ML18137A425
| ML18137A425 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/2018 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| Download: ML18137A425 (82) | |
Text
L-17-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Date of Examination: 10/23/2017 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 2017-301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*
Perform and Evaluate QPTR Conduct of Operations 2.1.7: Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments D, R based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (RO 4.4)
Calculate a Manual Makeup to the VCT Conduct of Operations P, R 2.1.25: Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. (RO 3.9)
Equipment Control Perform Accident Monitoring Instrument Channel Checks M, R 2.2.12: Knowledge of surveillance procedures. (RO 3.7)
Steam Generator Tube Leakage Estimation Radiation Control D, R 2.3.14: Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities. (RO 3.4)
Emergency Plan NOT SELECTED FOR RO EXAM NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).
- Type Codes and Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1, randomly selected)
L-17-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 JPM
SUMMARY
STATEMENTS A.1.a Perform and Evaluate QPTR: Given excore detector currents, the operator is directed to perform 3-OSP-059.10, Determination of Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio. Section 4.2, Determination of NIS QPTR Using Detector Current Readings, will require the operator to evaluate actual excore detector currents with Plant Curve Book Section 5 Figure 5, Excore NIS Calibration Factors and Setpoints, and record on Attachment 1, Determination of NIS QPTR Using Excore Detector Currents. Upon completion of Attachment 1, the operator will determine that the QPTR is outside of the Acceptance Criteria.
A.1.b Calculate a Manual Makeup to the VCT: The operator is given current VCT level, desired VCT level, RCS and BAST concentrations, and boric acid flow rate. The operator is directed to calculate primary water flow rate, primary water volume, boric acid volume, and potentiometer settings for both primary water and boric acid controllers IAW 0-OP-046, CVCS - Boron Concentration Control, and Plant Curve Book Section 3, Boron Change Tables, Method 2.
A.2 Perform Accident Monitoring Instrument Channel Checks: Operator is directed to perform the monthly check of the Core Exit Thermocouples IAW 3-OSP-204, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Channel Checks, Section 4.10, Core Exit Thermocouples Channel Check. After recording and evaluating the data for all quadrants, the operator will determine that some Functional and Acceptance Criteria are not met.
A.3 Steam Generator Tube Leakage Estimation: The operator is directed to perform 3-ONOP-071.2, Steam Generator Tube Leakage, to estimate tube leakage after receiving Annunciator H-1/4 PRMS HI RADIATION due to high radiation readings on R-15. The operator is given the Meteorological and Rad Data screen of DCS, which contains R-15 and SPING data, and air in leakage. This information is then used in conjunction with Plant Curve Book Section 5 Figures 14 and 15 for SJAE SPING to Secondary Leak Rate Graph and R-15 Primary to Secondary Leak Rate Graph respectively. Leakage is within Action Levels listed in Attachment 3, Guidelines for Continued Plant Operation with Primary to Secondary Leakage, of 3-ONOP-071.2.
A.4 NOT SELECTED FOR RO EXAM ES-301-1 RO pg 2 of 2
L-17-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Date of Examination: 10/23/2017 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 2017-301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*
Perform and Evaluate QPTR Conduct of Operations 2.1.7: Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments D, R based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (SRO 4.7)
Conduct of Operations Determine Contingency Actions per 0-ADM-051 D, R 2.1.20: Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps. (SRO 4.6)
Equipment Control Determine Required Action For CCW Test D, R 2.2.12: Knowledge of surveillance procedures. (SRO 4.1)
Radiation Control Approve Liquid Release Permits P, R 2.3.6: Ability to approve release permits. (SRO 3.8)
Issue PARs and Determine Evacuation Route Emergency Plan M, R 2.4.44: Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations.
(SRO 4.4)
NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).
- Type Codes and Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1, randomly selected)
L-17-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 JPM
SUMMARY
STATEMENTS A.1.a Perform and Evaluate QPTR: Given excore detector currents, the SRO is directed to perform 3-OSP-059.10, Determination of Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio. Section 4.2, Determination of NIS QPTR Using Detector Current Readings, had been completed yielding suspect results. The SRO is now directed to perform Section 4.3, Determination of NIS QPTR Using Detector Voltage Readings. This will require the SRO to evaluate detector voltages with Plant Curve Book Section 5 Figure 5, Excore NIS Calibration Factors and Setpoints, and record on Attachment 2, Determination of NIS QPTR Using Excore Detector Volts. Upon completion of Attachment 2, the SRO will determine that the QPTR is outside of the Acceptance Criteria and identify all applicable Technical Specifications.
A.1.b Determine Contingency Actions per 0-ADM-051: SRO directed to perform a risk assessment for the loss of the 3A EDG during an outage IAW 0-ADM-051, Outage Risk Assessment and Control. SRO will determine the correct enclosure of 0-ADM-051 based on initial conditions. Plant Curve Book Section 5, Figure 9, Level Indicators vs RCS Component Elevations, and Plant Curve Book Section 5, Figure 12A, RCS Level Cross Reference, will be used for evaluating RCS inventory and distance below the Reactor Vessel Flange. Based on plant conditions, Safe Shutdown Function Color Code and required contingency actions will be recognized.
A.2 Determine Required Action For CCW Test: An inservice test for the 3A Component Cooling Water Pump has just been completed IAW 3-OSP-030.1, Component Cooling Water Pump Inservice Test. SRO is required to list any equipment deficiencies, determine pump operability, and identify and applicable Technical Specification actions. Upon reviewing the data the SRO will identify CCW pump vibrations are exceeding alert and required action ranges as well as CCW pump head outside of the required action range. Pump will be declared inoperable and Technical Specifications will be listed.
A.3 Approve Liquid Release Permits: Recycle Monitor Tank has been recirculated, sampled, analyzed, and a Radioactive Liquid Release Permit has been generated. Process Radiation Monitor R-18 is out of service.
SRO is required to review 0-NOP-061.11A, Controlled Liquid Release from Recycle Monitor Tank A, and determine any procedural requirements that may be required prior to commencing the release. The SRO shall also review and the Radioactive Liquid Release Permit for completeness and accuracy IAW 0-NCOP-003, Preparation of Liquid Release Permits, and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Upon review, the SRO will determine that several actions are to be taken due to R-18 being out of service and the Radioactive Liquid Release Permit being incomplete and invalid.
A.4 Issue PARs and Determine Evacuation Route: Unit 3 has declared a General Emergency. Emergency Classification is FG1. The SRO will be provided with a list of plant conditions during the emergency. The SRO is directed to evaluate conditions using 0-EPIP-20101, Duties of the Emergency Coordinator, and evaluate protective action recommendations using 0-EPIP-20134, Offsite Notifications and Protective Action Recommendations. Based on plant conditions, wind directions, and PARs evaluation, the SRO is directed to complete the Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form and determine the appropriate Evacuation Route.
L-17-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Date of Examination: 10/23/2017 Examination Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: 2017-301 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function
- a. 001 Control Rod Drive System (A2.11 4.4)
A, N, S 1 Withdraw Control Rods and Restore to Automatic Control
- b. 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (A4.02 4.0)
A, M, L, S 2 Align Safety Injection For Hot Leg Recirc
- c. W E02 Emergency Core Cooling System (EA1.1 4.0)
P, L, S 3 Terminate SI
- d. APE 015 Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (AA1.23 3.1)
A, D, L, S 4P Start 3A RCP in Mode 3
- e. 061 Auxiliary Feedwater System (A2.05 3.1)
EN, N, S 4S Shutdown of AFW Pumps from Spurious Actuation
- f. APE 069 Loss of Containment Integrity (AA2.02 3.9)
EN, L, N, S 5 Automatic Phase B Actuation Failure
- g. 064 Emergency Diesel Generator System (A4.06 3.9)
A, D, L, S 6 Perform 3A Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test
- h. 073 Process Radiation Monitoring System (A4.02 3.7)
N, S 7 R-11/12 PRMS Operational Test In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U
- i. 001 Control Rod Drive System (A4.08 3.7)
D 1 Startup A Rod Drive Motor Generator Set
- j. EPE 011 Large Break LOCA (EA1.13 4.1)
E, L, N, R 4P Realignment of Unit 4 High Head SI Pump Suction to Unit 4 RWST
- k. APE 054 Loss of Main Feedwater (AA1.01 4.5)
A, D 4S Manually Control Steam to AFW Pump with T&T Valve
- All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO /SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6/4-6/2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/ 8/ 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/ 1/ 1 (EN)gineered safety feature 1/ 1/ 1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power/Shutdown 1/ 1/ 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/ 2/ 1 (P)revious 2 exams 3/ 3/ 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA 1/ 1/ 1 (S)imulator ES-301-2 RO pg 1 of 2
L-17-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 JPM
SUMMARY
STATEMENTS
- a. Withdraw Control Rods and Restore to Automatic Control: Control Rods have stepped in as a result of a plant transient. The operator has been directed to restore control rods to ARO and place them in automatic control.
Upon placing the rod control switch back in automatic control, rods will continuously insert requiring execution of 3-ONOP-028, Reactor Control System Malfunction, and 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, immediate operator actions.
- b. Align Safety Injection For Hot Leg Recirc: The plant has been aligned for Cold Leg Recirculation IAW 3-EOP-ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation. The operator is required to place the plant on Hot Leg Recirculation IAW 3-EOP-ES-1.4, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation. MOV-3-843B, SI to Cold Leg Isolation Valve, fails to close. The operator will reestablish Cold Leg Recirculation. Upon the realignment, MOV-3-866A, Loop Hot Leg Safety Injection Valve, trips on motor overload. The response is to isolate flow via MOV-3-869, Safety Injection to Hot Leg Isolation, and start HHSI pumps to minimize core flow interruption to less than three minutes.
A portion of this JPM is time critical.
- c. Terminate SI: Unit 3 has experienced a spurious Train B Safety Injection. The crew entered 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. The Balance of Plant Operator has just started performing 3-EOP-E-0, Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verifications. The crew has transitioned to 3-EOP-ES-1.1, SI Termination. The operator is directed to terminate SI IAW 3-EOP-ES-1.1. The operator is required to reset SI and Phase A in order to establish charging flow and terminate RHR and HHSI pumps.
- d. Start 3A RCP in Mode 3: Unit 3 is in Mode 3 with shutdown banks withdrawn. 3A RCP was stopped for maintenance and is ready to be restarted IAW 3-NOP-041.01A, 3A Reactor Coolant Pump Operations. Upon starting, the 3A RCP has high vibrations. High vibrations are confirmed and 3-ONOP-041.1, Reactor Coolant Pump Off-Normal, is entered. Reactor trip criteria is met per the foldout page. Actions are taken IAW 3-ONOP-041.1 foldout page after verifying Reactor Trip using EOP network.
- e. Shutdown of AFW Pumps from Spurious Actuation: There has been a spurious initiation of Train A Auxiliary Feedwater. The operator is required to shut down the AFW system IAW 3-NOP-075, Auxiliary Feedwater System.
After reducing AFW flow, the operator will close the required steam supply MOVs and adjust respective train hand controllers to normal setpoints and place in automatic control.
- f. Automatic Phase B Actuation Failure: Unit 3 has experienced a faulted generator inside containment. As a result, containment pressure has increased to greater than 20 psig. The operator is directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verification. Upon performance of Attachment 3 the operator will recognize that Phase B automatic actuation has failed. Containment spray is running but all Phase B valves will need to be manually closed and all RCPs manually stopped.
- g. Perform 3A Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test: Unit 3 is in Mode 3. 3A EDG is running unloaded IAW 3-OSP-023.1, Diesel Generator Operability Test. The operator is required to take over the test and continue to synchronize the 3A EDG to the 3A 4kV bus. As the operator raises load, the 3A EDG kW continues to increase uncontrollably. The operator will either trip the 3A EDG or open the EDG output breaker.
- h. R-11/12 PRMS Operational Test: R-3-11 initial test conditions have been completed per 3-OSP-067.1A, R-3-11/12 Process Radiation Monitoring Operational Test. The operator is directed to perform Section 4.2.2, Testing R-3-11 Alert/Warning Functions, to test R-3-11 alert/warning functions and then restore setpoints to pre-test conditions.
- i. Startup A Rod Drive Motor Generator Set: No Control Rod Drive MG Sets are currently operating. Both Control Rod Drive MG Set breakers are racked in. The operator is directed to start the 3A Control Rod Drive MG Set IAW 3-NOP-028, Control Rod Drive MG Set Operation.
- j. Realignment of Unit 4 High Head SI Pump Suction to Unit 4 RWST: Unit 3 has experienced a Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation. Unit 3 is preparing to establish Safety Injection from Unit 4 RWST. The operator has been directed to perform 3-EOP-ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, Attachment 3, Realignment of Unit 4 High Head SI Pump Suction to Unit 4 RWST.
