Operating None Experience:

Risk Significant Operator Actions:

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 4 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SRO TASK # TASK TITLE 02009002300 INVESTIGATE SCREEN D/P ALARM 02028033500 AUTHORIZE UNIT TRIP 02041057300 RESPOND TO PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL MALFUNCTION 02063008500 VERIFY SI OPERATION 02073030300 INVESTIGATE CONDENSATE SYSTEM ALARMS 02089026300 AUTHORIZE FAST LOAD REDUCTION 02200021500 RESPOND TO A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 02200044500 RESPOND TO STEAM GENERATOR HIGH LEVEL RO TASK TASK TITLE 01009002300 INVESTIGATE SCREEN D/P ALARM 01010005100 SHUTDOWN CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS 01028015100 ADJUST POWER LEVEL 01041027100 ADJUST PRESSURIZER PRESSURE MANUALLY USING THE MASTER CONTROLLER (444J) 01041057300 RESPOND TO PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL MALFUNCTION 01046007100 BORATE THE RCS VIA THE BLENDER 01063008500 VERIFY SAFETY INJECTION OPERATION 01073030300 INVESTIGATE CONDENSATE SYSTEM ALARMS 01074011300 CONTROL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL MANUALLY WITH MAIN FEED REGULATING VALVES 01089026300 RESPOND TO/ADJUST TURBINE DURING FAST LOAD REDUCTION 01200001500 RESPOND TO UNIT TRIP 01200021500 RESPOND TO A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 01200044500 RESPOND TO STEAM GENERATOR HIGH LEVEL NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 5 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION UPDATE LOG:

Place this form with the working copies of lesson plans and/or other materials to document changes made between formal revisions. For fleet-wide training materials, keep electronic file NOTES:

of this form in same folder as approved materials. Refer to TR-AA-230-1003 SAT Development for specific directions regarding how and when this form shall be used.

Indicate in the following table any minor changes or major revisions (as defined in TR-AA-230-1003) made to the material after initial approval. Or use separate Update Log form TR-AA-230-1003-F16.

DESCRIPTION OF PREPARER DATE

REASON FOR CHANGE AR/TWR#

CHANGE REVIEWER DATE Revised for L-16-1 NRC Note 5 Note 5 0-0 Initial Revision 2108338 Exam Note 5 Note 5 0-1 0-2 0-3 0-4 0-5

1. Individual updating lesson plan or training material shall complete the appropriate blocks on the Update Log.

2. Describe the change to the lesson plan or training materials.

3. State the reason for the change (e.g., reference has changed, typographical error, etc.)

4. Preparer enters name/date on the Update Log and obtains Training Supervisor approval.

5. Initial dates and site approval on cover page.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 6 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Initial Conditions The plant is at 75% power (MOL). Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units.

Equipment OOS The 3A RHR pump and 3A1 Circulating Water pump are OOS.

Event 1 Shortly after taking the watch, LT-3-459, PZR Level Control Transmitter, fails high causing charging flow to reduce to the minimum and Pressurizer level to start trending down. The US will enter 3-ONOP-041.6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction, and direct the RCO to place Pressurizer Level Control Transfer Switch to position 3, CH.2&3. Once Pressurizer level is stabilized the US will enter 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels. The RCO will verify the Pressurizer Level Control Transfer Switch has been switched to position 3 and Pressurize level control is in automatic.

Event 2 After the US evaluates Tech Specs for LT-3-459, the Intake Screen differential level will start rising on all running Circulating Water Pumps. The US will enter 3-ONOP-011, Screen Wash System/Intake Malfunction. The screen differential level on the 3A2 screen will require the 3A2 Circulating Water Pump be secured. Prior to securing the 3A2 CWP Circulating Water Pump, Reactor power must be reduced to less than 60%. The crew will reduce power to less than 60% using 3-GOP-100, Fast Load Reduction, and then secure the 3A2 Circulating Water Pump.

Event 3 After the crew stops the 3A2 Circulating Water Pump, FT-3-474, 3A S/G Steam Flow Transmitter, will drift high. The BOP will take manual control of the 3A S/G level and restore the 3A S/G level to normal. The US will enter 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, direct the BOP to select an operable channel, and restore 3A S/G level control to automatic.

Event 4 Once the US completes the Tech Spec evaluation for FT-3-474, Pressurizer Pressure Control Transmitter, PT-3-444 fails low. The PZR Sprays will close and all PZR Heaters will turn on causing Pressurizer pressure to rise. The US will enter 3-ONOP-041.5, PZR Press Control Malfunction. The RCO will take manual control of PC-3-444J, PZR Press Controller, and restore PZR pressure to normal.

Event 5 After the crew restores Pressurizer Pressure, the crew will start the 3C Condensate pump and secure the 3A Condensate pump due to a sheared shaft on the 3A Condensate Pump.

Event 6 Once the crew completes swapping condensate pumps, a Large Break LOCA will occur. The crew will manually trip the Reactor and enter 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection. When RCP Trip Criteria are met, the RCO will trip the RCPs.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 7 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Event 7 When SI actuates, the 3B RHR pump fails to auto start. The RCO will start the 3B RHR pump following the Immediate Operator Actions of 3-EOP-E-0.

Event 8 When Phase A actuates, CV-3-2826 and CV-3-2819, IA Bleed Valves, fail to auto close. While performing 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verifications the BOP manually closes CV-3-2826 however 3-CV-3-2819 is failed open and will not close in auto or manual.

The crew will transition from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. During or shortly after the transition to 3-EOP-E-1, the crew will be required to go to 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, due to a RED path on the Integrity Status Tree. They will verify RHR flow greater than 1100 gpm, and then return to 3-EOP-E-1.

The scenario may be terminated after the crew transitions from 3-EOP-FR-P.1 to 3-EOP-E-1, or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion once all Critical Tasks have been evaluated.

CRITICAL TASKS Event # Description 6/7 CT1 Start 3B RHR Pump During a Large Break LOCA start at least one RHR pump to provide core cooling to avoid transition to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

Safety Significance -- Failure to manually start at least one low-head ECCS pump prior to the transition to a contingency procedure constitutes misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system capacity that may lead to or prolong core uncovery.

6/8 CT2 Close CV-3-2826 During a Large Break LOCA close containment isolation valves such that at least one valve is closed on each critical Phase A penetration before whichever of the following occurs first:

The completion of 3-EOP-0 Attachment 3.

Within 60 minutes of the Phase A actuation signal.

Safety Significance -- Failure to perform the critical task leads to an unnecessary release of fission products to the auxiliary building, increasing the potential for release to the environment and reducing accessibility to vital equipment within the auxiliary building. High radiation in the auxiliary building can lead to increased doses to personnel.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 8 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SEQUENCE OF EVENTS EVENT # DESCRIPTION

1. LT-3-459, PZR Level Transmitter, Fails High

2. 3A2 Intake Screen Blockage (Load reduction required)

3. FT-3-474, 3A S/G Steam Flow Transmitter, Drifts High

4. PT-3-444, PZR Pressure Transmitter, Fails Low

5. 3A Condensate Pump Sheared Shaft

6. Large Break LOCA

7. 3B RHR Pump Fails To Auto Start

8. CV-3-2826, Containment Isolation IA Bleed Valves, Fail To Auto Close CV-3-2819, Containment Isolation IA Bleed Valves, Fail Open NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 9 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR SET UP INSTRUCTIONS Check Action

____ Restore IC-16 (75% MOL) or equivalent IC.

____ Unfreeze the Simulator.

____ Stop the 3A1 Circ Water Pump

____ Open & execute lesson file L-16-1 N1.lsn Ensure the following lesson steps are triggered:

SETUP - 3A RHR PUMP OOS

____

SETUP - 3A1 CWP OOS

EVENT 7 SETUP - 3B RHR PUMP FAILS TO AUTO START

EVENT 8 SETUP - IA BLEED VLVS FAIL TO CLOSE

____ Place 3A RHR pump in PTL and hang ECO tag.

____ Place 3A1 CWP in stop and hang ECO tag.

____ Verify the trend for 3A1 Screen on the TWS DP Recorder is clear.

____ Ensure Rod Group Step Counters have completed stepping out.

____ Allow the plant to stabilize.

____ Acknowledge any alarms and freeze Simulator.

____ Ensure B train is protected train on VPA.

____ Perform the SIMULATOR OPERATOR CHECKLIST or equivalent.

____ Place TURNOVER SHEETS on ROs desk or give to the Lead Evaluator.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 10 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION BRIEFINGS

Shift turnover information is attached to the back of this guide.

Ensure all applicants are prior briefed on Appendix E of NUREG 1021, Policies and Guidelines For Taking NRC Examinations.

Conduct a Crew Pre-brief to cover turnover information. Shift turnover information is attached to the back of this guide.

US:

RCO:

BOP:

SCENARIO NOTE 0-ADM-211, Emergency and Off-Normal Operating Procedure Usage, Prudent Operator Actions.

If redundant stand-by equipment is available and ready, the operator is permitted to start the redundant equipment for failed or failing operating equipment. Immediate follow up of applicable ARPs and ONOPs (AOPs) shall occur as required.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 11 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Critical Tasks are highlighted in Simulator Operator Actions Operator Verifiable Actions are pink. are highlighted in blue. Highlighted in green EVENT 1 - LT-3-459, PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER, FAILS HIGH 3-ONOP-041.6, PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL MALFUNCTION.

TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE NOTE Ensure the Simulator is in RUN before the crew enters the Simulator.

US:

Conducts shift turnover.

BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:

When directed by the Lead evaluator Observes LT-3-459 failed high trigger EVENT 1 - LT-3-459 FAILS HIGH BOP:

Acknowledges A8/3, A9/3, G1/1

A5/4 may alarm shortly after

Reviews ARP and recommends entry into 3-ONOP-041.6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction.

US:

Directs 3-ONOP-041.6 response.

PROCEDURE NOTES

If Pressurizer Level Malfunction is a result of a failure of the 3-459CX or 3-460CX relays (as indicated by a loss of letdown flow with a loss of Pressurizer Heaters with no concurrent failure of Level Transmitters 3-459A, 3-460, 3-461), use 3-ONOP-003.6 Attachment 4, for 3-460CX failure, OR 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 4, for 3-459CX failure as guidance for establishing Letdown flow and Pressurizer Heaters.

If the button on relays 3-459CX or 3-460CX are used to restore Letdown flow and Pressurizer Heaters, comply with Tech Spec Action Statement 3.4.3 Action b.

If the manual control of Heaters from the Electrical Penetration Room is used, comply with Tech Spec Action Statement 3.4.3 Action a.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 12 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 1 - LT-3-459, PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER, FAILS HIGH 3-ONOP-041.6, PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL MALFUNCTION.

TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE LEAD EVALUATOR RCO:

The 3A2 INTAKE SCREEN BLOCKAGE

Check Pressurizer level indicators failure in Event 2 may go undetected for LI-3-459A, LI-3-460 AND LI-3-461 up to 15 minutes. After the crew enters 3-

Selects ch 2 & 3 PZR level control ONOP-041.6, direct the Booth Operator (Position 3) to trigger Event 2 at your discretion.

Maintains PZR level on program per 3-ONOP-041.6, Enclosure 1

May place Master Charging Pump Controller, LC-3-459G in manual

May Start or Stop one charging pump as required.

Place LR-3-459 Channel Select Pressurizer Level Recorder to position 2 or 3.

Steps 5.1 - 5.4 US:

Marks Steps 5.5 - 5.7 N/A RCO:

WHEN desired place LC-3-459G in Automatic Step 5.8 US:

Perform actions required by 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels.

Step 5.9 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 13 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 1 - LT-3-459, PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER, FAILS HIGH 3-ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION CHANNELS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTEs EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE US:

Enters and directs actions of 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, for response RCO:

Verify LT-459 failure by comparison LT-3-460/461 and known plant parameters and conditions

Verify no off-normal conditions exist on LT-3-460/461

Verify ch 2 & 3 PZR level control in (Position 3)

Verify LR-3-459 Channel Selected to Pressurizer Level Recorder to position 2 or 3

Verify PZR level control function is returned to automatic.

Steps 5.1 - 5.5 US Reviews TECH Specs

Tech Spec 3.3-1 Functional Unit 9 not met.

- Action 13, inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

US:

Marks steps 5.7 - 5.11 N/A.

US:

Identify Bistables which need to be tripped.

Step 5.12 US:

Marks steps 5.13 - 5.16 N/A.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 14 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 1 - LT-3-459, PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER, FAILS HIGH 3-ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION CHANNELS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTEs EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR US:

WCC/I&C: Acknowledge the report. If Initiate a Plant Work Order AND notify the asked I&C would like to be present when I&C Supervisor.

bi-stables are tripped. They will be in the Step 5.17 control room in about 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

US:

Conducts crew brief.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 15 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - 3A2 INTAKE SCREEN BLOCKAGE 3-ONOP-011, SCREEN WASH SYSTEM/INTAKE MALFUNCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTEs EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by the Lead evaluator trigger EVENT 2 - INTAKE SCREEN BLOCKAGE NOTE BOP:

The crew may enter 3-ONOP-011 prior

Addresses Alarm Response for I3/3 to receiving the alarm.

CHECKs Intake Well DPs greater than 25" water on recorder R-3-2300 BOOTH OPERATOR at VPA(3C04).

If asked to rake the grizzly screen,

Dispatches an Operator to check the report the rake is stuck. Maintenance following:

support has been requested. - Traveling Screens with HI DP are running in FAST.

NOTE - Operating Traveling Screens The crew may swap ICW pumps. Spray Wash is maintaining the screen clear of debris.

- Recommends entering 3-ONOP-011, Screen Wash System /

Intake Malfunction.

US:

Enters and directs the actions of 3-ONOP-011.

US:

Reviews Foldout page with the crew.

Circulating Water Pump Stopping Criteria

Fast Load Reduction Criteria

Reactor Trip Criteria

Loss of Intake Cooling Water

Plant Management Notification

Shift Manager Evaluation of Intake Screen Effectiveness

Amertap Screen Debris Monitoring Foldout Page NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 16 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - 3A2 INTAKE SCREEN BLOCKAGE 3-ONOP-011, SCREEN WASH SYSTEM/INTAKE MALFUNCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTEs EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE PROCEDURE NOTE To rotate a Traveling Screen manually, a 10mm wrench is required to remove the motor cover to allow access to the drive crank. When the motor cover is removed, a micro switch will de-energize 480V power from the Screen and actuate I-3/4, TRAVELING SCREEN GENERAL TROUBLE.

BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When dispatched to locally start Direct ANPO to:

traveling screens, wait 2 minutes and

Check Traveling Screens Operating then trigger EVENT 2 LOA - START Properly ALL PUMPS AND ALL SCREENS IN

Check Traveling Screen Spray FAST Wash Pumps Operating Properly Steps 1 & 2 BOOTH OPERATOR When the screens start, verify EVENT 2

- REDUCE SCREEN BLOCKAGE triggers.

BOOTH OPERATOR If asked all traveling screen equipment is operating normally.

BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When dispatched to locally check ICW Directs SNPO:

to CCW and TPCW heat Exchanger or

Maintain Intake Cooling Water Flow strainers, wait 1-3 min, report all ICW/ To Component Cooling Water Heat CCW ICW / TPCW Strainers < 1 P. If a Exchangers.

specific value is requested use

Maintain Intake Cooling Water To simulator drawings COMMON The Turbine Plant Cooling Water SERVICES/INTAKE COOLING and Heat Exchangers COMMON SERVICES/TURBINE PLANT COOLING to report actual Steps 3 & 4 values.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 17 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - 3A2 INTAKE SCREEN BLOCKAGE 3-ONOP-011, SCREEN WASH SYSTEM/INTAKE MALFUNCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTEs EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

Check If Conditions Returned To When I3/3,Traveling Screen High P Normal. (NO, Go to Step 7) alarms, verify EVENT 2 - STABILIZE Step 5 SCREEN BLOCKAGE triggers Monitor screen level on the TWS DP recorder. If needed use the active malfunction summary page to adjust TAKPXA2 to maintain screen level less than 30 inches.

BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

Acknowledge request for additional

Contact WCC and Maintenance for support. additional support.

BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

If asked to locally check level drop Check If One Circulating Water Pump behind Traveling Screens, use the Should Be Stopped.

Simulator Panel drawings to report the

Locally check that level drop behind same level displayed on the control Traveling Screens is greater than 3 room chart recorders. feet. (NO)

OR LEAD EVALUATOR

VPA P greater than 36 inches.

After the crew evaluates step 7 have the (No)

Booth Operator call the Unit Supervisor as the Shift Manager and direct the US to reduce power to less than 60% per Return to step 1 3-GOP-100, Fast Load Reduction to Step 7 secure the 3A2 Circulating Water Pump.

BOOTH OPERATOR US:

Acknowledge notifications Notify Plant Management.

If Chemistry is asked, request the crew maintain current blowdown flow.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 18 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - 3A2 INTAKE SCREEN BLOCKAGE 3-GOP-100, FAST LOAD REDUCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE US:

Directs actions to reduce Rx power from 50% per 3-GOP-100.

Completes Attachment 3 (Page 44)

Brief the crew per Attachment 4 (Page 45)

Steps 1-2 US:

Reviews Foldout page with crew.

3-EOP-E-0 Transition Criteria

Notify Chemistry Department

Boration Stop Criteria

Restore Blender to AUTO FOLDOUT PAGE BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

Acknowledge notifications. Notify The Following Of Fast Load Reduction

System Dispatcher

Plant personnel using the Page Boost

Chemistry to start RCS sampling is required according to Tech Spec Table 4.4-4.

Step 3 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 19 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - 3A2 INTAKE SCREEN BLOCKAGE 3-GOP-100, FAST LOAD REDUCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Begin Boration For Initial Tavg Effect

Set the Boric Acid Totalizer to total boric acid volume value determined on Attachment 3 (~250 gallons).

Place the Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to BORATE.

Place the RCS Makeup Control Switch to START.

Adjust FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller to achieve 40 gpm boric acid flow as indicated on FR-3-113.

WHEN Tavg begins to lower from the boration, THEN, adjust FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller to load reduction value from Attachment 3.

Step 4 US:

Determine Turbine Load Reduction in MW CNTRL Step 5 BOP:

Initiate Turbine Load Reduction in MW CNTRL

Select MW CNTRL

Set TARGET power level - MW VALUE from Attachment 3

Set RAMP RATE - MW/M VALUE FROM Attachment 3.

Check Tavg has lowered 1° to 2°F from the initial value prior to boration.

Depress GO

Ensure FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller, has been adjusted to the load reduction boration rate.

Go to Step 10 Step 6 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 20 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - 3A2 INTAKE SCREEN BLOCKAGE 3-GOP-100, FAST LOAD REDUCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Monitor Load Reduction

Adjusts power reduction rate to maintain Tavg/Tref within limits of Attachment 3.

Monitors S/G level control to ensure feed reg valves properly maintain level control in automatic.

Refer to Enclosure 1 for expected alarms. (Page 46)

Step 10 BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:

Respond as SNPO. If asked, idle

Maintain pressurizer level to ensure Charging Pump ready for start. that automatic pressurizer level control maintains level on program.

If needed starts 2nd Chg Pp and places 2nd orifice in service.

Adjusts boration rate to maintain Tavg/Tref within limits of Attachment 3.

Refer to Enclosure 1 for expected alarms.

Step 10 RCO:

Monitor Boration Rate

Monitor for excessive rod movement by monitoring TR-3-409D, Rod Position Bank D.

Determine if Insertion Limit and Bank D position are converging at a rate that will cause rod insertion limit alarms.

Adjust power reduction rate as needed to control rod insertion

Increase boration rate and/or total amount as necessary to limit control rod insertion Step 11 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 21 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - 3A2 INTAKE SCREEN BLOCKAGE 3-GOP-100, FAST LOAD REDUCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Monitor Annunciator B 8/1, ROD A/B/C/D BANK LO LIMIT - CLEAR

Monitor B 8/2 ROD BANK A/B/C/D EXTRA LO LIMIT - CLEAR Steps 12-13 US:

Have SM refer to the following procedures:

0-EPIP-20101, DUTIES OF EMERGENCY COORDINATOR

0-ADM-115, NOTIFICATION OF PLANT EVENTS Step 14 PROCEDURE NOTE Axial flux difference is allowed to exceed the Target Band during the load reduction without entering 3-ONOP-059.4, AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE.

BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:

Acknowledge notifications Energize Pressurizer Backup Heaters If Chemistry is asked, request the crew Step 15 maintain current blowdown flow.

BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When directed to close 3-30-002 and 3- When power is reduce to <60%, stops the 30-004 per step 4 of 3-NOP-010, wait 1 - 3A2 CWP In Accordance With 2 minutes, then trigger LOA - CLOSE 3-NOP-010, Circulating Water System.

3-30-002 AND 3-30-004.

Report when complete.

BOOTH OPERATOR When dispatched to monitor the 3A2 CWP discharge MOV, report it fully closed after the pump stopped. All checks are SAT.

BOP:

Verify Turbine Load is Less Than 675 MWE.

Step 16 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 22 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - 3A2 INTAKE SCREEN BLOCKAGE 3-GOP-100, FAST LOAD REDUCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE PROCEDURE CAUTIONS

If Medium Runback Armed is ACTIVE and one of three operating Condensate Pumps is shutdown, a Turbine Runback will result.

Medium Runback Armed should be NOT ACTIVE below TIP pressure of approximately 574 psig.

BOP:

Check Condensate Pump Operation

a. Check three condensate pumps running

b. Verify Medium Runback Armed NOT active

c. Stop one condensate pump Step 17 US:

Check Desired Final Power Target -

LESS THAN 475 MWE Step 18 LEAD EVALUATOR Once power the 3A2 CWP is shutdown, or at the Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to the next event.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 23 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 3 - FT-3-474, 3A S/G STEAM FLOW TRANSMITTER, DRIFTS HIGH 3-ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION CHANNELS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When directed by the lead evaluator, Recognizes and reports FT-3-474 is trigger EVENT 3 - FT-3-474 DRIFTS failing high.

HIGH

Takes manual control of 3A S/G level control valve FCV-3-478.

Restores 3A S/G level to normal.

NOTE RCO:

The crew may use direction in the ARP to Addresses Alarm Response for C4/1, select alternate input signals and return C5/1, C6/1 and C7/1.

3A S/G level control to automatic before

Ensures BOP takes Prompt Actions enter 3-ONOP-049.1.

- Take manual control of level.

- Return SG levels to normal.

Checks if alarm is due to instrument failure, then refers to 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels.

US:

Enters and directs actions of 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, for response BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

If dispatched to reset AMSAC, wait 3 to 5

Verify FT-3-474 failure by comparison minutes and then trigger EVENT 3 LOA - to FT-3-475 and known plant RESET AMSAC. Report when complete. parameters and conditions.

Verify no off-normal conditions exist on FT-3-475

Place 3A S/G Steam Flow Control transfer switch to FT-3-475. (Ch IV-Yellow)

Place 3A S/G Feed Water Flow Control transfer switch to FT-3-476.( Ch IV-Yellow)

When 3A S/G level is returned to normal place FCV-3-478 level control valve in auto.

Steps 5.1- 5.5 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 24 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 3 - FT-3-474, 3A S/G STEAM FLOW TRANSMITTER, DRIFTS HIGH 3-ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION CHANNELS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR US Acknowledge notifications and request for Reviews Tech Specs additional support. If asked, I&C would

Tech Spec 3.3-1 Functional Unit 12 not like to be resent when the bi-stables are met.

tripped. They will be in the control room as - Action 6, inoperable channel must soon as their work package is ready, be placed in the tripped condition about an hour. within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Tech Spec 3.3-2 Functional Unit 1f and 4d not met.

- Action 15, inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Step 5.6 US:

Marks steps 5.7 - 5.11 N/A.

US:

Identify Bistables which need to be tripped.

Step 5.12 US:

Marks steps 5.13 - 5.16 N/A.

US:

Initiate a Plant Work Order AND notify the I&C Supervisor.

Step 5.17 LEAD EVALUATOR US After S/G level control is restored to auto

Conducts crew brief.

and the Tech Spec review is complete, at the Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to the next event.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 25 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 4 - PT-3-444, PZR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILS LOW 3-ONOP-041.5, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL MALFUNCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, trigger EVENT 4 - PT-3-444 FAILS LOW RCO:

Reports PZR pressure rising due to PI-3-444 failing low.

NOTE BOP:

The RCO will most likely notice this Reviews ARP for A9/2, PZR CONTROL failure before Alarm A9/2 comes in. The HI/LO PRESS crew may use the ARP for guidance.

Check PZR pressure less than 2235 psig (NO)

Check PI-3-445/444, PZR pressure greater than 2300 psig or Less than 2185 psig.

Refer to 3-ONOP-041.5, PZR Press Control Malfunction.

US:

Directs the Action of 3-ONOP-041.5, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction.

US:

Reviews the Foldout Page with the crew.

Failed Instrument Isolation

3-EOP-E-0 Transition Criteria

PORV Isolation/Leaking PORV Identification

Open/Leaking PZR Safety Valve Identification

Spurious Actuation Of CV-3-311, Auxiliary Spray Valve PROCEDURE CAUTION The Master Controller should be operated carefully (Normal controller output for 2235 psig is 42.5 percent demand; 92 percent demand will open PCV-3-455C). If the following conditions are met, an excessive increase in controller output could cause Power Operated Relief Valve PCV-3-455C to open:

1. PCV-3-455C hand switch in AUTO.

2. Pressurizer pressure is greater than or equal to 2000 psig, or OMS switch in LO Press Ops.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 26 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 4 - PT-3-444, PZR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILS LOW 3-ONOP-041.5, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL MALFUNCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Check PT-3-444 - NOT FAILED (NO)

- Verify PCV-3-455C OR MOV 536 CLOSED.

- Take manual control of PC-3-444J, PZR PRESS CONTROL.

Check PT-3-445 - NOT FAILED Step 1 RCO:

Check PORVs Closed

PZR pressure normal or trending to normal.

Check PZR Safety Valves Closed

Check PZR Pressure Stable Or Increasing

Check Pressurizer Pressure Above Normal Value (NO - Go to Step 10)

Step 2 - 6 RCO:

Check Pressurizer Pressure Low Or Decreasing (NO- Go to Step 20)

Step 10 RCO:

Check RCS Pressure Stable Step 20 BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:

Acknowledge notifications and request for Check If Automatic Pressure Control Can support. Be Established (NO)

Notify the Instrument and Controls LEAD EVALUATOR Department.

After PZR Pressure is stable, then

Continue efforts to establish proceed with the next event. Automatic Pressure Control.

Return to Step 20 Step 21 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 27 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 5 - 3A CONDENSATE PUMP SHEARED SHAFT 3-NOP-073, CONDENSATE SYSTEM TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, trigger EVENT 5- 3A CONDENSATE PUMP SHEARED SHAFT.

RCO:

Reviews Alarm G8/3, COND PUMP A LO FLOW BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

If dispatched to check the 3A Condensate

Check Condensate Pump flow pump, wait 2- 3 minutes and then report indication on DCS.

you see nothing wrong with the pump.

Monitor feed pump suction pressure.

Report low amps on 3A Condensate pump and high amps on the 3B Condensate pump.

US:

Direct BOP to start the 3C Condensate pump and Secure the 3A Condensate pump per 3-NOP-073.

BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

If asked, the 3C Condensate Pump is Dispatch an operator to verify the 3B ready for a start. After the pump is Condensate pump is ready to start per 3-started, report a SAT start. NOP-073.

Start the 3C Condensate Pump.

Secure the 3A Condensate Pump.

NOTE 3A Condensate Pump has restart feature that may encourage the crew to have it racked out.

LEAD EVALUATOR US After the Condensate pumps are

Notifies WCC to initiate PWO and I&C swapped, proceed to the next event. for troubleshooting.

Conducts crew brief.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 28 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - LARGE BREAK LOCA 3-EOP-E-0, RX TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by the Lead Evaluator trigger EVENT 6 - LB LOCA RCO:

Responds to various alarms PZR LO Pressure and level Alarms A9/2, A9/3.

Reports lowering Pressurizer and pressure and level.

Maximizes Charging

Isolates Letdown

When PZR cannot be maintained recommends a Reactor trip.

NOTE US:

Steps 1 - 4 of 3-EOP-E-0 are Immediate Directs RCO to manually trip the Reactor.

Operator Actions (IOAs). The board RCO:

operators will call out the high level steps of the IOAs as each step is completed Manually trips Reactor.

from memory. RCO/BOP:

Perform IOAs of 3-EOP-E-0.

RCO:

Verify Reactor Trip STEP 1 BOP:

Verify Turbine STEP 2 BOP:

Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses STEP 3 RCO:

Checks If SI Is Actuated STEP 4 US:

Reviews Steps 1 - 4 of 3-EOP-E-0 with the crew.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 29 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - LARGE BREAK LOCA 3-EOP-E-0, RX TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE NOTE The crew may take Prudent Operator Actions to start the 3B RHR pump and/or close Containment Phase A Isolation valve CV-3-2826 or they may wait until directed by 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3.

CV-3-2819 is failed open and will not close in auto or manual.

CT1 Start 3B RHR Pump RCO:

During a Large Break LOCA, start at least

Starts the 3B RHR pump one RHR pump to provide core cooling prior to transition to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

CT2 Close CV-3-2826 BOP:

During a Large Break LOCA, close

Close CV-3-2826 containment isolation valves such that at least one valve is closed on each critical Phase A penetration before whichever of the following occurs first:

The completion of 3-EOP-0 Attachment 3

Within 60 minutes of the Phase A actuation signal.

US:

Reviews FOP for 3-EOP-E-0

Adverse Cntmt (Met, Temp>180°F)

RCP Trip Criteria (Met)

Trips RCPs once met.

Faulted S/G Isolation

Ruptured S/G Isolation

AFW Sys Operation Criteria

CST Makeup Water Criteria

RHR System Operation Criteria

Loss of Offsite Power or SI on the Other Unit

Loss of Charging Criteria FOLDOUT PAGE NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 30 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - LARGE BREAK LOCA 3-EOP-E-0, RX TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE NOTE BOP:

The actions of Attachment 3 are listed

Continues with ATTACHMENT 3 to beginning on page 38. complete The Prompt Action Verifications.

STEP 5 RCO:

Check AFW Pumps - AT LEAST TWO RUNNING STEP 6 RCO:

Verify AFW Valve Alignment -

PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT STEP 7 NOTE RCO:

Crew may enter 3-EOP-FR-H.1 if total Verify Proper AFW Flow:

AFW flow is less than 400 gpm with all

Check Narrow Range Level in at least Steam Generators LESS THAN 27% one S/G - GREATER THAN 7%[27%]

Narrow Range.

Maintain feed flow to S/G until Narrow Range Levels between 21%[27%]

and 50%

STEP 8 RCO:

All RCP Thermal Barrier Alarms - CLEAR (NO)

Trip RCPs (RCPs tripped per Foldout Page.)

Check All RCP CBO temperatures -

LESS THAN 260°F

SI - RESET

Start one Charging Pump at minimum speed for Seal Injection.

Adjust HCV-3-121, Charging Flow To Regen Heat Exchanger, to maintain proper Seal Injection flow STEP 9 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 31 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - LARGE BREAK LOCA 3-EOP-E-0, RX TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Check RCS Temperatures:

Check RCPs - ANY RUNNING (NO)

Check RCS Cold Leg temperatures stable between 545°F and 547°F or trending down to 547°F (NO)

IF TCOLD is decreasing, THEN perform the following:

Stop dumping steam.

IF cooldown continues AND is due to excessive feed flow, then reduce total feed flow to 400 gpm until Narrow Range Level greater than 7%[27%] in at least one S/G.

IF cooldown continues AND is due to excessive steam flow, THEN close Main Steamline isolation and Bypass valves.

STEP 10 RCO:

Check PRZ PORVs, Spray Valves And Excess Letdown Isolated:

STEP 11 RCO:

Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

RCPs - ANY RUNNING (NO)

STEP 12 RCO:

Check If S/Gs Are Faulted: (NO)

STEP 13 RCO:

Check If S/G Tubes Are Ruptured: (NO)

STEP 14 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 32 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - LARGE BREAK LOCA 3-EOP-E-0, RX TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Check If RCS Is Intact (NO)

US:

Perform the following:

Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-0, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES.

