IR 05000247/2012002

IR 05000247-12-002, 01/01/12 - 03/31/12, Indian Point, Unit 2, Maintenance Effectiveness

ML12121A641
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	04/30/2012
From:	Mel Gray Reactor Projects Branch 2
To:	Ventosa J Entergy Nuclear Operations
References
IR-12-002
Download: ML12121A641 (45)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES ril 30, 2012

SUBJECT:

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT 2 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000247/2012002

Dear Mr. Ventosa:

On March 31, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 26, 2012, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents two NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green). One finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance, and because it was entered into your corrective action program (CAP), the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region 1; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room of from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, /RA/ Mel Gray, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-247 License No. DPR-26

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000247/2012002 w/ Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION I== Docket No.: 50-247 License No.: DPR-26 Report No.: 05000247/2012002 Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Northeast (Entergy) Facility: Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2 Location: 450 Broadway, GSB Buchanan, NY 10511-0249 Dates: January 1, 2012, through March 31, 2012 Inspectors: M. Catts, Senior Resident Inspector - Indian Point 2 O. Ayegbusi, Resident Inspector - Indian Point 2 Jeff Laughlin, Emergency Preparedness Inspector, NSIR J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist - Region I E. Gray, Senior Reactor Inspector - Region I M. Jennerich, Project Engineer - Region I S. McCarver, Project Engineer - Region I Approved By: Mel Gray, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000247/2012002; 1/1/12 - 3/31/12; Indian Point Nuclear Generating (Indian Point) Unit 2;

Maintenance Effectiveness.

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by region inspectors. The inspectors identified two findings of very low safety significance (Green), one of which was an NCV. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC)0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). The cross-cutting aspects for the findings were determined using IMC 0310, Components Within the Cross-Cutting Areas. Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green, or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green.

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for Entergy staff not following Entergy Procedure EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Program.

Specifically, between initial plant startup and January 17, 2012, Entergy staff did not follow Procedure EN-LI-102, to classify equipment failures of the drains in the 480 volt switchgear room as repetitive such that an apparent cause would have been performed, and corrective actions developed to address the blocked drain. This resulted in instances of the drains in the 480 volt switchgear room being clogged. Entergy personnel performed an apparent cause evaluation (ACE), cleaned out the drains, and developed a preventative maintenance (PM) schedule to keep the drains cleared.

Entergy personnel entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2011-4324.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. Specifically, water intrusion into the room with clogged drains could impact all four trains of 480 volt switchgear. Using IMC 0609.04,

       "Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) using SDP Phases 1 and 3.

Phase 1 screened this Initiating Event Cornerstone finding to Phase 3 because the finding increased the likelihood of a flood causing a loss of offsite power (LOOP) and station blackout (SBO), which would require use of the alternate safe shutdown system (ASSS). A Region I Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) conducted the Phase 3 analysis and determined the finding was of very low safety significance. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the CAP attribute because Entergy personnel did not periodically trend and assesses information from the CAP and other assessments in the aggregate to identify programmatic and common cause problems associated with the drains. [P.1(b) per IMC 0310] (Section 1R12)

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified an NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, because Entergy personnel did not follow Procedure 2-AOP-ANNUN-1, Failure of Flight or Supervisory Panel Annunciators, for an intermittent control room annunciator problem. Specifically, between January 18, 2012 and January 30, 2012, operations personnel did not enter Procedure 2-AOP-ANNUN-1 when the entrance criteria were satisfied for an intermittent problem that involved control room annunciator horns sounding but alarms not flashing on control room panels SAF-SCF. The procedure directed troubleshooting the problem, notifying the shift manager (SM) / control room supervisory (CRS) to determine methods of compensatory monitoring, initiating a work request (WR) to repair the problem, determining emergency action level applicability, and initiating a CR. After this issue was identified by NRC inspectors, Entergy personnels corrective actions included troubleshooting the issue, developing a standing order for an extra operator to verify annunciators during a transient, and initiating a WR to fix the annunciator issue during the refueling outage in March 2012. Entergy personnel entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2012-595.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure of the control room annunciators to alert operators to changing plant conditions during a transient could delay or impact operators ability to mitigate an accident. Using IMC 0609.04, "Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in an actual loss of safety function, was not a loss of barrier function, and was not potentially risk significant for external events. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision making because Entergy personnel did not make safety-significant or risk-significant decisions using a systematic process including entering 2-AOP-ANNUN-1, especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions, to ensure safety is maintained. This includes formally defining the authority and roles for decisions affecting nuclear safety, communicating these roles to applicable personnel, and implementing these roles and authorities as designed and obtaining interdisciplinary input and reviews on safety-significant or risk-significant decisions. [H.1(a) per IMC 0310] (Section 1R12)

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Indian Point Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and operated at full power until January 10, 2012 when the unit commenced an unplanned maintenance outage to repair the 21 RCP seal. Operators returned the unit to 100 percent power on January 19. On March 5, operators commenced a shutdown for a planned refueling and maintenance outage (2R20). Following the completion of refueling and maintenance activities, operators commenced a reactor startup on March 30. Unit 2 ended the inspection period at 5 percent power.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of Entergys readiness for the onset of seasonal low temperatures. The review focused on the auxiliary boiler feed pump room, service water (SW) pumps and the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications, control room logs, and the CAP to determine what temperatures or other seasonal weather could challenge these systems, and to ensure Entergy personnel had adequately prepared for these challenges. The inspectors reviewed station procedures, including Entergys seasonal weather preparation procedure and applicable operating procedures.

The inspectors performed walkdowns of the selected systems to ensure station personnel identified issues that could challenge the operability of the systems during cold weather conditions. Documents reviewed for each section of the inspection report are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

==

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:

• Weld channel on February 29, 2012
• 480V electrical bus 3A on March 28, 2012
• 21 residual heat removal on March 28, 2012 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, technical specifications, WOs, CRs, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether Entergy staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Full System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

On February 23, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of accessible portions of the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system to verify the existing equipment lineup was correct. The inspectors reviewed operating procedures, surveillance tests, drawings, equipment line-up check-off lists, and the UFSAR to verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions. The inspectors also reviewed electrical power availability, component lubrication and equipment cooling, hangar and support functionality, and operability of support systems. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related CRs and work orders (WOs) to ensure Entergy appropriately evaluated and resolved any deficiencies.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection