IR 05000247/2007006
| ML071730036 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/20/2007 |
| From: | Rogge J F Engineering Region 1 Branch 3 |
| To: | Dacimo F Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| References | |
| IR-07-006 | |
| Download: ML071730036 (21) | |
Text
June 20, 2007
Mr. Fred DacimoSite Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Indian Point Energy Center 450 Broadway, GSB P.O. Box 249 Buchanan, NY 10511-0249
SUBJECT: INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTIONREPORT 05000247/2007006
Dear Mr. Dacimo:
On May 17, 2007, the NRC completed a triennial fire protection team inspection at your IndianPoint Nuclear Generating Unit 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed at an exit meeting on May 17, 2007, with you and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and itsenclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public DocumentRoom or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ADAMS.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/John F. Rogge, ChiefEngineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety June 20, 2007Mr. Fred DacimoSite Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Indian Point Energy Center 450 Broadway, GSB P.O. Box 249 Buchanan, NY 10511-0249
SUBJECT: INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTIONREPORT 05000247/2007006
Dear Mr. Dacimo:
On May 17, 2007, the NRC completed a triennial fire protection team inspection at your IndianPoint Nuclear Generating Unit 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed at an exit meeting on May 17, 2007, with you and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and itsenclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public DocumentRoom or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ADAMS.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/John F. Rogge, ChiefEngineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor SafetySUNSI Review Complete: JFR (Reviewer's Initials
)DOCUMENT NAME: C:\FileNet\ML071730036.wpdAfter declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be released to the Public.To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box:
" C" = Copy withoutattachment/enclosure " E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure " N" = No copyOFFICERI/DRSNRI/DRPRI/DRSNAMERFuhrmeister/RFECobey/JDO forJRogge/JFRDATE06/7/0706/14/0706/20/07OFFICIAL RECORD COPY* See Previous Concurrence PageADAMS ACC # ML071730036 F. Dacimo2Docket No. 50-247License No. DPR-26
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000247/2007006 cc w/encl:G. J. Taylor, Chief Executive Officer, Entergy Operations M. Kansler, President, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
J. T. Herron, Senior Vice President for Operations M. Balduzzi, Senior Vice President, Northeastern Regional Operations W. Campbell, Senior Vice President of Engineering and Technical Services C. Schwarz, Vice President, Operations Support (ENO)
K. Polson, General Manager Operations O. Limpias, Vice President, Engineering (ENO)
J. McCann, Director, Licensing (ENO)
C. D. Faison, Manager, Licensing (ENO)
R. Patch, Director of Oversight (ENO)
J. Comiotes, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance P. Conroy, Manager, Licensing T. C. McCullough, Assistant General Counsel, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
M. Balboni, Deputy Secy, New York State Energy, Research and Development Authority P. Eddy, Electric Division, New York State Department of Public Service C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law D. O'Neill, Mayor, Village of Buchanan J. G. Testa, Mayor, City of Peekskill R. Albanese, Four County Coordinator S. Lousteau, Treasury Department, Entergy Services, Inc.
Chairman, Standing Committee on Energy, NYS Assembly Chairman, Standing Committee on Environmental Conservation, NYS Assembly Chairman, Committee on Corporations, Authorities, and Commissions M. Slobodien, Director, Emergency Planning B. Brandenburg, Assistant General Counsel Assemblywoman Sandra Galef, NYS Assembly County Clerk, Westchester County Legislature A. Spano, Westchester County Executive R. Bondi, Putnam County Executive C. Vanderhoef, Rockland County Executive E. A. Diana, Orange County Executive T. Judson, Central NY Citizens Awareness Network M. Elie, Citizens Awareness Network D. Lochbaum, Nuclear Safety Engineer, Union of Concerned Scientists Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy Project M. Mariotte, Nuclear Information & Resources Service F. Zalcman, Pace Law School, Energy Project L. Puglisi, Supervisor, Town of Cortlandt Congressman John Hall Congresswoman Nita Lowey Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton Senator Charles Schumer G. Shapiro, Senator Clinton's Staff J. Riccio, Greenpeace F. Dacimo3P. Musegaas, Riverkeeper, Inc.M. Kaplowitz, Chairman of County Environment & Health Committee A. Reynolds, Environmental Advocates M. Jacobs, Director, Longview School D. Katz, Executive Director, Citizens Awareness Network S. Tanzer, The Nuclear Control Institute K. Coplan, Pace Environmental Litigation Clinic M. Jacobs, IPSEC D. C. Poole, PWR SRC Consultant W. Russell, PWR SRC Consultant W. Little, Associate Attorney, NYSDEC M. J. Greene, Clearwater, Inc R. Christman, Manager Training and Development J. Spath, New York State Energy Research, SLO Designee A. J. Kremer, New York Affordable Reliable Electricity Alliance (NY AREA)
F. Dacimo4Distribution w/encl:(via E-mail)
S. Collins, RAM. Dapas, DRA J. Lamb, RI OEDO J. Lubinski, NRR M. Kowal, NRR J. Boska, PM, NRR J. Hughey, NRR E. Cobey, DRP D. Jackson, DRP M. Cox, DRP, Senior Resident Inspector - Indian Point 2 G. Bowman, DRP, Resident Inspector - Indian Point 2 R. Martin, DRP, Resident OA Region I Docket Room (w/concurrences)
ROPreports@nrc.gov M. Gamberoni, DRS J. Rogge, DRS R. Fuhrmeister, DRP EnclosureU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IDocket No.50-247 License No.DPR-26 Report No.05000247/2007006 Licensee:Entergy Nuclear Northeast (Entergy)
Facility:Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2 Location:450 Broadway, GSBBuchanan, NY 10511-0249Dates:April 23, 2007 through April 27, 2007 andMay 14, 2007 through May 18, 2007Inspectors:R. Fuhrmeister, Senior Project Engineer, DRPL. Cheung, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS M. Patel, Reactor Inspector, DRS K. Diederich, Reactor Inspector, DRSApproved by:John F. Rogge, ChiefEngineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000247/2007006; 04/23 - 05/18/2007; Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2; TriennialFire Protection Team Inspection.The report covered a two-week triennial fire protection team inspection by a Region I seniorproject inspector and three Region I specialist inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeingthe safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649,
"Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.A.
NRC-Identified Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
B.Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
BackgroundThis report presents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection conducted in accordancewith NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05T, "Fire Protection." The objective of the inspection was to assess whether Entergy Nuclear Northeast has implemented an adequate fire protection program and that post-fire safe shutdown capabilities have been established and are being properly maintained at the Indian Point Energy Nuclear Generating Unit 2 (IP2). The following fire areas (FAs) and fire zones (FZs) were selected for detailed review based on risk insights from the IP2 Individual Plant Examination (IPE) and Individual Plant Examination ofExternal Events (IPEEE):Fire Area P, FZ-1Fire Area A, FZ-1AFire Area A, FZ-11Fire Area I, FZ-22/63AThe inspection team evaluated Entergy's fire protection program (FPP) against applicablerequirements which included facility operating license condition 2.K, NRC safety evaluation reports, 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. The team also reviewed related documents that included the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), the fire hazards analysis (FHA) and the post-fire safe shutdown analysis (SSA).Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment.1.REACTOR SAFETYCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems1R05Fire Protection
.01 Post-Fire Safe Shutdown From Outside the Main Control Room (Alternative Shutdown)and Normal Shutdown
a. Inspection Scope
MethodologyThe team reviewed the safe shutdown analysis, operating procedures, piping andinstrumentation drawings (P&IDs), electrical drawings, the UFSAR and other supporting documents to verify that hot and cold shutdown could be achieved and maintained from outside the control room for fires that rely on shutdown from outside the control room.