INTEGRITY Critical Safety Function Status Tree is RED Go to 3-EOP-FR-P.1, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION STEP 15 US:

Reviews the Fold Page of 3-EOP-FR-P.1

ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS RCO:

Check RCS Pressure - GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [575 PSIG] (NO)

Check RHR flow greater than1100 gpm.

US:

Returns to 3-EOP-E-0, step 15.

Go to 3-EOP-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 33 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - LB LOCA 3-EOP-E-1, Loss Of Reactor Or Secondary Coolant TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR US:

If dispatched to start the B Standby

Conducts EOP transition brief.

SGFP, wait 3 minutes and then trigger START B STANDBY SGFP.

Directs 3-EOP-E-1 response.

US:

Reviews FOP for 3-EOP-E-1 with the crew.

Containment Adverse (YES)

RCP Trip Criteria - Tripped

SI Termination Criteria

Secondary Integrity Criteria.

E-3 Transition Criteria

Cold Leg Recirculation Switchover Criteria. (met < 155k)

Recirculation Sump Blockage.

CST Makeup Water Criteria.

Loss of Offsite Power or Unit 4 SI

RHR Sys Operation Criteria

Loss Of Charging Criteria FOLDOUT PAGE RCO:

Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped (Tripped)

STEP 1 RCO:

Check If S/Gs Are NOT Faulted.

STEP 2 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 34 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - LB LOCA 3-EOP-E-1, Loss Of Reactor Or Secondary Coolant TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Check Intact S/G Levels:

Any Narrow Range Level Greater Than 7%[27%].

- Maintain total feed flow greater than 400 gpm until Narrow range Level greater the 7% [27%] in at least one S/G.

Control feed flow to maintain Narrow Range Level between 21%[27%] and 50%.

Narrow Range Level Less Than 50%.

STEP 3 BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:

Acknowledge the request for Chemistry Check Secondary Radiation:

and HP support STEP 4 RCO:

Checks PRZ PORVs And Block Valves:

STEP 5 RCO:

Check SI - RESET STEP 6 RCO:

Resets Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B.

STEP 7 RCO:

Verify Instrument Air To Containment STEP 8 RCO:

Check Power Supply To All Charging Pumps - ALIGNED TO OFFSITE POWER STEP 9 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 35 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - LB LOCA 3-EOP-E-1, Loss Of Reactor Or Secondary Coolant TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Check If Charging Flow Has Been Established.

Charging pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES)

Establish desired charging by performing ATTACHMENT 2, steps 3 through 5.

- Place RCS Makeup Control Switch in STOP

- Start additional Charging pumps if needed.

- Adjust Charging Flow To Regen Heat Exchanger, HCV-3-121, to maintain proper seal injection flow.

- Verify charging pump suction auto transfers to RWST.

- Notify Unit Supervisor That Attachment 2 Is Complete.

STEP 10 US:

Check if SI Flow Should Be Terminated (NO)

STEP 11 RCO:

Check if Containment Spray should be stopped. (NO)

STEP 12 RCO:

Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped.

(NO)

STEPS 13 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 36 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - LB LOCA 3-EOP-E-1, Loss Of Reactor Or Secondary Coolant TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO\BOP:

Check RCS And S/G Pressures

Pressure in all S/Gs - STABLE OR INCREASING

RCS pressure STABLE OR DECREASING STEP 14 BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

If directed to Stop 4A and 4B EDG, Check If Diesel Generators Should Be acknowledge request.

Stopped:

BOOTH OPERATOR

Stop 3A and 3B EDG by placing its If dispatched to place any stopped EDGs Normal Stop/Normal Start switch in in standby, acknowledge request. NORMAL STOP position.

Direct Unit 4 RCO to stop any unloaded diesel generator by placing its Normal Stop/Normal Start switch in NORMAL STOP position.

Dispatch Operator to place any stopped EDGs in standby using 3/4-OP-023, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR STEP 15 BOOTH OPERATOR If dispatched to unlock and close cold leg recirc breakers, wait 2 to 3 minutes then US:

trigger LOA - ENERGIZE TRAIN A SI Initiate Evaluation Of Plant Status RECIR MOVS and LOA - ENERGIZE STEP 16 TRAIN B SI RECIR MOVS The scenario may be terminated after the crew transitions from 3-EOP-FR-P.1 to 3-EOP-E-1 at the Lead Evaluator's discretion once all Critical Task have been evaluated.

- - END OF SCENARIO ***

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 37 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 8 - CV-3-2826/2819, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION IA BLEED VALVES, FAIL TO AUTO CLOSE 3-EOP-E-0 ATTACHMENT 3, PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Check Load Centers Associated With Energized 4 KV Buses - ENERGIZED STEP 1 BOP:

Verify Feedwater Isolation:

STEP 2 NOTE The crew may have taken Prudent BOP:

Operator Actions to close CV-3-2826 after Check If Main Steam Lines Should Be SI Actuated.

Isolated 3-CV-3-2819 is failed open and will not STEP 3 close in auto or manual.

CT2 Close CV-3-2826 During a Large Break LOCA, close BOP:

containment isolation valves such that at Verify Containment Isolation Phase A least one valve is closed on each critical Valve White Lights On VPB - ALL Phase A penetration before whichever of BRIGHT (NO) the following occurs first:

Manually actuate Containment

The completion of 3-EOP-0 isolation Phase A.

Attachment 3

Close CV-3-2826

Within 60 minutes of the Phase A STEP 4 actuation signal.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 38 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 7 - 3B RHR PUMP FAILS TO AUTO START 3-EOP-E-0 ATTACHMENT 3 - PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE NOTE The crew may have taken Prudent Operator Actions to start the 3B RHR pump after SI actuated. BOP:

Verify Pump Operation:

CT1 Start 3B RHR Pump

At least two High-Head SI Pumps -

During a Large Break LOCA start at least RUNNING one RHR pump to provide core cooling

Both RHR Pumps - RUNNING (NO) prior to transition to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

Starts the 3B RHR pump STEP 5 BOP:

Verify Proper CCW System Operation:

CCW Heat Exchangers - THREE IN SERVICE

CCW Pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING

CCW Headers - TIED TOGETHER

MOV-3-626, RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Outlet - OPEN (NO Phase B)

STEP 6 BOP:

Verify Proper ICW System Operation:

Verify ICW Pumps - AT LEAST TWO RUNNING

Verify ICW To TPCW Heat Exchanger

- ISOLATED:

Check ICW Headers - TIED TOGETHER STEP 7 BOP:

Check Emergency Containment Coolers

- ONLY TWO RUNNING STEP 8 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 39 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 7 - 3B RHR PUMP FAILS TO AUTO START 3-EOP-E-0 ATTACHMENT 3 - PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Verify Unit 3 Containment Purge Exhaust And Supply Fans - OFF STEP 9 BOP:

Verify Containment Spray and Phase B actuated.

STEP 10 BOP:

Verify SI - RESET STEP 11 BOP:

Verify SI Valve Amber Lights On VPB -

ALL BRIGHT STEP 12 BOP:

Verify SI Flow:

RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1625 PSIG[1950 PSIG]

High-Head SI Pump flow indicator -

CHECK FOR FLOW STEP 13 BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When requested, trigger LOA - ALIGN Realign SI System:

U-4 HHSIs TO U3 RWST

Check Procedure Entry Status - E-0 ENTERED FROM 3-ONOP-047.1, LOSS OF CHARGING FLOW IN MODES 1 THROUGH 4 (NO)

Verify Unit 3 High-Head SI Pumps -

TWO RUNNING

Stop both Unit 4 High-Head SI

Pumps and place in standby

Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to align Unit 4 High-Head SI Pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using Attachment 1.

STEP 14 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 40 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 7 - 3B RHR PUMP FAILS TO AUTO START 3-EOP-E-0 ATTACHMENT 3 - PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Verify Containment Isolation Phase A -

RESET STEP 15 BOP:

Reestablish RCP Cooling:

Check RCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (NO)

Go to Step 17 STEP 16 BOP:

Verify Control Room Ventilation Isolation:

STEP 17 BOP:

BOOTH OPERATOR Place Hydrogen Monitors In Service When requested, trigger LOA - PLACE Using 3-NOP-094, CONTAINMENT PAHM IN SERVICE, wait 3 to 5 minutes POST ACCIDENT MONITORING and then report task complete.

SYSTEM STEP 18 BOP:

Verify All Four EDGs - RUNNING STEP 19 BOP:

Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses:

STEP 20 BOP:

Notify Unit Supervisor Of The Following:

Attachment 3 is complete

Any safeguards equipment that is NOT running is in the required condition

Status of Containment pressure continuous action STEP 21 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 41 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Discussion Points are intentionally NOT included in evaluated scenarios. However, space is available below to document follow-up questions when further information is required to determine an evaluation outcome.

FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS QUESTION #1

________________________________________________________

________________________

ANSWER #1

________________________________________________________

______________________________

QUESTION #2

________________________________________________________

________________________

ANSWER #2

________________________________________________________

______________________________

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 42 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR POST-SCENARIO RESTORATION:

______ 1. Restore per Simulator Operator Checklist.

2. Once exams are complete, restore from SEI-19, Simulator Exam Security.

______

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 43 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 44 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 45 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 46 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG DRAFT L-16-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 3 RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE) UNIT 4 RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)

PROTECTED TRAIN: B PROTECTED TRAIN: B ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO:

Field Supv.: Outside SNPO:

Admin RCO: ANPO:

Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit Supv.: Unit Supv.:

RCO: RCO:

NPO: NPO:

PLANT STATUS Unit 3 Unit 4 Mode: 1 Mode: 1 Power: 75% Power: 100%

MWe: 608 MWe: 842 Gross Leakrate: .22 gpm Gross Leakrate: 0.03 gpm RCS Boron Conc: 828 ppm RCS Boron Conc: 642 Operational Concerns:

3A RHR pump taken OOS 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago for an oil change, expected back by the end of this shift.

3A1 Circ Water pump OOS. Tripped on over current, Electrical Maintenance is investigating.

3A Condensate pump was returned to service last shift following a motor bearing replacement.

Return to full power expected next shift.

MIMS alarms are inhibited.

U3 Anticipated LCO Actions:

None U4 Anticipated LCO Actions:

None Results of Offgoing Focus Area:

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 47 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG DRAFT L-16-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION UNIT 3 STATUS REACTOR OPERATOR UNIT RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE) PROTECTED TRAIN: B Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 75% Gross: 0.22 GPM A 6656 MWe 608 Unidentified 0.04 GPM B 6608 Tavg: 571°F Charging Pps: 0.00 GPM C 6646 RCS Pressure: 2235 RCS Boron Conc: 828 ppm Abnormal Annunciators:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Current Tech Spec Action Statements: (Does Not Include For Tracking Only Items T.S.A.S / Component: 3A RHR pump, 3.5.2.c - Action g Reason: Oil Change Entry Date: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 48 of 49

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 SEG DRAFT L-16-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION REACTOR OPERATOR (CONT'D)

UNIT RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE) PROTECTED TRAIN: B Changes to Risk Significant Equipment:

No recent changes from last shift.

OLRM: GREEN PROTECTED TRAIN: B Upcoming Reactivity Management Activities:

Maintain current power level + .5%

Xe is stable.

Upcoming Major POD Activities:

NONE Upcoming ECOs to Hang and /or Release:

Hang - None

Release - None Evolutions or Compensatory Actions in Progress:

NONE General Information, Remarks, and Operator Work Around Status:

Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.

U3 supplying Aux Steam

Air In-leakage = 0.0 SCFM NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 49 of 49

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L-16-1 N2 (Rev-0)

Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 2016-301 Examiners: Operators: Surrogate (SRO)

Phil Mark Formoso (RCO)

Michael Mike Portal (BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (BOL). Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units.

Turnover: The 3A RHR pump and 3A1 Circulating Water pump are OOS.

Event. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description TFB1LTLV I-RCO LT-3-115 VCT Level Transmitter Fails Low 1

I-SRO TVUTPMPA C-RCO 3A Heater Drain Pump Trip (Turbine Runback) 2 TFL10101 C-SRO Rods Fail To Auto Insert TFN1CP22 I-BOP N-42 Loss Of Instrument Power 3

I-SRO (TS)

R-RCO 3B S/G Feedwater pump High Vibration (Fast Load Reduction 4 N/A R-SRO required)

N-BOP TFS1M5EA I-BOP FT-3-494 3C S/G Steam Flow Transmitter Fails As Is 5

I-SRO (TS)

TVFAHDR1 M-RCO Common Main Feed Header Break TVSBVL14 M-BOP Common Loss Of Suction To All AFW Pumps 6 TAFK144 M-SRO TAFK244 TAFK344 7 TFU10005 P- BOP Main Turbine Fails To Automatically Trip 8 TFHV55CC P-RCO PCV-3-455C Fails To Open. (PZR PORV)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (P)ost Trip NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 1 of 3

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L-16-1 N2 (Rev-0)

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Event 1 Shortly after the crew takes the shift LT-3-115 VCT Level Transmitter Fails Low which causes auto makeup to start.

The crew responds using the 3-ONOP-046.4, Malfunction of Boron Concentration Control System. The RCO manually stops auto makeup.

Event 2 Once the crew stabilizes VCT level the 3A Heater Drain Pump trips which causes an automatic Turbine Runback.

The crew will enter 3-ONOP-089, Turbine Runback. During the runback Control Rods fail to auto insert. The RCO will manually insert rods to maintain Tave + 3°F. When the Runback is complete the RCO will borate as needed to clear Rod Lo Limit and Axial Flux alarms, and the BOP will reset the Steam Dumps. When the plant is stable the crew will enter 3-ONOP-028, Reactor Control System Malfunction for the failure of Rods to auto insert.

Event 3 Once the crew resets the Steam Dumps and completes the required actions for the Reactor Control System Malfunction the N-42 Instrument Power Fuse Blows. The crew will enter 3-ONOP-059.8, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction. The BOP will defeat or bypass the affect functions of N-42 as directed by the ONOP.

Event 4 After the crew completes the actions of 3-ONOP-059.8 Engineering reports High Vibration on the 3B SGFW pump.

The SM directs the crew to start a 3-GOP-100 Fast Load Reduction to secure the 3B SGFW pump.

Event 5 When the crew starts the down power FT-3-494, 3C S/G Steam Flow Transmitter will be failed as is. The BOP will take manual control of the 3C S/G level and restore the 3C S/G level to normal. The US will enter 3-ONOP-049.1, direct the BOP to select an operable channel, and restore 3C S/G level control to automatic.

Event 6 After the crew reduces power by 5 to 10% and completes the actions for the failed Steam Flow channel a Main Feed Water Header break occurs. The crew responds to the reactor trip using 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. During the loss of Main Feed Water theres also a loss of the suction piping to all AFW pumps. The crew will transition to 3-EOP-FR-H.1, Response To Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink, and initiate Feed and Bleed.

Event 7 During 3-EOP-E-0, The Main Turbine fails to automatically trip. The BOP will take compensatory action to trip the Turbine manually.

Event 8 When the crew attempts to initiate Feed and Bleed one of the PZR PORVs fails to open so the crew will open all RCS Vent Valves The scenario is terminated once the RCS Vent Valves are or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion once all critical tasks have been evaluated.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 2 of 3

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L-16-1 N2 (Rev-0)

Event CRITICAL TASKS 6 CT1 Manually Trip the Main Turbine Manually trip the main turbine before any RCS cold leg temperature decreases by more than 100°F.

Safety Significance - Failure to trip the main turbine causes an excessive rate of RCS cooldown, well beyond the conditions typically analyzed in the FSAR. The excessive cooldown rate creates large thermal stresses in the reactor pressure vessel and causes rapid insertion of a large amount of positive reactivity. Thus, failure to manually trip the Main Turbine under the postulated conditions can result in challenges to the Integrity and Subcriticality CSFs.

6 CT2 Initiate Bleed-And-Feed Initiate RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for high-head injection to occur.

Safety Significance - Failure to initiate RCS bleed and feed before the RCS saturates at a pressure above which the high-head ECCS pumps can inject results in significant and sustained core uncovery. If RCS bleed is initiated so that the RCS is depressurized below the shutoff head of the high-head ECCS pumps, then core uncovery is prevented or minimized.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 3 of 3

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Site: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 (PTN)

Title:

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 LMS #: NRC 22 LMS Rev Date: 6/7/16 Rev #: 0.0 SEG Type: Training Evaluation Program: LOCT LOIT Other Duration: 110 minutes Developed by: Brian Clark 8/4/16 Instructor/Developer Date Reviewed by: Luis Sagion 8/4/16 Instructor (Instructional Review) Date Validated by : Sean Bloom 8/5/16 SME (Technical Review) Date Approved by: Mark Wilson 8/5/16 Training Supervision Date Approved by: Sean Bloom 8/5/16 Training Program Owner (Line) Date NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SCENARIO REFERENCES DOC NO. TITLE REV PTN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 300 3-EOP-E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION 12 3-GOP-100 FAST LOAD REDUCTION 12A 3-ONOP-028 REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION 4A 3-ONOP-046.4 MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL SYSTEM 0 3-ONOP-049.1 DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR 4 PROTECTION CHANNEL 3-ONOP-059.8 POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION MALFUNCTION 0A 3-ONOP-089 TURBINE RUNBACK 1A 3-OSP-059.10 DETERMINATION OF QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO 2A NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 2 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REQUIREMENTS Terminal Given this simulator scenario and resources normally found in the Control Room, the Objective operating crew will perform Control Room operations IAW approved plant procedures in order to maintain the integrity of the plant and the health and safety of the public.

Enabling Given this simulator scenario and resources normally found in the Control Room, Objectives: operate in accordance with approved plant procedures, Operations Department Instructions, and management expectations:

1. (ALL) Demonstrate personnel SAFETY awareness in interactions with plant staff and outside agencies.

2. (ALL) Demonstrate ALARA awareness in interactions with plant staff and outside agencies.

3. (ALL) Exchange correct information using 3-point communication/Repeat-backs with Control Room personnel and other plant staff.

4. (ALL) Inform plant personnel and System of plant conditions, as needed.

5. (US) Employ timely and concise crew briefs where appropriate.

6. (ALL) Maintain awareness of plant status and control board indication.

7. (ALL) Correctly diagnose plant situations.

8. (ALL) Solve operational problems as they arise.

9. (RCO/BOP) Manipulate plant controls properly and safely.

10. (ALL) Demonstrate self-checking using STAR and peer checks(when required)

11. (US) Demonstrate command and control of the crew.

12. (US) Coordinate the input of crew members and other plant staff.

13. (US) Utilize the input of crew members and other plant staff.

14. (ALL) Demonstrate conservative decision making.

15. (ALL) Demonstrate teamwork.

16. (ALL) Respond to plant events using procedural guidance (OPs/ONOPs/EOPs) as applicable in accordance with rules of usage.

17. (RCO/BOP) Implement any applicable procedural immediate operator actions without use of references.

18. (SRO) Maintain compliance with Tech Specs.

19. (ALL) Identify/enter applicable Tech Spec action statements.

20. (ALL) Respond to annunciators using ARPs (time permitting).

21. (ALL) Maintain written communication, logs, and documentation as needed to permit post-event reconstruction.

Continued on next page NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 3 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REQUIREMENTS While addressing the following events:

1. LT-3-115 VCT Level Transmitter Fails Low.

2. 3A Heater Drain Pump (Turbine Runback)

Rods Fail To Auto Insert

3. N-42 Loss Of Instrument Power

4. 3B S/G Feedwater pump High Vibration (Fast Load Reduction required)

5. FT-3-494 3C S/G Steam Flow Transmitter Fails As Is

6. Common Main Feed Header Break Common Loss Of Suction To All AFW Pumps

7. Main Turbine Fails To Automatically Trip

8. PCV-3-455C Fails To Open (PZR PORV)

Prerequisites: None Training PTN Unit 3 Plant Simulator Resources:

Development

TR-AA-220-1003, Initial NRC and Audit Exam Process

References:

TR-AA-230-1003, SAT Development

TR-AA-230-1007, Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation

0-ADM-232, Time Critical Action Program

OP-AA-100-1000, Conduct Of Operations

OP-AA-103-1000, Reactivity Management

0-ADM-200, Operations Management Manual

0-ADM-211, Emergency and Off-Normal Operating Procedure Usage

WCAP-17711-NP, Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group Westinghouse Emergency Response Guideline Revision 2-Based Critical Tasks Protected N/A Content:

Evaluation Performance Mode Method:

Operating None Experience:

Risk Initiate bleed-and-feed cooling within 36 minutes following a loss of Feed Water with a Significant reactor trip on low SG level.

Operator Actions:

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 4 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SRO TASK # TASK TITLE 02028033500 Authorize Unit Trip 02046045300 Recover From VCT Level Transmitter Failures 02059026300 Respond To Loss Of Power Range Instrumentation Channel 02074016500 Respond To A Loss Of Heat Sink Following A Reactor Trip 02081006300 Respond To A Loss Of One Heater Drain Pump 02200046500 Respond to Steam Generator Low Level 02200009300 Respond to Unit Runback RO TASK TASK TITLE 01046045300 Recover from VCT Level Transmitter Failures 01059026300 Respond to Loss of Power Range Instrumentation Channel 01074006100 Stop Steam Generator Feed Pump 01074011300 Control Steam Generator Level Manually With Main Feed Regulating Valves 01074016500 Respond To A Loss Of Heat Sink Following A Reactor Trip 01081006300 Respond to a Loss of One Heater Drain Pump 01089020100 Trip Turbine Manually 01200001500 Respond To Unit Trip 01200046500 Respond to Steam Generator Low Level 01200009300 Respond to Unit Runback NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 5 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION UPDATE LOG:

Place this form with the working copies of lesson plans and/or other materials to document changes made between formal revisions. For fleet-wide training materials, keep electronic file NOTES:

of this form in same folder as approved materials. Refer to TR-AA-230-1003 SAT Development for specific directions regarding how and when this form shall be used.

Indicate in the following table any minor changes or major revisions (as defined in TR-AA-230-1003) made to the material after initial approval. Or use separate Update Log form TR-AA-230-1003-F16.

DESCRIPTION OF PREPARER DATE

REASON FOR CHANGE AR/TWR#

CHANGE REVIEWER DATE Revised for L-16-1 NRC Note 5 Note 5 0-0 Initial Revision 2108338 Exam Note 5 Note 5 0-1 0-2 0-3 0-4 0-5

1. Individual updating lesson plan or training material shall complete the appropriate blocks on the Update Log.

2. Describe the change to the lesson plan or training materials.

3. State the reason for the change (e.g., reference has changed, typographical error, etc.)

4. Preparer enters name/date on the Update Log and obtains Training Supervisor approval.

5. Initial dates and site approval on cover page.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 6 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 100% power (BOL). Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units Equipment OOS The 3A RHR pump and 3A1 Circulating Water pump are OOS.

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Event 1 Shortly after the crew takes the shift, LT-3-115, VCT Level Transmitter, Fails Low which causes auto makeup to start. The crew responds using the 3-ONOP-046.4, Malfunction of Boron Concentration Control System. The RCO manually stops auto makeup.

Event 2 Once the crew stabilizes VCT level, the 3A Heater Drain Pump trips, which causes an automatic Turbine Runback. The crew will enter 3-ONOP-089, Turbine Runback. During the runback, Control Rods fail to auto insert. The RCO will manually insert rods to maintain Tave +3°F. When the Runback is complete, the RCO will borate as needed to clear Rod Lo Limit and Axial Flux alarms, and the BOP will reset the Steam Dumps. When the plant is stable, the crew will enter 3-ONOP-028, Reactor Control System Malfunction, for the failure of Rods to auto insert.

Event 3 Once the crew resets the Steam Dumps and completes the required actions for the Reactor Control System Malfunction, the N-42 Instrument Power Fuse Blows. The crew will enter 3-ONOP-059.8, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction. The BOP will defeat or bypass the functions of N-42, as directed by the ONOP.

Event 4 After the crew completes the actions of 3-ONOP-059.8, Engineering reports High Vibration on the 3B SGFW pump. The SM directs the crew to start a 3-GOP-100 Fast Load Reduction to secure the 3B SGFW pump.

Event 5 When the crew starts the down power, FT-3-494, 3C S/G Steam Flow Transmitter, will be failed as is.

The BOP will take manual control of the 3C S/G level and restore the 3C S/G level to normal. The US will enter 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, and direct the BOP to select an operable channel, then restore 3C S/G level control to automatic.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 7 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Event 6 After the crew reduces power by 5 to 10% and completes the actions for the failed Steam Flow channel, a Main Feed Water Header break occurs inside containment. The crew responds to the reactor trip using 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. During the loss of Main Feed Water, theres also a loss of the suction piping to all AFW pumps. The crew will transition to 3-EOP-FR-H.1, Response To Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink, and initiate Feed and Bleed.

Event 7 During 3-EOP-E-0, The Main Turbine fails to automatically trip. The BOP will take compensatory action to trip the Turbine manually.

Event 8 When the crew attempts to initiate Feed and Bleed, one of the PZR PORVs fails to open so the crew will open all RCS Vent Valves The scenario is terminated once the RCS Vent Valves are open or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion once all critical tasks have been evaluated.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 8 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Event CRITICAL TASKS 7 CT1 Manually Trip the Main Turbine Manually trip the main turbine before any RCS cold leg temperature decreases by more than 100°F.

Safety Significance - Failure to trip the main turbine causes an excessive rate of RCS cooldown, well beyond the conditions typically analyzed in the FSAR. The excessive cooldown rate creates large thermal stresses in the reactor pressure vessel and causes rapid insertion of a large amount of positive reactivity. Thus, failure to manually trip the Main Turbine under the postulated conditions can result in challenges to the Integrity and Subcriticality CSFs.

8 CT2 Initiate Bleed-And-Feed Initiate RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for high-head injection to occur Safety Significance - Failure to initiate RCS bleed and feed before the RCS saturates at a pressure above which the high-head ECCS pumps can inject results in significant and sustained core uncovery. If RCS bleed is initiated so that the RCS is depressurized below the shutoff head of the high-head ECCS pumps, then core uncovery is prevented or minimized.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 9 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Event # Description

1. LT-3-115 VCT Level Transmitter Fails Low 3A Heater Drain Pump (Turbine Runback) 2.

Rods Fail To Auto Insert

3. N-42 Loss Of Instrument Power

4. 3B S/G Feedwater pump High Vibration (Fast Load Reduction required)

5. FT-3-494 3C S/G Steam Flow Transmitter Fails As Is Common Main Feed Header Break 6.

Common Loss Of Suction To All AFW Pumps

7. Main Turbine Fails To Automatically Trip

8. PCV-3-455C Fails To Open (PZR PORV)

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 10 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR SET UP INSTRUCTIONS Check Action

____ Restore IC-11 (100% BOL) or equivalent IC.

____ Place the Simulator in RUN.

____ Stop the 3A1 Circ Water Pump

____ Open & execute lesson file L-16-1 N2 Ensure the following lesson steps are triggered:

EVENT 6 SETUP - LOSS OF AFW PUMP SUCTION

EVENT 8 SETUP - PORV 455C FAILED CLOSE

EVENT 7 SETUP - TURBINE FAILS TO TRIP

EVENT 7 SETUP - CV FAIL AS IS is in CONDITION state

SETUP - 3A RHR PUMP OOS

____

SETUP - 3A1 CWP OOS

Place 3A RHR pump in PTL and hang an ECO Card

____

3A1 CWP in stop and hang an ECO card

____ Verify the trend for 3A1 Screen on the TWS DP Recorder is clear.

____ Ensure Rod Group Step Counters have completed stepping out.

____ Allow the plant to stabilize.

____ Acknowledge any alarms and freeze Simulator.

____ Ensure B train is protected train on VPA.

____ Verify Key 13 for Reactor Head Vent valves is in the key locker (6 keys on one key ring)

____ Perform the SIMULATOR OPERATOR CHECKLIST or equivalent.

____ Place TURNOVER SHEETS on ROs desk or give to the Lead Evaluator.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 11 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION BRIEFINGS

Shift turnover information is attached to the back of this guide.

Ensure all applicants are prior briefed on Appendix E of NUREG 1021, Policies and Guidelines For Taking NRC Examinations.

Conduct a Crew Pre-brief to cover turnover information. Shift turnover information is attached to the back of this guide.

US:

RCO:

BOP:

SCENARIO NOTE 0-ADM-211 Prudent Operator Actions - If redundant stand-by equipment is available and ready, the operator is permitted to start the redundant equipment for failed or failing operating equipment.

Immediate follow up of applicable ARPs and ONOPs (AOPs) shall occur as required.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 12 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Critical Tasks are highlighted in Simulator Operator Actions are Operator Verifiable Actions are red. highlighted in blue. Highlighted in green.

EVENT 1 - LT-3-115 VCT LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILS LOW.

3-ONOP-046.4, MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL SYSTEM TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE NOTE Ensure the Simulator is in RUN before the crew enters the Simulator.

US:

Conducts shift turnover.

BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by the Lead Evaluator, trigger EVENT 1 - LT-3-115 FAILS LOW RCO:

Responds to Alarms A3/4 VCT AUTO MAKE-UP and A4/6 VCT HI/LOW LEVEL

VERIFY Make-Up Flow.

Reports LT-3-115 failed low.

BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

If dispatched to locally check the VCT

Reviews ARP, refer to 3-ONOP-level, wait 2-5 minutes and report 046.4, Malfunction of Boron LT-3-115 failed low. No obvious cause of Concentration Control System.

the failure.

Checks VCT level on DCS

Dispatches SNPO to locally check LT-3-115 indication in charging pump room.

US:

Directs response using 3-ONOP-046.4, Malfunction of Boron Concentration Control System RCO:

Check Boric Acid OR Primary Water Makeup Flow Rates - ABNORMAL (NO Go to Step 28)

Step 1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 13 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 1 - LT-3-115 VCT LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILS LOW.

3-ONOP-046.4, MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL SYSTEM TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Check For VCT Level Transmitter, LT 115, Failing Or Failed High. (NO, Go to Step 31)

Step 28 RCO Check for LI-3-115 Failing Or Failed Low

LI-3-115 - ABNORMALLY LOW (YES)

LI-3-112 - INCREASING DUE TO AUTO MAKEUP OR STABLE DUE TO LCV-3-115A DIVERTING Step 31 US:

Review caution and note with the crew.

CAUTION With no operator action, LT-3-115 failed low with makeup flow greater than charging flow could result in over pressurization of the VCT.

NOTE Failure of LT-3-115 low will result in the following:

Annunciator Alarm A4/6 VCT HI/LO LEVEL.

Auto makeup starts, but does not stop automatically.

LCV-3-115A modulating open to attempt to control level at the VCT Level Controller, LC-3-112, setpoint RCO:

Turn RCS Makeup Control Switch To STOP Go to Step 41.

Step 32 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 14 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 1 - LT-3-115 VCT LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILS LOW.

3-ONOP-046.4, MALFUNCTION OF BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL SYSTEM TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR Respond as WCC/I&C Notifies WCC/I&C regarding LT-3-115 failure. Directs PWO initiation

& troubleshooting.

Determines no Tech Specs apply Steps 41/42 Performs a manual MU to the VCT using 0-OP-046, as required Step 43 BOOTH OPERATOR US:

Acknowledge briefing on how to swap

Conducts crew brief.

charging pump suction to RWST if

Briefs Operator how to manually required. swap charging pump suction to RWST if required.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 15 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - 3A HEATER DRAIN PUMP TRIP, RODS FAIL TO AUTO INSERT 3-ONOP-089, TURBINE RUNBACK TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by the Lead Evaluator, trigger EVENT 2 - 3A HDP TRIP BOP:

Acknowledges Alarms D8/2, HDP A/B MOTOR OVERLOAD TRIP and E2/5, TURBINE RUNBACK.

