ML15119A519
| ML15119A519 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/29/2015 |
| From: | Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| Download: ML15119A519 (197) | |
Text
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Appendix D Scenario Outline NRC Final (Rev 1-112/29/14)
Form ES-D-1 Facility:
Turkey Point Nuclear Scenario No.:
1 Op Test No.:
2015-301 (PTN) - Units 3 and 4 Examiners:
Operators:
(SRO)
(RCO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions:
The plant is at 100% power (MOL).
Online risk is green.
8 train is protected on both units.
Maintain 100% power for the shift. Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.
Turnover:
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 38 HHSI Pump has a wiped motor bearing, and its return to service is expected in two days. 8 AFW Pump is having turbine repairs, and the expected return to service is late next shift. 3A 1 CWP preventive maintenance is done with the clearance released. The 3A 1 CWP is ready for start for a PMT.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
TFE2Z93S C-BOP &SRO 30 Feeder Breaker 3AB19 overcurrent and fails open - Loss of 30 4KV Bus. (TS) 2 TVHHSGC C-RO&SRO 3C SG Tube Leakage. (TS) 3 TFS1MAML 1-RO&SRO Turbine Inlet Pressure Channel, PT-3-447 fails low. (TS) 4 NIA R-RO & SRO 3C SGTL Fast Load Reduction from 100% power.
N-BOP 5
TFF1M87M I-BOP & SRO 38 Feedwater Channel FT-3-487 fails as is. (TS) 6 TVH1TX45 I-RO & SRO Pressurizer Control Channel PT-3-445 fails high.
TFHV4560 TVHHSGC M-RO,BOP, 3C SGTR starts and RV-3-1411, 3C Steamline Safety Valve fails 7
TFSW50A
&SRO open during the RCS cooldown for the ruptured Steam Generator.
TFL3F50 FeedwaterValves, MOV-3-1409 and FCV-3-498, fail to isolate on 8
TFL3F60 C-BOP & SRO TFFW980 a Safety Injection.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Appendix D l-15-1 NRC Scenario #1 Scenario Outline NRC Final (Rev 1-112/29/14)
Form ES-D-1 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units. Maintain 100% power for the shift. Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 3B HHSI Pump has a wiped motor bearing, and its return to service is expected in two days. B AFW Pump is having turbine repairs, and the expected return to service is late next shift. 3A 1 CWP preventive maintenance is done with the clearance released. The 3A CWP is ready to start for a PMT.
Event 1 Shortly after taking the watch, the 30 Feeder Breaker 3AB19 faults and opens. The loss of the 30 4KV Bus leads to a power loss to 3C CCW Pump and 3C ICW Pump. Loss of these pumps places the plant in a 14 day (ICW) and 30 day (CCW) TS LCO Action. The crew stabilizes the plant by starting an ICW Pump and ensuring CCW flow is adequate.
3-ARP-097.CR Annunciator response is used to stabilize the plant. 3-0NOP-004.5, Loss of 30 4KV Bus, will be used for bus restoration.
Event 2 Once Event 1 crew actions are complete or enough time is allowed, then a 3C SG Tube leak occurs and ramps in over 5 minutes. The crew will enter 3-0NOP-071.2, Steam Generator Tube Leakage. They ensure the alarm is valid and estimate a leakage rate.
The leakrate exceeds Tech Spec limits for daily SG leakage. Once R-3-19, Steam Generator Slowdown Monitor, count rate is in alarm, then Steam Generator Slowdown Flow Control Valves (FCV-3-6278NB/C) and Slowdown Tank to Canal Level Control Valve, LCV-3-6265B are closed.
Event 3 Once Event 2 has progressed, the crew will calculate and brief a downpower to respond to the tube leak. After the brief is complete prior to the downpower, then PT-3-447, Turbine Inlet Pressure Channel, fails low. This failure affects the Tref signal to Rod Control. Control Rods insert due to the Tavg and Tref mismatch. The crew uses diverse indications to ensure a runback is not in progress. Control rods are taken to manual to stop the movement. The crew enters 3-0NOP-028, Reactor Control System Malfunction, for follow-up after immediate action response, and then they use 3-0NOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, to remove the channel from service.
2 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Appendix D Event 4 Scenario Outline NRC Final (Rev 1-112/29/14)
Form ES-D-1 The crew performs the downpower using the previous calculation and accommodates the response if a Tavgffref mismatch exists from the previous event. The fast load reduction is started with a boration of the primary and a noted RCS temperature decrease. The Unit Supervisor directs the BOP to unload the Turbine at the specified rate. The BOP sets up for the automatic load reduction by selecting desired MW target, reduction rate, and depresses "GO" to start the reduction.
Event 5 As Turbine load lowers, a slow failure occurs with auto feedwater control to 3B SG since FT-3-487 fails as is. With this failure, the actual flow to 3B SG actually lowers along with SG level. The BOP selects manual control for the 3B Feedwater Control Valve operation. Once the feedwater control channel is selected out, automatic control can be re-established. The US enters 3-0NOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, to remove the channel from service. During this process, the US references Tech Specs for required actions.
Event 6 The crew demonstrates precise control during the Steam Generator Tube Leak load reduction. During this evolution, Pressurizer Control Channel PT-3-445 fails high. This channel causes PCV-3-456 to fail open. The RCO takes action to close either the PORV or its Block Valve, MOV-3-535, prior to a reactor trip. The US directs 3-0NOP-041.5, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction, for response.
Event 7 After about 5 to 10% down power, 3C SGTR starts on a 5 minute ramp. The crew takes actions to maximize Charging and to isolate Letdown. When the leakage exceeds the CVCS capacity, the US orders the crew to trip the Reactor and Turbine, initiate Safety Injection and Phase A, and enters to 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. RV 1411, 3C Steamline Safety Valve fails open after the cooldown is started. The mitigation sequence is 3-EOP-E-O to 3-EOP-E-3 to 3-EOP-E-2.
Event 8 This post trip failure removes the auto isolation of feedwater flow to the 3C SG. The 3C SG Feedwater Control Valve FCV-3-498 fails open along with MOV-3-1409. MOV 1409 is manually closed to isolate this flowpath prior to the cooldown in 3-EOP-E-3.
The scenario is terminated once the crew has the opportunity to isolate the faulted 3C Steam Generator or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion.
3 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Appendix D CT1:
Control SG Level Scenario Outline NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/29114)
Form ES-0-1 After a failure of 38 Feedwater Channel FT-3-487, manually control 38 SG Water Level to prevent a Unit trip on low or high SG level.
Safety Significance: The failure to control 38 SG level demonstrates a lack of corrective actions which create a challenge to plant safety with an unintentional reactor protection system (RPS) actuation.
CT2:
Isolate Faulted 3C SG After Unit 3 Reactor is tripped when a heat sink is established by total feedwater flow greater than 400 gpm or one narrow range SG level greater than 7%, manually isolate the faulted 3C SG including closing MOV-3-1409 3C SG Feedwater Isolation MOV prior to wide range SG level reaching 100%.
Safety Significance: The failure to isolate the faulted 3C SG challenges the Integrity CSF beyond the amount introduced by the postulated conditions. It also contributes to more off-site radiological release from the ruptured SG. This significant failure is the crew's lack of ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
CT3:
Control Initial RCS Cooldown When 3-EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture is entered, dump steam from 3A and 38 SGs at maximum rate using the Condenser Steam Dump Valves or Steam Dump To Atmosphere Valves to achieve Core Exit TCs less than required temperatures based on the lowest ruptured S/G pressure without causing a required transition to 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition.
Safety Significance: A SGTR mitigation strategy leading to a transition from 3-EOP-E-3 to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance requiring the crew to take additional compensatory actions that complicate the event mitigation strategy. With a SGTR, there exists a breach of the RCS fission-product and Containment barriers which allows radioactive RCS inventory to leak into the SG and associated piping. Without controlling the cooldown, the primary-to-secondary leakage is not stopped. This continued leakage results in a larger release of radioactivity to the environment affecting the safety of the public.
4 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Appendix D Scenario Outline NRC Final (Rev 1-112/29/14)
CT4:
Limit RHR Time On Recirculation Form ES-D-1 When a RHR Pump starts and is operating at shutoff head, limit the operating time at shutoff head with minimum flow recirculation to no more than 44 minutes.
Safety Significance: Failure to secure the RHR Pumps operating at shutoff head leads to pump overheating and adverse vibration which would constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent a degradation of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity.
Note: Individual minimum flow recirculation lines are provided to allow enough flow (330 gpm) for pump operation for a limited time (44 minutes).
[O-ADM-232, Time Critical Operator Action Program-Attachment 1, page 9 of 24]
CT5:
Close PZR PORV or Associated Block Valve When PZR pressure is less than 2235 psig and the PZR PORV is open close the PORV or the associated block valve prior to a Reactor Trip.
Safety Significance: The failure to control PZR pressure demonstrates a lack of corrective actions which create a challenge to plant safety with an unintentional reactor protection system (RPS) actuation.
5 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
era SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE E~
SEG RID NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
Site:
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 (PTN)
Title:
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 LMS#:
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 LMS Rev Date:
12/29/14 Rev#: 1.1 SEG Type:
D Training
~ Evaluation Program:
OLOCT
~LOIT D Other Duration:
120 minutes Developed by:
Mark Wilson 11/21114 Instructor/Developer Date Reviewed by:
Tim Hodge 11/28/14 Instructor (Instructional Review)
Date Validated by :
Jose Vasquez 11/21/14 SME (Technical Review)
Date Approved by:
Matt Glander 11/28/14 Training Supervision Date Approved by:
Mike Coen 11/26/14 Training Program Owner (Line)
Date TR-AA-230-1003-F06 Revision 0 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
h". f T IS in ormat1on is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15*1} NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
FUFI 3-ARP-097.CR various O-ADM-115 8B O-ADM-211 3
O-ADM-232 4
O-EPIP-20101 16 O-EPIP-20134 3
3-EOP-E-O 10 3-EOP-F-O 3
3-GOP-301 30 3-0NOP-004.5 03/25/10 3-0NOP-041.5 OA 3-0NOP-028 3
3-0NOP-049.1 3A 3-0NOP-071.2 8
3-NOP-010 16 3-0SP-041.1 8A PTN Technical Specs 293 ODCM R20 Page 2 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f 1s m orma ion 1s con f
tr II db o e 1y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NE* *era l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
Terminal Objective Rm Enabling Objectives:
SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REQUIREMENTS Given this simulator scenario and resources normally found in the Control Room, the operating crew will perform Control Room operations IAW approved plant procedures in order to maintain the integrity of the plant and the health and safety of the public.
Given this simulator scenario and resources normally found in the Control Room, operate in accordance with approved plant procedures, Operations Department Instructions, and management expectations:
- 1. (ALL) Demonstrate personnel SAFETY awareness in interactions with plant staff and outside agencies.
- 2. (ALL) Demonstrate ALARA awareness in interactions with plant staff and outside agencies.
- 3. (ALL) Exchange correct information using 3-point communication/Repeat-backs with Control Room personnel and other plant staff.
- 4. (ALL) Inform plant personnel and System of plant conditions, as needed.
- 5. (SM) Employ timely and concise crew briefs where appropriate.
- 6. (SM) Make timely and correct emergency plan classifications where appropriate.
- 7. (SM/COMM) Make timely and correct emergency plan protective action recommendations if General Emergency declared with SHIFT MANAGER and Communicator assigned.
- 8. (COMM) Make accurate and timely emergency plan notifications where appropriate.
- 9. (ALL) Maintain awareness of plant status and control board indication.
- 10. (ALL) Correctly diagnose plant situations.
- 11. (ALL) Solve operational problems as they arise.
- 12. (RCO/BOP) Manipulate plant controls properly and safely.
- 13. (ALL) Demonstrate self-checking using STAR and peer checks(when required)
- 14. (US) Demonstrate command and control of the crew.
- 15. (US) Coordinate the input of crew members and other plant staff.
- 16. (US) Utilize the input of crew members and other plant staff.
- 17. (ALL) Demonstrate conservative decision making.
- 18. (STA) Provide informed technical assistance to the operating crew.
- 19. (ALL) Demonstrate teamwork.
- 20. (ALL) Respond to plant events using procedural guidance (OPs/ONOPs/EOPs) as applicable in accordance with rules of usage.
- 21. (RCO/BOP) Implement any applicable procedural immediate operator actions without use of references.
- 22. (SRO) Maintain compliance with Tech Specs.
- 23. (ALL) Identify/enter applicable Tech Spec action statements.
- 24. (ALL) Respond to annunciators using ARPs (time permitting).
- 25. (ALL) Maintain written communication, logs, and documentation as needed to permit post-event reconstruction.
While addressing the following events:
- 1. 30 Feeder Breaker 3AB19 Overcurrent and Fails Open - Loss of 30 4KV Bus Page 3 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT {L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
f This in ormation is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
era L-15-1 NRC SCENARI0.1 ENERGYQ SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14) llUCWll rurr
- 2. 3C SG Tube Leakage
- 3. Turbine Inlet Pressure Channel, PT-3-447 Fails Low 4_ 3C SGTL Fast Load Reduction from 100% Power
- 5. 38 Feedwater Channel FT-3-487 Fails As Is 6_ Pressurizer Control Channel PT-3-445 Fails High
- 7. 3C SGTR
- 8. Feedwater Valves, MOV-3-1409 and FCV-3-498, Fail to Isolate on a Safety Injection Prerequisites:
None Training PTN Unit 3 Plant Simulator Resources:
Development TR-AA-230,-1003, SAT Development
References:
- TR-AA-230,-1007 Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation O-ADM-232, Time Critical Action Program OP-AA-100,-1000 Conduct Of Operations OP-AA-103,-1000 Reactivity Management O-ADM-200, Operations Management Manual
- O-ADM-211, Emergency and Off-Normal Operating Procedure Usage
- WCAP-17711-NP, Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group Westinghouse Emergency Response Guideline Revision 2-8ased Critical Tasks Protected N/A Content:
Evaluation Performance Mode Method:
Operating None Experience:
Risk
- 1. After Unit 3 Reactor is tripped when a heat sink is established by total Significant feedwater flow greater than 400 gpm or one narrow range SG level greater Operator than 7%, manually isolate the ruptured/faulted 3C SG including closing MOV-Actions:
3-1409 3C SG Feed-water Isolation MOV prior to wide range level reaching 100%.
- 2. When 3-EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture is entered, dump steam from 3A and 38 SGs at maximum rate using the Condenser Steam Dump Valves or Steam Dump To Atmosphere Valves to achieve Core Exit TCs less than required temperatures based on the lowest ruptured S/G pressure without causing a required transition to 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition.
Page 4 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th.. f II db 1s m ormation 1s contra e 1y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera' L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 ENERGY~
SEG
-~
NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
R.EfT
- I ASKS; ASSOCIATED WITH SIMUl.:ATOR EXERCISE.GUIDE *...
- .J8'k'litie!
/.
- ~ "***.
h SROTask#
02200006300 INVESTIGATE ANO CONTROL STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 02028026300 RESPOND TO CONTINUOUS ROD INSERTION 02089026300 AUTHORIZE FAST LOAD REDUCTION 02200044500 RESPOND TO HIGH STEAM GENERA TOR LEVEL 02041013300 RESPOND TO A PORV MALFUNCTION 02028033500 AUTHORIZE UNIT TRIP 02200008500 RESPOND TO A STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 02200001500 RESPOND TO UNIT TRIP 02200022500 DIAGNOSE CAUSE OF SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION 02200002500 EVALUATE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSF) STATUS TREE OUTPUT 02200007500 RESPOND TO A STEAM LINE FAULT
'RO Task Task Titli 01005030100 TRANSFER 0 4KV BUS FROM B TO A 4KV 01200006300 INVESTIGATE AND CONTROL STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK 01028026300 RESPOND TO CONTINUOUS ROD INSERTION 01089026300 RESPOND TO I ADJUST TURBINE DURING FAST LOAD REDUCTION 01200044500 RESPOND TO HIGH STEAM GENERA TOR LEVEL 01041013100 RESPOND TO A PORV MALFUNCTION 01200001500 RESPOND TO UNIT TRIP 01200008500 RESPOND TO A STEAM GENERA TOR TUBE RUPTURE 01200022500 DIAGNOSE CAUSE OF SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION 01200007500 RESPOND TO A STEAM LINE FAULT Page 5 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
- >,*era L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 EN~f3...GY~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
Rm UPDATE LOG:
Place this form with the working copies of lesson plans and/or other materials to document changes NOTES:
made between formal revisions. For fleet-wide training materials, keep electronic file of this form in same folder as approved materials. Refer to TR-AA-230-1003 SAT Development for specific directions regarding how and when this form shall be used.
Indicate in the following table any minor changes or major revisions (as defined in TR-AA-230-1003) made to the material after initial approval. Or use separate Update Log form TR-AA-230-1003-F16.
PREPARER DATE DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE REASON FOR CHANGE ARITWR#
REVIEWER DATE 1-0 Initial Revision Revised for L-15-1 NRC Exam 01982463 Note 5 Notes Note 5 Note 5 Allow RCO to manually close PORV, manually trigger 3C B.Clark 1/2/15 Steamline Safety Valve failure, Incorporate comments from 1-1 identify CT4 and CT5 which 01982463 require no additional Operator NRC validation week.
actions, and correct Mark Wilson 1/2/15 miscellaneous typos.
1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5
- 1.
Individual updating lesson plan or training material shall complete the appropnate blocks on the Update Log.
- 2.
Describe the change to the lesson plan or training materials.
- 3.
State the reason for the change (e.g., reference has changed, typographical error, etc.)
- 4.
Preparer enters name/date on the Update Log and obtains Training Supervisor approval.
- 5.
Initial dates and site approval on cover page.
Page 6 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
1s m orma ion 1s con ro e 1y T s 5 1) NRC Th.. f f
t II d b P N' 201 LOIT (L 1 A
EX MINATION SEC URITY AGR EEMENT i\\~ExTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 ENERGYB SEG
~
NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
Rm OVERVIEW Initial Conditions The plant is at 100% power (MOL). Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units. Maintain 100% power for the shift. Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.
Equipment OOS 38 HHSI Pump has a wiped motor bearing, and its return to service is expected in two days. B AFW Pump is having turbine repairs, and the expected return to service is late next shift. 3A 1 CWP preventive maintenance is done with the clearance released. The 3A 1 CWP is ready to start for a PMT.
SYNOPSIS Event 1 Shortly after taking the watch) the 3D Feeder Breaker 3AB19 faults and opens. The loss of the 3D 4KV Bus leads to a power loss to 3C CCW Pump and 3C ICW Pump. Loss of these pumps places the plant in a 14 day (ICW) and 30 day (CCW) TS LCO Action. The crew stabilizes the plant by starting an ICW Pump and ensuring CCW flow is adequate. 3-ARP-097.CR Annunciator response is used to stabilize the plant. 3-0NOP-004.5, Loss of 3D 4KV Bus, will be used for bus restoration.
Event 2 Once Event 1 crew actions are complete or enough time is allowed, then a 3C SG Tube leak occurs and ramps in over 5 minutes. The crew will enter 3-0NOP-071.2, Steam Generator Tube Leakage. They ensure the alarm is valid and estimate a leakage rate. The leakrate exceeds Tech Spec limits for daily SG leakage. Once R-3-19, Steam Generator Slowdown Monitor, count rate is in alarm, then Steam Generator Slowdown Flow Control Valves (FCV-3-6278A/B/C) and Slowdown Tank to Canal Level Control Valve, LCV-3-62658 are closed.
Event3 Once Event 2 has progressed, the crew will calculate and brief a downpower to respond to the tube leak.
After the brief is complete prior to the downpower, then PT-3-447, Turbine Inlet Pressure Channel, fails low. This failure affects the Tref signal to Rod Control. Control Rods insert due to the Tavg and Tref mismatch. The crew uses diverse indications to ensure a runback is not in progress. Control rods are taken to manual to stop the movement. The crew enters 3-0NOP-028, Reactor Control System Malfunction, for follow-up after immediate action response, and then they use 3-0NOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, to remove the channel from service.
Event4 The crew performs the downpower using the previous calculation and accommodates the response if a Tavg/Tref mismatch exists from the previous event. The fast load reduction is started with a boration of the primary and a noted RCS temperature decrease. The Unit Supervisor directs the BOP to unload the Turbine at the specified rate. The BOP sets up for the automatic load reduction by selecting desired MW target, reduction rate, and depresses "GO" to start the reduction.
Event 5 As Turbine load lowers, a slow failure occurs with auto feedwater control to 38 SG since FT-3-487 fails as is. With this failure, the actual flow to 38 SG actually lowers along with SG level. The BOP selects manual control for the 38 Feedwater Control Valve operation. Once the feedwater control channel is selected out, automatic control can be re-established. The US enters 3-0NOP-049.1, Deviation or Page 7 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This in ormation IS contro ed tV PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1} NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
f II b
era L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 ENERGY~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-112/29/14)
NUl1EAR run Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, to remove the channel from service. During this process, the US references Tech Specs for required actions.
Event 6 The crew demonstrates precise control during the Steam Generator Tube Leak load reduction. During this evolution, Pressurizer Control Channel PT-3-445 fails high. This channel causes PCV-3-456 to fail open. The RCO takes action to close either the PORV or its Block Valve, MOV-3-535, prior to a reactor trip. The US directs 3-0NOP-041.5, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction, for response.
Event 7 After about 5 to 10% downpower, 3C SGTR starts on a 5 minute ramp. The crew takes actions to maximize Charging and to isolate Letdown. When the leakage exceeds the CVCS capacity, the US orders the crew to trip the Reactor and Turbine, initiate Safety Injection and Phase A, and enters to 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. RV-3-1411, 3C Steamline Safety Valve fails open after the cooldown is started. The mitigation sequence is 3-EOP-E-O to 3-EOP-E-3 to 3-EOP-E-2.
Event 8 This post trip failure removes the auto isolation of feedwater flow to the 3C SG. The 3C SG Feedwater Control Valve FCV-3-498 fails open along with MOV-3-1409. MOV-3-1409 is manually closed to isolate this flowpath prior to the cooldown in 3-EOP-E-3.
The scenario is terminated once the crew has the opportunity to isolate the faulted 3C Steam Generator or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion.
Page 8 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f II db 1s m ormat1on 1s contra e
- Y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14) 11.EET CREW CRITICAl TASKS
,7 f
event#
.. **, ***..,.. ** c*.c*:.,. * *.
Descriptie>n*...*
5 CT1: Control SG Level After a failure of 38 Feedwater Channel FT-3-487, manually control 38 SG Water Level to prevent a Unit trip on low or high SG level.
7 CT2: Isolate Ruptured 3C SG After Unit 3 Reactor is tripped when a heat sink is established by total feedwater flow greater than 400 gpm or one narrow range SG level greater than 7%, manually isolate the ruptured 3C SG including closing MOV-3-1409 3C SG Feed-water Isolation MOV prior to wide range level reaching 100%.
7 CT3: Control Initial RCS Cooldown When 3-EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture is *entered, dump steam from 3A and 38 SGs at maximum rate using the Condenser Steam Dump Valves or Steam Dump To Atmosphere Valves to achieve Core Exit TCs less than required temperatures based on the lowest ruptured S/G pressure without causing a required transition to 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition.
7 CT4: Limit RHR Time On recirculation When a RHR Pump starts and is operating at shutoff head, limit the operating time at shutoff head with minimum flow recirculation to no more than 44 minutes.
[O-ADM-232, Time Critical Operator Action Program-Attachment 1, page 9 of 24]
6 CT5: Close PZR PORV or PORV Block Valve When PZR pressure is less than 2235 psig and the PZR PORV is open, close the PORV or the associated block valve prior to a Reactor Trip.
- 1.
3D Feeder Breaker 3AB19 Overcurrent and Fails Open - Loss of 3D 4KV Bus
- 2.
3C SG Tube Leakage
- 3.
Turbine Inlet Pressure Channel, PT-3447 Fails Low
- 4.
3C SGTL Fast Load Reduction from 100% Power
- 5.
3B Feedwater Channel FT-3-487 Fails As ls
- 6.
Pressurizer Control Channel PT-3445 Fails High
- 7.
3C SGTR
- 8.
Feedwater Valves, MOV-3-1409 and FCV-3-498, Fail to Isolate on a Safety Injection Page 9 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
T.. f I db his rn ormat1on 1s contro le
>V PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Nr::>Tera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1
~~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
RUT Restore IC-1 (100% MOL) or equivalent IC.
Unfreeze the Simulator.
Stop 3A 1 Circulating Water Pump.
Open & execute lesson file L-15-1 NRC SCEN 1 - Final.lsn Ensure the following lesson steps are triggered:
SETUP-OOS EQUIPMENT (IMM23BT, TAMSD3BS, TAFF01B, TCF5MTB).
Place ECO tag on B AFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve.
Remove velcro tags for B AFW alignment at RPM meter.
Place the 38 HHSI Pump in PTL and hang an ECO tag on it.
Ensure Rod Group Step Counters have completed stepping out.
Ensure PT-3-44 7 is selected for Turbine Inlet Pressure control.
Allow the plant to stabilize.
Acknowledge any alarms and freeze Simulator.
Ensure B train is protected train on VPA.
Perform the SIMULA TOR OPERA TOR CHECKLIST or equivalent.
Place TURNOVER SHEETS on RO's desk or give to the Lead Evaluator.
Ensure at least 4 copies of the maneuvering guide are available for shift turnover.
Ensure a copy of the ODCM is available in the SM Office.
Page 10 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f II db 0
L 1s m ormat1on 1s contro e 1y PTN's 2015 L IT ( 1) NR AMI 10 SECU CEX NAT N RITY R
AG EEMEN T.
-.~-era L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-112/29/14)
FUEi BRIEFINGS Shift turnover information is attached to the back of this guide.
o Ensure all applicants are prior briefed on Appendix E of NUREG 1021, Policies and Guidelines For Taking NRC Examinations.
Conduct a Crew Pre-brief to cover turnover information.
US:
BOP:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SCENARIO NOTE O-ADM-211 Prudent Operator Actions - If redundant stand-by equipment is available and ready, the operator is permitted to start the redundant equipment for failed or failing operating equipment. Immediate follow up of applicable ARPs and ONOPs (AOPs) shall occur as required.
Page 11of53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14}
SEG TIME TIME FUf'I EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE This procedure may be done anytime during scenario.
BOP:
As directed, Uses 3-NOP-010, Circulating Water System, to start 3A1 CWP.
Notifies Chemistry of intent to start and records SG Slowdown rates.
- ~~1i~WR and ensures discharge valve MOV-3-1416 opens.
Informs US that 3A 1 CWP is running.
EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE US:
Ensure the Simulator is in Conducts shift turnover.
RUN before the crew enters the Simulator.
NOTE The US may direct starting an ICW and/or CCW Pump first prior to procedure entry.
Acknowledges multiple annunciators for loss of 30 4KV Bus, loss of CCW, and ICW.
Sfifis:~ficjt)""::TcWrf'"m" er ARP 14/4
~-'-*2'~~-d.>>-***~t~.**-'--Jl~t.... !.A p Reviews ARPs and recommends entry into 3-0NOP-004.5.
US:
Directs ARP and 3-0NOP-004.5 response Understands ~~j~@:~nc~.K~fQtf~[I:E~J~;j:1~(~~Y 3
.. :-v*0i*:**>**-*;*d*r>***;~***M**{~<<*:-:; ***<-;::* *;******* ;+c. :. ** <c.*:***.
- Understands <J;;:_egw.:I§£.~:Q~)\\~J<;>Jt3;J".;2;~ ~.::~O diaY Page 12 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
f This in ormation 1s controlle db IV PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
TIME R.l£T EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
Check 30 4KV Bus Lockout Relay - RESET STEP 1 BOP:
Check 3A And 3B 4KV Buses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED Both energized STEP BOP:
Disconnect Loads From 30 4KV Bus
- a. Verify 3C Intake Cooling Water Pump Breaker, 3AD05 - OPEN
- b. Verify 3C Component Cooling Water Pump Breaker, 3AD04 -
OPEN STEP BOP:
Determine Source Of Power For 3D 4KV Bus
- a. Check 3A and 3B 4KV buses - BOTH ENERGIZED
- b. Consult with Nuclear Plant Supervisor to determine desired source of power for 3D 4KV bus:
- 3A4KVbus OR
- 3B 4KV bus
Re-energize 30 4KV Bus From 3A 4KV Bus:
af~e.D~fi~~r~0:;4KVIsusao;;3AEfis li~@ii!ll§~Jili~EfPm~fKYJ~~~:~J3i.~6
~~raie1s~!Y£F~Q'm~fKY5~u~:~M~~91 81[Q.l§§gJ=~Q~ft!9f4RVl*s'{i~~~~IMAJ7' Continues with Step 8 Page 13 of 53 STEPS 5 &
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f II db 1s m ormat1on 1s contro e
~v PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 ENERGYQ
-~-
SEG TIME A.UT NRC Final (Rev1-1 12129/14)
EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE:
Once power or loads are restored or at the Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 2.
BOP:
Verify 3D 4KV Bus - ALIGNED TO AN ENERGIZED BUS
- 3A4KVbus OR
- 3B 4KV bus BOP:
STEP Locally Verify No Breaker Targets Exist On 3D 4KV Bus Breakers STEP BOP:
Restart Components Supplied By 3D 4KV Bus As Directed By Shift Manager:
3C Intake Cooling Water Pump 3C Component Cooling Water Pump Return To Procedure And Step In Effect STEPS 10 & 11 BOP:
Notify the following:
Electrical Maintenance to make repairs WCC to generate of PWO.
Page 14 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
T.. f II db his m onnat1on 1s contro e
>V PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-112/29/14)
TIME R.m EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO Observes ANN H1/4, PRMS HIGH RAD.
Since an alarm is on R-15 OR R-19, refer to 3-0NOP-071.2, Steam Generator Tube Leakage.
Recommends entering 3-0NOP-071.2.
BOP Reviews ARP and confirms alarm.
Makes a plant announcement to warn personnel of the radiation hazard.
US:
Directs ANN response.
Refers to PCB to estimate leakage on graphs
~Qre~!~flf~"~~:,.~
BOP:
Addresses ANN H1/4 response.
Verifies alarm is on R-3-15 Refers to 3-0NOP-071.2, Steam Generator Tube Leakage Page 15 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f ldb 1s m ormat1on 1s control e 1y PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEx,era L-15.. 1 NRC SCENARIO 1 EN~-
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
TIME FlE!T EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
US:
Directs response per 3-0NOP-071.2.
111 Reviews Foldout Page with the crew.
RCO:
Trip the Reactor if RCS Tavg - GREATER THAN Tref by 6°F, Trip the Reactor and initiate Safety Injection if RCS Leakage greater than Charging Pump capacity and letdown isolated or PZR Level can NOT be maintained within 10%
of program.
IF a reactor trip occurs and any PRMS channel R-15, R-19, or R20 is in the alarm state, then manually align Control Room ventilation for emergency recirculation mode with 30 minutes of the alarm.
When turbine load is within 10% of end target load, then stop the boration.
If PRMS R-19 Count Rate is increasing or High Alarm is present, then verify the Steam Generator Slowdown Flow Control Valves and Slowdown Tank to Canal Level Control Valve are closed.
When R-19 High Alarm is present verify NO FLOW on SIG Sample Flow Indicators at the Cold Chem Lab.