This review included verification that shutdown from outside the control room could be performed both with and without the availability of offsite power. Plant walkdowns were also performed to verify that the plant configuration was consistent with that described in the safe shutdown and fire hazards analyses. These inspection activities focused on ensuring the adequacy of systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant 2Enclosuremakeup, reactor decay heat removal, process monitoring instrumentation and supportsystems functions. The team verified that the systems and components credited for use during post-fire safe shutdown would remain free from fire damage. The team verified that the transfer of control from the control room to the alternative shutdown locations would not be affected by fire-induced failures.Similarly, for fire areas that utilize shutdown from the control room, the team alsoverified that the shutdown methodology properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. Operational ImplementationThe team verified that the training program for licensed and non-licensed operatorsincluded alternative shutdown capability. The team also verified that personnel required for safe shutdown using the normal or alternative shutdown systems and procedures were trained, available onsite at all times, and exclusive of those assigned as fire brigade members.The team reviewed the adequacy of procedures utilized for post-fire safe shutdown andperformed an independent walk through of procedure steps to ensure the implementation and human factors adequacy of the procedures. The team also verified that operators could reasonably be expected to perform specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits. Time critical actions which were verified included restoring alternating current (AC) electrical power, establishing alternate shutdown system operation, establishing reactor coolant makeup and establishing decay heat removal.Specific procedures reviewed for alternative shutdown, including shutdown from outsidethe control room included the following:2-AOP-SSD-1, Rev. 9, Control Room Inaccessibility Safe Shutdown Control2-ONOP-FP-001, Rev. 2, Plant FiresThe team reviewed manual actions to ensure that they had been properly reviewed andapproved and that the actions could be implemented in accordance with plant procedures in the time necessary to support the safe shutdown method for each selected fire area. The team also reviewed periodic testing records of the alternative shutdown transfer capability and instrumentation and control functions to ensure the tests demonstrated the functionality of the alternative shutdown capability.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
3Enclosure.02Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the fire hazards analysis, safe shutdown analyses and supportingdrawings and documentation to verify that safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected. The team ensured that separation requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G, were maintained for the credited safe shutdown equipment includingsupporting power, control and instrumentation cables. This review included an assessment of the adequacy of the selected systems for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring, and associated support system functions.The team reviewed Entergy's procedures and programs for the control of ignitionsources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and controlling combustible loading within limits established in the Combustible Loading Calculation. A sample of hot work and transient combustible control permits were also reviewed. The team performed plant walkdowns to verify that protective features were being properly maintained and administrative controls were being implemented.The team also reviewed Entergy's design control procedures to ensure that the processincluded appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the fire protection program, post-fire safe shutdown analysis, and procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..03Passive Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The team walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe materialcondition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries (including walls, fire doors and fire dampers) to ensure they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4Enclosure.04Active Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the design, maintenance, testing and operation of the fire detectionand suppression systems in the selected plant fire areas. This included verification that the manual and automatic detection and suppression systems were installed, tested and maintained in accordance with the NFPA code of record and that they would control or extinguish fires associated with the hazards in the selected areas. A review of the design capability of suppression agent delivery systems were verified to meet the code requirements for the fire hazards involved. The team also performed a walkdown of accessible portions of the detection and suppressions systems in the selected areas as well as a walkdown of major system support equipment in other areas (e.g. fire protection pumps, Halon storage tanks and supply system) to assess the materialcondition of the systems and components.The team reviewed electric and diesel fire pump flow and pressure tests to ensure thatthe pumps were meeting their design requirements. The team also reviewed the fire main loop flow tests to ensure that the flow distribution circuits were able to meet the design requirements. The team also assessed the fire brigade capabilities by reviewing training andqualification records, drill critique records, and observing live fire training. The team also reviewed pre-fire plans and smoke removal plans for the selected fire areas to determine if appropriate information was provided to fire brigade members and plant operators to identify safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation, and to facilitate suppression of a fire that could impact post-fire safe shutdown.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.05 Protection From Damage From Fire Suppression Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed documents and walked down the selected fire areas to verify thatredundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown were not subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems. Specifically, the team verified that:A fire in one of the selected fire areas would not directly, through production ofsmoke, heat or hot gases, cause activation of suppression systems that could potentially damage all redundant safe shutdown trains, 5EnclosureA fire in one of the selected fire areas (or the inadvertent actuation or rupture ofa fire suppression system) would not directly cause damage to all redundant safe shutdown trains (e.g., sprinkler caused flooding of other than the locally affected train), and Adequate drainage was provided in areas protected by water suppressionsystems.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..06Alternative Shutdown CapabilityAlternative shutdown capability for the selected fire areas inspection utilizes shutdownfrom outside the control room and is discussed in Section 1R05.01 of this report..07Circuit Analyses
a. Inspection Scope
The team verified that Entergy performed a post-fire safe shutdown analysis for theselected fire areas and that the analysis appropriately identified the structures, systems and components important to achieving and maintaining post-fire safe shutdown.
Additionally, the team verified that Entergy's analysis ensured that necessary electrical circuits were properly protected and that circuits that could adversely impact safe shutdown due to hot shorts, shorts to ground or other failures were identified, evaluated and dispositioned to ensure spurious actuations would not prevent safe shutdown.The team's review considered fire and cable attributes, potential undesirableconsequences and common power supply/bus concerns. Specific items included the credibility of the fire threat, cable construction details, cable failure modes, spurious actuations, actuations resulting in flow diversion or loss of coolant events.The team also reviewed wiring diagrams and routing lists for a sample of componentsrequired for post-fire safe shutdown to verify that cables were routed as described in the cable routing reports.Cable failure modes were reviewed for the following components:
Charging Pumps 21 and 23,Service Water Pump 24,Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 21,Component Cooling Pump 23, andCircuit breakers associated with the 13.8 kV Alternate Safe Shutdown PowerSystem.
6EnclosureThe team reviewed circuit breaker coordination studies to ensure equipment needed toconduct post-fire safe shutdown activities would not be impacted due to a lack of coordination. The team confirmed that coordination studies had addressed multiple faults due to fire. Additionally, the team reviewed a sample of circuit breaker maintenance and records to verify that circuit breakers for components required for post-fire safe shutdown were properly maintained in accordance with procedural requirements.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..08Communications
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed safe shutdown procedures, the SSA and associated documents toverify an adequate method of communications would be available to plant operators following a fire. During this review, the team considered the effects of ambient noise levels, clarity of reception, reliability and coverage patterns. The team also inspected the designated emergency storage lockers to verify the availability of portable radios for the fire brigade and plant operators. The team also verified that communications equipment such as repeaters and transmitters would not be affected by a fire.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..09Emergency Lighting
a. Inspection Scope
The team observed the placement and coverage area of eight-hour emergency lightsthroughout the selected fire areas and evaluated their adequacy for illuminating access and egress pathways and any equipment requiring local operation or instrumentation monitoring for post-fire safe shutdown. The team also verified that the battery power supplies were rated for at least an eight-hour capacity. Preventive maintenance procedures, the vendor manual, completed surveillance tests and battery replacement practices were reviewed to verify that the emergency lighting was being maintained in a manner that would ensure reliable operation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
7Enclosure.10Cold Shutdown RepairsThe team verified that Entergy had dedicated repair procedures, equipment, andmaterials to accomplish repairs of components required for cold shutdown which might be damaged by the fire to ensure cold shutdown could be achieved within the time frames specific in their design and licensing bases. The inspectors verified that therepair equipment, components, tools and materials (e.g. pre-cut cables with prepared attachment lugs) were available and accessible on site..11Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The team verified that compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service,degraded, or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems and equipment, passive fire barriers, pumps, valves or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions or capabilities). The team also verified that the short term compensatory measures compensated for the degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective action could be taken and that Entergy was effective in returning the equipment to service in a reasonable period of time.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.4.OTHER ACTIVITIES4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems.01Corrective Actions for Fire Protection Deficiencies
a. Inspection Scope
The team verified that Entergy was identifying fire protection and post-fire safeshutdown issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into the corrective action program. The team also reviewed a sample of selected issues to verify that Entergy had completed or planned appropriate corrective actions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
8Enclosure4OA6Meetings, Including ExitExit Meeting SummaryOn May 18, 2007, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. F. Dacimo, Site VicePresident, and other members of the site staff. No proprietary information was included in this inspection report.ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
- R. Burroni, Manager, Programs and Components
- S. Wilkie, Senior Fire Protection Engineer
- J. Cottam, Fire Protection Engineer
- K. Elliott, Fire Protection Engineer
- J. Etzweiler, Operations Supervisor
- A. Singer, Training Supervisor
- M. Yee, Electrical Engineer
- G. Dahl, Licensing Technical Specialist
NRC
- J. Rogge, Chief, Engineering Branch 3, Division of Reactor Safety
- W. Cook, Senior Reactor Analyst, Division of Reactor Safety
- M. Cox, Senior Resident Inspector, IP2
- D. Jackson, Acting Senior Resident, IP3
- G. Bowman, Resident Inspector, IP2
- B. Wittick, Resident Inspector, IP3
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened NoneOpen and
Closed
- None
Closed
- None
Discussed
None
A-2Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Calculations/Engineering Evaluation ReportsPGI-00577, Evaluation of Cable Spreading Room to CAS Corridor and Stairwell 3 Fire BarrierInterface, Rev. 0FMX-00358-00, Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump Curbing Volume Calculation, Rev. 4
- FLEX-00160-02, Rev. 2, IP2 Evaluation of Alternate Power Supplies
- EGP-00150-00, Appendix R Alternate Safe Shutdown System Voltage Drop Analysis, ElectricSupply through Indian Point 1.EGE-00001-02, Class 1E Motor Minimum Starting Voltage and Acceleration Time Calculations
- RPT-05-00084, Rev. 0, IP2 10
- CFR 50 Appendix R Safe-Shutdown Manual Action FeasibilityReportIP2-RPT-03-00015, Rev. 3, IP2 Fire Hazards Analysis
- IP-RPT-04-00188, Rev. 1, Evaluation of Hemyc Wrap Fire Protective Systems
- IP-RPT-05-00071, Rev. 1, IP2 10
- CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Separation Analysis
- IP-RPT-05-00071, Rev. 2, Cable Logic Report
- NEA-00031-01, Rev. 1, SG Boil-Dry Analysis
- IP-CALC-05-01034, Rev. 0, Appendix R Cooldown Benchmark and Sensitivity Analysis UsingRETRAN-3DIP-CALC-06-00029, Rev. 0, Appendix R Cooldown to RHR Initiation Using
- RERAN-3DProceduresEN-DC-127, Control of Hot Work and Ignition Sources, Rev. 2SMM-DC-901, IPEC Fire Protection Program Plan, Rev. 2
- SA0-703, Fire Protection Impairment Criteria and Surveillance, Rev. 25
- 2-BRK-020-ELC, Rev. 0, Westinghouse Model 150DH1000E (13.8kV) Air Circuit BreakersMaintenance Circuit Breakers Maintenance Procedure2-PC-R37, Rev. 11, Alternate Safe Shutdown and Remote shutdown Instrument CalibrationProcedures2-SOP-27.1.3, Rev. 30, Operation of 13.8 KV System
- OAP-115, Rev. 05, Operations Commitments and Policy Details
- 2-AOP-SSD-1, Rev. 09, Control Room Inaccessibility Safe Shutdown Control
- 2-AOP-SSD-1
- BGD-R07, Background Document for 2-AOP-SSD-1, Rev. 07
- AOI 27.1.9.2, Rev. 0, Providing Appendix R Power from Unit 3
- SAO-703, Rev. 25, Fire Protection Impairment Criteria and Surveillance
- SMM-DC-901, Rev. 2, IPEC Fire Protection Program PlanCompleted Tests/Surveillances0-PT-M001, Fire Brigade Equipment Inventory and Inspection, Rev. 3, Completed 04/19/072PT-2Y017, Penetration Fire Barrier Seal Inspections, Rev. 0, Completed 12/13/05
- PT-EM9, Fire Dampers Operability, Rev. 4, Completed 11/16/06
- PT-SA12A, Ionization Type Smoke Detector (Conventional), Rev. 8, Completed 02/06/07
- A-3AttachmentPT-SA12B, Ionization Type Smoke Detector (PAB), Rev. 6, Completed 04/09/07PT-SA12C, Ionization Type Smoke Detector (Electrical and Pipe Penetration Area), Rev. 6,Completed 04/10/07PT-SA13, Cable Spreading Room Halon System, Rev. 9, Completed 03/13/07
- PT-19, Cable Spreading Room Halon System, Rev. 10, Completed 12/21/06
- 2-PT-A023, Fire Main Booster Pump Capacity Test, Rev. 10, Completed 06/14/06
- PT-A40, Diesel Fire Pump Capacity Test, Rev. 0, Completed 03/08/07
- 2-PT-3Y015A, Underground Fire Loop Flow, Rev. 2, Completed 09/23/04
- PMT-I2-2658, Installation of Halon System in Cable Spreading Room, Completed 12/18/79
- IP2-04-23808, 5/22/06 performance of
- PC-2Y 1, RCS Alternate Safe Shutdown TemperatureMonitor Calibration, Rev. 6IP2-04-30257, 4/23/06 performance of
- PC-2Y70, Source Range Neutron Flux (N-5143)Channel Calibration, Rev. 2IP2-04-31441, 5/5/06 performance of 2-PC-R37, Alternate Safe Shutdown and RemoteShutdown Instruments, Rev. 11IP-06-22688, 4/23/07 performance of 0-PT-M002, Appendix R Equipment Inventory andInspection, Rev. 3QS-2006-IP-04, Surveillance Report: Performance of Appendix R Safe Shutdown Procedure,4/18/06Quality Assurance AuditsAudit Report A03-12-I, IPEC Fire Protection ProgramQA-09-2005-IP-1, IPEC Fire Protection program Audit
- QA-09-2006-IP-1, IPEC Fire Protection Program Audit
- QS-2006-IP-04, Performance of Appendix R Safe Shutdown Procedure, 2-AOP-SSD-1,Revision 7DrawingsD-8775, Halon System Cable Spreading Room, Sh. 2, Rev. 4D-8775, Halon System Cable Spreading Room, Sh. 3, Rev. 4
- D-8775, Halon System Cable Spreading Room, Sh. 4, Rev. 3
- D-8775, Halon System Cable Spreading Room, Sh. 5, Rev. 2
- D-8775, Halon System Cable Spreading Room, Sh. 6, Rev. 2
- D-8677, Halon System Piping Cable Spreading Room, Sh. 4, Rev. 1
- 400411, Fire Area/Zone Arrangement - EL. 100', Sh. 1, Rev. 1
- 400403, Fire Area/Zone Arrangement - EL. 53', Sh. 1, Rev. 2
- 400404, Fire Area/Zone Arrangement - EL. 80', Sh. 1, Rev. 2
- 400405, Fire Area/Zone Arrangement - EL. 96', Sh. 1, Rev. 2
- 21-F-4022, Flow Diagram Ventilation System Containment, Primary Aux. Building, Sh. 1, Rev. 62A208377-11, Unit 2 One Line Diagram.
- A208088-42, One Line Diagram of 480 Vac Switchgears 21 and 23.
- A208064-5, Level and Pressure Instrument for Steam Generator and Pressurizer Arrangement,Piping.
- A-4AttachmentA208065-11, Level and Pressure Instrument for Steam Generator and PressurizerArrangement, Piping Details - Instrumentation.A209561-5, Steam Generator and Pressurizer Instrumentation Arrangement OutsideContainment.A208247-8, Modification to Pressurizer Level transmitter Cabinet - Rack No. 19Instrumentation.A208248-6, Modification to Steam Generator Level transmitter Rack No. 21. Instrumentation.
- B225132-12, Elementary Wiring Diagram for Charging Pumps 21 and 23.
- B225137-10, Elementary Wiring Diagram for Residual Heat Removal Pumps 21 and 22.
- B225149-1-24, Elementary Wiring Diagram for Service Water Pump 23.
- 308762-0, Instrument Air and Nitrogen Supply to Pressurizer and Steam Generator FlowDiagram.IP2-S-000193-1,
- SWD-Control and Indication Service Water Pump 24
- 21-LL-3118-30, Breaker 52/AF1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 21.
- 260503-03, Loop Diagram RCS Pressure SSD Level and Pressure, Loop Nos. 3101 and 3105
- A138040-54, Unit 1 One Line diagram, 13.8kV and 440V Systems.
- 244016-19, Unit 1 One Line 440V Switchgear Unit Substation 11RW1, 12RW3, 12FD3, MCC's10M,10N 10Z and 10X.9321-F-36033, IP3 Appendix R On-site Alternate Power Source, Diesel Generator Main One-Line Diagram, Revision10A209762, Rev 67, Flow Diagram Service Water System Nuclear Steam Supply Plant, sheet 2 of
- 29321-F-2722-117, Rev 117, Flow Diagram Service Water System Nuclear Steam Supply Plant,sheet 1 of 29321-F-2019, Flow Diagram Boiler Feedwater
- 21-F-3056-41, Rev. 41, Control Building, Elev. 33'-0" Cable Spreading Room Cable Trays -
- PlanA206640-10, Arrangement of Equipment in Cable Spreading Room, Elev. 33'-0", West Half -Plan &Sects.Pre-Fire PlansPFP-209-FZ-1, Component Cooling Pump Room, Rev. 0PFP-215-FZ-1A, General Floor Plan - Fan House, Rev. 0
- PFP-252-FZ-11, Cable Spreading Room, Rev. 0
- PFP-264-FZ-22 & 63A, Intake Structure, Rev. 0Fire Brigade TrainingIP-SMM-TQ-122, Fire Brigade Drill Attendance Record, Rev. 1Drill Records 1
st - 4 th Quarter 2006, 1
st Quarter 2007.
- A-5AttachmentOperator Safe Shutdown TrainingI2LP-ILO-ASSD, Rev. 14, Instructor Lesson Plan: Alternate Safe Shutdown SystemTransient Combustible EvaluationsEN-DC-161, Transient Combustible Evaluation,07-011 for Unit 2 Intake Structure, 4/26/07
Miscellaneous
- DocumentsECRIS cable routing data report, 5/14/07ECRIS cable routing data report, 5/15/07
- TB-04-22, Westinghouse Technical Bulletin: Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Performance -Appendix R Compliance and Loss fo All Seal Cooling, Rev. 1Condition Reports1999-015462002-115362003-018252004-006072004-006092004-014452006-008932006-01212
- 2006-033732006-052992006-068382006-06844
- 2007-001252007-001432007-006362007-00743
- 2007-009352007-009362007-009582007-01014
- 2007-010542007-010762007-011762007-01254
- 2007-013912007-017552007-017572007-10769
- 2007-017712007-017722007-017812007-02026
- 2007-020392007-020522007-02067Work Orders NP9262151NP9262152NP9157705NP9261088NP9259111NP9262153NP9364109NP9153738
LIST OF ACRONYMS
USEDACAlternating CurrentAOPAbnormal Operating Procedure
DRSDivision of Reactor Safety
FAFire Area
FHAFire Hazards Analysis
FPPFire Protection Program
FZFire Zone
IPInspection Procedure
IP2Indian Point Unit 2
A-6AttachmentIPEIndividual Plant ExaminationIPECIndian Point Energy Center
IPEEEIndividual Plant Examination of External Events
IRInspection Report
NFPANational Fire Protection Association
NRCNuclear Regulatory Commission
PARPublicly Available Records
P&IDPiping and Instrumentation Drawing
SUNSISensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information