Reports 3A Heater Drain Pump tripped, Turbine Runback in progress NOTE BOP:

Steps 1 and 2 are Immediate Operator Verifies a SGFP was NOT lost.

Actions. IOA-Step 1 RCO/BOP:

Check for proper operation of the following:

Steam Dumps

Turbine

If Rods are in AUTO, then verify Auto Rod Insertion to match Tavg with Tref.

(NO)

- Manually insert Rods as need to match Tavg with Tref

Main Feedwater Valves

Pressurizer IOA-Step 2 US:

Enters and directs the actions of 3-ONOP-089, Turbine Runback.

Reviews Notes with the crew.

BOP:

Check Steam Generator levels stabilized and on program.

Step 1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 16 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - 3A HEATER DRAIN PUMP TRIP, RODS FAIL TO AUTO INSERT 3-ONOP-089, TURBINE RUNBACK TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Check Tavg is maintained within +3°F of Tref.

Place Control Rods in Manual.

Maintain Tavg/Tref T within +3°F.

Step 2 BOP:

Check Steam Generator pressures stabilizing.

Step 3 RCO:

Check Pressurizer Level stabilizing and trending to Program Level.

Step 4 NOTE RCO:

When the plant is stabilized, the US may Check Pressurizer Pressure stabilizing also enter 3-ONOP-028, Reactor Control and trending to 2235 psig.

System Malfunction due to the failure of Step 5 rods to auto insert. 3-ONOP-028 starts on page 20.

BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

If dispatched to locally check the 3A Check following for proper operation:

Heater Drain pump, wait 5 minutes, and

Steam Gen Feed Pump Recirc then report its breaker has an over current flag but nothing abnormal at the

Condensate Pump Recirc pump.

Heater Drain Pumps

Heater Drain Tank Level Controls

Secondary Heater Level Controls Step 6 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 17 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - 3A HEATER DRAIN PUMP TRIP, RODS FAIL TO AUTO INSERT 3-ONOP-089, TURBINE RUNBACK TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE NOTE RCO/BOP:

The crew should monitor alarms and

Monitor Annunciator G5/1, AXIAL borate using 50 gallon batches as FLUX T.S. LIMIT EXCEEDED -

necessary to withdraw rods until the CLEAR.

alarm is clear.

Monitor Annunciator B9/2, Axial Flux Tilt - CLEAR NOTE

Monitor Annunciator B8/1, ROD The crew may acknowledge LEFM inputs BANK LO LIMIT - CLEAR. (NO) using DCS. RNO Perform the following as necessary after the runback:

A. WHEN runback is complete, THEN PLACE rods in Manual.

B. SET boric acid totalizer to 50 gallons.

C. DETERMINE boric acid flow rate as determined by the Unit Supervisor.

D. PLACE the Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to BORATE.

E. PLACE the RCS Makeup Control Switch to START.

F. ADJUST the setpoint on the Boric Acid Controller FC-3-113A to the desired flow rate as indicated on FR-3-113.

G. WITHDRAW Control Rods to establish Tavg/Tref T up to +3°F GREATER THAN Tref until Annunciator B8/1 is CLEAR.

Monitor Annunciator B8/2 ROD BANK A/B/C/D EXTRA LO LIMIT - CLEAR.

Steps 7 - 10 NOTE BOP:

The crew may direct personnel to rack When the turbine runback is complete:

out the 3A Heater Drain Pump breaker

Match the control switch flag for the due to its auto start features. 3A Heater Drain pump.

Steps 11.a PROCEDURE NOTE Closing CV-3-2011, LP HTR BYP, can cause a minor secondary transient causing Tavg to rise by 1°F to 2°F, Reactor Power to drop 1% to 2%, and MWe output to rise.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 18 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - 3A HEATER DRAIN PUMP TRIP, RODS FAIL TO AUTO INSERT 3-ONOP-089, TURBINE RUNBACK TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE When the turbine runback is complete:

Check CV-3-2011, LP HTR BYP CLOSED.

Steps 11.b BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

Acknowledge reports of plant status and NOTIFY Load Dispatcher of load request for support. restrictions. (~85% and 740 MW)

Step 11c US:

Informs SM to notify Plant Management and NRC Resident per 0-ADM-115, Notifications of Plant Events.

Step 11d NOTE RCO:

The crew may decide to not restore Auto If boration was used, when plant Makeup to AUTO due to previous conditions are stable, stop the boration failures. and restore Auto Makeup Step 12 NOTE RCO:

Since Auto Rod control is not working, the Check Rod Control in MANUAL.

crew should leave rods in manual. A. CHECK Tavg within +/-1.5°F of Tref B. PLACE Rod Control in AUTO Step 13 BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

Acknowledge notification to take RCS IF change in Reactor Power exceeded samples. 15%, then notify Chemistry that RCS sampling is required within 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months per TS 4.4.8, Table 4.4-4, Item 6b.

Step 14 NOTE BOP:

If the RO promptly inserts rods during the Take Steam Dump To Condenser Mode runback, the Steam Dumps may not arm.

Switch to Reset, and Release to AUTO.

Step 15 BOOTH OPERATOR If crew prematurely places SDTC to manual thinking its malfunctioned, respond appropriately and report that there are no abnormalities.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 19 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - 3A HEATER DRAIN PUMP TRIP, RODS FAIL TO AUTO INSERT 3-ONOP-028, REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTEs EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE US:

Enters and direct the actions of 3-ONOP-028.

RCO:

Verify Rods in manual.

Step 4.2.1 RCO:

Do NOT increase reactor power without permission from the Reactor Engineering Supervisor and the Shift Manager.

Manually position the RCC control bank to restore steady state conditions.

Notify Reactor Engineering and I&C

Review Subsection 5.1.

Determine Unit Shut down not required at this time Steps 5.2.1 - 5.2.5 LEAD EVALUATOR NOTE After plant is stabilized or at the Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 3 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 20 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 3 - N-42 LOSS OF INSTURMENT POWER 3-ONOP-059.8, POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION MALFUNCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by the Lead Evaluator trigger EVENT 3 - N42 BLOWN INST PWR FUSE RCO:

Respond to multiple alarms associated with the Power Range

Reports N-42 Instrument Power Fuse blown.

BOP:

Reviews ARPs, recommend entering 3-ONOP-059.8, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction.

US:

Enters 3-ONOP-059.8, Power Range NI Malfunction.

BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

If asked, I&C would like be present while

Place the DROPPED ROD MODE tripping bistables. They will report to the switch for N42 channel in the control room in about one hour. BYPASS position (ANN B8/4)

Place the N42 ROD STOP BYPASS switch to the failed channel BYPASS position

Transfer the UPPER SECTION comparator defeat switch to the N42.

Transfer the LOWER SECTION comparator defeat switch to the N42.

Transfer POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch to BYPASS N42.

Transfer the COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch to N42 Step 5.1.1.1 - 5.1.1.6 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 21 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 3 - N-42 LOSS OF INSTURMENT POWER 3-ONOP-059.8, POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION MALFUNCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR US:

Acknowledge request for assistance. If Notify I&C asked, the STA will monitor QPTR. Monitor the Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio using 3-OSP-059.10, Determination Of Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio.

Step 5.1.1.9 - 5.1.1.10 US:

Review Tech Specs:

TS 3.3.1, Functional Unit 2 a & b

- Action 2, Trip bistables in 6 hrs and restrict power to 75% RTP or monitor QPTR

TS 3.3.1, Functional Unit 5 & 6

- Action 13, Trip bistables in 6 hrs LEAD EVALUATOR Once the crew completes the steps of 3-ONOP-059.8, or at the Lead Evaluators discretion, move on the next event.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 22 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 4 - 3B S/G FEEDWATER PUMP HIGH VIBRATION 3-GOP-100, FAST LOAD REDUCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by the Lead Evaluator, call as the SM to report High Vibration on the 3B SG Feedwater pump. Engineering has looked at the pump and recommends it be secured. Direct the crew to start a 3-GOP-100, Fast Load Reduction, to secure the 3B SG Feedwater pump.

BOOTH OPERATOR Acknowledge request for support.

US:

Directs actions to reduce Rx power from 50% per 3-GOP-100.

NOTE Attachment 3 is available on Page 43

Completes Attachment 3 Attachment 4 is available on Page 44

Brief the crew per Attachment 4 Steps 1-2 US:

Reviews Foldout page with crew.

3-EOP-E-0 Transition Criteria

Notify Chemistry Department

Boration Stop Criteria

Restore Blender to AUTO FOLDOUT PAGE BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

Acknowledge notifications. Notify The Following Of Fast Load Reduction

System Dispatcher

Plant personnel using the Page Boost

Chemistry to start RCS sampling is required according to Tech Spec Table 4.4-4.

Step 3 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 23 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 4 - 3B S/G FEEDWATER PUMP HIGH VIBRATION 3-GOP-100, FAST LOAD REDUCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Begin Boration For Initial Tavg Effect

Set the Boric Acid Totalizer to total boric acid volume value determined on Attachment 3.

Place the Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to BORATE.

Place the RCS Makeup Control Switch to START.

Adjust FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller, to achieve 40 gpm boric acid flow as indicated on FR-3-113.

WHEN Tavg begins to lower from the boration, THEN adjust FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller, to load reduction value from Attachment 3.

Step 4 BOOTH OPERATOR US:

When crew starts reducing power, trigger Determine Turbine Load Reduction in EVENT 5 - FT-3-494 FAILED AS IS MW CNTRL Step 5 NOTE BOP:

When the crew notices the 3C Steam Initiate Turbine Load Reduction in MW Flow Chanel, FT-3-494, failed as is, they CNTRL may place the ramp on hold. The steps

Select MW CNTRL for the FT-3-494 failure start on page 27.

Set TARGET power level - MW VALUE from Attachment 3

Set RAMP RATE - MW/M VALUE FROM Attachment 3.

Check Tavg has lowered 1° to 2°F from the initial value prior to boration.

Depress GO

Ensure FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller, has been adjusted to the load reduction boration rate.

Go to Step 10 Step 6 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 24 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 4 - 3B S/G FEEDWATER PUMP HIGH VIBRATION 3-GOP-100, FAST LOAD REDUCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Monitor Load Reduction

Adjusts power reduction rate to maintain Tavg/Tref within limits of Attachment 3.

Monitors S/G level control to ensure feed reg valves properly maintain level control in automatic.

NOTE

Refer to Enclosure 1 for expected Enclosure 1 is available on Page 45. alarms.

Step 10 BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:

Respond as SNPO. If asked, idle

Maintain pressurizer level to ensure Charging Pump ready for start. that automatic pressurizer level control maintains level on program.

If needed, start 2nd Chg Pp and place 2nd orifice in service.

Adjust boration rate to maintain Tavg/Tref within limits of Attachment 3.

Refer to Enclosure 1 for expected alarms.

Step 10 RCO:

Monitor Boration Rate

Monitor for excessive rod movement by monitoring TR-3-409D, Rod Position Bank D.

Determine if Insertion Limit and Bank D position are converging at a rate that will cause rod insertion limit alarms.

Adjust power reduction rate as needed to control rod insertion

Increase boration rate and/or total amount as necessary to limit control rod insertion Step 11 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 25 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 4 - 3B S/G FEEDWATER PUMP HIGH VIBRATION 3-GOP-100, FAST LOAD REDUCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Monitor Annunciator B 8/1, ROD BANK LO LIMIT - CLEAR

Monitor B 8/2 ROD BANK A/B/C/D EXTRA LO LIMIT - CLEAR Steps 12-13 US:

Have SM refer to the following procedures:

0-EPIP-20101, DUTIES OF EMERGENCY COORDINATOR

0-ADM-115, NOTIFICATION OF PLANT EVENTS Step 14 RCO:

Energize Pressurizer Backup Heaters Step 15 NOTE BOP:

Since the unit is not coming offline, the

Verify Turbine Load Less Than 675 crew should leave station services on the MWE Auxiliary Transformers.

Stop one condensate pump

Check Desired Final Power Target -

LESS THAN 475 MWe.

LEAD EVALUATOR Once power has been reduced by a minimum of 5%, or at the Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 6.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 26 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 5 - FT-3-494 3C S/G STEAM FLOW TRANSMITTER FAILS AS IS 3-ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

This malfunction was inserted when the

Recognizes and reports 3C S/G Steam crew started the fast load reduction. Flow FT-3-494 failure.

Takes Prompt Actions

- Take manual control of 3C S/G level control valve FCV-3-498.

- Return 3C S/G level to normal.

NOTE RCO:

The crew may stop the load reduction. Addresses Alarm Response for C6/3, SG C Level Deviation.

CHECK LI-3-496 or LI-3-498, C STM GEN LEVEL controlling channel for SG Level deviation.

CHECK Feedwater Controllers FIC 498A or FIC-3-498B for indications of failure, alarm, or input signal failures.

CHECK Feedwater Controller Inputs

IF alarm is due to instrument failure, THEN REFER TO 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels.

US:

Enters and directs actions of 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, for response.

NOTE BOP:

The crew may use the ARP to select an

Verify FT-3-494 failure by channel check operable channel and restore automatic comparison.

level control.

Verify no off-normal conditions exist on FT-3-495.

Place 3C S/G Steam Flow Control Transfer Switch to FT-3-495 (Yellow)

Place 3C S/G Feed Water Flow Control Transfer Switch to FT-3-496 (Yellow)

Ensure 3C S/G level is returned to AUTO.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 27 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 5 - FT-3-494 3C S/G STEAM FLOW TRANSMITTER FAILS AS IS 3-ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

WCC/I&C: Acknowledge the report. I&C Notifies WCC to initiate PWO and I&C for want to be present to trip bi-stables and troubleshooting.

should be in the control room in about an hour.

BOOTH OPERATOR US:

If asked to reset AMSAC, wait 2- 3 Reviews Tech Specs minutes and then trigger EVENT 5 -

RESET AMSAC.

Enters Tech Spec Action 3.3.1 Functional Unit 12

- Action 6, within 6 hrs trip bistables

Enters Tech Spec Action 3.3.2 Functional Unit 1.f and 4.d

- Action 15, within 6 hrs trip bistables LEAD EVALUATOR US:

If the crew stopped the Rapid Power Conducts crew brief.

reduction, they should resume it once the 3C S/G level control is restored to auto and the US completes a review of Tech Specs.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 28 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - COMMON MAIN FEED HEADER BREAK 3-EOP-E-0, RX TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME TIME TIME BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator or if Reactor trips, verify EVENT 6 - MAIN FEED HEADER BREAK triggers.

BOP

Reports S/G levels lowing rapidly

Recommends a Manual Rx trip and SI US:

Directs RCO to manually trip the Reactor and for operators to perform their IOAs.

RCO:

Manually trips Reactor.

NOTE RO/BOP:

Steps 1 - 4 of 3-EOP-E-0 are Immediate Perform IOAs.

Operator Actions (IOAs). The board operators will call out the high level steps of the IOAs as each step is completed from memory. Once the IOAs are completed, the US will read though Steps 1 - 4 with the crew.

RCO:

Verifies Reactor Trip STEP 1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 29 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT - 7 MAIN TURBINE FAILS TO AUTOMATICALLY TRIP 3-EOP-E-0, RX TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME TIME TIME CT1 Manually Trip the Main Turbine BOP:

Manually trip the main turbine before any RCS cold leg temperature decreases by Verify Turbine Trip (NO) more than 100°F.

Manually Trips the turbine.

STEP 2 BOOTH OPERATOR When the BOP trips the turbine verify EVENT 6 - STEAM LEAK INSIDE CTMT triggers.

When the BOP trips the turbine verify EVENT 7 - DELETE TURBINE TRIP FAILURE triggers.

BOP:

Verifies Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses STEP 3 RCO:

Checks If SI Is Actuated STEP 4 US:

Directs 3-EOP-E-0 response and reviews the IOAs.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 30 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT - 7 MAIN TURBINE FAILS TO AUTOMATICALLY TRIP 3-EOP-E-0, RX TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME TIME TIME US:

Reviews FOP for 3-EOP-E-0 with the crew

Adverse Containment Conditions

RCP Trip Criteria

Faulted S/G Isolation Criteria

Ruptured S/G Isolation Criteria

AFW System Operation Criteria

CST Makeup Water Criteria

RHR System Operation Criteria(YES, RCO starts timer)

Loss Of Offsite Power Or SI On Other Unit

Loss Of Charging Criteria FOLDOUT PAGE NOTE BOP:

Attachment 3 actions start on page 37. Continues with ATTACHMENT 3 to complete The Prompt Action Verifications.

STEP 5 BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:

If dispatched to check AFW pumps, wait 3 Check AFW Pumps - AT LEAST TWO to 5 minutes and then report there too RUNNING. (NO) much steam in the area to check the STEP 6 pumps.

RCO:

Verify AFW Valve Alignment - PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT STEP 7 RCO:

Verify Proper AFW Flow: (NO)

NO feed flow available STEP 8 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 31 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT - 7 MAIN TURBINE FAILS TO AUTOMATICALLY TRIP 3-EOP-E-0, RX TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME TIME TIME US:

Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-0, Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

Go to 3-EOP-FR-H.1, Response To Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink, Step 1.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 32 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 8 - PCV-3-455C FAILS TO OPEN. (PZR PORV) 3-EOP-FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR US:

If dispatched to start A or B Standby S/G Enters and directs the actions of 3-EOP-Feedwater Pump, wait 2 to 3 minutes and FR-H.1, Response To Loss Of Secondary then report DWDS-3-012, Standby S/G Heat Sink FW Pump Manual Isolation valve, will not open.

PROCEDURE CAUTION

If total feed flow has been reduced to less than 400 gpm due to procedural requirements AND 400 gpm total feed flow is available, then this procedure shall NOT be performed.

Feed flow shall NOT be re-established to any faulted S/G if a non-faulted S/G is available.

If an Alternate Low Pressure Feedwater Source has been implemented (e.g., 3-EOP-ECA-0.0, Attachment 15), AND CETs are able to be maintained stable OR decreasing, then this procedure shall NOT be performed.

RCO:

Check If Secondary Heat Sink Is Required (YES)

a. RCS pressure - GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED S/G PRESSURE

b. RCS Hot Leg Temp - GREATER THAN 350°F STEP 1 NOTE US:

The transient also cause a small steam Reviews Foldout Page leak on the 3B Main Steam Line inside

Adverse Containment Conditions containment. (MET)

Foldout Page NOTE RCO:

Step 2 is a continuous action step. Check If Bleed And Feed Is Required

Stop all RCPs (Go to Step 13)

STEP 2 CAUTION US:

Step 13 through Step 17 must be Reviews Caution with the crew.

performed quickly in order to establish RCS heat removal by RCS bleed and feed.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 33 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 8 - PCV-3-455C FAILS TO OPEN. (PZR PORV) 3-EOP-FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Part of CT2 Actuate SI And Containment Isolation Phase A STEP 13 RCO:

Establish maximum Charging flow

Check power supply to all Charging pumps - Aligned To Offsite Power

Check status of Charging pumps prior to SI actuation in Step 13 - any running (NO)

Check CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barrier is lost (NO)

Part of CT2

Reset SI

Start all available Charging pumps

Adjust Charging pump speed controllers to establish maximum charging flow

Adjust HCV-3-121, Charging Flow To Regen Heat Exchanger, to maintain proper Seal Injection flow

Place RCS Makeup Control Switch in STOP

Check Charging Pump Suction -

Aligned To RWST STEP 14.a RCO:

Check SI pumps status - at least two running

Verify SI valve amber lights on VPB -

All Bright STEP 14.b&c NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 34 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 8 - PCV-3-455C FAILS TO OPEN. (PZR PORV) 3-EOP-FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE US:

Reviews Caution and notes with crew CAUTION If Low PRZ Pressure SI signal is NOT blocked prior to PRZ pressure decreasing below 1730 psig, Charging Pumps started in previous step will trip NOTE

PRZ pressure must be less than 1987 psig for permissive to block the Low

PRZ Pressure SI signal.

Step 15 should be reviewed in advance to ensure timely performance.

NOTE RCO:

PORV-455C was failed closed during the

Verify power to PRZ PORV Block simulator setup. One PORV is valves - Available insufficient bleed path.

Verify PRZ PORV Block valves - Both Open

Check Block Low PRZ Press S.I.

status light - ON (NO)

Initiate Bleed-And-Feed CT2

Open one PRZ PORV Initiate bleed-and-feed cooling in accordance with 3-EOP-FR-H.1 within 36

When Block Low PRZ Press. S.I.

minutes following an automatic or manual status light is ON Momentarily place Reactor trip due to a loss of Feed Water. both Safety Injection Block switches to Block and return to Neutral

Verify Low PRZ Press. S.I. Blocked status light - ON

Open remaining PRZ PORV (NO, Failed Close)

STEP 15 BOP:

Verify Instrument Air To Containment STEP 16 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 35 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 8 - PCV-3-455C FAILS TO OPEN. (PZR PORV) 3-EOP-FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR RCO/BOP:

When dispatched to install the fuses for Both PRZ PORVs Open (NO) the RCS Vent valves, trigger EVENT 8

Install fuses for RCS Vent valves:

LOA - INSTALL FUSES FOR RX HEAD

WHEN power is restored to RCS vent VENTS. valves, THEN open all RCS vents:

STEP 17 The scenario is terminated once the RCS Vent Valves are open or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion once all critical task have been evaluated.

- - END OF SCENARIO ***

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 36 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - COMMON MAIN FEED HEADER BREAK 3-EOP-E-0 ATTACHMENT 3 - PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Check Load Centers Associated With Energized 4 KV Buses - ENERGIZED STEP 1 BOP:

Verify Feedwater Isolation:

Place Main Feedwater Pump switches in STOP

Feedwater Control Valves - CLOSED

Feedwater Bypass Valves - CLOSED

Feedwater Bypass Isolation Valves -

CLOSED

Feedwater Isolation MOVs - CLOSED

Verify Standby Feedwater Pumps -

OFF STEP 2 BOP:

Check If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated STEP 3 BOP:

Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve White Lights On VPB - ALL BRIGHT STEP 4 BOP:

Verify Pump Operation:

At least two High-Head SI Pumps -

RUNNING

Only one RHR Pump Available STEP 5 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 37 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - COMMON MAIN FEED HEADER BREAK 3-EOP-E-0 ATTACHMENT 3 - PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Verify Proper CCW System Operation:

CCW Heat Exchangers - THREE IN SERVICE

CCW Pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING

CCW Headers - TIED TOGETHER

MOV-3-626, RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Outlet - OPEN STEP 6 BOP:

Verify Proper ICW System Operation:

Verify ICW Pumps - AT LEAST TWO RUNNING

Verify ICW To TPCW Heat Exchanger

- ISOLATED

Check ICW Headers - TIED TOGETHER STEP 7 BOP:

Check Emergency Containment Coolers

- ONLY TWO RUNNING STEP 8 BOP:

Verify Unit 3 Containment Purge Exhaust And Supply Fans - OFF STEP 9 BOP:

Verify Containment Spray NOT Required:

-STEP 10 BOP:

Verify SI - RESET STEP 11 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 38 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - COMMON MAIN FEED HEADER BREAK 3-EOP-E-0 ATTACHMENT 3 - PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Verify SI Valve Amber Lights On VPB -

ALL BRIGHT STEP 12 BOP:

Verify SI Flow:

RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1625 PSIG[1950 PSIG] (NO)

STEP 13 BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When directed by the crew, trigger LOA Realign SI System:

- ALIGN U-4 HHSI TO U-3 RWST.

Check Procedure Entry Status - E-0 Wait 5 minutes and report local operator ENTERED FROM 3-ONOP-047.1, steps complete. LOSS OF CHARGING FLOW IN MODES 1 THROUGH 4 (NO)

Verify Unit 3 High-Head SI Pumps -

TWO RUNNING

Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to align Unit 4 High-Head SI Pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using Attachment 1.

STEP 14 BOP:

Verify Containment Isolation Phase A -

RESET STEP 15 BOP:

Reestablish RCP Cooling:

Check RCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING

Open CCW To Normal Containment Cooler Valves:

MOV-3-1417 MOV-3-1418

Reset and start Normal Containment Coolers STEP 16 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 39 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - COMMON MAIN FEED HEADER BREAK 3-EOP-E-0 ATTACHMENT 3 - PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Verify Control Room Ventilation Isolation:

STEP 17 BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When requested by crew, trigger LOA - Place Hydrogen Monitors In Service PLACE PAHMS IN SERVICE. Using 3-NOP-094, CONTAINMENT POST ACCIDENT MONITORING Wait 5 minutes and report local operator SYSTEM steps complete.

For Each Hydrogen Monitor A/B

- ENSURE FUNCTION SELECTOR switch is in SAMPLE.

- PLACE control switch in ANALYZE.

- PRESS the REMOTE SELECTOR button.

- PRESS the ALARM RESET button.

Dispatch an operator to complete local step of 3-NOP-094 STEP 18 BOP:

Verify All Four EDGs - RUNNING STEP 19 BOP:

Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses:

STEP 20 BOP:

Notify Unit Supervisor Of The Following:

Attachment 3 is complete

Any safeguards equipment that is NOT In the required condition

Status of Containment pressure continuous action STEP 21 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 40 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Discussion Points are intentionally NOT included in evaluated scenarios. However, space is available below to document follow-up questions when further information is required to determine an evaluation outcome.

FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS QUESTION #1

________________________________________________________

________________________

ANSWER #1

________________________________________________________

______________________________

QUESTION #2

________________________________________________________

________________________

ANSWER #2

________________________________________________________

______________________________

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 41 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR POST-SCENARIO RESTORATION:

______ 1. Restore per Simulator Operator Checklist.

2. Once exams are complete, restore from SEI-19, Simulator Exam Security.

______

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 42 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 43 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 44 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 45 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 3 RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE) UNIT 4 RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)

PROTECTED TRAIN: B PROTECTED TRAIN: B ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO:

Field Supv.: Outside SNPO:

Admin RCO: ANPO:

Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit Supv.: Unit Supv.:

RCO: RCO:

NPO: NPO:

PLANT STATUS Unit 3 Unit 4 Mode: 1 Mode: 1 Power: 100% Power: 100%

MWe: 842 MWe: 842 Gross Leakrate: 0.25 gpm Gross Leakrate: 0.03 gpm RCS Boron Conc: 1145 RCS Boron Conc: 642 Operational Concerns:

3A RHR pump taken OOS 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago for an oil change, expected back by the end of this shift.

3A1 Circ Water pump OOS. Tripped on over current, Electrical Maintenance is investigating.

U3 Anticipated LCO Actions:

None U4 Anticipated LCO Actions:

None Results of Offgoing Focus Area:

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 46 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION UNIT 3 STATUS REACTOR OPERATOR UNIT RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE) PROTECTED TRAIN: B Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 100% Gross: 0.25 GPM A 6656 MWe 842 Unidentified 0.04 GPM B 6608 Tavg: 580°F Charging Pps: 0.00 GPM C 6646 RCS Pressure: 2235 RCS Boron Conc: 1145 Abnormal Annunciators:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Current Tech Spec Action Statements: (Does Not Include For Tracking Only Items T.S.A.S / Component: 3A RHR pump, 3.5.2.c - Action g Reason: Oil Change Entry Date: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 47 of 48

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION REACTOR OPERATOR (CONT'D)

UNIT RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE) PROTECTED TRAIN: B Changes to Risk Significant Equipment:

No recent changes from last shift.

OLRM: GREEN PROTECTED TRAIN: B Upcoming Reactivity Management Activities:

Maintain 99.5% to 100%

Upcoming Major POD Activities:

NONE Upcoming ECOs to Hang and /or Release:

Hang - None

Release - None Evolutions or Compensatory Actions in Progress:

NONE General Information, Remarks, and Operator Work Around Status:

Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.

U3 supplying Aux Steam

Air In-leakage = 0.0 SCFM NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 48 of 48

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L-16-1 N3 (Rev-0)

Facility: Turkey Point Nuclear (PTN) - Units Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 2016-301 3 and 4 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RCO)

(BOP)

-8 Initial Conditions: The plant is at 10 Amps power (BOL). Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units.

Turnover: No equipment is OOS Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description R-RCO Raise Power to 3%

1 N/A R-SRO N-BOP I-BOP N35 Loss Of Compensating Voltage 2 TFN1IACF I-SRO (TS)

TAB1SCLC C-RCO 3C Charging Pump Speed Controller Air Leak 3 V8CG30OF C-SRO TCB1SCLC TVS1SR2O C-BOP PT-3-1607, 3B S/G Steam Dump To Atmosphere Pressure Transmitter, 4 drifts high C-SRO 5 TFC1SOL I-SRO (TS) PS-3-2007, Containment Pressure Channel Fails High TFN1IBFH I-RCO N-36, Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrument fails high 6 TFL2RTAB I-SRO The Rx fails to automatically trip TFL4AF TFLIA44 P-RCO 2 Stuck Rods 7

TFLIA84 TVSBVL14 M-RCO 3B S/G Faulted Inside Containment 8 M-BOP M-SRO TFFVV87M P-BOP POV-3-487, Feedwater Bypass Isolation, and FCV-3-489, Feedwater 9 Bypass, Valves Fail To Isolate.

TFFVV89

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (P)ost Trip L-16-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 1 of 3

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L-16-1 N3 (Rev-0)

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NOTE Allow 30 minutes for the crew to brief raising power before entering the control room to brief raising power from 10-8 amps to 3%.

Event 1 After the crew takes the shift the RCO will start raising Rx power by withdrawing Control Rods per 3-GOP-301, Hot Standby to Power Operation. The BOP will manually adjust Feedwater Bypass Flow Control valves, FCV-3-479/489/499, to maintain Steam Generator levels Event 2 After the crew levels power at ~ 3% N35 loses compensating voltage. The US will enter 3-ONOP-059.7, Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation and direct the BOP to place N35 in bypass.

Event 3 After the actions of 3-ONOP-059.7 are complete an air leak will develop on the 3C Charging pump speed controller causing the controller to fail to maximum output. The US will enter 3-ONOP-041.6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction and direct the RCO to start the 3B charging pump and secure the 3C charging pump.

Event 4 After the charging pumps are swapped PT-3-1607, 3B S/G Steam Dump To Atmosphere Pressure Transmitter, will drift high causing CV-3-1607, 3B Steam Dump To Atmosphere, to slowly open lowering the 3B S/G pressure. The BOP will place CV-3-1607 in manual and reduce demand to stabilize 3B S/G pressure.

Event 5 After the plant is stabilized, PS-3-2007, Containment Pressure Channel fails high. The US will enter 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channel, and review Tech Specs for the failed pressure channel.

Event 6 The US complete a review of Tech Specs for PS-3-2007, Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel N36 fails high and the Rx fails to auto trip. The RCO will manually trip the Reactor. The US will enter and direct the actions 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Event 7 When the Rx is tripped the RCO will report 2 control rods failed to fully insert. After the crew completes the Immediate Operator Actions they will transition to 3-EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. The RCO will start a boration for the 2 stuck rods.

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 2 of 3

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L-16-1 N3 (Rev-0)

Event 8 After the boration is started a steam leak will develop on the 3B S/G inside containment. The crew will return to 3-EOP-E-0, verify SI actuates, and isolate Aux Feed Water to the 3B S/G per the Foldout page of 3-EOP-E-0.

Event 9 When SI actuates POV-3-487, 3B S/G Feedwater Bypass Isolation valve, 3B S/G Feedwater Bypass is failed as is, and FCV-3-489 will leak by. The BOP will manually close POV-3-487 per Attachment 3 of 3-EOP-E-0. The crew will complete the actions of 3-EOP-E-0. About the time the crew is ready to transition to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, a red path will develop on the RCS Integrity Status Tree. The US will transition to 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response To Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition.

The scenario is terminated once the crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 and isolates AFW flow to the 3B Steam Generator or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion once all critical tasks have been evaluated.

Event CRITICAL TASKS 6 CT1 MANUALLY TRIP THE RX Manually trip the reactor from the control room prior to manually inserting rods.

Safety Significance: Failure to manually trip the reactor demonstrates the inability of the crew to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

8 CT2 STOP AFW FLOW TO FAULTED SG During a MSLB stop AFW flow to the faulted Steam Generator prior to starting the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months soak required per 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response To Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted Steam Generator that can be isolated causes an additional challenge to the Integrity Critical Safety Function.

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 3 of 3

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Site: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 (PTN)

Title:

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 LMS #: NRC 23 LMS Rev Date: 5/31/16 Rev #: 0.0 SEG Type: Training Evaluation Program: LOCT LOIT Other Duration: 120 minutes Developed by: Brian Clark 8/4/16 Instructor/Developer Date Reviewed by: Luis Sagion 8/4/16 Instructor (Instructional Review) Date Validated by : Sean Bloom 8/5/16 SME (Technical Review) Date Approved by: Mark Wilson 8/5/16 Training Supervision Date Approved by: Sean Bloom 8/5/16 Training Program Owner (Line) Date NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SCENARIO REFERENCES DOC NO. TITLE REV 3-GOP-301 HOT STANDBY TO POWER OPERATION 36B 3-ONOP-059.7 INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION MALFUNCTION 0 3-ONOP-041.6 PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL MALFUNCTION 2 3-ONOP-049.1 DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR 4 PROTECTION CHANNEL 3-EOP-E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION 12 3-EOP-ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE 12 3-ONOP-046.1 EMERGENCY BORATION 4 3-EOP-E-2 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION 4 3-EOP-FR-P.1 RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK 4 CONDITION PTN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 300 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 2 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REQUIREMENTS Terminal Given this simulator scenario and resources normally found in the Control Room, the Objective operating crew will perform Control Room operations IAW approved plant procedures in order to maintain the integrity of the plant and the health and safety of the public.

Enabling Given this simulator scenario and resources normally found in the Control Room, Objectives: operate in accordance with approved plant procedures, Operations Department Instructions, and management expectations:

1. (ALL) Demonstrate personnel SAFETY awareness in interactions with plant staff and outside agencies.

2. (ALL) Demonstrate ALARA awareness in interactions with plant staff and outside agencies.

3. (ALL) Exchange correct information using 3-point communication/Repeat-backs with Control Room personnel and other plant staff.

4. (ALL) Inform plant personnel and System of plant conditions, as needed.

5. (US) Employ timely and concise crew briefs where appropriate.

6. (ALL) Maintain awareness of plant status and control board indication.

7. (ALL) Correctly diagnose plant situations.

8. (ALL) Solve operational problems as they arise.

9. (RCO/BOP) Manipulate plant controls properly and safely.

10. (ALL) Demonstrate self-checking using STAR and peer checks(when required)

11. (US) Demonstrate command and control of the crew.

12. (US) Coordinate the input of crew members and other plant staff.

13. (US) Utilize the input of crew members and other plant staff.

14. (ALL) Demonstrate conservative decision making.

15. (ALL) Demonstrate teamwork.

16. (ALL) Respond to plant events using procedural guidance (OPs/ONOPs/EOPs) as applicable in accordance with rules of usage.

17. (RCO/BOP) Implement any applicable procedural immediate operator actions without use of references.

18. (SRO) Maintain compliance with Tech Specs.

19. (ALL) Identify/enter applicable Tech Spec action statements.

20. (ALL) Respond to annunciators using ARPs (time permitting).

21. (ALL) Maintain written communication, logs, and documentation as needed to permit post-event reconstruction.

Continued on the next page:

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 3 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REQUIREMENTS While addressing the following events:

1. Raise Power to 3%

2. N35 Loss Of Compensating Voltage

3. 3C Charging Pump Speed Controller Air Leak

4. PT-3-1607, 3B S/G Steam Dump To Atmosphere Pressure Transmitter, Drifts High

5. PS-3-2007, Containment Pressure Channel Fails High

6. N36 Fails High, Rx Fails To Automatically Trip

7. 2 Stuck Rods

8. 3B Faulted S/G Inside Containment

9. POV-3-487, Feedwater Bypass Isolation, and FCV-3-489, Feedwater Bypass, Valves Fail To Isolate.

Prerequisites: None Training PTN Unit 3 Plant Simulator Resources:

Development

TR-AA-220-1003, Initial NRC and Audit Exam Process

References:

TR-AA-230-1003, SAT Development

TR-AA-230-1007, Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation

0-ADM-232, Time Critical Action Program

OP-AA-100-1000, Conduct Of Operations

OP-AA-103-1000, Reactivity Management

0-ADM-200, Operations Management Manual

0-ADM-211, Emergency and Off-Normal Operating Procedure Usage

WCAP-17711-NP, Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group Westinghouse Emergency Response Guideline Revision 2-Based Critical Tasks Protected N/A Content:

Evaluation Performance Mode Method:

Operating None Experience:

Risk None Significant Operator Actions:

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 4 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SRO TASK # TASK TITLE 02028033500 AUTHORIZE UNIT TRIP 02046008300 EMERGENCY BORATE THE R.C.S. (MOV-350) 02047008300 INVESTIGATE CHARGING PUMP MALFUNCTIONS 02059008100 AUTHORIZE REMOVAL OF AN INTERMEDIATE RANGE NIS CHANNEL FROM SERVICE 02059024300 RESPOND TO LOSS OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE INSTRUMENTATION 02059027300 EVALUATE AND DIRECT TECH SPECS REQUIRED ACTIONS DUE TO NIS OUT OF SPEC / SERVICE CONDITIONS 02200002500 EVALUATE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSF) STATUS TREE OUTPUT 02200007500 RESPOND TO A STEAM LINE FAULT 02200022500 DIAGNOSE CAUSE OF SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION 02200023100 COORDINATE UNIT STARTUP 02200050500 RESPOND TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION RO TASK TASK TITLE 01200023100 COORDINATE UNIT STARTUP 01059024300 RESPOND TO LOSS OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE INSTRUMENTATION 01046008300 EMERGENCY BORATE THE R.C.S. (MOV-350) 01200007500 RESPOND TO A STEAM LINE FAULT 01200022500 DIAGNOSE CAUSE OF SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION 01200050500 RESPOND TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION 01047013100 START A CHARGING PUMP 01200001500 RESPOND TO UNIT TRIP 01047008300 INVESTIGATE CHARGING PUMP MALFUNCTIONS NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 5 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION UPDATE LOG:

Place this form with the working copies of lesson plans and/or other materials to document changes made between formal revisions. For fleet-wide training materials, keep electronic file NOTES:

of this form in same folder as approved materials. Refer to TR-AA-230-1003 SAT Development for specific directions regarding how and when this form shall be used.

Indicate in the following table any minor changes or major revisions (as defined in TR-AA-230-1003) made to the material after initial approval. Or use separate Update Log form TR-AA-230-1003-F16.

DESCRIPTION OF PREPARER DATE

REASON FOR CHANGE AR/TWR#

CHANGE REVIEWER DATE Note 5 Note 5 0-0 Initial Revision New for L-16-1 NRC Exam 2108338 Note 5 Note 5

1. Individual updating lesson plan or training material shall complete the appropriate blocks on the Update Log.

2. Describe the change to the lesson plan or training materials.

3. State the reason for the change (e.g., reference has changed, typographical error, etc.)

4. Preparer enters name/date on the Update Log and obtains Training Supervisor approval.

5. Initial dates and site approval on cover page.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 6 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SCENARIO

SUMMARY

INITIAL CONDITIONS The plant is at 10-8 Amps power (BOL). Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units. The crew will raise power to 3%.

EQUIPMENT OOS:

None NOTE Allow 30 minutes for the crew to brief raising power before entering the control room to brief raising power from 10-8 amps to 3%.

Event 1 After the crew takes the shift, the RCO will start raising Rx power by withdrawing Control Rods per 3-GOP-301, Hot Standby to Power Operation. The BOP will manually adjust Feedwater Bypass Flow Control valves, FCV-3-479/489/499, to maintain Steam Generator levels.

Event 2 After the crew stabilizes power at ~ 3%, N35 loses compensating voltage. The US will enter 3-ONOP-059.7, Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation, and direct the BOP to place N35 in bypass.

Event 3 After the actions of 3-ONOP-059.7 are complete, an air leak will develop on the 3C Charging pump speed controller, causing the controller to fail to maximum output. The US will enter 3-ONOP-041.6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction, and direct the RCO to start the 3B charging pump and secure the 3C charging pump.

Event 4 After the charging pumps are swapped, PT-3-1607, 3B S/G Steam Dump To Atmosphere Pressure Transmitter, will drift high causing CV-3-1607, 3B Steam Dump To Atmosphere, to slowly open, lowering the 3B S/G pressure. The BOP will place CV-3-1607 in manual and reduce demand to stabilize 3B S/G pressure.

Event 5 After the plant is stabilized, PS-3-2007, Containment Pressure Channel, fails high. The US will enter 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channel, and review Tech Specs for the failed pressure channel.

Event 6 After the US completes the review of Tech Specs for PS-3-2007, Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel, N36, fails high and the Rx fails to auto trip. The RCO will manually trip the Reactor. The US will enter and direct the actions 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 7 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Event 7 When the Rx is tripped, the RCO will report 2 control rods failed to fully insert. After the crew completes the Immediate Operator Actions they will transition to 3-EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. The RCO will start a boration for the 2 stuck rods using 3-ONOP-046.1, Emergency Boration.

Event 8 After the boration is started, a steam leak will develop on the 3B S/G inside containment. The crew will return to 3-EOP-E-0, verify SI actuates, and isolate Aux Feed Water to the 3B S/G per the Foldout page of 3-EOP-E-0.

Event 9 When SI actuates, POV-3-487, 3B S/G Feedwater Bypass Isolation valve, is failed as is, and FCV-3-489, 3B FW Bypass, will leak by. The BOP will manually close POV-3-487, 3B FW Bypass Isolation, per of 3-EOP-E-0. The crew will complete the actions of 3-EOP-E-0. About the time the crew is ready to transition to 3-EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, a red path will develop on the RCS Integrity Status Tree. The US will transition to 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response To Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition.

The scenario is terminated once the crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 and isolates AFW flow to the 3B Steam Generator or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion once all critical tasks have been evaluated.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 8 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION CREW CRITICAL TASKS Event Description 6 CT1 MANUALLY TRIP THE RX Manually trip the reactor from the control room prior to manually inserting rods.

Safety Significance: Failure to manually trip the reactor demonstrates the inability of the crew to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

8 CT2 STOP AFW FLOW TO FAULTED SG During a MSLB stop AFW flow to the faulted Steam Generator prior to starting the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months soak required per 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response To Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted Steam Generator that can be isolated causes an additional challenge to the Integrity Critical Safety Function.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 9 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Event # Description

1. Raise Power to 3%

2. N35 Loss Of Compensating Voltage

3. 3C Charging Pump Speed Controller Air Leak

4. PT-3-1607, 3B S/G Steam Dump To Atmosphere Pressure Transmitter, Drifts High

5. PS-3-2007, Containment Pressure Channel Fails High

6. N36 Fails High, Rx Fails To Automatically Trip

7. 2 Stuck Rods

8. 3B Faulted S/G Inside Containment

9. POV-3-487, Feedwater Bypass Isolation, and FCV-3-489, Feedwater Bypass, Valves Fail To Isolate.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 10 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR SET UP INSTRUCTIONS Check Action

____ Restore IC-181 BOL 10-8 amps

____ Open & execute lesson file L-16-1 N3.lsn Verify the following step is triggered

____

SETUP - DEFEAT AUTO RX TRIP

____ Ensure Rod Group Step Counters have completed stepping out.

____ Allow the plant to stabilize.

____ Acknowledge any alarms and freeze Simulator.

____ Ensure B train is protected train on VPB.

____ Perform the SIMULATOR OPERATOR CHECKLIST or equivalent.

____ Place TURNOVER SHEETS on ROs desk or give to the Lead Evaluator.

____ Ensure a copy of the maneuvering guideline is available

____ Ensure a marked copy of 3-GOP-301 is available for power increase.

____ Ensure a copy of 0-ADM-200 is available for briefs.

____ Ensure a copy of ODI-44 is available for briefs.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 11 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION BRIEFINGS

Shift turnover information is attached to the back of this guide.

Ensure all applicants are prior briefed on Appendix E of NUREG 1021, Policies and Guidelines For Taking NRC Examinations.

Conduct a Crew Pre-brief to cover turnover information. Shift turnover information is attached to the back of this guide US:

RCO:

BOP:

SCENARIO NOTE 0-ADM-211 Prudent Operator Actions - If redundant stand-by equipment is available and ready, the operator is permitted to start the redundant equipment for failed or failing operating equipment.

Immediate follow up of applicable ARPs and ONOPs (AOPs) shall occur as required.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 12 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Critical Tasks are highlighted in Simulator Operator Actions Operator Verifiable Actions are pink. are highlighted in blue. Highlighted in green EVENT 1 - RAISE POWER TO 3%

3-GOP-301, HOT STANDBY TO POWER OPERATION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTEs EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE NOTE CREW:

The Reactivity briefing will occur prior to Participates in reactivity briefing for assuming the watch in the Simulator raising Rx power to 3% / POAH.

Briefing Room. Allow up to 30 minutes for the briefing before the crew enters the control room.

NOTE US:

Maneuvering Guidelines are attached to Directs the evolution per 3-GOP-301, Hot the back of this Scenario Guide. Standby to Power Operation, in accordance Step 5.24.

RCO:

Pull Rods to establish a startup rate not to exceed 1 dpm while below the POAH.

BOP:

Adjusts Steam Dumps to Atmosphere and Feedwater flow to maintain S/G Level on program when POAH is reached.

RCO:

Once above the POAH withdrawals rods continues to raise power with a startup rate not to exceed .5 dpm.

LEAD EVALUATOR Once the crew levels power above the POAH or at the lead evaluators discretion, direct the Booth Operator to trigger the next event.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 13 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - N35 LOSS OF COMPENSATING VOLTAGE 3-ONOP-059.7, INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTEs EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, trigger EVENT 2 - N-35 FAILS RCO:

Recognizes / reports N-35 IR channel malfunction.

BOP:

Review ARP B5/3

CHECK LOSS OF COMP VOLT light on N-35 IR channel drawer ON.

Refer to 3-ONOP-059.7 US:

Enters 3-ONOP-059.7, Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction.

RCO:

Check If Reactor Trip Required

a. Check Rx Power <P-10

b. Check Hi Flux Status Light for N35 OR N36 - ON

c. Check Rx Trip Breakers - OPEN

Check Annunciator B 5/3 OFF. (NO)

Go to Step 4 Steps 1-2 NOTE BOP:

Annunciator B8/4 expected when placing

Places N35 level trip switch in level trip switch to bypass. BYPASS

Verify N36 Operable RCO:

Verify N-45 recorder selected to N36 Step 4 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 14 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - N35 LOSS OF COMPENSATING VOLTAGE 3-ONOP-059.7, INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTEs EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Check Reactor In Mode 1 Above P-10 (NO)

Check Reactor In Mode 1 Below P-10 (NO)

Check Reactor In Mode 2 Above P-6

Maintain power below 5 percent until both IR channels are Operable

Go to Step 10 Steps 5 - 7 BOOTH OPERATOR US:

As WCC / I&C, inform US that ARs & Initiate a PWO and notify I&C to check WRs have been written and I&C has affected IR channel.

been notified to investigate.

US:

Reviews Tech Spec applicability.

TS 3.3.1 Functional Unit 3

- Action 3, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 10%

TS 3.3.1 Functional Unit 17a

- Action 7, within 1 hr determine that the interlock is in its required state LEAD EVALUATOR Once the US completes the review of Tech Specs, or at your discretion, continue to the next event.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 15 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 3 - 3C CHARGING PUMP SPEED CONTROLLER AIR LEAK 3-ONOP-041.6, PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL MALFUNCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTEs EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, trigger EVENT 3 - 3C CHARGING PUMP SPEED CONTROLLER AIR LEAK RCO:

Report Max demand on 3C Charging pump speed controller.

NOTE BOP:

The US may use the guidance in the Review ARP G1/2, CHARGING PUMP ARP to swap charging pumps prior to entering enter 3-ONOP-041.6. HI SPEED

Check individual charging pump controller and the master charging pump controller.

IF a failure of the individual charging pump controller has occurred in automatic, THEN PLACE the individual controller in manual AND MAINTAIN pressurizer level on program.

- GO TO 3-ONOP-041.6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction

IF unable to control running charging pump, THEN START a standby charging pump AND SHUTDOWN the affected pump.

US:

Enter 3-ONOP-041.6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 16 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 3 - 3C CHARGING PUMP SPEED CONTROLLER AIR LEAK 3-ONOP-041.6, PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL MALFUNCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTEs EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE PROCEDURE NOTE

If Pressurizer Level Malfunction is a result of a failure of the 3-459CX or 3-460CX relays (as indicated by a loss of letdown flow with a loss of Pressurizer Heaters with no concurrent failure of Level Transmitters 3-459A, 3-460, 3-461), use 3-ONOP-003.6 Attachment 4, for 3-460CX failure, OR 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 4, for 3-459CX failure as guidance for establishing Letdown flow and Pressurizer Heaters.

If the button on relays 3-459CX or 3-460CX are used to restore Letdown flow and Pressurizer Heaters, comply with Tech Spec Action Statement 3.4.3 Action b.

If the manual control of Heaters from the Electrical Penetration Room is used, comply with Tech Spec Action Statement 3.4.3 Action a.

BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:

If dispatched to check the 3C Charging

Check pressurizer level indicators LI-Pump, wait 2 to 3 minutes and then 3-459A, LI-3-460, and LI-3-461 (NO) report a large air leak on the speed

Place Master Charging Pump controller. Controller, LC-3-459G in Manual If asked, the 3B Charging pump is ready

Place individual Charging Pump for a start and once its started, report Controllers in Manual back a SAT start.

Start or stop additional pumps as necessary Steps 5.1 - 5.3 RCO:

When desired, place running charge controllers and master controller in auto.

BOOTH OPERATOR US:

When asked, acknowledge request for Initiate a PWO addition support. .

LEAD EVALUATOR Continue with next event after the RCO swaps charging pumps.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 17 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 4 - 3B S/G STEAM DUMP TO ATMOSPHERE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER DRIFTS HIGH 0-ADM-211, PRUDENT OPERATOR ACTIONS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, trigger EVENT 4 - PT-3-1607, 3B S/G STEAM DUMP TO ATMOSPHERE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER, DRIFTS HIGH CREW:

Hears steam flow.

BOP:

Reports CV-3-1607, 3B Steam Dump to Atmosphere, is open.

US:

Directs BOP to close CV-3-1607.

BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

As WCC, inform US that WCC/AOM has Places CV-3-1607 in manual and reduces been notified, ARs & WRs were written, demand to stabilize 3B S/G pressure.

and proper work groups have been notified.

LEAD EVALUATOR After the plant is stabilized, proceed with the next event.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 18 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 5 - PS-3-2007, CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CHANNEL FAILS HIGH 3-ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION CHANNEL TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, trigger EVENT 5 - CTMT PRESSURE CHANNEL FAILS HIGH BOP:

Review ARP, H5/1, CNTMT HI-HI/HI PRESS

CHECK Containment pressure indication

CHECK Status lamps on VPB(3C05)

Refer to 3-ONOP-049.1 US:

Enters 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels BOP:

Verify instrument loop failure by comparison to adjacent loops and known plant parameters and conditions.

Step 5.1 US:

Refer to Technical Specifications

Tech Spec 3.3.2, Functional units 1.c, 2.b, 3.b.3, and 4.c

- Action 15 - Place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Step 5.6 US:

Identifies fuses for failed channel using Attachment 7. (FU 25 & 26)

BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

WCC/I&C: Acknowledge the report. State Notifies WCC to initiate PWO and I&C for that I&C wants to be present before troubleshooting.

removing the fuses and should be in the control room in about an hour.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 19 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 5 - PS-3-2007, CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CHANNEL FAILS HIGH 3-ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION CHANNEL TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE LEAD EVALUATOR After the US completes the Tech Spec review, proceed with the next event.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 20 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - N36 FAILS HIGH 3-EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, trigger EVENT 6 - N36 FAILURE and verify EVENT 7 - 2 STUCK RODS triggers.

NOTE RCO:

Record the time Annunciator C6/5 Reports conditions met for manual INTERM RANGE HI FLUX TRIP Alarms reactor trip.

N-36 has failed high

Associated bistables are lit

Reports manual reactor trip is required US:

Directs a reactor trip CT1 Manually Trip The Rx RCO:

Manually trip the reactor from the control Trips the reactor room prior to manually inserting rods.

SAT _______

NOTE RCO:

Steps 1 - 4 of 3-EOP-E-0 are Immediate Verifies Reactor Trip Operator Actions (IOAs). The board

Determines 2 rods stuck out operators will call out the high level steps

Reports reactor trip (NO) of the IOAs as each step is completed RNO - Rx Power is <5% and lowering.

from memory. Once the IOAs are complete the US read through steps 1 - 4 Step 1 with the crew. BOP:

Verifies Turbine trip Step 2 BOP:

Verifies Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses Step 3 RCO:

Checks SI has NOT Actuated and is NOT required Step 4 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 21 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - N36 FAILS HIGH 3-EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE US:

Directs transition to 3-EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response Step 4 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 22 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 7 - 2 STUCK RODS 3-EOP-ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE US:

Directs 3-EOP-ES-0.1 response CREW:

Reviews FOP for 3-EOP-ES-0.1

SI Actuation Criteria

Pressurizer Level Criteria

S/G Level Criteria Using AFW

CST Makeup Water Criteria

Control Room Ventilation Manual Isolation Criteria Foldout Page PROCEDURE CAUTION If SI Actuation occurs during this procedure, 3-EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, is required to be performed.

BOP:

Checks RCS temperature control

Checks AFW pumps - NONE running

Checks RCPs - all running

Checks RCS Average Temperatures using DCS - Stable between 545°F and 547°F Step 1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 23 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 7 - 2 STUCK RODS 3-EOP-ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Checks Feedwater Status

Checks RCS Average Temperatures -

LESS THAN 554°F

Verifies Main Feedwater Flow Control valves - CLOSED AND IN MANUAL

Manually closes Feedwater Isolation valves:

- MOV-3-1407

- MOV-3-1408

- MOV-3-1409

Checks S/G Narrow Range Levels -

GREATER THAN 7% IN AT LEAST ONE S/G

Stops all but one Main Feedwater Pump Step 2 RCO:

Verifies ALL control rods - fully inserted (NO) (L-7 & L-9 are stuck out)

Emergency Borate for stuck control rods using 3-ONOP-046.1, EMERGENCY BORATION, while continuing with Step 4.

Step 3 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 24 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 7 - 2 STUCK RODS 3-EOP-ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE NOTE RCO:

In accordance with step 4 of 3-ONOP- Commences emergency boration using 3-046.1, Emergency borate for 50 minutes ONOP-046.1 for each rod not fully inserted using BAST

Verifies charging pumps - AT LEAST water at 60 GPM through MOV-3-350. ONE RUNNING (2 rods x 50 min /rod = 100 min)

Turns RCS Makeup Control Switch to LEAD EVALUATOR STOP When emergency boration is established,

Manually starts Boric Acid Pump 3A continue with next event. or 3B

Opens Emergency Boration Valve, MOV-3-350

Opens Charging Flow to Regen Heat Exchanger, HCV-3-121

Verify Loop A Charging Isolation,CV-3-310A - OPEN

Establishes emergency boration flow

- FI-3-110 > 60 GPM

- FI-3-122A > 45 GPM

Informs US emergency boration is established NOTE BOP:

The US and BOP should continue with

Checks 4KV Power Status To Both 3-EOP-ES-0.1. Unit 3 And Unit 4

Checks Pressurizer Level Control

Checks PRZ Pressure Control

Checks S/G Levels Verifies All 4kV buses energized by OFFSITE POWER

Establish S/G Pressure Control NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 25 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 8 - 3B S/G FAULTED INSIDE CONTAINMENT 3-EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:

When directed by Lead Evaluator, trigger

Reports Tavg lowering EVENT 8 - 3B S/G STEAM LEAK

Reports containment press rising INSIDE CONTAINMENT When event 8 is triggered, verify EVENT BOP:

9 - 3B SG FAILS TO ISOLATE triggers

Reports 3B SG pressure lowering uncontrollably NOTE US:

The Crew will transition to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 Transitions to 3-EOP-E-0, Step 1, when when any RCS Cold Leg is < 280°F Foldout page SI initiation criteria are met.

(Orange Condition for P.1) The steps for 3-EOP-FR-P.1 start on page 30.

RCO:

Verifies Reactor Trip Step 1 BOP:

Verifies Turbine Trip Step 2 BOP:

Verifies Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses Step 3 RCO:

Checks If SI Is Actuated Step 4 US:

Directs 3-EOP-E-0 response and reviews the IOAs.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 26 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 8 - 3B S/G FAULTED INSIDE CONTAINMENT 3-EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE NOTE CREW:

CT2 may be completed and at any time Reviews FOP for 3-EOP-E-0 before the completion of 3-EOP-FR-P.1

Adverse Cntmt Step 2.

RCP Trip Criteria (YES)

- Trips RCPs when RCP trip criteria met.

STOP AFW FLOW TO FAULTED SG

Faulted S/G Isolation - (YES)

CT2 During a MSLB stop AFW flow to the - Place in manual and close or faulted Steam Generator prior to starting reduce the controller setpoint to 0 the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months soak required per o Train 1 AFW Flow to 3B S/G 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response To Imminent CV-3-2817 SAT _______ Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition. o Train 2 AFW Flow to 3B S/G CV-3-2832

RUPTURED S/G ISOLATION CRITERIA

AFW Sys Operation Criteria - (YES)

CST Makeup Water Criteria

RHR System Operation Criteria -

(YES Set timer)

Loss of Offsite Power or SI on the Other Unit

Loss of Charging Criteria Foldout Page NOTE BOP:

Attachment 3 actions start on page 32. Continues with ATTACHMENT 3 to complete the Prompt Action Verifications.

Step 5 RCO:

Check AFW Pumps - AT LEAST TWO RUNNING - (YES)

Step 6 RCO:

Verify AFW Valve Alignment - PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT - (YES)

Step 7 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 27 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 8 - 3B S/G FAULTED INSIDE CONTAINMENT 3-EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Verify Proper AFW Flow:

Check Narrow Range Level in at least one S/G - GREATER THAN 7%[27%]

Maintain feed flow to S/G until Narrow Range Levels between 21%[27%]

and 50%

Step 8 RCO:

Check RCP Seal Cooling

d. SI - RESET (NO) Reset SI

f. Start one Charging Pump at minimum speed for Seal Injection Step 9.d & f RCO:

Check RCS Temperatures

Check RCPs - ANY RUNNING -

(NO)

Check RCS Cold Leg Temperatures -

STABLE BETWEEN 545°F AND 547°F OR TRENDING DOWN TO 547°F - (NO)

Stops dumping steam Step 10 RCO:

Check PRZ PORVs, Spray Valves And Excess Letdown Isolated - Yes Step 11 RCO:

Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped - (Not running)

Step 12 RCO:

Check If S/Gs Are Faulted - YES

Continue to monitor CSFs Step 13 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 28 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 8 - 3B S/G FAULTED INSIDE CONTAINMENT 3-EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE US:

When any RCS Cold Leg is < 280°F (Orange Condition for P.1) transition to 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response To Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition Step 13 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 29 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 8 - 3B S/G FAULTED INSIDE CONTAINMENT 3-EOP-FR-P.1, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE US:

Enter 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response To Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock.

US:

Reviews the Foldout Page

ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS (YES)

Foldout Page RCO:

Check RCS Pressure - GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [575 PSIG] (NO)

Step 1 BOP:

RCS Cold Leg Temperatures -

DECREASING Try to stop RCS cooldown:

Verify S/G Steam Dump To Atmosphere Valves - CLOSED

Verify steam Dump To Condenser Valves - CLOSED

IF RHR System in service THEN stop any cool down from RHR System

Control feed flow to non-faulted S/G(s) to stop RCS cooldown.

Steps 2a - 2b NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 30 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 8 - 3B S/G FAULTED INSIDE CONTAINMENT 3-EOP-FR-P.1, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR RCO/BOP:

When dispatched to isolate AFW steam Minimize cooldown from faulted S/G(s) supply from the 3B S/G using Attachment

Check S/Gs - ANY FAULTED 2, wait 1 to 2 minutes and then trigger LOA - CLOSE AND DE-ENERGIZE

Verify Main Steamline Isolation AND MOV-3-1404. Report when the step is Bypass Valves closed for each complete. Faulted S/G

- Close 3B MSIV

Dispatch operator to isolate AFW steam supply from 3B S/G using Attachment 2

Check all S/Gs - ANY S/G NOT FAULTED

Control feed flow at 50 gpm to any NOTE Faulted S/G(s) needed for RCS CT2 may have been completed per the temperature control FOLDOUT Page of 3-EOP-E-0

Isolate Feedwater to all Faulted S/G(s) NOT needed for RCS STOP AFW FLOW TO FAULTED SG temperature control CT2 During a MSLB stop AFW flow to the - Place in manual and close or faulted Steam Generator prior to starting reduce the controller setpoint to 0 the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months soak required per - Train 1 AFW Flow to 3B S/G CV-3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response To Imminent 3-2817 SAT _______ Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition. - Train 2 AFW Flow to 3B S/G CV-3-2832 Step 2.c The scenario is terminated once the crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 and isolates AFW flow to the 3B Steam Generator or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion once all critical tasks have been evaluated.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 31 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 9 - 3B S/G FAULTED INSIDE CONTAINMENT 3-EOP-E-0 ATTACHMENT 3 - PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Check Load Centers - Energized Step 1 BOP:

Verify Feedwater Isolation:

Place Main Feedwater Pump switches in STOP

Feedwater Control valves - CLOSED

Feedwater Bypass valves - CLOSED

Feedwater Bypass Isolation valves -

NOT CLOSED

- Closes POV-3-487

Feedwater Isolation MOVs - CLOSED

Verify Standby Feedwater Pumps -

OFF Step 2 BOP:

Check If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated (MSIVs Closed)

Step 3 BOP:

Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve White Lights On VPB - ALL BRIGHT Step 4 BOP:

Verify Pump Operation:

At least two High-Head SI Pumps -

RUNNING

Both RHR Pumps - RUNNING Step 5 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 32 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 9 - 3B S/G FAULTED INSIDE CONTAINMENT 3-EOP-E-0 ATTACHMENT 3 - PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Verify Proper CCW System Operation:

CCW Heat Exchangers - THREE IN SERVICE

CCW Pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING

CCW Headers - TIED TOGETHER

MOV-3-626, RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Outlet - OPEN Step 3 BOP:

Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve White Lights On VPB - ALL BRIGHT Step 4 BOP:

Verify Pump Operation:

At least two High-Head SI Pumps -

RUNNING

Both RHR Pumps - RUNNING Step 5 BOP:

Verify Proper CCW System Operation:

CCW Heat Exchangers - THREE IN SERVICE

CCW Pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING

CCW Headers - TIED TOGETHER

MOV-3-626, RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Outlet - OPEN Step 6 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 33 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 9 - 3B S/G FAULTED INSIDE CONTAINMENT 3-EOP-E-0 ATTACHMENT 3 - PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Verify Proper ICW System Operation:

Verify ICW Pumps - AT LEAST TWO RUNNING

Verify ICW To TPCW Heat Exchanger

- ISOLATED

Check ICW Headers - TIED TOGETHER Step 7 BOP:

Check Emergency Containment Coolers

- ONLY TWO RUNNING Step 8 BOP:

Verify Unit 3 Containment Purge Exhaust And Supply Fans - OFF Step 9 BOP:

Verify Containment Spray Running Step 10 BOP:

Verify SI - RESET Step 11 BOP:

Verify SI Valve Amber Lights On VPB -

ALL BRIGHT Step 12 BOP:

Verify SI Flow:

RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1625 PSIG[1950 PSIG] (NO)

Go to Step 14.

Step 13 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 34 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 9 - 3B S/G FAULTED INSIDE CONTAINMENT 3-EOP-E-0 ATTACHMENT 3 - PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When requested, trigger LOA - ALIGN Realign SI System:

U-4 HHSIs TO U3 RWST

Check Procedure Entry Status - E-0 ENTERED FROM 3-ONOP-047.1, LOSS OF CHARGING FLOW IN MODES 1 THROUGH 4 (NO)

Verify Unit 3 High-Head SI Pumps -

TWO RUNNING Step 14 BOP:

Reset Phase A.

Step 15 BOP:

Reestablish RCP Cooling:

Check RCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (NO Go To Step 17)

Step 16 BOP:

Verify Control Room Ventilation Isolation:

Step 17 BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When requested, trigger LOA - ALIGN Place Hydrogen Monitors In Service PAHMS FOR SERVICE Using 3-NOP-094, CONTAINMENT POST ACCIDENT MONITORING SYSTEM Step 18 BOP:

Verify All Four EDGs - RUNNING Step 19 BOP:

Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses:

Step 20 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 35 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 9 - 3B S/G FAULTED INSIDE CONTAINMENT 3-EOP-E-0 ATTACHMENT 3 - PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Notify Unit Supervisor Of The Following:

Attachment 3 is complete

Any safeguards equipment that is NOT is in the required condition

Status of Containment pressure continuous action Step 21 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 36 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Discussion Points are intentionally NOT included in evaluated scenarios. However, space is available below to document follow-up questions when further information is required to determine an evaluation outcome.

FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS QUESTION #1

________________________________________________________

________________________

ANSWER #1

________________________________________________________

______________________________

QUESTION #2

________________________________________________________

________________________

ANSWER #2

________________________________________________________

______________________________

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 37 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR POST-SCENARIO RESTORATION:

______ 1. Restore per Simulator Operator Checklist.

2. Once exams are complete, restore from SEI-19, Simulator Exam Security.

______

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 38 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG L-16-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 3 RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE) UNIT 4 RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)

PROTECTED TRAIN: B PROTECTED TRAIN: B ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO:

Field Supv.: Outside SNPO:

Admin RCO: ANPO:

Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit Supv.: Unit Supv.:

RCO: RCO:

NPO: NPO:

PLANT STATUS Unit 3 Unit 4 Mode: 2 Mode: 1

-8 Power: 10 amps Power: 100%

MWe: 0 MWe: 842 Gross Leakrate: 0.23 gpm Gross Leakrate: 0.03 gpm RCS Boron Conc: 1670 ppm RCS Boron Conc: 642 ppm Operational Concerns:

Plant Start Up last shift following a 10 day outage to repair Feed Water Line Leak.

2 ROs and 2 SROs are in JITT for Turbine Roll and power accession. You are to raise power to 3% and hold until they return.

U3 Anticipated LCO Actions:

None U4 Anticipated LCO Actions:

None Results of Offgoing Focus Area:

DRAFT L-16-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 39 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG L-16-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION UNIT 3 STATUS REACTOR OPERATOR UNIT RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE) PROTECTED TRAIN: B Mode: 2 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: .2% Gross: 0.23 GPM A 6656 MWe 0 Unidentified 0.02 GPM B 6608 Tavg: 547 °F Charging Pps: 0.00 GPM C 6646 RCS Pressure: 2235 RCS Boron Conc: 1670 ppm Abnormal Annunciators:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Current Tech Spec Action Statements: (Does Not Include For Tracking Only Items T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

DRAFT L-16-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 40 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG L-16-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION REACTOR OPERATOR (CONT'D)

UNIT RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE) PROTECTED TRAIN: B Changes to Risk Significant Equipment:

No recent changes from last shift.

OLRM: GREEN PROTECTED TRAIN: B Upcoming Reactivity Management Activities:

Approval granted to withdraw rods to 125 steps to raise power to Raise Power to 3% to roll the Turbine per 3-GOP-301 Step 5.45.

Place unit online and continue power increase to 30%.

Upcoming Major POD Activities:

SM has approved going to Mode 1 Roll the Turbine Place the Unit Online Continue power increase to 30%.

Upcoming ECOs to Hang and /or Release:

Hang - None Evolutions or Compensatory Actions in Progress:

NONE General Information, Remarks, and Operator Work Around Status:

Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.

U4 supplying Aux Steam

Air In-leakage = 0.0 SCFM DRAFT L-16-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 41 of 42

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 SEG L-16-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION FOR TRAINING USE ONLY TURKEY POINT Reactivity Manipulation Table REACTOR ENGINEERING (USE ONLY AS GUIDELINE)

Unit 3 Cycle 28 BOC Power Ascension Rev. 0 RAOC BORON CHANGE DILUTE BORATE ELAPSED TIME POWER (%) CBD (Steps) AFD (%) (Limit) (ppm) (ppm) (gal) (gal) 00:00 0.1 107 -0.00 N/A 1675 * *

00:02 0.1 109 -0.00 N/A 1675 * *

00:04 0.5 111 -0.00 N/A 1675 * *

00:06 0.5 113 -0.00 N/A 1675 * *

00:08 1.0 115 -0.1 N/A 1675 * *

00:10 1.5 117 -0.1 N/A 1675 * *

00:12 2.0 117 -0.1 N/A 1675 * *

00:14 2.5 119 -0.2 N/A 1675 * *

00:16 3.0 119 -0.2 N/A 1675 * *

00:18 3.0 119 -0.2 N/A 1675 * *

00:20 3.0 119 -0.2 N/A 1675

Note 3

NOTEs

-8

1. Withdraw rods to establish a SUR of 1 dpm to raise power from 10 amps to the Point Of Adding Heat

2. The SUR should be limited to .5 dpm above the Point Of Adding Heat

3. Once power is leveled at ~ 3% dilute and operate control rods as required to maintain RCS temperature for current power plateau.

DRAFT L-16-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 42 of 42

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L-16-1 N4 (Rev-0)

Facility: Turkey Point Nuclear (PTN) - Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: 2016-301 Units 3 and 4 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RCO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units.

Turnover: The 3A RHR pump and 3A1 Circulating Water pump are OOS.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description TVS1M6WD I-BOP PT-3-495 3C S/G Pressure Transmitter Fails High 1

I-SRO (TS)

HNACSPECI R-RCO 3C RCP Degraded Seals (Rapid S/D Required)

FIC_VRCPS R-SRO EAL1CTVV N-BOP 2

HNACSPECI FIC_VRCPS EAL2CTVV TCE6DG8C C-RCO 3P08 Loss Of Power (Power Restored) 3 C-BOP C-SRO (TS)

HNACSPECI C-RCO 3C RCP Seal Failure, (Rx Trip Required)

FIC_VRCPS C-SRO 4

EAL1CTVV /

EAL2CTVV TFP1S3GC M-RCO Loss of All AC 5 TFE2Z51S M-BOP M-SRO 6 TFQ6X1BF P-BOP 3B 4Kv Bus Stripping Relay Failure TVHHCLC M-RCO Small Break LOCA 7 M-BOP M-SRO TFL3S12D P-RCO MOV-3-843B HHSI Discharge to Cold Leg fails to auto open.

8 (Slave Relay Failure)

P-BOP

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (P)ost Trip NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 1 of 3

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L-16-1 N4 (Rev-0)

Scenario Summary Event 1 After the crew takes the shift PT-3-495 3C S/G Pressure slowly fails high. The BOP will take manual control of 3C S/G level, and restore level to normal. The crew will use the ARP or 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, to select operable channels and restore 3C S/G level control to automatic. The US will enter 3-ONOP-049.1 to verify all required actions are complete and to determine which bistables need to be tripped.

Event 2 Once equipment is restored to automatic, the 3C RCP seals will start degrading. The US will enter 3-ONOP-041.1, Reactor Coolant Pump Off-Normal and commence a unit shutdown using 3-GOP-100, Fast Load Reduction.

Event 3 After the crew starts the Load reduction Vital AC Bus 3P08 loses power. The Crew will enter 3-ONOP-003.8, Loss of Vital AC Bus 3P08. The crew will dispatch an operator to 3P08 to attempt to restore power. The 3A and 3B S/G level controllers shift to manual. The 3C S/G level controller shifts to manual on the Backup Controller. The BOP will select operable control channels for the 3A and 3B S/G and then restore automatic control. The operator dispatched to the restore power will report the Main Breaker for 3P08 will not close. Electrical Maintenance estimates it will take 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to replace the breaker.

Event 4 After the US completes the Tech Spec review for the loss of 3P08, the 3C RCP Seal degrades to the point that requires a Reactor trip and stopping of the 3C RCP. The RCO will trip the Reactor, verify the Reactor is tripped, stop 3C RCP, close 3C RCP CBO Isolation Valve CV-3-303C, and close PCV 455A, PZR Spray Valve Loop C. The crew will enter 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and complete the Operator Immediate Actions.

Event 5 After the RCO completes tripping the 3C RCP, a Loss of AC Power will occur. The 3A and 3B Emergency Diesel Generators will start but neither will energize its respective 4KV bus. The crew will enter 3-EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.

Event 6 The 3A 4KV Bus is locked out so the US will direct the BOP perform Attachment 2, 3B 4KV Bus Stripping.

The BOP will open the 3B ICW pump, 3B CCW pump, 3C CCW pump, 3B Load Center, and 3D Load Center breakers to complete bus stripping. Once Bus Stripping is complete the 3B EDG will automatically energize the 3B 4KV Bus.

Event 7 Once the 3B 4KV Bus is energized the crew will transition back to 3-EOP-E-0. Shortly after the transition a Small Break LOCA will occur.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 2 of 3

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L-16-1 N4 (Rev-0)

Scenario Summary Event 8 When SI actuates, the slave relay which opens MOV-3-843B fails to actuate. The RCO may open MOV 843B any time after SI actuates. If the RCO doesnt open MOV-3-843B the BOP will open it during the performance of 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verifications.

When the crew is ready to transition to 3-EOP-E-1, Loss Of Reactor Or Secondary Coolant, they will notice the Integrity Critical Safety Function Status Tree is RED and will transition to 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response To Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition.

The scenario is terminated after the crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 and determines a soak is required, or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion once all critical tasks have been evaluated.

Event Scenario Critical Tasks 6 CT1 Re-energize 3B 4KV Bus Following a Loss Of All AC, complete bus stripping and restore power to the 3B 4KV bus prior to actuating SI and within 30 minutes of the loss of power.

Safety Significance: The failure to energize an AC emergency bus in a timely manner constitutes a misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent a degraded emergency power capacity. The 30 minute time limit is based minimizing DC bus battery depletion and the requirement to manually load a de-energized DC bus battery charger onto the operating EDG. (0-ADM-232, Attachment 1, Time Critical Operator Actions) 7 CT2 Open MOV-3-843B During a SBLOCA establish at least one train of HHSI flow prior to completing 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 and within 30 minutes the HHSI pump starting.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish at least one train HHSI flow constitutes a misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. The 30 minute time limit is based on the requirement to limit the time the pump is operating at shutoff head to less than 30 minutes. (0-ADM-232 Attachment 1, Time Critical Operator Actions)

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 3 of 3

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Site: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 (PTN)

Title:

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 LMS #: NRC 24 LMS Rev Date: 6/8/16 Rev #: 0 SEG Type: Training Evaluation Program: LOCT LOIT Other Duration: 120 minutes Developed by: Tim Hodge / Luis Sagion 8/4/16 Instructor/Developer Date Reviewed by: Brian Clark 8/4/16 Instructor (Instructional Review) Date Validated by : Sean Bloom 8/5/16 SME (Technical Review) Date Approved by: Mark Wilson 8/5/16 Training Supervision Date Approved by: Sean Bloom 8/5/16 Training Program Owner (Line) Date NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 1 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SCENARIO REFERENCES DOC NO. TITLE REV 3-EOP-E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION 12 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 LOSS OF ALL AC POWER 10 3-EOP-FR-P.1 RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK 3 CONDITION 3-GOP-100 FAST LOAD REDUCTION 12A 3-ONOP-003.8 LOSS OF 120V VITAL INSTRUMENT PANEL 3P08 6 3-ONOP-041.1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OFF-NORMAL 11 3-ONOP-049.1 DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR 4 PROTECTION CHANNEL PTN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 300 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 2 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REQUIREMENTS Terminal Given this simulator scenario and resources normally found in the Control Room, the Objective operating crew will perform Control Room operations IAW approved plant procedures in order to maintain the integrity of the plant and the health and safety of the public.

Enabling Given this simulator scenario and resources normally found in the Control Room, Objectives: operate in accordance with approved plant procedures, Operations Department Instructions, and management expectations:

1. (ALL) Demonstrate personnel SAFETY awareness in interactions with plant staff and outside agencies.

2. (ALL) Demonstrate ALARA awareness in interactions with plant staff and outside agencies.

3. (ALL) Exchange correct information using 3-point communication/Repeat-backs with Control Room personnel and other plant staff.

4. (ALL) Inform plant personnel and System of plant conditions, as needed.

5. (US) Employ timely and concise crew briefs where appropriate.

6. (ALL) Maintain awareness of plant status and control board indication.

7. (ALL) Correctly diagnose plant situations.

8. (ALL) Solve operational problems as they arise.

9. (RCO/BOP) Manipulate plant controls properly and safely.

10. (ALL) Demonstrate self-checking using STAR and peer checks(when required)

11. (US) Demonstrate command and control of the crew.

12. (US) Coordinate the input of crew members and other plant staff.

13. (US) Utilize the input of crew members and other plant staff.

14. (ALL) Demonstrate conservative decision making.

15. (ALL) Demonstrate teamwork.

16. (ALL) Respond to plant events using procedural guidance (OPs/ONOPs/EOPs) as applicable in accordance with rules of usage.

17. (RCO/BOP) Implement any applicable procedural immediate operator actions without use of references.

18. (SRO) Maintain compliance with Tech Specs.

19. (ALL) Identify/enter applicable Tech Spec action statements.

20. (ALL) Respond to annunciators using ARPs (time permitting).

21. (ALL) Maintain written communication, logs, and documentation as needed to permit post-event reconstruction.

Continued on next page NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 3 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REQUIREMENTS While addressing the following events:

1. PT-3-495 3C S/G Pressure Transmitter Fails High

2. 3C RCP Degraded Seals

3. 3P08 Loss Of Power

4. 3C RCP Seal Failure

5. Loss of All AC

6. 3B 4Kv Bus Stripping Relay Failure

7. Small Break LOCA

8. MOV-3-843B HHSI Discharge to Cold Leg Fails To Auto Open Prerequisites: None Training PTN Unit 3 Plant Simulator Resources:

Development

TR-AA-220-1003, Initial NRC and Audit Exam Process

References:

TR-AA-230-1003, SAT Development

TR-AA-230-1007, Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation

0-ADM-232, Time Critical Action Program

OP-AA-100-1000, Conduct Of Operations

OP-AA-103-1000, Reactivity Management

0-ADM-200, Operations Management Manual

0-ADM-211, Emergency and Off-Normal Operating Procedure Usage

WCAP-17711-NP, Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group Westinghouse Emergency Response Guideline Revision 2-Based Critical Tasks Protected N/A Content:

Evaluation Performance Mode Method:

Operating None Experience:

Risk Following a Loss Of All AC, complete bus stripping and restore power to the 3B 4KV Significant bus prior to actuating SI and within 30 minutes of the loss of power.

Operator Actions:

During a SBLOCA, establish at least one train of HHSI flow prior to completing 3-EOP-E-0, Attachment 3, and within 30 minutes the HHSI pump starting.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 4 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SRO TASK # TASK TITLE 02005015500 RESPOND TO A LOSS OF ALL A.C. POWER 02028033500 AUTHORIZE UNIT TRIP 02041029300 EVALUATE AND RESPOND TO A LOW PRESSURIZER PRESSURE 02041044300 EVALUATE AND RESPOND TO HIGH RCP NUMBER ONE SEAL LEAKOFF 02089026300 AUTHORIZE FAST LOAD REDUCTION 02200001500 RESPOND TO UNIT TRIP 02200021500 RESPOND TO LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 02200022500 DIAGNOSE CAUSE OF SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION 02200044500 RESPOND TO HIGH STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL 02200050500 RESPOND TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION RO TASK TASK TITLE 01005015500 RESPOND TO A LOSS OF ALL A.C. POWER 01041044300 EVALUATE AND RESPOND TO HIGH RCP NUMBER ONE SEAL LEAKOFF 01089026300 RESPOND TO / ADJUST TURBINE DURING FAST LOAD REDUCTION 01200001500 RESPOND TO UNIT TRIP 01200021500 RESPOND TO LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 01200022500 DIAGNOSE CAUSE OF SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION 02200044500 RESPOND TO HIGH STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL 02200050500 RESPOND TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 5 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION UPDATE LOG:

Place this form with the working copies of lesson plans and/or other materials to document changes made between formal revisions. For fleet-wide training materials, keep electronic file NOTES:

of this form in same folder as approved materials. Refer to TR-AA-230-1003 SAT Development for specific directions regarding how and when this form shall be used.

Indicate in the following table any minor changes or major revisions (as defined in TR-AA-230-1003) made to the material after initial approval. Or use separate Update Log form TR-AA-230-1003-F16.

DESCRIPTION OF PREPARER DATE

REASON FOR CHANGE AR/TWR#

CHANGE REVIEWER DATE Revised for L-16-1 NRC Note 5 Note 5 0-0 Initial Revision 2108338 Exam Note 5 Note 5 0-1 0-2 0-3 0-4 0-5

1. Individual updating lesson plan or training material shall complete the appropriate blocks on the Update Log.

2. Describe the change to the lesson plan or training materials.

3. State the reason for the change (e.g., reference has changed, typographical error, etc.)

4. Preparer enters name/date on the Update Log and obtains Training Supervisor approval.

5. Initial dates and site approval on cover page.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 6 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 100% power (MOL). Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units.

Equipment OOS

The 3A RHR pump and 3A1 Circulating Water pump are OOS.

Event 1 After the crew takes the shift, PT-3-495, 3C S/G Pressure, slowly fails high. The BOP will take manual control of 3C S/G level and restore level to normal. The crew will use the ARP or 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, to select operable channels and restore 3C S/G level control to automatic. The US will enter 3-ONOP-049.1 to verify all required actions are complete and to determine which bistables need to be tripped.

Event 2 Once equipment is restored to automatic, the 3C RCP seals will start degrading. The US will enter 3-ONOP-041.1, Reactor Coolant Pump Off-Normal, and commence a unit shutdown using 3-GOP-100, Fast Load Reduction.

Event 3 After the crew starts the Load reduction, Vital AC Bus 3P08 loses power. The Crew will enter 3-ONOP-003.8, Loss of Vital AC Bus 3P08. The crew will dispatch an operator to 3P08 to attempt to restore power. The 3A and 3B S/G level controllers shift to manual. The 3C S/G level controller shifts to manual on the Backup Controller. The BOP will select operable control channels for the 3A and 3B S/G and then restore automatic control. The operator dispatched to restore power will report the Main Breaker for 3P08 will not close. Electrical Maintenance estimates it will take 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to replace the breaker.

Event 4 After the US completes the Tech Spec review for the loss of 3P08, the 3C RCP Seal degrades to the point that requires a Reactor trip and stopping the 3C RCP. The RCO will trip the Reactor, verify the Reactor is tripped, stop 3C RCP, close 3C RCP CBO Isolation Valve, CV-3-303C, and close PCV-3-455A, PZR Spray Valve Loop C. The crew will enter 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and complete the Immediate Operator Actions.

Event 5 After the RCO completes tripping the 3C RCP, a Loss of AC Power will occur. The 3A and 3B Emergency Diesel Generators will start, but neither will energize its respective 4KV bus. The crew will enter 3-EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 7 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Event 6 The 3A 4KV Bus is locked out, so the US will direct the BOP perform Attachment 2, 3B 4KV Bus Stripping. The BOP will open the 3B ICW pump, 3B CCW pump, 3C CCW pump, 3B Load Center, and 3D Load Center breakers to complete bus stripping. Once Bus Stripping is complete, the 3B EDG will automatically energize the 3B 4KV Bus.

Event 7 Once the 3B 4KV Bus is energized, the crew will transition back to 3-EOP-E-0. Shortly after the transition, a Small Break LOCA will occur.

Event 8 When SI actuates, the slave relay which opens MOV-3-843B fails to actuate. The RCO may open MOV 843B any time after SI actuates. If the RCO doesnt open MOV-3-843B, the BOP will open it during the performance of 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verifications.

The scenario is terminated after the crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 and determines a soak is required, or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion once all critical tasks have been evaluated.

Event CRITICAL TASKS 6 CT1 Re-energize 3B 4KV Bus Following a Loss Of All AC, complete bus stripping and restore power to the 3B 4KV bus prior to actuating SI and within 30 minutes of the loss of power.

Safety Significance: The failure to energize an AC emergency bus in a timely manner constitutes a misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent a degraded emergency power capacity. The 30 minute time limit is based minimizing DC bus battery depletion and the requirement to manually load a de-energized DC bus battery charger onto the operating EDG. (0-ADM-232, Attachment 1, Time Critical Operator Actions) 7 CT2 Open MOV-3-843B During a SBLOCA, establish at least one train of HHSI flow prior to completing 3-EOP-E-0, Attachment 3, and within 30 minutes the HHSI pump starting.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish at least one train HHSI flow constitutes a misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. The 30 minute time limit is based on the requirement to limit the time the pump is operating at shutoff head to less than 30 minutes. (0-ADM-232 Attachment 1, Time Critical Operator Actions)

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 8 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Event # Description

1. PT-3-495 3C S/G Pressure Transmitter Fails High

2. 3C RCP Degraded Seals

3. 3P08 Loss Of Power

4. 3C RCP Seal Failure

5. Loss of All AC

6. 3B 4Kv Bus Stripping Relay Failure

7. Small Break LOCA

8. MOV-3-843B HHSI Discharge to Cold Leg Fails To Auto Open NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 9 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR SET UP INSTRUCTIONS Check Action

____ Restore IC-1 (100% MOL) or equivalent IC.

____ Place the Simulator in RUN.

____ Stop the 3A1 Circ Water Pump

____ Open & execute lesson file L-16-1 N4 Ensure the following lesson steps are triggered:

SETUP - 3A RHR PUMP OOS

SETUP - 3A1 CWP OOS

SETUP EVENT 6 - 3B BUS STRIPPING FAILURE

____

SETUP EVENT 8 - B TRAIN SLAVE RELAY FAILURE

Place an ECO tag on the 3A RHR pump place it in PTL:

____

Place an ECO tag on the 3A1 CWP place it in Stop.

____ Verify the trend for 3A1 Screen on the TWS DP Recorder is clear.

____ Ensure Rod Group Step Counters have completed stepping out.

____ Allow the plant to stabilize.

____ Acknowledge any alarms and freeze Simulator.

____ Ensure B train is protected train on VPA.

____ Perform the SIMULATOR OPERATOR CHECKLIST or equivalent.

____ Place TURNOVER SHEETS on ROs desk or give to the Lead Evaluator.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 10 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION BRIEFINGS

Shift turnover information is attached to the back of this guide.

Ensure all applicants are prior briefed on Appendix E of NUREG 1021, Policies and Guidelines For Taking NRC Examinations.

Conduct a Crew Pre-brief to cover turnover information. Shift turnover information is attached to the back of this guide.

US:

RCO:

BOP:

SCENARIO NOTE 0-ADM-211 Prudent Operator Actions - If redundant stand-by equipment is available and ready, the operator is permitted to start the redundant equipment for failed or failing operating equipment.

Immediate follow up of applicable ARPs and ONOPs (AOPs) shall occur as required.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 11 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Critical Tasks are highlighted in Simulator Operator Actions are Operator Verifiable Actions are red. highlighted in blue. Highlighted in green.

EVENT 1 - PT-3-495 3C S/G PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILS HIGH 3-ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, trigger EVENT 1 - PT-3-495 FAILS HIGH BOP:

Recognizes and reports PT-3-495 failure.

PROMPT ACTIONS

Takes manual control of 3C S/G level control valve FCV-3-498.

Restores 3C S/G level to normal.

RCO:

Addresses Alarm Response for C5/3, 6/3, SG C Level Deviation.

CHECK LI-3-496 or LI-3-498, B\C STM GEN LEVEL controlling channel for SG Level deviation.

CHECK Feedwater Controllers FIC 498A or FIC-3-498B for indications of failure, alarm, or input signal failures.

CHECK Feedwater Controller Inputs

IF alarm is due to instrument failure, THEN REFER TO 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels.

US:

Enters and directs actions of 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, for response.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 12 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 1 - PT-3-495 3C S/G PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILS HIGH 3-ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE NOTE BOP:

The crew may use the ARP to select an

Verify PT-3-495 failure by channel check operable channel and restore automatic comparison.

level control.

Verify no off-normal conditions exist on PT-3-496.

Place 3C S/G Steam Flow Control BOOTH OPERATOR Transfer Switch to FT-3-495 (Ch IV -

If asked to locally investigate Yellow) transmitters, wait 2-3 minutes and report

Place 3C S/G Feed Water Flow Control no abnormalities noticed. Transfer Switch to FT-3-496 (CH IV -

Yellow)

Ensure 3C S/G level is returned to auto.

BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

WCC/I&C: Acknowledge the report. If Notifies WCC to initiate PWO and I&C for asked, I&C would like to be present troubleshooting.

before tripping bi-stables. They will report to the control room within an hour.

US:

Reviews Tech Specs

LCO 3.3.1 Functional Unit 12

- Action 6 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months trip bi-stables

LCO 3.3.2 Functional Unit 1e, 1f, and 4d.

- Action 15 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months trip bi-stables LEAD EVALUATOR US:

After S/G level control is restored to auto Conducts crew brief.

and the US completes the review of Tech Specs, at the Lead Evaluators discretion, direct the Booth Operator to trigger the next event.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 13 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - 3C RCP DEGRADED SEALS 3-ONOP-041.1, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OFF-NORMAL TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by the lead evaluator, trigger EVENT 2 - 3C RCP DEGRADED SEAL BOP:

Reviews ARPs A6/4, 7/4, 7/5.

Refer to 3-ONOP-041.1, Reactor Coolant Pump Off Normal.

RCO:

Responds to RCP Alarms

Check P2 pressure equal to or less than 1741 psig on VPA (NO)

Check P3 pressure greater than 975 psig on VPA (YES)

US:

Enter and direct the actions of 3-ONOP-041.1, Reactor Coolant Pump Off Normal.

US:

Reviews Foldout Page with the crew.

RCP Stopping Criteria

RCP Seal Criteria For Stopping RCP

Fast Load Reduction Criteria (YES, 3C RCP Seal Stage - greater than 1700 and / or CBO exceeds 3.7 gpm)

Exceeding Vibration Or Stator Temperature Limits

RCP Vibration Assessment Criteria US:

Enter and direct the actions of 3-GOP-100, Fast Load Reduction NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 14 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - 3C RCP DEGRADED SEALS 3-GOP-100, FAST LOAD REDUCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE US:

Directs actions to reduce Rx power NOTE per 3-GOP-100 Attachment 3 is available on Page 41

Completes Attachment 3 Attachment 4 is available on Page 42

Brief the crew per Attachment 4 Steps 1-2 US:

Reviews Foldout page with crew.

3-EOP-E-0 Transition Criteria

Notify Chemistry Department

Boration Stop Criteria

Restore Blender to AUTO FOLDOUT PAGE BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

Acknowledge notifications. Notify The Following Of Fast Load Reduction

System Dispatcher

Plant personnel using the Page Boost

Chemistry to start RCS sampling is required according to Tech Spec Table 4.4-4.

Step 3 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 15 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - 3C RCP DEGRADED SEALS 3-GOP-100, FAST LOAD REDUCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Begin Boration For Initial Tavg Effect

Set the Boric Acid Totalizer to total boric acid volume value determined on Attachment 3.

Place the Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to BORATE.

Place the RCS Makeup Control Switch to START.

Adjust FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller, to achieve 40 gpm boric acid flow as indicated on FR-3-113.

WHEN Tavg begins to lower from the boration, adjust FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller, to load reduction value from Attachment 3.

Step 4 US:

Determine Turbine Load Reduction in MW CNTRL Step 5 BOP:

Initiate Turbine Load Reduction in MW CNTRL

Select MW CNTRL

Set TARGET power level - MW VALUE from Attachment 3

Set RAMP RATE - MW/M VALUE FROM Attachment 3.

Check Tavg has lowered 1° to 2°F from the initial value prior to boration.

Depress GO

Ensure FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller, has been adjusted to the load reduction boration rate.

Go to Step 10 Step 6 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 16 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - 3C RCP DEGRADED SEALS 3-GOP-100, FAST LOAD REDUCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Monitor Load Reduction

Adjusts power reduction rate to Maintain Tavg/Tref within the expected T identified in Attachment 3.

Monitors S/G level control to ensure feed reg valves properly maintain level control in automatic.

NOTE

Refer to Enclosure 1 for expected Enclosure 1 is available on Page 43. alarms.

Step 10 BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:

Respond as SNPO. If asked, report idle

Maintain pressurizer level to ensure Charging Pump is ready for start. that automatic pressurizer level control maintains level on program.

If needed, start 2nd Chg Pp and place 2nd orifice in service.

Adjusts boration rate to Maintain Tavg/Tref within the expected T identified in Attachment 3.

Refer to Enclosure 1 for expected alarms.

Step 10 RCO:

Monitor Boration Rate

Monitor for excessive rod movement by monitoring TR-3-409D, Rod Position Bank D.

Determine if Insertion Limit and Bank D position are converging at a rate that will cause rod insertion limit alarms.

Adjust power reduction rate as needed to control rod insertion

Increase boration rate and/or total amount as necessary to limit control rod insertion Step 11 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 17 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - 3C RCP DEGRADED SEALS 3-GOP-100, FAST LOAD REDUCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Monitor Annunciator B 8/1, ROD BANK LO LIMIT - CLEAR

Monitor B 8/2 ROD BANK A/B/C/D EXTRA LO LIMIT - CLEAR Steps 12-13 US:

Have SM refer to the following procedures:

0-EPIP-20101, DUTIES OF EMERGENCY COORDINATOR

0-ADM-115, NOTIFICATION OF PLANT EVENTS Step 14 LEAD EVALUATOR RCO:

Once power has been reduced by a Energize Pressurizer Backup Heaters minimum of 5%, at the Lead Evaluators Step 15 discretion, proceed to the next Event.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 18 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 3 - 3P08 LOSS OF POWER 3-ONOP-003.8, LOSS OF 120V VITAL INSTRUMENT PANEL 3P08 TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTEs EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by the Lead Evaluator, trigger EVENT 3 - LOSS OF 3P08 RCO/BOP

Respond to various alarms.

Report a loss of power to 3P08

- Power Range N-43 Failure (NIS Racks Channel III Lights Out)

- Loss of Channel III Vital Instrumentation/Indications

- Bottom two rows of bistable lights are out US:

Enter and direct the actions of 3-ONOP-003.8, Loss Of 120V Vital Instrument Panel 3P08.

NOTE RCO:

Step 1 is an immediate action step.

Check If A Reactor Trip has occurred (NO)

Check If A Reactor Trip is required.

(NO)

STEP 1 BOOTH OPERATOR US:

When dispatched to restore power 3P08 Reviews Foldout Page with the crew.

per Attachment 1, wait 3 minutes and

Verify Turbine Inlet Pressure Control then report nothing obviously wrong. selected to PT-3-447 (CH.4 Yellow)

Dispatch operator to restore power to Inform the control room you are going to 3P08 using Attachment 1.

attempt to re-energize the bus, then

If a Reactor Trip has occurred (NO) trigger EVENT 3 - 3P08/3P23 ALL BREAKERS OFF.

If power available to 3P09, then perform the following:

- Place CS-3-1608, Power Selector switch for H/A-3-1608, to 3P09.

- Restore H/A-3-1608 to Auto.

FOLDOUT PAGE NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 19 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 3 - 3P08 LOSS OF POWER 3-ONOP-003.8, LOSS OF 120V VITAL INSTRUMENT PANEL 3P08 PROCEDURE CAUTION Loss of power to 3PO8 when OMS is in LOW PRESSURE OPS will cause a continuous open signal to PCV-3-456.

RCO/BOP:

Check Unit Operating In Modes 1 Through 3 Prior To Loss Of 3P08.

STEP 2 RCO:

Verify Pressurizer PORVs - CLOSED

Check Pressurizer Level control switch in Position 1 (CH 1 & 2)

Control charging flow using the 3A or 3B charging pumps in AUTO speed control

- Starts 3A or 3B Charging pump

- Stop 3C Charging pump STEP 3 PROCEDURE CAUTION

3C Steam Generator Level Recorder is de-energized.

Main Generator load should be maintained as stable as possible until all FW Control Valves are restored to automatic control.

PROCEDURE NOTE

3A and 3B Steam Generator level controllers should remain in AUTOMATIC if Feedwater flow selected to Channel IV (Yellow) and Steam Generator Level selected to the control channel.

3C Steam Generator level controllers is in MANUAL on the Backup Controller.

3A and 3B Steam Generator level controllers shift to MANUAL If Feedwater flow or Steam Generator Level selected to channel III ( Blue).

BOP:

Control 3C Steam Generator Water Level by using MANUAL control on the backup Controller.

Step 4a NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 20 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 3 - 3P08 LOSS OF POWER 3-ONOP-003.8, LOSS OF 120V VITAL INSTRUMENT PANEL 3P08 BOP:

Check 3A Steam Generator Feedwater Primary Controller in AUTOMATIC Mode (NO)

Select 3A Steam Generator Feedwater Flow Control Transfer switch to FI 476 (Ch IV - Yellow)

Select 3A Steam Generator Steam Flow Control Transfer switch to FI 475 (Ch IV - Yellow)

Select 3A Steam Generator Level Control Transfer switch to LI-3-478 (Ch I - Red)

On 3A Primary Controller, press A button for 2 seconds until backlit to return controller to AUTOMATIC Mode STEP 4b BOP:

Check 3B Steam Generator Feedwater Primary Controller in AUTOMATIC Mode (NO)

Select 3B Steam Generator Feedwater Flow Control Transfer switch to FI 486 (Ch IV - Yellow)

Select 3B Steam Generator Steam Flow Control Transfer switch to FI 485 (Ch IV - Yellow)

Select 3B Steam Generator Level Control Transfer switch to LI-3-488 (Ch II - White)

On 3B Primary Controller press A button for 2 seconds until backlit to return controller to AUTOMATIC Mode STEP 4c PROCEDURE CAUTION If Tavg decreases to less than 543°F, an automatic Safety Injection will occur due to the High Steam Flow bistables already tripped by the loss of power.

RCO/BOP Maintain Plant Parameters - STABLE STEP 5 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 21 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 3 - 3P08 LOSS OF POWER 3-ONOP-003.8, LOSS OF 120V VITAL INSTRUMENT PANEL 3P08 BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:

Report the Main breaker for 3P08 will not Check Power Restored To 3P08 (NO) close. Electrical Maintenance will have to IF power can NOT be restored to 3P08 replace it. Estimated repair time is 2 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , THEN perform the actions hours. required by Technical Specifications as directed by the SM, Return to Step 1.

STEP 6 LEAD EVALUATOR US:

This Tech Spec review can be quite Review Tech Specs extensive. The Lead evaluator may

LCO 3.3.1 Functional Unit 17.b due to choose to have the US identify Tech the loss of PT-3-446 Specs with actions statements of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months - Action 7 - within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months determine or less as a follow up question. When the by observation of the associated US starts the Tech Spec review at the permissive annunciator window(s)

Lead Evaluators discretion proceed to the that the interlock is in its required next event. state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

LCO 3.4.4 due to the loss of PORV PCV-3-456 NOTE - Action a - within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either Per Foldout Page, cooldown will require restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE closure of MSIVs and possible reduction status or close the associated block of feedwater flow. valve(s) with power maintained to the block valve(s); otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

LCO 3.8.3.1.h due to the loss of 3P08

- Action c - Reenergize the A.C. vital panel within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 22 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 4 - 3C RCP SEAL FAILURE 3-EOP-E-0, RX TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, trigger EVENT 4 - 3C RCP SEAL FAILURE RCO:

Reports rising CBO Flow and #3 seal differential pressure.

RCP CBO flow exceeds 4.1 gpm or any Seal Stage differential pressure exceeds 2000 psid, recommends a Manual Rx trip.

US:

Directs 3-EOP-E-0 response after auto Reactor trip.

RCO:

Manually trips Reactor.

LEAD EVALUATOR RCO:

When the RCO completes the required

Verifies Reactor Trip actions for the RCP seal package failure,

After verifying Rx Trip proceed to the next event.

- Trips 3C RCP

- Closes CV-3-303C, CBO Isolation valve CV-303C.

- Closes PCV-3-455A, PZR Spray Valve Loop C STEP 1 BOP:

Verify Turbine Trip STEP 2 BOP:

Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses STEP 3 RCO:

Checks If SI Is Actuated STEP 4 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 23 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 5 - LOSS OF ALL AC 3-EOP-ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by the Lead Evaluator, trigger EVENT 5 LOSS OF ALL AC.

NOTE CT1 Record the time offsite power is lost for Start Time Time Critical Task verification.

NOTE RCO:

Step 1 and Step 2 are IMMEDIATE Verify Reactor Trip ACTION steps STEP 1 BOP:

Verify Turbine Trip STEP 2 RCO:

Check If RCS Is Isolated (NO)

Close Letdown Isolation valves CV-3-200A/B/C STEP 3 BOP:

Verify Proper AFW Flow STEP 4 US:

The Unit Supervisor shall evaluate plant conditions and establish EDG Priority.

Since the 3A Bus is locked out the US determines the 3B EDG is the priority.

STEP 5 BOP:

Try To Restore Power To 3A OR 3B 4KV Bus

Check EDG Priority - 3A (NO)

Go to Step 5.o STEP 5.a NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 24 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 5 - LOSS OF ALL AC 3-EOP-ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Check 3B Bus Lockout Relay - RESET

Check 3B EDG Lockout - RESET

Check 3B EDG - RUNNING

Check 3B 4KV Bus - ENERGIZED (NO)

Go to step 5.t STEP 5.o - 5.r BOP:

Verify 3B 4KV bus stripping using Attachment 2.

STEP 5.t NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 25 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - 3B 4KV BUS STRIPPING RELAY FAILURE 3-EOP-ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER ATTACHMENT 2 TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Step 1 is N/A STEP 1 NOTE BOP:

The BOP will have to manually strip the Verify the following breakers OPEN loads highlighted in red. When all loads

3AB22, 3B 4KV BUS TIE TO 3A OR are stripped, the 3B EDG will energize the 3C 4KV BUS 3B 4KV Bus.

3AB05, STARTUP TRANSFORMER 3B 4KV BUS SUPPLY

3AB02, AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 3B BUS SUPPLY

3AB10, HEATER DRAIN PUMP 3B

3AB21, CONDENSATE PUMP 3B

3AB12, SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 3B

3AB15, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 3B Re-energize 3B 4KV Bus CT1

3AB13, COMPONENT COOLING Following a Loss Of All AC, complete bus WATER PUMP 3B Stop Time stripping and restore power to the 3B 4KV

3AB01, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP bus prior to actuating SI and within 30 3B minutes of the loss of power.

3AB06, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 3C

3AB17, INTAKE COOLING WATER PUMP 3B

3AB11, TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER PUMP 3B

3AB16, CIRCULATING WATER PUMP 3B1

3AB18, CIRCULATING WATER PUMP 3B2

3AB09, 3B LOAD CENTER

3AB14, 3D LOAD CENTER STEP 2 BOP:

Step 3 is N/A STEP 3 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 26 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - 3B 4KV BUS STRIPPING RELAY FAILURE 3-EOP-ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER ATTACHMENT 2 TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Verify 3AD05, INTAKE COOLING WATER PUMP 3C BREAKER, is open.

Verify 3AD04, COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 3C BREAKER, is open STEP 4 BOP:

Notify Unit Supervisor that 3B 4KV Bus stripping is complete.

STEP 5 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 27 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - 3B 4KV BUS STRIPPING RELAY FAILURE 3-EOP-ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE PROCEDURE CAUTION If an SI signal exists OR is actuated during this procedure, it must be reset to ensure restoration of a power source and to ensure controlled loading of equipment on the 4KV bus.

PROCEDURE NOTE If a Sequencer Failure has occurred AND SI has actuated, the associated EDG Output Breaker may NOT close unless SI is reset.

BOP:

Verify SI - RESET

Check 3B 4KV Bus - ENERGIZED

Observe CAUTION and NOTE prior to Step 5.f, and return to Step 5.f STEPs 5.u - 5.w Crew Verify required Safeguards equipment -

OPERATING STEP 5.f LEAD EVALUATOR US:

When the crew returns to 3-EOP-E-0 Check status of 3-EOP-F-0, CRITICAL proceed to the next event. SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES, prior to entering this procedure -

MONITORED FOR INFORMATION ONLY.

(NO)

Implement FRPs as required

Return to procedure and step in effect.

STEP 5.g NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 28 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 7 - SMALL BREAK LOCA 3-EOP-E-0, RX TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by the Lead Evaluator, trigger EVENT 7 - SBLOCA RCO:

Verify Reactor Trip STEP 1 BOP:

Verify Turbine STEP 2 BOP:

Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses STEP 3 NOTE RCO:

CT2 Record the time SI actuates for Time Checks If SI Is Actuated Start Time Critical task verification STEP 4 US:

Reviews Steps 1 - 4 of 3-EOP-E-0 with the crew.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 29 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 7 - SMALL BREAK LOCA 3-EOP-E-0, RX TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE US:

Reviews FOP for 3-EOP-E-0

Adverse Cntmt (Will Be Met)

RCP Trip Criteria (Not Running)

Faulted S/G Isolation

Ruptured S/G Isolation

AFW Sys Operation Criteria

CST Makeup Water Criteria

RHR System Operation Criteria (Starts a Timer)

Loss of Offsite Power or SI on the Other Unit

Loss of Charging Criteria FOLDOUT PAGE NOTE BOP:

The actions of Attachment 3 are listed

Continues with ATTACHMENT 3 to beginning on page 35. complete The Prompt Action Verifications.

STEP 5 RCO:

Check AFW Pumps - AT LEAST TWO RUNNING STEP 6 BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:

If asked to manually align AFW valves,

Verify AFW Valve Alignment -

acknowledge request but take no action. PROPER EMERGENCY If later asked status update, report still ALIGNMENT (NO) working on it.

Manually align Valves STEP 7 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 30 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 7 - SMALL BREAK LOCA 3-EOP-E-0, RX TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Verify Proper AFW Flow:

Check Narrow Range Level in at least one S/G - GREATER THAN 7%[27%]

Maintain feed flow to S/G until Narrow Range Levels between 21%[27%]

and 50%

STEP 8 RCO:

All RCP Thermal Barrier Alarms - CLEAR STEP 9 RCO:

Check RCS Temperatures:

Check RCPs - ANY RUNNING (NO)

Check RCS Cold Leg temperatures stable between 545°F and 547°F or trending down to 547°F (NO)

IF TCOLD is decreasing, THEN perform the following:

Stop dumping steam.

If cooldown continues, and is due to excessive feed flow, then reduce total feed flow to 400 gpm until Narrow Range Level greater than 7%[27%] in at least one S/G.

IF cooldown continues AND is due to excessive steam flow, THEN close Main Steamline isolation and Bypass valves.

STEP 10 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 31 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 7 - SMALL BREAK LOCA 3-EOP-E-0, RX TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Check PRZ PORVs, Spray Valves, And Excess Letdown Isolated:

STEP 11 RCO:

Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

RCPs - ANY RUNNING (NO)

STEP 12 RCO:

Check If S/Gs Are Faulted: (NO)

STEP 13 RCO:

Check If S/G Tubes Are Ruptured:

(NO)

STEP 14 RCO:

If RCS Is Intact (NO)

US:

Perform the following:

Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-0, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES.

INTEGRITY Critical Safety Function Status Tree is RED Go to 3-EOP-FR-P.1, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION STEP 15 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 32 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 7 - SMALL BREAK LOCA 3-EOP-FR-P.1, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE US:

Conducts EOP transition brief.

Directs 3-EOP-FR-P.1 response.

US:

Reviews FOP for 3-EOP-FR-P.1 with the crew.

Containment Adverse (YES)

FOLDOUT PAGE RCO:

Check RCS Pressure - GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [575 PSIG]

Step 1 PROCEDURE CAUTION

Low range flow indication is NOT available when using Main Feedwater instrumentation and an alternate source of feedwater. Changes in RCS temperature and S/G level may be used to control feedwater flow.

If the AFW Pumps are the only available source of feed flow, the steam supply to the AFW Pumps needs to be maintained from at least one S/G.

PROCEDURE NOTE A Faulted S/G is any S/G that is depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner OR is completely depressurized.

RCO:

Check RCS Cold Leg Temperatures decreasing (NO)

Go to Step 3 Step 2 RCO:

Check PRZ PORV Block Valves Step 3 RCO:

Check If PRZ PORVs Should Be Closed Step 4 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 33 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 7 - SMALL BREAK LOCA 3-EOP-FR-P.1, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Check High-Head SI Pumps - ANY RUNNING Step 5 RCO:

Check If SI Can Be Terminated (NO)

Go to Step 23 Step 6 RCO:

Determine If RCS Temperature Soak Is Required (YES)

Step 23 The scenario is terminated after the crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 and determines a soak is required, or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion once all critical tasks have been evaluated.

- - END OF SCENARIO ***

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 34 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 8 - MOV-3-843B HHSI DISCHARGE TO COLD LEG FAILS TO AUTO OPEN 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 - Prompt Action Verifications TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Check Load Centers Associated With Energized 4 KV Buses - ENERGIZED (NO 3A & 3C no power)

STEP 1 BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When requested, trigger LOA - CLOSE Verify Feedwater Isolation:

MOV 1408 & 1409. Wait 3-5 minutes and then report task complete. STEP 2 BOP:

Check If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated STEP 3 BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

If dispatched to verify MOV-3-1426 and Verify Containment Isolation Phase A MOV-3-1427 closed, wait 3 to 5 minutes Valve White Lights On VPB - ALL and then report the valves are closed. BRIGHT (NO)

Manually actuate Containment Isolation Phase A.

Dispatch Operator to verify closed MOV-3-1426, and MOV-3-1427,

MOV-3-6386 (MOV-3-281 closed)

Containment Purge Valves (fuses pulled)

STEP 4 BOP:

Verify Pump Operation:

At least two High-Head SI Pumps -

RUNNING

Both RHR Pumps - RUNNING (NO)

- 3A RHR pump OOS STEP 5 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 35 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 8 - MOV-3-843B HHSI DISCHARGE TO COLD LEG FAILS TO AUTO OPEN 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 - Prompt Action Verifications TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Verify Proper CCW System Operation:

CCW Heat Exchangers - THREE IN SERVICE

CCW Pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING (NO)

- Starts 3C CCW pump

CCW Headers - TIED TOGETHER

MOV-3-626, RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Outlet - OPEN STEP 6 BOP:

Verify Proper ICW System Operation:

Verify ICW Pumps - AT LEAST TWO RUNNING (NO)

- Starts the 3C ICW pump

Verify ICW To TPCW Heat Exchanger

- ISOLATED:

Check ICW Headers - TIED TOGETHER STEP 7 BOP:

Check Emergency Containment Coolers

- ONLY TWO RUNNING STEP 8 BOP:

Verify Unit 3 Containment Purge Exhaust And Supply Fans - OFF STEP 9 BOP:

Verify -Containment Spray NOT Required STEP 10 BOP:

Verify SI - RESET STEP 11 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 36 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 8 - MOV-3-843B HHSI DISCHARGE TO COLD LEG FAILS TO AUTO OPEN 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 - Prompt Action Verifications TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Open MOV-3-843B BOP:

CT2 During a SBLOCA, establish at least one Verify SI Valve Amber Lights On VPB -

Stop Time train of HHSI flow prior to completing ALL BRIGHT (NO) 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 and within 30

Opens MOV-3-843B minutes the HHSI pump starting.

Opens MOV-3-744B

No power to equipment powered by the 3A Bus STEP 12 BOP:

Verify SI Flow:

RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1625 PSIG[1950 PSIG]

High-Head SI Pump flow indicator -

CHECK FOR FLOW STEP 13 BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When requested, trigger LOA - ALIGN Realign SI System:

U-4 HHSIs TO U3 RWST. Wait 5 to 7

Check Procedure Entry Status - E-0 minutes and then report task complete. ENTERED FROM 3-ONOP-047.1, LOSS OF CHARGING FLOW IN MODES 1THROUGH 4 (NO)

Verify Unit 3 High-Head SI Pumps -

TWO RUNNING (NO)

- Stop one Unit 4 High-Head SI Pump and place in standby

Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to align Unit 4 High-Head SI Pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using Attachment 1.

STEP 14 BOP:

Verify Containment Isolation Phase A -

RESET STEP 15 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 37 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 8 - MOV-3-843B HHSI DISCHARGE TO COLD LEG FAILS TO AUTO OPEN 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 - Prompt Action Verifications TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Reestablish RCP Cooling:

Check RCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (NO)

Go to Step 17 STEP 16 BOP:

Verify Control Room Ventilation Isolation:

STEP 17 BOP:

BOOTH OPERATOR Place Hydrogen Monitors In Service When requested, trigger LOA - PLACE Using 3-NOP-094, CONTAINMENT PAHM IN SERVICE. Wait 3 to 5 minutes POST ACCIDENT MONITORING and then report task complete.

SYSTEM STEP 18 BOP:

Verify All Four EDGs - RUNNING STEP 19 BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

If asked to start one train of chilled water,

Verify Power To 3A and 3B acknowledge request. No action required. Emergency 4KV Buses (NO)

- Inform US

Check 3A and 3B 4KV buses energized from offsite power. (NO)

- Start one train of Chilled Water STEP 20 BOP:

Notify Unit Supervisor Of The Following:

Attachment 3 is complete

Any safeguards equipment that is NOT In the required condition

Status of Containment pressure continuous action STEP 21 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 38 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Discussion Points are intentionally NOT included in evaluated scenarios. However, space is available below to document follow-up questions when further information is required to determine an evaluation outcome.

FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS QUESTION #1

________________________________________________________

________________________

ANSWER #1

________________________________________________________

______________________________

QUESTION #2

________________________________________________________

________________________

ANSWER #2

________________________________________________________

______________________________

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 39 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR POST-SCENARIO RESTORATION:

______ 1. Restore per Simulator Operator Checklist.

______ 2. Once exams are complete, restore from SEI-19, Simulator Exam Security.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 40 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 41 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 42 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 43 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 3 RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE) UNIT 4 RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)

PROTECTED TRAIN: B PROTECTED TRAIN: B ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO:

Field Supv.: Outside SNPO:

Admin RCO: ANPO:

Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit Supv.: Unit Supv.:

RCO: RCO:

NPO: NPO:

PLANT STATUS Unit 3 Unit 4 Mode: 1 Mode: 1 Power: 100% Power: 100%

MWe: 842 MWe: 842 Gross Leakrate: .22 gpm Gross Leakrate: 0.03 gpm RCS Boron Conc: 745 ppm RCS Boron Conc: 642 Operational Concerns:

3A RHR pump taken OOS 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago for an oil change, expected back by the end of this shift.

3A1 Circ Water pump OOS. Tripped on over current, Electrical Maintenance is investigating.

U3 Anticipated LCO Actions:

None U4 Anticipated LCO Actions:

None Results of Offgoing Focus Area:

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 44 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION UNIT 3 STATUS REACTOR OPERATOR UNIT RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE) PROTECTED TRAIN: B Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 100% Gross: 0.22 GPM A 6656 MWe 842 Unidentified 0.04 GPM B 6608 Tavg: 580°F Charging Pps: 0.00 GPM C 6646 RCS Pressure: 2235 RCS Boron Conc: 745 ppm Abnormal Annunciators:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Current Tech Spec Action Statements: (Does Not Include For Tracking Only Items T.S.A.S / Component: 3A RHR pump, 3.5.2.c - Action g Reason: Oil Change Entry Date: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 45 of 46

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION REACTOR OPERATOR (CONT'D)

UNIT RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE) PROTECTED TRAIN: B Changes to Risk Significant Equipment:

No recent changes from last shift.

OLRM: GREEN PROTECTED TRAIN: B Upcoming Reactivity Management Activities:

Maintain current power level 99.5% -100%

Xe is stable.

Upcoming Major POD Activities:

NONE Upcoming ECOs to Hang and /or Release:

Hang - None

Release - None Evolutions or Compensatory Actions in Progress:

NONE General Information, Remarks, and Operator Work Around Status:

Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.

U3 supplying Aux Steam

Air In-leakage = 0.0 SCFM NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 46 of 46

EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L-16-1 N5 (Rev-0)

Facility: Turkey Point Nuclear (PTN) - Units Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: 2016-301 3 and 4 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RCO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 60% power (MOL). Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units.

Turnover: The 3A RHR pump and 3A1 Circulating Water pump are OOS.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description TVF1M87D I-BOP FT-3-487 3B S/G Feed Water Flow Transmitter Drifts High 1

I-SRO (TS)

TFCMM2H3 C-RCO R-3-17B CCW Hx Radiation Monitor Fails High &

2 TFKV609O C-SRO RCV-3-609 CCW Surge Tank Vent Fails To Auto Close TAKD032 C-BOP 3A TPCW Pump Cavitation 3

C-SRO TFH1TV60 I-RCO LT-3-460 Pressurizer Level Fails Low 4

I-SRO (TS)

TFC1DOR R-RCO 3A & 3B CRDM Fans Trip (Fast Load Reduction required) 5 TFC1DOR2 R-SRO N-BOP TVHHSGA M-RCO 3A SGTR with LOOP 6 M-BOP M-SRO TFP1S3GC P- BOP Control Room HVAC Fails To Align on SI 7 TFP8D6MT TFP8D6BT TFHV55CO P-RCO PCV-3-445C PZR PORV, Fails To Close During E-3 8

Depressurization

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 1 of 4

EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L-16-1 N5 (Rev-0)

Scenario #5 Event 1 Shortly after the crew takes the shift FT-3-487 3B S/G Feed Water Flow transmitter drifts high. The BOP will take manual control of 3B S/G level and restore level to normal. The crew may use the ARP or 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection, to select operable channels and restore 3B S/G level control to automatic. The US will enter 3-ONOP-049.1 to verify all required actions are complete and to determine which bistables need to be tripped.

Event 2 After the actions of Event 1 are complete CCW Surge Tank Radiation Monitor R-17B fails high. CCW surge tank vent valve RCV-3-609 fails to close on the high radiation signal. The US will enter 3-ONOP-067, Radioactive Effluent Release, to verify the failure and direct the RCO to manually close the valve.

Event 3 After the actions of Event 2 are complete the crew will respond to a TPCW low pressure alarm. The BOP will report signs of cavitation and swap TPCW pumps. The US may enter 3-ONOP-008, Turbine Plant Cooling Water Malfunction to verify all required actions are complete.

Event 4 After the crew swaps TPCW pumps Pressurizer Level transmitter LT-3-460 will fail low. The PZR Heaters will trip and letdown will isolate. The US will enter 3-ONOP-041.6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction.

The RCO will select an operable channel, re-establish normal letdown flow, and restore PZR heaters to automatic. The US will also enter 3-ONOP-049.1 to verify all required actions are complete and to determine which bistables need to be tripped.

Event 5 After the actions of Event 4 are complete the 3A CRDM Fan Trips and a few minutes later the 3B CRDM Fan Trips. The crew will commence a shutdown using 3-GOP-100, Fast Load Reduction.

Event 6 After a 5 to 10% downpower a SGTR develops over a 5 minute period on the 3A S/G. The crew will take actions to maximize Charging and to isolate Letdown. When the leakage exceeds the CVCS capacity, the US will order the RCO to trip the Reactor and enter to 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection.

When the Generator trips a Loss Of Offsite Power occurs. Both Emergency Diesel Generators will start and energize their respective 4KV buses. When the Ruptured S/G Isolation Criteria are met the BOP or RCO will isolate Aux Feed Water flow to the 3A S/G.

Event 7 When SI actuates Control Room Ventilation fails to align for recirc. The BOP will manually open Emergency Inlet Dampers D-2 and D-3 per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verifications.

EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 2 of 4

EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L-16-1 N5 (Rev-0)

Event 8 The crew will transition from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. The crew will isolate the 3A S/G, cooldown the RCS, Establish Charging Flow, and stop the RHR pumps. When the cooldown is complete the RCO will open PZR PORV PCV-3-455C to depressurize the RCS (PCV-3-456 is failed close). When the depressurization is complete PCV-3-455C will fail to close so the RCO will close block valve MOV-3-536 to stop the depressurization.

The scenario is terminated after the crew completes the depressurization per 3-EOP-E-3, or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion once all critical task have been evaluated.

Event Scenario Critical Tasks 6 CT1 Isolate the Ruptured S/G During a Steam Generator Tube Rupture, isolate the ruptured S/G before a the ruptured Steam Generator pressure drops below 450 psig to prevent transition to 3-EOP-ECA-3.1, SGTR With Loss Of Reactor Coolant-Subcooled Recovery Desired.

Safety Significance: Isolation of the ruptured steam generator minimizes release of radioactivity from this generator. In addition, isolation is necessary to establish a pressure differential between the ruptured and non-ruptured steam generators in order to cool the RCS and stop primary-to secondary leakage. If any ruptured S/G cannot be isolated from at least one intact S/G, the operator is directed to go to 3-ECA-3.1, SGTR With Loss Of Reactor Coolant -Subcooled Recovery Desired.

6 CT2 Control Initial RCS Cooldown During a Steam Generator Tube Rupture dump steam from intact S/Gs at maximum rate to achieve Core Exit TCs less than required temperatures based on the lowest ruptured S/G pressure without causing a transition to 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, or 3-EOP-ECA-3.1, SGTR With Loss Of Reactor Coolant-Subcooled Recovery Desired.

Safety Significance: A SGTR mitigation strategy leading to a transition from 3-EOP-E-3 to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance requiring the crew to take additional compensatory actions that complicate the event mitigation strategy. With a SGTR, there exists a breach of the RCS fission-product and Containment barriers which allows radioactive RCS inventory to leak into the SG and associated piping. Without controlling the cooldown, the primary-to-secondary leakage is not stopped. This continued leakage results in a larger release of radioactivity to the environment affecting the safety of the public.

EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 3 of 4

EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L-16-1 N5 (Rev-0)

Event Scenario Critical Tasks 6 CT3 Limit RHR Time On Recirculation When a RHR Pump starts and is operating at shutoff head, limit the operating time at shutoff head with minimum flow recirculation to no more than 44 minutes.

(0-ADM-232, Time Critical Operator Action Program-Attachment 1)

Safety Significance: Failure to secure the RHR Pumps operating at shutoff head leads to pump overheating and adverse vibration which would constitutes incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent a degradation of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity.

6 CT4 Control Initial RCS Depressurization During a Steam Generator Tube Rupture depressurize the RCS to the ruptured S/G pressure without causing a transition to 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, or 3-EOP-ECA-3.1, SGTR With Loss Of Reactor Coolant-Subcooled Recovery Desired.

Safety Significance: A SGTR mitigation strategy leading to a transition from 3-EOP-E-3 to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance requiring the crew to take additional compensatory actions that complicate the event mitigation strategy. With a SGTR, there exists a breach of the RCS fission-product and Containment barriers which allows radioactive RCS inventory to leak into the SG and associated piping. Without controlling the cooldown, the primary-to-secondary leakage is not stopped. This continued leakage results in a larger release of radioactivity to the environment affecting the safety of the public.

EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 4 of 4

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Site: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 (PTN)

Title:

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 LMS #: NRC 25 LMS Rev Date: 6/9/16 Rev #: 0 SEG Type: Training Evaluation Program: LOCT LOIT Other Duration: 120 minutes Developed by: Brian Clark 8/4/16 Instructor/Developer Date Reviewed by: Luis Sagion 8/4/16 Instructor (Instructional Review) Date Validated by : Sean Bloom 8/5/16 SME (Technical Review) Date Approved by: Mark Wilson 8/5/16 Training Supervision Date Approved by: Sean Bloom 8/5/16 Training Program Owner (Line) Date NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SCENARIO REFERENCES DOC NO. TITLE REV 3-EOP-E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION 12 3-EOP-E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 9 3-ONOP-028 REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION 4A 3-ONOP-041.5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL MALFUNCTION 1 3-ONOP-049.1 DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR 4 3-ONOP-059.8 POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION MALFUNCTION 4 3-ONOP-071.2 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE 11 3-OSP-059.10 DETERMINATION OF QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO 2A PTN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 300 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 2 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REQUIREMENTS Terminal Given this simulator scenario and resources normally found in the Control Room, the Objective operating crew will perform Control Room operations IAW approved plant procedures in order to maintain the integrity of the plant and the health and safety of the public.

Enabling Given this simulator scenario and resources normally found in the Control Room, Objectives: operate in accordance with approved plant procedures, Operations Department Instructions, and management expectations:

1. (ALL) Demonstrate personnel SAFETY awareness in interactions with plant staff and outside agencies.

2. (ALL) Demonstrate ALARA awareness in interactions with plant staff and outside agencies.

3. (ALL) Exchange correct information using 3-point communication/Repeat-backs with Control Room personnel and other plant staff.

4. (ALL) Inform plant personnel and System of plant conditions, as needed.

5. (US) Employ timely and concise crew briefs where appropriate.

6. (ALL) Maintain awareness of plant status and control board indication.

7. (ALL) Correctly diagnose plant situations.

8. (ALL) Solve operational problems as they arise.

9. (RCO/BOP) Manipulate plant controls properly and safely.

10. (ALL) Demonstrate self-checking using STAR and peer checks(when required)

11. (US) Demonstrate command and control of the crew.

12. (US) Coordinate the input of crew members and other plant staff.

13. (US) Utilize the input of crew members and other plant staff.

14. (ALL) Demonstrate conservative decision making.

15. (ALL) Demonstrate teamwork.

16. (ALL) Respond to plant events using procedural guidance (OPs/ONOPs/EOPs) as applicable in accordance with rules of usage.

17. (RCO/BOP) Implement any applicable procedural immediate operator actions without use of references.

18. (SRO) Maintain compliance with Tech Specs.

19. (ALL) Identify/enter applicable Tech Spec action statements.

20. (ALL) Respond to annunciators using ARPs (time permitting).

21. (ALL) Maintain written communication, logs, and documentation as needed to permit post-event reconstruction.

Continued on next page NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 3 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REQUIREMENTS While addressing the following events:

1. FT-3-487 3B S/G Feed Water Flow Transmitter Drifts High

2. R-3-17B CCW Hx Radiation Monitor Fails High

3. 3A TPCW Pump Cavitation

4. LT-3-460 Pressurizer Level Fails Low

5. 3A & 3B CRDM Fans Trip

6. 3A SGTR with LOOP

7. Control Room HVAC Fails To Align on SI

8. PCV-3-445C PZR PORV, Fails To Close During E-3 Depressurization Prerequisites: None Training PTN Unit 3 Plant Simulator Resources:

Development

TR-AA-220-1003, Initial NRC and Audit Exam Process

References:

TR-AA-230-1003, SAT Development

TR-AA-230-1007, Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation

0-ADM-232, Time Critical Action Program

OP-AA-100-1000, Conduct Of Operations

OP-AA-103-1000, Reactivity Management

0-ADM-200, Operations Management Manual

0-ADM-211, Emergency and Off-Normal Operating Procedure Usage

WCAP-17711-NP, Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group Westinghouse Emergency Response Guideline Revision 2-Based Critical Tasks Protected N/A Content:

Evaluation Performance Mode Method:

Operating None Experience:

Risk Limit RHR Time On Recirculation Significant When a RHR Pump starts and is operating at shutoff head, limit the operating time at Operator shutoff head with minimum flow recirculation to no more than 44 minutes.