When the affected Steam Generator is identified, then perform the following:
a) Verify Steam Supply aligned to both trains of AFW from the Intact Steam Generators b) Verify Closed AND De-Energize the affected Steam Generator AFW Steam Supply MOV.
Monitor Affected Plant Parameters 111 Checks PRZ Level-STABLE OR INCREASING Start Charging Pumps and isolate Letdown as required.
IF PRZ level can NOT be maintained, THEN, manually trip the reactor.
BOP:
Check High Alarm ON For The Following PRMS Channels:
111 Check R-15 High Alarm light-ON Page 16 of 53 STEP 1 STEP2 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
f II This in ormatlon is contro ed bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEX era l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29114)
SEG TIME fl.EEi' EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE This is also a foldout page item that may be manually initiated if R-19 Count Rate is increasing OR High Alarm.
BOP:
Check PRMS Channel R-15 Alarm Valid As Follows Check readout on affected channel - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO ALARM SETPOINT Check R-15 operability:
BOP:
ROU green OPERA TE LEO - ON Plus sign(+}- ROTATING Check PRMS Channels R-19 For Proper Operation:
Check R-19 High Alarm light - ON (NO)
BOP:
Check The Following Radiation Monitors:
STEP3 STEP4 Check RA0-3-6417 (SJAE SPING)-ALARM CLEAR Check RAD-6426 (DAM-1 Monitor) - ALARM CLEAR STEPS BOP:
Checks PRMS Channel Counts-INCREASING OR STABLE AT HIGHER VALUE R-3-15 (yes)
R-3-19 STEP6 BOP:
Check R-3-19 HI ALARM-CLEAR STEP7 Page 17 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f II db 1s m ormat1on 1s contro e IY PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
Rm' EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
US:
Approximate Tube Leakage:
Determines leakage to be 3 gpm using any or all off the following:
BOP:
3-0SP-041.1, RCS LEAK RATE CALCULATION Unit 3 SJAE SPING Primary to Secondary Leak Rate Graph in the Plant Curve Book (Section 5, Figure 14)
AND record on ATTACHMENT 7 Unit 3 R-15 Primary to Secondary Leak Rate Graph in the Plant Curve Book (Section 5, Figure 15) AND record on ATTACHMENT 7 STEP 8 Identify Leaking S/G:
Monitor the following for SIG tube leak indications Unexplained increase in any SIG level High radiation detected on a SIG sample High radiation detected on a main steam line High radiation detected on AFW steam supply line (if running)
High radiation detected from a SIG Slowdown line Unexplained difference between steam flow and feedwater flow Increasing radiation levels indicated on R-15, R-19, SPING, AND DAM-1 STEP 9.a COMM:
Directs Radiation Protection to:
Monitor radiation levels on Main Steam Lines.
Monitor radiation levels on AFW steam supply line (if running}.
Monitor radiation levels on SIG Slowdown lines Monitor airborne activity at Steam Jet Air Ejectors.
STEP 9.b Page 18 of 53 This infonnation is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEX1era l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
SEG TIME FU£I EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERATOR COMM:
A'QR!iQld~e 1
'~1r~'Qff!l~1
Increase SIG sampling frequency as determined by Nuclear Chemistry.
Monitor DAM-1 and SJAE SPING readings.
STEP 9.
BOP:
When the 3C Steam Generator is identified as the affected SIG:
US:
Dispatch and operator to close 3-006 and open 3-007 to provide steam to the A AFW Pump.
Verify Closed 3C Steam Generator AFW Steam Supply MOV-3-1405.
Dispatch an Operator to de-energize BKR 3D01-27 for MOV-3-1405.
FOP-ATTACHMENT Determine If Operation May Continue:
Uses 3-0NOP-71.2 Attachment 3 to determine Action level.
Determines SG Tube Leak> T.S. 3.4.6.2.a limit of 150 GPD, Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
STEP 10 BOOTH OPERA TOR US:
B~JiO...:'.ila,ilS:,§r;,t!~~~;I;~ Notifies the Shift Manager To Review The Following Procedures And Make Any Required Notifications O-EPIP-20101, Duties of Emergency Coordinator.
O-ADM-115, Notification of Plant Events.
Verify NRC Resident notified of Fast Load Reduction and SIG Tube Leakage.
STEP 11 Page 19 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOlT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
1s m orma ion 1s con ro e
- Y s
15
( 1) N C EXAM NATION Th-
. f r
t II d b PTN' 20 LOIT L 1 R
E URI SC TY AGREEMENT.
N _<rera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
SEG TIME TIME FlW' EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE Before the Control Room fast load reduction brief or at the Lead Evaluators discretion, continue to the next event.
US/COMM:
Complete Attachment 1, Fast Load Reductions Maneuvering Plan.
POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
Directs the crew to check for a runback.
No runback, directs RCO to take the rods to manual.
US:
STEP12 Directs response of 3-0NOP-028, Reactor Control System Malfunction.
NOTE RCO:
This is an Immediate Operator Action RCO:
gj~~~~uceff[ffii~IQia;JQJii~ri}WiYJi~ij{iftc>~fr1!f RCO:
RCO:
Compare rod position to control rod insertion limits If RILs are exceeded, borate at 16 gpm RCO:
Page 20 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
T his information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOil (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
era L-15-1 NRC SCENARI0~1 E~
NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
SEG TIME
- ,~4)N~
10R.ei~:f TIME Rm EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
Once the crew has stabilized the plant and initiated actions to match Tave to Tref and /or Tech Specs exercised, then at the Lead Evaluators discretion move on the next event.
BOP:
Notify:
WCCand l&C US:
Enters and directs actions of 3-0NOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, for response.
BOP:
Dispatches operator to place the Bypass Switches for PT-3-44 7 to Bypass position at the AMSAC panel using Attachment 5.
!1t'ED17Jf~'.Action.7 for*e:t::
.I61~§l~Bie1~Jl£i6e"~rr~cf$1E.t~
EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
US:
Directs 3-0NOP-071.2 response Reviews Foldout page with the crew Page 21of53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th
. f b
is in ormation is control ed 'v PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
l\\.Ex1era l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
SEG TIME Rm EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE After Rx Power has been lowered about 5% or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion go to the next event.
US:
Reviews Attachment 1, Fast Load Reductions Maneuvering Plan.
US:
Briefs Control Room Personnel Using ATTACHMENT 2 BOP:
Notify the Following:
System Dispatch Plant personnel using Page Boost.
Chemistry to perform RCS TS samples (>15% power change)
RCO:
Begins Boration For Initial Tave Effect BOP:
Initiate Turbine Load reduction in MW CNTRL BOP:
Monitor Load reduction Monitors turbine load reduction and informs crew at each 50 MWe increment of power reduction Adjusts turbine load reduction rate to maintain Tavgff ref withi
+/- 4°F ~T.
Monitors SIG level control to ensure feed reg valves properly maintain level control in automatic Page 22 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
f Th". f II db 0
1s m orma ion 1s contro e
- Y PTN s 2015 L IT (L-15-1) NRC EXA Ml A 10 S C R G EE N T NEUITYAR MENT.
era L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
TIME Rm NOTE The crew may transfer from the Station Service xfmr, to the S/U xfmr early.
POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
Monitor Load reduction Monitors Pressurizer Level to maintain on program.
Starts 2nd Chg Pp and places 2nd orifice in service, if desired.
US:
Refers to Enclosure 1 for expected alarms.
BOP:
Isolate Miscellaneous Flow paths From Leaking S/G Verify Slowdown Isolation valve CV-3-6275C for 3C S/G CLOSED.
Direct Unit 3 Turbine Operator to realign Aux Stm Supply from U4 per Attachment 8.
RCO:
Monitor Boration Rate During Downpower Determine if Insertion Limit and Bank D position are converging at a rate that will cause rod insertion limit alarms Adjust power reduction rate as needed to control rod insertion Increase boration rate and/or total amount as necessary to limit control rod insertion Monitor Annunciator 88/1, ROD BANK LO LIMIT - CLEAR Monitor 88/2 ROD BANK A/B/C/D EXTRA LO LIMIT - CLEAR EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
Recognizes and reports FT-3-487 failure.
ffi~lffiifftiili~S[1Qt~E,31§Z§s[~~~Egfrifli2[i~fY~J~cy-:3~8.
Restores 38 SIG level to normal.
RCO:
Addresses Alarm Response for SG B Level Deviation.
US:
Enters and directs actions of 3-0NOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, for response.
Page 23 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f, f
II db 1s tn orma ion 1s contro e 1y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
NOCUM TIME TIME FUET EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE:
After S/G level control is restored, at the Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 6.
BOP:
GI Verify FT-3-487 failure by channel check comparison.
GI Verify no off-normal conditions exist on FT-3-487.
GI f~~~:~;*~~~~~
0
~~!.... ~*.*w*~*~~Vl!f1~~l~i]~f~B~~~~rl(J BOP:
Notifies WCC to initiate PWO and l&C for troubleshooting.
US:
Conducts crew brief.
EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
Verifies PZR pressure less than 2235.
E10Sei~~RYl~~rlLMQSl~~QBSZ~~;f~1~*y~1Ve BOP:
Addresses Alarm Response for A9/2.
Checks if alarm is due to instrument failure, then refers to 3-0NOP-041.5, PZR Press Control Malfunction.
Page 24 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th.. f II db 1s m ormation 1s contro e 1y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-112/29/14)
MJtUNI TIME IU£T EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
US:
Enters and directs actions of 3-0NOP-041.5, PZR Press Control Malfunction, for response.
Reviews 3-0NOP-041.5 Foldout Page IF any Pressurizer Pressure control Instrument Loop fails, THEN place applicable control switches to a position that isolates the failed instrument.
IF PZR pressure cannot be maintained greater than 2000 psig, THEN perform the following:
Continue efforts to restore PZR pressure and Trip the reactor and turbine and go to 3-EOP-E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
IF any PORV is OPEN OR Leaking AND pressure is less than 2235 psig, THEN CLOSE the applicable PORV and/or Block valve.
RCO:
Check PZR Pressure Control Instrument Loop Not Failed Check PT-3-444-NOT FAILED by comparison with adjacent pressure channels and known plant parameters. (YES)
Check PT-3-445-NOT FAILED by comparison with adjacent pressure channels and known plant parameters.
. (NO)
Verify PCV-3-456 OR MOV-3-535 is CLOSED.
RCO:
Checks PORVs closed Checks PZR Spray Valves Closed with PZR pressure normal or trending to normal.
Checks PZR Safety Valves closed.
Check PZR Pressure Stable or Increasing.
Check Pressurizer Pressure Above Normal Value (NO)
RCO:
Check Pressurizer Pressure Low Or Decreasing.
Maintain PZR Pressure Greater Than 2000 psig.
Check PZR Heater Operable Check PZR Heaters ON.
Check PZR Heaters capable of maintaining pressure.
Page 25 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th *. f II db 1s m ormatmn 1s contro e
- V PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
r,EXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1
~~
NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29114)
SEG TIME FlE£'I EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERATOR WCC/l&C: Acknowledge the report.
NOTE At the Lead Evaluator's discretion go to the next event.
BOP:
Notifies WCC to initiate PWO and l&C for troubleshooting.
US:
Conducts crew brief.
Page 26 of 53 This infonnation is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f t
II db 1s m ormat1on 1s con ro e
- Y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
f'JEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
SEG TIME CT4 Start Time FlUI EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by Leaa Evaluator ot if ~~aci:or trips, ~igger MA4()ff EVENT 7 ~ 3C S$TR.
Notices loss of RCS pressure control as a result of either the PT-3-445 failure or the subsequent 3C SGTR.
Recommends entering 3-EOP-E-O, Rx Trip or Safety Injection.
When Event7 is triggered verifyit e1uto triggef5 EVENT 8 -
~.(: FAll:.S to ISOLATE QI'! ~I....
US:
Directs 3-EOP-E-O response after auto Reactor trip.
OR Directs RCO to manually trip the Reactor, then for operators to perform their IOA's.
RO/BOP:
Perform IOA's.
NOTE RCO:
3A and 38 RHR pumps Verifies Reactor Trip will start when SI Rod bottom lights - ON actuates. Record the time for verification of CT 4 to Reactor trip & bypass breakers - OPEN secure RHR pumps within Rod position indicators -AT ZERO 44 minutes.
Neutron flux - DECREASING STEP 1 BOP:
All turbine stop or associated control valves - CLOSED Moisture Separator Reheater Steam Valves-CLOSED MSR Main Stm Sup Stop MOVs Reheater Timing Valves MSR Purge Stm Valves Checks Mid and East GCBs -
OPEN STEP2 Page 27 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th" f
II db 1s in ormat1on 1s contro e
- V PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
1\\.1-era l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 ENERGY~
SEG
~
TIME A.m NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE The SGTR ramps in. The signs of the SI requirement may not be evident until the reading of the IOA actions.
BOP:
Verifies Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses
- a. Checks the 3A and 3B 4 KV buses - MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED
- b. Checks the 3A and 38 4 KV buses - MAINTAIN BOTH ENERGIZED
- c.
Maintains the 3D 4 KV Bus energized - ALIGNED TO AN ENERGIZED 4 KV BUS RCO:
Checks If SI Is Actuated SI Annunciators ANY ON OR Safeguards equipment -AUTO STARTED RCO:
- a. Checks if SI is required:
Low PZR pressure - 1730 psig OR High Containment pressure - 4 psig OR High steam line differential pressure - 100 psid OR STEP3 STEP4 High steam flow with low S/G pressure 614 psig OR low Tavg (543°F)
RCO:
Verifies SI actuation when required.
US:
Directs 3-EOP-E-O response and reviews the IOAs.
Reviews Foldout page with the crew Page 28 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f II d IS in ormat1on IS contro e by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera>
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
NRC Final (Rev1-1 12129/14)
SEG TIME R£EI' EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
CREW:
Reviews FOP for 3-EOP-E-O Adverse Cntmt - Not met RCP Trip Criteria - Not met Faulted SIG Isolation - Not met initially. When met,
- 1) maintains AFW flow> 400 gpm until NR level is> 7%
- 2) isolate AFW flow
- 3) stabilize RCS Hot Leg temperatures using Steam Dumps when faulted SGs < 9% WR (may not be met due to SGTR)
RUPTURED SIG ISOLATION CRITERIA When 3C SIG narrow range level is greater than 7%[27%],
then stop feed flow to 3C SIG AFW Sys Operation Criteria - time monitored
- CST Makeup Water Criteria - N/A RHR System Operation Criteria Both running at shutoff - time monitored Loss of Offsite Power or SI on the Other Unit-Not met Loss of Charging Criteria - Not met FOLDOUT PAGE NOTE BOP: actions are Continues with ATIACHMENT 3 to complete The Prompt listed starting on page 44.
Action Verifications.
NOTE RCO:
The RCO may notice that Check AFW Pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING.
MOV-3-1409 and FCV 498 fail to isolate on Safety Injection, close valve or isolate locally.
RCO:
STEPS STEP6 Verify AFW Valve Alignment - PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT STEP?
Page 29 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th-
- f f
II db PTN' 1s m orma ion 1s contro e
- Y s 2015 L OIT N C X Ml 0
SEC TY G EEMENT (L-15-1) R E A NATI N URI A R rera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-112/29/14)
RHI EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
Verify Proper AFW Flow:
Check Narrow Range Level in at least one SIG - GREATER THAN 7%[27%]
Maintain feed flow to SIG until Narrow Range Levels between 21%[27%] and 50%
RCO:
Check RCP Seal Cooling:
RCO:
- a. All RCP Thermal Barrier Alarms - CLEAR:
A 111, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI FLOW A 112, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI TEMP A 113, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER LO FLOW Check RCS Temperatures:
- a. Check RCPs - ANY RUNNING (yes)
- b. Check RCS Average temperatures -
- STABLE BETWEEN 545°F AND 547°F OR
- TRENDING DOWN TO 547°F STEPS STEP9 STEP10 RCO:
Check PRZ PORVs, Spray Valves And Excess Letdown Isolated:
- a. PORVs - CLOSED
- b. Normal PRZ Spray valves - CLOSED
- c. CV-3-311, Auxiliary Spray Valve - CLOSED
- d. Excess Letdown - NOT IN SERVICE STEP 11 Page 30 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
f b
This in ormation is controlled >V PTN's 2015 LOIT {L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXT era l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
R.m EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:
RCO:
- a. RCPs -ANY RUNNING a. Go to Step 13.
- c. RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 19°F[41°F] - met STEP12 Check If S/Gs Are Faulted: (NOT met at this time)
- a. Check pressures in all S/Gs -
- ANY S/G PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR
- ANY SIG COMPLETELY OEPRESSURIZEO STEP 13 Page 31of53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
1s in orma ion 1s con ro e
~y P N s 2015 L Th". f f
t lldb T' OIT(L 1) NRC EX MINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT A
NEx era L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1
~~
NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14) nm-TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERATOR If Chemistry or RP is called, local secondary radiation readings indicate a 3C SGTR.
RCO:
Check If SIG Tubes Are Ruptured: (met for 3C SG)
- a. Check levels in all SIGs and secondary radiation levels:
- Any SIG level - INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR
- Condenser Air Ejector Radiation R HIGHER THAN NORMAL OR
- SIG Slowdown Radiation R HIGHER THAN NORMAL OR
- Local steamline radiation - HIGHER THAN NORMAL
- b. Perform the following:
1} Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES
- 2) Go to 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERA TOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1 Page 32 of 53 SEG STEP14 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f f
II db TN 1s m orma ion 1s contro e
>Y p 01 R EXAM NA
's 2015 L T (L-15*1) N C I
s c G
MENT TION E URITY A REE NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
SEG TIME Rm EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERATOR If called as RP, report the radiation readings on 3C SG lines are higher than normal.
US:
- 1) Monitors Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES.
- 2) Go to 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERA TOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1 US:
Directs 3-EOP-E-3 response.
Reviews Foldout Page Adverse Containment Setpoints RCP Trip Criteria SI Re-Initiation Criteria Secondary Integrity Criteria Cold Leg Recirculation Switchover Criteria CST Makeup Water Criteria Multiple Tube Rupture Criteria Loss Of Offsite Power Or SI On Other Unit.
,.:~(;~~,**,m~~~1C~
JQ!l~~
RCO:
Checks If RCPs Should Be Stopped BOP:
Identify Ruptured S/G:
Identify 3C as the Ruptured SIG Directs RP to take rad readings on Main Steam and Slowdown Lines Evaluates DAM1 on DCS STEP 1 Determines ruptured SG by level increase or radiation STEP 2 Page 33 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT {L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1
~~
NRC Final (Rev1-112/29/14}
SEG TIME fUFI EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
Report complete after 5min.
After 5 minutes, report complete.
BOP:
Isolate Flow From Ruptured SIG Checks 3C SIG Steam Dump To Atmosphere Closed.
WHEN ruptured SIG pressure is less than 1060 psig, THEN Verify SIG Steam Dump to Atmosphere is closed.
STEP 3.
BOP:
Close steam supply valves from ruptured SIG(s) to AFW Pumps using: *Attachment 19 for 3C SIG Close MOV-3-1405 by dispatching an Operator To Locally Perform The Following:
- a. Place Breaker 4D01-27 in OFF
- b. Verify MOV-3-1405-CLOSED Notify Unit Supervisor That 3C SIG AFW Steam Supply Is Isolated and Attach 19 is complete.
A TI ACHMENT 19 BOP:
Verify 3C SIG Slowdown Isolation Valve FCV-3-6278C is closed on 3C SIG.
- C.to~ii~Gf""~IY.
STEP 3.d-e BOP:
Check Circulating Water Pumps -ANY RUNNING STEP 3.f BOP:
Dispatch Operator to align main steam auxiliaries using STEP 3.f Page 34of53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
h". f II b
T IS m ormat1on IS contro ed,y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
!era l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12129/14)
TIME Am EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE The fault is delayed in 3C SG to establish a target for cooldown.
NOTE RV-3-1411, 3C Steam Safety, will fail open during the cooldown.
BOP:
Isolate miscellaneous flow paths from 3A SIG using 6.
Verify 3C SIG Slowdown Sample MOV MOV-3-1425-CLOSED Dispatches Operator to locally isolate 3C SIG Main Steamline Steam Trap 3-10-321 Steam Sample Valves 3-10-896 for SIG 3C Inform Unit Supervisor That Attachment 16 Is Complete.
STEP 3.f BOP:
Check Rupture S/G Level:
US:
Check 3C S/G Level Narrow Range level-GREATER THAN 7%[27%)
Verify feed flow stopped to 3C SIG.
STEP4 Checks 3C SIG pressure greater than 450 psig. (yes)
US/BOP:
Initiate RCS Cooldown Determines required CET Temp for Cooldown.
Check feed sources to intact S/Gs-CAPABLE OF PROVIDING 400 GPM STEP Check Condenser AVAILABLE (IF lost, uses Stm Dumps to Atmosphere)
Continue with step 7 When Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE, then stops cooldown.
Maintains core exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.
STEP Page 35of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f f
II db TN 1s in orma ion 1s contro e 1y p 0
's 2015 L IT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
era L.. 15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 EN~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
TIME.
CT4 Stop Time:
fUEt EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
CT4 Secure RHR pumps operating time at shutoff head on minimum flow recirculation within 44 minutes to prevent pump overheating and adverse vibration.
BOP:
Check Intact SIG Level:
Any Narrow Range Level-GREATER THAN 7% [27%].
Maintain 3A and 38 S/G narrow range level between 21 %
[27%] and 50%.
Narrow Level - LESS THAN 50%.
STEP?
STEPS RCO:
Establish Charging Flow:
Charging Pumps -AT LEAST ONE RUNNING Check offsite power - AVAILABLE st1wltVava1ras11tctiif1:1r.rieam:~.
'~~~)e 20(,-N~"gmg~,;y""~"~'~~~
Verify Charging Pump Suction auto transfers to RWST.
STEP9 RCO:
Check If RHR Pumps should Be Stopped:
Check RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 275 PSIG[575 PSIG]
Check RHR flow - LESS THAN 1100 GPM wlf7~Rl-1Rieunr~anff~1§ce:ifistailat>"v~
~!Jf1l,~*~*-*~v*_,l_R$~-**~!t *...*... d***-*****.-.* ~.)!J.,
STEP 10 RCO:
Check PRZ PORVs And Block Valves:
Check Power to block valves -AVAILABLE Check PORVs - CLOSED Check Block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN STEP 11 Page 36 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f f
t II db
' 2 1 0
1s m orma ion 1s con ro e 1y PTN s 0 5 L IT (L-15-1) NRC EXAM INAT 0 S C RITY I N E U T
AGREEMEN.
NEXTera" l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
SEG TIME FUET EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE The crew may apply Secondary Integrity Criteria from Foldout page and transition to 3-EOP-E-2 prior to or in 3-EOP-ECA-3.1.
RCO:
Reset Containment Isolation Phase A & Phase B.
STEP12 RCO:
Verify Instrument Air To Containment:
Verify CV-3-2803, Instrument Air Containment Isolation -
OPEN Verify Instrument Air pressure, as indicated on Pl-3-1444-GREA TER THAN 95 PSIG STEP 13 BOP:
Check If RCS Cooldown Should be Stopped:
Check CETs < REQUIRED WHEN core exit TCs are less than required temperature Stop RCS cooldown Maintain CETs < REQUIRED STEP 1 BOP:
Checks Ruptured S/G(s) Pressure STABLE or INCREASING (no)
STEP15 BOP:
Checks RCS Pressure decreasing to < 250 psig from intact SGs STEP 15.RNO US:
- 1) Monitors Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES.
- 2) Go to 3-EOP-ECA-3.1, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT-SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED RUPTURE, Step 1.
The scenario is terminated after the opportunity to isolate the 3C Steam Generator or at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
- END OF SCENARIO ***
Page 37 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f II db 1s m onnat1on 1s contro e
>V PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NC:xTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1
~~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
TIME Rm EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
US:
Conducts EOP transition crew brief.
Directs 3-EOP-E-2 response.
US:
Reviews FOP for 3-EOP-E-2 with the crew Adverse Containment Setpoints Containment atmosphere temperature greater than 180°F OR Containment radiation levels greater than 1.3x105 R/hr FOLDOUT PAGE BOP:
Checks Main Steamline Isolation And Bypass Valves On faulted SG(s)-Closed.
BOP:
Check If Any SIG ls Not Faulted:
3A and 3B are not faulted.
BOP:
Identify Faulted S/G(s)
Identifies 3C S/G to be faulted Page 38 of 53 STEP 1 STEP2 STEP3 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
.. f II db P Thts in ormat1on 1s contro e 1y TN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC E XA I M NATION S R
ECU ITV AGR EEME NT.
N
- rera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
Rm TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
Verifies Faulted SIG Isolated:
%~.:~~tfiJ~~w-~Uj(J=~
§~L_J>JJW.
.Q,Z~rQ~
Dispatch operator to verify closed 3C Steam Generator AFW Steam Supply, MOV-3-1405.
Verify de-energized MOV-3-1405 BKR, 3D01-27 Verify closed 3C SIG Dump to Atmosphere Valve.
- ~lfr:TN~gtos~<iIK111}v;~1~2~iia~§Z~]~!QUiijt§~m1>1Et~~Jv~~
STEP 1 BOP:
Stabilize RCS Hot Leg Temperature:
Check faulted SIG Level - LESS THAN 9% Wide Range
[27% Narrow Range].
Stabilize RCS Hot Leg temperatures using Steam Dump by adjusting intact SIG Steam Dump To Atmosphere valves Auto setpoint to match current SIG pressures.
STEP 2 BOP:
Checks CST Level - GREATER THAN 12%.
STEP BOP:
Check Secondary Radiation:
Direct Nuclear Chemistry to take periodic activity samples of all SIGs.
Direct Radiation Protection to take radiation readings on Main Steam lines.
Check DCS DAM1 and other unisolated or secondary monitors readings - NORMAL.
Secondary radiation -NORMAL (no)
STEP4 The scenario is terminated after the opportunity to isolate the 3C Steam Generator or at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
Page 39 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
. f This m ormat1on 1s controlle db *v PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera**
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final {Rev1-112/29/14)
AaT TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
- END OF SCENARIO ***
Page40 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-112/29/14)
TIME RHT EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
US:
Directs 3-EOP-ECA-3.1 response.
Reviews Foldout Page Adverse Containment Setpoints SI Re-Initiation Criteria Secondary Integrity Criteria Cold Leg Recirculation Switchover Criteria CST Makeup Water Criteria Loss Of Offsite Power Or SI On Other Unit.
RCO:
Verify SI - RESET STEP 1 RCO:
Reset Containment Isolation Phase A & Phase B.
STEP2 RCO:
Verify Instrument Air To Containment:
Verify CV-3-2803, Instrument Air Containment Isolation -
OPEN Verify Instrument Air pressure, as indicated on Pl-3-1444 -
GREATER THAN 95 PSIG STEP 3 BOP:
Verify All 4KV Buses - ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER A4KV Bus 84KV Bus C 4KV Bus D4KV Bus STEP4 Page 41of53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th.. f II db 1s in ormat1on 1s contro e
)V PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
N era l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
TIME CT4 Stop Time:
Rm EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:
When TSC is called for De-energize PRZ Heaters minimum PRZ Water Positon PRZ Switches in OFF Level for heater coverage.*
- Consult TSC Report-TSC recommends PRZ Heaters be re-energized at 30% level Reset PRZ Backup Heaters RCO:
Checks Containment Spray Pumps not running.
BOP:
Check Rupture S/G Level:
STEPS STEP6 Check 3C SIG Level Narrow Range level - GREATER THAN 7%[27%]
CT4 Secure RHR pumps operating time at shutoff head on minimum flow recirculation within 44 minutes to prevent pump overheating and adverse vibration.
Verify feed flow stopped to 3C SIG.
STEP?
RCO:
Check If RHR Pumps should Be Stopped:
Suction aligned to RWST Check RCS pressure-GREATER THAN 275 PSIG[575 PSIG]
Check RHR flow - LESS THAN 1100 GPM
- 1$1Qi?Li!8&RIJ!!l]iltt:~:'~I~~Iij:~n~by.
STEPS BOP:
Initiate Evaluation of Plant Status Using Attachment 8.
STEP9 Page 42 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th *. t f
II db 1s m orma ion 1s contro e 1y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L*15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NB era L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
TIME Rl£I EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
Establish Charging Flow:
it~lqi1!fiinfm!Im~t~!i~~];0NERUNNiN~
Check offsite power-AVAILABLE Start all available Charging Pumps.
Adjust speed controller as necessary to establish maximum Charging flow from the running Charging Pump(s).
Place RCS Makeup Control in STOP.
Adjust HCV-3-121, Charging Flow To Regen Heat Exchanger, to maintain proper Seal Injection flow.
Verify Charging Pump Suction auto transfers to RWST.
STEP 10 BOP:
Checks If SIGs Are NOT Faulted NO SIG Pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled manner NO SIG completely depressurized Continues with 3-EOP-E-2 if NOT previously isolated STEP 11 The scenario is terminated after the opportunity to isolate the 3C Steam Generator or at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
- END OF SCENARIO ***
Page 43 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L*15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f II db 1s m ormat1on 1s contro e IY PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
1'-JEXTera**
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
TIME FU£I EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
Check Load Centers Associated With Energized 4 KV Buses -
ENERGIZED:
-3ALC
-3B LC
-3C LC
-3D LC
-3H LC BOP:
Verify Feedwater Isolation:
- a. RTace~Malfflieeawaterl>um':swaclles ln~sfop
"'*-*~**************J***~~* ~*.................. JP........ ~..........................
- b. Feedwater Control Valves - CLOSED:
- FCV-3-478 - unable to close, failed open
- FCV-3-488
- FCV-3-498
- c. Feedwater Bypass Valves - CLOSED:
- FCV-3-479
- FCV-3-489
- FCV-3-499
- d. Feedwater Bypass Isolation Valves - CLOSED:
- POV-3-477
- POV-3-487
- POV-3-497
- MOV-3-1407
- MOV-3-1408
- f. Verify Standby Feedwater Pumps - OFF Page 44 of 53 STEP 1 STEP2 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
f This in ormation is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
i'JEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~_
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
TIME R..EET EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
"' Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
Check If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated: (no)
- a. Check Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass valves -
ANY OPEN
- b. Check if either Main Steam Isolation Signal has actuated:
- Hi-Hi Containment Pressure 20 psig
- c. Verify Main Steam Isolation and Bypass valves - CLOSED STEP3 BOP:
Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve White Lights On VPB
-ALL BRIGHT BOP:
Verify Pump Operation:
- a. At least two High-Head SI Pumps - RUNNING
- b. Both RHR Pumps - RUNNING BOP:
Verify Proper CCW System Operation:
- a. CCW Heat Exchangers - THREE IN SERVICE
- b. CCW Pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING
Verify Proper ICW System Operation:
- a. Verify ICW Pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING
- b. Verify ICW To TPCW Heat Exchanger - ISOLATED:
- POV-3-4882 - CLOSED
- POV-3-4883 - CLOSED
- c. Check ICW Headers - TIED TOGETHER Page 45 of 53 STEP4 STEPS STEP6 STEP?
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
T.. f II b
his m ormatton IS contro ed tV PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1} NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Nr~-era, L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRG Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14) run EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
Verify Containment Cooling:
- a. Check Emergency Containment Coolers - ONLY TWO RUNNING BOP:
Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation:
STEPS
- a. Unit 3 Containment Purge Exhaust And Supply Fans - OFF STEP9 BOP:
Verify Containment Spray NOT Required: (yes)
- a. Containment pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 20 PSIG:
- PR-3-6306A
- PR-3-63068 STEP10 BOP:
Verify SI - RESET STEP 11 BOP:
Verify SI Valve Amber Lights On VPB - ALL BRIGHT STEP12 BOP:
Verify SI Flow:
- a. RCS pressure-LESS THAN 1625 PSIG[1950 PSIG]
- b. High-Head SI Pump flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW
- c. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 275 PSIG[575 PSIG]
- d. RHR Pump flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW STEP 13 Page46of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f II db 1s in ormat1on 1s contra e
'Y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
N1::'<Tera E~
lilJCtEAll FU£'I BOOTH OPERATOR When requested by crew, trigger LOA - ALIGN PAHMS 3-NOP-094.
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
Realign SI System:
SEG
- a. Check Procedure Entry Status - E-0 ENTERED FROM 3-0NOP-047.1, LOSS OF CHARGING FLOW IN MODES 1 THROUGH 4 (no)
- e. Verify Unit 3 High-Head SI Pumps - TWO RUNNING (no)
- g. Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to align Unit 4 High-Head SI Pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using Attachment 1.
BOP:
~KtJHL~onfjJJfl[;n:c1§.21<!tl2!iRfi@:~=A*§)3§~$~E:r BOP:
Reestablish RCP Cooling:
- a. Check RCPs -AT LEAST ONE RUNNING
- b. Open CCW To Normal Containment Cooler Valves:
- MOV-3-1417
- MOV-3-1418
- c. ~lett~trar§!@ttlf[rm~l:~grr~ofil~iff~29t~'~
BOP:
Verify Control Room Ventilation Isolation:
- a. Emergency Air Supply Fan SF-1 B - ON
- b. Emergency Air Supply Fan SF-1A-OFF STEP14 STEP 15 STEP16
- c. Control Room Ventilation dampers -ALIGNED FOR RECIRC
- d. TS-0002, TSC Emergency Vent Auto Initiate Key Switch - IN ENABLE STEP17 BOP:
"n~~i~Jnl~oo~rQsin9,~Nt!P-:Cl94~~***********
- -~*$*---* ~.,~:J~~~. ]Ii'~~~1Qt;~;;MQNIJQl31NG SY&tt;l'!f STEP18 BOP:
Verify All Four EDGs - RUNNING STEP19 Page47of53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
T.
f II d his in ormation IS contro e bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14) fl.!!T EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses:
- a. Check 3A, 3B AND 3D 4 KV Buses - ALL ENERGIZED STEP 20 BOP:
- b. Check 3A AND 3B 4 KV Buses -ALL ENERGIZED FROM OFFSITE POWER BOP:
Notify Unit Supervisor Of The Following:
- Attachment 3 is complete
- Any safeguards equipment that is NOT In the required condition
- Status of Containment pressure continuous action STEP 21 Page48 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th.. f f
II db TN' 0
L x
1s m orma ion 1s contro e 1y p s2 15 OIT(L-15-1)NRCE AMIN I N ATO SE G EE CURITYA R MENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 E_~-
SEG NRC Final (Rev1-112/29/14)
RID Discussion Points are intentionally NOT included in evaluated scenarios. However, space is available below to document follow-up questions when further information is required to determine an evaluation outcome.
FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS QUESTION#1 ANSWER#1 QUESTION#2 ANSWER#2 Page 49 of 53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f\\
f t
II d b TN 201 LO T (
1s m orma ion 1s con ro e
- Y p
's 5
I L-15-1) N RC M NA 0 EXA I Tl N SECURITY A G REEMENT.
'~*.. ;*era L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 1 ENEf3QY_~
SEG
/~ -
NRC Final (Rev1-1 12/29/14)
FUEi SIMULA TOR POST-SCENARIO RESTORATION:
- 1. Restore per Simulator Operator Checklist.
- 2. Once exams are complete, restore from SEl-19, Simulator Exam Security.
Page 50of53 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1} NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
~-*.Po.;: ~,
OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 3 RISK: GREEN (ACCEPT ABLE)
UNIT 4 RISK: GREEN {ACCEPTABLE)
PROTECTED TRAIN: B PROTECTED TRAIN: B ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS
~'
Shift Mgr:
Inside SNPO:
Field Supv.:
Outside SNPO:
AdminRCO:
ANPO:
Unit3 Unit4 UnitSupv.:
Unit Supv.:
RCO:
RCO:
NPO:
NPO:
PLANT STATUS Unit3 Unit4 Mode:
1 Mode:
1 Power:
100%
Power:
100%
MWe:
857 MWe:
842 Gross Leakrate:
0.01 gpm Gross Leakrate:
642 Operational Concerns:
I 38 HHSI Pump has a wiped motor bearing, and its return to service is expected in two days. B AFW Pump is having turbine repairs, and the expected return to service is late next shift. 3A 1 CWP preventive maintenance is done with the clearance released. The 3A1 CWP is ready for start for a PMT.
U3 Anticipated LCO Actions:
I None U4 Anticipated LCO Actions:
I None Results of Offa:oinf:! Focus Area:
I This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1} NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
UNIT 3 STATUS tREA~TOR oeERATOR
'"'"~ 0
<'.S,
'< 4 UNIT RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)
PROTECTED TRAIN: B Mode:
1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power:
100%
Gross:
0.01GPM A
6656 MWe 857 Unidentified O.OOGPM B 6608 Tavg:
580°F Charging Pps:
0.01 GPM c 6646 RCS Pressure:
784 Abnormal Annunciators:
w.::
,,~-* ',
~ ~<,,
Annunciator:
H3/2 - SAFETY INJ PUMP 38 TRIP Comp Actions:
3A, 4A, and 48 HHSI Pumps are guarded.
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Current Tech S[!ee Action Statements: ro*0es Not Include "For Tracking Onl! Items" T.S.A.S I Component:
3.5.2.c-30 day action I 38 HHS! Pump Reason:
Bearing Replacement Entry Date:
Yesterday T.S.A.S I Component:
3.7.1.2.c-30dayaction/ 8AFWPump Reason:
Turbine Repairs Entry Date:
Yesterday T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
~~CTOR OPE~TOR (CONT'D)
UNIT RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)
PROTECTED TRAIN: B Changes to Risk Significant Equipment:
No recent changes from last shift.
OLRM: GREEN PROTECTED TRAIN: B Upcoming.Reactivity Management Activities:
I*
~
~*
Maintain current power.
Upcoming Major POD Activities:
NONE Upcoming ECOs to Hang and /or Release:
Hang-None Release - None Evolutions or Compensatory Actions in Progress:
NONE General Information. Remarks. and Operator*Wc:>rkAround Status:
Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.
U3 supplying Aux Steam Air In-leakage= 0.0 SCFM This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L*15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Appendix D Scenario Outline NRC Final (Rev 1-112/30/14)
Form ES-D-1 Facility:
Turkey Point Nuclear Scenario No.:
2 Op Test No.:
2015-301 (PTN) - Units 3 and 4 Examiners:
Operators:
(SRO)
(RCO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions:
The plant is at 50% power (MOL} following repairs to the 38 Steam Generator Feedwater Pump. Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units. Power escalation to 100% will begin next shift. Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.
Turnover:
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 38 HHSI Pump has a wiped motor bearing, and its return to service is expected in two days. B AFW Pump is having turbine repairs, and the expected return to service is late next shift. 3A 1 CWP preventive maintenance is done with the clearance released. The 3A1 CWP is ready for start for a PMT.
Event Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Description 1
TVKD001X C-BOP&SRO 3A TPCW Pump Seizes TFK3B11S 2
TFCMSSF4 C-RO&SRO R-3-19 Failure - Isolate Steam Generator Blowdown 3
TFLll25S 1-RO&SRO Loss of Two Individual Control Bank D Rod Positions TFLll29S (TS) 4 N/A R-RO&SRO Shutdown the Unit from 50%
N-BOP TFU7H1523B CV-3-1523A, MSR A Drain To HOT 3A, Fails As Is -
5 TAFV1523A C-BOP &SRO TFC1523B Dump Valve Operation Required 6
TVHP1ALK M-RO, BOP, Pressurizer Steam Space Break From RV-3-551A
&SRO Pressurizer Safety Valve TFL3SIA1 7
TFL3SIA2 C-RO& SRO Failure of U3 Auto SI and U4 HHSI Pump Start TFQ634CF TFQ634DF (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I }nstrument, (C)omponent, (M}ajor 1
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Appendix D l-15-1 NRC Scenario #2 Scenario Outline NRC Final (Rev 1-112/30/14)
Form ES-D-1 The plant is at 50% power (MOL) following repairs to the 38 Steam Generator Feedwater Pump.
Online risk is green.
B train is protected on both units. Power escalation to 100% will begin next shift. Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 38 HHS! Pump has a wiped motor bearing, and its return to service is expected in two days. B AFW Pump is having turbine repairs, and the expected return to service is late next shift. 3A 1 CWP preventive maintenance is done with the clearance released. The 3A 1 CWP is ready for start for a PMT.
Event 1 The 3A TPCW Pump slowly seizes with a manual start of 38 TPCW Pump required. The crew refers to 3-ARP-097.CR for guidance. TPCW motor overload, pump trip, and low pressure alarms are received. The auto start signal has failed. 38 TPCW is manually started to establish flow to avoid further adverse conditions due to no turbine/generator cooling.
Event 2 Once Event 1 has progressed, a failure is inserted causing R-3-19 radiation monitor to fail. 3-ARP-097.CR is reference for the PRMS Channel Failure alarm. Since this is a failure of R-19 with a release in progress, Steam Generator Slowdown is isolated per H1/6 guidance. The crew recognizes isolation of Steam Generator Slowdown is a reactivity manipulation and discusses the effects of the manipulation.
Event3 After Steam Generator Slowdown is isolated, a sequential failure of Control Bank D individual rod position (NARPI) occurs on two rods. With this failure, 87/1, NIS/RPI Rod Drop/Rod Stop, alarms. The crew enters the ARP response and verifies with diverse indications that no movement occurred. The rod bottom light for the rod is lit along with the NARPI indicating a failure. 3-0NOP-028.1, RCC misalignment, is entered to verify RCCs are aligned with the associated bank. Control Rods are placed in manual. Reactor Engineering confirms a RCC position indication malfunction exists. The crew transitions to 3-0NOP-028.2, RCC Position Indication Malfunction. TS 3.1.3.1 is referred to for this failure and LCO 3.0.3 is determined. Since two or more RPls per bank are inoperable, then within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, a plant shutdown must commence to place the plant in MODE 3 in the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Event4 Since two or more RPls per bank are inoperable, then within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, the crew commences a plant shutdown to place the plant in MODE 3 in the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The crew briefs the downpower and the RCO commences a boration to start lowering temperature. Once Tavg has decreased at least one degree, the BOP lowers Turbine load at an equivalent rate using the Turbine Control System (TCS).
2 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Appendix D Event 5 Scenario Outline NRC Final (Rev 1-112/30/14)
Form ES-D-1 After a 5 to 10% load decrease, the Moisture Separator Drain system experiences a perturbation in response to L T-3-15238 failing high and CV-3-1523A, MSR A Drain to HOT 3A, failing in a mid-position. In response to this failure, the operator has minutes to respond to the 03/1, MSR A Hi Level, alarm before a Turbine trip. The MSR A Overview screen is open on the plant computer (DCS) to select manual control and open the dump valve CV-3-15238 to re-establish level control.
Event6 Next, RV-3-551A Pressurizer Safety Valve fails open. The crew notes the lowering Pressurizer pressure and responds as time permits with maximum Charging. As pressure continues to lower, the US orders to trip the Reactor and perform 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, immediate operator actions. The auto SI signal is blocked. The crew ensures SI actuation by manually pushing the SI Actuation pushbuttons, and then actuating Containment Isolation Phase A The mitigation sequence is 3-EOP-E-O to 3-EOP-E-1.The scenario is complete after the crew has terminated RHR Pump operation when evaluation of plant status for cold leg recirculation is determined.
Event 7 This post trip failure removes the Unit 3 auto SI actuation and the auto start of Unit 4 HHSI Pumps. The 38 HHSI Pump is OOS at the start of the scenario. 3-EOP-E-O is performed to ensure equipment starts and alignments are proper for plant conditions. During this verification, the BOP ensures proper HHSI flow based on requirements.
The scenario is terminated prior to transitioning from 3-EOP-E-1 once the crew has terminated RHR recirculation flow or the time to terminate RHR recirculation flow has expired or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion.
3 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Appendix D Critical Tasks:
Scenario Outline NRC Flnal (Rev 1-112/30/14)
Form ES-D-1 CT1: When the automatic SI signal is failed, actuate SI manually with at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards equipment prior to reaching a Red Path on Integrity.
Safety Significance: Failure to manually actuate SI under these postulated conditions constitutes the misoperation or incorrect crew performance. The crew does not prevent a degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity, demonstrate the ability to direct/manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls, or recognize an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
CT2: When a RHR Pump starts and is operating at shutoff head, limit the operating time at shutoff head with minimum flow recirculation to no more than 44 minutes.
Safety Significance: Failure to secure the RHR Pumps operating at shutoff head leads to pump overheating and adverse vibration which would constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent a degradation of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity.
Note: Individual minimum flow recirculation lines are provided to allow enough flow (330 gpm) for pump operation for a limited time (44 minutes).
[O-ADM-232, Time Critical Operator Action Program-Attachment 1, page 9 of 24]
CT3: Manually Control 3A MSR Level When CV-3-1523A (MSR Normal Drain to Heater Drain Tank) fails as is and CV-3-15238 (MSR Alternate Drain to Condenser) fails to operate in automatic, manually operate CV-3-15238 to prevent a Unit trip due to high MSR level.
Safety Significance: The failure to control MSR level demonstrates a lack of corrective actions which create a challenge to plant safety with an unintentional reactor protection system (RPS) actuation 4
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th'. f II db 1s m ormatton 1s contra e
- Y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NE.><Tera E~
SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SEG REI Site:
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 (PTN)
Title:
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 LMS#:
L-15*1 NRC SCENARIO 2 LMS Rev Date:
12/30114 Rev#: 1-1 SEG Type:
D Train-ing
[8J Evaluation Program:
OLOCT
[8J LOIT D Other Duration:
90 minutes Developed by:
Mark Wilson 11121114 Instructor/Developer Date Reviewed by:
Matt Glander 11126114 Instructor (Instructional Review)
Date Validated by :
Jose Vasquez 11121114 SME (Technical Review)
Date Approved by:
Matt Glander 11126/14 Training Supervision Date Approved by:
Mike Coen 11/26114 Training Program Owner (Line)
Date TR-AA-230-1003-F06 Revision 0 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT..
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
Rm References Revision Number 3-ARP-097.CR various O-ADM-115 88 O-ADM-200 21 O-ADM-211 3
O-ADM-232 4
O-EPIP-20101 16 O-EPIP-20134 3
3-EOP-E-O 10 3-EOP-E-1 5
3-EOP-F-O 3
3-GOP-100 6
3-NOP-010 16 3-NOP-071 6
3-NOP-094 3
3-0NOP-008 OA 3-0NOP-028.1 1
3-0NOP-028.2 2
3-0NOP-067 6
3-0NOP-071.2 8
3-0SP-059.10 1A PTN Technical Specs 293 Page 2 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NE>cera E~
Terminal Objective Rm Enabling Objectives:
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REQUIREMENTS Given this simulator scenario and resources normally found in the Control Room, the operating crew will perform Control Room operations IAW approved plant procedures in order to maintain the integrity of the plant and the health and safety of the public.
Given this simulator scenario and resources normally found in the Control Room, operate in accordance with approved plant procedures, Operations Department Instructions, and management expectations:
- 1. (ALL) Demonstrate personnel SAFETY awareness in interactions with plant staff and outside agencies.
- 2. (ALL) Demonstrate ALARA awareness in interactions with plant staff and outside agencies.
- 3. (ALL) Exchange correct information using 3-point communication/Repeat-backs with Control Room personnel and other plant staff.
- 4. (ALL) Inform plant personnel and System of plant conditions, as needed.
- 5. (SM) Employ timely and concise crew briefs where appropriate.
- 6. (SM) Make timely and correct emergency plan classifications where appropriate.
- 7. (SM/COMM) Make timely and correct emergency plan protective action recommendations if General Emergency declared with SHIFT MANAGER and Communicator assigned.
- 8. (COMM) Make accurate and timely emergency plan notifications where appropriate.
- 9. (ALL) Maintain awareness of plant status and control board indication.
- 10. (ALL) Correctly diagnose plant situations.
- 11. (ALL) Solve operational problems as they arise.
- 12. (RCO/BOP) Manipulate plant controls properly and safely.
- 13. (ALL) Demonstrate self-checking using STAR and peer checks(when required)
- 14. (US) Demonstrate command and control of the crew.
- 15. (US) Coordinate the input of crew members and other plant staff.
- 16. (US) Utilize the input of crew members and other plant staff.
- 17. (ALL) Demonstrate conservative decision making.
- 18. (STA) Provide informed technical assistance to the operating crew.
- 19. (ALL) Demonstrate teamwork.
- 20. (ALL) Respond to plant events using procedural guidance (OPs/ONOPs/EOPs) as applicable in accordance with rules of usage.
- 21. (RCO/BOP) Implement any applicable procedural immediate operator actions without use of references.
- 22. (SRO) Maintain compliance with Tech Specs.
- 23. (ALL) Identify/enter applicable Tech Spec action statements.
- 24. (ALL) Respond to annunciators using ARPs (time permitting).
- 25. (ALL) Maintain written communication, Jogs, and documentation as needed to permit post-event reconstruction.
While addressing the following events:
- 1. 3A TPCW Pump Seizes Page 3 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEx-era" L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
Rm
- 2. R-3-19 Failure - Isolate Steam Generator Slowdown
- 3. Loss of Two Individual Control Bank D Rod Positions
- 4. Shutdown the Unit from 50%
- 5. CV-3-1523A, MSR A Drain To HOT 3A, Fails As - Dump Valve Operation Required
- 6. Pressurizer Steam Space Break From RV-3-551A Pressurizer Safety Valve
None Training PTN Unit 3 Plant Simulator Resources:
Development Iii TR-AA-230,-1003, SAT Development
References:
Iii TR-AA-230,-1007 Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation
- O-ADM-232, Time Critical Action Program Iii OP-AA-100,-1000 Conduct Of Operations
- OP-AA-103,-1000 Reactivity Management
- O-ADM-200, Operations Management Manual
- O-ADM-211, Emergency and Off-Normal Operating Procedure Usage
- WCAP-17711-NP, Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group Westinghouse Emergency Response Guideline Revision 2-Based Critical Tasks Protected N/A Content:
Evaluation Performance Mode Method:
Operating None Experience:
Risk
- 1. When the automatic SI signal is failed, manually actuate Safety Injection.
Significant Operator
- 2. When a RHR Pump starts and is operating at shutoff head, limit the operating Actions:
time at shutoff head with minimum flow recirculation to no more than 44 minutes.
Page 4 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT {L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
IUET TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SRO Task#
Task Title 02008018100 AUTHORIZE ALIGNMENT OF THE TPCW SYSTEM 02067009300 RESPOND TO PROCESS RADIATION MONITORALARM(S) 02028033500 AUTHORIZE UNIT TRIP 02041068300 RESPOND TO EXCESSIVE RCS LEAKAGE 02028038100 INVESTIGATE ROD POSITION INDICATION (ROUTINE OPERATIONS) 02089026300 AUTHORIZE FAST LOAD REDUCTION 02200001500 RESPOND TO UNIT TRIP 02200021500 RESPOND TO LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 02200002500 EVALUATE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSF) STATUS TREE OUTPUT 02200022500 DIAGNOSE CAUSE OF SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION RO Task Task Title 01008002100 START A TPCW PUMP 01067009300 RESPOND TO PROCESS RADIATION MONITOR ALARM(S) 01041068300 RESPOND TO EXCESSIVE RCS LEAKAGE 01063008500 VERIFY SAFETY INJECTION OPERATION 01067009300 RESPOND TO PROCESS RADIATION MONITOR ALARMS 01089026300 RESPOND TO I ADJUST TURBINE DURING FAST LOAD REDUCTION 01072006100 PLACE MOISTUTRE SEPARATOR HEATERS IN SERVICE 01200001500 RESPOND TO UNIT TRIP 01200021500 RESPOND TO LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 01200022500 DIAGNOSE CAUSE OF SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION Page 5of45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12130/14) flttl UPDATE LOG:
Place this form with the working copies of lesson plans and/or other materials to document changes NOTES:
made between formal revisions. For fleet-wide training materials, keep electronic file of this form in same folder as approved materials. Refer to TR-AA-230-1003 SAT Development for specific directions regarding how and when this form shall be used.
Indicate in the following table any minor changes or major revisions (as defined in TR-AA-230-1003) made to the material after initial approval. Or use separate Update Log form TR-AA-230-1003-F16.
PREPARER DATE DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE REASON FOR AR/TWR#
CHANGE REVIEWER DATE 5
5 1-0 Initial Revision Revised for L 01982463 1 NRC Exam 5
5 Identify CT3 which requires no additional Operator actions, add details to SEG for B.Clark 1/2115 starting the CW pump, add cue for SM to Incorporate 1-1 direct that blowdown be isolated if needed, comments from 01982463 add details to SEG for isolating blowdown, NRC validation add cue for SM to direct that 3-GOP-100 be week.
used if needed, and corrected M.Wilson 1/2/15 miscellaneous typos and formatting.
1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5
- 1.
lnd1v1dual updating lesson plan or training matenal shall complete the appropnate blocks on the Update Log.
- 2.
Describe the change to the lesson plan or training materials.
- 3.
State the reason for the change (e.g., reference has changed, typographical error, etc.)
- 4.
Preparer enters name/date on the Update Log and obtains Training Supervisor approval.
- 5.
Initial dates and site approval on cover page.
Page 6 of 45 This Information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEX1era L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14) fUET OVERVIEW INITIAL CONDITIONS The plant is at 50% power (MOL). Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units. Maintain 50%
power for the shift. Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.
EQUIPMENT OOS 38 HHSI Pump has a wiped motor bearing, and its return to service is expected in two days. B AFW Pump is having turbine repairs, and the expected return to service is late next shift. 3A 1 CWP preventive maintenance is done with the clearance released. The 3A 1 CWP is ready for start for a PMT.
SYNOPSIS Event 1 The 3A TPCW Pump slowly seizes with a manual start of 38 TPCW Pump required. The crew refers to 3-ARP-097.CR for guidance. TPCW motor overload, pump trip, and low pressure alarms are received.
The auto start signal has failed. 38 TPCW is manually started to establish flow to avoid further adverse conditions due to no turbine/generator cooling.
Event 2 Once Event 1 has progressed, a failure is inserted causing R-3-19 radiation monitor to fail. 3-ARP-097.CR is reference for the PRMS Channel Failure alarm. Since this is a failure of R-19 with a release in progress, Steam Generator Slowdown is isolated per H1/6 guidance. The crew recognizes isolation of Steam Generator Slowdown is a reactivity manipulation and discusses the effects of the manipulation.
Event 3 After Steam Generator Slowdown is isolated, a sequential failure of Control Bank D individual rod position (NARPI) occurs on two rods. With this failure, 87/1, NIS/RPI Rod Drop/Rod Stop, alarms. The crew enters the ARP response and verifies with diverse indications that no movement occurred. The rod bottom light for the rod is lit along with the NARPI indicating a failure. 3-0NOP-028.1, RCC misalignment, is entered to verify RCCs are aligned with the associated bank. Control Rods are placed in manual. Reactor Engineering confirms a RCC position indication malfunction exists. The crew transitions to 3-0NOP-028.2, RCC Position Indication Malfunction. TS 3.1.3.1 is referred to for this failure and LCO 3.0.3 is determined. Since two or more RPls per bank are inoperable, then within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, a plant shutdown must commence to place the plant in MODE 3 in the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Event4 Since two or more RPls per bank are inoperable, then within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, the crew commences a plant shutdown to place the plant in MODE 3 in the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The crew briefs the downpower and the RCO commences a boration to start lowering temperature. Once Tavg has decreased at least one degree, the BOP lowers Turbine load at an equivalent rate using the Turbine Control System (TCS).
Event 5 After a 5 to 10% load decrease, the Moisture Separator Drain system experiences a perturbation in response to L T-3-15238 failing high and CV-3-1523A, MSR a Drain to HOT 3A, failing in a mid-position.
In response to this failure, the operator has minutes to respond to the 03/1, MSR A Hi Level, alarm before a Turbine trip. The MSR A Overview screen is open on the plant computer (DCS) to select manual control and open the dump valve CV-3-15238 to re-establish level control.
Page 7 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEX'era*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
A.ID Event 6 Next, RV-3-551A Pressurizer Safety Valve fails open. The crew notes the lowering Pressurizer pressure and responds as time permits with maximum Charging. As pressure continues to lower, the US orders to trip the Reactor and perform 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, immediate operator actions.
The auto SI signal is blocked. The crew ensures SI actuation by manually pushing the SI Actuation pushbuttons, and then actuating Containment Isolation Phase A. The mitigation sequence is 3-EOP-E-O to 3-EOP-E-1.The scenario is complete after the crew has terminated RHR Pump operation when evaluation of plant status for cold leg recirculation is determined.
Event 7 This post trip failure removes the Unit 3 auto SI actuation and the auto start of Unit 4 HHSI Pumps. The 38 HHSI Pump is COS at the start of the scenario. 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 is performed to ensure equipment starts and alignments are proper for plant conditions. During this verification, the BOP ensures proper HHSI flow based on requirements.
The scenario is terminated prior to transitioning from 3-EOP-E-1 once the crew has terminated RHR recirculation flow or the time to terminate RHR recirculation flow has expired or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion.
Page 8 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~_
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
Rm CREW CRITICAL TASKS Event# Description 6
CT1: Manually Actuate Safety Injection When the automatic SI signal is failed, actuate SI manually with at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards equipment prior to reaching a Red Path on Integrity.
6 CT2: Limit RHR Time On Recirculation When a RHR Pump starts and is operating at shutoff head, limit the operating time at shutoff head with minimum flow recirculation to no more than 44 minutes.
fO-ADM-232, Time Critical Operator Action Program-Attachment 1, page 9 of 241 5
CT3: Manually Control 3A MSR Level When CV-3-1523A (MSR Normal Drain to Heater Drain Tank) fails as is and CV-3-15238 (MSR Alternate Drain to Condenser) fails to operate in automatic, manually operate CV 15238 to prevent a Unit trip due to high MSR level.
~EQUENCE OF EVENTS Event# Description
- 1.
3A TPCW Pump Seizes
- 2.
R-3-19 Failure - Isolate Steam Generator Slowdown
- 3.
Loss of Two Individual Control Bank D Rod Positions
- 4.
Shutdown the Unit from 50%
- 5.
CV-3-1523A, MSR A Drain To HOT 3A, Fails As Is - Dump Valve Operation Required
- 6.
Pressurizer Steam Space Break From RV-3-551A Pressurizer Safety Valve
- 7.
Failure of U3 Auto SI and U4 HHSI Pump Start Page 9 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT fl-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
IUET SIMULATOR SET UP INSTRUCTIONS Check Action Restore IC-2 (50% MOL) or equivalent IC.
Unfreeze the Simulator.
Stop 3A 1 Circulating Water Pump.
Open & execute lesson file L-15-1 NRC SCEN 2 Final.lsn Ensure the following lesson steps are triggered:
- SETUP - OOS EQUIPMENT (IMM23BT, TAMSD3BS, TAFF01 B, TCF5MTB).
Place ECO tag on B AFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve.
Remove velcro tags for B AFW alignment at RPM meter.
Place the 38 HHSI Pump in PTL and hang an ECO tag on it.
Ensure Rod Group Step Counters have completed stepping out.
Allow the plant to stabilize.
Acknowledge any alarms and freeze Simulator.
Ensure B train is protected train on VPA.
Perform the SIMULATOR OPERATOR CHECKLIST or equivalent.
Place TURNOVER SHEETS on RO's desk or give to the Lead Evaluator.
Ensure a copy of O-ADM-200 is available for briefs.
Ensure a copy of ODI-44 is available for briefs.
Ensure a copy of 3-0SP-59.10 is available for QPTR, if requested.
Ensure a copy of the ODCM is available in SM Office.
Page 10 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT {L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
Rm BRIEFINGS Shift turnover information is attached to the back of this guide.
Ensure all applicants are prior briefed on Appendix E of NUREG 1021, Policies and Guidelines For Taking NRC Examinations.
Conduct a Crew Pre-brief to cover turnover information.
US:
SCENARIO NOTE O-ADM-211 Prudent Operator Actions - If redundant stand-by equipment is available and ready, the operator is permitted to start the redundant equipment for failed or failing operating equipment. Immediate follow up of applicable ARPs and ONOPs (AOPs) shall occur as required.
Page 11of45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
Rm 3-NOP-010, CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE US:
Ensure the Simulator is in
- Conducts shift turnover.
RUN before the crew enters the Simulator.
NOTE This procedure may be done anytime during BOP:
scenario.
As directed, BOOTH OPERATOR Uses 3-NOP-010, Circulating Water System, to start 3A1 CWP.
If asked, reply that pre-Notifies Chemistry of intent to start and records SG Slowdown start checks for 3A 1 CWP are complete.
rates.
- Starts 3A 1 CWP and ensures discharge valve MOV-3-1416 If called as Chemistry, opens.
acknowledge starting
- Informs US that 3A 1 CWP is running.
3A1 CWP.
~VENT 1 - 3A TPCWPump Seizes TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERATOR O-ADM-211 Prudent Operator Actions - If redundant stand-by When directed.bY ttie lead equipment is available and ready, the operator is permitted to start the redundant equipment for failed or failing operating equipment.
evaluator, trigger. l:VENT Immediate follow up of applicable ARPs and ONOPs (AOPs) shall 1 - 3ATPCW SHAFT SEIZES.
occur as required.
BOP:
- Acknowledges ANN 15/4, TPCW HI TEMP/ LO PRESS.
- Recommends entry into ARP response.
3-ARP-097.CR.I, CONTROL ROOM RESPONSE - PANEL I US:
- Directs performance of ANN 15/4 response.
RCO/BOP:
- Checks TPCW header pressure equal to or less than 75 psig.
RCO/BOP:
- Checks DCS/ERDADS Component Cooling Water System Data and Interfaces display-T1472_A between 108°F and 112°F.
Page 12 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURllY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
Rm EVENT 1 - 3A TPCW Pump Seizes TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
ReO/BOP:
- Determines TPeW header low pressure condition exists.
BOOTH OPERATOR US:
When the 38 TPeW
- Acknowledges low pressure condition.
pump C/S is t8~en to start
- Directs BOP to start the standby 3B TPeW Pump.
verify ALLQW ~8 TPCW PUMP M,t\\NUAL START autQ triggers.
BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:
When call9d, reJ)ort:
- Starts the standby 38 wew Pump.
- 1. A satisfact<>ty ~~'1 on
- Monitors pump amp indication on 3e04.
t~e ~~}"Py'Af Pump.
- Dispatches U3 Turbine Operator for locally checks for system
- 2. T~e 3}\\. TP(;W leakage and pump start.
PU~p*~ in~ardmotor bearing is hot to* touch aria shaft is not spinning; 3. No loeal leakage, if
. asked.
BOOTH OPERATOR US:
wnen callec;t; May review 3-0NOP-008, Turbine Plant Cooling Water acknoWl~ge. the.report Malfunction, for additional verifications.
and direction.
BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:
Resp()nd as wee Notify the following:
/Maintenance~
- Mechanical maintenance called to make repairs
- wee to generate a PWO and ECO.
NOTE:
After the 3B TPeW Pump is started or at the Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 2.
Page 13 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information Is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L*15-1} NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXT era~
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRG Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
A1£T EVENT 2 - R-3-19 Failure - Isolate Steam Generator Blowdown TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:
When directed by the
- Acknowledges ANN H1/6, PRMS CHANNEL FAILURE.
Lead Evaluator, bigger
- Recommends entry into ARP response.
EVENT 2 - R-3-19 FAILURE - MAN SGBD ISOLATION.
US:
- Directs performance of ANN H1/6 response.
NOTE RCO/BOP:
May review 3-0NOP-067 Checks for or 3-0NOP-071.2 actions
- Fail lamp on PRMS drawer.
for applicability. 3-0NOP-
- Loss of power to PRMS channel.
067 will not be applicable for this failure.
- Loss of detector counts for three minutes.
RCO:
Ill Discuss reactivity effects with crew.
NOTE US:
The US may discuss this Ill Directs RCO to isolate SG Slowdown.
channel is NOT a Tech Spec requirement, but is in the ODCM. The ODCM does not require blowdown be isolated if compensatory action are taken.
BOOTH OPERATOR If asked to check the ODGM, report a capy of the ODCM is in the SM office.
If the US decides tO NOT isolate Slowdown call as the SM and direct steam Generator Slowdown be is~tedul'ttil R-3-19 repairs are compete.
Page 14 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1} NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
IUET EVENT 2 - R-3-19 Failure
- Isolate Steam Generator Slowdown TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:
If dispatched to close
- Isolates SG Blowdown using skill of the craft by lowering output SGB-3-007/8/9, SIG on HIC3"6278A/B/C.
BLDN MANUAL CNTMT OR ISOL, wait 5 minutes and use the schema to close
- Isolates SG Slowdown per 3-NOP-071, STEAM GENERATOR the valves.
BLOWDOWN RECOVERY SYSTEM.
When complete report Obtain Chemistry approval valves closed.
Close HIC3-6278A/B/C, SLOWDOWN FLOW Close CV-~275A/B/C, ISOL VALVE Dispatch an Operator to close SGB-3-007 /8/9, SIG BLDN MANUAL CNTMT ISOL Notify Chemistry when Slowdown is secured BOOTH OPERATOR US:
When eallect, Calls or directs call to Work Control Center for maintenance acl<oowledge the report activities on and direction.
R-3-19 and uses this time to update management.
- May review 3-0NOP-067, Radioactive Effluent Release, to NOTE ensure no further actions are required.
Alarms associated with PRMS Channels R-15 and R-19 are mitigated using 3-0NOP-071.2, STEAM GENERA TOR TUBE LEAKAGE.
BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:
Respond as WCC /l&C.
Notify the following:
- l&C called to make repairs NOTE
- WCC to generate of PWO and ECO.
After SGBD is isolated or at the Lead Evaluators discretion, continue to the next event.
Page 15 of 45 This Information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT,
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
RHT EVENT 3 - loss of Two Individual Control Bank D Rod Positions TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:
When directed by the
- Acknowledges ANN 87/1, NIS/RPI ROD STOP ROD STOP.
Lead Evaluator, trigger Recommends entry into ARP response.
EVENT 3 - NARPI SIGNAL LOSS CB D.
NOTE US:
Sequential loss of H12,
- Directs performance of ANN B7/1 response.
and then D8 (both CB D Rod Banks).
RCO:
- Checks for any RPI or rod bottom lights on console indicating one or more dropped control rods.
Checks for any PR channel indicating instrument malfunction, loss of power suooly, or blown fuses.
RCO:
- Ensures auto rod withdrawal block has occurred (Auto rod withdrawal capability currently disabled).
- Determines Individual Rod Movement has NOT occurred by using diverse parameters: Rx Power, AFD, Tavg, That, and MWe.
- Determines no dropped rods.
US:
Acknowledges the diverse checks and the reports of two NARPI channels out of service.
3-0NOP-028.1, RCC Misalignment NOTE US:
This procedure is initially Directs response of 3-0NOP-028.1, RCC Misalignment.
used for an RCC position indication malfunction to verify the RCCs are aligned with the associated ban.
RCO:
Place the Rod Motion Control Selector switch to the MAN position.
STEP 5.1 Page 16 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRG Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
FU£T EVENT 3 - Loss of Two Individual Control Bank D Rod Positions TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
US:
- Step 5.2 is N/A.
STEP 5.2 BOOTH OPERATOR US/RCO:
Acknowledge the report Notifies the Reactor Engineering Supervisor and provides:
as the Reactor
- Degree of misalignment. - N/A
- Current reactor status (i.e., rods in manual, reactor power, and RCC position). - 50% with rods in manual, CB D at 161 steps STEP 5.3 BOOTH OPERATOR US/RCO:
Acknowledge the report Notifies l&C Supervisor to verify RPI indication AND to investigate as the l&C Supervisor.
CRDM System for possible failure.
STEP 5.4 BOOTH OPERATOR US:
Notifies the Reactor Engineering Supervisor to confirm RCC If asked to do a QPTR or Misalignment or RCC Position Indication Malfunction by:
to check fl. Flux use time compression and report
- 3-0SP-059.10, Determination of Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio.
QPTR and fl. Flux meters
- fl. Flux meters.
are normal and have not Core Exit Thermocouples (CETs).
changed.
- 1. Visual use time compression and
- 2. Computer check of digital data report a flux map was
- Full Core Flux Map for verification of core power distribution.
performed for each Rod
- Stepping of RCCs that are nearly or fully withdrawn.
and no abnormalities
- Rod Deviation/ Axial Flux Panel were detected.
STEP 5.5 US:
- Acknowledges Reactor Engineering Supervisor's determination and enters 3-0NOP-28.2, RCC Position Indication Malfunction.
STEP 5.6 3-0NOP-028.2, RCC Position Indication NOTE US:
This procedure shall be Directs response of 3-0NOP-028.2, RCC Position Indication entered only as directed Malfunction.
by 3-0NOP-028.1, RCC Misalignment.
Page 17 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT,
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT fl-15-1} NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXT era l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final {Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
FWT EVENT 3 - Loss of Two Individual Control Bank D Rod Positions TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE RCO:
NARPI meter as a green LED ON below the 0 step LED with 11 red LEDs ON: the O step red LED remains ON plus 1 O red LEDs ON indicating - 25 steps.
A low off scale condition indicates on the DCS as between -1 and -5 steps.
At -5 steps (2% of scale) or greater, the DCS locks Verify/Place the Rod Motion Control Selector switch to the MAN position. (already in Manual for 3-0NOP-028.1)
STEP 5.1 US:
Step 5.2 is NIA.
STEP 5.2 RCO:
Verifies the DCS digital indication for the faulty RCC indicates between -1 and -5 steps.
Verifies the DCS digital indication is blue on a white background.
in at -5 steps and displays in blue on a white background.
Contacts l&C that a NARPI meter indicates off scale low.
STEP 5.3 BOOTH OPERATOR US/RCO:
Acknowledge notifications Notifies the l&C Supervisor to investigate the RCC position to l&C/l&C Supervispr.
indication malfunction.
BOOTH OPERATOR Acknowledge notifications of Rx Engineering and l&C.
NOTE Once the crew has stabilized the plant and initiated actions to match Tave to Tref, at the Lead Evaluators discretion move on the next event.
STEP 5.4 US:
Notify the following:
Reactor Engineering Supervisor or designee.
l&C Supervisor to verify RPI indication and to investigate CROM System for possible failure US:
The RCC position indication malfunction is caused by an RPI power supply transfer. (no)
Step 5.5 is N/A.
STEP 5.5 Page 18 of 45 This Information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT fl-15-1} NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
R.E£T EVENT 3 - Loss of Two Individual Control Bank D Rod Positions TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTES US:
The rod position
- If a maximum of one individual RCC position indicator (RPI) monitoring in Step 5.6.2 is per bank is inoperable {no) allowed by Actions a.2.a),
Ill Step 5.6 is NIA due to 2 rod inoperable same bank.
a.2.b), and a.2.c) of Technical Specification 3.1.3.2 and may be applied to only one ino12erable rod i;;iosition indicator per unit and shall be allowed only Determines TS LCO 3.0.3 is applicable since a Limiting Condition until an entry into Mode 3.
for Operation is not met and the system is beyond TS 3.1.3.2 J,\\CTIONS for the Analog Rod. Position Indication System and the Dernand Position lndi£ation System.
If more then one bank has an inoperable RPI, Step Wittlin 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action shall be initiated to place the unit, as 5.6.2 can be used for only applicable, in:
one inoperable RPI and
- a. At least HOT ~TAf\\JDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, Step 5.6.1 applies to the
- b. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the followjng 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and other inoperable rod
- c. At least COLD SHUT[)OWN within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
position indicators.
STEP 5.6 NOTE US:
3-GOP-103 is a IF two or more RPls per bank are inoperable in Mode 1 or 2, THEN standardized reference for within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, commence power reduction to Mode 3, Hot Standby, plant shutdown. Ops also using 3-GOP-103, Power Operation to Hot Standby, and be in Hot allow 3-GOP-100, Fast Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Load Reduction as an acceptable substitute.
BOOTH OPERATOR If needed the SM directs the US use 3-GOP-100 Fast Load Reduction.
STEP 5.7 US:
Ill Steps 5.8 - 5.11 are NIA.
STEP 5.8-5.11 Page 19 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT(L*15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG.
NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
FlHT EVENT 3 - Loss of Two Individual Control Bank D Rod Positions TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
US:
- If unit shutdown is required, then assume that the non-indicating RCC is positioned in the fully withdrawn position, unless prior incore flux traces indicated the RCC was in the inserted position.
STEP 5.12 US:
Perform an incore flux trace before AND after performance of RCC exercise tests for bank containing non-indicating rods to verify the RCC has returned to the associated bank position.
STEP 5.13 US:
- When the malfunction has been corrected, then place Rod Control Selector Switch to Manual or Automatic position.
STEP 5.14 EVENT 4 - Shutdown the Unit from 50%
3-GOP-100, FaSt Load Reduction US:
Directs actions to reduce Rx power from 50% per 3-GOP-100.
Completes Attachment 3 Brief the crew per Attachment 4 STEPS 1-2 US:
Reviews Foldout page with crew.
3-EOP-E-O Transition Criteria IF RCS Tavg - GREATER THAN Tref by 6 °F, THEN trip the Reactor and Turbine AND go to 3-EOP-E-0.
Notify Chemistry Department WHEN reactor power has changed by greater than or
- equal to 15 percent, THEN notify the Chemistry Department that RCS sampling is required according to Tech Spec Table 4.4-4.
WHEN turbine load is within 10% of target load, THEN stop boration.
Restore Blender to AUTO FOLDOUT PAGE Page 20 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L*15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT [l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
A.m EVENT 4-Shutdown the Unit from 50%
3-GOP-100, Fast load Reduction BOOTH OPERATOR COMM:
Acknowledge notifications.
Notify The Following Of Fast Load Reduction System Dispatcher Plant personnel using the Page Boost Chemistry to start RCS sampling is required according to Tech Spec Table 4.4-4.
STEP3 RCO:
Begin Boration For Initial Tavg Effect Set the Boric Acid T()talizer to total boric acid volume value determined on Attachment 3.
Place the Reactor Make\\Jp Selector Switch to BORATE.
Place the RCS Makeup Control ~witcti to.START.
Adjust FC-3-113.A. Boric.Aci(j Flow Controller fo achieve 40 gpm;boric.aci(j flc:>'N as.indicated on FR-3-113; WHEN Tavg begins to lo\\Veffrom the boration, THEN, adjust FC-3-113A, Boric Acid* Flow Controller to load reduction value from Attachment 3.
BOP:
Determine Turbine Load Reduction Control Initiate Turbine Load Reduction in MW CNTRL Select MW CNTRL STEP4 Set TARGET power level - MW VALUE from Attachment 3 Set RAMP RATE - MW/M VALUE FROM Attachment 3.
Check T avg h(ls lowered 1° to 2°F from the initial value prior to borati()n, Depress GO Ensure FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller, has been adjusted to the load reduction boration rate.
STEPS 5&
Page 21of45 This lnfonnatlon is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
Rm
.. EVENT 4-Shutdown the Un.it from 50%
3-Gof>>-100,.Fast Load Reduction BOOTH OPERATOR Respond as SNPO. If asked, idle Charging Pump ready for start.
NOTE Once power as been reduced by a minimum of 5%, at the Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to the next event.
BOP:
Monitor Load Reduction Monitors turbine load reduction and informs crew at each 50 MWe increment of power reduction.
Adjusts power reduction rate to maintain Tavg!Tret within +/-4°F
~T.
Monitors SIG level control to ensure feed reg valves properly maintain level control in automatic.
STEPS 7-9 RCO:
Maintain pressurizer level to ensure that automatic pressurizer level control maintains level on program.
If needed starts 2nd Chg Pp and places 2nd orifice in service.
Adjusts boration rate to maintain Tavg!Tret within +/-4 °F ~ T.
STEP10 RCO:
Monitor Boration Rate During Downpower:
Monitor for excessive rod movement by monitoring TR-3-409D, Rod Position Bank D.
Determine if Insertion Limit and Bank D position are converging at a rate that will cause rod insertion limit alarms.
Adjust power reduction rate as needed to control rod insertion Increase boration rate and/or total amount as necessary to limit control rod insertion STEP 11 RCO:
Monitor Annunciator B 8/1, ROD BANK LO LIMIT - CLEAR Monitor B 8/2 ROD BANK A/B/C/D EXTRA LOLIMIT - CLEAR STEPS 12-13 US:
Have SM refer to the following procedures:
O-EPIP-20101, DUTIES OF EMERGENCY COORDINATOR O-ADM-115, NOTIFICATION OF PLANT EVENTS STEP 14 RCO:
Energize Pressurizer Backup Heaters STEP15 Page 22 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14) fUEl EVENT 4 - Shutdown the Unit from 50%
3-GOP-100, Fast loadReducti6n BOP:
Verify Turbine Load Less Than 675 MWE.
Check Condensate Pump Operation.
Check three condensate pumps running.
- Verify Medium Runback Armed NOT active.
- Stop one condensate pump.
STEPS 16-17 BOP:
Check Desired Final Power Target - LESS THAN 475 Mwe.
Check Station Service Loads Supplied By The Startup Transformer.
STEPS 18-19 EVENT 5...;. CV-3-1523A, l\\'ISR A [)rain To HOT 3A, *Fails As Is - Dump Valve Operation Required TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:
When direritea fiY:the.
- Acknowledges ANN D3/1, MSR A HI LEVEL.
l.~C1H~valuatorJrigger
- Recommends entry into ARP response.
EV1:NJ5.~3,Ar.11SR L.T*
3-15238. FAJ~$tfl(;H.
NOTE US:
Turbine Trip occurs on Directs performance of ANN D3/1 response.
MSR Hi-Hi level of 62 inches.
RCO:
- Reads ANN D3/1 response.
BOP:
- From DCS secondary screens, selects SECONDARY CONTROL MENU.
From DCS - SECONDARY CONTROL MENU selects MSR A OVERVIEW.
Page 23 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT(L*15-1l NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera" L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
IU!T EVENT 5 - CV.;.3-1523.A, MSR A Drain To HDT 3A, Fails As Is - Dump Valve Operation Required TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
Ensures automatic actions have occurred:
- Normal Drain to Htr Orn Tk, CV-3-1523A, OPEN.
Alternate Drain to Condenser, CV-3-15238, OPEN.
BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:
When cV~3-1523B is
- Normal Drain to Htr Drn Tk, CV-3-1523A, 57% OPEN.
taken t() manual. C>n TCS, Notices Alternate Drain to Condenser, CV-3-15238, NOT verify CV*3*1~23' *MAN OPS auto triggers.
- OPEN.
Updates the US on plant status.
US:
- Acknowledges reports of plant status.
NOTE BOP:
No response in manual Takes manual control to reduce tank level:
control to adjust
- Selects M/A STATION CV-3-1523A pushbutton on DCS CV-3-1523A position.
screen.
- Selects "M" pushbutton to swap to manual control on the overlay. (transfers to manual control)
- Pushes up arrows on DCS overlay to open CV-3-1523A further than 57% OPEN.
CT3: Manually Control BOP:
3A MSR Level Takes manual control to reduce tank level:
- Selects MIA STATION CV-3-15238 pushbutton on DCS NOTE screen.
With signal buildup, CV-3-15238 position may
- Selects "M" pushbutton to swap to manual control on the open rapidly. The initial overlay. (transfers to manual control) response will be course Controls arrows on DCS overlay to throttle ope11 CV-3-1523E3.
control followed by the ability to control more (controls manually) precisely.
Page 24 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L*15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This Information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT {l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
II.Ell l;VENT 5 - CV-3-1523A, MSR A Drain To HDT 3A, Fails As Is..... [)ump Valve Operation Required TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:
Whan called,
- Dispatches U3 Turbine Operator for investigation and to check acknowledge the request.
A MSR drain TE-3-1448 by comparing with TE-3-1449 (B MSR), TE-3-1450 (C MSR), and TE-3-1451 (D MSR).
Report back after one minute, CV-3-152~A is not moving and about half open and CV-3~1523B appears to have rib nqttCE*iblE;t* iSSl;JeS.
BOP:
- Notifies System Engineer. (This may be accomplished through the work control process.)
BOP:
- Updates the US on status and that 3C Condensate Pump is available to start, if needed.
US:
- May direct starting the 3C Condensate Pump to minimize impacts on SGFP suction pressure.
BOP:
- If directed, starts 3C Condensate Pump.
BOOTH OPERATOR US:
Wh*h called,
- Calls or directs call to Work Control Center for maintenance acknowledge the report activities on CV-3-1523A being stuck and CV-3-1523B only and direction.
operating in Manual and uses this time to update management.
NOTE:
After the 3A MSR Level is stabilized or at the Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 5.
Page 25 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1} NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
SEG fll£f EVENT 6 - Pressurizer Safety Valve V*3-551A Fails Open TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERATOR When directed by the Le.ad *E~luator, trigger EVENT.6
- V-3-551A PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE LEAKAGE.
RCO:
Recognizes rapidly lowering Pressurizer pressure.
Recommends entering 3-EOP-E-O, Rx Trip or Safety Injection.
US:
Directs 3-EOP-E-O response after auto Reactor trip.
OR Directs RCO to manually trip the Reactor, then for operators to perform their IOA's.
RCO:
Manually trips Reactor. {NIA, if Auto Rx Trip occurred)
RO/BOP:
Perform IOA's.
RCO:
Verifies Reactor Trip Rod bottom lights - ON Reactor trip & bypass breakers - OPEN Rod position indicators -AT ZERO Neutron flux - DECREASING STEP 1 BOP:
All turbine stop or associated control valves - CLOSED Moisture Separator Reheater Steam Valves-CLOSED MSR Main Stm Sup Stop MOVs Reheater Timing Valves MSR Purge Stm Valves Checks Mid and East GCBs -
OPEN Manually opens East GCB using the Emergency Trip Switch.
STEP2 Page 26 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information Is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
FUET EVENT 6 - Pressurizer Safety Valve V-3-551A Fails Open
\\
TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
Verifies Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses
- a. Checks the 3A and 38 4 KV buses-MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED
- b. Checks the 3A and 3B 4 KV buses-MAINTAIN BOTH ENERGIZED
- Checks If SI Is Actuated SI Annunciators ANY ON OR
- Safeguards equipment - AUTO STARTED STEP4 NOTE RCO:
Failure of U3 Auto SI and
- a. Checks if SI is required:
U4 HHSI Pumps is part of
- Low PZR pressure - 1730 psig the scenario setup.
OR CT2 High Containment pressure-4 psig Start NOTE OR Time 3A and 3B RHR pumps High steam line differential pressure - 100 psid will start when SI actuates. Record the time OR for verification of CT2 to
- High steam flow with low SIG pressure 614 psig OR low secure RHR pumps within Tavg (543°F) 44 minutes.
- b. IF SI is required, THEN:
CT1: Manually Actuate Manually actuate SI.
Safety Injection Manually actuate Containment Isolation Phase A.
STEP4-RNO RCO:
Verifies SI actuation when required.
Ensures a HHSI Pump is running.
Page 27 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15*1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
SEG R.W EVENT 6 - Pressurizer Safety Valve V-3-551A Fails Open TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE US:
Directs 3-EOP-E-O response and reviews the IOAs.
Reviews Foldout page with the crew NOTE CREW:
Reviews FOP for 3-EOP-E-O Adverse Cntmt - Met soon after PRT rupture.
RCP Trip Criteria - Met soon. HHSI flow to core required.
o RCO trips* RCPs once met.
Faulted SIG Isolation - Not met Ruptured SIG Isolation Criteria - Not met AFW Sys Operation Criteria - time monitored CST Makeup Water Criteria - NIA RHR System Operation Criteria - both started and running at shutoff - time monitored Loss of Offsite Power or SI on the Other Unit-Not met Loss of Charging Criteria - Not met FOLDOUT PAGE BOP:
The actions of Attachment Continues with ATTACHMENT 3 to complete The Prompt Action 3 are listed beginning on Verifications.
page 37.
STEP 5 RCO:
Check AFW Pumps - AT LEAST TWO RUNNING STEP6 RCO:
Verify AFW Valve Alignment - PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT STEP7 RCO:
Verify Proper AFW Flow:
- a. Check Narrow Range Level in at least one SIG - GREATER THAN 7%(27%]
- b. Maintain feed flow to SIG until Narrow Range Levels between 21 %[27%) and 50%
STEP8 Page 28 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT {l-1S.1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
SEG IU£I EVENT 6 - Pressurizer Safety Valve V-~55~A Fails ~pen TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE Pressurizer Safety Valve V-3-551A has failed open.
RCO:
Check RCP Seal Cooling:
- a. All RCP Thermal Barrier Alarms - CLEAR:
A 1/1, RCPTHERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI FLOW A 1/2, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI TEMP A 1/3, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER LO FLOW RCO:
Check RCS Temperatures:
- a. Check RCPs - ANY RUNNING (no)
- b. Check RCS Cold Leg temperatures -
- STABLE BETWEEN 545°F AND 547°F OR
- TRENDING DOWN TO 547°F RNO
- 1) IF TCOLD is decreasing, THEN perform the following:
a) Stop dumping steam.
STEP9 b) If cooldown continues. and is due to excessive feed flow, then reduce.total feed flow to 400 gpm until Narr9w Rang~ Level greater than 7%[27%] in at least one SIG.
c) IF cooldown continues AND is due to excessive steam flow, THEN close Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass valves. (no)
STEP10 RCO:
Check PRZ PORVs, Spray Valves And Excess Letdown Isolated:
- a. PORVs - CLOSED
- b. Normal PRZ Spray valves - CLOSED
- c. CV-3-311, Auxiliary Spray Valve - CLOSED
- d. Excess Letdown - NOT IN SERVICE STEP 11 RCO:
Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:
- a. RCPs - ANY RUNNING a. Go to Step 13.
- c. RCS subcooling-LESS THAN 19°F[41°F]
- d. Stop all RCPs (If not stopped per FQldout Page)
STEP12 Page 29of45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURllY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
R.m EVENT 6 - Pressurizer Safety Valve V-3-551A Fails Open..
TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
Check If S/Gs Are Faulted: (NOT met)
- a. Check pressures in all S/Gs -
- ANY S/G PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR
- ANY SIG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED STEP13 RCO: Check If SIG Tubes Are Ruptured: (NOT met)
- a. Check levels in all SIGs and secondary radiation levels:
- Any S/G level - INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR
- Condenser Air Ejector Radiation R HIGHER THAN NORMAL OR
- SIG Slowdown Radiation R HIGHER THAN NORMAL OR
- Local steamline radiation-HIGHER THAN NORMAL
- b. Perform the following:
- 1) Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES
- 2) Go to 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1 Page 30of45 STEP14 This Information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURllY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15*1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
IUFI EVENT 6 - Pressurizer Safety Valve V*3-551A fails Open TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
Check If RCS Is Intact:
Containment radiation - NORMAL Containment pressure - NORMAL:
o PR-3-6306A o
PR-3-63068 Containment Sump level - NORMAL:
o Ll-3-6308A 0
Ll-3-63088 Perform the following:
- 1. Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES.
- 2. Go to 3-EOP-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1 Page 31of45 SEG STEP15 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAlllllNATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
SEG Rm 3-EOP-E-1, Loss Of Reactor Or Seconde1.ry C:oolant TIME CT2 Stop Time EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE FOLDOUT Page shall be monitored for the remainder of this procedure.
NOTE The crew may wait until step 13 of 3-EOP-1.
CT2: Limit RHR Time On Recirculation.
US:
Conducts EOP transition crew brief.
Directs 3-EOP-E-1 response.
US:
Reviews FOP for 3-EOP-E-1 with the crew.
Containment Adverse {YES)
RCP Trip Criteria - Tripped SI Tennination Criteria IF met, then go to 3-EOP-ES-1.1, SI Termination, Step 1.
Secondary Integrity Criteria.
E-3 Transition Criteria Cold leg Recirculation Switchover Criteria. (met < 155k)
Recirculation Sump Blockage.
CST Makeup Water Criteria.
Loss of Offsite Power or Unit 4 SI RHR Sys Operation Criteria - IF RHR flow is less than 1100 gpm, THEN the RHR Pumps shall be shut down within 44 minutes of the initial start signal. (May Stop RHR pumps)
Loss Of Charging Criteria RCO:
Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped (tripped)
BOP:
Check If S/Gs Are NOT Faulted.
Page 32of45 FOLDOUT PAGE STEP 1 STEP2 This Information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAlllllNATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURllY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRG Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
R.m 3-EOP*E-1, Loss Of Reactor Or Secondary Coolant TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
Check Intact S/G Levels:
- Any Narrow Range Level Greater Than 7%[27%].
Maintain total feed flow greater than 400 gpm until Narrow range Level greater the 7% [27%] in at least one S/G.
- Control feed flow to maintain Narrow Range Level between 21 %[27%] and 50%.
- Narrow Range Level Less Than 50%.
STEP3 BOP:
BOOTH OPERATOR Check Secondary Radiation:
Acknowledge the Directs Nuclear Chemistry to take periodic activity samples request for Chemistry of all S/Gs and HP support Directs Nuclear Chemistry to check DAM1 monitor reading Directs Health Physics to take radiation readings on Main Steam lines.
- Secondary radiation - NORMAL NEAR ROUTINE OPERATION VALUE STEP4 RCO:
Checks PRZ PORVs And Block Valves:
- Checks Block Valves Power Available
- Checks PORVs - CLOSED
- Checks Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN STEP5 RCO:
- Check SI - RESET Resets Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B.
Verifies Instrument Air To Containment:
- Verifies Instrument Air To Containment Isolation, CV 2803-0PEN Verifies instrument air pressure, Pl-3-1444 > 95 PSIG STEPS 6, 7, 8 Page 33 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURllY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera~
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
R.EET 3-EOP*E-1, Loss Of Reactor Or Secondary Coolant TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
Checks Power Supply To All Charging Pumps - ALIGNED TO OFFSITE POWER Check If Charging Flow Has Been Established.
Charging pumps -AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (no)
US:
Establish desired charging by performing ATTACHMENT 2 step 3 through 5.
Place RC~ Makeup. Control Switch in STOP Start additional Charging pumps if needed.
Adjust Charging. Flow To Regen Heat EXchanger, HCV-3-121, to maintain proper sealinjection flow.
Verify charging pump suction auto transfers to RWST.
Notify Unit Supervisor That Attachment 2 Is Complete.
STEPS 9,10 Check if SI Flow Should Be Terminated RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit TCs Greater Than 19°F [Refer to Foldout Page Item 3 Adverse Value 0 F].
(NO)
Secondary heat sink:
Total feed flow to intact S/Gs Greater Than 400 GPM OR Narrow Range Level in at least one intact S/G Greater Than 7%[27%]
RCS pressure:
Pressure - Greater Than 1625 PSIG[1950 PSIG]
Pressure Stable Or Increasing PRZ level - Greater Than 7% [48%].
Charging capability-AVAILABLE STEP 11 RCO:
Check if Containment Spray should be stopped. (None Running)
STEP12 Page 34of 45 This Information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This Information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT(L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
R..EFr 3-EOP-E-1, Loss Of Reactor Or Secondal'J c001ant TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE RCO:
This CT may have been Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:
CT2 completed earlier per the
FOP Stop CT2: Limit RHR Time RCS pressure - Greater Than 275 PSIG[575 PSIG].
Time On Recirculation
- RHR flow - Less Than 1100 GPM.
SI-RESET
- Stops RHR Pumps and places in standby.
STEPS 13-14 BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:
If directed to Stop 4A Check If Diesel Generators Should Be Stopped:
and 48 EOG acknowledge request.
- A AND B 4KV Buses - ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER BOOTH OPERATOR Stop 3A and 3B EOG by placing its Normal Stop/Normal If dispatched to place Start switch in NORMAL STOP position.
any stopped EDGs in Direct Unit 4 RCO to Stop any unloaded diesel generator standby acknowledge by placing its Normal Stop/Normal Start switch in NORMAL request.
STOP position.
- Dispatch Operator to place any stopped EDGs in standby using 3/4-0P-023, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR STEP15 Page 35 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT(L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
Rm 3-EOP*E*1, loss Of Reactor Or Secondal)' Coolant TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
BOOTH OPERATOR Initiate Evaluation Of Plant Status If dispatched to locally unlock and close Train A
- Verify Cold Leg Recirculation capability:
minutes prior to Dispatch Operators to Locally unlock and close the triggering.
following breakers:
Train A MOV breakers using Attachment 4, Section 1.0 Train B MOV breakers using Attachment 4, Section 2.0.
- Check RHR Pumps-ONE AVAILABLE
- Check at least one Containment Sump flowpath-AVAILABLE:
MOV-3-860A AND MOV-3-861A OR MOV-860B AND MOV-3-861B STEP16 The scenario may be terminated after the RHR pumps are placed in standby per 3-EOP-E-1 step 13, or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion.
- END OF SCENARIO ***
Page 36 of 45 This Information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT(l*15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
FLEET 3-EoP.. E-o Attachment 3-Prompt Action'vermcations TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
Check Load Centers Associated With Energized 4 KV Buses -
ENERGIZED:
- 3A LC
-3B LC
-3CLC
-30 LC
-3H LC BOP:
Verify Feedwater Isolation:
- a. Place Main Feedwater Pump switches in STOP
- b. Feedwater Control Valves - CLOSED:
- FCV-3-478
- FCV-3-488
- FCV-3-498
- c. Feedwater Bypass Valves - CLOSED:
- FCV-3-479
- FCV-3-489
- FCV-3-499 STEP 1
- d. Feedwater Bypass Isolation Valves - CLOSED: - POV-3-477
- POV-3-487
- POV-3-497
- MOV-3-1407
- MOV-3-1408
- MOV-3-1409
- f. Verify Standby Feedwater Pumps - OFF BOP:
Check If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:
- a. Check Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass valves -
ANY OPEN
- b. Check if either Main Steam Isolation Signal has actuated:
- Hi-Hi Containment Pressure 20 psig STEP2
- c. Verify Main Steam Isolation and Bypass valves - CLOSED STEP3 Page 37 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (l*15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
IUET EVJ:NT 7 - failure of Auto SI And U4 HHSI Pump Start 0
3-EOP-E-O Atblchm,nt 3 -Prompt ACtion Verificatic>ns TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve White Lights On VPB
-ALL BRIGHT Actuates SI and Phase A Containment Isolation, if NOT actuated.
STEP4 BOP:
Verify Pump Operation:
- a. At least two High-Head SI Pumps - RUNNING (NO)
Start at least one U4 High-Head SI Pumps
- b. Both RHR Pumps - RUNNING STEP5 BOP:
Verify Proper CCW System Operation:
- a. CCW Heat Exchangers - THREE IN SERVICE
- b. CCW Pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING
Verify Proper ICW System Operation:
- a. Verify ICW Pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING
- b. Verify ICW To TPCW Heat Exchanger-ISOLATED:
- POV-3-4882 - CLOSED
- POV-3-4883 - CLOSED
- c. Check ICW Headers - TIED TOGETHER STEP?
BOP:
Verify Containment Cooling:
- a. Check Emergency Containment Coolers - ONLY TWO RUNNING STEPS BOP:
Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation:
- a. Unit 3 Containment Purge Exhaust And Supply Fans - OFF STEP9 Page 38of 45 This information ls controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th. I ti II db c x 1s n ormat1on 1s contro e 1y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NR E AMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15*1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
SEG Rm EVENT 7 - failure of Auto SIArid U4 HHSI Pump Start 3-EOP*E*O Attachment 3 -Prompt Action VeriflcatiOns TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERA TOR When directed fo realign 4 HH$1 Pumps to RWST, trigger LOA-ALIGN U4 HHSIPs TOU3 RWST.
BOP:
Verify Containment Spray NOT Required:
- a. Containment pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 20 PSIG:
- PR-3-6306A
- PR-3-6306B STEP 10 BOP:
Verify SI - RESET STEP 11 BOP:
Verify SI Valve Amber Lights On VPB - ALL BRIGHT STEP12 BOP:
Verify SI Flow:
- a. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1625 PSIG[1950 PSIG]
- b. High-Head SI Pump flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW
- c. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 275 PSIG[575 PSIG]
- d. RHR Pump flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW STEP13 BOP:
Realign SI System:
- a. Check Procedure Entry Status - E-0 ENTERED FROM 3-0NOP-047.1, LOSS OF CHARGING FLOW IN MODES 1 THROUGH4
- b. Check High-Head SI Pump flow indicator - FLOW NOT INDICATED
- c. Establish only one High-Head SI Pump running
- d. Go to Attachment 3, Step 14.g
- e. Verify Unit 3 High-Head SI Pumps - TWO RUNNING (NO)
Operate Unit 3 and Unit 4 High-Head SI Pumps to establish injection to Unit 3 from two Hlgh*Head SI Pumps Go to step 14.g
- g. Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to align Unit 4 High-Head SI Pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using Attachment 1.
STEP14 BOP:
Verify Containment Isolation Phase A - RESET STEP15 Page 39 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT lL-15-1} NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2
~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30114) fUET EVENT 7 -Failure of Auto SI And U4.HHSI Pump Start
/
3;.EOP*E*O Attachm<<tnt 3 -Prompt Action Verifications TIME EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
ACTIVITIES & NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
Reestablish RCP Cooling:
- a. Check RCPs -AT LEAST ONE RUNNING
- b. Open CCW To Normal Containment Cooler Valves:
- MOV-3-1417
- MOV-3-1418
- c. Reset and start Normal Containment Coolers STEP16 BOP:
Verify Control Room Ventilation Isolation:
- a. Emergency Air Supply Fan SF-1 B - ON
- b. Emergency Air Supply Fan SF-1A-OFF
- c. Control Room Ventilation dampers - ALIGNED FOR RECIRC
- d. TS-0002, TSC Emergency Vent Auto Initiate Key Switch - IN ENABLE STEP17 BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:
When direCtect to perform Place Hydrogen Monitors In Service Using 3-NOP'"'.094, field actions for PAHMS, CONTAINMENT POST ACCIDENT MONITORING SYSTEM triggerLOA-A~IGN STEP18 PAHMS FOR SERVICE.
BOP:
Verify All Four EDGs - RUNNING STEP19 BOP:
Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses:
- a. Check 3A, 38 AND 3D 4 KV Buses - ALL ENERGIZED STEP 20 BOP:
- b. Check 3A AND 3B 4 KV Buses - ALL ENERGIZED FROM OFFSITE POWER BOP:
- 21. Notify Unit Supervisor Of The Following:
- Attachment 3 is complete
- Any safeguards equipment that is NOT In the required condition
- Status of Containment pressure continuous action STEP 21 Page 40 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L*15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12/30/14)
Rm Discussion Points are intentionally NOT included in evaluated scenarios. However, space is available below to document follow-up questions when further information is required to determine an evaluation outcome.
FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS QUESTION#1 ANSWER#1 QUESTION#2 ANSWER#2 Page 41of45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURllY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 2 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 12130/14) lUlT SIMULATOR POST-SCENARIO RESTORATION:
- 1. Restore per Simulator Operator Checklist.
- 2. Once exams are complete, restore from SEl-19, Simulator Exam Security.
Page 42 of 45 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURllY AGREEMENT.
~~-
OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 3 RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)
UNIT 4 RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)
PROTECTED TRAIN: B PROTECTED TRAIN: B ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr:
Inside SNPO:
Field Supv.:
Outside SNPO:
AdminRCO:
ANPO:
Unit3 Unit4 Unit Supv.:
Unit Supv.:
RCO:
RCO:
NPO:
NPO:
PLANT STATUS Unit3 Unit4 Mode:
1 Mode:
1 Power:
50%
Power:
100%
MWe:
412 MWe:
842 Gross Leakrate:
0.01 gpm Gross Leakrate:
642 Operational Concerns:
I 38 HHSI Pump has a wiped motor bearing, and its return to service is expected in two days. B AFW Pump is having turbine repairs, and the expected return to service is late next shift. 3A 1 CWP preventive maintenance is done with the clearance released. The 3A 1 CWP is ready for start for a PMT.
U3 Anticipated LCO Actions:
I None U4 Anticipated LCO Actions:
I None Results of Off~oin~ Focus Area:
I
UNIT 3 STATUS REACTOR OPERATOR UNIT RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)
PROTECTED TRAIN: B Mode:
1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power:
50%
Gross:
0.01 GPM A
6656 MWe 407 Unidentified 0.00 GPM B
6608 Tavg:
562 Charging Pps:
0.01 GPM c
6646 RCS Pressure:
967 Abnormal Annunciators:
Annunciator:
82/2 - PWR UPR DET HI FLUX DEV/ AUTO DFT Comp Actions:
Expected for plant conditions.
Annunciator:
H3/2 - SAFETY INJ PUMP 38 TRIP Comp Actions:
3A, 4A, and 48 HHSI Pumps are guarded.
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Current Tech Snee Action Statements: {!!oes Not Include "For Tracking Only Items" T.S.A.S I Component:
3.5.2.c-30 day action I 38 HHSI Pump Reason:
Bearing Replacement Entry Date:
Yesterday T.S.A.S I Component:
- 3. 7.1.2.c - 30 day action I B AFW Pump Reason:
Turbine Repairs Entry Date:
Yesterday T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
UNIT 3 STATUS REACTOR OPERATOR (CONTD)
UNIT RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)
PROTECTED TRAIN: B Changes to Risk Significant Eguiement:
No recent changes from last shift.
OLRM: GREEN PROTECTED TRAIN: B U2£oming Reactivi1ll Management Activities:
The plant is at 50% power (MOL) following repairs to the 38 Steam Generator Feedwater Pump. Maintain current power level. Power escalation to 100% will begin next shift.
U2£oming Major POD Activities:
NONE YR£oming ECOs to Hang and /or Relea1e:
- Hang-None Release - None Evolutions or ComQ!nsatoa Actions in Progress:
NONE general lnformation1 Remarks1 and OQ!rator Work Around Status:
- Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.
U3 supplying Aux Steam Air In-leakage = 0.0 SCFM
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC Final (Rev 1-11/2/15)
Facility:
Turkey Point Nuclear Scenario No.:
3 Op Test No.:
2015-301 (PTN) - Units 3 and 4 Examiners:
Operators:
(SRO)
(RCO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions:
The plant is at 75% power (MOL) following repairs to the 38 Steam Generator Feedwater Pump. Power escalation to 100% at 10%/hr will begin following turnover. Online risk is green. 8 train is protected on both units. Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.
Turnover:
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 38 HHSI Pump has a wiped motor bearing, and its return to service is expected in two days. 8 AFW Pump is having turbine repairs, and the expected return to service is late next shift. 3A 1 CWP preventive maintenance is done with the clearance released. The 3A 1 CWP is readv for start for a PMT.
Event Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Description 1
N/A R-RO&SRO Raise Reactor Power to 100%.
N-BOP 2
TVKD001X 1-RO&SRO N-44 fails high. (TS) 3 TVKB002X TFKCSMB C-BOP& SRO 3B ICW Pump seizes causing a shaft shear. (TS) 4 TVBMBFN C-RO&SRO Gradual loss of 3C Charging Pump flow.
5 TFSW91A C-BOP&SRO 3C 4KV Bus trip initiates a fast Turbine runback.
TFE2Z40S Condenser Steam Dump CV-3-2827 fails open.
TVFALN2 TFL10101 TFL4AF M-RO,BOP, Feedwater Break Outside Containment with ATWS.
6 TFL2XASE Main Turbine fails to trip. Auto rod insertion is blocked.
TFL2XBSE
&SRO TFU1ASBF TFU1ASTF 7
TCF5MTA C-BOP& SRO A AFW Pump trips. MOV-3-1403 fails to auto open.
TFFXC03 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I )nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC Final (Rev 1-11/2/15)
L-15-1 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 75% power (MOL) following repairs to the 38 Steam Generator Feedwater Pump. Power escalation to 100% at 10%/hr will begin following turnover.
Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units. Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 38 HHSI Pump has a wiped motor bearing, and its return to service is expected in two days. B AFW Pump is having turbine repairs, and the expected return to service is late next shift. 3A 1 CWP preventive maintenance is done with the clearance released. The 3A1 CWP is ready for start for a PMT.
Event 1 The RCO reviews the maneuvering guide and calculates the amount of water needed for a dilution to raise power to 100%. Either the BOP or US verifies the amount. The US or RCO hold a brief for the 25% power change. 3-GOP-301, Hot Standby to Power Operation, guidance is used for this maneuver. The crew performs the up-power using dilutions and rods as applicable to accommodate the response if a Tavg/Tref mismatch.
Event 2 After power is increased on the Turbine, N-44 Power Range NI fails high. This failure causes Control Rods to step in based on detected high power. The RCO uses diverse indications for the failure and stops inward rod motion due to the failed channel. 3-0NOP-028, Reactor Control System Malfunction, and/or 3-0NOP-059.8, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction, will be entered for initial response. 3-0NOP-059.8 is used to remove the NI from service. (TS 3.3.1)
Event 3 After response to Event 2, the 38 ICW Pump fails which requires an additional pump to be started. The US enters a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO Action for this condition. 3-ARP-097 gives appropriate direction to start the standby pump. (TS 3.7.3.b)
Event 4 After time for the review of 38 ICW Pump Technical Specifications, the 3C Charging Pump flow is gradually lost due to a pump failure. 3-ARP-097 and/or 3-0NOP-047.1 is entered to re-establish flow with either 3A or 38 Charging Pump.
Event 5 After the recovery of Charging, a protective relay trips the 3C Bus which leads to a fast Turbine Runback since 38 SGFP is lost. The crew enters 3-0NOP-089, Turbine Runback for response. As Turbine load lowers, Condenser Steam Dump CV-3-2827 fails open. Tbe RCO will ensure Control Rod insertion. When Condenser Steam Dumps are disabled by taking their handswitch to OFF, then CV-3-2827 will close.
2 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC Final (Rev 1*11/2/15)
Event 6 After the plant is stabilized from the runback, 3B Feedwater line breaks outside Containment combined with an ATWS. Control Rods fail to auto insert during the ATWS.
The RCO ensures negative reactivity is added by manually inserting Control Rods and emergency boration. Also, the Main Turbine fails to auto trip. The BOP initiates a manual Turbine trip. After the Turbine trip A AFW Pump trips. The BOP manually opens MOV 1403 to re-initiate AFW flow. The mitigation sequence is from 3-EOP-E-O to 3-EOP-FR-S.1 to 3-EOP-E-0. The scenario is complete after the crew subsequently exits 3-EOP-E-O after re-entry from 3-EOP-FR-S.1.
Event 7 This post trip failure prevents MOV-3-1403 from auto opening. When A AFW Pump trips, AFW flow is restored by manually opening 3A SG AFW Steam Supply to provide steam to the C AFW Pump.
Critical Tasks:
CT1: Manually Insert Control Rods After an ATWS event and auto rod insertion is defeated, insert negative reactivity into the core by manually inserting Control Rods within one minute.
[O-ADM-232, Attachment 2, Time Critical Operator Actions - PTN PSA Model - page 4 of 5, NHFPMRODIN]
CT2: Manually Trip The Main Turbine After an A TWS event without an auto Turbine trip, perform a manual trip of the Main Turbine by pushing the Manual Trip pushbutton or closing MSIVs within one minute.
[O-ADM-232, Attachment 2, Time Critical Operator Actions - PTN PSA Model - page 2 of 5, FHFPTRBTRP]
CT3: Manually Align AFW Pumps After an A TWS event, manually align AFW Pumps by opening Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valves to restore Auxiliary Feedwater Flow prior to the WR SG Levels reaching less than 9% on the non-faulted SGs.
CT4: Close CV-3-2827 After CV-3-2827, Steam Dump To Condenser fails open; manually close or isolate the failed open Steam Dump within 15 minutes of Tave dropping below 541°F. (Minimum Temperature For Criticality) 3 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
f II This in ormation IS contra ed bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L*15*1) NRG EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera E~
SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SEG RHT Site:
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 (PTN)
Title:
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 LMS#:
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 LMS Rev Date:
1/2/15 Rev#: 1.1 SEG Type:
D Training
~ Evaluation Program:
DLOCT
~LOIT D Other Duration:
90 minutes Developed by:
Mark Wilson 11/21/14 Instructor/Developer Date Reviewed by:
Tim Hodge 11/26/14 Instructor (Instructional Review)
Date Validated by :
Jose Vasquez 11/21/14 SME (Technical Review)
Date Approved by:
Matt Glander 11/28/14 Training Supervision Date Approved by:
Mike Coen 11/25/14 Training Program Owner (Line)
Date TR-AA-230-1003-F06 Revision 0 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRG EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRG Final (Rev 1-1 1/2115) fUET References Revision Number 3-ARP-097. CR various O-ADM-115 88 O-ADM-200 21 O-ADM-211 3
O-ADM-232 4
0-EPI P-20101 16 O-EPIP-20134 3
3-EOP-E-O 10 3-EOP-F-O 3
3-EOP-FR-S.1 4
3-GOP-301 30 3-NOP-010 16 3-NOP-089 19 3-NOP-094 3
O-OP-046 15 3-0NOP-004.4 4
3-0NOP-019 2
3-0NOP-028 3
3-0NOP-047.1 2
3-0NOP-059.8 0(11/14/07) 3-0NOP-089 1
3-0SP-059.1 O 1A PTN Technical Specs 293 Page 2 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT(L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Nf::.Xrera E~
Terminal Objective Rm Enabling Objectives:
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REQUIREMENTS Given this simulator scenario and resources normally found in the Control Room, the operating crew will perform Control Room operations IAW approved plant procedures in order to maintain the integrity of the plant and the health and safety of the public.
Given this simulator scenario and resources normally found in the Control Room, operate in accordance with approved plant procedures, Operations Department Instructions, and management expectations:
- 1. (ALL) Demonstrate personnel SAFETY awareness in interactions with plant staff and outside agencies.
- 2. (ALL) Demonstrate ALARA awareness in interactions with plant staff and outside agencies.
- 3. (ALL) Exchange correct information using 3-point communication/Repeat-backs with Control Room personnel and other plant staff.
- 4. (ALL) Inform plant personnel and System of plant conditions, as needed.
- 5. (SM) Employ timely and concise crew briefs where appropriate.
- 6. (SM) Make timely and correct emergency plan classifications where appropriate.
- 7. (SM/COMM) Make timely and correct emergency plan protective action recommendations if General Emergency declared with SHIFT MANAGER and Communicator assigned.
- 8. (COMM) Make accurate and timely emergency plan notifications where appropriate.
- 9. (ALL) Maintain awareness of plant status and control board indication.
- 10. (ALL) Correctly diagnose plant situations.
- 11. (ALL) Solve operational problems as they arise.
- 12. (RCO/BOP) Manipulate plant controls properly and safely.
- 13. (ALL) Demonstrate self-checking using STAR and peer checks(when required)
- 14. (US) Demonstrate command and control of the crew.
- 15. (US) Coordinate the input of crew members and other plant staff.
- 16. (US) Utilize the input of crew m~mbers and other plant staff.
- 17. (ALL) Demonstrate conservative decision making.
- 18. (STA) Provide informed technical assistance to the operating crew.
- 19. (ALL) Demonstrate teamwork.
- 20. (ALL) Respond to plant events using procedural guidance (OPs/ONOPs/EOPs) as applicable in accordance with rules of usage.
- 21. (RCO/BOP) Implement any applicable procedural immediate operator actions without use of references.
- 22. (SRO) Maintain compliance with Tech Specs.
- 23. (ALL) Identify/enter applicable Tech Spec action statements.
- 24. (ALL) Respond to annunciators using ARPs (time permitting).
- 25. (ALL) Maintain written communication, logs, and documentation as needed to permit post-event reconstruction.
While addressing the following events:
Page 3 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
hJEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15) run
- 1. Raise Reactor Power to 100%.
- 2. N-44 fails high. (TS)
- 3. 38 ICW Pump seizes causing a shaft shears. (TS)
- 4. Gradual loss of 3C Charging Pump flow.
- 5. 3C 4KV Bus trip initiates a fast Turbine runback. Condenser Steam Dump CV-3-2827 fails open.
- 6. Feedwater Break Outside Containment with ATWS. Main Turbine fails to trip. Auto rod insertion is blocked.
- 7. A AFW Pump trips. MOV-3-1403 fails to auto open.
Prerequisites:
None Training PTN Unit 3 Plant Simulator Resources:
Development
References:
- TR-AA-230,-1007 Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation
- O-ADM-232, Time Critical Action Program
- OP-AA-100,-1000 Conduct Of Operations
- OP-AA-103,-1000 Reactivity Management
- O-ADM-200, Operations Management Manual
- O-ADM-211, Emergency and Off-Normal Operating Procedure Usage
- WCAP-17711-NP, Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group Westinghouse Emergency Response Guideline Revision 2-Based Critical Tasks
- NU REG 1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards Protected N/A Content:
Evaluation Performance Mode Method:
Operating None Experience:
Risk Significant
- 1. After an A TWS event and auto rod insertion is defeated, insert negative Operator reactivity into the core by manually inserting Control Rods within one minute.
Actions:
- 2. After an A TWS event without an auto Turbine trip, perform a manual trip of the Main Turbine by pushing the Manual Trip pushbutton or closing MSIVs within one minute.
Page 4 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th'. f f
t II db PTN' 201 0
L 1 1) NRC E AM NAT 0 1s in orma ion 1s con ro e 1y s
5 L IT ( x I
I N SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2115)
IUET TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE SRO Task#
Task Title 02059026300 RESPOND TO LOSS OF POWER RANGE INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL 02019005100 AUTHORIZE INTAKE COOLING WATER PUMP STARTS 02019017300 EVALUATE AND DIRECT TECH SPECS REQUIRED ACTIONS DUE TO ICW SYSTEM OUT OF SPEC/SERVICE CONDITIONS 02047008300 INVESTIGATE CHARGING MALFUNCTIONS 02200009300 RESPOND TO UNIT RUNBACK 02072023300 RESPOND TO INADVERTANT OPENING OF STEAM DUMP TO CONDENSER VALVES 02028033500 AUTHORIZE UNIT TRIP 02028009500 RESPOND TO ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM (A TWS) 02075023300 RE-ALIGN AFW SYSTEM IN RESPONSE TO COMPONENTMALFUNCTION I FAILURE 2200022500 DIAGNOSE CAUSE OF SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION 2200002500 EVALUATE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSF) STATUS TREE OUTPUT RO Task Task Title 01028015100 ADJUST POWER LEVEL 01059026300 RESPOND TO LOSS OF POWER RANGE INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL 01019005100 START INTAKE COOLING WATER PUMPS 01047008300 INVESTIGATE CHARGING MALFUNCTIONS 01200009300 RESPOND TO UNIT RUNBACK 01072023300 RESPOND TO INADVERTANT OPENING OF STEAM DUMP TO CONDENSER VALVES 01028009500 RESPOND TO ATWS 01075003100 START AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (FROM CONTROL ROOM) 01200022500 DIAGNOSE CAUSE OF SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION Page 5 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Nl::.XTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
Rm UPDATE LOG:
Place this form with the working copies of lesson plans and/or other materials to document changes NOTES:
made between formal revisions. For fleet-wide training materials, keep electronic file of this form in same folder as approved materials. Refer to TR-AA-230-1003 SAT Development for specific directions regarding how and when this form shall be used.
Indicate in the following table any minor changes or major revisions (as defined in TR-AA-230-1003) made to the material after initial approval. Or use separate Update Log form TR-AA-230-1003-F16.
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE REASON FOR AR/TWR#
PREPARER DATE CHANGE REVIEWER DATE Revised for L-5 5
1-0 Initial Revision 15-1 NRC 01982463 Exam 5
5 Identify CT4 which requires no additional Incorporate B.Clark 1/2/15 Operator actions and deleted the Boric comments from 1-1 Acid pump failure and associated steps, NRC validation 01982463 and corrected miscellaneous typos and week.
Mark Wilson 1/2/15 formatting.
1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5
- 1.
lnd1v1dual updating lesson plan or trarrnng matenal shall complete the appropnate blocks on the Update Log.
- 2.
Describe the change to the lesson plan or training materials.
- 3.
State the reason for the change (e.g., reference has changed, typographical error, etc.)
- 4.
Preparer enters name/date on the Update Log and obtains Training Supervisor approval.
- 5.
Initial dates and site approval on cover page.
Page 6 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1} NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
Rm OVERVIEW INITIAL CONDITIONS The plant is at 75% power (MOL) following repairs to the 38 Steam Generator Feedwater Pump. Power escalation to 100% at 10%/hr will begin following turnover. Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units. Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.
EQUIPMENT OOS 38 HHSI Pump has a wiped motor bearing, and its return to service is expected in two days. B AFW Pump is having turbine repairs, and the expected return to service is late next shift. 3A 1 CWP preventive maintenance is done with the clearance released. The 3A1 CWP is ready for start for a PMT.
SYNOPSIS Event1 The RCO reviews the maneuvering guide and calculates the amount of water needed for a dilution to raise power to 100%. Either the BOP or US verifies the amount. The US or RCO hold a brief for the 25%
power change. 3-GOP-301, Hot Standby to Power Operation, guidance is used for this maneuver. The crew performs the up-power using dilutions and rods as applicable to accommodate the response if a Tavg/Tref mismatch.
Event 2 After power is increased on the Turbine, N-44 Power Range NI fails high. This failure causes Control Rods to step in based on detected high power. The RCO uses diverse indications for the failure and stops inward rod motion due to the failed channel. 3-0NOP-028, Reactor Control System Malfunction, and/or 3-0NOP-059.8, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction, will be entered for initial response.
3-0NOP-059.8 is used to remove the NI from service. (TS 3.3.1)
Event 3 After response to Event 2, the 3B ICW Pump fails which requires an additional pump to be started. The US enters a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO Action for this condition. 3-ARP-097 gives appropriate direction to start the standby pump. (TS 3.7.3.b)
Event 4 After time for the review of 38 ICW Pump Technical Specifications, the 3C Charging Pump flow is gradually lost due to a pump failure. 3-ARP-097 and/or 3-0NOP-047.1 is entered to re-establish flow with either 3A or 36 Charging Pump.
Event 5 After the recovery of Charging, a protective relay trips the 3C Bus which leads to a fast Turbine Runback since 3B SGFP is lost. The crew enters 3-0NOP-089, Turbine Runback for response. As Turbine load lowers, Condenser Steam Dump CV-3-2827 fails open. The RCO will ensure Control Rod insertion. When Condenser Steam Dumps are disabled by taking their handswitch to OFF, then CV-3-2827 will close.
Continued on next page.
Page 7 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-11/2/15)
A.ID Event 6 After the plant is stabilized from the runback, 38 Feedwater line breaks outside Containment combined with an A TWS. Control Rods fail to auto insert during the A TWS. The RCO ensures negative reactivity is added by manually inserting Control Rods and emergency boration. Also, the Main Turbine fails to auto trip. The BOP initiates a manual Turbine trip. After the Turbine trip A AFW Pump trips. The BOP manually opens MOV-3-1403 to re-initiate AFW flow. The mitigation sequence is from 3-EOP-E-O to 3-EOP-FR-S.1 to 3-EOP-E-O. The scenario is complete after the crew subsequently exits 3-EOP-E-O after re-entry from 3-EOP-FR-S.1.
Event 7 This post trip failure prevents MOV-3-1403 from auto opening. When A AFW Pump trips, AFW flow is restored by manually opening 3A SG AFW Steam Supply to provide steam to the C AFW Pump.
The scenario is terminated after the crew subsequently exits 3-EOP-E-O after re-entry from 3-EOP-FR-S.1 or at the Lead Evaluator' discretion.
Page 8 of 41 This information Is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
f'-JE>eTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-11/2/15)
R.EEr CREW CRITICAL TASKS Event# Description CT1: Manually Insert Control Rods After an ATWS event and auto rod insertion is defeated, insert negative reactivity into the core by manually inserting Control Rods within one minute.
6
[O-ADM-232, Attachment 2, Time Critical Operator Actions - PTN PSA Model - page 4 of 5, NHFPMRODIN]
CT2: Manually Trip The Main Turbine After an ATWS event without an auto Turbine trip, perform a manual trip of the Main Turbine by pushing the Manual Trip pushbutton or closing MSIVs within one minute.
6
[O-ADM-232, Attachment 2, Time Critical Operator Actions - PTN PSA Model - page 2 of 5, FHFPTRBTRP]
CT3: Manually Align AFW Pumps After an ATWS event, manually align AFW Pumps by opening Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 7
Steam Supply Valves to restore Auxiliary Feedwater Flow prior to the WR SG Levels reaching less than 9% on the non-faulted SGs.
CT4: Close CV-3-2827 5
After CV-3-2827, Steam Dump To Condenser fails open; manually close or isolate the failed open Steam Dump within 15 minutes of Tave dropping below 541°F. (Minimum Temperature For Criticality)
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Event# Description
- 1.
Raise Reactor Power to 100%.
- 2.
N-44 Fails high.(TS)
- 3.
3B ICW Pump seizes causing a shaft shear. (TS)
- 4.
Gradual loss of 3C Charging Pump flow.
- 5.
3C 4KV Bus trip initiates a fast Turbine runback. Condenser Steam Dump CV-3-2827 fails open.
- 6.
Feedwater Break Outside Containment with ATWS. Main Turbine fails to trip. Auto rod insertion is blocked.
- 7.
A AFW Pump trips. MOV-3-1403 fails to auto open.
Page 9 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L*15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This Information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
IU£T SIMULATOR SET.UP INSTRUCTIONS Check Action Restore IC-16 (75% MOL) or equivalent IC.
Unfreeze the Simulator.
Stop 3A 1 Circulating Water Pump.
Open & execute lesson file L-15-1 NRC SCEN 3 Final.lsn Ensure the following lesson steps are triggered:
SETUP-OOS EQUIPMENT (IMM23BT, TAMSD3BS, TAFF01B, TCF5MTB).
- SETUP - A TWS (TFL4AF, TFL2XASE, TFL2XBSE).
Place ECO tag on B AFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve.
Remove velcro tags for B AFW alignment at RPM meter.
Place the 38 HHSI Pump in PTL and hang an ECO tag on it.
Ensure Rod Group Step Counters have completed stepping out.
Allow the plant to stabilize.
Acknowledge any alarms and freeze Simulator.
Ensure B train is protected train on VPA.
Perform the SIMULA TOR OPERA TOR CHECKLIST or equivalent.
Place TURNOVER SHEETS on RO's desk or give to the Lead Evaluator.
Ensure at least 4 copies of the maneuvering guide are available for shift turnover.
Ensure a marked copy of 3-GOP-301 is available for power increase.
Ensure a copy of O-ADM-200 is available for briefs.
Ensure a copy of ODl-44 is available for briefs.
Ensure at least 4 copies of the maneuvering guide are available for shift turnover.
Ensure a copy of 3-0SP-59.1 O is available for QPTR, if requested.
Ensure a copy of the ODCM is available in SM Office.
Page 10 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT {L-15-H NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Nt:xTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
RSiT BRIEFINGS Shift turnover information is attached to the back of this guide.
Ensure all applicants are prior briefed on Appendix E of NU REG 1021, Policies and Guidelines For Taking NRC Examinations.
Conduct a Crew Pre-brief to cover turnover information.
US:
SCENARIO NOTE O-ADM-211 Prudent Operator Actions - If redundant stand-by equipment is available and ready, the operator is permitted to start the redundant equipment for failed or failing operating equipment. Immediate follow up of applicable ARPs and ONOPs (AOPs) shall occur as required.
Page 11of41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
FUEi EVENT 1 - Raise Reactor Power to 100%
EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES &
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTES NOTE US:
Ensure the Simulator
- Conducts shift turnover.
is in RUN before the crew enters the Simulator.
3*GOP-301, HOT STANDBY TO FULL POWER OPERATION US:
Uses 3-GOP-301 guidance to return power to 100%.
- Observes the reactivity manipulations on the unit.
Prepares to start equipment as required by 3-GOP-301.
May direct the BOP to restore 3A1 CWP IAW 3-NOP-010.
3-NOP-010, CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM NOTE This procedure may be done anytime BOP:
during scenario.
As directed, BOOTH OPERATOR Uses 3-NOP-010, Circulating Water System, to start 3A1 CWP.
11.asRed,replytflaf.**
pre-s~rt checks for
- Notifies Chemistry of intent to start and records SG Slowdown 3A1.CWPare rates.
complete.
- Starts 3A1 CWP and ensures discharge valve MOV-3-1416 opens.
If (;ailed* as* Chemistry,
- Informs US that 3A 1 CWP is running.
ackn9wl~dge starting 3.AfCWP.
''" --' ~"-
'"' ""'°' '~,,,,,,,
'"w>,,,'
O-NOP-046, eves - BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL RCO:
Reviews the maneuvering guide for dilution amount - 1,500 gal.
- Calculates amount of water required to increase power at 10%
per hour. (about 600 gals per hour)
Page 12 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-H NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
Rm EVENT 1 - Raise Reactor Power to 100%
EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES &
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTES RCO:
NOTES
- Determines the amount of primary water required for a batch
- US peer checks the addition.
amount of water to
- Set the Primary Water Totalizer to amount of water determined add.
to batch add:
0 Press CLR
- Dilute (via FCV 0 i;nier the amount of water 1148) is the 0
Pr~s~ENT preferred switch 0
pres{cc:llmt A position to minimize the impact to the 0
Push LIMIT 1 ancj verify the amount RCP seals by 0
Press Count A preheating the Place the Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to DILUTE.
water in the VCT Place the RCS Makeup Control Switch to START.
and ensuring RCS
- hydrogen Ill Verifies the expected primary water flow rate by observing concentration is FR-3-113 and ensures that flow rate is consistent with the flow maintained.
rate.
- After dilution STOPPED, verify in auto/closed:
- The RCO will 0
Boric Acid to Blender, FCV-3-113A perform Control 0
Primary Water to Blender, FCV-3-114A Rod steps as 0
Blender to Charging Pump Suction, FCV-3-1138 required to maintain 0
Blender to VCT, FCV-3-1148 AFD within required limits.
Repeats for additional dilutions.
- When complete, realigns for AUTO by:
0 Tum the RCS Makeup Control switch to Start.
0 Verify Red Start light is Energized.
3*NOP*089, MAIN. TURBINE BOP:
NOTE Determines target and load ramp rate.
Depressing HOLD on Uses Section 4.2.2 to use MW CTRL for load increase.
TCS for Turbine Raise Turbine load with TCS by:
controls will stop loading rate at current
- St:ilecting IN 011 M'N CNTRL load.
- $elect §n~ c9nfirm MWtAR.~E-r
- Afterfarget isteachect, select OUT on.MW CJ\\JTRL Page 13 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT(L-15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera" l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG
!U1ENI NRC Final (Rev 1-11/2/15)
RUT EVENT 2 ~ N-44 Fails High 3-0NOP-028, REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
&NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERATOR US:
After sufficient power is Directs response of 3-0NOP-028, Reactor Control System raised on Turbine when rods Malfunction.
are in AUTO, and then at Lead. Evaluator's direction, trigger EVENT 2 - f\\144 FAl~S HIQH~
NOTE RCO:
3-0NOP-059.8 may be Recognizes/Reports the following:
entered only. The IOA from
- Annunciators B 2/2, 2/3, 6/1, 6/3, 614 3-0NOP-028 also may be N44 PR channel indication on console fails high used to stop unnecessary rod motion.
N44 NIS power and detector current indication fail high
- N44 NIS rod stop indication NOTE RCO:
This is an Immediate
- En!?ure the R()CI Motion Control Selector switch to the MAN Operator Action position;
- Adjusting rods back to previous position will occur after entry into 3-0NOP-059.8 to bypass N44. Then, rods may be used.
US:
May continue or stop increasing power.
May also direct matching Tavgffref with the Turbine.
Page 14 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th' i f II db 1s n ormation 1s contro e 1y PTN's 2015 LOIT {L*15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
FWT EVENT 2-N..&14 Fails.His;Jh 3-0NOP-059.8, REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM.MALFUNCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
& NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
US:
- Enters 3-0NOP-059.8, Power Range NI Malfunction BOP:
- 1. Place the DROPPED ROD MODE switch for N44 channel in the BYPASS PQ$ition (Al\\ll\\l BB/4)
- 2. Place the N44 ROD STOP BYPASS switch to the failed chanflel BYPASS p(.)sition
- 3. Transfer tne UPPER SECTION comparator defeat switch to tn~N44:
- 4. Transfer the LOWER SECTION C()mparator defeat switch to the NM-.
- 5. Transfer POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch to BYPASS N44.
- 6. TransfE)rthe COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch to N44
- 7. Transfer Rod Motion Control Selector switch to AUTO if disir~d.
BOOTH OPERATOR US:
If asked, l&C does not need Review Tech Specs:
to trc.>ubleshoot prior to
tripping. bistables, Trip bi-stables in 6 hrs and restrict power to 75% RTP or monitor QPTR
BOP:
- Trip the Power Range bistables by removing the INSTRUMENT POWER fuses from drawer B of the failed channel.
BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:
Respond as WCC/l&C.
- Notify the following:
- l&C, to make repairs
- WCC to generate a PWO.
Page 15 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT(L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT IL-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2115) run EVENT 2 - N-44 Fails High 3-0NOP-059.8,R~CTOR CONTRQL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
& NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE Once the crew has stabilized the plant and placed Rods in auto, or at the Lead Evaluators discretion move on the next event.
EVENT 3 - 3B ICW Pump Seizes Causing A Shaft Shear TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
&NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:
When ctirected bythe Lead
- Notices 38 ICW Pump amps trending high, then falling low.
evaluator. trigger EVENT 3 -
- Dispatches ANPO for investigation if time allows.
38 ICW PUMP LOSS.
- Recommends entry into ARP response.
US:
- Directs the BOP to start 3A ICW Pump and secure 38 ICW Pump.
Directs the RCO to read ANN 14/4 response.
BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:
If asked to check the ICW Ensures start of standby ICW pump. May use 3-NOP-019, pumps wait 3 to 5 irliril.ltes Intake Cooling Water System, for guidance.
and then report a normal Dispatches ANPO to check ICW piping and heat exchangers start on th.a 3AJC'iV and 38 for leaks.
ICW pump shaft may be Directs US to refer to 3-0NOP-019, Intake Cooling Water sheared.
Malfunction.
If dispatched to ICW piping and.heat exchangers wait 5 minutes and report no leaks found Page 16 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f ti t
II db PTN' 20 5 LOIT (L 1 1) N C EXAMINATION SECUR GR EMEN 1s m orma on ts con ro e I'!(
s 1
- 5--
R ITYA E
T
- NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 EN~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
Rm EVENT 3-3B ICW Pump Seizes Causing*A Sttaft Shear TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
&NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:
Respond.as WCC/l&C.
- Notify the following:
l&C, to make repairs BOOTH OPERATOR
- WCC to generate of PWO.
If directed.by the crew to rackout 3B ICW Pum(l Bkr, trigger LOA - RACKOUT 38 ICW PUMP E)KR 3AB17.
Respond back in 5 minutes.
US:
NOTE
- Refers to Tech Specs-TS 3.7.3.b-72 hrs to restore 2 ICW After plant is stabilized or at Pumps from independent power §lJpplies.
the Lead Evaluators
- Once 3AB17 is racked out, then the ACTION shifts to 3.7.3.a discretion, proceed to Event
-14days.
- 4.
EVENT 4-Gradual Loss of 3C Charging Pump Flow EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME
&NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERATOR RCO:
When direet~d by the Lead
- Notices reduced Charging flow.
Evaluator, trigger EVENT 4
- Discovers 3C Charging Pump red indicating light is OFF.
- 3C CHRG PUMP LOSS.
- Acknowledges NOTE 0
ANN A5/3, CHARGING PUMP C TRIP The crew may remove one 0
ANN A6/3, CHARGING PUMP C MOTOR OVERLOAD letdown orifice from service.
- Recommends entry into ARP response.
US:
- Directs performance of ANN A5/3 response.
Page 17 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information Is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
R£E1 EVENT 4 - Gradual Loss of 3C Charging Pump Flow EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME
&NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
- Checks VCT suction source.
- Starts 3B Charging Pump.
- If not stopped, then stops 3C Charging Pump.
- Ensures RCP Seal Injection and Charging flow are re-established with individual and master controllers.
US:
- Refers to TS 3.1.2.3 and determines it is MET with 3A and 3B Charging Pumps being operable.
US:
- Refers to 3-0NOP-047.1, Loss of Charging Flow in Modes 1 Through 4, and determines no additional actions are required.
BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:
Respond as WCC and
- Notify the following:
Electrleal Maintenance as
- l&C, to make repairs required.
- WCC to generate of PWO.
EVENT 5..,. 3C.~
B\\JI; Trip Initiates A Fast Turbine Runback I Condenser Steam Dump and CV-3-2827 Fails Oj>4tn.
- 3-0NOP-089, TURBINE RUNB~CK EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME
& NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:
Aft~r regovefy ()f Charging
- Recognize and reports a loss of the 3B SG Feed Pump.
flow or at lead evaluator *.
- Recognize and report the Turbine runback in progress and diregtion, trigg~r EVE~T 5..-
power is less than 85% power.
LO$S OF 3C 4KV BUS.
- Refer US to 3-0NOP-089, Turbine Runback.
NOTE This results in a loss of power to 38 SGFP which initiates the runback.
NOTE BOP:
Steps 1 and 2 are Immediate Verifies a SGFP was lost and power less than 85%.
Operator Actions.
IOA-STEP 1 Page 18 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-11 NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
NRG Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
SEG A..E£T EVENT 5 -.3C 4KV Bus Trip Initiates A Fast Turbine Runback I Co.ndenser Steam Dump and CV-3-2827 Fi1ils Open.
3-0NOP-089, TURBINE RUNBACK TIME CT4 Start Time EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
& NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE With the dynamics of the loss of the 38 SGFP and delays associated with CV-3-2827, this event may be unrecoverable. If a Reactor Trip is signal is generated continue with EVENT6.
NOTE Note the time that Tave drops below 541°F as the start of the time critical portion of CT4. If the failed open steam dump is closed before Tave drops below 541°F, this Critical task is met.
NOTE Time to recover 3C 4KV Bus with 3-0NOP-004.4 is not anticipated.
BOOTH OPERA TOR Wh~r'l Stm [)ump Selector goes to. manual,. thEm verify an auto trigger $TM DUMP MODE SELECTOR.
ci.oses cv~3-2821 deletes tfie iil~lflJn¢ion.
BOOTH OPERATOR RCO/BOP:
Check for proper operation of the following:
US:
Steam Dumps (At first indication appears normal, then it is apparent CV-3-2827 failed open.)
Turbine If Rods are in AUTO, then verify Auto Rod Insertion to match Tavg with Tref.
If Rods are in MANUAL then manually insert Rods as need to match Tavg with Tref.
Main Feedwater Valves Pressurizer IOA-STEP 2 Enters and directs the actions of 3-0NOP-089, Turbine Run back.
BOP:
Check Steam Generator levels stabilized and on program.
STEP 1 RCO:
WhenStmDump Control Check Tavg is maintained within :t. 3°F of Tref.
goes to off, then v~rify STM DUMP.CONTROL Off STEP2 CLO~ES CV*3-2827 deletes the malfunction.
Page 19 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L*15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
SEG R£ET EVENT 5,.;.. 3C 41<V Bus Trip Initiates A Fast Turbine Runback I Condenser Steam Dump and CV-3-2827 Fails Open.
3-0NOP-089, *TuRBINE RUNBACK EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME
& NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
CT4 CT4: Close CV-3-2827 BOP:
Stop Time After CV-3-2827, Steam Check Steam Generator pressures stabilizing.
Dump To Condenser fails open; manually close the failed open Steam Dump within 15 minutes of Tave dropping below 541°F.
(Minimum Temperature For Criticality)
BOOTH OPERATOR lfdispatc;hed to locally check the 38 SGFP. Wait 5 minutes, and then report not running and nothing abnormal at the pump.
NOTE The crew should monitor alarms and borate using 50 gallon batches as necessary to withdraw rods until the alarm is clear.
STEP3 RCO:
Check Pressurizer Level stabilizing and trending to Program Level.
STEP4 RCO:
Check Pressurizer Pressure stabilizing and trending to 2235 psig.
STEPS BOP:
Check following for proper operation:
Steam Gen Feed Pump Recirc Condensate Pump Recirc Heater Drain Pumps Heater Drain Tank Level Controls Secondary Heater Level Controls STEP6 RCO/BOP:
- 1. Monitor Annunciator G 5/1, AXIAL FLUX T.S. LIMIT EXCEEDED -CLEAR.
- 2. Monitor Annunciator B 9/2, Axial Flux Tilt - CLEAR
- 3. Monitor Annunciator B 8/1, ROD BANK LO LIMIT - CLEAR.
- 4. Monitor Annunciator B 8/2 ROD BANK A/B/C/D EXTRA LO LIMIT - CLEAR.
STEPS 7-10 Page 20 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L*15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
Rm EVENT 5 - 3C 4Ky Bus Trip Initiates A Fast Turbine Runback I Condenser Steam Dump and CV-3-2827 Fails O~n.
~ONOP-089, TURBINE RUNBACK EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME
&NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
When the turbine runback is complete:
- Match the control switch flag for the 38 SGFP.
STEP 11.A&B BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:
Acknowledge reports of
- NOTIFY Load Dispatcher of load restrictions.
plant status and request for STEP 11C support.
US:
- Informs SM to notify Plant Management and NRC Resident per O-ADM-115, Notifications of Plant Events.
STEP 11D NOTE RCO:
If boration was used, when CHECK boration used during the performance of this conditions are stable stop procedure. (NO) the boration and restore auto STEP12 makeup. (NIA)
NOTE RCO:
If Rod Control is in manual, Check Rod Control in MANUAL. (NO) restore Rod Control to Auto when Tave is within +/- 1.5°F of Tref.
STEP13 BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:
Acknowledge notification to IF change in Reactor Power exceeded 15%, then notify take RCS ~amples.
Chemistry that RCS sampling is required within 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> per TS 4.4.8, Table 4.4-4, Item 6b.
STEP 14 NOTE BOP:
When it is noticed CV
- Take Steam Dump To Condenser Mode Switch to Reset, 2827 is failed open, placing and Release to AUTO.
Steam Dumps in OFF will
- The BOP should notice at this point that CV-3-2827 is failed allow closure.
open. If not, action will be taken post ATWS response.
STEP 15 Page 21of41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (l*15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
.. f b
This IO ormation IS controlled *V PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
RE.ET EVENT 5 - 3C 4~ Bus Trip Initiates A Fast Turbine Runback I Condenser Steam Dump and CV-3-2827 Fe1ils Opell~
3-oNoF>-o89, TURBINE RlJNBAcK EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME
& NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE After plant is stabilized or at the Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event
- 6.
EVENT 6 - Feeclwater Break Outside Ccmtainment with A TWS I Main Turbine Fails to Trip I Auto RC>d Insertion is Blocked 3-EOP*E*O, Rx Trip or safety lnjecti()ll EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES &
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTES BOOTH OPERATOR WheriATWS is recogniz~~*or W,hf:m directed*.by ~ead**
Evaluator trigger,.
EVENT&~ 3B Fw BREAK OUTSIDE CTMT WITH AUTO Rob.FAilURE.
BOOTH OPERATOR From verifY Ev~nt 5 aqto triggers: t;\\!ENJ 7 -.MAIN TURBINE FAILS TO A.tiro*.. *.
TRIP and ALLOWS MAIN TURBINE MANUAL TRIP from pushbutton.
RCO:
Recognizes rapidly lowering Pressurizer pressure.
Recommends entering 3-EOP-E-O, Rx Trip or Safety Injection.
Page 22 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
R.EET EVENT 6 - Feedwater Brea1< Outside Containment with A TWS I Main Turbine Fails to Trip I Auto Rod lnsertioriis Blocked 3-EOP*E*O, Rx Trip* or Saf~ty lnledion EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES &
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTES NOTE US:
T-0 for the critical task
- Directs 3-EOP-E-O response after auto Reactor trip.
CT1&2 1 and 2 is whichever OR T-0 occurs first.
Directs RCO to manually trip the Reactor, then for operators to
- The RCO attempts perform their IOA's.
to manually trip the Reactor from either Rx trip switch.
OR Any other Rx Trip Red 151 out.
RCO:
Manually attempts a trip from the console and VP B which are NOT successful to trip the Reactor.
RO/BOP:
Perform IOA's.
RCO:
Verifies Reactor Trip
- Rod bottom lights - ON (NO)
- Reactor trip & bypass breakers - OPEN(NO)
- Rod position indicators -AT ZERO (NO)
- Neutron flux - DECREASING (NO)
STEP 1 RCO:
Informs the US:
- The Reactor is NOT tripped.
Reactor power is greater than 5% and Intermediate Range Power is NOT stable or decreasing.
US:
- Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES.
Directs operators to perform IOAs of 3-EOP-FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION /ATWS.
Page 23 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT(L-15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT,
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera~
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
Rm EVENT 6 - FeedwatcH-. Break Ol1t!5f(j~Containmenfwl~ A 1W$ / Main Turbine failf5 to Trip I A~o (t()(f lnS19rtiOf1 is Blocl<ed 3-EOP-FR-S.1, RESPtiNSE TO NUCLEAR POWERGENERATIONIA1WS TIME
.~
EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES &
NOTES CAUTION RCPs should NOT be tripped with reactor power greater than 5%.
NOTE POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
- 1. Verify Reactor Trip:
Rod Bottom Lights-ON (NO)
Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers-OPEN (NO)
Rod Position Indicators-AT ZERO (NO)
Manually trip reactor. (NOT EFFECTIVE)
Step 1 and Step 2 are IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION steps.
If reactor will NOT trip, then ensure Control Rod Insertion in Auto or Manual. (YES)
CT1 Stop Time CT1: Manually Insert Control Rods After an A TWS event and auto rod insertion is defeated, insert negative reactivity into the core by manually inserting Control Rods within one minute.
Page 24 of 41 This Information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L*15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
STEP 1
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT {L-15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-11/2115)
R£ET EVENT 6 - feec:lwater Break Outside <:ontainment with ATWS I Main Turbine Falls to Trip I Auto Rod ln1!59rtiOn is Block~
3--EOP-FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS BOP:
CT2 CT2: Manually Trip
- 2. Verify Turbine Trip:
Stop The Main Turbine
- All Jurbil1f3 $top OR associated Control Valves - CLOSED (NO)
Time After an A TWS event
- Manually trip. turbine.
without an auto All Turbine Stop OR associated Control Valves - CLOSED Turbine trip, perform a manual trip of the
- Moisture SeparatorReheater Steam Valves - CLOSED:
Main Turbine by MSR Main Steam Supply Stop MOVs pushing the Manual Reheatf:tr Timing Valves Trip pushbutton or MSR Purge Steam Valves closing MSIVs within one minute.
STEP2 BOOTH OPERATOR verify Event !5 aufo mggers,. POST TRIP A.f:W.
MALFUNCTIONS
~n4 P<itltTfilP _.
ALLOW MANUAL OPENING OFMOV-3-1403from han(t$wi(ch.
NOTE US:
FOLDOUT Page shall Reviews FOP for 3-EOP-FR-S.1 with the crew.
be monitored for the
- Adverse Containment Setpoints remainder of this Containment Atmosphere Temperature Greater Than 180°F procedure.
OR Containment Radiation Greater Than 1.3x105 R/hr FOLDOUT PAGE Page 25 of 41 This Information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT(L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th.. f I
II db 1s in ormatlon s contro e 1y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
RID EVENT 7 - A AFW Pump Trips I MOV-3-1403 fails to Auto Open
'* >\\
3-EOP*FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES &
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTES BOP:
CT3: Manually Align Checks AFW Pumps - ALL RUNNING. (no)
AFWPumps
- Opens MOV-3-1403 to start C AFW Pump.
After an A TWS event,
Pumps by opening Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Steam Supply STEP3 Valves to restore Auxiliary Feedwater Flow prior to the WR SG Levels reaching less than 9% on the non-faulted SGs.
RCO:
BOOTH OPERATOR Initiates Emergency Boration If dispatched to
- Verifies SI reset investigate loss oJA
- VeritiSs at leai?t one Charging pump running.
AFW Pump, after 5 StOP!? Makeup Syst~m minutes reply the A AFWPumpis
- Starts Boric Acid Pump 3A or 38 mechanically tripped
- ()pen MOV-3-350, Emergency Boration Valve and will NOT reset.
Ensures HCV-3-121 open
- Verifies CV-3-310A open BOOTH OPERATOR Verify trigger POST
- Establishes > 60 gpm, Fl-3-110 (0 gpm) and > 45 gpm, Fl..
122A TRIP - A AFW PUMP TRIP, auto inserts.
STEP4 RCO:
Verifies Cntmt Vent. - Isolated:
- U3 Cntmt Sup & Exh Fans off
- U3 Cntmt Sup & Exh Valves closed POV-3-2600 / 2601 I 26021 2603
- Cntmt Instr Air Bleed lso Vlvs closed CV-3-2819/2826 STEP5 Page 26 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
SEG FUET EVENT 7 - A AFW Pump Trips /MOV-3-1403 Fai.ls to Auto Open 3-EOP*FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES &
NOTES NOTE actions start on page 33.
BOOTH OPERATOR When dispatched to locally.trip the r~actor, wait 2-4 min, then trigger LO" :-OPEN RX TRIP AND MG SETBKRS.
CAUTION If an SI signal exists or occurs and the reactor is subcritical, proper safeguards equipment alignment is required to be verified using of 3-EOP-E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, while continuing with this procedure.
NOTES
- 1. If Rx power is
<5% the crew will go to step 16 and exit 3-EOP-FR-S.1.
- 2. When Adverse Containment conditions exist, Gamma-Metrics indication needs to be used.
POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
US:
May direct the BOP proper safeguards equipment alignment using Attachment 3 of 3-EOP-E-O.
RCO:
Check If Rx Trip Has Occurred - (no)
Dispatches U3 Operator to 38 MCC Room to locally trip Reactor.
Directs Opening:
3A & 38 Reactor Trip Bkrs 3A & 38 Reactor Trip Bypass Bkrs 3N3B MG Set Gen Output Bkrs 3N3B MG Set Gen Input Bkrs STEP6.a RNO BOP:
Checks Turbine tripped. (yes)
Checks Generator is tripped with Mid and East GCBs open. (yes)
RCO:
Check If Reactor Is Subcritical:
Power range channels< 5% (yes)
AND Intermediate range - Negative SUR (yes)
Observe CAUTION prior to Step 16 Page 27 of 41 STEP 6.b and c RNO STEP7 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
FWT EVENT 7 - A AFW Pump Trips I MOV-3-1403 Fails to Al,rto Open 3-EOP-FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES &
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTES US:
Ill Directs Observing CAUTION prior to Step 16 and goes to Step 16.
Ill Ensures boration continues until subsequent actions to verify adequate Shutdown Margin is obtained.
- Return To Procedure And Step In Effect STEP16 US:
Return to 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Step 1.
3-EOP-E.O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES &
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTES RCO:
Verifies Reactor Trip Rod bottom lights - ON Reactor trip & bypass breakers - OPEN Rod position indicators - AT ZERO Neutron flux - DECREASING STEP 1 BOP:
All turbine stop or associated control valves - CLOSED Moisture Separator Reheater Steam Valves-CLOSED MSR Main Stm Sup Stop MOVs Reheater Timing Valves MSR Purge Stm Valves Checks Mid and East GCBs -
OPEN STEP2 Page 28 of 41 This Information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L*15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1 /2/15)
RID 3-EOP-E.O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY tNJECTIOt4 EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES &
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTES BOP:
- Verifies Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses
- a. Checks the 3A and 3B 4 KV buses-MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED
- b. Checks the 3A and 3B 4 KV buses-MAINTAIN BOTH ENERGIZED
- c.
Maintains the 3D 4 KV Bus energized - ALIGNED TO AN ENERGIZED 4 KV BUS STEP3 RCO:
Checks If SI Is Actuated
- SI Annunciators ANY ON OR
- Safeguards equipment -AUTO STARTED STEP4 RCO:
- Verifies SI actuation when required.
Ensures a HHSI Pump is running.
US:
Directs 3-EOP-E-O response and reviews the IOAs.
- Reviews Foldout page with the crew NOTE Page 29 of 41 This Information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L*15--1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera" L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
SEG R.m 3*EOP*E.O, R~C.TOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES &
NOTES NOTE actions start on page 33 POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
CREW:
Reviews FOP for 3-EOP-E-O Adverse Cntmt - No RCP Trip Criteria - Monitoring Faulted SIG Isolation - Yes o
FW Flow> 400 gpm until NR >7%
o Isolate NW flow to any faulted S/G(s) - ~B o
Stabilize R,cs Hot leg temperature using Steam Dumps when faulted S/G has blown dawn to less than9% Wide Range by reducing lritact S/G Steam Dump To Atmc>sphere valves AUTO setp()int to match.t;urrent S/G prC:)tS&Ure.
RUPTURED S/G !SOLA TION CRITERIA - Not met AFW Sys Operation Criteria - time monitored CST Makeup Water Criteria - Not met RHR System Operation Criteria - both started and running at shutoff - time monitored Loss of Offsite Power or SI on the Other Unit-Not met Loss of Charging Criteria - Not met FOLDOUT PAGE BOP:
Continues with A TT A CHM ENT 3 to complete The Prompt Action Verifications.
STEPS BOOTH OPERATOR:
RCO:
If dispatched to investigate loss of A AFW f>ump, after 5 minutes reply the A AFWPumpls mechanically tripped and will NOT reset. B AFW Pump is QOS.
Check AFW Pumps - AT LEAST TWO RUNNING (NO)
Manually open valves to establish two AFW Pumps running.
(may open MOV-3-1403 at this time)
If an AFW Pump is tripped, dispatches an operator to locally reset the AFW turbine trips.
RCO:
Verify AFW Valve Alignment - PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT. (may open MOV-3-1403 at this time)
Page 30 of 41 STEP6 STEP?
This Information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15--1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2115) run 3-EOP-E.O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJEC::TION EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES &
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTES RCO:
Verify Proper AFW Flow:
- a. Check Narrow Range Level in at least one S/G - GREATER THAN 7%[27%J
- b. Maintain feed flow to S/G until Narrow Range Levels between 21 %[27%] and 50%
STEPS RCO:
Check RCP Seal Cooling:
- a. All RCP Thermal Barrier Alarms - CLEAR:
A 1/1, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI FLOW A 1/2, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI TEMP A 1/3, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER LO FLOW STEP9 RCO:
Check RCS Temperatures:
- a. Check RCPs - ANY RUNNING (yes)
- b. Check RCS Avg Temperatures -
- STABLE BETWEEN 545°F AND 547°F OR
- TRENDING DOWN TO 547°F RNO
- 1) IF TCOLD is decreasing, THEN perform the following:
a) Stop dumping steam.
b) If cooldown continues, and is due to excessive feed flow, then reduce total feed flow to 400 gpm until Narrow Rc:lnge Level greater than 1%[27%) in at least one S/G.
c) IF cooldown continues AND is due to excessive steam flow, THEN close Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass valves. (no)
STEP 10 RCO:
Check PRZ PORVs, Spray Valves And Excess Letdown Isolated:
- a. PORVs - CLOSED
- b. Normal PRZ Spray valves - CLOSED
- c. CV-3-311, Auxiliary Spray Valve - CLOSED
- d. Excess Letdown - NOT IN SERVICE STEP 11 Page 31of41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT IL-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXT era*
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
Rm 3-EOP-E.01 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES &
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTES RCO:
Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:
- a. RCPs - ANY RUNNING
- c. RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 19°F[41°F]
STEP 12 RCO:
Check If S/Gs Are Faulted: (Yes)
- a. Check pressures in all S/Gs -
- ANY SIG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR
- ANY S/G COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED STEP 13 US:
- Continues to monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-0, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES.
- Hold a transition brief for 3-EOP-E-2, FAUL TED STEAM GENERA TOR ISOLATION.
- Enters 3-EOP-E-2.
The scenario may be terminated after the diagnosis of a faulted SG and exit of 3-EOP-E-O with, Prompt Action Verifications complete or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion.
- END OF SCENARIO ***
Page 32 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 lOIT ll-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRG Final (Rev 1-1 1 /2/15)
IUET 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3 -Prompt ActionVeB'lfications EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES &
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTES BOP:
Check Load Centers Associated With Energized 4 KV Buses -
ENERGIZED:
-3ALC
-3B LC
-3CLC
-30 LC
-3HLC STEP 1 BOP:
Verify Feedwater Isolation:
- a. Place Main Feeclwater Pump switches in STOP
- b. Feedwater Control Valves - CLOSED:
- FCV-3-478
- FCV-3-488
- FCV-3-498
- c. Feedwater Bypass Valves - CLOSED:
- FCV-3-479
-FCV-3.489
- FCV-3-499
- d. Feedwater Bypass Isolation Valves-CLOSED: - POV-3-477
-POV-3-487
- POV-3-497
- MOV-3-1407
- MOV-3-1408
- MOV-3-1409
- f. Verify Standby Feedwater Pumps - OFF STEP2 BOP:
Check If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:
- a. Check Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass valves -
ANY OPEN
- b. Check if either Main Steam Isolation Signal has actuated:
- Hi-Hi Containment Pressure 20 psig
- c. Verify Main Steam Isolation and Bypass valves - CLOSED STEP3 Page 33 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 lOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT {L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-11/2/15)
Rm 3-EOP*E*O Attachment 3 -Prompt Action Verifications EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES &
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTES BOP:
Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve White Lights On VPB -
ALL BRIGHT STEP4 BOP:
Verify Pump Operation:
- a. At least two High-Head SI Pumps - RUNNING
- b. Both RHR Pumps - RUNNING STEPS BOP:
Verify Proper CCW System Operation:
- a. CCW Heat Exchangers - THREE IN SERVICE
- b. CCW Pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING
Verify Proper ICW System Operation:
- a. Verify ICW Pumps - AT LEAST TWO RUNNING
- b. Verify ICW To TPCW Heat Exchanger-ISOLATED:
POV-3-4882 - CLOSED POV-3-4883 - CLOSED
- c. Check ICW Headers - TIED TOGETHER STEP?
BOP:
Verify Containment Cooling:
- a. Check Emergency Containment Coolers - ONLY TWO RUNNING STEP8 BOP:
Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation:
- a. Unit 3 Containment Purge Exhaust And Supply Fans - OFF STEP9 BOP:
Verify Containment Spray NOT Required:
- a. Containment pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 20 PSIG:
PR-3-636A PR-3-636B STEP10 Page 34 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT {L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
h' I f II db T 1s n ormat on is contro e ti/ PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L.. 15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
R£ET 3-EOP*E-O Attachment 3-PromptAction Verifications EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES &
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTES BOOTH OPERA TOR When directed by crew, trigger LOA*
ALIGN U4 HHSIPs TORWST.
BOP:
BOP:
Verify SI - RESET STEP 11 BOP:
Verify SI Valve Amber Lights On VPB - ALL BRIGHT STEP 12 BOP:
Verify SI Flow:
RCS pressure-LESS THAN 1625 PSIG[1950 PSIG] (NO)
STEP 13 BOP:
Realign SI System:
Check Procedure Entry Status - E-0 ENTERED FROM 3-0NOP-047.1, LOSS OF CHARGING FLOW IN MODES 1 THROUGH 4 (NO)
Verify Unit 3 High-Head SI Pumps-TWO RUNNING (NO)
Operate Unit 3 and Unit 4 High-Head SI Pumps to ~stablish injection te> Unit 3 from two Hlgh-Heacl SI Pumps.
Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to align Unit 4 High-Head SI Pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using Attachment 1.
BOP:
Verify Containment l59lation Phase A - RESET BOP:
Reestablish RCP Cooling:
- a. Check RCPs-AT LEAST ONE RUNNING
- b. Open CCW To Normal Containment Cooler Valves:
- MOV-3-1417
- MOV-3-1418
- c. Reset and start Normal Containment Coolers BOP:
Verify Control Room Ventilation Isolation:
- a. Emergency Air Supply Fan SF-1 B - ON
- b. Emergency Air Supply Fan SF-1A-OFF STEP 14 STEP 15 STEP16
- c. Control Room Ventilation dampers - ALIGNED FOR RECIRC
- d. TS-0002, TSC Emergency Vent Auto Initiate Key Switch-IN ENABLE STEP 17 Page 35 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L*15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIHL-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera-L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2115)
Rm 3-EOP*E-O Attachment 3 -Prompt Action Verifications EVALUATOR POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
TIME ACTIVITIES &
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTES BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:
When directed by Place Hydrogen Monitors In Service Using 3-NOP-094, crew, triggE;)r l.OA..
CONTAINMENT POST ACCIDENT MONITORING SYSTEM ALIGN PAHMS FOR STEP 18 SERVICE.
BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:
If asked 4A and 48 Verify All Four EDGs - RUNNING EDGsare running STEP 19 unloaded.
BOP:
Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses:
- a. Check 3A, 3B AND 3D 4 KV Buses - ALL ENERGIZED STEP 20 BOP:
- b. Check 3A AND 3B 4 KV Buses - ALL ENERGIZED FROM OFFSITE POWER BOP:
- 21. Notify Unit Supervisor Of The Following:
- is complete
- Any safeguards equipment that is NOT In the required condition Status of Containment pressure continuous action STEP 21 Page 36 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This in ormation is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Nt:.xTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
REI Discussion Points are intentionally NOT included in evaluated scenarios. However, space is available below to document follow-up questions when further information is required to determine an evaluation outcome.
FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS QUESTION#1 ANSWER#1 QUESTION#2 ANSWER#2 Page 37 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
1s m orma on 1s con ro e IY s 1 NR Th". f ti t
II db PTN' 2015 LOIT (L C EXAMINATION SEC R M URITY AG EE ENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 3 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1-1 1/2/15)
R.m SIMULATOR POST-SCENARIO RESTORATION:
- 1. Restore per Simulator Operator Checklist.
- 2. Once exams are complete, restore from SEl-19, Simulator Exam Security.
Page 38 of 41 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L*15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT ja
- -~-
UNIT 3 RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)
UNIT 4 RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)
PROTECTED TRAIN: B PROTECTED TRAIN: B ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr:
Inside SNPO:
Field Supv.:
Outside SNPO:
AdminRCO:
ANPO:
Unit3 Unit4 Unit Supv.:
Unit Supv.:
RCO:
RCO:
NPO:
NPO:
PLANT STATUS Unit3 Unit4 Mode:
1 Mode:
1 Power:
75%
Power:
100%
MWe:
633 MWe:
842 Gross Leakrate:
0.01 gpm Gross Leakrate:
642 Operational Concerns:
I 3B HHSI Pump has a wiped motor bearing, and its return to service is expected in two days. B AFW Pump is having turbine repairs, and the expected return to service is late next shift. 3A 1 CWP preventive maintenance is done with the clearance released. The 3A 1 CWP is ready for start for a PMT.
UJ Anticipated LCO Actions:
I None U4 Anticipated LCO Actions:
I None Results of Off going Focus Area:
I
UNIT 3 STATUS REACTOR OPERATOR UNIT RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)
PROTECTED TRAIN: B Mode:
1 RCS Leak.rate Accumulator Ref Levels Power:
75%
Gross:
0.01 GPM A
6656 MWe 333 Unidentified 0.00 GPM B
6608 Tavg:
570 Charging Pps:
0.01 GPM c
6646 RCS Pressure:
863 Abnormal Annunciators:
Annunciator:
H3/2 - SAFETY INJ PUMP 3B TRIP Comp Actions:
3A, 4A, and 48 HHSI Pumps are guarded.
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Current Tech Snee Action Statements: ffioes Not Include "For Tracking Onll'. Items" T.S.A.S I Component:
3.5.2.c-30 day action I 3B HHSI Pump Reason:
Bearing Replacement Entry Date:
Yesterday T.S.A.S I Component:
- 3. 7.1.2.c - 30 day action I B AFW Pump Reason:
Turbine Repairs Entry Date:
Yesterday T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
UNIT 3 STATUS REACTOR OPERATOR (CONT'D)
UNIT RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)
PROTECTED TRAIN: B Changes to Risk Significant Eguigment:
No recent changes from last shift.
OLRM: GREEN PROTECTED TRAIN: B Ugcoming Reactivjll Management Activities:
The plant is at 75% power (MOL) following repairs to the 38 Steam Generator Feedwater Pump. Power escalation will begin following turnover to 100%.
Ugcoming Major POD Activities:
NONE U~oming ECOs to Hang and /or Release:
- Hang-None Release - None Evolutions or Come!nsatorx Actions in Prggress:
NONE General lnformation1 Remarks1 and O~erator Work Around Status:
- Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.
- U3 supplying Aux Steam Air In-leakage= 0.0 SCFM
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Appendix D Scenario Outline NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
Form ES-D-1 Facility:
Turkey Point Nuclear Scenario No.:
4 Op Test No.:
2015-301 (PTN) - Units 3 and 4 Examiners:
Operators:
(SRO)
(RCO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions:
The plant is at 25% power (MOL).
Online risk is green.
B train is protected on both units. Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.
Turnover:
Chemistry parameters are satisfied for increasing unit power. Raise Reactor Power to 35% power. There are no ramp rate fuel integrity restrictions for this power increase to 35%.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 38 HHSI Pump has a wiped motor bearing, and its return to service is expected in two days. B AFW Pump is having turbine repairs, and the expected return to service is late next shift. 3A 1 CWP preventive maintenance is done with the clearance released. The 3A 1 CWP is ready for start for a PMT.
Event Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Description Raise power up 10% with dilution and rods and hold TFB1PWT R-RO & SRO at 35%.
1 TFBV019 N-BOP Makeup dilution valve CV-3-114A fails open with Makeup Counter failure.
2 TVF1MABD C-BOP& SRO 3B SG Level Transmitter LT-3-486 drifts low. (TS) 3 TFH244GH I-RO & SRO Pressurizer Spray Valve PCV-3-455A fails open. (TS) 4 TVKKB2 C-RO&SRO 3A RCP High Vibration TVPGM03P TFP8SWYD M-RO,BOP, A trip of 3A RCP causes a 4KV Bus fault leading to a bus 5
TFE2Z50S lockout followed by a delayed loss of Switchyard and loss of TFQ5851S
&SRO 38 EOG.
TFQSGBS 6
TFP807BA C-BOP & SRO Mid and East Main Generator Output Breakers fail to open on TFP807MA Main Turbine trip.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT {L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Appendix D L-15-1 NRC Scenario #4 Scenario Outline NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
Form ES-D-1 The plant is at 25% power (BOL). Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units. Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.
Chemistry parameters are satisfied for increasing unit power. Raise Reactor Power to 35% power. There are no ramp rate fuel integrity restrictions for this power increase to 35%.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 38 HHSI Pump has a wiped motor bearing, and its return to service is expected in two days. B AFW Pump is having turbine repairs, and the expected return to service is late next shift. 3A 1 CWP preventive maintenance is done with the clearance released. The 3A 1 CWP is ready for start for a PMT.
Event 1 The crew briefs the power increase. While the RO is performing a dilution, CV-3-114A fails open with the Makeup Counter failing. The dilution slightly increases with the audible noise also increasing. The RCS dilution continues to dilute the RCS until the RO notices the failure with diverse indications. The RO turns the RCS Makeup Control Switch to Off. The US enters 3-ARP-097.CR and/or 3-0NOP-046.4, Malfunction of Boron Concentration Control System.
Event 2 After the crew finishes with compensatory actions from Event 2, 38 Steam Generator Level Transmitter, L T-3-486 drifts low. As this slow failure occurs, 38 SG FW flow increases which causes a C6/2, SG B Level Deviation/Cntrl Trbl Alrm. The BOP takes manual control of 38 SG Level and restores to program level. 3-0NOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, is reviewed for applicability.
PTN Technical Specifications are entered with 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to trip LT-3-486 bi-stables.
Event3 After sufficient time for the crew to refer to Technical Specifications and regain control of SG Level, then the Pressurizer Spray Valve PCV-3-455A fails open. The immediate effect of this failure is a corresponding RCS pressure drop below TS DNB limits. The RO compensates for this auto failure by taking manual control of the Pressurizer Spray Valve. 3-ARP-097 and/or 3-0NOP-041.5, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction are used for crew response.
Event4 Once the crew has adequate time for the responding to the pressure control malfunction, 3A RCP develops an imbalance causing a high RCP vibration. The US enters 3-0NOP-041.1 to monitor the 3A RCP status. From indications provided, 3A RCP meets trip criteria. The US briefs the crew on tripping 3A RCP after the Reactor is verified trip. The RO trips the Reactor and performs immediate operator actions of 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
2 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Appendix D Events Scenario Outline NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
Form ES-D-1 A trip of 3A RCP causes a 4KV Bus fault leading to a bus lockout followed by a delayed loss of Switchyard and loss of 38 EOG. The crew starts with immediate operator actions of 3-EOP-E-O and when power is verified lost, then they transition to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0.
Power is restored to the 38 4KV Bus after bus stripping through the SBO Crosstie using - 38 4KV Bus Restoration. 30 4KV Bus is aligned and Load Centers energized.
Event&
After the Reactor is tripped, as the Main Turbine Generator Breakers do not auto open.
The BOP will carry out his actions to divorce the 4 KV Buses from the switchyard and manually open these breakers.
The scenario is complete after the crew has the opportunity to start an ICW Pump, CCW Pump, and Charging Pump/HHSI Pump for inventory control as applicable 3
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Appendix D Critical Tasks:
CT1:
Control SG Level Scenario Outline NRC Final {Rev 1.1)
Form ES-D-1 After a failure of 38 SG Level Transmitter LT-3-486, manually control 38 SG Water Level to prevent a Unit trip on low or high SG level.
Safety Significance: The failure to control 38 SG level demonstrates a lack of corrective actions which create a challenge to plant safety with an unintentional reactor protection system (RPS) actuation CT2:
Re-energize 38 4KV Bus After a loss of all AC Power and confirmation of an S80 condition, restore this unit's 4 KV Bus power through the SBO crosstie from the non-SBO unit EOG via the 4 KV Crosstie and the Swing Bus Switchgear within 10 minutes.
Safety Significance: The failure to energize an ac emergency bus constitutes a misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent a degraded emergency power capacity. The failure to perform this critical task also results in a needless degradation of any barrier to fission product release, specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals.
CT3:
Manually Start An ICW Pump After Unit 3 power is restored to one 4 KV Bus, start at least one ICW Pump prior to allowing CCW Supply Header temperature to exceed 125°F.
Safety Significance: The failure to manually start at least the minimum required number of ICW (SW) Pumps in an operating safeguards train represents a failure by the crew to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
CT4: Close Failed Open PZR Spray Valve After PCV-3-455A, PZR Spray Valve fails open, manually close the valve prior to a Reactor Trip.
Safety Significance: The failure to control PZR pressure demonstrates a lack of corrective actions which create a challenge to plant safety with an unintentional reactor protection system (RPS) actuation.
4 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f f
lldb PN 2 1s m orma ion 1s contro e IY T 's 015 LOI T (L 1 N C EXAMINA 0 ECURITY AGREEMENT } R Tl NS era SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE E~
SEG fl.EEi' NRC Draft (Rev 1.1)
Site:
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 (PTN)
Title:
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 LMS#:
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 LMS Rev Date:
01105/15 Rev#: 1.1 SEG Type:
D Training 181 Evaluation Program:
OLOCT 181 LOIT D Other Duration:
90 minutes Developed by:
Mark Wilson 11121114 Instructor/Developer Date Reviewed by:
Tim Hodge 11128114 Instructor (Instructional Review)
Date Validated by :
Jose Vasquez 11121114 SME (Technical Review)
Date Approved by:
Matt Glander 11128/14 Training SupeNision Date Approved by:
Mike Coen 11126114 Training Program Owner (Line)
Date TR-AA-230-1003-F06 Revision O This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
T
. f his in ormation is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NF.:xTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1.1) run 3-ARP-097. CR various O-ADM-115 8B O-ADM-200 21 O-ADM-211 3
O-ADM-232 4
0-EPI P-20101 16 O-EPIP-20134 3
3-EOP-E-O 10 3-EOP-F-O 3
3-EOP-ECA-0.0 6
3-GOP-301 30 3-NOP-010 16 3-NOP-089 19 3-NOP-094 3
O-OP-046 15 3-0NOP-041.1 7
3-0NOP-041.5 OA 3-0NOP-046.4 0 (08/27/03) 3-0NOP-049.1 3A 3-0SP-059.10 1A PTN Technical Specs 293 Page 2 of 42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
1s m ormat1on 1s con ro e
>Y Th". f t
II db PTN' s 2015 L OIT (L 1 1 RC EXAM ) N INATI N R
0 SECURITY AG EEMENT NEXTera
~~-
Terminal Objective FU£T Enabling Objectives:
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE REQUIREMENTS Given this simulator scenario and resources normally found in the Control Room, the operating crew will perform Control Room operations IAW approved plant procedures in order to maintain the integrity of the plant and the health and safety of the public.
Given this simulator scenario and resources normally found in the Control Room, operate in accordance with approved plant procedures, Operations Department Instructions, and management expectations:
- 1. (ALL) Demonstrate personnel SAFETY awareness in interactions with plant staff and outside agencies.
- 2. (ALL) Demonstrate ALARA awareness in interactions with plant staff and outside agencies.
- 3. (ALL) Exchange correct information using 3-point communication/Repeat-backs with Control Room personnel and other plant staff.
- 4. (ALL) Inform plant personnel and System of plant conditions, as needed.
- 5. (SM) Employ timely and concise crew briefs where appropriate.
- 6. (SM) Make timely and correct emergency plan classifications where appropriate.
- 7. (SM/COMM) Make timely and correct emergency plan protective action recommendations if General Emergency declared with SHIFT MANAGER and Communicator assigned.
- 8. (COMM) Make accurate and timely emergency plan notifications where appropriate.
- 9. (ALL) Maintain awareness of plant status and control board indication.
- 10. (ALL) Correctly diagnose plant situations.
- 11. (ALL) Solve operational problems as they arise.
- 12. (RCO/BOP) Manipulate plant controls properly and safely.
- 14. (US) Demonstrate command and control of the crew.
- 15. (US) Coordinate the input of crew members and other plant staff.
- 16. (US) Utilize the input of crew members and other plant staff.
- 17. (ALL) Demonstrate conservative decision making.
- 18. (STA) Provide informed technical assistance to the operating crew.
- 19. (ALL) Demonstrate teamwork.
- 20. (ALL) Respond to plant events using procedural guidance (OPs/ONOPs/EOPs) as applicable in accordance with rules of usage.
- 21. (RCO/BOP) Implement any applicable procedural immediate operator actions without use of references.
- 22. (SRO) Maintain compliance with Tech Specs.
- 23. (ALL) Identify/enter applicable Tech Spec action statements.
- 24. (ALL) Respond to annunciators using ARPs (time permitting).
- 25. (ALL) Maintain written communication, logs, and documentation as needed to permit post-event reconstruction.
While addressing the following events:
Page 3of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th.. f II db TN 1s m ormat1on rs contro e 1y p
's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION s ECURITY AGREEMENT.
~*Jr_:::::-:Tera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 ENERGYR SEG
~--
NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
HUCUAR A.ID
- 1. Raise Power 10% With Dilution And Rods To 35% With Makeup Dilution Failures - CV-3-114A Fails Open And Makeup Counter Fails
- 2. 3B SG Level Transmitter LT-3-486 Drifts Low
- 3. Pressurizer Spray Valve PCV-3-455A Fails Open
- 4. 3A RCP High Vibration
- 5. 3A RCP Trip Causes A 4KV Bus Fault Leading To A Bus Lockout Followed By A Delayed Loss of Switchyard And Loss Of 38 EDG
- 6. Mid and East Main Generator Output Breakers Fail To Open On Main Turbine Trip.
- 7.
A AFW Pump trips. MOV-3-1403 fails to auto open.
Prerequisites:
None Training PTN Unit 3 Plant Simulator Resources:
Development TR-M-230,-1003, SAT Development
References:
TR-M-230,-1007 Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation O-ADM-232, Time Critical Action Program OP-M-100,-1000 Conduct Of Operations OP-M-103,-1000 Reactivity Management O-ADM-200, Operations Management Manual O-ADM-211, Emergency and Off-Normal Operating Procedure Usage WCAP-17711-NP, Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group Westinghouse Emergency Response Guideline Revision 2-Based Critical Tasks NUREG 1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards Protected N/A Content:
Evaluation Performance Mode Method:
Operating None Experience:
Risk Significant
- 1. After a loss of all AC Power and confirmation of an SBO condition, restore Operator this unit's 4 KV Bus power through the SBO crosstie from the non-SBO unit Actions:
EDG via the 4 KV Crosstie and the Swing Bus Switchgear within 1 O minutes.
- 2. After Unit 3 power is restored to one 4 KV Bus, start at least one ICW Pump prior to allowing CCW Supply Header temperature to exceed 125°F.
Page 4 of 42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
Rm' TASKS,ASSOCIAlEDWITH'SIMUllA]Oft!;EXERCISEGUIDE..
SROTas~#
Task Title
- <*~~'..""*<
- i
.'i.i..
02046049300 RECOVER FROM BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL SYSTEM MAKEUP FAILURES 02200044500 RESPOND TO STEAM GENERA TOR HIGH LEVEL 02041054300 RESPOND TO HIGH RCP VIBRATION 02200022500 DIAGNOSE CAUSE OF SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION 02200002500 EVALUATE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSF) STATUS TREE OUTPUT 02028033500 AUTHORIZE UNIT TRIP 02005015500 RESPOND TO A LOSS OF ALL A.C. POWER 02041029300 EVALUATE AND RESPOND TO A LOW PRESSURIZER PRESSURE RO Task
.. Tas_kTitle 01046049300 RECOVER FROM BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL SYSTEM MAKEUP FAILURES 01200044500 RESPOND TO STEAM GENERA TOR HIGH LEVEL 01041029300 EVALUATE AND RESPOND TO A LOW PRESSURIZER PRESSURE 01041054300 RESPOND TO HIGH RCP VIBRATION 01005015500 RESPOND TO A LOSS OF ALL A.C. POWER 01200022500 DIAGNOSE CAUSE OF SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION Page 5of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
f This in ormation is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
era L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 ENERGY~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1.1}
11\\KllAA FLEET UPDATE LOG:
Place this form with the working copies of lesson plans and/or other materials to document changes NOTES:
made between formal revisions. For fleet-wide training materials, keep electronic file of this form in same folder as approved materials. Refer to TR-AA-230-1003 SAT Development for specific directions regarding how and when this form shall be used.
Indicate in the following table any minor changes or major revisions (as defined in TR-AA-230-1003} made to the material after initial approval. Or use separate Update Log form TR-AA-230-1003-F16.
REASON FOR PREPARER DATE DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE CHANGE AR/TWR#
REVIEWER DATE Revised for L-Notes Note 5 1-0 Initial Revision 15-1 NRC 01982463 Exam Note 5 Note 5 Identify CT 4 which requires no B.Clark 1/6/15 additional Operator actions, added Incorporate 1-1 additional guidance in Event 1 to comments from 01982463 complete the dilution, deleted the NRC validation PORV malfunction, and corrected week.
M.Wilson 1/6/15 miscellaneous typos and formatting.
1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5
- 1.
lnd1v1dual updating lesson plan or trammg material shall complete the appropriate blocks on the Update Log.
- 2.
Describe the change to the lesson plan or training materials.
- 3.
State the reason for the change (e.g., reference has changed, typographical error, etc.)
- 4.
Preparer enters name/date on the Update Log and obtains Training Supervisor approval.
- 5.
Initial dates and site approval on cover page.
Page 6of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This in ormation is controlled 1y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
f b
- . 11
- era l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 E~.
SEG NRG Final (Rev 1.1)
II.EEi OVERVIEW INITIAL CONDITIONS The plant is at 25% power (BOL). Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units. Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain. Chemistry parameters are satisfied for increasing unit power. Raise Reactor Power to 35% power. There are no ramp rate fuel integrity restrictions for this power increase to 35%.
EQUIPMENT OOS 3B HHSI Pump has a wiped motor bearing, and its return to service is expected in two days. B AFW Pump is having turbine repairs, and the expected return to service is late next shift. 3A 1 CWP preventive maintenance is done with the clearance released. The 3A 1 CWP is ready for start for a PMT.
SYNOPSIS Event 1 The crew briefs the power increase. While the RO is performing a dilution, CV-3-114A fails open with the Makeup Counter failing. The dilution slightly increases with the audible noise also increasing. The RCS dilution continues to dilute the RCS until the RO notices the failure with diverse indications. The RO turns the RCS Makeup Control Switch to Off. The US enters 3-ARP-097.CR and/or 3-0NOP-046.4, Malfunction of Boron Concentration Control System.
Event 2 After the crew finishes with compensatory actions from Event 2, 3B Steam Generator Level Transmitter, L T-3-486 drifts low. As this slow failure occurs, 3B SG FW flow increases which causes a C6/2, SG B Level Deviation/Cntrl Trbl Alrm. The BOP takes manual control of 3B SG Level and restores to program level. 3-0NOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, is reviewed for applicability. PTN Technical Specifications are entered with 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to trip L T-3-486 bi-stables.
Event 3 After sufficient time for the crew to refer to Technical Specifications and regain control of SG Level, then the Pressurizer Spray Valve PCV-3-455A fails open. The immediate effect of this failure is a corresponding RCS pressure drop below TS DNB limits. The RO compensates for this auto failure by taking manual control of the Pressurizer Spray Valve. 3-ARP-097 and/or 3-0NOP-041.5, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction are used for crew response.
Event4 Once the crew has adequate time for the responding to the pressure control malfunction, 3A RCP develops an imbalance causing a high RCP vibration. The US enters 3-0NOP-041.1 to monitor the 3A RCP status. From indications provided, 3A RCP meets trip criteria. The US briefs the crew on tripping 3A RCP after the Reactor is verified trip. The RO trips the Reactor and performs immediate operator actions of 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Events A trip of 3A RCP causes a 4KV Bus fault leading to a bus lockout followed by a delayed loss of Switchyard and loss of 3B EOG. The crew starts with immediate operator actions of 3-EOP-E-O and when power is verified lost, then they transition to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0. Power is restored to the 3B 4KV Bus after bus stripping through the SBO Crosstie using Attachment 6 - 3B 4KV Bus Restoration. 30 4KV Bus is aligned and Load Centers energized.
Page 7of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f f
t II db PTN 20 1s m orma ion 1s con ro e
'Y
's 15 LOIT (L-15*1) NRC EXAM INATI 0 N SECU I RTY T
AGREEMEN.
l\\JEXTera**
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 ENERGY~
-~
SEG run NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
Event 6 After the Reactor is tripped, as the Main Turbine Generator Breakers do not auto open. The BOP will carry out his actions to divorce the 4 KV Buses from the switchyard and manually open these breakers.
The scenario is complete after the crew has the opportunity to start an ICW Pump, CCW Pump, and Charging Pump/HHSI Pump for inventory control as applicable.
CREW CRITICAL.TASKS
~
Event# Description CT1: Control SG level 2
After a failure of 3B SG Level Transmitter L T-3-486, manually control 3B SG Water Level to prevent a Unit trip on low or high SG level.
CT2: Re-energize 38 4KV Bus After a loss of all AC Power and confirmation of an SBO condition, restore this unit's 4KV Bus power through the SBO crosstie from the non-SBO unit EOG via the 4 KV Crosstie and the 5
Swing Bus Switchgear within 1 O minutes.
[O-ADM-232, Attachment 1, Time Critical Operator Actions - page 11 of 24]
CT3: Manually Start An ICW Pump 5
After Unit 3 power is restored to one 4 KV Bus, start at least one ICW Pump prior to allowing CCW Supply Header temperature to exceed 125°F.
CT4: Close Failed Open PZR Spray Valve 3
After PCV-3-455A, PZR Spray Valve fails open, manually close the valve prior to a Reactor Trip.
SEQUENCE O_F f:VE~TS Event# Description
. *;c: **.* >:... :
' ~' '
- 1.
Raise Power 10% With Dilution And Rods To 35% With Makeup Dilution Failures - CV-3-114A Fails Open And Makeup Counter Fails
- 2.
3B SG Level Transmitter L T-3-486 Drifts Low
- 3.
Pressurizer Spray Valve PCV-3-455A Fails Open
- 4.
3A RCP High Vibration
- 5.
3A RCP Trip Causes A 4KV Bus Fault Leading To A Bus Lockout Followed By A Delayed Loss of Switchyard And Loss Of 38 EOG
- 6.
Mid and East Main Generator Output Breakers Fail To Open On Main Turbine Trip.
Page 8 of 42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th.. f trlldb N
1s in ormat1on 1s con o e
) NRC EX MINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT
( 1 A
NEXT era L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
R££l Restore IC-77, (24% BOL) or equivalent IC (IC-17).
Unfreeze the Simulator.
Stop 3A 1 Circulating Water Pump.
Open & execute lesson file L-15-1 NRC SCEN 4 Draft 112114.lsn Ensure the following lesson steps are triggered:
SETUP-OOS EQUIPMENT (IMM23BT, TAMSD3BS, TAFF01B, TCF5MTB).
SETUP - MAIN GEN BKRS FAIL TO AUTO OPEN (TFP807BA, TFP807MA).
Place ECO tag on B AFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve.
Remove velcro tags for B AFW alignment at RPM meter.
Place the 38 HHSI Pump in PTL and hang an ECO tag on it.
Ensure Rod Group Step Counters have completed stepping out.
Align All SIG Control Transfer Switched to the BLUE Channel Ill.
Allow the plant to stabilize.
Acknowledge any alarms and freeze Simulator.
Ensure Key Number 82 for 3AD07, Station Blackout Breaker is in key box.
Ensure B train is protected train on VPA.
Perform the SIMULATOR OPERATOR CHECKLIST or equivalent.
Place TURNOVER SHEETS on RO's desk or give to the Lead Evaluator.
Ensure at least 4 copies of the maneuvering guide are available for shift turnover.
Ensure a marked copy of 3-GOP-301 is available for power increase.
Ensure a copy of O-ADM-200 is available for briefs.
Ensure a copy of 001-44 is available for briefs.
Ensure at least 4 copies of the maneuvering guide are available for shift turnover.
Page 9 of 42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
.. f b
This m ormat1on IS controlled >V PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
era EN~f3GY-~.
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 SEG NIJQ.UR NRG Final (Rev 1.1) run BRIEFINGS Shift turnover information is attached to the back of this guide.
Ensure all applicants are prior briefed on Appendix E of NUREG 1021, Policies and Guidelines For Taking NRC Examinations.
Conduct a Crew Pre-brief to cover turnover information.
US:
RCO:
SCENARIO NOTE O-ADM-211 Prudent Operator Actions - If redundant stand-by equipment is available and ready, the operator is permitted to start the redundant equipment for failed or failing operating equipment. Immediate follow up of applicable ARPs and ONOPs (AOPs) shall occur as required.
Page 10of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1} NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 E~
NRC Final {Rev 1.1)
SEG TIME ruET EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES &
NOTES NOTE POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
US:
Ensure the Simulator Conducts shift turnover.
is in RUN before the crew enters the Simulator.
NOTE This procedure may be done anytime during scenario.
US:
Uses 3-GOP-301 guidance to increase power to 35%.
Observes the reactivity manipulations on the unit.
Prepares to start equipment as required by 3-GOP-301.
May direct the BOP to restore 3A 1 CWP IAW 3-NOP-010.
BOP:
As directed, Uses 3-NOP-010, Circulating Water System, to start 3A1 CWP.
Notifies Chemistry of intent to start and records SG Slowdown rates.
- [~~l[~1f~WB and ensures discharge valve MOV-3-1416 opens.
Informs US that 3A1 CWP is running.
RCO:
Reviews the maneuvering guide for dilution amount - 100 gal. every 10 minutes.
Amount of water required does not increase power greater than 10% per hour.
Page 11of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th.. f II db 1s m ormat1on 1s contro e 1y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
1-1E,<Tera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 E~
NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
SEG TIME Fl.EET EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES &
NOTES NOTES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
Determines the amount of primary water required for a batch addition.
US peer checks the amount of water to add.
Set the Primary Water Totalizer to amount of water determined to batch add:
Dilute (via FCV 114B) is the preferred switch position to minimize the impact to the RCP seals by preheating the water in the VCT and ensuring RCS hydrogen concentration is maintained.
The R CO will perform Control Rod steps as required to maintain AFD within required limits.
NOTES This process is repeated subsequent dilutions.
Proceed with the makeup failure afte the BOP is raising Turbine load with a dilution ongoing.
B~~~£RfessIGI!lj
§~~Jfil1tei!!iM~m~!JJ3JrolW~1~r iY~~b""}e~s"s""tmN*. -r; Q~2~~t:~!i
~jf~'SW~
~tlBRustitl!IMITtll!aR~~Yirrfiifi~1imQ'i,ii)j pjf&f~~iY:Al!~
Place the ~~M!~!YQ;{§~I~~§wJf£~1il;i'.~Qf~t;F[~.
Place the BtaSlMfk~~n1f:gfI$~~11J~~TA~].
Verifies the expected primary water flow rate by observing FR-3-113 and ensures that flow rate is consistent with the flow rate.
After dilution STOPPED, verify in auto/closed:
o Boric Acid to Blender, FCV-3-113A o
Primary Water to Blender, FCV-3-114A o
Blender to Charging Pump Suction, FCV-3-113B o
Blender to VCT, FCV-3-114B Repeats for additional dilutions.
When complete, realigns for AUTO by:
o =;Lim4ffffe!Rss!MaK.eu'icontr011;swftctl:fosfart.
M~22%h2o*-.4022%o22022202o* __ JQ>~ ***-*-*-**oo>* ****~ ******'.. ~
.~.
o Verify Red Start light is Energized.
Page 12 of 42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th.. f II db 1s m ormat1on 1s contro e 1y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 E~
NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
SEG lUU TIME NOTE Depressing HOLD on TCS for Turbine controls will stop loading rate at current load.
BOP:
Determines target and load ramp rate.
Uses Section 4.2.2 to use MW CTRL for load increase.
Raise Turbine load with TCS by:
!ii§ll!Q1~JN;:Qf1MW4:QNfB~
~lllseifai1Pa~confirm;!M'W~I8'RGJ;Ti
~S!i~£t~~fi~~~§iJf!mfMW8AMe'~f~
RCO:
Addresses Alarm A2/6, PRI WATER MAKE-UP FLOW DEVIATION Notices audible beeping for a dilution in progress starts increasing as CV-3-114A Fails open.
Checks lights for CV-3-114A and finds only the red light is lit.
Secures the dilution by taking the Makeup Control Switch to OFF.
Recommends 3-0NOP-046.4, Malfunction of Boron Concentration Control System.
NOTE US:
If left unnoticed, the
- Directs ARP and 3-0NOP-0046.4 response.
Makeup Counter Directs the RCO to ensure dilution is stopped.
also freezes which will contribute to the
- continuous dilution event until the RCO
- stops the dilution by taking the Makeup Control Switch to Off.
May use The Turbine to balance Tavg/Tref, otherwise will stop Turbine load increase.
If auto Turbine load increase is to be stopped, then directs the BOP to place the TCS Controls in Manual or Hold.
Page 13of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th.* f II db f
E 1s in orma ion 1s contro e
>Y PTN's 2015 LOT (L-15-1) NRC XAMINATI 0 N SECURITY AGREEMENT.
l era E~
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
TIME FW1 EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES &
NOTES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
Checks Boric Acid OR Primary Water Makeup Flow Rates -
ABNORMAL STEP 1 RCO:
RCO:
Checks the Reactor Makeup Selector Switch In BORATE OR AUTO (no)
STEP RCO:
Goes to Step 16.
STEP 3-RNO RCO:
Checks If Additional Primary Water Should Be Added (If No Go To Step 41)
STEP 16 RCO:
Check Primary Water Flow Rate was equal to or less than expected before the makeup s stem was stopped? (NO)
_f¥~'Tu1~Y~JJQii9~f tti_el~m9Mo!J~f l-*~§ri1~7~l157!Qlb6ser'\\leJt1~Prlm~fy
- e. Go to Step 26.
STEP 17 Page 14of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th.. f f
t II db PTN' 2015 LOIT (L 151 NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMEN 1s m orma ion 1s con ro e
>Y s
- - )
T.
.EXTera ENERGY a
.. ~
RHT TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES &
NOTES l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
SEG Check That The Amount Of Primary water needed was added.
STEP 26 US:
Go To Step41 STEP 27 BOP:
Notifies:
l&C, to make repairs WCC to generate of PWO.
STEP 41 Recognizes and reports 38 SG Level drifting low.
Takes manual control of 38 S/G level control valve FCV 488.
After conditions stabilize, recognize L T-3-486 failure.
Restores 38 SIG level to normal.
US:
Establishes a control band for 38 SIG Level.
RCO:
Addresses Alarm Response for SG B Level Deviation.
US:
Enters and directs actions of 3-0NOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels, for response Page 15 of 42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
xTera*
E~-
R.EEr NOTE:
After S/G level control is restored, at the Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 3.
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC Final (Rev 1. 1)
BOP:
Verifies LT-3-486 failure by channel check comparison.
Verifies no off-normal conditions exist on LT-3-488.
Place 38 S/G FW Control Transfer Switch to L T-3-488 and ensure 38 S/G level is returned to auto.
BOP:
Notifies WCC to initiate PWO and l&C for troubleshooting.
US:
Enters Tech Spec Actions:
3.3.1 FU 11 -Action 6, within 6 hrs trip bi-stables 3.3.2 FU 6.b - Action 15, within 6 hrs trip bi-stables US:
Conducts crew brief.
POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
Notices Pressurizer pressure lowering.
Pressurizer Heaters are ON.
Notices Pressurizer Master Pressure Controller is near normal setpoint.
Finds PCV-3-455A Spray Valve going open Recommends entry into ARP response.
RCO:
Finds PCV-3-455A Spray Valve going open.
~l!;:FS~miny@traQlltfofa[d"CiQSfl§:~e~'l~H~~A~
Informs the US of DNB Entry. (TS 3.2.5-2 hours to restore)
Page 16 of 42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f f
t II d b PTN 20 0 T (L 1s rn orma ion 1s con ro e
'Y
's 15 L I 1) NR C EXAMIN 0
C TY ATI N SE URI AGREE M ENT.
NE era l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
TIME fl.E.El EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
& NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
NOTE Event 4 takes 7 minutes to reach the alarm setpoint.
Consider triggering Event 4 now while continuing with this Event.
US:
Enters 3-0NOP-041.5, PZR Press Control Malfunction.
Reviews 3-0NOP-041.5 Foldout Page IF any Pressurizer Pressure control Instrument Loop fails, THEN place applicable control switches to a position that isolates the failed instrument.
IF PZR pressure cannot be maintained greater than 2000 psig, THEN perform the following:
+ Continue efforts to restore PZR pressure and
+ Trip the reactor and turbine and go to 3-EOP-E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
IF any PORV is OPEN OR Leaking AND pressure is less than 2235 psig, THEN CLOSE the applicable PORV and/or Block valve.
FOLDOUT PAGE RCO:
Check PZR Pressure Control Instrument Loop Not Failed Check PT-3-444-NOT FAILED by comparison with adjacent pressure channels and known plant parameters. (YES)
Check PT-3-445-NOT FAILED by comparison with RCO:
adjacent pressure channels and known plant parameters. (YES)
Checks PORVs closed Checks PZR Spray Valves Closed with PZR pressure normal or trending to normal. (NO)
- ~§;Rp~1l~~~R~~lftg~E$J)riycY<lfv~2
- ~,~;c.
Checks PZR Safety Valves closed.
Checks PZR Pressure Stable or Increasing.
Checks Pressurizer Pressure Above Normal Value (NO)
RCO:
Checks Pressurizer Pressure Low Or Decreasing.
Maintain PZR Pressure Greater Than 2000 psig.
Checks PZR Heater Operable Checks PZR Heaters ON.
Checks PZRHeaters capable of maintaining pressure.
Page 17 of 42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f II db PTN f
1s in orma ton 1s contro e
>Y 0
L 1 R
XAMIN TON SECURITY AGREEMENT
~,it=.x:. era l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 E~
NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
SEG TIME TIME ruer EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
& NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
BOOTH OPERATOR BOP:
- B~~JiQJia~~~IW~ll~~~;ifft~~~ Notify
NOTE After plant is stabilized or at the Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event
- 4.
l&C, to make repairs WCC to generate of PWO.
US:
Exits DNB Spec when Pressurizer Pressure is ~ 2204 psig.
EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
& NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
Notices 3A RCP Vibration trending higher.
Acknowledges o
ANN F1/1, RCP MOTOR/SHAFT HI VIB Dispatches an operator to check the Bently Nevada RCP Vibration recorder R-3-369.
Recommends entry into 3-0NOP-041.1.
US:
Directs performance of 3-0NOP-041.1 response.
RCO:
ITEM 2 - RCP STOPPING CRITERIA If any of the following RCP limits are reached, then manually trip the reactor AND verify reactor trip and stop the affected RCP.
o Motor frame vibration, R-3-369 (Points 1, 2, 5, 6, 9,
- 10) - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 5 MILS.
o RCP shaft vibration, R-3-369 (Points 3, 4, 7, 8, 11,
- 12) - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 20 MILS.
FOLDOUT PAGE Page 18of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 E~.
NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
SEG TIME Rm EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
& NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
Checks For Proper Seal Injection Flow Thermal Barrier DP > 0 inches Seal Injection Flow > 6 gpm RCO:
Checks Number One Seal Leakoff Flow Within Limits Of {yes)
RCO:
Checks Thermal Barriers Intact STEP 1 STEP2 A 1/1 RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI FLOW alarm - OFF A 1/2 RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI TEMP alarm-OFF A 1/3 RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER LO FLOW alarm-OFF STEP 3 RCO:
Checks For Proper Cooling To RCP Pump Bearing RCP pump bearing temperatures on DCS - < 210°F Number one seal leakoff temperature on DCS - < 215°F STEP4 RCO:
Checks VCT Temperature, Tl-3-116 - < 130°F STEPS RCO:
Checks RCP STANDPIPE HI LEVEL Alarms - OFF o
G 2/1 for RCP A o
G 212 for RCP B o
G 2/3for RCP C STEP6 RCO:
Checks RCP STANDPIPE LO LEVEL Alarms -OFF o
G 3/1 for RCP A o
G 3/2 for RCP B o
G 3/3 for RCP C STEP?
Page 19 of 42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
II b
This information is contro ed IV PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
i\\J_::;(.rera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 E~
NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
SEG TIME RID EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
& NOTES
"'Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
Checks RCP OIL RESERVOIR HI/LO LEVEL Alarms - OFF o
B 2/4 for RCP A o
B 2/5 for RCP B o
B 2/6 for RCP C RCO:
Checks For Proper RCP Motor Cooling
- a. Verifies the following alarms are OFF H 9/1, RCP A MOTOR BEARING HI TEMP H 9/2, RCP B MOTOR BEARING HI TEMP H 9/3, RCP C MOTOR BEARING HI TEMP STEPS H 9/4, RCP MOTOR BRG COOLING WATER HI TEMP H 9/5, RCP MOTOR BRG COOLING WATER LO FLOW H 9/6, RCP A/B/C PUMP/MOTOR HI TEMP
- STABLE OR DECREASING STEP9 RCO:
Checks RCP Seal Bypass Valve, CV-3-307 - OPEN STEP 10 RCO:
Checks RCP Seal Bypass Low Flow Alarms - OFF A 714 for RCP A A 715 for RCP B A 716 for RCP C STEP11 RCO:
Notices trend on vibration is still rising and is approaching the Foldout Pa e limit of 20 mils.
Page 20 of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
r'-JEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 E~
NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
SEG TIME R.EFI EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
& NOTES
- Observable actions grayed.
US:
Briefs the crew on why tripping the unit and expected actions.
Orders the RCO to trip the Reactor and verify tripped, then trip 3A RCP and close the RCP Spray Valve.
Page 21of42 This infonnation is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th.. f II db 1s m ormat1on 1s contro e 1y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera" E~
Fl.!£T TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES &
NOTES l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
SEG Recommends tripping the Reactor and 3A RCP once reactor is tripped.
Recommends entering 3-EOP-E-O, Rx Trip or Safety Injection.
US:
Directs RCO to manually trip the Reactor, then for operators to perform their IOA's.
Directs RCO to trip 3A RCP after the Reactor is tripped.
Directs 3-EOP-E-O response.
RCO/BOP:
Perform IOA's. BQQ]jffiy~llyjrip~jheB~§§t9rl RCO:
Verifies Reactor Trip Rod bottom lights - ON Reactor trip & bypass breakers - OPEN Rod position indicators -AT ZERO Neutron flux - DECREASING STEP 1 Page 22of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th.. f II db 1s m ormat1on 1s contro e
>Y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 E~
NRC Final {Rev 1.1)
SEG TIME Fl£ET EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES &
NOTES POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
f)JiVJtnpicth~iS~B~~ or wait until IOAs are complete.
BOP:
All turbine stop or associated control valves - CLOSED Moisture Separator Reheater Steam Valves-CLOSED MSR Main Stm Sup Stop MOVs Reheater Timing Valves MSR Purge Stm Valves
~~iaJ1gJ~l~~~1$1 STEP2 BOP: (continues to monitor, will UPDATE the crew when no power occurs)
Verifies Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses
- a. Checks the 3A and 3B 4 KV buses-MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED
- b. Checks the 3A and 3B 4 KV buses - MAINTAIN BOTH ENERGIZED
- c.
Maintains the 3D 4 KV Bus energized - ALIGNED TO AN ENERGIZED 4 KV BUS STEP 3 RCO:
Checks If SI Is Actuated SI Annunciators ANY ON OR Safeguards equipment-AUTO STARTED STEP4 NOTE RCO:
This commences the lli[~lf[~~;RGR~~lfifl:QlJiQ'r)~j loss of all AC Power.
US:
Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES for information ONLY.
Directs operators to perform IOAs of 3-EOP-ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER.
Page 23 of 42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th"
- f II db 1s in ormat1on 1s contro e 1y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera..
ENERGY~
.--~
fUl!T NOTE Step 1 and Step 2 are IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION steps.
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC Final (Rev 1, 1)
US:
Directs the actions of 3-EOP-ECA-0.0.
RCO:
Verify Reactor Trip:
Rod Bottom Lights - ON Reactor Trip & Bypass Breakers - OPEN Rod Position Indicators -AT ZERO Neutron Flux - DECREASING BOP:
Verify Turbine Trip:
All Turbine Stop or associated Control Valves - CLOSED.
Moisture Separator Reheater Steam Valves - CLOSED.
o MSR Main Stm Sup Stop MOVs o
Reheater Timing Valves o
MSR Purge Stm Valves
- iifi~V.~}EasI~~~} (Normally 30-second delay)
US: Reviews Foldout page with crew.
ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS IF either condition listed below occurs, THEN use [Adverse Containment Setpoints]:
Containment atmosphere temperature ~180°F OR Containment radiation levels ~ 1.3x105 R/hr STEP 1 STEP2 FOLDOUT PAGE RCO:
Check RCS Isolated Letdown isolation valves Closed.
PRZ PORVs Closed.
Excess letdown isolation valves Closed.
RCS Sample Isolation valves Closed.
STEP3 Page 24of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th.. f f
t II db 0
c 1s in orrna ion 1s con ro e 1y PTN's 2015 L IT (L*15*1) NR EXAMINATI 0 N SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEX era E~
RHT TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES &
NOTES NOTE actions start on page 35.
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
Verifies Proper AFW Flow Check at least 2 AFW Pumps.
Verifies total AFW flow Between 400 and 450 gpm.
BOP:
Try To Restore Power To 3A 4KV Bus.
SEG STEP4
- a. Check 4KV BUS PRIORITY - 3A (NO - Bus locked out)
- b. Check 3A Bus Lockout Relay Reset. (NO)
- o. Check 3B Bus Lockout Relay Reset. (YES)
- p. Check 3B EOG Lockout - RESET (NO)
- y. Check 3A AND 3B 4KV Buses AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED (NO)
- y.
RNO - Restore 4KV 3B Bus per Attachment 7 (3A Bus N/A due to lockout.)
STEP5 Place The Following Unit 3 Equipment Switches In PULL-TO-LOCK or STOP:
UJ11!1lllt\\3TmfJ*iw&1~~arsfi~E?!llnQ!!
- .--~'""'*~***->**
i£1:0,0i:1tammeotisif~way~
talim~llf'g)lear1~mlti~K~9Q!~~J l'E~
!g~~eir~
Check at least one Unit 4 4KV bus (4A or 4B) Energized From Offsite Power. (NO)
STEP6 Page 25of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th.. f f
t II d b PTN' 20 OIT 1s m orma ion 1s con ro e 1y s
15 L (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SEC RI Y G EEMENT U T A R xTera*
ENERGYS
--~
FUET TIME L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
Locally Close Valves to Isolate RCP Seals Using Attachment 8.
STEP?
RCO:
Check S/G Status Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass valves - CLOSED.
Main Feedwater Control and Bypass valves - CLOSED.
S/G Slowdown Isolation valves - CLOSED STEPS RCO:
Check If S/Gs are Not Faulted:
Check pressures in all S/Gs:
No S/G Pressure Decreasing In An Uncontrolled Manner.
No S/G Completely Depressurized.
STEP9 RCO:
Check Intact SIG Levels:
Any Narrow Range Level greater than 7%.[27%].
Control feed flow to maintain Narrow Range Level between 21%[27%] and 50%.
Narrow Range Level - LEES THAN 50%.
STEP 10 Page 26 of 42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th.. f f
II db PT 2
0 1s m orma ion 1s contro e IY N's 015 l IT (l-15-1) NR C EXA !NATION SECURITY AGREEMENT M
NEXTera E~
TIME nm EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES &
NOTES NOTE With 38 4KV Bus power restored, go to Step 21.
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
Check If SIG Tubes Are NOT Ruptured:
R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Radiation Normal.
R-19, SIG Slowdown Radiation Normal.
DCS SIG or Secondary Radiation Monitor readings Normal.
Local Steamline Radiation readings Normal.
NO unexpected increase in any SIG Narrow Range Level.
STEP 11 RCO:
Check DC Bus Load:
Direct operator to reduce DC Bus loading as necessary using.
Dispatch personnel to periodically monitor DC Power Supply voltage.
STEP 12 RCO:
Check CST Level greater than 12%.
STEP 1 RCO:
Depressurize All Intact SIGs To 230 psig.
Check SIG narrow range levels greater than 7% [27%] in at least one SIG.
Check RCS cold leg temperatures greater than 310°F.
Check SIG pressures less than 230 psig.
rsr; ~~?"'ntr
\\WP~<\\'r*~~~~'.Y~~es]o STEP 14 RCO:
Check Reactor Subcritical Intermediate range channels Zero or Negative Startup Rate.
Source range channels Zero or Negative Startup Rate.
STEP15 Page 27 of 42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (l-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f II db A
1s m ormat1on 1s contro e tY PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EX MINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEX era E~
TIME nm EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES &
NOTES NOTE:
Steady state loading on each Unit 4 Emergency Diesel Generator shall NOT exceed 287 4 KW.
Load transients up to 3162 KW are acceptable when starting additional equipment.
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
Check If 4KV Bus Power restored:
SEG Check 3A and 3B 4KV Buses At Least One Energized. (38)
Check Both of the following Breakers Closed:
3AD07, Station Blackout Breaker.
4AD07, Station Blackout Breaker.
4A and 4B 4KV busses both Energized, RNO is N/A RCO:
Stabilize SIG Pressures:
STEP 21
~fllff:~~~~(\\/itW!~~?$~!1~~~j~~*:;***
STEP 22 BOP:
Verify Following Equipment Loaded On Energized 4KV Buses:
30 4KV Bus Aligned To An Energized Bus 480 Volt Load Centers:
3ALC 3BLC 3CLC 3DLC 3H LC Page 28 of 42 STEP 23 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
.. f II db P This in ormatlon 1s contro e 1y TN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATI 0 N SECURITY AGR EEMENT NEXTera*
E~
~
TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES &
NOTES NOTE The actions for 3-EOP-ECA-0.1 start on page 32.
The actions for 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 start on the next page.
l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 SEG NRC Final {Rev 1.1)
~!~~!~!tr!e1t.
POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
Verify miscellaneous essential equipment loaded onto energized4KV bus using Attachment 13.
US:
Verify Each Vital DC Bus Has At Least One Associated Battery Charger Energized.
Verify all Vital 125V AC Buses energized from Inverter by observing bottom row of Inverter Status lights.
Verify Plant Page System restored.
- Verify at least one Computer Room Chiller Running.
Verify at Least One Auxiliary Building Exhaust Fan Running.
Verify Spent Fuel Cooling Water Pump Restored.
STEP 23.c Select Recovery Procedure:
Verify SI NOT required:
RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit TCs greater than 19°F.
[73°F]
PRZ level greater than 7%. [48%]
SI has NOT Actuated.
Option 1 - If all bullets are yes, then go to 3-EOP-ECA-0.1.
Option 2 - If any NO from above, then go to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2.
Page 29 of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f f
II db 1s m orma ion 1s contro e
>V PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1} NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
NEXTera**
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 ENERGY~
SEG
.. ~
F1.E£T TIME TIME NOTE CSF Status Trees are required to be monitored for Information Only. FRPs shall not be implemented prior to completion of Step 11.
CAUTION If SI is reset and subsequently either offsite power is lost OR SI actuation occurs on the other unit, manual action may be required to restore safeguards equipment and at least one Computer Room Chiller, to the required configuration.
NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
US:
Directs the actions of 3-EOP-ECA-0.2.
US: Reviews Foldout page with crew.
ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS IF either condition listed below occurs, THEN use [Adverse Containment Setpoints]:
Containment atmosphere temperature ~180°F OR Containment radiation levels ~ 1.3x105 R/hr FOLDOUT PAGE RCO:
Verify SI Reset.
STEP 1 RCO:
Check RWST Level Less Than 155,000. (NO}
STEP RCO:
Check SI Valve Amber Lights on VPB all bright. (NO}
Manually align valves to establish proper SI alignment.
STEP3 Page 30of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15*1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
f' EXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 E~
NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
SEG TIME IUFI TIME CAUTION POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
Check RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Isolation Status:
Check CCW Pumps all stopped.
Check MOV-3-626, RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Outlet closed.
STEP4 BOP:
Manually Load The Following Safeguards Equipment On Energized Buses:
Mii$U:Wcrifmak&fe&>nn~~wa£~r'F?am's.
~~,.,,"~~...,,....,.,..,,,,,,,-.~,, w.9.,.,.,,.,,,,0,,,., ** It Verify ICW Closed POV-3-4882 and POV-3-4883.
Steady state loading on each Unit 4 Emergency Diesel Generator shall NOT exceed 287 4 KW. Load transients up to 3162 KW are acceptable when starting Check Intake Cooling Water Headers tied together.
additional equipment.
Check three CCW Heat Exchangers in service.
Check only two ccw pumps running. (NO) Startisfol:ias
~~n=
..,~"*~* *"*'..
114~~-
STEPS BOP:
Verify at least one Unit 3 High-Head SI pumps running.(NO)
~l@!r~ilfi!li§ERumJ1~
STEP6 The scenario is complete after the crew has the opportunity to start an ICW Pump, CCW Pump, and Char in Pum /HHSI Pum for invento control as a licable or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion.
- END OF SCENARIO ***
Page 31of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th". f f
t II db PTN' 2 15 LOIT (L 15 1) NRC EXAM NATION SECURITY GREEME T 1s in orma ion ts con ro e
- Y s 0 I
A N.
NEXTera*
E~
A.EET TIME TIME L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 NRC Final (Rev 1. 1)
POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
US:
Directs the actions of 3-EOP-ECA-0.1.
RCO:
Checks RCP Seal Isolation Status SEG Check RCP seal injection manual isolation valves -
CLOSED 3-297A 3-2978 3-297C Check RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Outlet, MOV-3-626 -
CLOSED STEP 1 RCO:
Checks Containment Isolation Phase A - NOT ACTUATED STEP2 RCO:
Verify Instrument Air To Containment
- a. Verifies Instrument Air Containment Isolation, CV-3-2803 -
OPEN
- b. Verifies instrument air pressure Pl-3-1444-GREATER THAN 95 PSIG STEP 3 Page 32of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
This information IS controlled bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
t era l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
TIME
- IUFI TIME POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO/BOP:
Manually Load The Following Equipment On Energized Buses RCO:
- a. StI61IW?finfaR$7~Ilijg::wateipum~R§
- b. Check intake cooling water headers - TIED TOGETHER
- c. ~fii:tlQR~&~\\MJiYmQ
- e. Check charging valve alignment VCT Outlet Isolation Valve, LCV-3-115C -
OPEN VCT makeup control system - SET FOR AUTOMATIC CONTROL AND GREATER THAN RCS BORON CONCENTRATION Loop A Charging Line Isolation Valve, CV 310A - OPEN
- f. ~IrfQne~"~[~mim9i'PY'mQ~afim!i!ffiG11i~~il~iJ STEP4 Manually Load Additional Loads On Energized Buses
- a. Check the A and B 4 KV buses - ENERGIZED BY OFF SITE POWER
- b. Verify CCW To Normal Containment Cooler valves -
OPEN MOV-3-1417 MOV-3-1418
- c. ~aft:}al!IJ5QID)il'c9nfalnmenffan ~Q(>l~r§
- d. HVAC Equipment Computer Room Chiller Battery Room Air Conditioners
- E16E (30609)
- E16F (40625)
- e. 6taroaffiCR0M1fans
~~~"'~;}%?,~~k-f4'<<',m_'f.E><<,,/",-Mk#<$""'7=~#,
Page 33of42 STEPS This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
1s m orma ion 1s con ro e 1y s
L L )
Th.* f f
t II db PTN' 2015 CIT ( 1 1 NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT i\\JEX rera E~
run TIME TIME L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
RCO:
Establish 40 Gpm Charging Flow SEG Adjust charging pump speed controllers to establish at least 40 gpm charging flow STEP6 The scenario is complete after the crew has the opportunity to start an ICW Pump, CCW Pump, and Char in Pum /HHSI Pum for invento control as a licable or at the Lead Evaluator's discretion.
- END OF SCENARIO ***
Page 34of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
1s in orma ion 1s contro e 1y s
- 1 *1) N A
Th'. f r
II db PTN' 2015 LOIT (L 5 RC EXAMINATION SECURITY GREEMENT
/\\.ExTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 E~
NRC Final (Rev 1.1}
SEG R.m i'~ff~cf!~e~f(~?'!:
TIME TIME EVALUATOR ACTIVITIES &
NOTES TIME POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
If 3B 4KV Bus is de-energized and 30 4KV Bus is aligned to 3B 4KV Bus, then verify the Station Blackout Tie Permissive blue light is ON and 4AD07 open.
STEP 1 BOP:
Verify 3AD05, Intake Cooling Water Pump 3C Bkr, is open.
Verify 3AD04, Component Cooling Water Pump 3C Bkr, is open.
STEP4 BOP:
Notify Unit Supervisor that 38 4KV Bus stripping is complete.
POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
STEP 5 NOTE BOP:
Actions for Attachment 2 are Confirms Bus Stripping On 3B 4KV Bus:
listed above.
Check if 3B 4KV Bus Stripping was verified(NO)
Verify 3B 4KV Bus Stripping per Attachment 2, 3B 4KV Bus Stripping.
STEP 1 STEP2 Page 35 of 42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
I d This information is contra le bv PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
f\\JEXTera l-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 E~
TIME CT2 Start Time:
fl.ID TIME NOTE Start time for CT2 is when the US reviews this note.:.
NRC Final {Rev 1.1)
POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
Attempts to energize 3B 4KV Bus From Unit 3 Startup Transformer:
SEG
- a. Checks Unit 3 Startup Transformer Potential white light is ON (NO)
- a. RNO - Observes NOTE prior to Attachment 7, Step 4 and goes to, Step 4.
STEP3 US:
Reviews Note Power needs to be restored to one 4KV bus (3A OR 3B) within 1 O minutes to satisfy Station Blackout requirements BOP:
Determine If Station Blackout Tie Line Is Available:
Check 3A 4KV Bus - DE-ENERGIZED Check at least one of the following - ENERGIZED:
- 4A4KV Bus
- 4B4KVBus STEP4 BOP:
Check 3D 4KV Bus Lockout Relay - RESET STEP5 BOP:
Checks 3D 4KV Bus - ALIGNED TO 3B 4KV BUS:
3AD06, Supply From 4KV Bus 3B - CLOSED 3AB19, Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D-CLOSED STEP6 BOP:
Checks Station Blackout Permissive Blue Light For 3AD07, Station Blackout Breaker - ON STEP?
Page 36of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th.. f II db 1s m ormat1on 1s contro e 1y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
ExTera*
L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 ENERGY~
SEG
-~-
Rm TIME CT2 Stop Time:
TIME NOTE Stop time for CT2 is when 3B 4KV Bus is energized.
NOTE Step 21 actions are on page
- 28.
NRC Final (Rev 1.1}
POSITION: APPLICANT'S ACTIONS/BEHAVIORS*
- Observable actions grayed.
BOP:
Checks 40 4KV Bus - ENERGIZED BOP:
STEP8 Checks 4KV Bus Supplying Power To 4D 4KV Bus -
ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER (NO) 4D Directs Unit 4 RO place non-running safeguards equipment in PULL-TO-LOCK OR STOP on Unit 4 4KV bus supplying 4KVBus.
STEP9 BOP:
Energize 3B 4KV Bus From Station Blackout Tie Line:
- b. Direct Unit 4 RO to close 4AD07, Station Blackout Breaker, using keylock switch (Key Number 82)
STEP10 BOP:
Checks 3B 4KV Bus - ENERGIZED STEP 11 BOP:
Go to Attachment 7, Step 14 Notify Unit Supervisor 3B 4KV Bus Is Energized, And Of The Need To Proceed To Section 3.0, Step 21 STEP14 Page 37of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Th.. f II d IS m ormat1on IS contro e bv PTN's 2015 LOIT {L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
era L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 E~
SEG NRC Final (Rev 1.1) flfEr Discussion Points are intentionally NOT included in evaluated scenarios. However, space is available below to document follow-up questions when further information is required to determine an evaluation outcome.
FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS QUESTION #1 ANSWER#1 QUESTION#2 ANSWER#2 Page 38of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
b This information is controlled 1y PTN's 2015 LOIT (L*15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
era L-15-1 NRC SCENARIO 4 ENE£3~e SEG HUCUAA NRC Final (Rev 1.1)
Rm SIMULA TOR POST-SCENARIO RESTORATION:
- 1. Restore per Simulator Operator Checklist.
- 2. Ensure the Key Log's last page is replaced as required.
- 3. Once exams are complete, restore from SEl-19, Simulator Exam Security.
Page 39of42 This information is controlled by PTN's 2015 LOIT (L-15-1) NRC EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT.
e OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT
+
~
UNIT 3 RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)
UNIT 4 RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)
PROTECTED TRAIN: B PROTECTED TRAIN: B ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr:
Inside SNPO:
Field Supv.:
Outside SNPO:
AdminRCO:
ANPO:
Unit3 Unit4 Unit Supv.:
Unit Supv.:
RCO:
RCO:
NPO:
NPO:
PLANT STATUS Unit3 Unit4 Mode:
1 Mode:
1 Power:
24%
Power:
100%
MWe:
185 MWe:
842 Gross Leak.rate:
0.01 gpm Gross Leakrate:
642 Operational Concerns:
I 38 HHSI Pump has a wiped motor bearing, and its return to service is expected in two days. B AFW Pump is having turbine repairs, and the expected return to service is late next shift. 3A 1 CWP preventive
U3 Anticipated LCO Actions:
I None U4 Anticipated LCO.Actions:
I None Results of Off ~oinJt Focus Area:
I
UNIT 3 STATUS REAClOR'OPERA "FOR UNIT RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)
PROTECTED TRAIN: B Mode:
RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref 1
Levels Power:
24%
Gross:
0.01 GPM A
6656 MWe 185 Unidentified 0.00 GPM B
6608 Tavg:
554°F Charging Pps:
0.01 GPM c
6646 RCS Pressure:
1285 AbnormalAgnunciatois:..
~' ',,, '
Annunciator:
H3/2 - SAFETY INJ PUMP 38 TRIP Comp Actions:
3A, 4A, and 4B HHSI Pumps are guarded.
Annunciator:
82/2 - POWER RANGE UPPER DET HI FLUX DEV/AUTO DEFEAT Comp Actions:
NIA-Power Range Detectors below 50% power.
Annunciator:
82/3 -
POWER RANGE LOWER DET HI FLUX DEV/AUTO DEFEAT Comp Actions:
NIA-Power Range Detectors below 50% power.
Annunciator:
D1/1 - FW HEATER 1A HI LEVEL Comp Actions:
Continue to monitor. Alarm intermittent and expected for current conditions.
Annunciator:
D1/2-FW HEATER 2A HI LEVEL Comp Actions:
Continue to monitor. Alarm intermittent and expected for current conditions.
Current Tech Sl!ec Action Statements: (J!oesot Include "For Tracking Onll'. Items" T.S.A.S I Component:
3.5.2.c-30 day action I 38 HHSI Pump Reason:
Bearing Replacement Entry Date:
Yesterday T.S.A.S I Component:
- 3. 7.1.2.c - 30 day action I 8 /JFV\\I Pump Reason:
Turbine Repairs Entry Date:
Yesterday T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S I Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
UNIT 3 STATUS REACTOR OPERATOR(CONT'D)
UNIT RISK: GREEN (ACCEPTABLE)
PROTECTED TRAIN: B Changes to Risk* Significant Eguil!ment: **
No recent changes from last shift.
OLRM: GREEN PROTECTED TRAIN: B U1!£.~mi!'g Re.activ~ Management 'Activities:
Chemistry parameters are satisfied for increasing unit power. After turnover, raise Reactor Power to 35%
power. There are no ramp rate fuel integrity restrictions for this power increase to 35%.
Ul!COming. Maior POD Actlvitie&:
Ugcoming ECOs to Hang.and /or Release:
- Hang-None Release - None Evolutions or Comm!nsatoa Actions in Prggress:
NONE General lnformationl Remarks. and OoeratorWork Around Status:
- Weather forecast is overcast skies with scattered pockets of severe rain.
U3 supplying Aux Steam
- Air In-leakage= 0.0 SCFM