Text

Wat - Init Exam - 11/2006 - Draft Operating Exam
	ML070530083
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	08/24/2006
From:	; Entergy Operations
To:	; NRC Region 4
References
	50-285/06-301
	Download: ML070530083 (180)
	v • d • e

PERFORM A MANUAL CEA SUBGROUP SELECTIONRO ADMIN 1Site W3Job ROSystem/Duty AreaRXCMode NORMNumber 8Revision008/24/2006Approval04/03/2000Arvel J. HallEstimated Time 20 MinTime CriticalNoCritical TimeN/AAlternate PathNoReferencesOP-004-015, Reactor Power Cutback SystemPlant Data BookNRC KA Number2.1.23. RO: 3.9; SRO: 4.0Evaluation MethodsPERFORMTraineeEvaluatorObserverDateSatisfactoryUnsatisfactory Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure2 of 5INITIAL CONDITIONSThe plant is holding at 81% (PMC Point C24107) power at Woodlands' request.Regulating Group 6 CEAs are selected for Reactor Power Cutback.Core Burnup is 271 EFPD (PMC Point C24110).Steam Bypass Control Valve, MS-320B, has been removed from service due to erratic behavior.INITIATING CUEThe Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform a Manual CEA Subgroup Selection calculation todetermine if the current alignment is acceptable for the current power level.TERMINATING CUECandidate determines the correct CEA Subgroup Selection for the current condition.STANDARDCandidate determines that Subgroups 5 and 11 (Reg Groups 5 and 6) should be selected for Reactor PowerCutback.TOOLS1. Copy of OP-004-015, Reactor Power Cutback System2. Copy of the Plant Data Book3. Copy of Plant Data Book Figure 1.7.2.1, Power Level After Drop of Bank 6 (or 6 + 5) From IndicatedPower Level (for candidate to mark up)4. CalculatorSAFETY CONSIDERATIONSNONEPERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCESReactor power will be above SBCS capabilities if a Reactor Power Cutback were to occur.HUMAN INTERFACESSM/CRSSKILLS / KNOWLEDGESNoneINSTRUCTOR NOTESThis task is normally performed while raising power to 100%. OP-010-004 directs placing Cutback in serviceabove 65% power, and then it directs re-evaluation of the subgroups selected to drop prior to exceeding 90%power. When one SBCS valve became inoperable at 81% power, it became necessary to re-evaluate at thattime.

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure3 of 5Note that CEA Subgroup 5 is the same as Regulating Group 6, and CEA Subgroup 11 is the same asRegulating Group 5.

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure4 of 5Perform the task in accordance with OP-004-015 Attachment 11.1. Critical steps are denoted byCRIT.START TIME_________1.Fill in current reactor power.CRITCUES:Cues required for this step are contained in the Initial ConditionsSTANDARDS:Examinee records 81% from Initial ConditionsSAT______UNSAT______2.Fill in current EFPD.CRITCUES:Cues required for this step are contained in the Initial ConditionsSTANDARDS:Examinee records 271 from Initial ConditionsSAT______UNSAT______3.Fill in number of Operable SBCS ValvesCRITCUES:Cues required for this step are contained in the Initial ConditionsSTANDARDS:1. Examinee records 5 from Initial Conditions2. 6 total SBCS valves minus 1 that is inoperableSAT______UNSAT______4.Determine maximum allowed reactor power after Reactor CutbackCRITCUES:Cues required for this step are contained in the procedureSTANDARDS:Examinee records 49.4%SAT______UNSAT______5.Using result from Step 11.1.4 and Figure 1.7.2.1, determine the Subgroups that should beselected for Reactor Power Cutback.CRITCUES:Cues required for this step are contained in the procedureSTANDARDS:1. Refer to PDB Figure 1.7.2.12. Check "Subgroups 5 & 11"Note: Subgroup 5 alone would place the final power level above 49.4% (approx52-54%). Subgroups 5 and 11 would place the final power level above 20%(approx 25-27%).SAT______UNSAT______6.End of TaskSTOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure5 of 5Examinee copyINITIAL CONDITIONSThe plant is holding at 81% (PMC Point C24107) power at Woodlands' request.Regulating Group 6 CEAs are selected for Reactor Power Cutback.Core Burnup is 271 EFPD (PMC Point C24110).Steam Bypass Control Valve, MS-320B, has been removed from service due to erratic behavior.INITIATING CUEThe Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform a Manual CEA Subgroup Selection calculation todetermine if the current alignment is acceptable for the current power level.

PERFORM A SHUTDOWN MARGIN CALCULATIONRO ADMIN 2Site W3Job ROSystem/Duty AreaCEDMode SURVNumber 4Revision509/16/2006Approval09/16/2006Arvel J. HallEstimated Time 20 MinTime CriticalNoCritical TimeN/AAlternate PathNoReferencesOP-903-090, Shutdown MarginPlant Data BookNRC KA Number2.1.20 (RO: 4.3; SRO: 4.2)Evaluation MethodsPERFORMTraineeEvaluatorObserverDateSatisfactoryUnsatisfactory Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure2 of 7INITIAL CONDITIONSThe Plant tripped 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ago, the conditions prior to the trip were:* 100% Xenon equilibrium conditions* 250 EFPD* RCS Boron Concentration 1000 ppmCurrent Plant conditions:* Mode 3* Tave 541°F* RCS Boron Concentration 1000 ppm* All CEAs are inserted* Reactivity Bias factor 0.001INITIATING CUEThe Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform a Shutdown Margin Calculation. Shutdown MarginVerification for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is not required for this task.TERMINATING CUERCS Boron Concentration meets Shutdown Margin requirement.STANDARDCandidate determines Shutdown margin is acceptable.TOOLSOP-903-090, Shutdown Margin, Section 7.1OP-903-090, Shutdown Margin, Attachment 10.1Plant Data Book Figures*1.3.4.1, SDM Boron Concentration vs. Burnup*1.3.4.2, SDM Boron Concentration vs. Burnup*1.4.1, HZP Inverse Boron Worth vs. Burnup*1.4.2, Boron Worth vs. Tmod, Normalized to 541 Deg. F*1.6.3.1, Xenon Worth After Trip From Indicated Power Level at BOC*1.6.3.2, Xenon Worth After Trip From Indicated Power Level at MOC*1.6.3.3, Xenon Worth After Trip From Indicated Power Level at EOCStraight EdgeCalculatorSAFETY CONSIDERATIONSNonePERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCESLoss of Shutdown MarginHUMAN INTERFACESSM/CRSSKILLS / KNOWLEDGES Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure3 of 7NoneINSTRUCTOR NOTESNone Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure4 of 7Perform OP-903-090 Shutdown Margin attachment 10.1.Critical steps are denoted byCRIT.START TIME_________1.Document current Plant Data.CUES:Cues required for this step are contained in the initial conditions.STANDARDS:Candidate Records the following Data in:1. Current Date and Time2. Mode 3.3. 250 EFPD4. RCS Boron 1000 ppm5. Tave 541°F6. Duration of shutdown 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months s7. CEA position, all CEAs insertedSAT______UNSAT______2.Determine current Xenon Free Shutdown Margin Boron Concentration for plant conditions.CUES:None.STANDARDS:Examinee determines 1200 (1190 to 1210) ppm from Figure 1.3.4.2, SDMconcentration vs Burnup and records in step 7.1.3.1.1 on attachment 10.1SAT______UNSAT______3.Enter Reactivity Bias factor from Reactor Engineering Book.CUES:Cues required for this step are contained in the initial conditions.STANDARDS: Examinee records 0.001 in step 7.1.3.1.2 attachment 10.1SAT______UNSAT______4.Determine HZP Inverse Boron Worth.CUES:None.STANDARDS:Examinee determines HZP inverse Boron worth 127 (126.5 to 127.5) from curve1.4.1 and records in step 7.1.3.1.3 attachment 10.1:SAT______UNSAT______5.Determine current normalized Boron worth.CUES:None.STANDARDS:Examinee determines normalized boron worth 1.00 from curve 1.4.2 and recordsin step 7.1.3.4 on attachment 10.1:SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure5 of 76.Calculate current Xenon Free Shutdown Margin Boron Concentration.CRITCUES:Initial conditions stated trip from xenon equilibrium conditions.STANDARDS:Examinee determines current Xenon Free Boron Concentration to be 1200 (1190to 1210) ppm and records in step 7.1.3.1.5 of attachment 10.1:Note: Examinee should determine that initial conditions stated Xenon equilibriumconditions and xenon worth can be determined from figure 1.6.3.SAT______UNSAT______7.Determine current Xenon Equivalent Boron Concentration.CUES:None.STANDARDS:Examinee determines current xenon reactivity worth for plant conditions to -3.90(-3.85 to -3.95) % delta rho from figure 1.6.3.2 and records on step 7.1.3.3.1 onattachment 10.1:SAT______UNSAT______8.Determine current HZP inverse boron worth.CUES:None.STANDARDS:Examinee determines HZP inverse worth 127 (126.5 to 127.5) ppm fromfigure 1.4.1 and records in step 7.1.3.3.2 on attachment 10.1SAT______UNSAT______9.Determine current normalized boron worth.CUES:None.STANDARDS:Examinee determines normalized boron worth 1.00 from figure 1.4.2 and recordsin step 7.1.3.3.3 on attachment 10.1:SAT______UNSAT______10.Calculate Xenon Equivalent Boron.CRITCUES:None.STANDARDS:Examinee determines Xenon Equivalent Boron -495 (-485 to -505) ppm andrecords in step 7.1.3.3.4:SAT______UNSAT______11.Calculate Required Shutdown Margin Boron Concentration.CRITCUES:None.STANDARDS:Examinee determines Required Shutdown Margin Boron Concentration between705 (685 to 725) ppm and records in step 7.1.3.4 on attachment 10.1:SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure6 of 712.Verify current RCS boron concentration > Required Shutdown Margin Concentration.CRITCUES:None.STANDARDS:Examinee determines current RCS Boron Concentration is greater than RequiredShutdown margin Boron Concentration:SAT______UNSAT______13.Determine Xenon Equivalent Boron Concentration for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months from present.CUES:Inform the examinee that further calculation is not necessary for this JPM.STANDARDS:NoneSAT______UNSAT______14.End of TaskSTOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure7 of 7Examinee copyINITIAL CONDITIONSThe Plant tripped 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ago, the conditions prior to the trip were:* 100% Xenon equilibrium conditions* 250 EFPD* RCS Boron Concentration 1000 ppmCurrent Plant conditions:* Mode 3* Tave 541°F* RCS Boron Concentration 1000 ppm* All CEAs are inserted* Reactivity Bias factor 0.001INITIATING CUEThe Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform a Shutdown Margin Calculation. Shutdown MarginVerification for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is not required for this task.

PERFORM A CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CALCULATIONRO ADMIN 3Site W3Job ROSystem/Duty AreaCBMode SURVNumber 3Revision008/28/2006Approval04/03/2000Arvel J. HallEstimated Time 20 MinTime CriticalNoCritical TimeN/AAlternate PathNoReferencesOP-903-001, Technical Specification Surveillance LogsTechnical Specification 3/4.6.1.4NRC KA Number2.2.12. RO: 3.0; SRO 3.4Evaluation MethodsPERFORMTraineeEvaluatorObserverDateSatisfactoryUnsatisfactory Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure2 of 5INITIAL CONDITIONSThe plant is 100% power.Containment Pressure Reduction has just been secured.You note that Containment Pressure is -5.4 INWC (PMC Point A51000), and you inform the Control RoomSupervisor.The TGB Watch reports that barometric pressure, as measured from the TGB roof, is 29.44 INHG.INITIATING CUEThe Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform a Containment Pressure Calculation to determine ifabsolute Containment internal pressure is within the limits of the Technical Specification Logs.TERMINATING CUECandidate determines the correct absolute Containment internal pressure for the current condition.STANDARDCandidate determines that absolute Containment internal pressure is 14.290 (14.285 - 14.295) PSIA, which iswithin the limits of the Technical Specification Logs.TOOLS1. Copy of OP-903-001, Technical Specification Logs2. Copy of Attachment 11.15, Containment Pressure Calculation (for candidate to mark up)3. CalculatorSAFETY CONSIDERATIONSNONEPERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCESInadvertent entry into a Technical Specification Action.HUMAN INTERFACESSM/CRSSKILLS / KNOWLEDGESFamiliarity with Technical Specification 3/4.6.1.4INSTRUCTOR NOTESIf candidate does not add 0.05 INHG to the Barometric Pressure, as directed in Note 1, the final outcome willbe Absolute Containment Internal Pressure being below the Tech Spec limit, and result in an inadvertententry into the Action for Tech Spec 3.6.1.4.

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure3 of 5Perform the task in accordance with OP-903-001 Attachment 11.15. Critical steps are denoted byCRIT.START TIME_________1.Fill in current barometric pressure.CRITCUES:Cues required for this step are contained in the Initial ConditionsSTANDARDS:1. Examinee records 29.49 INHG from Initial Conditions2. Examinee must add 0.05 INHG to the 29.44 provided to meet requirementfrom Note 1.SAT______UNSAT______2.Fill in current Containment to Ambient Differential Pressure.CRITCUES:Cues required for this step are contained in the Initial ConditionsSTANDARDS:Examinee records -5.4 INWC from Initial ConditionsSAT______UNSAT______3.Calculate Barometric Pressure (BP) to PSIACRITCUES:Cues required for this step are contained in the procedureSTANDARDS:1. Examinee records 14.485 PSIA (14.485 - 14.486)2. Value comes from: 29.49 X 0.4912 (rounded down from 14.485488)SAT______UNSAT______4.Calculate Containment to Ambient D/P (C/A) to PSIACRITCUES:Cues required for this step are contained in the procedureSTANDARDS:1. Examinee records -0.195 PSIA [(-0.1949) - (-0.195)]2. Value comes from: -5.4 X 0.0361 (rounded up from -0.19494)SAT______UNSAT______5.Calculate Absolute Containment Internal Pressure (CP)CRITCUES:Cues required for this step are contained in the procedureSTANDARDS:1. Examinee records 14.290 PSIA (14.290 - 14.2911) PSIA, which is withinthe limits of the Technical Specification Logs.2. Value comes from: 14.485 - 0.195SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure4 of 56.Determines that Absolute Containment Internal Pressure is within the limits of theTechnical Specification LogsCRITCUES:Cues required for this step are contained in the procedureSTANDARDS:Compare actual pressure to Tech Spec Log Limit (> 14.275 PSIA) found onAttachment 11.1 (page 1 of 42).SAT______UNSAT______7.End of TaskSTOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure5 of 5Examinee copyINITIAL CONDITIONSThe plant is 100% power.Containment Pressure Reduction is in progress.You note that Containment Pressure is -5.4 INWC (PMC Point A51000), and you inform the Control RoomSupervisor.The TGB Watch reports that barometric pressure, as measured from the TGB roof, is 29.44 INHG.INITIATING CUEThe Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform a Containment Pressure Calculation to determine ifabsolute Containment internal pressure is within the limits of the Technical Specification Logs.

REVIEW A RADIATION WORK PERMITRO ADMIN 1Site W3Job NAOSystem/Duty AreaPPAMode ADMINNumber 22Revision009/08/2006Approval04/03/2000Arvel J. HallEstimated Time 10 MinTime CriticalNoCritical TimeN/AAlternate PathNoReferencesENS-RP-105, Radiation Work PermitsNRC KA Number2.3.10 (RO: 2.9; SRO: 3.3)Evaluation MethodsPERFORMTraineeEvaluatorObserverDateSatisfactoryUnsatisfactory Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure2 of 5INITIAL CONDITIONSLow Pressure Safety Injection Pump A is being prepared to replace the pump impeller.The pump has been isolated and is ready for draining and venting at the following valves:*SI-114A, LPSI Pump A Suction Drain Valve*SI-1141A, LPSI Pump A Discharge PX Root ValveRadwaste has connected and lined up the required hoses.INITIATING CUEThe Control Room directs you to locally vent and drain LPSI Pump A with the following valves:*SI-114A, LPSI Pump A Suction Drain Valve*SI-1141A, LPSI Pump A Discharge PX Root ValveShow me the radiological preparations you would make prior to entering the RCA.Describe to me all the radiological instructions that apply to you in the performance of this task.TERMINATING CUEExaminee reviews the survey map and the RWP, and describes the applicable Worker Instructions of theRWP.STANDARDExaminee locates and reviews the survey map for -35 RAB Safeguards Room "A".Examinee locates and reviews RWP 2006-0002 for Operations personnel.Examinee describes all applicable Worker Instructions of the RWP for entering a HRA/HCA.TOOLSNONESAFETY CONSIDERATIONSNONEPERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCESNoncompliance with the Waterford 3 ALARA program.Personnel contamination.HUMAN INTERFACESATC/BOPSKILLS / KNOWLEDGESNone THIS PAGE HAS BEEN REMOVED BECAUSE IT

CONTAINED SUNSI

INFORMATION Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure4 of 5Perform the task in accordance with ENS-RP-105, Radiation Work Permits. Critical steps are denoted byCRIT.START TIME_________1.Review the survey map on the RADS computer screen.CRITCUES:Cues required for this step are contained in the Initiating Cue.STANDARDS:1.Examinee locates and reviews the survey map for -35 RAB Safeguards Room"A".2.Examinee recognizes that the valves to be operated are located in a HighRadiation Area/High Contamination Area (at LPSI Pump A).SAT______UNSAT______2.Locate and review the RWP.CRITCUES:Cues required for this step are contained in the Initiating Cue.STANDARDS:Examinee locates and reviews RWP 2006-0002 for Operations personnel.SAT______UNSAT______3.Describe all applicable Worker Instructions of the RWP for entering a HRA/HCA.CRITCUES:Cues required for this step are contained in the Initiating Cue.STANDARDS:Note: Critical elements are inBOLD:1. Notify HP prior to filling/venting/draining radioactive systems andcomponents.2. Status Board/Area Postings should be reviewed, or HP contacted asappropriate to ensure awareness of radiological conditions in work area.3. Conduct a face to face briefing with HP.4. Periodically check EAD. Secure from work, inform coworkers, exit area,and notify HP/SCT if a dose alarm is received or dose rate continuouslyalarms.5. Full PCs are required.6. HP may require additional PCs.7. Peer check that you have EAD & TLD prior to entering HRA.SAT______UNSAT______4.End of TaskSTOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure5 of 5Examinee copyINITIAL CONDITIONSLow Pressure Safety Injection Pump A is being prepared to replace the pump impeller.The pump has been isolated and is ready for draining and venting at the following valves:*SI-114A, LPSI Pump A Suction Drain Valve*SI-1141A, LPSI Pump A Discharge PX Root ValveRadwaste has connected and lined up the required hoses.INITIATING CUEThe Control Room directs you to locally vent and drain LPSI Pump A with the following valves:*SI-114A, LPSI Pump A Suction Drain Valve*SI-1141A, LPSI Pump A Discharge PX Root ValveShow me the radiological preparations you would make prior to entering the RCA.Describe to me all the radiological instructions that apply to you in the performance of this task.Excerpt from drawing G-167 Sheet 3 REVIEW A MANUAL CEA SUBGROUP SELECTION SRO ADMIN 1 Site W3 Job SRO System/Duty Area RXC Mode NORM Number 1 Revision 0 08/24/2006 Approval 04/03/2000 Arvel J. Hall Estimated Time 20 Min Time Critical No Critical Time N/A Alternate Path No References OP-004-015, Reactor Power Cutback System Plant Data Book NRC KA Number 2.1.20 2.1.23 Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 2 of 5 INITIAL CONDITIONS The plant is holding at 78.2% (PMC Point C24107) power at Woodlands' request.

Regulating Group 6 CEAs are selected for Reactor Power Cutback.

Core Burnup is 271 EFPD (PMC Point C24110).

Steam Bypass Control Valve, MS-320B, has been re moved from service due to erratic behavior.

INITIATING CUE The At The Controls Operator requests you to review a Manual CEA Subgroup Selection calculation that you had directed him/her to perform.

TERMINATING CUE Candidate determines the correct CEA Subgr oup Selection for the current condition.

STANDARD Candidate recognizes errors in the calculation and determines that Subgroups 5 and 11 (Reg Groups 5 and 6) should be selected for Reactor Power Cutback.

TOOLS 1. Copy of OP-004-015, Reac tor Power Cutback System 2. Copy of the Plant Data Book 3. Copy of Plant Data Book Figure 1.7.2.1, Power Level After Drop of Bank 6 (or 6 + 5) From Indicated Power Level (for candidate to mark up)

4. Calculator SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Reactor power will be above SBCS capabilities if a Reactor Power Cutback were to occur.

HUMAN INTERFACES SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES None INSTRUCTOR NOTES This task is normally performed while raising power to 100%. OP-010-004 directs placing Cutback in service above 65% power, and then it directs re-evaluation of the subgroups selected to drop prior to exceeding 90%

power. When one SBCS valve became inoperable at 78% power , it became necessary to re-evaluate at that time. Note that CEA Subgroup 5 is the same as Regul ating Group 6, and CEA Subgroup 11 is the same as Regulating Group 5.

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 3 of 5 Review the calculation in accordance with OP-004-015 Attachment 11.1. Crit ical steps are denoted by CRIT. START TIME_________

1. Verify current reactor power.

CRIT CUES: Cues required for this step are c ontained in the Initial Conditions STANDARDS: Candidate verifies that 78.2% is correct SAT______UNSAT______

2. Verify current EFPD.

CRIT CUES: Cues required for this step are contained in the Initial Conditions STANDARDS:

Candidate verifies that 271 is correct SAT______UNSAT______

3. Verify number of Operable SBCS Valves CRIT CUES: Cues required for this step are c ontained in the Initial Conditions STANDARDS: 1. Candidate determines that 6 is incorrect 2. 6 total SBCS valves minus 1 t hat is inoperable should be 5 valves SAT______UNSAT______

4. Verify maximum allowed reactor power after Reactor Cutback CRIT CUES: Cues required for this step are contained in the procedure STANDARDS: 1. Candidate determines that 59.28% is incorrect 2. Value should be 5 X 9.88, which equals 49.4%

SAT______UNSAT______

5. Using result from Step 11.1.4 and Figure 1.7.2.1, verify the Subgroups that should be selected for Reactor Power Cutback..

CRIT CUES: Cues required for this step are contained in the procedure STANDARDS: 1. Refer to PDB Figure 1.7.2.1 2. Candidate determines that "Subgroup 5" is incorrect 3. Correct alignment should be "Subgroups 5 & 11" Note: Subgroup 5 alone would place the fi nal power level above 49.4% (approx 50-52%). Subgroups 5 and 11 would plac e the final power level above 20% (approx 23-25%).

SAT______UNSAT______

6. End of Task STOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 4 of 5 Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 5 of 5 Candidate copy INITIAL CONDITIONS The plant is holding at 78.2% (PMC Point C24107) power at Woodlands' request.

Regulating Group 6 CEAs are selected for Reactor Power Cutback.

Core Burnup is 271 EFPD (PMC Point C24110).

Steam Bypass Control Valve, MS-320B, has been re moved from service due to erratic behavior.

INITIATING CUE The At The Controls Operator requests you to review a Manual CEA Subgroup Selection calculation that you had directed him/her to perform.

EVALUATE PROPOSED WORK SCHEDULE AGAI NST ESTABLISHED OVERTIME GUIDELINES RO ADMIN 2 Site W3 Job SRO System/Duty Area PPA Mode ADMIN Number 4 Revision 0 09/15/2006 Approval 09/15/2006 Arvel J. Hall Estimated Time 20 Min Time Critical No Critical Time N/A Alternate Path No References OM-123, Working Hour Limits Tech Spec 6.2.2, Unit Staff NRC KA Number 2.1.4 (RO: 2.3; SRO: 3.4)

Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 2 of 5 INITIAL CONDITIONS The plant is holding at 100% power.

Operations shift manning is being severely affected due to a flu epidemic.

All healthy licensed operators are being scheduled to work rolling overtime hours in order to cover shift vacancies.

Listed below is a proposed Work Schedule for one of y our reactor operator, whose schedule starts on the 21 st. NOVEMBER SUN MON TUE WED THU FRI SAT 14 OFF 15 OFF 16 1800-0600 17 1800-0600 18 1800-0600 19 OFF 20 OFF 21 START 0600-2000 22 0600-1400 23 0600-2000 24 0200-1000 25 0000-1400 26 0000-1200 27 0600-1800 28 OFF Note: All work hours shown exclude turnover time.

INITIATING CUE One of your reactor operators brings you this proposed Work Schedule, which begins on November 21 st , for review and approval. Review the proposed schedule to determine compliance with the Working Hour Limits.

TERMINATING CUE Examinee determines that the proposed schedul e will require additional authorization.

STANDARD Examinee determines 4 conditions requiring addi tional authorization (VP, GM, or designee): 1. Does not meet the 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months between sh ifts. Scheduled for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months off (Friday). 2. Exceeds 16 in 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months limit. Scheduled for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months (Friday). 3. Exceeds 24 in 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months limit. Scheduled for 26 hours3.009259e-4 days 0.00722 hours 4.298942e-5 weeks 9.893e-6 months in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months (Sunday). 4. Exceeds 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months limit. Scheduled for 84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months in 7 days (Monday).

TOOLS OM-123, Working Hour Limits Calculator SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Fatigue from working excessive hours could reduce the abilit y of the individual in keeping the reactor in a safe condition during the performance of safety-related functions.

HUMAN INTERFACES Reactor Operator SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 3 of 5 None INSTRUCTOR NOTES Provide the Examinee a copy of OM-123, Working Hour Limits.

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 4 of 5 Review the work schedule and compare to the guidelines in OM-123, Working Hour Limi ts. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT. START TIME_________

1. Candidate reviews the Overtime Guidelines and determines that working hour limits are exceeded by this schedule.

CRIT CUES: Cues required for this step are contained in the policy.

STANDARDS: Candidate determines 4 conditions that exceed the working hour limits (step 5.2.2): 1. Does not meet the 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months between shifts. Scheduled for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months off (Friday). 2. Exceeds 16 in 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months limit. Scheduled for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months (Friday). 3. Exceeds 24 in 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months limit. Scheduled for 26 hours3.009259e-4 days 0.00722 hours 4.298942e-5 weeks 9.893e-6 months in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months (Sunday). 4. Exceeds 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months limit. Scheduled for 84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months in 7 days (Monday).

SAT______UNSAT______

2. Candidate reviews the Authorizat ion Guidelines of OM-123.

CRIT CUES: Cues required for this step are contained in the policy.

STANDARDS

Candidate determines that management appr oval (VP, GM, or designee) is required prior to exceeding the limits (step 5.3.1.c).

SAT______UNSAT______

3. End of Task STOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 5 of 5 Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS The plant is holding at 100% power.

Operations shift manning is being severely affected due to a flu epidemic.

All healthy licensed operators are being scheduled to work rolling overtime hours in order to cover shift vacancies.

Listed below is a proposed Work Schedule for one of y our reactor operator, whose schedule starts on the 21 st. NOVEMBER SUN MON TUE WED THU FRI SAT 14 OFF 15 OFF 16 1800-0600 17 1800-0600 18 1800-0600 19 OFF 20 OFF 21 START 0600-2000 22 0600-1400 23 0600-2000 24 0200-1000 25 0000-1400 26 0000-1200 27 0600-1800 28 OFF Note: All work hours shown exclude turnover time.

INITIATING CUE One of your reactor operators brings you this proposed Work Schedule, which begins on November 21 st , for review and approval. Review the proposed schedule to determine compliance with the Working Hour Limits.

PERFORM AN SRO REVIEW OF A CO NTAINMENT PRESSURE CALCULATION SRO ADMIN 3 Site W3 Job SRO System/Duty Area CB Mode SURV Number 1 Revision 0 08/28/2006 Approval 04/03/2000 Arvel J. Hall Estimated Time 20 Min Time Critical No Critical Time N/A Alternate Path No References OP-903-001, Technical Specification Surveillance Logs Technical Specification 3/4.6.1.4 NRC KA Number 2.2.12 2.2.22 Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 2 of 5 INITIAL CONDITIONS The plant is 100% power.

Containment Pressure Reduction has just been secured.

Containment Pressure is -5.4 INWC (PMC Point A 51000), and you direct the ATC to perform a Containment Pressure Calculation to determine if absolute Containm ent internal pressure is within the limits of the Technical Specification Logs.

Barometric Pressure is 29.

44 INHG (PMC Point C48516.

INITIATING CUE The ATC informs you that absolute C ontainment internal pressure is within the limits of the Technical Specification Logs. The ATC presents you a completed A ttachment 11.15, Containment Pressure Calculation, to review.

TERMINATING CUE Candidate determines the correct abs olute Containment internal pre ssure for the current condition.

STANDARD Candidate determines that absolute C ontainment internal pressure is 14.266 (14.265 - 14.2661) PSIA, which is outside the limits of the Technical Specification Logs.

TOOLS 1. Copy of OP-903-001, Te chnical Specification Logs 2. Copy of Attachment 11.15, Containment Pr essure Calculation (performed by the ATC)

3. Calculator SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Missed Technical Specification Action entry.

Possibility of exceeding design peak clad temperature and ox idation following a LOCA (Basis for TS 3.6.1.4).

HUMAN INTERFACES SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES Familiarity with Technica l Specification 3/4.6.1.4 INSTRUCTOR NOTES Examiner may note that there are no Performance, Verification, or Reviewer signatures on this form. This is because this form becomes part of the Tech Specs Su rveillance Logs, which are reviewed on the final page of the logs. All calculations are also verified on the same page of the logs.

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 3 of 5 Review OP-903-001 Attachment 11.15 and determine errors in the calculation. Crit ical steps are denoted by CRIT. START TIME_________

1. Step 11.15.1, Barometric Pressure.

CRIT CUES: Cues required for this step are c ontained in the Initial Conditions STANDARDS: 1. 29.49 INHG is incorrect.

Should be 29.44 INHG. (Critical) 2. ATC had incorrectly applied Note 1 and added 0.05 INHG. (Not Critical)

SAT______UNSAT______

2. Step 11.15.3, Convert Barometric Pressure to PSIA.

CRIT CUES: Cues required for this step are contained in the Initial Conditions STANDARDS: 1. Value should be 14.461 (14.460 to 14.461) (Critical) 2. Error carried forward from Step 11.15.1. (Not Critical)

SAT______UNSAT______

3. Step 11.15.4, Convert Containment to Ambient D/P (C/A) to PSIA CRIT CUES: Cues required for this step are contained in the procedure STANDARDS: 1. Value should be -0.

195 (-.01949 to -0.195) (Critical) 2. ATC transposed 0.0361 to 0.0316 when multiplying. (Not Critical)

SAT______UNSAT______

4. Step 11.15.5, Calculate Absolute Cont ainment Internal Pressure (CP)

CRIT CUES: Cues required for this step are contained in the procedure STANDARDS: 1. Final value should be 14.266 (14.265 to 14.2661) (Critical)

2. Error carried forward on CP.

Should be 14.461 (14.460 to 14.461) (Not Critical) 3. Error carried forward on BP. Should be -0.195 (-.01949 to -0.195). ATC also forgot the (-) sign and added t he number instead of subtracted. (Not Critical) SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 4 of 5 5. ATC had determined that Absolute Containment Inte rnal Pressure is within the limits of the Technical Specification Logs. This is an incorrect assessment.

CRIT CUES: Cues required for this step are contained in the procedure STANDARDS: 1. Compare actual pressure to Tech Spec Log Limit (> 14.275 PSIA) found on 1.1 (page 1 of 42) or to Tech Spec 3.6.1.4. 2. Determine that Tech Spec 3.6.1.4 Ac tion applies: Restore internal pressure to above 14.275 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . SAT______UNSAT______

6. End of Task STOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 5 of 5 Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS The plant is 100% power.

Containment Pressure Reduction has just been secured.

Containment Pressure is -5.4 INWC (PMC Point A 51000), and you direct the ATC to perform a Containment Pressure Calculation to determine if absolute Containm ent internal pressure is within the limits of the Technical Specification Logs.

Barometric Pressure is 29.

44 INHG (PMC Point C48516.

INITIATING CUE The ATC informs you that absolute C ontainment internal pressure is within the limits of the Technical Specification Logs. The ATC presents you a completed A ttachment 11.15, Containment Pressure Calculation, to review.

REVIEW AND APPROVE A GA SEOUS RELEASE PERMIT SRO ADMIN 4 Site W3 Job SRO System/Duty Area RMS Mode NORM Number 6 Revision 2 09/16/2006 Approval 09/16/2006 Arvel J. Hall Estimated Time 20 Min Time Critical No Critical Time N/A Alternate Path YES References OP-007-003, Gaseous Waste Management TRM 3.3.3.11, Radioactive Gaseous Effluent NRC KA Number 2.3.6 (SRO: 3.1)

Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 2 of 6 INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Gas Decay Tank C (and B) is to be discharged via Batch Release 2. Noble Gas Monitor, PRM -IRE-0648 is INOPERABLE,TRM 3.3.3.11 entered 3. Waste Flow Rate Measurement Device, GW M-IFT-0648 is INOPERABLE, TRM 3.3.3.11 entered 4. Meteorological conditions: Primary Met Tower T/50m reading is 1.1°C Ten Meter Wind Speed is 2 meters per second Wind Direction 270 5. RAB Exhaust Fan A is running INITIATING CUE One of your reactor operators has completed OP-007-003 Section 6.4, Discharging Gas Decay Tank, steps 6.4.1 to 6.4.4. As CRS, perform the reviews necessary to give your approval to release the GDTs specified on the release permit.

TERMINATING CUE GDT release is not permitted due to meteorological conditions.

STANDARD Examinee recognizes the following: Chemistry should have independently verified rel ease rate calculations (Action 1.b). Operations must perform an independent valv e lineup for the discharge (Action 1.b). Operations must estimate Waste (Process) flow rate must be estimated at least once every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months during the discharge (Action 5). Step 6.4.4 (and Att. 11.5): Meterological Conditions R equirements are NOT satisfied for release. Met conditions are Pasquill Stability Class F, which will not allow the resease.

TOOLS 1. Batch Release permit for GDT C Revised for JPM 2. TRM 3.3.3.11, Radioactive Gaseous Effluent 3. OP-007-003 Section 6.4, Discharging Gas Decay Tank 4. OP-007-003 Attachment 11.5, Mete rological Conditions Requirements SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS None PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Exceed Offsite Release Limits.

HUMAN INTERFACES None SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES None Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 3 of 6 INSTRUCTOR NOTES None Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 4 of 6 Review the Gaseous Batch Release Pe rmit. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT. START TIME_________

1. Review TRM 3.3.3.11, Radioactive Gaseous E ffluent for Noble Gas Monitor, PRM IRE-0648, being Inoperable.

CRIT CUES: CUE: Provided by theBatch Release Permit and the TRM.

STANDARDS: Examinee recognizes that with PRM IRE-0648 Inoperable: Two independent samples should have been taken by Chemistry was correct (Action 1.a). Chemistry should have independently veri fied release rate calculations (Action 1.b). Operations must perform an independent valve lineup for the discharge (Action 1.b)..

SAT____UNSAT____

2. Review TRM 3.3.3.11, Radioactive Gaseous Effluent for Waste Flow Rate Measurement Device, GWM-IFT-0648, being Inoperable.

CRIT CUES: CUE: Provided by theBatch Release Permit and the TRM.

STANDARDS: Examinee recognizes that wi th GWM-IFT-0648 Inoperable:

Operations must estimate Waste (Process) flow rate must be estimated at least once every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months during the discharge (Action 5).

SAT____UNSAT____

3. Review meterological conditions proper fo r release per step 6.4.4 of OP-007-003.

Review steps 6.4.1 through 6.4.4 as performed by the reactor operator.

CRIT CUES: CUE: Provided by the procedure OP-007-003.

STANDARDS

Examinee recognizes the following: Step 6.4.1: Gaseous Release Permit is issued. Step 6.4.2: Not discharging all GDT (only B and C); therefore, "N/A" is correct. Step 6.4.3: Source Check is not required since PRM IRE-0648 is Inoperable); therefore, "N/A" is correct. Step 6.4.4 (and Att. 11.5): Metero logical Conditions Requirements are NOT satisfied for release. Met conditions are Pasquill Stability Class F, which will not allow the resease.

NOTE: Critical step is BOLDED. SAT____UNSAT____

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 5 of 6 4. End of Task STOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 6 of 6 Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Gas Decay Tank C (and B) is to be discharged via Batch Release 2. Noble Gas Monitor, PRM -IRE-0648 is INOPERABLE,TRM 3.3.3.11 entered 3. Waste Flow Rate Measurement Device, GW M-IFT-0648 is INOPERABLE, TRM 3.3.3.11 entered 4. Meteorological conditions: Primary Met Tower T/50m reading is 1.1°C Ten Meter Wind Speed is 2 meters per second Wind Direction 270 5. RAB Exhaust Fan A is running INITIATING CUE One of your reactor operators has completed OP-007-003 Section 6.4, Discharging Gas Decay Tank, steps 6.4.1 to 6.4.4. As CRS, perform the reviews necessary to give your approval to release the GDTs specified on the release permit.

6 PRM-IRE-0648 inoperable. Multiple Gas Decay Tank Release. Additional Tank(s) Released: GDT B.

11/15/06 PRM-IRE-0648 ino p erable 11/15/0 6 N/A O O p p e e r r a a t t i i o o n n s s C C R R S S//S S S S H H P P F F o o r r e e m m a a n n//D D e e s s i i g g n n e e e e T R M3.3.3.11

( G WM RAD Monito r P R M-I R E-064 8 O O S TRM3.3.3.11 ( Waste Gas Flow Tranmsitter PRM-IFIT-0648 OOS 11/15/06 0 6-03 2 11671 285.9 15- Nov-2006 15- Nov-2006 15- Nov-2006 15- Nov-2006 15-Nov-200615-Nov-2006 15-Nov-2006 200 6 15-Nov-2006 2 006 15-Nov-2006 15-Nov-2006

15-Nov-2006

15- Nov-2006 15- Nov-2006 15- Nov-200615-Nov-2006 DETERMINE EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION SRO ADMIN 5 Site W3 Job SRO System/Duty Area PPE Mode EMERG Number 1 Revision 0 09/15/2006 Approval 09/15/2006 Arvel J. Hall Estimated Time 10 Min Time Critical No Critical Time N/A Alternate Path No References EP-001-001, Emergency Plan Implementing Document NRC KA Number 2.4.41 (RO: 2.3, SRO: 4.1)

Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 2 of 5 INITIAL CONDITIONS Initial Conditions are based upon the scenario chosen. The candidate should refer to the rough logs that were maintained during the scenario and to the indications available on the simulator.

INITIATING CUE Classify the event for the current scenario and determine the correct Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure to be entered.

TERMINATING CUE The correct level of emergency has been declared..

STANDARD Scenario 1:

Candidate classifies event as ALERT (SA1) due to the loss of offsite power and EDG B OOS for > 15 minutes.

Scenario 2:

Candidate classifies event as ALERT (FA1/

RCB1) due to the loss of the RCS barrier.

Scenario 3:

Candidate classifies event as ALERT (FA1/

RCB2) due to the loss of the RCS barrier.

TOOLS EP-001-001, Emergency Plan Implementing Document SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Incorrect Emergency Classification.

HUMAN INTERFACES None SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES None INSTRUCTOR NOTES This JPM is written to match any of the 3 scenarios prepared for this exam.

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 3 of 5 Perform the task in accordance with EP-001-001, Emergenc y Plan Implementing Document. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT. START TIME_________

Scenario 1: LOOP, Loss of All Feedwater.

1. Declare the highest emergency classification for which an IC has been met or exceeded.

CRIT CUES: Cues required for this step are contained in the rough log maintained by the crew and the indications available on the simulator.

STANDARDS: Candidate classifies event as ALERT (SA1) due to the loss of offsite power and EDG B OOS for > 15 minutes.

SAT______UNSAT______

2. Perform emergency actions of appropriate emergency plan implementing instruction.

CUES: Cues required for this step ar e contained in the procedure.

STANDARDS: Candidate states EP-001-030 to be entered SAT______UNSAT______

3. End of Task STOP TIME__________

Scenario 2: SB LOCA.

1. Declare the highest emergency classification for which an IC has been met or exceeded.

CRIT CUES: Cues required for this step are contained in the rough log maintained by the crew and the indications available on the simulator.

STANDARDS

Candidate classifies event as ALERT (FA1/RCB1) due to either: potential loss of the RCS barrier (unisolable RCS leak > 44 gpm), or loss of the RCS barrier (if RCS subcooling < 28°F).