Actions:

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 4 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SRO TASK # TASK TITLE 02008001300 RESPOND TO TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER (TPCW) MALFUNCTIONS 02028033500 AUTHORIZE UNIT TRIP 02041029300 EVALUATE AND RESPOND TO A LOW PRESSURIZER PRESSURE 02041057300 RESPOND TO PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL MALFUNCTION 02067009300 RESPOND TO PROCESS RADIATION MONITOR ALARM(S) 02089026300 AUTHORIZE FAST LOAD REDUCTION 02200001500 RESPOND TO UNIT TRIP 02200006300 INVESTIGATE AND CONTROL STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 02200008500 RESPOND TO A STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 02200022500 DIAGNOSE CAUSE OF SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION 02200046500 RESPOND TO STEAM GENERATOR LOW LEVEL RO TASK TASK TITLE 01008001300 RESPOND TO TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTION 01041029300 EVALUATE AND RESPOND TO A LOW PRESSURIZER PRESSURE 01041057300 RESPOND TO PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL MALFUNCTION 01067009300 RESPOND TO PROCESS RADIATION MONITOR ALARM(S) 01089026300 RESPOND TO / ADJUST TURBINE DURING FAST LOAD REDUCTION 01200001500 RESPOND TO UNIT TRIP 01200006300 INVESTIGATE AND CONTROL STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 01200008500 RESPOND TO A STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 01200022500 DIAGNOSE CAUSE OF SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION 01200046500 RESPOND TO STEAM GENERATOR LOW LEVEL NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 5 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION UPDATE LOG:

Place this form with the working copies of lesson plans and/or other materials to document changes made between formal revisions. For fleet-wide training materials, keep electronic file NOTES:

of this form in same folder as approved materials. Refer to TR-AA-230-1003 SAT Development for specific directions regarding how and when this form shall be used.

Indicate in the following table any minor changes or major revisions (as defined in TR-AA-230-1003) made to the material after initial approval. Or use separate Update Log form TR-AA-230-1003-F16.

DESCRIPTION OF PREPARER DATE

REASON FOR CHANGE AR/TWR#

CHANGE REVIEWER DATE Revised for L-16-1 NRC Note 5 Note 5 0-0 Initial Revision 2108338 Exam Note 5 Note 5

1. Individual updating lesson plan or training material shall complete the appropriate blocks on the Update Log.

2. Describe the change to the lesson plan or training materials.

3. State the reason for the change (e.g., reference has changed, typographical error, etc.)

4. Preparer enters name/date on the Update Log and obtains Training Supervisor approval.

5. Initial dates and site approval on cover page.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 6 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 60% power (MOL). Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units.

Equipment OOS

The 3A RHR pump and 3A1 Circulating Water pump are OOS.

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Event 1 Shortly after the crew takes the shift, FT-3-487, 3B S/G Feed Water Flow transmitter, drifts high. The BOP will take manual control of 3B S/G level and restore level to normal. The crew may use the ARP or 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection, to select operable channels and restore 3B S/G level control to automatic. The US will enter 3-ONOP-049.1 to verify all required actions are complete and to determine which bistables need to be tripped.

Event 2 After the actions of Event 1 are complete, CCW Surge Tank Radiation Monitor, R-17B, fails high. CCW surge tank vent valve, RCV-3-609, fails to close on the high radiation signal. The US will enter 3-ONOP-067, Radioactive Effluent Release, to verify the failure and direct the RCO to manually close the valve.

Event 3 After the actions of Event 2 are complete, the crew will respond to a TPCW low pressure alarm. The BOP will report signs of cavitation and swap TPCW pumps. The US may enter 3-ONOP-008, Turbine Plant Cooling Water Malfunction, to verify all required actions are complete.

Event 4 After the crew swaps TPCW pumps, Pressurizer Level transmitter, LT-3-460, will fail low. The PZR Heaters will trip and letdown will isolate. The US will enter 3-ONOP-041.6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction. The RCO will select an operable channel, re-establish normal letdown flow, and restore PZR heaters to automatic. The US will also enter 3-ONOP-049.1 to verify all required actions are complete and to determine which bistables need to be tripped.

Event 5 After the actions of Event 4 are complete, the 3A CRDM Fan Trips. A few minutes later the 3B CRDM Fan Trips. The crew will commence a shutdown using 3-GOP-100, Fast Load Reduction.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 7 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Event 6 After a 5 to 10% downpower, a SGTL develops over a 5 minute period on the 3A S/G. The crew will take actions to maximize Charging and to isolate Letdown in accordance with 3-ONOP-071.2. When the leakage exceeds the CVCS capacity, the US will order the RCO to trip the Reactor and enter to 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection. When the Generator trips a Loss Of Offsite Power occurs. Both Emergency Diesel Generators will start and energize their respective 4KV buses. When the Ruptured S/G Isolation Criteria are met, the BOP or RCO will isolate Aux Feed Water flow to the 3A S/G.

Event 7 When SI actuates, Control Room Ventilation fails to align for recirc. The BOP will manually open Emergency Inlet Dampers D-2 and D-3 per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verifications.

Event 8 The crew will transition from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. The crew will isolate the 3A S/G, cooldown the RCS, Establish Charging Flow, and stop the RHR pumps. When the cooldown is complete the RCO will open PZR PORV, PCV-3-455C, to depressurize the RCS (PCV 456 is failed close). When the depressurization is complete, PCV-3-455C will fail to close so the RCO will close block valve MOV-3-536 to stop the depressurization.

The scenario is terminated after the crew completes the depressurization per 3-EOP-E-3, or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion, once all critical tasks have been evaluated.

Event CRITICAL TASKS 6 CT1 Isolate the Ruptured S/G During a Steam Generator Tube Rupture, isolate the ruptured S/G before a the ruptured Steam Generator pressure drops below 450 psig to prevent transition to 3-EOP-ECA-3.1, SGTR With Loss Of Reactor Coolant-Subcooled Recovery Desired.

Safety Significance: Isolation of the ruptured steam generator minimizes release of radioactivity from this generator. In addition, isolation is necessary to establish a pressure differential between the ruptured and non-ruptured steam generators in order to cool the RCS and stop primary-to secondary leakage. If any ruptured S/G cannot be isolated from at least one intact S/G, the operator is directed to go to 3-ECA-3.1, SGTR With Loss Of Reactor Coolant -Subcooled Recovery Desired.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 8 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Event CRITICAL TASKS 6 CT2 Control Initial RCS Cooldown During a Steam Generator Tube Rupture, dump steam from intact S/Gs at maximum rate to achieve Core Exit TCs less than required temperatures based on the lowest ruptured S/G pressure without causing a transition to 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, or 3-EOP-ECA-3.1, SGTR With Loss Of Reactor Coolant-Subcooled Recovery Desired.

Safety Significance: A SGTR mitigation strategy leading to a transition from 3-EOP-E-3 to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance requiring the crew to take additional compensatory actions that complicate the event mitigation strategy. With a SGTR, there exists a breach of the RCS fission-product and Containment barriers which allows radioactive RCS inventory to leak into the SG and associated piping. Without controlling the cooldown, the primary-to-secondary leakage is not stopped. This continued leakage results in a larger release of radioactivity to the environment affecting the safety of the public.

6 CT3 Limit RHR Time On Recirculation When a RHR Pump starts and is operating at shutoff head, limit the operating time at shutoff head with minimum flow recirculation to no more than 44 minutes.

(0-ADM-232, Time Critical Operator Action Program-Attachment 1)

Safety Significance: Failure to secure the RHR Pumps operating at shutoff head leads to pump overheating and adverse vibration which would constitutes incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent a degradation of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity.

8 CT4 Control Initial RCS Depressurization During a Steam Generator Tube Rupture, depressurize the RCS to the ruptured S/G pressure without causing a transition to 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, or 3-EOP-ECA-3.1, SGTR With Loss Of Reactor Coolant-Subcooled Recovery Desired.

Safety Significance: A SGTR mitigation strategy leading to a transition from 3-EOP-E-3 to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance requiring the crew to take additional compensatory actions that complicate the event mitigation strategy. With a SGTR, there exists a breach of the RCS fission-product and Containment barriers which allows radioactive RCS inventory to leak into the SG and associated piping. Without controlling the cooldown, the primary-to-secondary leakage is not stopped. This continued leakage results in a larger release of radioactivity to the environment affecting the safety of the public.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 9 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Event # Description

1. FT-3-487 3B S/G Feed Water Flow Transmitter Drifts High

2. R-3-17B CCW Hx Radiation Monitor Fails High

3. 3A TPCW Pump Cavitation

4. LT-3-460 Pressurizer Level Fails Low

5. 3A & 3B CRDM Fans Trip

6. 3A SGTR with LOOP

7. Control Room HVAC Fails To Align on SI

8. PCV-3-445C PZR PORV, Fails To Close During E-3 Depressurization NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 10 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR SET UP INSTRUCTIONS Check Action

____ Restore IC-24 (60% MOL) or equivalent IC.

____ Place the Simulator in RUN.

____ Stop the 3A1 Circ Water Pump

____ Open & execute lesson file L-16-1 N5 Ensure the following lesson steps are triggered:

SETUP - 3A RHR PUMP OOS

SETUP - 3A1 CWP OOS

SETUP EVENT 2 - RCV-609 FAILED OPEN

SETUP EVENT 7 - CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION FANS FAIL TO START

____

SETUP EVENT 8 - PORV 456 FAILED CLOSE

Place the 3A RHR pump in PTL and hang an ECO tag.

____

Place the 3A1 CWP in STOP and hang an ECO tag.

____ Verify the trend for 3A1 Screen on the TWS DP Recorder is clear.

____ Ensure Rod Group Step Counters have completed stepping out.

____ Allow the plant to stabilize.

____ Acknowledge any alarms and freeze Simulator.

____ Ensure B train is protected train on VPA.

____ Perform the SIMULATOR OPERATOR CHECKLIST or equivalent.

____ Place TURNOVER SHEETS on ROs desk or give to the Lead Evaluator.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 11 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION BRIEFINGS

Shift turnover information is attached to the back of this guide.

Ensure all applicants are prior briefed on Appendix E of NUREG 1021, Policies and Guidelines For Taking NRC Examinations.

Conduct a Crew Pre-brief to cover turnover information. Shift turnover information is attached to the back of this guide.

US:

RCO:

BOP:

SCENARIO NOTE 0-ADM-211 Prudent Operator Actions - If redundant stand-by equipment is available and ready, the operator is permitted to start the redundant equipment for failed or failing operating equipment.

Immediate follow up of applicable ARPs and ONOPs (AOPs) shall occur as required.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 12 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Critical Tasks are highlighted in Simulator Operator Actions Operator Verifiable Actions are pink. are highlighted in blue. Highlighted in green EVENT 1 - FT-3-487 3B S/G FEED WATER FLOW TRANSMITTER DRIFTS HIGH 3-ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE NOTE Ensure the Simulator is in RUN before the crew enters the Simulator.

US:

Conducts shift turnover.

BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When directed by Lead Evaluator,

Recognizes and reports FT-3-487 trigger EVENT 1 - FT-3-487 DRIFTS failure.

HIGH PROMPT ACTIONS

Takes manual control of 3B S/G level control valve, FCV-3-488.

Restores 3B S/G level to normal.

RCO:

Addresses Alarm Response for C4/2 & C6/2

CHECK LI-3-486 or LI-3-488, B STM GEN LEVEL, controlling channel for SG Level deviation.

CHECK Feedwater Controllers, FIC 488A or FIC-3-488B, for indications of failure, alarm, or input signal failures.

CHECK Feedwater Controller Inputs

IF alarm is due to instrument failure, THEN REFER TO 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels.

US:

Enters and directs actions of 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, for response.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 13 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 1 - FT-3-487 3B S/G FEED WATER FLOW TRANSMITTER DRIFTS HIGH 3-ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE NOTE BOP:

The crew may use the ARP to select an

Verify FT-3-487 failure by channel check operable channel and restore automatic comparison.

level control.

Verify no off-normal conditions exist on FT-3-486.

Place 3B S/G Feed Water Flow Control Transfer Switch to FT-3-486 (Yellow)

Place 3B S/G Steam Flow Control Transfer Switch to FT-3-485 (Yellow)

Ensure 3B S/G level is returned to auto.

Steps 5.1 - 5.4 BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

WCC/I&C: Acknowledge the report. I&C Notifies WCC to initiate PWO and I&C for would like to be present when bistables troubleshooting.

are tripped. They will be in the control in one hour.

If asked to locally check FT-3-487, wait 2 to 3 minutes and then report nothing visibility wrong.

BOOTH OPERATOR US:

If dispatched to reset AMSAC, wait 2 to 3 Reviews Tech Specs minutes and then trigger EVENT 1 -

LCO 3.3.1 Functional Unit 12 RESET AMSAC - Action 6 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months trip bi-stables Step 5.5 - 5.6 LEAD EVALUATOR US:

After S/G level control is restored to auto Conducts crew brief.

and the US has reviewed Tech Specs, at the Lead Evaluators discretion, direct the Booth Operator to trigger the next event.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 14 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - R-3-17B CCW HX RADIATION MONITOR FAILS HIGH 3-ONOP-067, RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, trigger EVENT 2 - R-17B FAILS HIGH BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When the RCO closes RCV-3-609, verify Reviews ARP for H1/4 EVENT 2 - ALLOW RCV-609 TO CLOSE

IF alarm is on R-17A/B, then REFER MANUALLY triggers. to 3-ONOP-067, Radioactive Effluent Release, for expected automatic actions.

CHECK alarm valid as follows:

- CHECK FAIL/TEST light NOT LIT.

- PUSH FAIL/TEST light (meter reading of 288 or 289K)

- PUSH SOURCE CHECK light (should get meter increase).

- PUSH HIGH ALARM light to determine if meter level is above high alarm setpoint US:

Enter and direct the actions of 3-ONOP-067, Radioactive Effluent Release US:

Review the Foldout Page

Notify plant personnel

IF a Reactor Trip occurs AND any following PRMS alarms Actuate, THEN within 30 minutes of the alarm, manually align Control Room ventilation in the Emergency Recirculation Mode R-15/19/20

IF any PRMS high alarm occurs AND automatic actions are required, THEN verify the applicable automatic actions for the occurring PRMS HIGH ALARMS:

- R-17A/B HIGH ALARM, RCV 609, CCW Head Tank Vent Valve

- CLOSED NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 15 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - R-3-17B CCW HX RADIATION MONITOR FAILS HIGH 3-ONOP-067, RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Closes RCV-3-609, CCW Head Tank Vent Valve, per fold out page.

BOP:

Check High Alarm On R-17B STEP 1 NOTE BOP:

Parts of this step may have been

Check R17B readout GREATER completed using the ARP. THAN OR EQUAL TO ALARM SETPOINT

Check channel operability as follows

- Depress and hold FAIL/TEST pushbutton on affected PRMS Channel

- Check readout - EQUAL TO 288K OR 289K

- Release FAIL/TEST pushbutton

Check affected PRMS drawer responds to source check

Check for PRMS channel failure

- Check Fail indicator - OFF

- Display and recorder reading -

NOT FAILED LOW STEP 2 BOOTH OPERATOR US:

Acknowledge reports to SM, RP and

Notify the Shift Manager of problem Chemistry. If asked to survey or sample with R-17B.

CCW for elevated radiation, wait 3 to 5

Direct Radiation Protection Shift minutes and then report all radiation Supervisor to conduct radiological levels are normal. surveys to confirm validity of alarm.

Direct Chemistry to perform sampling to confirm validity of alarm.

STEP 2 RNO NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 16 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - R-3-17B CCW HX RADIATION MONITOR FAILS HIGH 3-ONOP-067, RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE NOTE BOP:

The US may discontinue use of Check R-17A and R-17B High Alarms -

3-ONOP-067 once its determined that an OFF (NO) actual high radiation condition does not

Go to Step 29 exist.

STEP 3 RCO:

Check CCW System For High Activity

Announce the high radiation alarm on page system and warn personnel to remain clear of all CCW piping

Verify RCV-3-609, CCW Head Tank vent Valve - CLOSED

Direct Chemistry Department to sample CCW System to determine its activity level

Route any known CCW system leakage to the WHUT floor drain STEP 29 Crew:

Check Normal CCW Temperatures And Flows Out Of RCP Thermal Barriers

Check Normal CCW Temperature And Flow Out Of NRHX

Check Normal CCW Temperature And Flow Out Of Seal Water Heat Exchanger

Check Normal CCW Temperature And Flow Out Of In-Service Spent Fuel Pit HXs

Check Normal CCW Temperature And Flow Out Of Excess Letdown HX

Check 3A RHR Pump AND 3A RHR Heat Exchanger - IN SERVICE (NO)

- Go to step 37 STEP 30 - 35 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 17 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 2 - R-3-17B CCW HX RADIATION MONITOR FAILS HIGH 3-ONOP-067, RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE LEAD EVALUATOR RCO:

Once the crew has verified the operability Check 3B RHR Pump AND 3B RHR Heat of the R-17B, go to the next event at your Exchanger - IN SERVICE (NO) discretion.

Go to step 39 STEP 37 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 18 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 3 - 3A TPCW PUMP CAVITATION 3-ONOP-008, TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, trigger EVENT 3 - 3A TPCW PUMP CAVITATION.

BOP:

Reports 3A TPCW amps and TPCW pressure fluctuating.

BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:

If dispatched to check the 3A TPCW Reviews ARP I5/4 while its running, wait 2 to 3 minutes and

Use DCS to check TPCW then report it sounds like its cavitating. If Temperature the 3A TPCW pump is stopped when you arrive, report it looks okay.

IF TPCW header low pressure condition exists:

- START standby TPCW pump If asked to check out the 3B TPCW for a start, report it is ready to start. Once the - MONITOR pump amp indication pump is running, report SAT start. on 3C04.

- Locally CHECK for system leakage, including TPCW If WCC or maintenance is contacted Supplemental Cooling Chiller(s) acknowledge request for additional support.

REFER TO 3-ONOP-008, Turbine Plant Cooling Water Malfunction.

LEAD EVALUATOR BOP:

Once the TPCW pumps are swapped,

Starts 3B TPCW pump move to the next event at your discretion.

Stops 3A TPCW pump NOTE US:

The US may choose not to enter Enter and direct the actions of 3-ONOP-008 if the TPCW pumps are 3-ONOP-008.

swapped per the ARP.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 19 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 3 - 3A TPCW PUMP CAVITATION 3-ONOP-008, TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

If dispatched to check TPCW equipment,

Check All Turbine Plant Cooling report all system parameters to be Water Pump Alarms - OFF normal. If asked for specific values, use

Verify Turbine Plant Cooling Water the simulator drawing or DCS to report Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING actual value.

Check Turbine Plant Cooling Water Header Pressure I5/4, TPCW HI TEMP/LO PRESS NOT LIT

Check Proper Intake Cooling Water Lineup To Turbine Plant Cooling Water Heat Exchangers

Check For Abnormal Surge Tank Level (NO)

- Go to Step 12 STEPs 1-5 BOP:

Check Cooling To Turbine Plant Cooling Water Heat Exchangers

Locally Verify Turbine Plant Cooling Water Basket Strainer P - LESS THAN 1.5 PSID

Check GEN RTD HI-HI TEMP - OFF

Check Generator Alarms - OFF

Check Pump Alarms - OFF

Check Proper Turbine Plant Cooling Water System Operation

Check Temperature Of Components Supplied By Turbine Plant Cooling Water - STABLE OR DECREASING

Go To Appropriate Plant Procedure As Determined By Shift Manager STEPs 12-17 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 20 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 4 - LT-3-460 PRESSURIZER LEVEL FAILS LOW 3-ONOP-041.6, PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL MALFUNCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:

When directed by the Lead evaluator, Reports LT-3-460 failed low trigger EVENT 4 - LT-3-460 FAILS LOW NOTE BOP:

Failure of LT-3-460 will cause Letdown to

Acknowledges A8/4, A9/4 isolate and PZR Heaters to de-energize.

CHECK LI-459A/460/461 less than or equal to 6%.

Check LCV-3-460, and CV 200A/B/C closed.

CHECK Control and Backup heaters OFF

Recommends entry into 3-ONOP-041.6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction.

US:

Directs 3-ONOP-041.6 response.

PROCEDURE NOTE

If Pressurizer Level Malfunction is a result of a failure of the 3-459CX or 3-460CX relays (as indicated by a loss of letdown flow with a loss of Pressurizer Heaters with no concurrent failure of Level Transmitters 3-459A, 3-460, 3-461), use 3-ONOP-003.6 Attachment 4, for 3-460CX failure, OR 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment 4, for 3-459CX failure as guidance for establishing Letdown flow and Pressurizer Heaters.

If the button on relays 3-459CX or 3-460CX are used to restore Letdown flow and Pressurizer Heaters, comply with Tech Spec Action Statement 3.4.3 Action b.

If the manual control of Heaters from the Electrical Penetration Room is used, comply with Tech Spec Action Statement 3.4.3 Action a.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 21 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 4 - LT-3-460 PRESSURIZER LEVEL FAILS LOW 3-ONOP-041.6, PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL MALFUNCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Check Pressurizer level indicators LI-3-459A, LI-3-460 AND LI-3-461

Selects ch 1 & 3 PZR level control (Position 2)

Maintains PZR level on program per 3-ONOP-041.6, Enclosure 1

May place Master Charging Pump Controller, LC-3-459G, in manual

May Start or Stop one charging pump as required.

Place LR-3-459 Channel Select Pressurizer Level Recorder to position 1 or 3.

Steps 5.1 - 5.4 NOTE RCO:

This failure may cause VCT Auto Restore Letdown Flow Makeup.

Place LC-3-459G, Pzr Lvl Inst Man/Auto Station, in Manual AND adjust charging flow as required for increased letdown flow.

Throttle Low Pressure LTDN Controller, PCV-3-145, as necessary to prevent LTDN relief valve from lifting.

Manually control Low Pressure Letdown Control Valve, PCV-3-145, to limit pressure spike.

Open High Pressure L/D Isol Vlv from Loop B Cold Leg, LCV-3-460.

Open L/D Isolation Valves, CV-3-200 A, B, or C as required to restore pressurizer level to programmed level.

Return Lower Pressure Letdown Control Valve, PCV-3-145, to Automatic.

STEP 5.5 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 22 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 4 - LT-3-460 PRESSURIZER LEVEL FAILS LOW 3-ONOP-041.6, PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL MALFUNCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

N/A STEP 5.6 RCO:

Restore PRZ heaters to automatic operation or take manual control.

Maintain pressurizer level to be consistent with programmed level as indicated in Enclosure 1.

WHEN desired, THEN place LC 459G in Automatic.

STEPs 5.7 - 5.8 US:

Perform actions required by 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels.

Step 5.9 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 23 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 4 - LT-3-460 PRESSURIZER LEVEL FAILS LOW 3-ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION CHANNELS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTEs EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE US:

Enters and directs actions of 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, for response BOP:

Verify LT-3-460 failure by comparison with LT-3-459/461 and known plant parameters and conditions

Verify no off-normal conditions exist on LT-3-459/461

Verify ch 1 & 3 PZR level control in (Position 2)

Verify LR-3-459 Channel Selected to Pressurizer Level Recorder to position 1 or 3

Verify PZR level control function is returned to automatic.

Steps 5.1 - 5.5 BOOTH OPERATOR US If asked, I&C would like to be present Reviews TECH Specs when bi-stables are tripped. They will be

Tech Spec 3.3.-1 Functional Unit 9 in the control room in one hour. not met.

- Action 13, inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

BOOTH OPERATOR US WCC/I&C: Acknowledge the report. If

Notifies WCC to initiate PWO and I&C asked, I&C would like to be present when for troubleshooting.

bi-stables are tripped. They will be in the

Notifies Plant Management IAW 0-control room in one hour. ADM-115.

LEAD EVALUATOR US:

After the PZR level control is restored to

Conducts crew brief.

auto and the US completes a review of Tech Specs, proceed to the next event at the Lead Evaluators discretion NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 24 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 5 - 3A & 3B CRDM FANS TRIP 3-GOP-100, FAST LOAD REDUCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by the Lead evaluator, trigger EVENT 5 - CRDM FANS TRIP NOTE BOP:

nd The 2 fan trips 60 seconds after the first Reviews ARP I8/5 fan.

CHECK indicating lights to determine affected CRDM Cooler on VPB.

BOOTH OPERATOR

TAKE affected CRDM Cooler control If dispatched to check CRMD fan switch to OFF.

breakers, wait 2 to 3 minutes and report

ENSURE remaining CRDM Cooler in breakers tripped. If asked to reset them, service.

report they will not reset.

IF neither fan will start, THEN PERFORM the following commence shutdown using 3-GOP-100, Fast Load Reduction.

US:

Directs actions to reduce Rx power NOTE per 3-GOP-100.

Attachment 3 is available on Page 49.

Completes Attachment 3 Attachment 4 is available on Page 50.

Brief the crew per Attachment 4 Steps 1-2 US:

Reviews Foldout page with crew.

3-EOP-E-0 Transition Criteria

Notify Chemistry Department

Boration Stop Criteria

Restore Blender to AUTO FOLDOUT PAGE NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 25 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 5 - 3A & 3B CRDM FANS TRIP 3-GOP-100, FAST LOAD REDUCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

Acknowledge notifications. Notify The Following Of Fast Load Reduction

System Dispatcher

Plant personnel using the Page Boost

Chemistry to start RCS sampling is required according to Tech Spec Table 4.4-4.

Step 3 RCO:

Begin Boration For Initial Tavg Effect

Set the Boric Acid Totalizer to total boric acid volume value determined on Attachment 3.

Place the Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to BORATE.

Place the RCS Makeup Control Switch to START.

Adjust FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller, to achieve 40 gpm boric acid flow as indicated on FR-3-113.

WHEN Tavg begins to lower from the boration, THEN adjust FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller, to load reduction value from Attachment 3.

Step 4 US:

Determine Turbine Load Reduction in MW CNTRL Step 5 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 26 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 5 - 3A & 3B CRDM FANS TRIP 3-GOP-100, FAST LOAD REDUCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Initiate Turbine Load Reduction in MW CNTRL

Select MW CNTRL

Set TARGET power level - MW VALUE from Attachment 3

Set RAMP RATE - MW/M VALUE FROM Attachment 3.

Check Tavg has lowered 1° to 2°F from the initial value prior to boration.

Depress GO

Ensure FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller, has been adjusted to the load reduction boration rate.

Go to Step 10 Step 6 BOP:

Monitor Load Reduction

Adjusts power reduction rate to maintain Tavg/Tref within limits of Attachment 3.

Monitors S/G level control to ensure feed reg valves properly maintain level control in automatic.

NOTE

Refer to Enclosure 1 for expected Enclosure 1 is available on Page 51. alarms.

Step 10 BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:

Respond as SNPO. If asked, idle

Maintain pressurizer level to ensure Charging Pump ready for start. that automatic pressurizer level control maintains level on program.

If needed, starts 2nd Chg Pp and places 2nd orifice in service.

Adjusts boration rate to maintain Tavg/Tref within +/-4°F T.

Refer to Enclosure 1 for expected alarms.

Step 10 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 27 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 5 - 3A & 3B CRDM FANS TRIP 3-GOP-100, FAST LOAD REDUCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Monitor Boration Rate

Monitor for excessive rod movement by monitoring TR-3-409D, Rod Position Bank D.

Determine if Insertion Limit and Bank D position are converging at a rate that will cause rod insertion limit alarms.

Adjust power reduction rate as needed to control rod insertion

Increase boration rate and/or total amount as necessary to limit control rod insertion Step 11 RCO:

Monitor Annunciator B 8/1, ROD BANK LO LIMIT - CLEAR

Monitor B 8/2 ROD BANK A/B/C/D EXTRA LO LIMIT - CLEAR Steps 12-13 BOOTH OPERATOR US:

Acknowledge notification to refer to Have SM refer to the following E-Plan and ADM-115. procedures:

0-EPIP-20101, DUTIES OF EMERGENCY COORDINATOR

0-ADM-115, NOTIFICATION OF PLANT EVENTS Step 14 LEAD EVALUATOR RCO:

Once power has been reduced by a Energize Pressurizer Backup Heaters minimum of 5%, at the Lead Evaluators Step 15 discretion, proceed to the next Event.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 28 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - 3A SGTR WITH LOOP 3-ONOP-071.2, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE NOTE The tube rupture ramps in over 5 minutes.

The crew will meet conditions to trip in ~ 2 minutes. The US may direct actions to maximize charging, isolate letdown, and trip the Reactor without enter 3-ONOP-071.2.

BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by the Lead Evaluator, trigger EVENT 6 - 3A SGTR BOP:

Reviews ARP for H1/4, PRMS HI RADIATION

Checks alarm on R-15

REFER TO 3-ONOP-071.2, Steam Generator Tube Leakage.

Check S/G Feedwater flows and levels for indication of a Ruptures S/G.

RCO:

Checks PZR pressure and level for indication of a S/G Tube Rupture.

US:

Enters and directs the actions of 3-ONOP-071.2, Steam Generator Tube Leakage.

US:

Reviews the Foldout page with the crew.

3-EOP-E-0 Transition Criteria

Control Room Ventilation Manual Isolation Criteria

Turbine Load Within 10% Of Target Power Level

Blowdown Release Path Isolation

AFW Steam Supply Release Path Isolation NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 29 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - 3A SGTR WITH LOOP 3-ONOP-071.2, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Check PRZ level - STABLE OR INCREASING

Start additional charging pumps as required.

Reduce letdown flow as necessary.

IF PRZ level can NOT be maintained, THEN manually trip the reactor AND go to 3-EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

Step 1 BOP:

Check R-15 High Alarm light - ON

Check PRMS Channel R-15 Alarm Valid As Follows

Check PRMS Channels R-19 For Proper Operation Step 2 - 4 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 30 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - 3A SGTR WITH LOOP 3-EOP-E-0, RX TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME TIME TIME NOTE US:

1. When the Generator trips, a Loss Of

Directs 3-EOP-E-0 response after auto Offsite Power occurs and both Reactor trip.

Emergency Diesel Generators start OR and energize their respective 4KV buses.

Directs RCO to manually trip the Reactor, then for operators to perform

2. When SI actuates, Control Room their IOAs.

Ventilation fails to align for recirc.

RCO:

Manually trips Reactor.

Manually actuates SI and Phase A NOTE RO/BOP:

Steps 1 - 4 of 3-EOP-E-0 are Immediate Perform IOAs.

Operator Actions (IOAs). The board operators will call out the high level steps of the IOAs as each step is completed from memory. Once the IOAs are complete, the US will read through Steps 1 - 4 with the crew.

NOTE RCO:

CT3 3B RHR pumps will start when SI Verifies Reactor Trip actuates. Record the time for verification Start Time of CT3 to secure RHR pumps within 44 minutes.

STEP 1 BOP:

Verify Turbine Trip STEP 2 BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When the GEN MID BKR OPENS, verify Verifies Power To Emergency 4 KV EVENT 6 LOOP triggers. Buses STEP 3 RCO:

Checks If SI Is Actuated STEP 4 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 31 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - 3A SGTR WITH LOOP 3-EOP-E-0, RX TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME TIME TIME RCO:

Checks if SI is required:

Manually actuate SI.

Manually actuate Containment Isolation Phase A.

STEP 4 RNO US:

Directs 3-EOP-E-0 response and reviews the IOAs.

US:

Reviews FOP for 3-EOP-E-0 with the crew

1. Adverse Containment Conditions

2. RCP Trip Criteria

3. Faulted S/G Isolation Criteria

4. Ruptured S/G Isolation Criteria (YES)

When 3A S/G narrow range level CT1 Isolate the Ruptured S/G is greater than 7%[27%], close CV-Closing CV-3-2816 & CV-3-2831 is part 3-2816 & CV-3-2831 of CT1. 5. AFW System Operation Criteria

6. CST Makeup Water Criteria

7. RHR System Operation Criteria (YES, RCO starts timer)

8. Loss Of Offsite Power Or SI On Other Unit

9. Loss Of Charging Criteria FOLDOUT PAGE PROCEDURE NOTE Hydrogen monitors should be in service within 30 minutes of a valid SI signal.

NOTE BOP:

Attachment 3 actions start on page 43.

Continues with ATTACHMENT 3 to complete The Prompt Action Verifications.

STEP 5 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 32 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - 3A SGTR WITH LOOP 3-EOP-E-0, RX TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME TIME TIME

. RCO:

Check AFW Pumps - AT LEAST TWO RUNNING.

STEP 6 RCO:

Verify AFW Valve Alignment - PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT STEP 7 RCO:

Verify Proper AFW Flow:

STEP 8 RCO:

Check all RCP Thermal Barrier Alarms clear. (A 1/1, 1/2 and 1/3)

STEP 9 RCO:

Check any RCPs running. (No)

Check RCS Cold Leg temperatures between 545°F and 547°F or trending down to 547°F. (NO)

- Stop dumping steam.

- Reduce AFW flow

- Close MSIVs STEP 10 RCO:

Check PRZ PORVs, Spray Valves And Excess Letdown Isolated:

STEP 11 RCO:

Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped: (Not Running)

STEP 12 RCO:

Check If S/Gs Are Faulted: (NO Go to Step 14)

STEP 13 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 33 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - 3A SGTR WITH LOOP 3-EOP-E-0, RX TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME TIME TIME RCO:

BOOTH OPERATOR Check If S/G Tubes Are Ruptured: (YES If Chemistry or RP is called, report local for 3A SG) secondary radiation readings and samples are highest on 3A SG. STEP 14 US:

Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-0, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES

Go to 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 34 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - 3A SGTR with LOOP 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE NOTE US:

The crew may wait until 3-EOP-E-3 step Directs 3-EOP-E-3 response.

10 to Stop RHR Pumps.

Reviews Foldout Page Limit RHR Time On Recirculation

Adverse Containment Setpoints CT3 When a RHR Pump starts and is

RCP Trip Criteria Stop Time operating at shutoff head, limit the operating time at shutoff head with

SI Re-Initiation Criteria minimum flow recirculation to no more

Secondary Integrity Criteria than 44 minutes.

Cold Leg Recirculation Switchover Criteria

[0-ADM-232, Time Critical Operator

CST Makeup Water Criteria Action Program - Attachment 1]

Multiple Tube Rupture Criteria

Loss Of Offsite Power Or SI On Other Unit.

If RHR flow is less than 1100 gpm, then the RHR Pumps shall be shut down within 44 minutes of the initial start signal.

FOP RCO:

Checks If RCPs Should Be Stopped STEP 1 RCO:

BOOTH OPERATOR Identify Ruptured S/G:

If called as RP, report the radiation

Identify 3A as the Ruptured S/G readings on 3A SG lines are higher than

Directs RP to take rad readings on normal. Main Steam and Blowdown Lines

Evaluates DAM1 on DCS

Determines ruptured SG by level increase or radiation STEP 2 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 35 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - 3A SGTR with LOOP 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE CT1 Isolate the Ruptured S/G RCO:

Adjusting 3A S/G Steam Dump To Isolate Flow From Ruptured S/G Atmosphere controller setpoint to 1060

Adjusts 3A S/G Steam Dump To psig and verifying it goes closed is part of Atmosphere controller setpoint to CT1.

1060 psig

Checks 3A S/G Steam Dump To Atmosphere Closed.

WHEN ruptured S/G pressure is less than 1060 psig, THEN Verify S/G Steam Dump to Atmosphere is closed.

STEP 3.a/b BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When directed to de-energize MOV Close steam supply valves from ruptured 1403 BKR 4D01-28, wait 3 minutes and 3A S/G to AFW Pumps using: Attachment then trigger LOA - DEENERGIZE MOV- 17 3-1403.

Check SI reset Report when action is complete.

Check AMSAC reset CT1

Check Both AFW Auto Start White Isolate the Ruptured S/G Lights - OFF (3QR50 AND 3QR51)

Closing and de-energizing MOV-3-1403

Close 3A Steam Generator AFW is part of CT1. Steam Supply, MOV-3-1403.

Dispatch an Operator to de-energize BKR 4D01-28 for MOV-3-1403.

Verify MOV-3-1403 - CLOSED

Notify Unit Supervisor That 3A S/G AFW Steam Supply Is Isolated and Attachment 17 is complete.

STEP 3.c BOP:

Verify 3A S/G Blowdown Isolation CT1 Isolate the Ruptured S/G Valve, FCV-3-6275A, is closed on 3A Closing the 3A MSIV is part of CT1. S/G.

Closes 3A MSIV.

STEP 3.d-e NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 36 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - 3A SGTR with LOOP 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Check Circulating Water Pumps -

ANY RUNNING (NO)

- Close 3B and 3C MSIVs STEP 3.f BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When dispatched to Align Main Steam

Dispatch Operator to align main auxiliaries using Attachment 5, trigger steam auxiliaries using Attachment LOA - ALIGN AUX STEAM SUPPLY 5 FROM U4.

STEP 3.f After 5 minutes, report complete.

BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When dispatched to close 3-10-321 and Isolate miscellaneous flow paths from 3A 3-10-896 for S/G 3C per Attachment 16, S/G using Attachment 16.

wait 5 minutes and report steps complete.

Verify 3A S/G Blowdown Sample MOV MOV-3-1427 - CLOSED

Dispatches Operator to locally isolate

- 3A S/G Main Steamline Steam Trap 3-10-121A

- Steam Sample Valves 3-10-891 for S/G 3A

Inform Unit Supervisor That Attachment 16 is Complete.

STEP 3.f NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 37 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - 3A SGTR with LOOP 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE CT1 Isolate the Ruptured S/G BOP:

During a Steam Generator Tube Rupture,

Check 3A S/G Level Narrow Range isolate the ruptured S/G before a the level - GREATER THAN 7%[27%]

ruptured Steam Generator pressure

Verify feed flow stopped to the 3A drops below 450 psig to prevent transition S/G.

to 3-EOP-ECA-3.1, SGTR With Loss Of Reactor Coolant-Subcooled Recovery STEP 4 Desired.

Verify 3A S/G has been Isolated by the crew

CV-3-2818, TRN 1 AFW controller, in manual and closed or auto with the setpoint set to zero.

CV-3-2831, TRN 2 AFW controller, in manual and closed or auto with the setpoint set to zero.

MOV-3-1403, 3A Steam Supply to AFW pumps, closed and de-energized

MOV-3-1407, 3A S/G FW Isolation, closed

CV-3-1606, 3A S/G Stm Dump to Atmosphere, closed in Auto and set to 1060#

3A MSIV CLOSED US:

Checks 3C S/G pressure greater than 450 psig.

STEP 5 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 38 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - 3A SGTR with LOOP 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE US/BOP:

Initiate RCS Cooldown

Determines required CET Temp for Cooldown.

Check feed sources to intact S/Gs -

CAPABLE OF PROVIDING 400 GPM

Check Condenser AVAILABLE (NO)

Manually dump steam to atmosphere from 3B & 3C S/G(s) at maximum rate using Steam Dump to Atmosphere Valves.

Continue with step 7

- When Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE, then stops cooldown.

- Maintains core exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

STEP 6 BOP:

Check Intact S/G Level:

Any Narrow Range Level -

GREATER THAN 7%[27%].

Maintain 3A and 3B S/G narrow range level between 21%[27%] and 50%.

Narrow Level - LESS THAN 50%.

STEP 7 RCO:

Verify SI - RESET STEP 8 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 39 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - 3A SGTR with LOOP 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Establish Charging Flow:

Charging Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING

Check offsite power - AVAILABLE (NO)

- Check if diesel capacity is adequate to run three Charging Pumps

Start all available Charging Pumps.

Adjust speed controller as necessary to establish maximum Charging flow from the running Charging Pump(s).

Place RCS Makeup Control in STOP.

Adjust HCV-3-121, Charging Flow To Regen Heat Exchanger, to maintain proper Seal Injection flow.

Verify Charging Pump Suction auto transfers to RWST.

STEP 9 Limit RHR Time On Recirculation RCO:

CT3 Stop Time When a RHR Pump starts and is operating at shutoff head, limit the Check If RHR Pumps should Be Stopped:

operating time at shutoff head with minimum flow recirculation to no more

Check RCS pressure - GREATER than 44 minutes. THAN 275 PSIG[575 PSIG]

Check RHR flow - LESS THAN 1100

[0-ADM-232, Time Critical Operator GPM Action Program - Attachment 1]

Stop RHR Pumps and place in standby.

STEP 10 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 40 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - 3A SGTR with LOOP 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCO:

Check PRZ PORVs And Block Valves:

Check Power to block valves -

AVAILABLE

Check PORVs - CLOSED

Check Block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN STEP 11 RCO:

Reset Containment Isolation Phase A &

Phase B.

STEP 12 RCO:

Verify Instrument Air To Containment:

Verify CV-3-2803, Instrument Air Containment Isolation - OPEN

Verify Instrument Air pressure, as indicated on PI-3-1444 - GREATER THAN 95 PSIG STEP 13 CT2 Control Initial RCS Cooldown BOP:

When 3-EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Check If RCS Cooldown Should be Rupture, is entered, dump steam from 3B Stopped:

and 3C SGs at maximum rate using the

Check CETs < REQUIRED Condenser Steam Dump Valves or Steam Dump To Atmosphere Valves to

WHEN core exit TCs are less than achieve Core Exit TCs less than required required temperature temperatures based on the lowest

Stop RCS cooldown ruptured S/G pressure without causing a

Maintain CETs < REQUIRED required transition to 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition.

STEP 14 BOP:

Checks Ruptured S/G(s) Pressure STABLE or INCREASING STEP 15 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 41 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 6 - 3A SGTR with LOOP 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Check RCS Subcooling Based On Core Exit TCs - GREATER THAN 39°F[93°F]

STEP 16 EVENT 8 - PCV-3-445C PZR PORV, FAILS TO CLOSE DURING E-3 DEPRESSURIZATION 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOOTH OPERATOR When PCV-3-455C is opened, verify EVENT 8 - PORV 455C FAILS TO CLOSE triggers.

NOTE RCO:

PORV PCV-3-456 was failed close in the Check Normal PRZ Spray available (NO) scenario setup. Go to Step 18 STEP 17 CT4 Control Initial RCS Depressurization RCO:

During a Steam Generator Tube Rupture,

Open one PRZ PORV until any of the depressurize the RCS to the ruptured S/G conditions satisfied using Attachment pressure without causing a transition to 3- 6.

EOP-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent

When the conditions of Attachment 6 Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, or are satisfied close PZR PORV 3-EOP-ECA-3.1, SGTR With Loss Of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery

Close Block Valve MOV-3-536 to stop Desired. the depressurization.

STEP 18 The scenario may be terminated at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator after the RCS cooldown is complete and the crew has had the opportunity to complete all critical steps.

- - END OF SCENARIO ***

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 42 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 7 - CONTROL ROOM HVAC FAILS TO ALIGN ON SI 3-EOP-E-0 ATTACHMENT 3 - PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Check Load Centers Associated With Energized 4 KV Buses - ENERGIZED STEP 1 BOP:

Verify Feedwater Isolation:

Place Main Feedwater Pump switches in STOP STEP 2 BOP:

Check If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated STEP 3 BOP:

Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve White Lights On VPB - ALL BRIGHT STEP 4 BOP:

Verify Pump Operation:

STEP 5 BOP:

Verify Proper CCW System Operation:

STEP 6 BOP:

Verify Proper ICW System Operation:

STEP 7 BOP:

Check Emergency Containment Coolers

- ONLY TWO RUNNING STEP 8 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 43 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 7 - CONTROL ROOM HVAC FAILS TO ALIGN ON SI 3-EOP-E-0 ATTACHMENT 3 - PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Verify Unit 3 Containment Purge Exhaust And Supply Fans - OFF STEP 9 BOP:

Verify Containment Spray NOT Required:

-STEP 10 BOP:

Verify SI - RESET STEP 11 BOP:

Verify SI Valve Amber Lights On VPB -

ALL BRIGHT STEP 12 BOP:

Verify SI Flow: (NO) Go to Step 14 STEP 13 BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When directed by the crew, trigger LOA Realign SI System:

- ALIGN U4 HHSI TO U3 RWST.

Verify Unit 3 High-Head SI Pumps -

Wait 5 minutes and report local operator TWO RUNNING steps complete.

Stop both Unit 4 HHSI pump.

Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to align Unit 4 High-Head SI Pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using Attachment 1.

Stop Unit 4 HHSI pumps STEP 14 BOP:

Verify Containment Isolation Phase A -

RESET STEP 15 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 44 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 7 - CONTROL ROOM HVAC FAILS TO ALIGN ON SI 3-EOP-E-0 ATTACHMENT 3 - PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Check RCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (NO Go to Step 17)

STEP 16 BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When the BOP opens damper D3, verify

Verify Emergency Air Supply Fans -

EVENT 7 - ALLOW OPENING D3 at least one running triggers

Control Room Ventilation dampers -

aligned for recirc (NO)

When the BOP opens damper D2, verify - Open Emergency Inlet Damper EVENT 7 - ALLOW OPENING D2 D-3 triggers - Open Emergency Inlet Damper D-2

Verify Normal Flow green indicating light (4QR82) - ON

TS-0002, TSC Emergency Vent Auto Initiate Key Switch - IN ENABLE STEP 17 BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:

When requested by crew, trigger LOA - Place Hydrogen Monitors In Service PLACE PAHMS IN SERVICE. Using 3-NOP-094, CONTAINMENT POST ACCIDENT MONITORING Wait 5 minutes and report local operator SYSTEM steps complete.

For Each Hydrogen Monitor A/B

- ENSURE FUNCTION SELECTOR switch is in SAMPLE.

- PLACE control switch in ANALYZE.

- PRESS the REMOTE SELECTOR button.

- PRESS the ALARM RESET button.

Dispatch an operator to complete local step of 3-NOP-094 (STEP 18)

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 45 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION EVENT 7 - CONTROL ROOM HVAC FAILS TO ALIGN ON SI 3-EOP-E-0 ATTACHMENT 3 - PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES & NOTES EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP:

Verify All Four EDGs - RUNNING STEP 19 BOP:

Check 3A AND 3B 4 KV Buses - All Energized From Offsite power.

(NO, check computer chiller running)

STEP 20 BOP:

Notify Unit Supervisor that Attachment 3 is complete.

STEP 21 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 46 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Discussion Points are intentionally NOT included in evaluated scenarios. However, space is available below to document follow-up questions when further information is required to determine an evaluation outcome.

FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS QUESTION #1

________________________________________________________

________________________

ANSWER #1

________________________________________________________

______________________________

QUESTION #2

________________________________________________________

________________________

ANSWER #2

________________________________________________________

______________________________

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 47 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR POST-SCENARIO RESTORATION:

______ 1. Restore per Simulator Operator Checklist.

______ 2. Once exams are complete, restore from SEI-19, Simulator Exam Security.

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 48 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 49 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 50 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 51 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 3 RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE) UNIT 4 RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)

PROTECTED TRAIN: B PROTECTED TRAIN: B ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO:

Field Supv.: Outside SNPO:

Admin RCO: ANPO:

Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit Supv.: Unit Supv.:

RCO: RCO:

NPO: NPO:

PLANT STATUS Unit 3 Unit 4 Mode: 1 Mode: 1 Power: 60% Power: 100%

MWe: 464 MWe: 842 Gross Leakrate: .22 gpm Gross Leakrate: 0.03 gpm RCS Boron Conc: 885 ppm RCS Boron Conc: 642 ppm Operational Concerns:

3A RHR pump taken OOS 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago for an oil change, expected back by the end of this shift.

3A1 Circ Water pump OOS. Tripped on over current, Electrical Maintenance is investigating.

3A Condensate pump was returned to service last shift following a motor bearing replacement and PMT run. Return to full power expected next shift.

U3 Anticipated LCO Actions:

None U4 Anticipated LCO Actions:

None Results of Offgoing Focus Area:

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 52 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION UNIT 3 STATUS REACTOR OPERATOR UNIT RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE) PROTECTED TRAIN: B Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 60% Gross: 0.22 GPM A 6656 MWe 464 Unidentified 0.04 GPM B 6608 Tavg: 565°F Charging Pps: 0.00 GPM C 6646 RCS Pressure: 2235 RCS Boron Conc: 885ppm Abnormal Annunciators:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Current Tech Spec Action Statements: (Does Not Include For Tracking Only Items T.S.A.S / Component: 3A RHR pump, 3.5.2.c - Action g Reason: Oil Change Entry Date: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 53 of 54

L-16-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 SEG NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION REACTOR OPERATOR (CONT'D)

UNIT RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE) PROTECTED TRAIN: B Changes to Risk Significant Equipment:

No recent changes from last shift.

OLRM: GREEN PROTECTED TRAIN: B Upcoming Reactivity Management Activities:

Maintain current power level + .5%

Xe is stable.

Upcoming Major POD Activities:

NONE Upcoming ECOs to Hang and /or Release:

Hang - None

Release - None Evolutions or Compensatory Actions in Progress:

NONE General Information, Remarks, and Operator Work Around Status:

Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.

U3 supplying Aux Steam

Air In-leakage = 0.0 SCFM NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Page 54 of 54

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION L-16-1 NRC Exam Control Room - JPM A NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION JPM TITLE: Respond to Control Bank D Demanded Past ARO JPM NUMBER: 01028916302 REV. 1-0 TASK NUMBER(S) / 01028916300 /

TASK TITLE(S): Respond to Control Bank D Demanded Past ARO K/A NUMBERS: 001 A4.14 K/A VALUE: RO 3.0 / SRO 3.4 Justification (FOR K/A VALUES <3.0): N/A TASK APPLICABILITY:

RO SRO STA Non-Lic SRO CERT OTHER:

APPLICABLE METHOD OF TESTING: Simulate/Walkthrough: Perform: X EVALUATION LOCATION: In-Plant: Control Room:

Simulator: X Other:

Lab:

Time for Completion: 15 Minutes Time Critical: No Alternate Path [NRC]: Yes Alternate Path [INPO]: Yes Developed by: Brian Clark 8/4/16 Instructor/Developer Date Reviewed by: Tim Hodge 8/4/16 Instructor (Instructional Review) Date Validated by: Sean Bloom 8/5/16 SME (Technical Review) Date Approved by: Mark Wilson 8/5/16 Training Supervision Date Approved by: Sean Bloom 8/5/16 Training Program Owner Date TR-AA-230-1003-F10, Revision 2 NRC Control Room - JPM A NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

01028916302, Respond to Control Bank D Demanded Past ARO Steps, Rev. 1-0 JPM Page 3 of 15 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST ALL STEPS IN THIS CHECKLIST ARE TO BE PERFORMED PRIOR TO USE.

REVIEW STATEMENTS YES NO N/A

1. Are all items on the signature page filled in correctly?

2. Has the JPM been reviewed and validated by SMEs?

3. Can the required conditions for the JPM be appropriately established in the simulator if required?

4. Do the performance steps accurately reflect trainees actions in accordance with plant procedures?

5. Is the standard for each performance item specific as to what controls, indications and ranges are required to evaluate if the trainee properly performed the step?

6. Has the completion time been established based on validation data or incumbent experience?

7. If the task is time critical, is the time critical portion based upon actual task performance requirements?

8. Is the job level appropriate for the task being evaluated if required?

9. Is the K/A appropriate to the task and to the licensee level if required?

10. Is justification provided for tasks with K/A values less than 3.0?

11. Have the performance steps been identified and classified (Critical /

Sequence / Time Critical) appropriately?

12. Have all special tools and equipment needed to perform the task been identified and made available to the trainee?

13. Are all references identified, current, accurate, and available to the trainee?

14. Have all required cues (as anticipated) been identified for the evaluator to assist task completion?

15. Are all critical steps supported by procedural guidance? (e.g., if licensing, EP or other groups were needed to determine correct actions, then the answer should be NO.)

16. If the JPM is to be administered to an LOIT student, has the required knowledge been taught to the individual prior to administering the JPM?

TPE does not have to be completed, but the JPM evaluation may not be valid if they have not been taught the required knowledge.

All questions/statements must be answered YES or N/A or the JPM is not valid for use. If all questions/statements are answered YES or N/A, then the JPM is considered valid and can be performed as written. The individual(s) performing the initial validation shall sign and date the cover sheet.

Protected Content: (CAPRs, corrective actions, licensing commitments, etc. associated with this material)

N/A TR-AA-230-1003-F10, Revision 2 NRC Control Room - JPM A NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

01028916302, Respond to Control Bank D Demanded Past ARO Steps, Rev. 1-0 JPM Page 4 of 15 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION UPDATE LOG: Indicate in the following table any minor changes or major revisions (as defined in TR-AA-230-1003) made to the material after initial approval. Or use separate Update Log form TR-AA-230-1003-F16.

PREPARER DATE

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE REASON FOR CHANGE AR/TWR#

SUPERVISOR DATE N/A N/A 0-0 New JPM N/A N/A Formatting; text/grammar N/A N/A 1-0 L-16-1 NRC Exam N/A changes N/A N/A TR-AA-230-1003-F10, Revision 2 NRC Control Room - JPM A NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

01028916302, Respond to Control Bank D Demanded Past ARO Steps, Rev. 1-0 JPM Page 5 of 15 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION SIMULATOR SET-UP:

SIMULATOR SETUP INSTRUCTIONS:

_____ 1. Reset to IC 1 or saved IC.

_____ 2. Place simulator in RUN.

_____ 3. Ensure applicable portions of Simulator Operator Checklist are complete.

N/A if using saved IC Perform following setup steps:

_____ 4.

a. Place Rod Motion Control Selector Switch in MANUAL

b. Withdraw Control Bank D to 230 steps

_____ 5. Open and execute L-16-1 NRC JPM A.lsn

_____ 6. Allow plant to stabilize.

_____ 7. Acknowledge alarms and place simulator in FREEZE.

_____ 8. Save as temporary IC, if JPM will be repeated.

_____ 9. When ready to begin, then place Simulator in RUN.

SIMULATOR MALFUNCTIONS:

TFL10201: Continuous rod insertion in auto SIMULATOR OVERRIDES:

N/A SIMULATOR REMOTE FUNCTIONS:

N/A TR-AA-230-1003-F10, Revision 2 NRC Control Room - JPM A NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

01028916302, Respond to Control Bank D Demanded Past ARO Steps, Rev. 1-0 JPM Page 6 of 15 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Required Materials:

HANDOUT 3-ONOP-028

HANDOUT Unit 3 COLR General

References:

3-ONOP-028, Reactor Control System Malfunction

Plant Curve Book, Unit 3 Task Standards:

Restore the Rod Control System to normal configuration with Bank D at 228 steps withdrawn

Respond to a continuous rod insertion event by placing rods in MANUAL TR-AA-230-1003-F10, Revision 2 NRC Control Room - JPM A NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

01028916302, Respond to Control Bank D Demanded Past ARO Steps, Rev. 1-0 JPM Page 7 of 15 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO EXAMINEE AT THIS TIME I will explain the initial conditions, which step(s) to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.

DURING THE JPM, ENSURE PROPER SAFETY PRECAUTIONS, FME, AND/OR RADIOLOGICAL CONCERNS AS APPLICABLE ARE FOLLOWED.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Unit 3 is at 100% power.

Control Bank D has been inadvertently withdrawn past 228 steps.

The Control Bank D step counters currently indicate 230 steps.

The crew entered 3-ONOP-028, Reactor Control System Malfunction, and completed the immediate actions.

INITIATING CUES:

The Unit Supervisor directs you to restore the Rod Control System to its normal configuration by performing Section 5.5 of 3-ONOP-028, Reactor Control System Malfunction.

The Shift Manager has authorized the return of control rods to automatic, on completion of the procedure.

NOTE: Ensure the turnover sheet that was given to the examinee is returned to the evaluator.

TR-AA-230-1003-F10, Revision 2 NRC Control Room - JPM A NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

01028916302, Respond to Control Bank D Demanded Past ARO Steps, Rev. 1-0 JPM Page 8 of 15 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION JPM PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Start Time:

NOTE: When providing Evaluator Cues to the examinee, care must be exercised to avoid prompting the examinee. Typically, cues are only provided when the examinees actions warrant receiving the information (i.e., the examinee looks or asks for the indication).

NOTE: Critical steps are marked with a Yes below the performance step number. Failure to meet the standard for any critical step shall result in failure of this JPM.

Performance Step: 1 Obtain required reference materials.

Critical: No Standard: Obtain 3-ONOP-028, Reactor Control System Malfunction.

If a peer check is requested for any of the following steps, then Evaluator Note:

acknowledge the request and allow the operator to continue.

Provide examinee with copies of HANDOUT 3-ONOP-028 and Evaluator Cue:

HANDOUT Unit 3 COLR.

Performance: SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY Comments:

TR-AA-230-1003-F10, Revision 2 NRC Control Room - JPM A NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

01028916302, Respond to Control Bank D Demanded Past ARO Steps, Rev. 1-0 JPM Page 9 of 15 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION 3-ONOP-028, prior to Step 5.5.1:

Performance Step: 2 CAUTION Critical: No Demanding RCCs to step past the ARO position may cause failure of the stationary grippers and result in a misaligned, partially inserted or dropped rod.

Standard: Read CAUTION and determine it is satisfactory to proceed.

Performance: SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY Comments:

3-ONOP-028, Step 5.5.1:

Performance Step: 3 Critical: No Check for indications of misaligned or dropped RCCs Observe Control Bank Ds rod position indicators and determines that no Standard:

rods are misaligned or dropped.

Performance: SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY Comments:

TR-AA-230-1003-F10, Revision 2 NRC Control Room - JPM A NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

01028916302, Respond to Control Bank D Demanded Past ARO Steps, Rev. 1-0 JPM Page 10 of 15 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION 3-ONOP-028, Step 5.5.2:

Performance Step: 4 Critical: No IF a RCC is determined to be misaligned, THEN Read step, compare to Initial Conditions, and determine it does not Standard:

apply.

Performance: SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY Comments:

3-ONOP-028, Step 5.5.3:

Performance Step: 5 Critical: No IF a RCC is determined to be dropped, THEN Read step, compare to Initial Conditions, and determine it does not Standard:

apply.

Performance: SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY Comments:

TR-AA-230-1003-F10, Revision 2 NRC Control Room - JPM A NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

01028916302, Respond to Control Bank D Demanded Past ARO Steps, Rev. 1-0 JPM Page 11 of 15 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION 3-ONOP-028, Step 5.5.4:

Performance Step: 6 IF Control Bank D control rods have not been withdrawn more than Critical: No 230 demanded steps, THEN perform the following:

1. Verify the Rod Motion Control Selector switch is in MAN.

Standard: Recognize that switch is in MAN position.

Performance: SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY Comments:

3-ONOP-028, Step 5.5.4:

Performance Step: 7 IF Control Bank D control rods have not been withdrawn more than Critical: Yes 230 demanded steps, THEN perform the following:

2. Insert Control Bank D to All Rods Out as defined in Core Operating Limits Report (COLR).

Standard: Determine ARO to be 228 steps and insert rods 2 steps.

Evaluator Note: Acknowledge any communication.

Performance: SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY Comments:

TR-AA-230-1003-F10, Revision 2 NRC Control Room - JPM A NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

01028916302, Respond to Control Bank D Demanded Past ARO Steps, Rev. 1-0 JPM Page 12 of 15 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION 3-ONOP-028, Step 5.5.4:

Performance Step: 8 IF Control Bank D control rods have not been withdrawn more than Critical: No 230 demanded steps, THEN perform the following:

3. IF directed by the Shift manager, THEN Place Rod Control Selector Switch to AUTOMATIC position.

Standard: Place rod control selector switch to AUTO position.

When rods are placed in MANUAL, verify trigger CONTINUOUS ROD Booth Operator Note:

INSERTION IN AUTO triggers.

May need to call as the SM if examinee chooses to leave rods in MAN.

Evaluator Note:

Placing rods in AUTO is necessary as it triggers the next event.

Evaluator/Booth Cue: If asked, respond as the SM and direct the rods to be placed in AUTO.

Performance: SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY Comments:

TR-AA-230-1003-F10, Revision 2 NRC Control Room - JPM A NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

01028916302, Respond to Control Bank D Demanded Past ARO Steps, Rev. 1-0 JPM Page 13 of 15 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION THIS BEGINS THE ALTERNATE-PATH PORTION OF THE JPM 3-ONOP-028, Step 5.5.4:

Performance Step: 9 IF Control Bank D control rods have not been withdrawn more than Critical: Yes 230 demanded steps, THEN perform the following:

3. IF directed by the Shift manager, THEN Place Rod Control Selector Switch to AUTOMATIC position.

Recognize continuous rod insertion and place rod control selector switch to Standard:

MANUAL position.

Examinee should place the Rod Motion Selector Switch in the MAN position prior to Tavg being 6°F less than Tref (i.e., 2°F lower than transient Evaluator Note:

band per 0-ADM-211, Emergency And Off-Normal Operating Procedure Usage).

Performance: SATISFACTORY UNSATISFACTORY Comments:

Once the Rod Control Selector Switch is placed in manual, state This Terminating Cue:

completes the JPM.

NOTE: Ensure the turnover sheet that was given to the examinee is returned to the evaluator.

Stop Time:

TR-AA-230-1003-F10, Revision 2 NRC Control Room - JPM A NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

01028916302, Respond to Control Bank D Demanded Past ARO Steps, Rev. 1-0 JPM Page 14 of 15 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION Examinee: Evaluator:

RO SRO STA Non-Lic SRO CERT Date:

LOIT RO LOIT SRO PERFORMANCE RESULTS: SAT: UNSAT:

Remediation required: YES NO COMMENTS/FEEDBACK: (Comments shall be made for any steps graded unsatisfactory).

EXAMINER NOTE: ENSURE ALL EXAM MATERIAL IS COLLECTED AND PROCEDURES CLEANED, AS APPROPRIATE.

EVALUATORS SIGNATURE:

NOTE: Only this page needs to be retained in examinees record if completed satisfactorily. If unsatisfactory performance is demonstrated, the entire JPM should be retained.

TR-AA-230-1003-F10, Revision 2 NRC Control Room - JPM A NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION JPM TURNOVER SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Unit 3 is at 100% power.

Control Bank D has been inadvertently withdrawn past 228 steps.

The Control Bank D step counters currently indicate 230 steps.

The crew entered 3-ONOP-028, Reactor Control System Malfunction, and completed the immediate actions.

INITIATING CUES:

The Unit Supervisor directs you to restore the Rod Control System to its normal configuration by performing Section 5.5 of 3-ONOP-028, Reactor Control System Malfunction.

The Shift Manager has authorized the return of control rods to automatic, on completion of the procedure.

NOTE: Ensure the turnover sheet is returned to the evaluator when the JPM is complete.

TR-AA-230-1003-F10, Revision 2 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION L-16-1 NRC Exam Control Room - JPM A NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JPM NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION JPM TITLE: Respond to Control Bank D Demanded Past ARO JPM NUMBER: 01028916302 REV. 1-0 TASK NUMBER(S) / 01028916300 /

TASK TITLE(S): Respond to Control Bank D Demanded Past ARO K/A NUMBERS: 001 A4.14 K/A VALUE: RO 3.0 / SRO 3.4 Justification (FOR K/A VALUES <3.0): N/A TASK APPLICABILITY:

RO SRO STA Non-Lic SRO CERT OTHER:

APPLICABLE METHOD OF TESTING: Simulate/Walkthrough: Perform: X EVALUATION LOCATION: In-Plant: Control Room:

Simulator: X Other:

Lab:

Time for Completion: 15 Minutes Time Critical: No Alternate Path [NRC]: Yes Alternate Path [INPO]: Yes Developed by: Brian Clark 8/4/16 Instructor/Developer Date Reviewed by: Luis Sagion 8/4/16 Instructor (Instructional Review) Date Validated by: Sean Bloom 8/5/16 SME (Technical Review) Date Approved by: Mark Wilson 8/5/16 Training Supervision Date Approved by: Sean Bloom 8/5/16 Training Program Owner Date TR-AA-230-1003-F10, Revision 2 NRC Control Room - JPM A NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION