ML18139A854

LER 80-069/03L-0:on 801022,PT-27D Revealed Low Amp Reading for Panel 8,circuit 13A (Boron Injection Recirculation to Boric Acid Tanks).Caused by Excessive Heat.Failed Heat Tape Replaced

ML18139A854
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	11/20/1980
From:	WILSON J L VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18139A853	List: ML18139A852 ML18139A854
References
LER-80-069-03L-02, LER-80-69-3L-2, NUDOCS 8011250372
Download: ML18139A854 (2)

Text

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~01 o I 5 I o I o I o 12 ! 8 10 101 1 I o I 2 I 2 I 8 I o 101 1 I 60 61 DOCKET-NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 1 1 2 1 0 1 8 1 0*10 REPORT DATE

• BO EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@

!With Unit #1 defueled and Unit #2 at 100% power, PT-27D revealed low amp reading for EJ:I] !Panel #8, Circuit 13A (Boron Injection Recirc to the Boric Acid Tanks). This event is " 1 a degraded mode of operation as specified in T.S. 3.3.B.5 and is reportable in accordance!

I]]] 1 with T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2).

Recirculation flow from the Boron Injection Tank was verified;

!therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

IE:]. TID ]JI) 8 9 SYSTEM CODE 1 5 IF I@ 9 10 (::;\ LE R/RO CV ENT YE,>.R REPORT I 8 I O ! NUMBER 21 . 22 CAUSE CAUSE COMP. CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE ~@ ~@ ,H ,E ,A ,T ,E ,R ,e ~@ 11 12 13 18 19 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REPORT NO. CODE TYPE I I I O 1 6 I 9 I 1......-1 Io I 3 I 23* 24 26 27 28 29 30 VALVE SUBCODE L.:.f@ 20 l.=l 31 ACTION FUTURE TAKEN ACTION EFFECT SHUTDOWN r::::,, ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. ON PLANT METHOD HOURS \.:::) SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER REVISION NO. 32 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 80 l.Ll@Li@ w@ t2J I o I o I o Io I UJ@). Li§ 33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 I Tl 11 8 ! 5 I@ l2:J@ 43 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS @ 44 ~7 ::II[] !The heat tracing failed because of excessive heat. A design change has been initiated to I :::n:IJ !change the manner by which these borated lines are heat traced. The failed tape was ]ID 1 replaced and verified operable.

IE] 8 9 FACILITY 'Jo' STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS \::.:::,, TII] ~@ 11 IO IO l@.._I _. N_/_A ___ __, 80 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

@ DISCOVERY I ~I PT-27D 8 9 10 12 1"3 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE *AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY W@ W@l N/A 8 9 10 . 11 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

• Q\ 44 45 46 80 _LOCATION OF RELEASE @ N/A 44 45 80 NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION IO IO 10 lLJ@~---:-N_/A

_____________________ 8 9 11 12 13 PERSONNEL INJURIES Q\ NUMBER DESC;:uPTION~

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• (';;:\ NRC USE ONLY "' ISSUEOQ DESCRIPTION*~

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• J. Lt Wil~on .§ 011250 37~. (804) 357~'31~ BC 0: 0 11 e ATTACHMENT 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNITS 1 DOCKET NO: 50-280 REPORT NO: 80-069/03L-0 EVENT DATE: 10/22/80 TITLE OF REPORT: HEAT TRACING FAILURE 1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: 2. With Unit #1 defueled and Unit #2 at 100% power, PT-27D revelaed that the amp readings for Panel #9, Circuit 13A (Boron Injection Recirc to the Boric Acid Tanks) Panel #8 was below the acceptance criteria stipulated in the PT. This event is a degraded mode of operation as specified in T.S. 3.3.B.5 and is reportable in accordance with T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2).

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS: The Heat Tracing is intended to maintain a temperature above that required to maintain Boric Acid in solution.

The redundant Heat Tracing Circuit (Panel #9, Circuit 13A) was operable, therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE: The Heat Tracing tape failed due to excessive heat. 4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION: 5. The imm.ediate corrective action was to verify that the r'edundant circuit was operable.

SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION: The defective Heat Tracing tape was replaced.

The circuit was tested torily within the time span specified by the Technical Specifications

(~4 hours). 6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

No additional actions deemed necessary.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS A task force has reviewed the total spectrum of the Heat Tracing System and a Design Change is being prepared.