SAT______UNSAT______

2. Perform emergency actions of appropriate emergency plan implementing instruction.

CUES: Cues required for this step ar e contained in the procedure.

STANDARDS

Candidate states EP-001-020 to be entered SAT______UNSAT______

3. End of Task STOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 4 of 5 Scenario 3: SGTR.

1. Declare the highest emergency classification for which an IC has been met or exceeded.

CRIT CUES: Cues required for this step are contained in the rough log maintained by the crew and the indications available on the simulator.

STANDARDS: Candidate classifies event as ALERT (F A1/RCB2) due to the loss of the RCS barrier. SAT______UNSAT______

2. Perform emergency actions of appropriate emergency plan implementing instruction.

CUES: Cues required for this step ar e contained in the procedure.

STANDARDS

Candidate states EP-001-020 to be entered SAT______UNSAT______

3. End of Task STOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 5 of 5 Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS Initial Conditions are based upon the scenario chosen. The candidate should refer to the rough logs that were maintained during the scenario and to the indications available on the simulator.

INITIATING CUE Classify the event for the current scenario and determine the correct Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure to be entered.

RECOVER DROPPED CEA (CONTINUOUS CEA MOTION)

RO JPM A Site W3 Job RO System/Duty Area CED Mode OFFNORM Number 35 Revision 4 09/07/2006 Approval 04/03/2000 Arvel J. Hall Estimated Time 15 Min Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path Yes References OP-901-102, CEA or CEDMCS Malfunction OP-004-004, Control Element Drive NRC KA Number 4.2-003-AA1.02 (RO: 3.6; SRO: 3.4) 4.2-001-AA2.05 (RO: 4.4; SRO: 4.6)

Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 2 of 7 INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Reactor Power is at 68 percent 2. Core age is 250 EFPD 3. CEA 87 has dropped 4. Repairs to CEA 87 have been completed 5. OP-901-102 Subsection E1, is in pr ogress, steps 1-14 have been completed INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to withdraw CEA 87 per step 15 of OP-901-102 Subsection E 1 using CEAs in MANUAL INDIVIDUAL mode. The BOP has been directed to add boric acid to the RCS at 10 gallon batches at your request in order to maintain Tc 543-546°F.

TERMINATING CUE

1. CEA 87 is aligned with other CEAs in Shutdown Bank B

2. (ALT) Reactor is tripped STANDARD 1. CEA 87 is aligned within 4 inches of other CEAs in Group P

2. (ALT) Reactor manually tripped TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES REACTIVITY EVENT HUMAN INTERFACES

1. CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES None INSTRUCTOR NOTES

1. Reset to IC 154 2. Insert RD02A87 to drop rod, THEN DELETE MALFUNCTION

3. Insert RD12A87 during CEA withdrawal, preferably 2 nd or 3 rd pull 4. Adjust RCS temperature

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 3 of 7 Perform the task in accordance with OP-901-102, Sect ion E.1. STEP 15. All components to be operated are located on CP-2. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT. Note: Examinee may initiate Boration at beginning of Task START TIME_________

1. Candidate may refer to OP-004-004, Control Element Drive section, 6.6 OPERATION OF CEAS IN MANUAL INDIVIDUAL (MI) MODE (C)

Position INDIVIDUAL CEA selection switches to CEA 87 CRIT CUES: The simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS: 1. Examinee positions individual CEA selection switch tens to 8 2. Examinee positions individual CEA selection switch units to 7 . SAT______UNSAT______

2. Position GROUP SELECT switch to group B CRIT CUES: The simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS:

Examinee positions GROUP SELECT switch to group B SAT______UNSAT______

3. Place mode select switch to MI CRIT CUES: The simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS:

Examinee positions MODE SELECT switch to MI SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 4 of 7 4. Verify: MI light illuminates. white lights on GROUP SELECTION MATR IX for Shutdown Bank B illuminates. white selection light for CEA 87 illuminates.

CUES: The simulator will provide the required cues.

STANDARDS: Examinee verifies MI light illuminates. Examinee verifies white lights on GR OUP SELECTION MATRIX for Shutdown Bank B illuminates. Examinee verifies white selection light for CEA 87 illuminates.

SAT______UNSAT______

5. Place CEA MANUAL SHIM switch to WITHDRAW.

CRIT CUES: The simulator will provide the required cues.

STANDARDS:

Examinee places CEA MANUAL SHIM switch to WITHDRAW.

SAT______UNSAT______

6. Monitor CEA 87 position indicator moving outward.

CUES: The simulator will provide the required cues.

STANDARDS:

Examinee moves CEA 87 at less than 15 in/min.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 5 of 7 7. Monitor: Reactor Power RCS temperature Axial Shape Index CUES: The simulator will provide the required cues.

STANDARDS: Examinee monitors to meters on CP-2 or PMC indications for: Power Temperature ASI SAT______UNSAT______

8. (ALT) NOTE:

On the 3 rd withdrawal, continuous outward CEA motion will begin when OUT SHIM switch released Attempt to stop outward CEA rod motion CRIT CUES: The simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS: Examinee recognizes continuous CEA withdrawal Examinee places MODE SELECTOR switch to OFF STOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 6 of 7 9. (ALT) Manually trip Reactor CRIT CUES: The simulator will provide the required cues NOTE: Examinee may refer to Subsection E 3 , Continuous Movement of CEA Group If Examinee suggests tripping the Reacto r, then direct Reactor Trip as CRS STANDARDS: Examinee recognizes continuous CEA withdrawal and recommends tripping the Reactor to CRS. (Critical) Examinee Depresses both REACTOR TRIP pushbuttons on CP-2 (Critical) Check reactor power dropping on CP-2 or CP-7 Check startup rate is negative on CP-2 or CP-7 Check less than 2 CEAS not fully inserted using o CEAC CRT on CP-2 o CEDMCS LEL Lights illuminated on CP-2 o CEA Rod Bottom Lights illuminated on CP-2 SAT______UNSAT______

10. END OF TASK.

STOP TIME________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 7 of 7 Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Reactor Power is at 68 percent 2. Core age is 250 EFPD 3. CEA 87 has dropped 4. Repairs to CEA 87 have been completed 5. OP-901-102 Subsection E1, is in pr ogress, steps 1-14 have been completed INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to withdraw CEA 87 per step 15 of OP-901-102 Subsection E 1 using CEAs in MANUAL INDIVIDUAL mode. The BOP has been directed to add boric acid to the RCS at 10 gallon batches at your request in order to maintain Tc 543-546°F.

PERFORM ACTIONS ON A RECIRCULATION ACTUATION (LEAK ON SUCTION LINE RO JPM B Site W3 Job RO System/Duty Area PPE Mode EMERG Number 1 Revision 9 09/07/2006 Approval 04/03/2000 Arvel J. Hall Estimated Time 20 Min Time Critical Critical Time YES Alternate Path YES References OP-902-002, Loss of Cool ant Accident Recovery OP-902-009, Standard Appendices NRC KA Number 4.1-E11-EA1.11 (RO: 4.2; SRO: 4.2)

Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 2 of 6 INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. The Reactor has tripped 2. A Loss of Coolant Accident in side Containment is in progress 3. OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident, has been implemented: 4. RWSP level is approaching 10% and a Recircul ation Actuation Signal (RAS) is imminent 5. Pretrips for RWSP level actuated INITIATING CUE The CRS directs you to take the actions for a Recircul ation Actuation Signal per st ep 42 of OP-902-002 after the RAS occurs.

TERMINATING CUE

1. All Safety Injection Pump Recirc Valves are closed 2. Both ESF Pump Suction Va lves from the RWSP are closed 3. All Charging Pumps are in OFF and CVC 209 is shut. 4. (ALT) SI-602B is overridden closed.

STANDARD 1. All Safety Injection Pump Recirc Valves are closed within 2 minutes of RAS actuation 2. Both ESF Pump Suction Va lves from the RWSP are closed 3. All Charging Pumps are in OFF and CVC 209 is shut. 4. (ALT) SI-602B is overridden closed.

TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Release of Radioactivity through the RWSP Vent HUMAN INTERFACES

1. SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES None INSTRUCTOR NOTES Reset to IC 155 Set up Remote SIR44B to OVERRIDE SI-602B on Event Trigger 1.

IC will have RAS signal actuate approximately 1 min after going to run Examiner will need stopwatch for time critical task Start timing when RAS actuates (step 1) Stop timing when SI-120A(B) & SI-121A(B) are all Closed (step 4) Should be within 2 minutes of RAS actuation

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 3 of 6 Perform the task in accordance with OP-902-002 and OP-902-009. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT. START TIME_________

1. Verify that an RAS occurs.

CRIT CUES: Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: Examinee observes RWSP level is approximately 10% (CP-7 or CP-8) Examinee verifies RAS annunciators on CP-2 o RAS TRAIN A LOGIC INITIATED (Cabinet K, K-19) o RAS TRAIN B LOGIC INITIATED (Cabinet K, K-20) Examinee verifies RAS trip path indica tors extinguished on all 4 PPS ROMs (CP-7)

NOTE: Examiner should start timing at this point. Critical Time Start_______

SAT______UNSAT______

2. Verify that BOTH LPSI Pumps are stopped.

CRIT CUES: Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS

Examinee verifies LPSI Pump A stopped, green OFF light lit, red START light out Examinee verifies LPSI Pump B stopped, green OFF light lit, red START light out SAT______UNSAT______

3. Verify that ESF PUMPS SUCTION SI valves are open. SI 602A SI 602B CRIT CUES: Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: 1. Examinee verifies SI 602A, green CLOSED light out, red OPEN light lit on CP-8 2. Examinee verifies SI 602B, green CLOSED light out, red OPEN light lit on CP-8.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 4 of 6 4. Close the SI PUMPS RECIRC ISOL VALVES WITHIN TWO MINUTES of receipt of RAS: SI 120A SI 120B SI 121A SI 121B.

CRIT CUES: Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: 1. Examinee takes control switch for SI 120A to CLOSE verifies green CLOSED light lit red OPEN light out 2. Examinee takes control switch for SI 120B to CLOSE verifies green CLOSED light lit red OPEN light out 3. Examinee takes control switch for SI 121A to CLOSE verifies green CLOSED light lit red OPEN light out 4. Examinee takes control switch for SI 121B to CLOSE verifies green CLOSED light lit red OPEN light out Note: Critical Time Stop_______. Should be < 2 minutes.

SAT______UNSAT______

5. Close the ESF PUMPS SUCTION RWSP: SI 106A SI 106B.

CRIT CUES: Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: 1. Examinee takes control switch for SI 106A to CLOSE verifies green CLOSED light lit red OPEN light out on CP-8 2. Examinee takes control switch for SI 106B to CLOSE verifies green CLOSED light lit red OPEN light out on CP-8 SAT______UNSAT______

6. Place all charging pumps to "OFF".

CRIT CUES: Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS:

Charging Pumps selected to OFF.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 5 of 6 7. Close CVC-209 CHARGING HEADER ISOLATION.

CRIT CUES: Simulator will provide cues (ALT) Local Operator reports large leak in wing area between SI-602B and SI-604B (ALT) CRS orders you to secure HPSI Pump B and Containment Spray Pump B and implement OP-902-009, Attachment 29 Override SI-602B.

(ALT) If examinee asks, Emergency Coordinator's permission has been provided. STANDARDS:

Close CVC-209 CHARGING HEADER ISOLATION closed.

SAT______UNSAT______

8. (ALT) Place keyswitch for SI-602B, ESF PUMP SUCTION SI PUMP, located on side of Auxiliary Panel 1, to OVERRIDE CRIT CUES: Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS:

Examinee orders NAO to obtain key for SI

-602B keyswitch and place in OVERRIDE on Auxiliary Panel 1 (Note to Booth operator) insert SIR44B remote verify Annunciator N-M14 alarms SAT______UNSAT______

9. Close SI-602B, ESF PUMP SUCTION SI PUMP, by placing on CP-8 to CLOSE CRIT CUES: NAO reports SI-602B is in override on Auxiliary panel 1. Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS:

Examinee rotates control switch for SI-602B to CLOSE, verifies green CLOSE light lit, red OPEN light out SAT______UNSAT______

10. End of Task STOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 6 of 6 Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. The Reactor has tripped 2. A Loss of Coolant Accident in side Containment is in progress 3. OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident, has been implemented: 4. RWSP level is approaching 10% and a Recircul ation Actuation Signal (RAS) is imminent 5. Pretrips for RWSP level actuated INITIATING CUE The CRS directs you to take the actions for a Recircul ation Actuation Signal per st ep 42 of OP-902-002 after the RAS occurs.

Perform ATC Immediate Actions on CR Evacuation (Fire in Control Room

)RO JPM C W3 RO OFFNORM PPO 4 Site Job System / Duty Area Mode Number 04/03/2000 4 Revision rfletch 04/05/2000Approval 5 Min Estimated Time YES No No A lternate Path Time Critical Critical Time References OP-901-502, Evacuation of Control Room & Subse q uent Plant ShutdownNRC KA Number 4.2-A 68-A K3.12, RO: 4.1; SRO: 4.5 Evaluation Methods METHOD SIMULATE Date Evaluator Trainee Observer Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. A fire has occurred in Control Room Panel CP-7 2. Control Room Evacuation has been ordered INITIATING CUE Perform IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS as ATC for C ontrol Room Evacuation per OP-901-502, Evacuation of Control Room & Subsequent Plant Shutdown TERMINATING CUE

1. IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS are taken

2. Exiting Control Room for + 21 RAB STANDARD 1. All IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS for ATC are taken within 15 minutes TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES

1. Reactor not tripped-potential for Fuel Damage HUMAN INTERFACES

1. SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES Reset to IC-30 Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-901-502 Sect ion D. 1.1-1.5. Crit ical steps are denoted by CRIT. START TIME_________

1. Trip the Reactor.

CUES: Simulator provides Cues CRIT STANDARDS

Examinee depresses REACTOR TRIP pushbuttons on CP-2 SAT______UNSAT______

2. Verify ALL CEAs fully inserted.

CUES: Simulator provides Cues CRIT STANDARDS: The examinee verifies ALL CEAs fully inserted by verifying at least one of the following: All Rod Bottom lights LIT, All CEA lower Electrical Limit lights green, CEAC CRT shows all CEAs inserted on CP-2 SAT______UNSAT______

3. Verify Spray Valves selector switch in BOTH.

CUES: Simulator provides Cues CRIT STANDARDS: The examinee verifies Spray Valves Selector switch in BOTH on CP-2 SAT______UNSAT______

4. (ALT) Trip ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps.

CUES: Simulator provides Cues CRIT STANDARDS: The examinee rotates control switch for one Oil Lift Pump for each RCP to START, verifies red START light lit, green TRIP light out. (NOTE: Performance of this step is NOT Critical) The examinee places control switches for 1A, 1B, 2A and 2B Reactor Coolant Pumps to TRIP. Verifies green STOP lights lit red START lights out.

SAT______UNSAT______

5. (ALT) S ecure Charging AND Letdown by performing the follo wing: Close CVC-101, Letdown Stop Valve. NOTE: Examinee may simultaneously close CVC-101 and 103 CRIT CUES: Simulator provides Cues STANDARDS: The examinee rotates control switch fo r CVC-101, Letdown Stop Valve to CLOSE, verifies green CLOSED light lit and red OPEN light off on CP-4.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

6. (ALT) Secure Charging AND Letdown by performing the following: Close CVC-103, Letdown Inside Containment Isolation.

CUES: Simulator provides Cues CRIT STANDARDS: The examinee rotates control switch for CVC-103, Letdown Inside Containment Isolation to CLOSE, verifies green CLOSED light lit and red OPEN light off on CP-4 SAT______UNSAT______

7. (ALT) Secure Charging AND Letdown by performing the following: Place ALL Charging Pumps in OFF. CRIT CUES: Simulator provides Cues STANDARDS

The examinee places control switches fo r all Charging Pumps to OFF, verifies green OFF light lit and red START light off on CP-4 SAT______UNSAT______

8. Obtain Operations Security Key Ring AND proceed to LCP-43.

CRIT CUES: Security Keys obtained STANDARDS: Examinee locates Security Keys from Shift Managers office and states he/she will enter the LCP-43 ROOM on +21 RAB. ( NOTE; JPM may be terminated when examinee has located keys and states he/she will go to LCP-43)

SAT______UNSAT______

9. End of Task.

STOP TIME _________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. A fire has occurred in Control Room Panel CP-7 2. Control Room Evacuation has been ordered INITIATING CUE Perform IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS as ATC for C ontrol Room Evacuation per OP-901-502, Evacuation of Control Room & Subsequent Plant Shutdown

START A REACTOR COOLANT PUMP (ALTERNATE PATH)

RO JPM D Site W3 Job RO System/Duty Area RCP Mode NORM Number 1 Revision 4 08/10/2004 Approval 04/03/2006 Arvel J. Hall Estimated Time 20 Min Time Critical No Critical Time N/A Alternate Path YES References OP-001-002, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation NRC KA Number 4.2-015/17-AA1.23, RO: 3.1; SRO 3.1 Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 2 of 6 INITIAL CONDITIONS The plant is in mode 3, RCS press is 2250 psia, Tave is 545 F RCP 1A, 1B, 2B are running INITIATING CUE The Control Room Supervisor directs you to start 2A RCP IAW with OP-001-002.

TERMINATING CUE

1. Desired RCP running

2. (ALT) RCP tripped.

STANDARD 1. Desired RCP running

2. (ALT) RCP tripped.

TOOLS OP-001-002 Att. 11.3 printout SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS Rotating Equipment PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Damage to Reactor Coolant Pump.

HUMAN INTERFACES SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES None INSTRUCTOR NOTES IC 157 with 3 RCPs running Setup: ensure Annunciators cleared to clear RCP 2A vibration HA8 alarm, HC8 is expected Print out att 11.3 OP-001-002.

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 3 of 6 Perform the task in accordance with OP-001-002 section 6.1. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT. START TIME_________

1. Review Precautions and Limitations.

CUES: None STANDARDS: Examinee reviews Precautions and limitations OP-001-002 SAT______UNSAT______

2. Verify Controlled Bleed Off (CBO) 1.2- 1.8gpm.

CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: Examinee verifies CBO 1.2-1.8gpm on RCP mimic or PMC point IAW Attachment 11.2 SAT______UNSAT______

3. Verify proper upper and lower oil reservoir level 65%

CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: 1. Examinee verifies RCP oil reservoi r level on RCP mimic or PMC point IAW 1.2 SAT______UNSAT______

4. Verify CCW flow at CP-2 to 2A RCP seal water cooler flow by checking inlet and outlet valves indicate open.

CUES: Simulator provides cues NOTE: If Examinee asks if SM/CRS desires CCW flow checked on local

indicators inform Examinee SM does not require local verification STANDARDS: 1. CC-666A, RCP 2A SEAL COOLER CCW INLET ISOLATION Open, 2. CC-680A, RCP 2A SEAL COOLER CCW OUTLET ISOLATION Open, SAT______UNSAT______

5. Test all annunciators on CP-2 and CP-18 and verify all RCP alarms indicate.

CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: 1. CP-2 and CP-18 annunciators tested satisfactorily.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 4 of 6 6. Verify RCP 2A High Vibration alarm is clear.

CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: 1. Examinee verifies annunciator RCP 2A VIBRATION HI (Cabinet H, A-8) clear. SAT______UNSAT______

7. Start RCP 2A oil lift pump.

CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: 1. Examinee places RCP 2A oil lift pump A or B to ON.

SAT______UNSAT______

8. Verify proper high Pressure Oil Lift System pressure for RCP 2A by observing annunciator clear. CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: 1. Examinee verifies annunciator RCP 2A BRNG LIFT OIL PRESS LO (Cabinet H, D-7) is clear.

SAT______UNSAT______

9. Verify RCS pressure and temperature ar e within limits of attachment 11.1.

CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: 1. Examinee verifies RCS pressure and temperature limits are within 1.1 (Note: examinee may use operator aid on MCB).

SAT______UNSAT______

10. Verify <100 F differential temperature between RCS Cold leg and Steam Generator.

CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: 1. This step is not applicable one RCP is already running in each loop.

SAT______UNSAT______

11. Refer to attachment 11.3 while per forming steps 6.1.16 through 6.1.26.

CUES: Provide Examinee with Attachment 11.3 after located in procedure STANDARDS: 1. Examinee locates Attachment 11.3.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 5 of 6 12. Verify associated RCP Oil Lift pump operati ng at normal pressure for minimum of 2 minutes. CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: 1. Examinee verifies RCP 2A BRNG LIFT OIL PRESS LO (Cabinet H, D-7) annunciator cleared.

SAT______UNSAT______

13. Start RCP 2A.

CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: 1. Examinee places and holds RCP 2A control switch to start 2. Examinee verifies RCP 2A breaker indication light indicates running.

SAT______UNSAT______

14. Trip RCP 2A if high vibration occurs.

CRIT CUES: NOTE: Simulator operator inserts RC07A RCP 2A HI Vib malfunction after RCP 2A stabilizes after start.

CUE: If Examinee recommends securing RCP then direct securing RCP 2A as CRS. STANDARDS: 1. Examinee recognizes (Cabinet H, A-8) annunciator and takes RCP 2A control switch to STOP.

SAT______UNSAT______

End of Task STOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 6 of 6 Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS The plant is in mode 3, RCS press is 2250 psia, Tave is 545 F RCP 1A, 1B, 2B are running . INITIATING CUE The Control Room Supervisor directs you to start 2A RCP IAW with OP-001-002. .

PLACE HYDROGEN RECO MBINER IN SERVICE RO JPM E Site W3 Job RO System/Duty Area HR Mode NORM Number 2 Revision 2 09/08/1995 Approval 04/03/2006 Arvel J. Hall Estimated Time 10 Min Time Critical No Critical Time N/A Alternate Path NO References OP-008-006, Hydrogen Recombiner NRC KA Number 3.5-028-A2.01 (RO: 3.4; SRO: 3.6) 3.5-028-A4.01 (RO: 4.0; SRO: 4.0)

Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 2 of 6 INITIAL CONDITIONS Plant is shutdown and depressurized following a LOCA Containment Hydrogen level is at 3% Post Loca Containment pressure is 20.7 psia on Containment Atmosphere Pressure indicator Pre-loca average containment temperature is 105 F INITIATING CUE Directed by the CRS to place Hydrogen Recombiner A in Service TERMINATING CUE Hydrogen Recombiner is in service STANDARD Hydrogen Recombiner is in service TOOLS Calculator SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS None PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Excessive H2 concentration HUMAN INTERFACES SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES None INSTRUCTOR NOTES Reset to IC-155 Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 3 of 6 Perform the task in accordance with OP-008-006 section 6.1. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT. START TIME_________

1. Record present Post-LOCA containment pressure.

CRIT CUES: Cues are given by initial conditions STANDARDS: Examinee records 20.7 psia on A ttachment 11.2 step 6.1.1.1 SAT______UNSAT______

2. Record Pre-LOCA Containment Aver age Temperature on Attachment 11.2.

CRIT CUES: Cues are given by initial conditions STANDARDS:

Examinee records 105 F on Attachment 11.2 step 6.1.1.2 SAT______UNSAT______

3. Determine Pressure factor Cp from Attachment 11.4 CRIT CUES: None STANDARDS:

Examinee determines that Pressure factor is 1.26 - 1.28 and records on 1.2 SAT______UNSAT______

4. Determine Hydrogen Recombiner Power Control setting on Attachment 11.2.

CRIT CUES: None STANDARDS:

Examine determines that power contro l setting is 60.48 - 61.44 and records on 1.2 SAT______UNSAT______

5. Verify Hydrogen Recombiner A Power Control potentiometer is set at zero.

CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:

Examinee verifies power control potentiometer is set at aero.

SAT______UNSAT______

6. Place Hydrogen Recombiner power c ontrol switch HRA-001A to ON CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:

Examinee places HRA-001A to ON, verifies power on light lit.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 4 of 6 7. Slowly adjust Hydrogen Recombiner Power Cont rol Potentiometer until 5 KW is indicated on power meter.

CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:

Examinee adjusts potentiometer until 5K W is indicated on HREM-EM-960.

SAT______UNSAT______

8. Hold reading for 10 minutes.

CUES: State that 10 minutes have elapsed STANDARDS:

Examinee states that reading must be held for 10 minutes.

SAT______UNSAT______

9. Verify Hydrogen Thermocouple temperatures trend upward when adjusting power control Potentiometer.

CUES: Cue Examinee that temperature indicates upward trend NOTE; simulator response is slow and Meter scale is such that visual indication will not be possible in a timely fashion STANDARDS:

Examinee verifies upward temperature trend on HRA-0001A SAT______UNSAT______

10. Adjust Hydrogen power control Potent iometer until 10 KW is indicated.

CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:

Examinee adjusts potentiometer until 10 KW is indicated.

SAT______UNSAT______

11. Hold for 10 minutes.

CUES: 10 minutes have elapsed STANDARDS:

Examinee states that reading must be held for 10 minutes.

SAT______UNSAT______

12. Adjust Hydrogen power control Potent iometer until 20 KW is indicated.

CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:

Examinee adjusts potentiometer until 20 KW is indicated.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 5 of 6 13. Adjust power control Potentiometer for Hydrogen Recombiner A to setting calculated on attachment 11.2.

CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: 1. Examinee adjusts potentiometer until 60.48 - 61.44 KW is indicated.

SAT______UNSAT______

14. Adjust Hydrogen Recombiner Power Control Potentiometer as necessary to maintain heater temperature >1225 F to 1400 F. CRIT CUES: Cue temperatures indicate the following when associated thermocouple selected:

TC-1 = 1245 TC-2 = 1250 TC-3 = 1255 STANDARDS:

Examinee calculates average temperature to be 1250 F SAT______UNSAT______

15. Record Containment Hydrogen concentration, Date and time on attachment 11.3 when hydrogen recombiner heater temperature reaches >1225 F. CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues NOTE: Examinee may refer to section 6.2 for proper operation STANDARDS:

Examinee records current date/time and hydrogen concentration from initial conditions.

SAT______UNSAT______

End of Task STOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 6 of 6 Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS Plant is shutdown and depressurized following a LOCA Containment Hydrogen level is at 3% Post Loca Containment pressure is 20.7 psia on Containment Atmosphere Pressure indicator Pre-loca average containment temperature is 105 F . INITIATING CUE Directed by the CRS to place Hydrogen Recombiner A in Service

RESTORE NORMAL POWER TO A 4.16 SAFETY BUSS AND SECURE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR RO JPM F Site W3 Job RO System/Duty Area EDG Mode EMERG Number 100 Revision 1 11/20/2001 Approval 04/03/2006 Arvel J. Hall Estimated Time 15 Min Time Critical No Critical Time N/A Alternate Path YES References OP-902-009, Standard Appendices NRC KA Number 3.6-064-A2.03 RO: 3.1; SRO: 3.1 Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 2 of 5 INITIAL CONDITIONS The plant is in mode 3 following a reactor trip 4.16 KV Safety Bus A2 is energized from Offsite Power 4.16 KV Safety Bus A3 is energized from EDG A INITIATING CUE CRS directs you to transfer 4.16 KV Safety Bus A3 from EDG to Offsite power IAW OP-902-009 Attachment-12C TERMINATING CUE EDG a is secured STANDARD 4.16 KV Safety Bus is being powered from non-safety 4.16 KV bus A2 TOOLS Synchronizer key SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS None PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Potential loss of ESF power from 4.16KV safety bus A3 Possible damage to EDG A due to loss of lube oil HUMAN INTERFACES SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES None INSTRUCTOR NOTES IC-156 Ensure no SIAS present Insert remote ED10A to trip EDG A if NAO ordered to trip diesel locally Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 3 of 5 Perform the task in accordance with OP-902-009 Attachment 12C. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT. START TIME_________

1. Verify bus A3S to A2 tie breaker OPEN.

CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: A3S to A2 tie breaker open SAT______UNSAT______

2. Close A2 to A3S tie breaker.

CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:

A2 to A3S tie breaker closed SAT______UNSAT______

3. Place synchronizer keyswitch in "BUS TIE" CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: 1. Synchronizer keyswitch is in "BUS TIE" position SAT______UNSAT______

4. Adjust EDG A voltage to equal system voltage.

CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: 1. EDG A voltage approximately equal to system voltage, SAT______UNSAT______

5. Adjust engine speed until Synchroscope rotates slowly clockwise.

CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: 1. Synchroscope rotating slowly in the clockwise direction.

SAT______UNSAT______

6. Close A3S to A2 tie breaker at 5 minut es to 12 position on the Synchroscope.

CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: 1. Examinee verifies Synchroscope positi on at 5 minutes to 12 prior to closing tie breaker. 2. Bus A3S to A2 tie breaker closed SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 4 of 5 7. Place Synchronizer keyswitch to OFF.

CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: 1. Synchronizer keyswitch OFF.

SAT______UNSAT______

8. Reduce load on EDG to 0.1 MW and 0.1 MVARS.

CRIT CUES: After Examinee begins reducing MW Cue NAO reports a large oil leak on the engine driven lube oil pump discharge and crankcase oil level is dropping STANDARDS: 1. Examinee locates speed control sw itch and starts to reduce load.

SAT______UNSAT______

9. Examinee depresses EDG A trip pushbutton on CP-1 or orders NAO to pull Manual Fuel Oil overspeed Trip locally.

CRIT CUES: 1. Simulator provides cues if trip pushbutton is used 2. If Examinee orders NAO to pull overspeed trip insert remote EG10A STANDARDS: 1. EDG A Tripped SAT______UNSAT______

End of Task STOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 5 of 5 Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS The plant is in mode 3 following a reactor trip 4.16 KV Safety Bus A2 is energized from Offsite Power 4.16 KV Safety Bus A3 is energized from EDG A . INITIATING CUE CRS directs you to transfer 4.16 KV Safety Bus A3 from EDG to Offsite power IAW OP-902-009 Attachment-12C

REALIGN CONTAINMENT SPRAY FOR AUTOM ATIC INITIATION FOLLOWING CSAS RO JPM G Site W3 Job RO System/Duty Area CS Mode EMER Number 11 Revision 3 09/12/2006 Approval 04/03/2006 Arvel J. Hall Estimated Time 15 Min Time Critical No Critical Time N/A Alternate Path NO References OP-902-009, Standard Appendices NRC KA Number 3.5-026-A2.08 (RO: 3.2; SRO: 3.7) 3.5-026-A4.01 (RO: 4.5; SRO: 4.3) 3.5-026-A4.05 (RO: 3.5; SRO: 3.5)

Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 2 of 5 INITIAL CONDITIONS A Loss of Coolant Accident has occurred.

A Containment Spray Actuation has occurred.

Containment pressure has been reduced to < 17.7 psia.

INITIATING CUE The CRS directs you to reset CSAS per OP-902-009 Appendix 5.

TERMINATING CUE Containment Spray aligned for Automatic initiation STANDARD Containment Spray aligned for Auto Initiation TOOLS None SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS None PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Thermal shock to RCP seals if CCW valves not taken to CLOSE.

Containment Spray System may not be proper ly aligned to re-initiate as designed.

HUMAN INTERFACES CRS May inform NAO of securing CS pumps SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES None INSTRUCTOR NOTES Reset to IC-158 (or a post-LOCA IC with Cont ainment Pressure restored to < 17.7 psia).

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 3 of 5 Perform the task in accordance with OP-902-009 A ttachment 5-E. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT. START TIME_________

1. Place control switches for RCP CCW supply valves to CLOSE.

CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: Examinee places control switches for the following valves to CLOSE (CP-8): CC 641, RCP INLET OUTSIDE ISOL CC 710, RCP OUTLET INSIDE ISOL CC 713, RCP OUTLET OUTSIDE ISOL SAT______UNSAT______

2. Reset CSAS Initiation Relays on ALL four channels.

CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:

Examinee performs the following on each (4 total) PPS Channel (CP-10): (NOTE: Critical Elements are in BOLD) Place Reset Permissive keyswitch to UNLK. Press CSAS pushbutton. Verify the initiation relay indicator lit on the ESFAS mimic. Place Reset Permissive keyswitch to LK.

SAT______UNSAT______

3. Reset CSAS actuation logic on BOTH trains.

CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: 1. Examinee presses both CSAS Reset pushbuttons (CP-33). 2. Examinee verifies the actuation relay indicator lit on the ESFAS mimic (CP-10) SAT______UNSAT______

3. Stop BOTH CS Pumps (CP-8).

CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:

Examinee places control switches fo r the following pumps to OFF (CP-8) Containment Spray Pump A Containment Spray Pump B SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 4 of 5 4. Close the Containment Spray Valves.

CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:

Examinee closes the following valves: CS 125A, CNTMT SPRAY HEADER A ISOL CS 125B, CNTMT SPRAY HEADER B ISOL SAT______UNSAT______

5. Place BOTH Containment Spray pump c ontrol switches to normal position.

CRIT CUES: Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:

Examinee places control switches for the following pumps to the mid position (CP-8): Containment Spray Pump A Containment Spray Pump B SAT______UNSAT______

6. End of Task STOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 5 of 5 Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS A Loss of Coolant Accident has occurred.

A Containment Spray Actuation has occurred.

Containment pressure has been reduced to < 17.7 psia.

INITIATING CUE The CRS directs you to reset CSAS per OP-902-009 Appendix 5.

PERFORM ACTION IN RESPONSE TO CCW SYSTEM LEAKAGE RO JPM H Site W3 Job RO System/Duty Area CC Mode OFFNOR M Number 8 Revision 2 05/05/1995 Approval 04/03/2000 Arvel J. Hall Estimated Time 15 Min Time Critical No Critical Time N/A Alternate Path No References OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction NRC KA Number 4.2-026-A2.01 RO: 2.9; SRO: 3.5 Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 2 of 5 INITIAL CONDITIONS CCW leakage is in progress CCW surge tank level is being maintained by automatic operation.

Steps 1-10 section E1 Op-901-510 have been completed INITIATING CUE The Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform actions to locate Header with leakage IAW with OP-901-510.

TERMINATING CUE Examinee determines CCW leak is located on the Header.

STANDARD Examinee determines CCW leak is located on the Header.

TOOLS None SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Loss of CCW.

HUMAN INTERFACES SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES None INSTRUCTOR NOTES Reset to IC-30 Insert Malfunction CC17A, CCW pump A discharge leak 3%.

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 3 of 5 Perform the task in accordance with OP-901-510 Section E1. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT. START TIME_________

1. Determine if leak is in the NNS Loop by performing the following.

CRIT CUES: Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS:

Examinee closes the following valves: CC-501 NNS LOOP SUPPLY ISOL CC-562 NNS LOOP RETURN ISOL SAT______UNSAT______

2. If CCW surge tank level continues to cycle OR makeup system is operating to maintain level then Open the following valves:

CRIT CUES: Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS:

Examinee determines leak is not in the NNS header and opens the following valves: CC-501 NNS LOOP SUPPLY ISOL CC-562 NNS LOOP RETURN ISOL SAT______UNSAT______

3. IF leak is in the NNS Loop then perform the following:

CRIT CUES: Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS:

Examinee identifies that leak is not in the NNS header SAT______UNSAT______

4. Split out the CCW Headers by closing the following valves: Train A CC-126A/CC-114A CCW Suct & Di sch HEADER TIE VALVES AB TO A CC-126A/CC-115A CCW Suct & Di sch HEADER TIE VALVES AB TO A CRIT CUES: Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS:

Examinee Places control switch fo r the following valves to CLOSE:

CC-126A/CC-114A CCW SUCT & DISCH HEADER TIE VALVES AB TO A CC-127A/CC-115A CCW SUCT & DISCH HEADER TIE VALVES AB TO A SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 4 of 5 5. Split out the CCW Headers by closing the following valves: Train B CC-126B/CC-114B CCW Suct & Di sch HEADER TIE VALVES AB TO B CC-127B/CC-115BA CCW Suct & Di sch HEADER TIE VALVES AB TO B CRIT CUES: Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS:

Examinee Places control switch fo r the following valves to CLOSE: CC-126B/CC-114B CCW SUCT & DISCH HEADER TIE VALVES AB TO B CC-127B/CC-115B CCW SUCT & DISCH HEADER TIE VALVES AB TO B SAT______UNSAT______

6. If CCW Pump AB is operating then locally check suction and discharge headers for leaks CUES: Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS:

Examinee identifies that AB pump is not operating SAT______UNSAT______

7. Verify CC-200B/CC-563 CCW Suct & Di sch HEADER TIE VALVES B TO AB open CUES: Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS:

Examinee verifies CC-200B/CC-563 CCW Suct & Disch HEADER TIE VALVES B TO AB open SAT______UNSAT______

8. Close CC-200A/CC-727 CCW Suct & Di sch HEADER TIE VALVES A TO AB CRIT CUES: Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS:

Examinee Places CC-200A/CC-727 CCW contro l switch for the following valves to CLOSE:

SAT______UNSAT______

9. Verify the following Pump cont rol Switches are in AUTO CRIT CUES: Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS:

Examinee verifies A and B CCW makeup Pump control switches are in AUTO SAT______UNSAT______

10. If CCW Surge Tank Level A drops < 50% then Leak is confined to CCW Safety Header A CRIT CUES: Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS:

Examinee verifies identifies CCW leak is confined to Safety Header A SAT______UNSAT______

END OF TASK STOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 5 of 5 Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS CCW leakage is in progress CCW surge tank level is being maintained by automatic operation.

Steps 1-10 section E1 Op-901-510 have been completed.

INITIATING CUE The Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform actions to locate Header with leakage IAW with OP-901-510.

OPERATE THE ATMOSHERIC DUMP VALVES LOCALLY (ALTERNATE PATH)

RO JPM I Site W3 Job NAO System/Duty Area MS Mode OFFNOR M Number 8 Revision 2 08/30/2006 Approval 04/03/2006 Arvel J. Hall Estimated Time 30 Min Time Critical No Critical Time N/A Alternate Path YES References OP-901-502, Evacuation of Control Room and Subsequent Plant Shutdown NRC KA Number 2.1.20 3.4-039-A4.07 4.2-A68-AA1.01 4.2-A68-AK3.06 Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 2 of 5 INITIAL CONDITIONS A fire has occurred in CP-2.

Control Room evacuation has occurred and controls have been transferred to LCP-43.

INITIATING CUE You have been directed by the ATC to take control of Atmospheric Dump Valve (ADV), MS-116A, and open it approximately 50%.

TERMINATING CUE ADV, MS-116A, is positioned per Initiating Cue STANDARD ADV, MS-116A, is positioned as required using Local Handwheel.

TOOLS None SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS Climbing ladders to platforms.

Trip and bump hazards in and around +46 Wing Area.

Hot piping.

PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Equipment Damage Overheating or overcooling of RCS Cooldown Rate in excess of Technical Specifications HUMAN INTERFACES ATC SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES None INSTRUCTOR NOTES Provide OP-901-502, Attachment 15 to Examinee Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 3 of 5 Perform the task IAW OP-901-502, Attachm ent 15. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT. START TIME_________

1. Record the pressure at the outlet of the transducer _______psig.

CRIT CUES: The actual transducer pressure gauge provides the cue.

STANDARDS: Examinee locates proper pressure gauge and records the actual pressure (should be around 3-5 psig)

SAT______UNSAT______

2. Adjust the pressure at the air regulator out let on the front of the panel to the pressure recorded in note 1.

CRIT CUES: Alternate Path:

the air regulator pressure will not lower.

STANDARDS:

Examinee simulates turning handle on top of the regulator counter clockwise.

SAT______UNSAT______

3. Inform Control Room that ADV will not operate in local pneumatic.

CRIT CUES: ATC directs Examinee to position ADV A to approx 50% using the local handwheel.

STANDARDS:

Examinee simulates informing Control r oom Atmospheric Dump will not operate in local pneumatic.

SAT______UNSAT______

4. Close local NG/IA isolation to the positioner to MS-116A.

CRIT CUES: NG-8271C, NG/IA Isolati on to MS-116A, is closed.

STANDARDS:

Examinee simulates closing NG-8271C, NG/IA Isolation to MS-116A.

SAT______UNSAT______

5. Open Regulator Petcock Drain and bleed off Air/N2 pressure.

CRIT CUES: Regulator is vented.

STANDARDS:

Examinee simulates opening Regulator Petcock Drain.

SAT______UNSAT______

6. Open MS-116A SG 1 MA Atm Dump Vlv Loc al Valve Positioner Equalizing Valve.

CRIT CUES: Positioner Equalizing Valve is open. STANDARDS:

Examinee simulates opening Positioner Equalizing Valve.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 4 of 5 7. Unscrew Clevis from top of the Manual Override shaft.

CRIT CUES: Clevis is free.

STANDARDS:

Examinee simulates unscrewing clevis from manual override shaft SAT______UNSAT______

8. Turn handwheel to expose actuator shaft above manual override shaft.

CRIT CUES: Actuator shaft is exposed.

STANDARDS:

Examinee simulates turning handwheel to expose actuator shaft above manual override shaft.

SAT______UNSAT______

9. Slide Clevis onto actuator shaft.

CRIT CUES: Clevis is positioned on actuator shaft STANDARDS:

Examinee simulates sliding Clevis onto actuator shaft.

SAT______UNSAT______

10. Turn handwheel to Open MS-116A to desired position.

CRIT CUES: MS-116A is at 50%.

STANDARDS:

Examinee simulates turning handwheel counter clockwise.

SAT______UNSAT______

11. End of Task STOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 5 of 5 Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS A fire has occurred in CP-2.

Control Room evacuation has occurred and controls have been transferred to LCP-43.

INITIATING CUE You have been directed by the ATC to take control of Atmospheric Dump Valve (ADV), MS-116A, and open it approximately 50%.

PERFORM A SUPS A STARTUP RO JPM J Site W3 Job NAO System/Duty Area ID Mode NORM Number 2 Revision 2 8/30/2006 Approval 04/03/2006 Arvel J. Hall Estimated Time 15 Min Time Critical NO Critical Time N/A Alternate Path NO References OP-006-005, Inverters and Distribution NRC KA Number 3.6-062-K4.10 3.6-062-A2.10 3.6-062-A3.04 Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 2 of 7 INITIAL CONDITIONS SUPS A has been shutdown for maintenance.

PDP 90A is energized from its Bypass source.

SUPS A is ready to be returned to service.

INITIATING CUE The ATC directs you to startup SUPS A.

TERMINATING CUE SUPS A energized and operating.

STANDARD SUPS A is energized and in operation.

TOOLS None SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS None PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Equipment damage HUMAN INTERFACES NPO SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES None INSTRUCTOR NOTES Provide Attachment 11.9, OP-006-005 Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 3 of 7 Perform the task IAW OP-006-005, section

5.2. Critical

steps are denoted by CRIT. START TIME_________

1. Verify the following SUPS A panel breakers OFF: ID-EBKR-A-2, SUPS A AC Input to Rectifier ID-EBKR-A-3, SUPS A Battery Input ID-EBKR-A-6, SUPS A Inverter Output ID-EBKR-A-7, SUPS A Bypass Source AC Input CUES: After the examinee locates the individual breakers, cue examinee the breakers are off STANDARDS: All breakers verified off SAT______UNSAT______

2. Verify Manual Bypass Switch in BYPASS TO LOAD.

CUES: After examinee locates manual bypass switch, cue examinee the switch is in the 'BYPASS TO LOAD' position.

STANDARDS:

Examinee verifies the manual bypass switch is in 'BYPASS TO LOAD' position SAT______UNSAT______

3. If PDP-90A is not energized from Bypass Source, then: Refer to Att. 11.10.

CUES: Cue in Initial Conditions states that PDP-90A is energized from Bypass Source.

STANDARDS:

Examinee should not perform this step.

SAT______UNSAT______

4. Verify the following SUPS A supply breakers to ON: ID-EBKR-312A-2F, SUPS A Normal Supply ID-EBKR-311A-3M, SUPS A Bypass Supply ID-EBKR-A-35, SUPS A Emergency Supply (DC)

CRIT CUES: 1. When examinee locates each SUPS supply breaker , cue examinee as follows: ID-EBKR-312A-2F, SUPS A Normal Supply - OFF ID-EBKR-311A-3M, SUPS A Bypass Supply - ON ID-EBKR-A-35, SUPS A Emergency Supply (DC) - OFF

2. After examinee simulates repositioning breakers , cue examinee the breakers are ON STANDARDS:

SUPS supply breakers verified on.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 4 of 7 5. Press and hold Precharge pushbutton on SUPS A. When Precharge light (Amber light) is lit, then Close Battery Input (ID-EBKR-A-3). Release Precharge pushbutton.

CRIT CUES: After examinee locates the DC IN PUT METER, and the PRECHARGE PUSHBUTTON, and has simulated depressing the PRECHARGE PUSHBUTTON, cue examinee the Precharge voltage is approximately 125 VDC on DC INPUT METER and the PRECHARGE LIGHT is lit.

STANDARDS:

1. Examinee depresses and holds PRECHARGE PUSHBUTTON until PRECHARGE LIGHT is lit.

2. Examinee closes BATTERY IN PUT BREAKER (ID-EBKR-A-3), and then releases the PRECHARGE PUSHBUTTON SAT______UNSAT______

6. Verify Closed the following breakers on SUPS A: AC Input To Rectifier (ID-EBKR-A-2) AC Input To Isolimiter (ID-EBKR-A-8) Bypass Source AC Input (ID-EBKR-A-7) System Output (ID-EBKR-A-4) Inverter Output (ID-EBKR-A-6)

CRIT CUES: After examinee locates and simulates closing the breakers, cue the examinee breakers are closed STANDARDS:

Examinee verifies breakers are closed SAT______UNSAT______

7. If Bypass Source Supplying Load light is Extinguished and Inverter Supplying Load is Illuminated (approximately 30 seconds), then:

CRIT CUES: 1. After examinee locates BYPASS SOURCE SUPPLYING LOAD light, cue examinee light is lit.

2. After examinee locates INVERTER SUPPLYING LOAD light, cue examinee light is NOT lit.

STANDARDS:

1. Examinee should recognize that th is step (5.2.7) is not required.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 5 of 7 8. If Bypass Source Supplying Load light is not Extinguished and Inverter Supplying Load is not Illuminated (approximately 30 seconds), then: Verify unit is In Sync Transfer Manual Bypass Switch to NORMAL OPERATION. Depress INVERTER TO LOAD pushbutton.

CRIT CUES: 1. After examinee locates BYPASS SOURCE SUPPLYING LOAD light, cue examinee light is lit. 2. After examinee locates INVERTER SUPPLYING LOAD light, cue examinee light is NOT lit. 3. After examinee locates IN SYNC light, cue examinee light is lit. 4. After examinee locates and transfers the MANUAL BYPASS switch to NORMAL OPERATION, cue examinee switch is in the NORMAL OPERATION position.

5. After examinee locates and depresses INVERTER TO LOAD pushbutton, cue examinee:

INVERTER SUPPLYING LOAD light is lit BYPASS SOURCE SUPPLYING LOAD light is NOT lit.

STANDARDS:

1. Examinee verifies BYPASS SOURCE SUPPLYING LOAD light is lit.

2. Examinee verifies IN SYNC light is lit.

4. Examinee depresses INVERTER TO LOAD pushbutton.

SAT______UNSAT______

9. Close DC Input breaker to SU PS A Annunciator, ID-EBKR-A-5.

CRIT CUES: After examinee locates and simulates closing the breaker, cue examinee the breaker is closed.

STANDARDS:

Examinee simulates closing breaker.

SAT______UNSAT______

10. Perform Attachment 11.9, SUPS A Breaker Lineup.

CUES: After examinee locates and verifies breaker positions per ATTACHMENT 11.9, Cue examinee all breakers are properly positioned. STANDARDS:

All breaker positions verified per ATTACHMENT 11.9 SAT______UNSAT______

11. Refer to Attachment 11.10, SUPS A Ci rcuit Loads, and place required SUPS A load breakers to ON at SM/CRS discretion.

CUES: Cue the examinee the CRS has determined that this step is NOT necessary.

STANDARDS:

Examinee should not perform this step.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 6 of 7 12. Verify SUPS A output frequency when loads are s upplied from the inverter is 59.2 to 60.8 Hertz. CUES: Actual SUPS A indication provides the c ue for this step (should be within limits specified).

STANDARDS:

Examinee locates indication and verifies inverter is 59.2 to 60.8 Hertz.

SAT______UNSAT______

13. End of Task STOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 7 of 7 Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS SUPS A was completely shutdown for maintenance.

PDP 90A is deenergized.

SUPS A is ready to be returned to service.

INITIATING CUE The ATC directs you to startup SUPS A.

PLACE GAS DECAY TANK ON DECAY RO JPM K Site W3 Job NAO System/Duty Area GWM Mode NORM Number 4 Revision 1 09/07/2006 Approval 04/03/2006 Arvel J. Hall Estimated Time 25 Min Time Critical No Critical Time N/A Alternate Path NO References OP-007-003, Gaseous Waste Management NRC KA Number 3.9-071-A4.05 (RO: 2.6; SRO: 2.6)

Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 2 of 6 INITIAL CONDITIONS Gas Decay Tank A is in service.

GDT A and B oxygen and Hydrogen limits are with in Technical Specification limits.

Gas Analyzer is operable.

INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to place Gas Decay Tank B in service and place Gas Decay Tank A on decay in accordance with Section 6.2 and 6.3 of OP-007-003, Gaseous Waste Management TERMINATING CUE Gas Decay Tank B in service and Gas Decay Tank A is lined up for decay STANDARD Gas Decay Tank B in service and Gas Decay Tank A is lined up for decay TOOLS OP-007-003, Gaseous Waste Management SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS Radiological considerations for valve lo cated greater than 8 feet above the floor.

Ladder safety considerations for reaching valv e located greater than 8 feet above the floor.

PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Unmonitored release of radioactivity HUMAN INTERFACES ATC/BOP SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES None INSTRUCTOR NOTES None Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 3 of 6 Perform the task IAW OP-007-003, Section 6.

2 and 6.3. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT. START TIME_________

1. Open Gas Decay tank B Inlet manual Isolation, GWM-2055B CRIT CUES: After examinee simulates opening valve, cue that GWM-2055B is open.

STANDARDS: Examinee locates GWM-2055B in -35' RAB GDT Room B and locally simulates opening GWM-2055B (counter-clockwise direction).

NOTE: This valve is located > 8 feet from the floor; however, a permanent platform is built for the operation of this valve. HP does not need to be informed of this operation, but the examinee may c hoose to request an HP survey. If so, inform the examinee that it has been surveyed.

SAT______UNSAT______

2. Position the CHARGE/OFF/RELEASE control switch for GDT B to CHARGE position CRIT CUES: CHARGE/OFF/RELEASE control switch for GDT B in CHARGE position STANDARDS: At LCP-42, examinee simulates placi ng CHARGE/OFF/RELEASE control switch for GDT B to CHARGE position.

SAT______UNSAT______

3. Verify GDT B Discharge Isolation GWM-305B Closed.

CUES: Green light is ON and Red light is OFF for GDT B Discharge Isolation GWM-305B Closed STANDARDS

At LCP-42, examinee verifies Green li ght is ON, and Red light is OFF for GWM-305B SAT______UNSAT______

4. Verify GDT B Inlet Isolation GWM-206B Open CUES: After examinee simulates depressing bu tton, cue that Red light is ON and Green light is OFF for GDT B Inlet Isolation GWM-206B.

NOTE: Examinee recognizes requirement to minimize time both GDT inlet valves are open to minimize transfer of Gas.

STANDARDS: 1. At LCP-42, examinee simulates depressing Gas Decay Tank B Inlet Isolation, GWM-206B, pushbutton. 2. Examinee verifies Red light is ON, and Green light is OFF for GWM-206B.

SAT______UNSAT______

5. Contact Chemistry to transfer Gas A nalyzer sample point to GDT B.

CRIT CUES: Chemistry transfers Gas Analyzer sample point to GDT B.

STANDARDS

Examinee notifies Chemistry to transfer Ga s Analyzer sample point to GDT B.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 4 of 6 6. Complete Attachment 11.8, Gas Decay Tank Sample Verification CRIT CUES: 1. Document GDT lineup on Att. 11.8.

2. Examiner circles "B" and dates on step 3 of Att. 11.8.

STANDARDS: 1. Examinee Circles GDT B Placed In Service and initials and dates Step 1 2. Examinee ensures that the Chemistry Tech Transfers Gas Analyzer sample point to GDT B and circles "B".

SAT______UNSAT______

7. Verify in service GDT pressure is > 10 psig.

CRIT CUES: GDT B pressure is 11 psig.

STANDARDS:

At LCP-42, examinee verifies in serv ice GDT B pressure is > 10 psig.

SAT______UNSAT______

8. Place CHARGE/OFF/RELEASE control switch for Gas Decay Tank A to the OFF position CRIT CUES: CHARGE/OFF/RELEASE control switch for Gas Decay Tank A is in OFF STANDARDS

At LCP-42, examinee simulates placi ng CHARGE/OFF/RELEASE control switch for Gas Decay Tank A to OFF.

SAT______UNSAT______

9. Verify Gas Decay Tank A Inlet Isolation, GWM-206A, Closed.

CRIT CUES: After examinee simulates depressing bu tton, cue that Red light is ON and Green light is OFF for GDT B Inlet Isolation GWM-206A.

STANDARDS: 1. At LCP-42, examinee simulates depressing Gas Decay Tank A Inlet Isolation, GWM-206A, pushbutton. 2. Examinee verifies Red light is ON, and Green light is OFF for GWM-206A.

SAT______UNSAT______

10. Close Gas Decay Tank A Inlet Manual Isolation, GWM-2055A (B) (C), for GDT being placed on decay.

CRIT CUES: After examinee simulates closing valve, cue that GWM-2055A is closed.

STANDARDS:

Examinee locates GWM-2055A in -35 RAB GDT Room A and simulates closing

GWM-2055A (clockwise direction).

NOTE: This valve is located > 8 feet from the floor, the examinee should recognize the following safety/rad prec autions prior to operating valve: 1. Must have HP survey valve area. 2. Must use ladder to reach valve.