- k. Manually Control Steam to AFW Pump with T&T Valve: Unit 3 has tripped from 100% power. The A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump has tripped on overspeed. The operator is directed to restore the A AFW pump IAW 3-ONOP-075, Auxiliary Feedwater System Malfunction. The operator will reset the Trip and Throttle valve, manually use the T&T to control steam, and subsequently secure the pump after steam leakage is identified.
L-17-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Date of Examination: 10/23/2017 Examination Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: 2017-301 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function
- a. 001 Control Rod Drive System (A2.11 4.7)
A, N, S 1 Withdraw Control Rods and Restore to Automatic Control
- b. 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (A4.02 3.8)
A, M, L, S 2 Align Safety Injection For Hot Leg Recirc
- c. W E02 Emergency Core Cooling System (EA1.1 3.9)
P, L, S 3 Terminate SI
- d. APE 015 Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (AA1.23 3.2)
A, D, L, S 4P Start 3A RCP in Mode 3
- e. 061 Auxiliary Feedwater System (A2.05 3.4)
EN, N, S 4S Shutdown of AFW Pumps from Spurious Actuation
- f. APE 069 Loss of Containment Integrity (AA2.02 4.4)
EN, L, N, S 5 Automatic Phase B Actuation Failure
- g. 064 Emergency Diesel Generator System (A4.06 3.9)
A, D, L, S 6 Perform 3A Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test
- i. 001 Control Rod Drive System (A4.08 3.4)
D 1 Startup A Rod Drive Motor Generator Set
- j. EPE 011 Large Break LOCA (EA1.13 4.2)
E, L, N, R 4P Realignment of Unit 4 High Head SI Pump Suction to Unit 4 RWST
- k. APE 054 Loss of Main Feedwater (AA1.01 4.4)
A, D 4S Manually Control Steam to AFW Pump with T&T Valve
- All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO /SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6/4-6/2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/ 8/ 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/ 1/ 1 (EN)gineered safety feature 1/ 1/ 1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power/Shutdown 1/ 1/ 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/ 2/ 1 (P)revious 2 exams 3/ 3/ 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA 1/ 1/ 1 (S)imulator ES-301-2 SRO pg 1 of 2
L-17-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 JPM
SUMMARY
STATEMENTS
- a. Withdraw Control Rods and Restore to Automatic Control: Control Rods have stepped in as a result of a plant transient. The operator has been directed to restore control rods to ARO and place them in automatic control.
Upon placing the rod control switch back in automatic control, rods will continuously insert requiring execution of 3-ONOP-028, Reactor Control System Malfunction, and 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, immediate operator actions.
- b. Align Safety Injection For Hot Leg Recirc: The plant has been aligned for Cold Leg Recirculation IAW 3-EOP-ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation. The operator is required to place the plant on Hot Leg Recirculation IAW 3-EOP-ES-1.4, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation. MOV-3-843B, SI to Cold Leg Isolation Valve, fails to close. The operator will reestablish Cold Leg Recirculation. Upon the realignment, MOV-3-866A, Loop Hot Leg Safety Injection Valve, trips on motor overload. The response is to isolate flow via MOV-3-869, Safety Injection to Hot Leg Isolation, and start HHSI pumps to minimize core flow interruption to less than three minutes.
A portion of this JPM is time critical.
- c. Terminate SI: Unit 3 has experienced a spurious Train B Safety Injection. The crew entered 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. The Balance of Plant Operator has just started performing 3-EOP-E-0, Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verifications. The crew has transitioned to 3-EOP-ES-1.1, SI Termination. The operator is directed to terminate SI IAW 3-EOP-ES-1.1. The operator is required to reset SI and Phase A in order to establish charging flow and terminate RHR and HHSI pumps.
- d. Start 3A RCP in Mode 3: Unit 3 is in Mode 3 with shutdown banks withdrawn. 3A RCP was stopped for maintenance and is ready to be restarted IAW 3-NOP-041.01A, 3A Reactor Coolant Pump Operations. Upon starting, the 3A RCP has high vibrations. High vibrations are confirmed and 3-ONOP-041.1, Reactor Coolant Pump Off-Normal, is entered. Reactor trip criteria is met per the foldout page. Actions are taken IAW 3-ONOP-041.1 foldout page after verifying Reactor Trip using EOP network.
- e. Shutdown of AFW Pumps from Spurious Actuation: There has been a spurious initiation of Train A Auxiliary Feedwater. The operator is required to shut down the AFW system IAW 3-NOP-075, Auxiliary Feedwater System.
After reducing AFW flow, the operator will close the required steam supply MOVs and adjust respective train hand controllers to normal setpoints and place in automatic control.
- f. Automatic Phase B Actuation Failure: Unit 3 has experienced a faulted generator inside containment. As a result, containment pressure has increased to greater than 20 psig. The operator is directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verification. Upon performance of Attachment 3 the operator will recognize that Phase B automatic actuation has failed. Containment spray is running but all Phase B valves will need to be manually closed and all RCPs manually stopped.
- g. Perform 3A Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test: Unit 3 is in Mode 3. 3A EDG is running unloaded IAW 3-OSP-023.1, Diesel Generator Operability Test. The operator is required to take over the test and continue to synchronize the 3A EDG to the 3A 4kV bus. As the operator raises load, the 3A EDG kW continues to increase uncontrollably. The operator will either trip the 3A EDG or open the EDG output breaker.
- h. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO EXAM
- i. Startup A Rod Drive Motor Generator Set: No Control Rod Drive MG Sets are currently operating. Both Control Rod Drive MG Set breakers are racked in. The operator is directed to start the 3A Control Rod Drive MG Set IAW 3-NOP-028, Control Rod Drive MG Set Operation.
- j. Realignment of Unit 4 High Head SI Pump Suction to Unit 4 RWST: Unit 3 has experienced a Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation. Unit 3 is preparing to establish Safety Injection from Unit 4 RWST. The operator has been directed to perform 3-EOP-ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, Attachment 3, Realignment of Unit 4 High Head SI Pump Suction to Unit 4 RWST.
- k. Manually Control Steam to AFW Pump with T&T Valve: Unit 3 has tripped from 100% power. The A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump has tripped on overspeed. The operator is directed to restore the A AFW pump IAW 3-ONOP-075, Auxiliary Feedwater System Malfunction. The operator will reset the Trip and Throttle valve, manually use the T&T to control steam, and subsequently secure the pump after steam leakage is identified.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Facility: Turkey Point Exam Date: 10/23/2017 1 2 3 4 5 6 Attributes Job Content Admin ADMIN Topic and LOD U/E/S Explanation JPMs K/A (1-5) I/C Critical Scope Perf. Job Cues Overlap Key Minutia Focus Steps (N/B) Std. Link Generic:
- Revise all Admin JPM initiating cues to include procedure name. Plant curve book and TS to be provided as references (in binders) for all.
D, R
- Can be administered concurrent with SRO A1a
- Revise JPM key to provide answers to 4 significant RO A1a COO / 2.1.7 3 S digits
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- No changes M, R RO A2 EC / 2.2.12 3 S - Outline comment resolved
- No changes D, R RO A3 RC / 2.3.14 3 S - Outline comment resolved
- No changes D, R
- Outline comment resolved
- Can be administered concurrent with RO A1a
- Cannot be procedurally performed as written
- Revise JPM to perform determination of Section 4.3 adequacy (i.e. Attachment 2). Will require modification SRO A1a COO / 2.1.7 3 S to provide I&C data and notification that Section 4.2 determined to be inadequate (i.e. results are suspect).
Applicant to determine appropriate TS evaluation following Att 2 completion.
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
D, R SRO A1b COO / 2.1.20 3 S - Facility to investigate having fleet procedure available for use as reference if desired.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 D, R
- JPM Initiating Cue is cluttered. Revise Initiating Cue to state You are directed to perform Step 7.1.32 of 3-OSP-030.1 and determine the following: The second bullet can be removed.
- Is it intended for applicant to mark 3A CCW under Equipment Deficiencies if the applicant makes the determination of equipment Operability and TS entry?
Identification of Equipment Deficiencies is specifically spelled out for applicant identification, yet is not SRO A2 EC / 2.2.12 3 S addressed in the JPM guide.
- Revise JPM standard to indicate performance of JPM Step 2 or 3 as CRITICAL.
- Revise JPM standard to indicate performance of JPM Step 5 as CRITICAL.
- Revise initiating cue 2: Justify your operability determination utilizing the evaluated parameters of 3-OSP-030.1.
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
P, R
- Revise expected count rate to read 2.854E3.
SRO A3 RC / 2.3.6 3 S
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
M, R
- Outline comment resolved
- Merge initial conditions with given turnover info on Page 1. Inform evaluator when Page 2 is ready to be transmitted to the EC.
- Page 2 converted to be a given partially completed SRO A4 EP / 2.4.44 3 S ENF form (without PAR block completed)
- Page 3 converted to be initiating cue and determination of site evacuation route.
- Ensure Time Critical aspect is incorporated.
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 1
Simulator/
In-Plant Safety Function and K/A JPMs A, N, S
- Outline comment resolved JPM A 1 / 001A2.11 3 S - RMCS in Manual is not required as an Initial Condition (available to applicant in Sim)
- No changes A, M, L, S
- Outline comment resolved
- Incorporate basis for 3 minute Time Critical aspect be included in the JPM guide for this JPM (or just provide reference doc)?
- Per ES-301, the same system or evolution should not be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location JPM B 2 / 006A4.02 3 S - This JPM meets all other requirements with the exception of K/A assignment overlap with JPM C.
- Separate Bullet 1 into 2 bullets.
- Renumber sequences to include 10, 11
- Sequences 6, 7, 8 no longer CRITICAL
- Time Critical portion of this JPM is 3.77 minutes (3 min 46 sec)
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
P, L, S
- Outline comment resolved
- Per ES-301, the same system or evolution should not be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location JPM C 3 / 006A4.01 3 S - This JPM meets all other requirements with the exception of K/A assignment overlap with JPM B.
- Include 5-13 gpm band for Sequence 7
- Add U4 at 100% RTP to Initial Conditions.
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
A, D, L, S
- Outline comment resolved
- Remove third IC bullet. Specifically verbiage concerning TS 3.4.1.2, LCO Action b. Not an evaluation point for this JPM or required information to perform the task.
JPM D 4P / 015AA1.23 3 S
- JPM Step 11, why would examiner provide this procedure section? Is this available in the Simulator?
- JPM Step 13, remove evaluator cue as an Examiner would not direct an applicant action during administration of a JPM.
- No changes
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 EN, N, S
- JPM Step 8/13 (place HIC controllers in AUTO) is CRITICAL, yet JPM Step 3/9 (reduce AFW flow) is not.
Is this correct for as-given task? I.e. should Step 3/9 be CRITICAL? Or does placing controller in AUTO not rely on initial flow setting for these controllers?
JPM E 4S / 061A2.05 3 S
- JPM Sequence 8 is now final step of JPM (another operator will continue from here)
- Incorporate band of 135-140 gpm for acceptable flow setting
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
EN, L, N, S
- During administration, ensure simulator reset permits Containment Pressure parameters to exhibit full traverse of casualty (i.e. pressure spike with JPM F 5 / 069AA2.02 3 S subsequent lowering) - add Booth Cue for this
- Include procedure steps for Sequence 3 (valves) -
NO longer CRITICAL
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
A, D, L, S
- Remove 3rd Initial Condition bullet. (none required for task)
- Remove 2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Initiating Cue bullets.
(none required for task)
- Place test performance bullet into initial conditions
- Simplify initiating cue applicant directed to perform JPM G 6 / 064A4.06 3 S Step 7.1.31.
-Highlight CRITICAL steps in yellow
- For Sequence 1, only a is CRITICAL
- Include an examiner cue that another operator will perform Attachment 2.
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
N, S
- Outline comment resolved
- JPM Step 8, Is there a value the applicant is trained to input here that the examiner should be cognizant of?
JPM H 7 / 073A4.02 3 S - Add in completed copy of Section 4.2.1 to permit applicant referring to this during administration
- Add in Rad Monitor placard data.
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 D
- JPM Step 6, Is holding of the Field Flash Pushbutton during performance of this step significant to examiner cueing? What if applicant just depresses the PB, would the voltage indication just move up to the expected 260 VAC? Concerned about examiner cueing JPM I 1 / 001A4.08 3 S in the field here. Please strengthen the language used in the Evaluator Cue box to specify what the applicant is expected to do when performing this step.
- Revise examiner cue to require applicant adjustment of voltage control switch
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
E, L, N, R JPM J 4P / 011EA1.13 3 S
- Outline comment resolved A, D
- Cueing present in Initiating Cue. You have been directed by to attempt to Restate this initiating cue to merely direct the applicant to perform the requested task.
- JPM Step 12, Remove the word properly from the JPM K 4S / 054AA1.01 3 S evaluator cue. Examiners do not provide affirmation of applicant actions, only plant response indications.
- JPM Step 13, Please highlight (or in some way make more distinguishable) that the examiner is required to notify the applicant of the very large amount of steam (i.e. alternate path initiation). Doesnt need to be a separate step, just emphasized in some way.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Instructions for Completing This Table:
Check or mark any item(s) requiring a comment and explain the issue in the space provided using the guide below.
- 1. Check each JPM for appropriate administrative topic requirements (COO, EC, Rad, and EP) or safety function requirements and corresponding K/A. Mark in column 1.
(ES-301, D.3 and D.4)
- 2. Determine the level of difficulty (LOD) using an established 1-5 rating scale. Levels 1 and 5 represent an inappropriate (low or high) discriminatory level for the license that is being tested. Mark in column 2 (Appendix D, C.1.f)
- 3. In column 3, Attributes, check the appropriate box when an attribute is not met:
The initial conditions and/or initiating cue is clear to ensure the operator understands the task and how to begin. (Appendix C, B.4)
The JPM contains appropriate cues that clearly indicate when they should be provided to the examinee. Cues are objective and not leading. (Appendix C, D.1)
All critical steps (elements) are properly identified.
The scope of the task is not too narrow (N) or too broad (B).
Excessive overlap does not occur with other parts of the operating test or written examination. (ES-301, D.1.a, and ES-301, D.2.a)
The task performance standard clearly describes the expected outcome (i.e., end state). Each performance step identifies a standard for successful completion of the step.
A valid marked up key was provided (e.g., graph interpretation, initialed steps for handouts).
- 4. For column 4, Job Content, check the appropriate box if the job content flaw does not meet the following elements:
Topics are linked to the job content (e.g., not a disguised task, task required in real job).
The JPM has meaningful performance requirements that will provide a legitimate basis for evaluating the applicant's understanding and ability to safely operate the plant. (ES-301, D.2.c)
- 5. Based on the reviewers judgment, is the JPM as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 5.
- 6. In column 6, provide a brief description of any (U)nacceptable or (E)nhancement rating from column 5.
Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound JPM is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Facility: Turkey Point Scenario: N1 (Spare) Exam Date: 10/23/2017 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.
Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap 1 S - Outline comment resolved
- Pg 15, Top right BOP Step 4 is not required. Un-highlight or restate to May place 2 S - Pg 15, TS, include bistable names Changes incorporated in final submittal 10/10/2017
- Overlap 2015-301 3 S
- Pg 16, 3-ONOP-028, if applicants request SM direction to restore Tavg=Tref using rods, direct applicants to perform their recommended action.
- Outline comment resolved (event revised)
- Pg 19, cueing of rising SGFP bearing temperature requires modification 4 S
- Dispatch operator then 2 min wait for reports
- Field report of 205F (increasing), 212F (stabilizing), 215F (stabilized) @ 2 minute intervals
- Engineering report (if called)
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
5 S 6 S
- Pg 26, Red or Orange path (response difference?)
7 S
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- Overlap 2016-301
8 S
- Remove Pgs 28-32, no additional actions performed this scenario.
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
8 2 2 6 S
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Facility: Turkey Point Scenario: N2 Exam Date: 10/23/2017 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.
Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap 1 S - Outline comment resolved (event revised)
- Outline comment resolved
- Swap event 2 with event 1 to ensure viability of Event 2 TS and Page 16, top right 2 S requires bullet
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- Overlap 2015-301 and outline comment resolved (event re-ordered/revised/JPM overlap) 3 S - Page 18, title should be ONOP-071.2 vs 041.5 and revisit trigger for Event 3 (incorrect during validation)
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- Overlap 2015-301 and outline comment resolved (event re-ordered)
- Page 24, Insert note for Event 5 entry, ensure examiners have observed the required 4 S reactivity change prior to proceeding with scenario
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
5 S - Outline comment resolved (event revised)
- Page 32, Top right box requires modification and Page 34, Revise affected S/G to read 3C vs 3A, ECA-3.1 transition is earliest point to terminate scenario, add in Step 3.e & RNO 6 S to perform 3C S/G isolation
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- Revise write-up for Event 7 (D-1 write-up) to remove mention of MOV-3-1405 7 S
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- Outline comment resolved and RHR CT removed and ensure trigger incorporated that 8 S fails MSIVs open
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
8 2 2 6 S
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Facility: Turkey Point Scenario: N3 Exam Date: 10/23/2017 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.
Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap 1 S - Outline comment resolved (event revised) and overlap 2016-301
- Outline comment resolved (JPM overlap) and overlap 2016-301 2 S - Page 13, Top right BOP Step 4 is not required. Un-highlight or restate to May place
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- Overlap 2016-301 and Page 17/18, No highlighting required for 3A TPCW pump STOP 3 S or I5/4 ann verification
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- Page 19, CCW R-17 samples are isolated and Sim Booth cue required for Supplemental 4 S Cooling OOS
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- Overlap 2016-301 and Page 23, CRDM breaker location cue requires modification 5 S
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- CT2 success criteria was to be revised to 280F Orange Path integrity. Current Scenario 3 guide states AFW flow isolation prior 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> soak. Why is this different?
- Insert note for expected crew use of 2000 psig as Rx trip criteria 6 (x2) S
- Page 30, Cue required for MSIV closure and Page 31, Transition to E-3 is earliest opportunity to terminate scenario
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
7 S - Ensure Event 7 is embedded as appropriate in Event 6
- Outline comment resolved and overlap 2016-301 8 S - CT3 removed and ensure Event 8 is incorporated as appropriate in Event 6
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
8 2 2 3 S
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Facility: Turkey Point Scenario: N4 Exam Date: 10/23/2017 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.
Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap 1 S - Overlap 2015-301
- TS 3.4.6.2 condition D required during Vessel Flange Leak 2 S - TS leakage spec for > 10 gpm required following leak isolation
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- Outline comment resolved (event revised) 3 S - Page 14, Top right BOP Step 4 is not required. Un-highlight or restate to May place
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
4 S 5 S
- Note that termination criteria can be met following transition from FR-S.1 back to E-0 (2nd 6 S time)
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
7 S 8 S 8 2 2 7 S
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Facility: Turkey Point Scenario: N5 Exam Date: 10/23/2017 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.
Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap 1 S
- Incorporate TS associated with HHSI 3B oil leak after Event 1 S
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- Include CCW tank level indication 614A for use by applicant during this event.
2 S - Page 13, revise field report to include that leak is isolated and specify that 832 is a throttle valve as a note to examiner
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- Revise CT1 success criteria to the Rx Trip setpoint of 1835 psig.
3 S - Revise event 3 to provide green light indication for breakers 30402 and 35001.
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- Outline comment resolved (event revised) 4 S - Page 17, listed TS is not applicable (mode of applicability), revise guide
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
5 S
- Page 19, insert breaker # manipulated for power swaps 6 S - Page 20, revise foldout criteria #5 to be listed as YES, once 3rd RCP is tripped -
provide auto trigger for Event 8 (include RCP foldout page actions)
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
7 S
- Page 23, revise E-1 note to state that operators may return to E-0, insert note that states that 3A EDG may have been started for Event 7 (pg 20) 8 S
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
8 2 2 8 S
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Facility: Turkey Point Scenario: N7 Exam Date: 10/23/2017 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.
Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap
- Outline comment resolved (event re-ordered) and reconfigure Event 1 to force a 1 S shutdown of the 3A2 CWP, then incorporate failure of MOV-3-1415
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- Outline comment resolved (event re-ordered) 2 S - Swap Event 2 with Event 5 (fuel failure), operational validity and Page 17, insert note that operators can place additional orifi in service as required.
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- Outline comment resolved (event re-ordered) 3 S - Page 20, revise cue and TS, add TS 3.1.3.1.c & 3.1.3.5 to TS call
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- Outline comment resolved
- CT for failure to isolate PORV leakage to be constrained by 283F (containment DB) and 4 S Page 21, revise sim report to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and insert note for fast load reduction that operators may lower power in manual
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- Overlap 2015-301 and outline comment resolved (event revised) 5 S - Top right BOP Step is not required. Un-highlight or restate to May place and swap Event 5 with Event 2 (3B S/G FRV controller), operational validity
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
- Page 30, Procedure transition to either E-0 or E-2 is earliest termination opportunity 6 (x2) S
- Corrected in Final Submittal.
7 S - Overlap 2015-301 8 S - CT3 removed.
8 2 2 6 S
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Instructions for Completing This Table:
Use this table for each scenario for evaluation.
2 Check this box if the events are not related (e.g., seismic event followed by a pipe rupture) OR if the events do not obey the laws of physics and thermodynamics.
3, 4 In columns 3 and 4, check the box if there is no verifiable or required action, as applicable. Examples of required actions are as follows: (ES-301, D.5f)
- opening, closing, and throttling valves
- starting and stopping equipment
- raising and lowering level, flow, and pressure
- making decisions and giving directions
- acknowledging or verifying key alarms and automatic actions (Uncomplicated events that require no operator action beyond this should not be included on the operating test unless they are necessary to set the stage for subsequent events. (Appendix D, B.3).)
5 Check this box if the level of difficulty is not appropriate.
6 Check this box if the event has a TS.
7 Check this box if the event has a critical task (CT). If the same CT covers more than one event, check the event where the CT started only.
8 Check this box if the event overlaps with another event on any of the last two NRC examinations. (Appendix D, C.1.f) 9 Based on the reviewers judgment, is the event as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 9.
10 Record any explanations of the events here.
In the shaded boxes, sum the number of check marks in each column.
- In column 1, sum the number of events.
- In columns 2-4, record the total number of check marks for each column.
- In column 5, based on the reviewer's judgement, place a checkmark only if the scenario's LOD is not appropriate.
- In column 6, TS are required to be 2 for each scenario. (ES-301, D.5.d)
- In column 8, record the number of events not used on the two previous NRC initial licensing exams. A scenario is considered unsatisfactory if there is < 2 new events. (ES-301, D.5.b; Appendix D, C.1.f)
- In column 9, record whether the scenario as written (U)nacceptable, in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory from column 11 of the simulator scenario table.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Facility: Turkey Point Exam Date: 10/23/2017 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 11 Scenario % Unsat. Explanation Event Events TS TS CT CT Scenario U/E/S Totals Unsat. Total Unsat. Total Unsat.
Elements N1 (Spare) 8 0 2 0 2 0 0 S N2 8 0 2 0 2 0 0 S N3 8 0 2 0 2 0 0 S N4 8 0 2 1 2 0 8.33 S N5 8 0 2 1 2 0 8.33 S N7 8 0 2 1 2 0 8.33 S Instructions for Completing This Table:
Check or mark any item(s) requiring comment and explain the issue in the space provided.
1, 3, 5 For each simulator scenario, enter the total number of events (column 1), TS entries/actions (column 3), and CTs (column 5).
This number should match the respective scenario from the event-based scenario tables (the sum from columns 1, 6, and 7, respectively).
2, 4, 6 For each simulator scenario, evaluate each event, TS, and CT as (S)atisfactory, (E)nhance, or (U)nsatisfactory based on the following criteria:
- a. Events. Each event is described on a Form ES-D-2, including all switch manipulations, pertinent alarms, and verifiable actions. Event actions are balanced between at-the-controls and balance-of-plant applicants during the scenario. All event-related attributes on Form ES-301-4 are met. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory events in column 2.
- b. TS. A scenario includes at least two TS entries/actions across at least two different events. TS entries and actions are detailed on Form ES-D-2. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory TS entries/actions in column 4. (ES-301, D.5d)
- c. CT. Check that a scenario includes at least two preidentified CTs. This criterion is a target quantitative attribute, not an absolute minimum requirement. Check that each CT is explicitly bounded on Form ES-D-2 with measurable performance standards (see Appendix D). Enter the total number of unsatisfactory CTs in column 6.
2+4+6 7 In column 7, calculate the percentage of unsatisfactory scenario elements: 100%
1+3+5 8 If the value in column 7 is > 20%, mark the scenario as (U)nsatisfactory in column 8. If column 7 is 20%, annotate with (E)nhancement or (S)atisfactory.
9 In column 9, explain each unsatisfactory event, TS, and CT. Editorial comments can also be added here.
Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Site name: Turkey Point Exam Date: 10/23/2017 OPERATING TEST TOTALS Total Total Total %
Total Explanation Unsat. Edits Sat. Unsat.
Admin.
9 1 4 4 JPMs Sim./In-Plant 11 0 7 4 JPMs Scenarios 6 0 6 0 Op. Test 26 1 17 8 3.85 Totals:
Instructions for Completing This Table:
Update data for this table from quality reviews and totals in the previous tables and then calculate the percentage of total items that are unsatisfactory and give an explanation in the space provided.
- 1. Enter the total number of items submitted for the operating test in the Total column. For example, if nine administrative JPMs were submitted, enter 9 in the Total items column for administrative JPMs.
For scenarios, enter the total number of simulator scenarios.
Enter the total number of (U)nsatisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the two JPMs column 5 and 2.
simulator scenarios column 8 in the previous tables. Provide an explanation in the space provided.
Enter totals for (E)nhancements needed and (S)atisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the previous 3.
tables. This task is for tracking only.
- 4. Total each column and enter the amounts in the Op. Test Totals row.
Calculate the percentage of the operating test that is (U)nsatisfactory (Op. Test Total Unsat.)/(Op. Test 5.
Total) and place this value in the bolded % Unsat. cell.
Refer to ES-501, E.3.a, to rate the overall operating test as follows:
- satisfactory, if the Op. Test Total % Unsat. is 20%
- unsatisfactory, if Op. Test Total % Unsat. is > 20%
Update this table and the tables above with post-exam changes if the as-administered operating test 6.
required content changes, including the following:
- The JPM performance standards were incorrect.
- The administrative JPM tasks/keys were incorrect.
- CTs were incorrect in the scenarios (not including postscenario critical tasks defined in Appendix D).
- The EOP strategy was incorrect in a scenario(s).
- TS entries/actions were determined to be incorrect in a scenario(s).
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Date of Exam:
RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* Total A2 G* Total
- 1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 3 3 6 Emergency and Abnormal Plant 2 1 1 2 N/A 2 2 N/A 1 9 2 2 4 Evolutions Tier Totals 4 4 5 5 5 4 27 5 5 10 1 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 28 3 2 5 2.
Plant 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 10 0 2 1 3 Systems Tier Totals 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 3 38 5 3 8
- 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 3 3 1 3 2 2 1 2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outline sections (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only section, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 radiation control K/A is allowed if it is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 category.)
- 2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points, and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
- 3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the outline. Systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification. Operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
- 4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible. Sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
- 5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
- 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
- 7. The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.
- 8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics IRs for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. If fuel-handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2. (Note 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
G* Generic K/As
- These systems/evolutions must be included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan. They are not required to be included when using earlier revisions of the K/A catalog.
- These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.
ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO/SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #
000007 (EPE 7; BW E02&E10; CE E02) 007EK1.02, Knowledge of the operational Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery / 1 X implications of the following concepts as 3.4 they apply to the reactor trip: Shutdown margin 000008 (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space 008AG2.1.20, Ability to interpret and Accident / 3 X execute procedure steps as they apply to 4.6 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident.
000009 (EPE 9) Small Break LOCA / 3 009EA1.04, Ability to operate and X monitor the following as they apply to a 3.7 small break LOCA: CVCS 000011 (EPE 11) Large Break LOCA / 3 011EK3.14, Knowledge of the reasons X for the following responses as the apply 4.1 to the Large Break LOCA: RCP tripping requirement 000015 (APE 15) Reactor Coolant Pump 015AA2.11, Ability to determine and Malfunctions / 4 X interpret the following as they apply to 3.4 the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): When to jog RCPs during ICC 000022 (APE 22) Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup / 2 000025 (APE 25) Loss of Residual Heat 025AG2.2.36, Ability to analyze the effect Removal System / 4 X of maintenance activities, such as 3.1 degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations as they apply to Loss of Residual Heat Removal System.
000026 (APE 26) Loss of Component 026AG2.2.42, Ability to recognize system Cooling Water / 8 X parameters that are entry-level conditions 3.9 for Technical Specifications as they apply to Loss of Component Cooling Water.
000027 (APE 27) Pressurizer Pressure 027AK2.03, Knowledge of the Control System Malfunction / 3 X interrelations between the Pressurizer 2.6 Pressure Control Malfunctions and the following: Controllers and positioners 000029 (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient 029EA2.06, Ability to determine or Without Scram / 1 X interpret the following as they apply to a 3.8 ATWS: Main turbine trip switch position indication 000038 (EPE 38) Steam Generator Tube 038EK1.02, Knowledge of the operational Rupture / 3 X implications of the following concepts as 3.2 they apply to the SGTR: Leak rate vs.
pressure drop 000040 (APE 40; BW E05; CE E05; W E12)
Steam Line RuptureExcessive Heat Transfer / 4
ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 000054 (APE 54; CE E06) Loss of Main 054AG2.4.2, Knowledge of system set Feedwater /4 X points, interlocks and automatic actions 4.6 associated with EOP entry conditions as they apply to Loss of Main Feedwater.
000055 (EPE 55) Station Blackout / 6 055EK3.02, Knowledge of the reasons X for the following responses as the apply 4.3 to the Station Blackout: Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite and onsite power 055EA2.06, Ability to determine or X 4.1 interpret the following as they apply to a Station Blackout: Faults and lockouts that must be cleared prior to re- energizing buses 000056 (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power / 6 000057 (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC 057AA2.02, Ability to determine and Instrument Bus / 6 X interpret the following as they apply to 3.7 the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus:
Core flood tank pressure and level indicators 000058 (APE 58) Loss of DC Power / 6 058AA1.02, Ability to operate and / or X monitor the following as they apply to 3.1 the Loss of DC Power: Static inverter dc input breaker, frequency meter, ac output breaker, and ground fault detector 058AG2.4.3, Ability to identify post-X 3.9 accident instrumentation as they apply to Loss of DC Power 000062 (APE 62) Loss of Nuclear Service 062AK3.02, Knowledge of the reasons Water / 4 X for the following responses as they apply 3.6 to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water:
The automatic actions (alignments) within the nuclear service water resulting from the actuation of the ESFAS 000065 (APE 65) Loss of Instrument Air / 8 065AA1.02, Ability to operate and / or X monitor the following as they apply to 2.6 the Loss of Instrument Air: Components served by instrument air to minimize drain on system 000077 (APE 77) Generator Voltage and 077AK2.06, Knowledge of the Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 X interrelations between Generator Voltage 3.9 and Electric Grid Disturbances and the following: Reactor power 077AA2.02, Ability to determine and X 3.6 interpret the following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: Voltage outside the generator capability curve
ES-401 4 Form ES-401-2 (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment / 3 WE04EG2.4.6, Knowledge of EOP X mitigation strategies as they apply to 4.7 LOCA Outside Containment (W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant WE11EK1.1, Knowledge of the 3.7 Recirculation / 4 X operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation):
Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems (BW E04; W E05) Inadequate Heat WE05EK2.2, Knowledge of the TransferLoss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 X interrelations between the (Loss of 3.9 Secondary Heat Sink) and the following:
Facilitys heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.
WE05EA2.1, Ability to determine and X 4.4 interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink): Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.
K/A Category Totals: 3 3 3 3 3/3 3/3 Group Point Total: 18/6
ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO/SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #
000001 (APE 1) Continuous Rod 001AA2.05, Ability to determine and Withdrawal / 1 X interpret the following as they apply to 4.4 the Continuous Rod Withdrawal:
Uncontrolled rod withdrawal, from available indications 000003 (APE 3) Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 (APE 5) Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 (APE 24) Emergency Boration / 1 000028 (APE 28) Pressurizer (PZR) Level 028AA2.03, Ability to determine and Control Malfunction / 2 X interpret the following as they apply to 2.8 the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: Charging subsystem flow indicator and controller 000032 (APE 32) Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 000033 (APE 33) Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 000036 (APE 36; BW/A08) Fuel-Handling 036AA2.02, Ability to determine and Incidents / 8 X interpret the following as they apply to 4.1 the Fuel Handling Incidents: Occurrence of a fuel handling incident 000037 (APE 37) Steam Generator Tube 037AA1.04, Ability to operate and / or Leak / 3 X monitor the following as they apply to 3.6 the Steam Generator Tube Leak:
Condensate air ejector exhaust radiation monitor and failure indicator 000051 (APE 51) Loss of Condenser 051AK3.01, Knowledge of the reasons Vacuum / 4 X for the following responses as they apply 2.8 to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum: Loss of steam dump capability upon loss of condenser vacuum 000059 (APE 59) Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release / 9 000060 (APE 60) Accidental Gaseous 060AK3.03, Knowledge of the reasons Radwaste Release / 9 X for the following responses as they apply 3.8 to the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste:
Actions contained in EOP for accidental gaseous-waste release 060AG2.4.35, Knowledge of local X 4.0 auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects as they apply to the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release
ES-401 6 Form ES-401-2 000061 (APE 61) Area Radiation 061AA2.03, Ability to determine and Monitoring System Alarms / 7 X interpret the following as they apply to 3.3 the Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM)
System Alarms: Setpoints for alert and high alarms 000067 (APE 67) Plant Fire On Site / 8 000068 (APE 68; BW A06) Control Room 068AG2.2.12, Knowledge of surveillance Evacuation / 8 X procedures as they apply to Control 3.7 Room Evacuation 000069 (APE 69; W E14) Loss of WE14EG2.4.4, Ability to recognize Containment Integrity / 5 X abnormal indications for system 4.7 operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures as they apply to Loss of Containment Integrity 000074 (EPE 74; W E06 & E07)
Inadequate Core Cooling / 4 000076 (APE 76) High Reactor Coolant 076AA1.04, Ability to operate and / or Activity / 9 X monitor the following as they apply to 3.2 the High Reactor Coolant Activity: Failed fuel-monitoring equipment 000078 (APE 78*) RCS Leak / 3 (W E01 & E02) Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 (W E13) Steam Generator Overpressure /
4 (W E15) Containment Flooding / 5 WE15EK2.1, Knowledge of the X interrelations between the (Containment 2.8 Flooding) and the following:
Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features (W E16) High Containment Radiation /9 (BW E08; W E03) LOCA Cooldown Depressurization / 4 (BW E09; CE A13**; W E09 & E10) Natural Circulation/4 (CE A11**; W E08) RCS Overcooling WE08EK1.1, Knowledge of the Pressurized Thermal Shock / 4 X operational implications of the following 3.8 concepts as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock):
Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.
K/A Category Point Totals: Group Point Total:
1 1 2 2 2/2 1/2 9/4
ES-401 7 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)
System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #
003K6.04, Knowledge of the effect of 003 (SF4P RCP) Reactor Coolant Pump X a loss or malfunction on the following 2.8 will have on the RCPS: Containment isolation valves affecting RCP operation 004A2.16, Ability to (a) predict the 004 (SF1; SF2 CVCS) Chemical and Volume Control X impacts of the following malfunctions 3.2 or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: T-ave.
and T-ref. deviations 004G2.4.46, Ability to verify that the X 4.2 alarms are consistent with the plant conditions as they apply to the CVCS 005K5.09, Knowledge of the 005 (SF4P RHR) Residual Heat Removal X operational implications of the 3.2 following concepts as they apply the RHRS: Dilution and boration considerations 006K4.09, Knowledge of ECCS 006 (SF2; SF3 ECCS) Emergency Core Cooling X design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) 3.9 which provide for the following: Valve positioning on safety injection signal 006A2.01, Ability to (a) predict the X 3.1 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
High bearing temperature 007K5.02, Knowledge of the 007 (SF5 PRTS) Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank X operational implications of the 3.1 following concepts as the apply to PRTS: Method of forming a steam bubble in the PZR 008K3.03, Knowledge of the effect 008 (SF8 CCW) Component Cooling Water X that a loss or malfunction of the 4.1 CCWS will have on the following:
ES-401 8 Form ES-401-2 010K4.03, Knowledge of PZR PCS 010 (SF3 PZR PCS) Pressurizer Pressure Control X design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) 3.8 which provide for the following: Over pressure control 010K5.02, Knowledge of the X 2.6 operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the PZR PCS: Constant enthalpy expansion through a valve 012K6.02, Knowledge of the effect of 012 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection X a loss or malfunction of the 2.9 following will have on the RPS:
Redundant channels 012A2.05, Ability to (a) predict the X 3.2 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Faulty or erratic operation of detectors and function generators 013K2.01, Knowledge of bus power 013 (SF2 ESFAS) Engineered Safety Features Actuation X supplies to the following: 3.6 ESFAS/safeguards equipment control 022K1.04, Knowledge of the physical 022 (SF5 CCS) Containment Cooling X connections and/or cause effect 2.9 relationships between the CCS and the following systems: Chilled water 022K3.02, Knowledge of the effect X 3.0 that a loss or malfunction of the CCS will have on the following:
Containment instrumentation readings 025 (SF5 ICE) Ice Condenser 026A4.01, Ability to manually operate 026 (SF5 CSS) Containment Spray X and/or monitor in the control room: 4.5 CSS controls
ES-401 9 Form ES-401-2 039A3.02, Ability to monitor 039 (SF4S MSS) Main and Reheat Steam X automatic operation of the MRSS, 3.1 including: Isolation of the MRSS 039A2.03, Ability to (a) predict the X 3.7 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) based on predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Indications and alarms for main steam and area radiation monitors (during SGTR) 059A1.03, Ability to predict and/or 059 (SF4S MFW) Main Feedwater X monitor changes in parameters 2.7 (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MFW controls including: Power level restrictions for operation of MFW pumps and valves 059K4.18, Knowledge of MFW X 3.0 design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
Automatic feedwater reduction on plant trip 061K2.01, Knowledge of bus power 061 (SF4S AFW)
Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X supplies to the following: AFW 3.2 system MOVs 061K6.02, Knowledge of the effect of X 2.6 a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the AFW components:
Pumps 062A1.03, Ability to predict and/or 062 (SF6 ED AC) AC Electrical Distribution X monitor changes in parameters (to 2.5 prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ac distribution system controls including:
Effect on instrumentation and controls of switching power supplies 063G2.1.7, Ability to evaluate plant 063 (SF6 ED DC) DC Electrical Distribution X performance and make operational 4.4 judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation as they apply to the DC electrical system 063K1.02, Knowledge of the physical X 2.7 connections and/or cause effect relationships between the DC electrical system and the following systems: AC electrical system
ES-401 10 Form ES-401-2 064K1.01, Knowledge of the physical 064 (SF6 EDG) Emergency Diesel Generator X connections and/or cause effect 4.1 relationships between the ED/G system and the following systems:
AC distribution system 073A2.02, Ability to (a) predict the 073 (SF7 PRM) Process Radiation Monitoring X impacts of the following malfunctions 2.7 or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Detector failure 076A3.02, Ability to monitor 076 (SF4S SW) Service Water X automatic operation of the SWS, 3.7 including: Emergency heat loads 076A4.02, Ability to manually operate X 2.6 and/or monitor in the control room:
SWS valves 076G2.1.23, Ability to perform X specific system and integrated plant 4.4 procedures during all modes of plant operation as the apply to the SWS 078A4.01, Ability to manually operate 078 (SF8 IAS) Instrument Air X and/or monitor in the control room: 3.1 Pressure gauges 103A2.03, Ability to (a) predict the 103 (SF5 CNT) Containment X impacts of the following malfunctions 3.5 or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations Phase A and B isolation 103G2.4.8, Knowledge of how X 4.5 abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs as they apply to the Containment System 053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*) Integrated Control K/A Category Point Totals: 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 3/3 2 3 2/2 Group Point Total: 28/5
ES-401 11 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (RO/SRO)
System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #
001 (SF1 CRDS) Control Rod 001K2.05, Knowledge of bus power Drive X supplies to the following: M/G sets 3.1 002 (SF2; SF4P RCS) Reactor Coolant 011 (SF2 PZR LCS) Pressurizer 011K3.01, Knowledge of the effect Level Control X that a loss or malfunction of the PZR 3.2 LCS will have on the following: CVCS 014 (SF1 RPI) Rod Position 014G2.2.25, Knowledge of the bases Indication X in Technical Specifications for limiting 4.2 conditions for operations and safety limits as they apply to the RPIS 015 (SF7 NI) Nuclear 015K1.01, Knowledge of the physical Instrumentation X connections and/or cause effect 4.1 relationships between the NIS and the following systems: RPS 016 (SF7 NNI) Nonnuclear Instrumentation 017 (SF7 ITM) In-Core Temperature Monitor 027 (SF5 CIRS) Containment Iodine Removal 028 (SF5 HRPS) Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 (SF8 CPS) Containment 029A1.03, Ability to predict and/or Purge X monitor changes in parameters to 3.0 prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Containment Purge System controls including: Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity 029A2.04, Ability to (a) predict the X 3.2 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Containment Purge System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Health physics sampling of containment atmosphere 033 (SF8 SFPCS) Spent Fuel Pool 033A2.02, Ability to (a) predict the Cooling X impacts of the following malfunctions 3.0 or operations on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of SFPCS
ES-401 12 Form ES-401-2 034 (SF8 FHS) Fuel-Handling Equipment 035 (SF 4P SG) Steam Generator 041 (SF4S SDS) Steam 041K5.06, Knowledge of the Dump/Turbine Bypass Control X operational implications of the 2.5 following concepts as the apply to the SDS: Effect of power change on fuel cladding 045 (SF 4S MTG) Main Turbine 045K4.01, Knowledge of MT/G Generator X system design feature(s) and/or 2.7 interlock(s) which provide for the following: Programmed controller for relationship between steam pressure at T/G inlet (impulse, first stage) and plant power level 055 (SF4S CARS) Condenser Air 055G2.1.19, Ability to use plant Removal X computers to evaluate system or 3.9 component status.
056 (SF4S CDS) Condensate 056A2.04, Ability to (a) predict the X impacts of the following malfunctions 2.6 or operations on the Condensate System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of condensate pumps 068 (SF9 LRS) Liquid Radwaste 071 (SF9 WGS) Waste Gas Disposal 072 (SF7 ARM) Area Radiation 072A4.01, Ability to manually operate Monitoring X and/or monitor in the control room: 3.0 Alarm and interlock setpoint checks and adjustments 075 (SF8 CW) Circulating Water 079 (SF8 SAS**) Station Air 086 Fire Protection 086A3.01, Ability to monitor automatic X operation of the Fire Protection 2.9 System including: Starting mechanisms of fire water pumps 050 (SF 9 CRV*) Control Room Ventilation K/A Category Point Totals: 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1/2 1 1 1/1 Group Point Total: 10/3
ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: Date of Exam:
Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-only IR # IR #
Knowledge of administrative requirements for G2.1.15 temporary management directives, such as standing 2.7 orders, night orders, Operations memos, etc.
Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and G2.1.31 indications, and to determine that they correctly 4.6 reflect the desired plant lineup.
- 1. Conduct of Operations Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement G2.1.42 procedures. 2.5 Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements. 4.2 G2.1.1 Knowledge of procedures and limitations involved in G2.1.36 core alterations. 4.1 Subtotal G2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures. 3.7 Knowledge of the process for controlling equipment G2.2.14 configuration or status. 3.9 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility G2.2.38
- 2. Equipment license. 3.6 Control Ability to determine operability and/or availability of G2.2.37 safety related equipment. 4.6 Knowledge of the process for conducting special or G2.2.7 infrequent tests. 3.6 Subtotal Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards 3.4 G2.3.14 that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.
- 3. Radiation Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as Control G2.3.15 fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey 3.1 instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.
Subtotal Knowledge of general operating crew responsibilities G2.4.12 during emergency operations. 4.0 Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP G2.4.20 warnings, cautions, and notes. 3.8 Knowledge of the organization of the operating G2.4.5
- 4. Emergency procedures network for normal, abnormal, and 3.7 Procedures/Plan emergency evolutions.
Knowledge of fire protection procedures.
2.4.25 3.7 Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency 2.4.40 plan implementation. 4.5 Subtotal Tier 3 Point Total 10 7
L-17-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 No rejected K/As.
Tier/Group Randomly Reason for Rejection Selected K/A ES-401-4 pg 1 of 1
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts:
- 1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
- 2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question a 1 (easy) to 5 (difficult); questions with a difficulty between 2 and 4 are acceptable.
- 3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:
- Stem Focus: The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).
- Cues: The stem or distractors contain cues (e.g., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length).
- T/F: The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.
- Cred. Dist.: The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, and more than one is unacceptable.
- Partial: One or more distractors are partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by the stem).
- 4. Check the appropriate box if a job content flaw is identified:
- Job Link: The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid K/A but, as written, is not operational in content).
- Minutia: The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed-reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).
- #/Units: The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).
- Backward: The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.
- 5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved K/A and those K/As that are designated SRO-only. (K/A and license-level mismatches are unacceptable.)
- 6. Enter questions source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Verify that (M)odified questions meet the criteria of Form ES-401, Section D.2.f.
- 7. Based on the reviewers judgment, is the question, as written, (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?
- 8. At a minimum, explain any U status ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).
Revision History Revision 0 - 8/2/2017: Pre-Review test item NRC review Post-Exam Comment Q34 resulting in question deletion modifies RO % UNSAT to Revision 1 - 8/18/2017: Draft Submittal NRC review (Questions 1-30 transmitted 8/21) (Questions31-100 transmitted 8/25) be 19% UNSAT.
Revision 2 - 9/7/2017: Draft Submittal Facility review Post-Exam Comment Q89 resulting in answer key change modifies SRO %
Revision 3 - 9/18/2017: 2nd Draft Submittal Facility review UNSAT to be 28% UNSAT.
Revision 4 - 10/11/2017: Final Submittal NRC review
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (H%) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N (Prev used) U/S Explanation (50-60% H% RO)
Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 35/40 (53%) 1 13 2 1 7/14/54 (0 RO) 13/62 RO - #10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 25, 35, 40, 53, 56, 61, 65 (17% Unsat) 4/21 (84%) 2 3 2 5 (2)/3/17 (2 SRO) 6/19 SRO - #79, 82, 83, 90, 92, 98 (24% Unsat)
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only Rev 0 Generic Comments:
- Addition of full procedures to ensure compliance with submittal of ES-401-5 information is not required. There is very good highlighting and explanations provided in the attached procedures of the pre-review package, only those marked pages should be included for individual questions.
- It is clear that a significant amount of effort went into ensuring sufficient KA matches for these pre-reviewed questions. However, in some cases this became all too evident in the form of cues incorporated into the questions (whether by inclusion of stem information or using references). Inappropriate cueing can, in many cases, invalidate the plausibility for distractors. Feedback is provided below to indicate ways this can be avoided, but in some cases, significant modification or wholesale swap out of question statements or answer choices may be required.
- There are some instances of multiple correct answers being present. This is typically due to vague or non-specific wording used in question statements that can be considered to have more than one correct answer. It is unfavorable to present applicants with questions/answer choices that result in the decision making of which one of these is the most correct answer. For NRC exams, there should be only one correct answer, with all other choices incorrect.
Rev 1 Generic Comment:
- Ensure examination references are verified. There appear to be some references included in the package which do not require inclusion (spider curves).
1 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- 2nd half question appears to only require knowledge of whether SI actuation has occurred to answer (i.e. no knowledge of SDM required to answer this half question). This half question also strays closely to SRO LOK. 2nd half question is a tack-on question. (Stem Focus)
(?) Can revise question statements to (1) 1st half question above/ below or 537F/ other plausible temperature, with 2nd half question remaining 20 gpm/ 45 gpm Rev 2 comment
- 1st half question remains the same, 2nd half question 537/547 - when boration is required Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
2 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 3 F 3 B S Rev 1 comment (2010 - Arent SI/RHR pump starts related to RCS pressure (given at Diablo 450#)? Remove one of these two initial conditions (no need for both).
Canyon) (Stem Focus)
Rev 2 comment
- Removed 3rd bullet, revised 1st two bullets (LOCA, SI cold leg injection flowrate provided)
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
4 H 3 M S Rev 1 comment (2009 - How is answer choice c not an additional correct answer based on McGuire) an unstated assumption? (Partially correct)
- Answer choices a and b appear to be cued for this question due to their presence in both in the initial conditions and current conditions for this question. (Cueing)
Rev 2 comment
- C is incorrect due to use of the word NEXT. Adjust last bullet to read, RCP support conditions are not currently met. Stem conditions changed to remove cueing concern (3rd bullet under given conditions).
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
5 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Remove Assuming no operator action. This is addressed in NUREG-1021, Appendix E. Applicants should assume normal plant response unless specific conditions are stated in the question. (Stem Focus)
Rev 2 comment
- Removed assume no operator action. 2nd half question tests 3.5.2 spec from perspective of other unit.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 6 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Remove the word failure from each question statement as this implies a given equipment condition as opposed to the applicant making the determination. (Cueing)
Rev 2 comment
- Removed the word failure.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
7 H 3 M S Rev 1 comment (2010 - Remove Assuming no operator action. This is addressed in Turkey NUREG-1021, Appendix E. Applicants should assume normal plant Point) response unless specific conditions are stated in the question. (Stem Focus)
(?) Can use the concept of time to clearly define when the applicant should be making the determination for answering of a given question (e.g. Given the following conditions at 1000 followed by The PC-3-444J, xxx, will immediately indicate a demand of ___.
Rev 2 comment
- Removed assume no operator action. 1st half question revised to shifts to __ and 2nd half question revised to INITIALLY rises/lowers.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 8 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- What is the purpose of including the 4th Subsequently bullet. SG NR level doesnt appear to require evaluation to arrive at the correct answer for this question. (Stem Focus)
- How are B.2/D.2 answer choices incorrect? Would a procedural tie be more appropriate here (i.e. IAW 3-EOP-FR-S.1, operators will confirm the Turbine Trip by observation of ___). (Partially correct)
Rev 2 comment
- 4th bullet is required to answer the question. Procedure incorporated into 2nd half question.
Rev 3 comment
- Revised 1st half question statement for clarity.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
9 H 3 N S Rev 0 comment
- First half question technically has multiple correct answers. Both depressurization and cooldown are performed after ruptured SG isolation in E-3.
- Second half question also has multiple correct answers (as indicated in justification statements). The entire basis for performing both depress and cooldown are to minimize 1o to 2o leakage.
Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 10 F 3 M S Rev 1 comment (2010 - What is the basis for the 3rd Given Condition bullet? Does not Turkey appear to be used to answer this question. (Stem Focus)
Point)
- There is no indication of a SG tube rupture performed for this question. How are A.2/C.2 distractors plausible? (Credible distractors)
(?) Can revise 2nd half question to incorporate 140#/ 220# or ECA-0.0 does/does NOT specify maintaining SG pressure >
140 psig)
Rev 2 comment
- Recommended changes incorporated into question.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
11 H 3 N S Rev 0 comment
- A closer K/A tie is available for this question (conversion to 1x4 question from 2x2 using a given set of indications). (no revision required)
Rev 1 comment
- Question is now composed of two separate concepts (i.e. whether a Rx Trip occurs due to loss of power panel and how CFT indications are affected by loss of power panel). 1st half question is a tack-on question. (Stem Focus)
Rev 2 comment
- Will revert to using the pre-review question instead of the Draft version for this question. Question would then be considered SAT.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 12 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Revise 1st half question to read, The 3C Normal Inverter will AUTOMATICALLY/ requires MANUAL transfer to the CVT. (Stem Focus)
- As written, there appears to be multiple correct answers to the 2nd half question. A procedural tie should be used here to differentiate the answer choices (i.e. IAW 3-ONOP-003.5, operators will open xxx to support restoration of the 3D23 Bus). (Partially correct)
Rev 2 comment
- Both comments incorporated into question.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
13 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Use of the phrase will be in the question statements implies an operator action. Revise question statements to read, Based on the given conditions, 3B/3C ICW Pump will AUTOMATICALLY/ requires a MANUAL start. (Stem Focus)
Rev 2 comment
- Comment incorporated.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 14 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- What is basis for including the 2nd Given Condition bullet? Appears that this can be removed. (Stem Focus)
- K/A is not matched by this question. Question posed is a setpoint question related to the IA header isolation valves. (Q=K/A)
- Justification statement for C.1/D.1 distractor refers to the hogging jet. There doesnt appear to be any stem information to support making any determination based on operation of the hogging jet.
(Credible distractors)
- How are the A.2/C.2 distractors plausible with the given un-isolable IA leak? Additionally, justification statement specifies potential evaluation of H2 makeup as a justification for this distractor. There doesnt appear to be any such evaluation included with this question.
(Credible distractors)
Rev 2 comment
- Still a F LOK question. 1st comment incorporated.
Rev 3 comment
- Question significantly revised. Given an IA line break on U3 with indications, 1st half question- U3 IA system will be automatically/
requires manual isolation from U4, 2nd half question- IA press to U3 Turb Area will be automatically/requires manual isolation.
Rev 4 comment
- Grammer of answer choices revised. Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 15 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Remove Assuming no operator action. This is addressed in NUREG-1021, Appendix E. Applicants should assume normal plant response unless specific conditions are stated in the question. (Stem Focus)
- Incorporate an indication of grid frequency to ensure plausibility of C.1/D.1 distractors (e.g. Grid Frequency indicates 60 Hz and steady).
(Stem Focus)
- Justification statement for A.2/C.2 distractor doesnt align with wording of distractor. Is the intent for this half answer choice to ask whether a uV trip of the RCPs will result in a direct reactor trip?
Conversely, is critical reactor operation permitted following a trip of all RCPs? As written, the A.2/C.2 distractor doesnt appear to be plausible. (Credible distractors)
- Justification statement for A.1/B.1 answer choice states that TCS is in manual, however the reference provided states that the Main Turbine should be maintained in MANUAL control. Is there a potential for an incorrect answer selection based on an unstated assumption? (Stem Focus)
Rev 2 comment
- First two comments applied to question.
Rev 3 comment
- Revised 2nd half question to ask if degraded load center voltage provides a direct reactor trip.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 16 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Is the intent of the first half question to be IAW ECA-1.2? What aspect of the 1st half question disqualifies C.1/D.1? (Stem Focus)
- How is selection of the B.2/D.2 distractor plausible? What given information justifies that SI has actuated and could require termination? (Credible distractors)
- 2nd half portion of this question appears to reside at the SRO level of knowledge (procedure selection). (SRO only)
Rev 2 comment
- 1st comment applied. Question revised to be a 1x4 asking for which parameter is used to verify leakage isolation.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
17 H 3 M S Rev 1 comment (2010 - Is an unstated assumption required to answer the first half question Turkey (i.e. operation of RHR/CSP pumps)? RHR/CSP pumps are not Point) addressed in given conditions. (Stem Focus)
(?) An option is available for the 1st half question is to state, IAW ECA-1.1, the 3A Charging Pump is/ is NOT required to be secured.
- Revise CET subcooling to be a value greater than 69oF to assure plausibility of A.2/C.2 distractors. These distractors are currently implausible with the question as written. (Credible distractors)
Rev 2 comment
- RHR/HHSI pump conditions are now provided in initial conditions (all running on Unit 3). Removed mention of CSP pumps from answer choices. CET subcooling changed to 70F.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 18 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- 5th Given condition bullet can be removed, stated in question stem.
Is 2nd bullet required? (Stem Focus)
- Wording of 1st half question statements is confusing. Appears that intent of question was to test knowledge of RPV vent usage. (Stem Focus)
(?) To establish an RCS bleed path IAW FR-H.1, operators will/ will NOT open all RCS vents.
- It is implausible that charging pumps would be secured or not used in FR-H.1 (plausibility of A.2/D.2 distractor). Can be revised.
(Credible distractors)
(?) BOTH Charging Pumps are/ are NOT required. Or BOTH/ ONLY one Charging Pump(s) are required.
Rev 2 comment
- 1st comment above incorporated. 1st half question modified to test FIRST flowpath used PORVs/RCS Vent Valves. 2nd half question is modified to ONLY ONE/ ALL AVAILABLE.
Rev 3 comment
- To ensure plausibility for 2nd half question, new bullet added that states 3A CCP is OOS Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
19 H 3 N S Rev 0 comment
- Initial condition of Unit 3 is at 50% power and stable is provided with the given initial PRNM information.
Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 20 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Remove Assuming no operator action. This is addressed in NUREG-1021, Appendix E. Applicants should assume normal plant response unless specific conditions are stated in the question. (Stem Focus)
Rev 2 comment
- Removed per comment above.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
21 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
22 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 23 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Remove Given conditions and 3rd Subsequently bullet. Information not needed to answer the given question and plant equipment is assumed to operate as designed unless stated in a given question.
(Stem Focus)
- A.1 and B.1 answer choices appear to be unclearly portrayed.
Based on the provided reference, manual operation (assumed to be direct, i.e. using the local valve operator) of RCV-014 is not attempted in the event of automatic valve closure failure. Instead, driving the hand loader to zero (air actuated valve?) is performed.
(Stem Focus)
(?) An option available is to revise 1st half question to read, Based on the conditions above, manual operator action is/ is NOT required to close RCV-014.
- Verify no overlap between question knowledge required to answer this question and 1st bullet under field operator report for SRO Question #83.
Rev 2 comment
- 1st comment applied. Revised question order for clarity. Question
- 83 bullet adjusted to simply state that RCV-14 is closed (remove overlap issue).
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 24 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Insert a comma (i.e. ,) after the word LOCAL in the question statement. (Editorial)
- Answer choice A is implausible and requires repair (single implausible distractor).
- All distractors for this question are false. This question is a collection of True/False statements as only answer choice C (the correct answer) is a true statement. Revision of at least one additional answer choice to make it a true statement (but not correct based on the question statement) is required. (T/F)
Rev 2 comment
- Editorial comment applied. Changed A distractor to make it possible but not correct for the question. Facility has a LOD concern with question.
Rev 3 comment
- Facility to pursue variation of:
(?) WOOTF is correct for 1606 accept criteria during performance of 3-OSP-300.1?
Testing of the 1606 does/ does NOT require local/remote sw in remote.
With remote/local sw in local, the annunciator is required to be in alarm/ clear.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 25 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- 2nd half question is a tack-on question unrelated to the 1st half question or the given K/A statement (i.e. focused only on the high RCS activity component of the situation). (Stem Focus)
- It is unclear with the given question, if Failed fuel-monitoring equipment is being evaluated with the question statement. Does this question only concern normal operation of R-3-20 in an alarming state? (Potential Q=K/A for first half question)
Rev 2 comment
- F LOK question. Question modified, 1st half question asks what happens to letdown in the event of high PRMS activity (R-3-20), 2nd half question asks if RO will/ will NOT perform operability check of R-3-20 per procedure.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
26 F 3 M S Rev 1 comment (2010 - Question is SAT.
Turkey Point) 27 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
28 H 3 M S Rev 1 comment (2009 - Question listed as a Bank question, but this is actually a modified Turkey question.
Point)
- Question statement reference to SI effect (i.e. effect of this SI actuation on RCPs) listed in conjunction with MSLB outside containment removes plausibility from answer choices A and B (phase B listed as justification). (Cueing)
Rev 2 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 29 H 3 S Rev 1 comment
- 1st half question is a tack-on question unrelated to the 2nd half question or the given K/A statement (i.e. procedure selection to mitigate Tref failure vs. CVCS impact). (Stem Focus)
(?) Perhaps Tref failure value can be asked as it pertains to B4/4 annunciator response procedure entry criteria and incorporated as 1st half question.
Rev 2 comment
- Question is fine as is, the second half question is ordered in a way that is peculiar. Facility will look at order to revise question.
Rev 3 comment
- VCT level bullet removed, ANN B4/4 alarms with picture of recorder Tref-561, Tave-pegged high, 1st half question revised to read CCP speed lowers/increases., 2nd half question remains similar with new answer choice- trip applicable bistables (1st half, old to 2nd half, new). Remove procedure numbers from end of answer choices.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
30 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Plausibility for answer choices B, C, and D all rely on the misconception that seal return header pressure is > CCW pressure.
The as-written question only requires knowledge of seal return/CCW D/P values. As-written question contains a form of collection of T/F statements. (T/F)
(?) To correct, at least one of the distractor choices requires modification to be true but unrelated to receipt of annunciator H8/6.
Rev 2 comment
- Stem revised to ask about ARP response, tube leakage verified by:
chemical level.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 31 H 3 B S Rev 1 comment (2010 - Justification statement for answer choice A is unclear. How is Time Turkey to Boil addressed by answer choice A?
Point)
- Revise Subsequently statement to read, The Manipulator Crane Operator requests that the 4B RHR Pump be stopped or RHR flow be reduced to less than 1000 gpm for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (duration of activity).
Revise answer choice A to read, flow is allowed to be reduced 1000 gpm for duration of activity, then raised back to 3500 gpm.
Rev 2 comment
- All comments incorporated.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
32 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
33 F 3 N S Rev 0 comment
- Cueing of a low pressure plant condition is provided in the stem information. There are three instances where the phrase Low Pressure is utilized in addition to the given low pressure value and the provided task (drawing a bubble).
Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
34 H 3 N S Rev 0 comment
- Remove the first statement after Subsequently as this implies that a reactor trip is a required action of 3-ONOP-030 (i.e.teaching in the question stem)
- Answer choice B doesnt appear to be plausible based on the given DCS information compared to the actual answer choice. The given DCS information indicates that the Motor Bearing Cooling Water Hi Temp Alarm is GREEN and indicated as NORMAL for all RCPs.
Why would a NORMAL indication be trip criteria for all RCPs?
Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 35 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Is MANUAL valve operation ever removed due to a permissive?
Unless mistaken, how are answer choices B2/D2 plausible?
Justification statement mentions a manual block, but question is clearly focused on use of a specific PRZ permissive. (Credible distractors)
Rev 2 comment
- Steam dumps to condenser become unavailable when < 20 vac.
There is precedent for this concept however, additional work is required for second half question.
Rev 3 comment
- Facility has revised this question. PT-3-445 failure high with plant initially at 50% power, with no operator action, final expected plant response A. Pzr press cycle at 2000 #
B. Pzr press cycle at 2335#
C. Unit trip on Hi Pzr lvl (potential correct answer, ensure justification statement proves this is incorrect)
D. Unit trip on low Pzr Press Rev 4 comment
- Question revised following Prep Week conversation. Question is SAT.
36 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
37 H 3 B S Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 38 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Remove Assuming no operator action. This is addressed in NUREG-1021, Appendix E. Applicants should assume normal plant response unless specific conditions are stated in the question. (Stem Focus)
- This question appears to be valid if the CCW system were specified in the K/A (i.e. knowledge of power supplies/effect of loss of power as they relate to CCW). The as-written question does not address NUREG-1122 K/A area 013, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System. (Q=K/A)
(?) Perhaps a ESFAS logic timer/manual reset question related to loss of power supply? Or, ESFAS instrument power supply/effect question?
- Ensure this is a Higher Cognitive question.
Rev 2 comment
- First comment incorporated. CCW is considered an ESFAS system in the UFSAR (Table 8.4-1) and 3-OSP-203.1.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
39 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- As-written, the 1st half question is unclear what system is being asked about (i.e. chilled water?, system usage?). (Stem Focus)
(?) Was the following statement intended:
To address elevated containment temperature conditions, operators will/ will NOT align chilled water from the Supplemental Cooling System (SCS) to Normal Containment Cooling (NCC?) IAW NOP-030.01, xxx
- Second half question statement should be shortened. An elevated containment temperature __(2)__ cause an AUTOMATIC isolation of the Supplemental Cooling System (SCS).
Rev 2 comment
- 1st half question revised as above (without procedure #). 2nd half question revised as recommended above.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 40 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Justification statement for 1st half question specifies a TS limit.
There is no mention of TS limit evaluation in the question statement.
Additionally, with the plant initially at 100% power, it is not plausible that the given casualty (SLB inside containment) would not result in adverse containment conditions. Particularly since there is no bounding on the question statement (i.e. 1 min after the casualty or 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> after the casualty). (Credible distractors)
Rev 2 comment
- Will incorporate an additional bullet under Subsequently to state a peak containment pressure (15 psig) to ensure CSP actuation does not affect answers and adds plausibility for 1st half question distractor statements.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
41 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Multiple correct answers since there is no question bounding for 2nd half question and the only given condition is 17 psig and rising.
(Partially correct)
(?) Can be addressed by adding a time component to this question, i.e. casualty occurred at 1000 with containment pressure 14 psig and rising at 1 psig/min, 2nd half question could read:
At 1002, MOV, is/ is NOT open. (no need for the word expected)
Statement of 17 psig and stable may also work (verification required).
Rev 2 comment
- Time component added to ensure only one correct answer, as recommended above.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 42 F 3 M S Rev 1 comment (2013 - Question is SAT.
Turkey Point) 43 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Revise the 1st given condition to state, Unit 3 is stable at 24%
power (Stem Focus)
Rev 2 comment
- Comment incorporated above.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
44 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Unstated assumption required to answer this question (i.e.
applicants have to assume no change in SGWL moving forward, which may not be appropriate). (Stem Focus)
(?) Can correct by re-wording answer statements for 1st half question to: have/ have NOT automatically tripped.
(?) Can correct by re-wording 2nd half question to: The Main Feedwater Control Valves have automatically __(2)__
closed.
Rev 2 comment
- Comment incorporated above.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
45 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
46 H 3 B S Rev 1 comment (2009 - Question is SAT.
Turkey Point)
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 47 H 3 M S Rev 1 comment (2010 - 2nd bullet of given conditions appears to be misplaced and should Turkey be relocated under the Subsequently information. Also, 2nd bullet of Point) given conditions appears to provide power supply cueing. Revise this bullet to read, The 3A Inverter has failed. (Stem Focus, Cueing)
(?) Is the information that loads are verified on the CVT required to answer this question?
- 3rd bullet of given conditions appears to provide power supply cueing. Revise this bullet to read, The BS Inverter is in service.
(Cueing)
Rev 2 comment
- Comments incorporated.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
48 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Is this question being asked with respect to a procedure? It appears that all first half answer choices can be considered correct with the as-written question. Justification statement for 1st half answer choice specifies that Rx Trip has precedence, where is the procedural reference for this? (Partially correct, Stem Focus)
(?) The 1st half question could be asked from a procedural perspective, however, that may elevate this question to the SRO LOK. It would be more appropriate to revise the 1st half question to read, Based on the conditions above, a reactor trip has/ has NOT occurred.
(?) To remove overlap issue between 1st and 2nd half question statements, 2nd half question can be revised to read, In the event of a subsequent SI signal, the Unit 4 Train B Rev 2 comment
- Comments incorporated.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
49 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 50 H 3 M S Rev 1 comment
- 2nd half answer is cued by stem information reduce. (Cueing)
(?) Revise question statement to read, To adjust 3A EDG reactive load to a setting of 700 kVAR LAG, an adjustment of the 3A EDG __(1)__ switch in the __(2)__ direction is required.
- Language of justification statement should be consistent with as-written question (use of VARS in/out vs. LEAD/LAG)
Rev 2 comment
- Comment incorporated above.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
51 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Addition of 3rd given condition bullet is confusing when addressing the question. A question should not be written to add ambiguity or to increase uncertainty. (Stem Focus)
- Based on the subject matter being requested, the second half question may exceed the RO LOK due to asking about administrative requirements not contained in the RO job function. (Job-Link, LOD)
Rev 2 comment
- 1st comment incorporated above.
Rev 3 comment
- Facility has tied subject matter to learning objective to ensure RO LOK. Facility will use Obj# 6918150, 9.e to ensure RO LOK tie.
Rev 4 comment
- Revision to question stem required for clarity. Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 52 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Addition of both the 1st and 2nd bullets under Subsequently is not required to answer this question. Provides cueing for 1st half question. Remove 2nd bullet under Subsequently. (Cueing)
- Addition of the 2nd bullet under given conditions and the 3rd bullet under Subsequently statements doesnt appear to be required to answer this question. Both statements can be removed. (Stem Focus)
Rev 2 comment
- Editorial changes performed to remove cueing and ensure stem focus.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 53 H 3 M S Rev 1 comment (2013 - Information included in stem that doesnt appear to be required to Turkey answer the question. (Stem Focus)
Point)
(?) Remove 2nd bullet under Subsequently
- B2 and D2 distractor statement is implausible with 2nd half question statement (i.e. power reduction on loss of cooling water flow is never a wrong answer choice when unable to restore plant parameters).
(Credible distractors)
(?) Can revise question statements to read, IAW 4-ONOP-019, The crew will throttle 4-50-401, xxx,/ 4-50-406, xxx to ensure less than 18,500 gpm total ICW flow/ 110 degrees TPCW Hx outlet temperature.
Rev 2 comment
- Question modified to incorporate 1st comment above and incorporated question restructure above (2nd half answer choices toggle between flow/motor amps). Facility to incorporate a motor amp reading into question stem to ensure plausibility of 2nd half distractors.
Rev 3 comment
- Facility took snapshot of board indications to incorporate into question. Since simulator used was U3, revised question to be U3.
Facility to use ammeter indication that shows pump operation outside normal range. 1st half question - required to manipulate, 401/407, 2nd half question - what is required to be monitored, ICW temp/motor amps.
Rev 4 comment
- Replace the word throttle with manipulate. Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 54 H 3 M S Rev 1 comment (2010 - Question is labelled as Bank but appears to be Modified.
Turkey
- Revise 2nd bullet under Subsequently to read, Both control room Point) instrument air pressure indicators slowly lower to 96 psig before rising to, and stabilizing at, 110 psig. (Stem Focus)
- Answer choices dont read correctly due to being separated, revise question statement to combine, (e.g. ELECTRIC LAG Compressor has failed to start and DIESEL STANDBY-LEAD Compressor is running loaded) (Stem Focus)
Rev 2 comment
- 1st two comments incorporated above. Last comment applied to question.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
55 H 3 M S Rev 1 comment (2013 - Question is labelled as Bank but appears to be Modified.
Turkey
- Question is SAT.
Point) 56 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- How is it plausible for Unit 4 power supplies to be considered as normal Unit 3 MG set power supplies (answer choices A and C)? Are cross-unit power supplies present for any other component in the CRD system? (Credible distractors)
(?) Can revise A and C answer choices to have cross-divisional Unit 3 power supplies.
Rev 2 comment
- Facility to pursue use of other power supplies Rev 3 comment
- Facility revised question to state CR MG Sets are powered from Vital/ Non-Vital power supplies from Load Centers/ MCCs.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 57 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Remove Assuming no operator action. This is addressed in NUREG-1021, Appendix E. Applicants should assume normal plant response unless specific conditions are stated in the question. (Stem Focus)
- Does this failure (LT-3-459) have overlap with the scenario operating test?
- Does the justification statement for answer choice C imply that an unstated assumption is required to answer this question (i.e. plant in Position 2)? What Position is justification statement referring to?
Rev 2 comment
- No overlap concern with scenario sets. Justification statement adjusted.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
58 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Revise question statement for clarity and to eliminate multiple correct answers, The At Power Reactor Trips will be enabled when a MINIMUM of __(1)__ Power Range Nuclear Instruments read a MINIMUM of __(2)__ reactor power. (Stem Focus, Partially correct)
Rev 2 comment
- Comments applied above.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 59 H 3 M S Rev 1 comment (2013 - Of the answer choices presented, only one concerns a parameter Turkey change (the correct answer), with all others relating to equipment Point) operation. Revise one distractor to be a parameter change (e.g. A.
Containment pressure rises). (Credible distractors)
- The change performed above will reclassify this question as modified.
Rev 2 comment
- A distractor revised to state that Containment Pressure rises.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
60 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
61 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- What is basis for use of 43% as justification for B2/D2 distractors (no reason provided in write-up)? Calculation performed to justify correct answer choice resulted in 42%. (Credible distractors)
(?) Can correct by revising B2/D2 answer choices to 58%.
Rev 2 comment
- Comment incorporated.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
62 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Is any indication of condenser air-in leakage available for another screen on the DCS display? Is this half question asking whether air-in leakage can be detected or if there is a dedicated air-in leakage parameter reading available? (Partially correct)
Rev 2 comment
- 2nd half question revised to state leakage readout is/ is NOT available.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 63 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- 2nd half question revision required.
Rev 2 comment
- 2nd half question revised to ask if Rx trip is required.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
64 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
65 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Answer choices C1/D1 are implausible due to use of deluge system as fire pump initiator. (Credible distractors)
(?) Revise 1st half question and answer choices to state, The fire pumps receive an AUTOMATIC start signal from a pressure/ flow actuated switch in the fire main header.
Rev 2 comment
- Comments incorporated above.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
66 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
67 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Specify switch being asked for in the question statement. Revise question statement to read, Which ONE of the following identifies (1) the location of the 480V LC3H Transfer control switch and (2) the (Stem Focus)
Rev 2 comment
- Comment incorporated.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 68 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
69 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- All 2nd half answer choices are correct for the as written 2nd half question. Revise the second half question to read, requires the crew to check __(1)__ is maintained above a MINIMUM of
__(2)__. (Partially correct)
Rev 2 comment
- Comment incorporated.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
70 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Revise the 1st half question statement to read, OP-AA-102-1003, xxx, requires __(1)__ be guarded. (Stem Focus)
Rev 2 comment
- Comment incorporated.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
71 F 3 B S Rev 1 comment
- Insufficient information provided in the question stem to completely answer this question. (Stem Focus)
(?) Revise 2nd bullet of given conditions to read, Following an audit of available diesel lubricating oil, it is discovered that there is no additional diesel lubricating oil available on plant site apart from what is already in each respective EDG sump.
Rev 2 comment
- Stem information condensed (2nd bullet revised).
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 72 H 3 M S Rev 1 comment (2013 - Question is SAT.
Turley Point) 73 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Question statement reads unclearly, revise question statement to read, 0ADM-211, xxx, permits performance of a crew brief prior to transitioning to ____. (Stem Focus)
Rev 2 comment
- Comment applied.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
74 H 3 B S Rev 1 comment (2013 - Question is SAT.
Turkey Point) 75 H 3 B S Rev 1 comment (2009 - Is answer choice B intended to be worded as RED path exists for Point Subriticality? Justification statement doesnt match answer choice.
Beach)
Rev 2 comment
- Comment incorporated, no change to question.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
76 H 3 M S Rev 1 comment (2011 - Question is SAT.
Seq) 77 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 78 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Incomplete justification statement for correct answer choice D.
Rev 2 comment
- Comment applied above.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
79 H 3 N S Rev 0 comment
- Unsure that a sufficient justification for answer choices A.2 and C.2 is met based on the wording of the portion cited in 0-ADM-211, When any EOP is in effect, ONOPs may be performed in the discretion of the US or SM, only if they do NOT interfere with the actions called for in the EOPs The above cited wording seems to indicate that simultaneous performance of an EOP and ONOP is never required, but may be performed by the US/SM if desired. If this interpretation is correct, then answer choices A.2 and C.2 are implausible (since the requirement is never mandatory as implied by the answer choices).
Rev 1 comment
- To support justification of A.2/C.2 distractor (using the as written justification statement), does the 2nd bullet under Subsequently need to be revised to read, 4-EOP-E-0, xxx, IOAs are in progress?
Rev 2 comment
- Revised 2nd bullet under Subsequently to state that EOP-E-0 is in progress (which implies that IOAs are in progress). Still supports A2/C2 distractors.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 80 H 3 N S Rev 0 comment
- The provided information indicates that a Main Generator issue is present (i.e. MVAR fluctuation, GEN FIELD annunciator, generator EXCITATION light report by TO). These cues serve to eliminate plausibility of the C.1 and D.1 distractors.
- Since there is no bounding of the second half question statement (and due to the choices presented), it appears that either answer to the second half question can be considered correct (i.e. notify either/both the Load Dispatcher as well as the System Engineer).
Rev 1 comment
- Revise 1st half question statement to read, The US will direct maintaining Main Generator Reactive Load below a MAXIMUM of
__(1)__. (Stem Focus)
- What is the basis for including kV, MWe, and H2 pressure in the list of supplied Unit 3 Main Generator parameters? None of these appear to be required to answer this question. These can be removed.
Rev 2 comment
- 1st half question revised as suggested, reference still required to answer this question.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
81 H 3 B S Rev 0 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 82 H 3 M S Rev 1 comment (2010 - Revise first two bullets under Subsequently (or combine them) to Turkey clearly define where the dropped spent fuel assembly is (i.e. dropped Point) in pool, over core, etc). Answer choices appear to imply dropped fuel is in the Spent Fuel Pool. (Stem Focus)
- 2 pages of justification statements for this question (Pages 452 and 453). Remove page that does not apply.
- It appears that B2/D2 distractor statement is implausible based on given conditions. Closure of SFP drain path is inconsistent with required actions for a gaseous radiological release. (Credible distractors)
(?) A more appropriate distractor would be for B2/D2 distractor to read, Place CR HVAC in service Rev 2 comment
- Facility to revise.
Rev 3 comment
- Question to remain as is with the exception of 2nd half answer choice B2/D2 is now Close the Equip Hatch Fast Closure Door. 2nd bullet under subsequently is also removed (gas bubbles).
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 83 H 3 M S Rev 1 comment (2010 - Verify no overlap between 1st bullet under field operator report and Turkey question knowledge required to answer RO Question #23.
Point)
- Why is 1st bullet under field operator actions included in the question stem? Isnt this an expected plant response following receipt of the PRMS R-14 high alarm? This bullet can be removed. (Stem Focus)
- Revise 1st half question statement to read, The US will direct re-alignment of the waste gas system in accordance with __(1)__.
- 2nd half question is asking for an overall mitigative strategy to deal with a leaking Gas Decay Tank. This is RO LOK. This can remain at the SRO LOK by altering the question statement/answer choices.
(SRO Only)
(?) Revise 2nd half question statement to read, The contents of the B GDT are/ are NOT required to be transferred to another GDT.
Rev 2 comment
- Facility to revise Rev 3 comment
- Filling GDT information is removed. RCV-014 valve information is removed. 1st half question revised as suggested above. 2nd half question revised as stated above. No overlap concern.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 84 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- According to the EAL tables (Att 1 - F668, Rev 12, Page 9). It appears that both 1st half answer choices can be selected as correct due to the given condition of lowering SFP level. RA2 merely requires SFP level drop sufficient to uncover fuel while RU2 requires SFP in conjunction with a valid ARM reading. (Partially correct)
(?) Is there some SFP design feature that limits SFP drain-down due to leak location (i.e. impossible to uncover fuel)?
- Per 0-EPIP-20134, rev 7, notification of state and local authorities is required within 15 minutes for the as-given conditions. Justification statement refers to 30 minutes. Which is procedurally correct? Based on the provided reference, it appears that the B2/D2 distractor is implausible. No information could be found in EPIP-20134 to support use of a 30 minute distractor. (Credible distractors)
Rev 2 comment
- Differentiation of Alert vs. UE requires knowledge that fuel CANNOT be uncovered based on given conditions. Justification for this knowledge area is required to be incorporated into this question.
- Revise question statement to read, The EC is required to notify the State of __(1)__ declaration by __(2)__.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
85 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Are the given conditions intended to imply that the Orange Path occurred independently of the operator action to place CSPs in P-T-L? Appears that the 4th bullet under given conditions should be placed under a new initial condition Subsequently section. (Stem Focus)
Rev 2 comment
- Comment incorporated.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 86 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- 1st half question statement indicates that operators are to assume no additional operator action, however, isnt the applicant expected to assume that Unit 4 HHSI pumps are aligned and placed into service in order to mitigate the CET temperature rise? Justification seems to support this. Unsure how to fix unless 1st half question statement is re-worded. (Stem Focus)
- Appears to be multiple correct answers based on the wording of the question statements (i.e. applicant assumes < 700F CET and FR-C.3 entry, answer choice D). (Partially correct)
- If the applicant is directed not to assume additional operator actions, is there technically NO correct answer to this question (i.e.
requirement to enter C.2)?
Rev 2 comment
- Question revised to swap question statements. New 2nd half question revised to state, If the crew fails to implement the procedure above, CETs are/ are NOT expected to rise above 700F.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
87 H 3 N S Rev 0 comment
- First half question is directly indicated by the provided reference (specifically the explanation of ACTION 3 from TS 3.3.1), this makes the first half question a direct lookup due to the little mental activity required (only one TS action statement invoked due to initial conditions).
- Additionally, due to the answer choices provided, the second half question implies that the reactor startup can continue (i.e. revealing the answer to the first half question). Since the second half question is asking at what point Rx power is restricted to, this half question is a P-6 set-point question.
- I am unsure of the reason behind 3/4.0 Applicability LCO inclusion as a reference to this question. There is no applicant determination of invoking LCO 3.0.4 to answer this question.
Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 88 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
89 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
90 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Revise the 1st half question statement to more narrowly focus this half question as a generic in the T2G1 area (as opposed to the T3 area). (Stem Focus)
(?) Revise 1st half question to read, During crew response to the conditions stated above, the mitigating actions of 0-ONOP-066, xxx,
- Based on the given conditions, the 2nd half question requires little mental activity to arrive at the correct answer beyond merely locating the corresponding information in the EAL chart (LOD=1).
(?) Can be corrected by revising 5th bullet under Given conditions to state, Both CHRRMS channels read 5x10E3 R/hr. This forces evaluation of SAE vs GE; loss vs. potential loss criteria. Correct answer would also require revision to key SAE as the correct answer choice.
Rev 2 comment
- Comments applied above.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
91 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 92 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Intent of 1st half question statement is unclear. This half question appears to ask detailed procedural knowledge but may not rise above the RO LOK (entry condition criteria). Additionally, the procedural knowledge specified has no procedure selection component. (Stem Focus, RO LOK?)
(?) Can be corrected by revising 1st half question statement to read, Operator action to close the Containment Purge Isolation valves will be performed following a required procedure transition to __(1)__.
- 2nd half question justification statement does not match answer choice. It appears that it was intended to ask if direct RP monitoring vs remote RP monitoring was required for the given conditions. The 2nd half question (as written) does not address this concept (merely asks if containment atmospheric monitoring will be performed at all).
(Credible distractors)
(?) What is example of ONOP/Mode that requires remote monitoring of containment atmosphere by RP (no information provided in justification)? Is knowledge of PASS intended to be tested here?
Rev 2 comment
- Comment associated with 1st half question incorporated into question.
Rev 3 comment
- 2nd half question revised to ask The US will direct monitoring for airborne contamination/ placing PAHMS in service.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 93 H 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- Multiple correct answers based on as-written 2nd half question.
Isolation of the SFP Purification Loop is required at 140F, the given conditions only provide indication of 135F (based on alarm receipt).
To arrive at the keyed answer requires the applicant to make an unstated assumption of continued SFP temperature rise (not provided, nor is decay heat load or time since shutdown). As written, the correct answer is A. (Partially correct)
(?) To correct, simply re-key this question to indicate that answer choice A is correct.
(?) Could also state that alarm is received at 1300 with SFP temperature rising at 2F/min, with second half question asking the earliest time SFP Pur. Loop is required to be isolated, 1300/ 1306.
Rev 2 comment
- SFP temp provided at 150F incorporated as an initial condition.
Correct answer choice remains B.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
94 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- The given conditions are included to provide plausibility for A.1/B.1 distractor. However, MODE 1 is a poor distractor element. To maintain plausibility revise the second bullet under given conditions to state, Unit 4 is in MODE 4. (Stem Focus)
(?) Another option would be to test the STA control room reporting time (i.e. 10 minutes/ 15 minutes)
Rev 2 comment
- Revised given information to incorporate MODE, as suggested above.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
95 H 3 B S Rev 1 comment (2016 - Question is SAT.
Turkey Point)
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 96 H 3 B S Rev 1 comment (2012 - Question is SAT.
Salem) 97 F 3 B S Rev 1 comment (2011 - Question is SAT.
Turkey Point)
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 98 H 3 B S Rev 1 comment (2016 - There is disagreement between the indicated reference (3.3.3.1)
Turkey and provided reference (3.3.3.3) for this question.
Point)
- Answer choice A is also a correct statement as transition of the plant is allowed into a MODE where unrestricted operation is permitted (i.e. invoke LCO 3.0.4). (Also, justification appears to be incorrect as it refers to return to Mode 5, where answer choice refers to Mode 4) (Partially correct)
- Answer choice B could also be construed as being correct as an applicant can contend that a Mode change isnt required if the instrument is restored to operable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (i.e. by making an unstated assumption). (Partially correct)
- This question is a direct lookup with little mental activity required to arrive at the answer (merely match answer choice with provided reference information). (LOD=1)
(?) Can be corrected by revising answer choice C to be incorrect (e.g. use another action statement), revising answer choice D to be correct IAW Required ACTION 34, and revising justification statements to support testing LCO 3.0.4 with answer choice A as being correct)
Rev 2 comment
- Facility is pursuing a LCO motherhood question that doesnt require a reference to hit this K/A.
Rev 3 comment
- Question revised. 1st half question- TS does/ does NOT allow entry into Mode 2. (reference required for plausibility of this half question).
2nd half question- The US will determine that the Cont. Rad Hi input to CR ventilation isolation is/ is NOT operable.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 99 H 3 N S Rev 0 comment
- Initial Conditions, 2nd bullet under subsequently - revise to Halon failed to automatically discharge
- How are answer choices C.1 and D.1 plausible with respect to the given first half question (i.e. actuation of Halon)? It is understood that a Control Room Evacuation is in progress due to the initial conditions.
- Answer choices A.2 and C.2 are correct for two reasons since LI-AA-102-1001 specifies declaration of any of the Emergency Classes (i.e. EAL entry required for both HU2 as well as HA5).
Additionally, since entry into ONOP-105 is specified as an initial condition, the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> reportable criteria is directly cued by the question stem (due to the EALs being provided as a reference).
Rev 1 comment
- Justification statement for answer choice A should be revised to include that 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> reportable determination stems from applicant identification of EAL entry based on given information.
Rev 2 comment
- Comment addressed.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 100 F 3 N S Rev 1 comment
- 1st half question statement is confusingly worded (e.g. delegate his responsibility to decide to). If the subject matter is his responsibility to decide, how can he delegate it? 2nd half question has similar language (e.g. delegate his responsibility to perform).
(Stem Focus, Credible distractors?)
(?) This type of subject matter can be asked more clearly in a table format where the applicant is asked which of the following identifies the EC responsibilities he can (or cannot) delegate. Pitfall of this approach is that a T/F question flaw is easy to incorporate so plausibility is vital.
(?) Revise question statement to read, Given: An Emergency has been declared and the EOF is fully staffed and operational.
Which ONE of the following identifies a SM/EC responsibility that CANNOT be delegated?
A. Notification of PAR to Offsite agencies B. Notification of Emergency Response Organization (ERO)
- C. Notification of emergency classification to Offsite agencies D. Notification of emergency conditions to Plant Management Ref: EPIP-20104, 20101, 20134 Rev 2 comment
- Question statements revised. Proposed question appears to be valid.
- The decision to notify federal/state/local authorities is/ is NOT allowed to be delegated.
- The action to notify is/ is NOT allowed to be delegated.
Rev 4 comment
- Question is SAT.