Examinee should locate ladder storage area on the -35 RAB.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 5 of 6 12. Complete Attachment 11.8, Gas Decay Tank Sample Verification.

CRIT CUES: 1. Document GDT lineup on Att. 11.8.

2. Examiner signs for receipt of a copy of Att. 11.8.

STANDARDS: 1. Examinee circles GDT A removed from service and initials and dates step. 2. Examinee ensures that the Chemistry Tech receives a copy of Att. 11.8.

SAT______UNSAT______

End of Task STOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 6 of 6 Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS Gas Decay Tank A is in service.

GDT A and B oxygen and Hydrogen limits are with in Technical Specification limits.

Gas Analyzer is operable.

INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to place Gas Decay Tank B in service and place Gas Decay Tank A on decay in accordance with Section 6.2 and 6.3 of OP-007-003, Gaseous Waste Management

A ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Waterford III Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: IC-19 70%, MOC Turnover: EFW Pump A tagged out and is expected to be returned to service by the end of shift. HPSI Pump A is tagged out and is expected to be returned to service within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . MFW Pump B has recently been returned to service following emergent maintenance. Plant is ready to restore power to 100%. Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*

Event Description 1 N/A R(RO) N(BOP/SRO) Crew performs a brief and commences power escalation toward 100% power.

2 SG07D2 I(BOP/SRO) SG 2 Channel D low pressure trip setpoint fails high. The crew should enter TS 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 and take required actions to bypass SG Pressure Low and SG P 1 and 2 (EFAS) in PPS Channel D.

3 CV12A2 I(RO/SRO) After the crew satisfies the reactivity manipulation, the VCT level transmitter fails low causing Charging Pump suction to swap from the VCT to the RWSP. The crew should implement OP-901-113 and secure Charging and Letdown to secure from inadvertent boration. The crew should enter TS 3.1.2.4 due to placing Charging Pump C/S to OFF (may enter 3.0.3 if they take all Pumps to OFF).

4 FW32B C(SRO) MFW Pump B lube oil pipe leak, which causes the crew to commence power reduction. During the power reduction brief the oil leak worsens and trips MFW Pump B.

5 PW02 I(RO/SRO) An automatic reactor power cutback fails to occur, and the crew trips

the reactor.

6 RD11A03 RD11A82 C(RO) CEAs 3 and 82 stick out on the trip, which causes the RO to emergency borate due to two stuck CEAs.

7 ED01A ED01B ED01C ED01D EG09B C(BOP) M(ALL) A LOOP occurs 1 minute after the trip, and EDG B Output breaker fails to close and cannot be closed. The crew will implement SPTAs and will be directed to OP-902-003.

8 FW05 C(BOP/SRO) After the crew performs Step 7 to Protect Main Condenser, the AB EFW Pump trips on overspeed and cannot be restored. The crew will transition to OP-902-008 due to a loss of all feedwater. Once safety function priorities are evaluated, EDG B Output breaker is restored and can be closed. Once closed, the B EFW Pump may be used to

feed SGs. * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor E-NRC06-1 Page 1 of 21 Simulator Scenario Waterford 3 Nuclear Plant Simulator Scenario Number: E-NRC06-1 Author: Kirk Kirkpatrick Approval: Arvel J. Hall Revision Number:

0 Estimated Time: 60 Minutes Initial Conditions: 70%, MOC (IC-151)

Scenario

Description:

Power is currently 74 % and rising, MFW Pump B has recently been returned to service following emergent maintenance on the Low Pressure Governor Valve servomotor. ASI control is in progress with Group P and Reg Group 6 CEAs. Subgroup 5 CEAs are selected for both Reactor Power Cutback events. Boron Equalization is in progress. The previous shift has started the power ascent to 100% and has completed all steps in Attachment 9.1 of OP-010-004 up to step 9.1.73. EFW Pump A tagged out to replace pump impeller and is expected to be returned to service by the end of shift. HPSI Pump A is tagged out due to bearing failure during surveillance run and is expect ed to be returned to service within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . DRTS and DEFAS are OOS, AB Bus is aligned to A. RCP 1A middle seal failed 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ago. Crew will perform a brief and commence power escalation toward 100% power. After the Up-power has commenced or at the discretion of the lead examiner, SG 2 Channel D low pressure trip setpoint fails high. The crew should enter TS 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 and take required actions to bypass SG Pressure Low and SG P 1 and 2 (EFAS) in PPS Channel D. After the crew satisfies the reactivity manipulation, VCT level transmitter 227 fails low causing Charging Pump suction to shift from the VCT to the RWSP. The crew should implement OP-901-113 and secure Charging and Letdown to secure from inadvertent boration. The crew should enter TS 3.1.2.4 due to placing Charging Pump C/S to OFF (may enter 3.0.3 if they take all Pumps to OFF). After Tech Specs have been addressed a lube oil pipe leak on MFW Pump B occurs, which causes the crew to commence power reduction. During the power reduction brief the oil leak worsens and trips MFW Pump B. An automatic reactor power cutback fails to occur when MFW B trips and the crew trips the reactor, enters OP-902-000, CEAs 3 and 82 stick out on the trip, which will require emergency boration. A Loss of Offsite Power occurs 1 minute after the trip, and EDG B Output Breaker fails to close and cannot be closed. The crew will implement SPTAs and will be directed to OP-902-003. After the crew performs Step 7 to Protect Main Condenser, the AB EFW Pump trips on overspeed and cannot be restored. The crew will transition to OP-902-008 due to a loss of all feedwater. Once safety function priorities are evaluated, EDG B Output breaker is restored and can be closed. Once closed, EFW Pump B will fail to auto start and must manually started. The scenario may be terminated when the crew has taken action to start EFW pump B. EPLAN classification for this event is SA1 E-NRC06-1 Page 2 of 21 Scenario Notes:

1. Reset Simulator to IC-151. 2. Download bat file: F:\Scenarios\Scenario061 from jump drive. 3. Verify Scenario Malfunctions, Remotes, and Overrides are loaded . Remotes and Overrides are as follows: 0. FWR74, EFW Pump A breaker racked out 0. SIR29, HPSI Pump A breaker racked out . Malfunctions 0. RC09A, RCP 1A middle seal failure (20%) (setup) 0. FW07B, EFW pump B fail to auto start. (setup) 0. PW02, Automatic Reactor Cutback fails to occur (Setup) 0. SG07D2, SG 2 channel D low pressure trip setpoint fails Hi (Trigger 2) 0. CV12A, VCT level transmitter 227 fails low (Trigger 3) 0. FW32B, MFW B oil leak 40, 2 min ramp (Trigger 3) 0. RD11A82, RD11A03, CEAs 3 and 82 stick out on the trip (setup) 0. ED01A,B,C,D, Loss of Offsite Power (tied to Reactor Trip) (Trigger 5 tie) 0. EG09B, EDG B Output Breaker fails to close (setup) 0. FW05, EFW AB Pump mechanical overspeed trips (Trigger 8) 4. Tie Event 7 to Reactor trip . Go to event icon select trigger 7 tie to RX tripped, click add event, click accept new event verify event 7 tied to RX tripped 1 minute delay. 5. Danger Tag and place in OFF: . EFW Pump A . HPSI Pump A 6. Ensure Protected Train B sign is placed in SM office window. 7. Complete the simulator setup checklist.

E-NRC06-1 Page 3 of 21 EVENT 1 - Power Escalation to 100 % 1. On Lead Examiner's cue. 2. If called as woodlands for raising load report ready to receive output 3. If called as TB Watch to monitor equipment during up-power report will monitor equipment.

EVENT 2 - SG 2 channel D low pressure trip setpoint fails Hi 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 2. 2. If Work Week Manager or I&C is called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room.

EVENT 3 - VCT level transmitter 227 fails low 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 3. 2. If Work Week Manager or I&C is called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room. (DO NOT ask for priority) Event 4 - MFW Pump B lube oil pipe leak

, 1. On Lead Examiners cue initiate Event Trigger 4 1. Insert malfunction after 1 st annunciator alarms enable modify and raise severity to cause Lo tank level alarm after 1 minute, after crew begins downpower brief modify malfunction to cause Feed pump to trip requiring cutback which will not automatically occur. 3. If called as TB watch to investigate MFW B report large oil leak on pump discharge unisolable and cannot keep up with leak rate Event 5, 6 and 7- An automatic reactor power cutback fails to occur, and the crew trips the reactor 2 CEAs stick out on trip. LOOP occurs 1 minute later.

NOTE: Mark time breaker failure occurs for classification purposes.

1. If called as woodlands about restoration of power report power will be restored within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 2. If called as WWM/PME to investigate EDG B output breaker report t eam will be dispat ched to breaker immediately. 3. If called as RAB watch to investigate EDG B breaker report no obvious reason for failure to close.

Event 8- EFW AB trips on mechanical overspeed 1. If called as RCA watch to investigate EFW AB report EFW AB Mechanical overspeed tripped, linkage broken and cannot be reset. 2. If called as WWM/PMM to repair EFW AB overspeed trip report team will be dispatched immediately 3. When step 7 OP-902-003 to protect main condenser reached call control room as PME at EDG B breaker and report breaker problem repaired and breaker can be safely closed remotely. 4. If asked what the breaker problem was state that the anti-pump device linkage detached.

Note: Ensure call back to close EDG B breaker does not occur until

> 15 minutes elapsed. This is to facilitate EPLAN classification of SAI, "AC power capability to ess ential buses reduced to a single power source for > 15 minutes such that any additional single failure would result in Station Blackout".

E-NRC06-1 Page 4 of 21 Scenario Timeline: Event Malfunction Time (Min) Severity Ramp HH:MM:SSDelay Trigger 1 1 0 NA NA NA Power Escalation to 100 %

2 SG07D2 10 100 N/A NA 2 SG 2 channel D low pressure trip setpoint fails Hi 3 CV12A 15 0 00:01:00 NA 3 VCT level transmitter 227 fails low 4 FW32B 25 40 00:03:00 NA 4 MFW B oil leak 5 PW02 30 TRUE NA NA NA Automatic Reactor Cutback fails to occur 6 RD11A03 RD11A82 30 TRUE N/A NA NA CEAs 3 and 82 stick out on the trip 7 ED01A,B,C, D 31 0 N/A 00:01:00 7 Loss of Offsite Power (tied to Reactor Trip) 7 EG09B 31 true N/A NA NA EDG B Output Breaker fails to close 8 FW05 55 true N/A NA 8 EFW AB Pump mechanical overspeed trips RCO9A 40% N/A NA N/A RCP 1A middle seal failure FW07B True N/A NA N/A EFW B fail to auto start.

E-NRC06-1 Page 5 of 21 OP Test 1, Scenario 1, Event 1- Power Escalation to 100 %

Event

Description:

Up-power from approximately 74% to 100% power.

Event Objectives:

1. Raise reactor power from 74% - 100% power in accordance with all precautions, limitations, and procedural guidance of General Operating Procedure, OP-010-004.

Event Critical Tasks:

1 None Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

CRS/ATC/BOP Commence power ascension by dilution of RCS and raising of Turbine load to match Tave - Tref ATC Initiate RCS Dilution Performs Dilution lineup in accordance with OP-002-005 at CP-4 per CRS direction. Estimates ~ 600 gallons of PMU to raise power to100% and sets up Batch Counter at CP -4 for desired amount of PMU BOP Initiate MT load increase to maintain RCS Tcold 536 F to 549 F. BOP sets load reference and rate per CRS or BOP instructions and depresses GO pushbutton on DEH Control Panel on CP-1 CRS/ATC Maintain ASI within its control band by withdrawal or insertion of reg group 6 or Reg Group P CEA's in accordance with axial shape control Maintains ASI within +/- 0.05 per Attachment 9.4, OP-10-004 CRS/ATC At or above 92% power, control Tcold in the following ranges: 0-30 EFPD 545- 548°F, 30-60 EFPD 545-547°F, >60 EFPD 545-546°F CRS At or above 97%, place MSBSCAL in service (SS/CRS discretion).

BOP When final power level is attained, adjust DEH valve position limit.

Termination When Reactivity manipulation satisfied at discretion of Lead Examiner E-NRC06-1 Page 6 of 21 OP Test 1, Scenario 1, Event 2 - SG 2 channel D low pressure trip setpoint fails Hi Event

Description:

SG 2 Channel D low pressure trip setpoint fails high. The crew should enter TS 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 and take required actions to bypass SG Pressure Low and SG P 1 and 2 (EFAS) in PPS Channel D.

Event Objectives:

1 Recognize failed instrument and verify RPS/CPC bistable functions as expected.

2 Bypass affected bistable channel Event Critical Tasks:

1 None Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

ATC Recognizes and report indications of failed channel Annunciators : (Cabinet K) RPS CHANNEL TRIP S/G 2 PRESS LO(E-16, Cabinet K) RPS CHANNEL D TROUBLE (H-18, Cabinet K) SG 2 Pressure Lo Pretrip A/C (F-16, Cabinet K) SG 2Pressure Lo Pretrip B/D (G-16, Cabinet K) Red Trip Light and White Pretrip Light on affected channel of RPS on ROM on CP-6 SG 2 Pressure indication on CP-8 BOP Identifies SG2 Pressure SG-IPI-1023D failed High on CP-8 CRS/ATC Verify RPS/CPC function bistable respond as expected CRS Review and/or implement actions required by technical specification section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 (RPS and ESFAS)

CRS Direct bistable bypass with 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months of failure CRS Note: failure of a second channel will require that channel to be placed in trip condition. To bypass a second channel will remove both channels from bypass E-NRC06-1 Page 7 of 21 Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

BOP Expected Annunciators: B-1 expected opening cabinet (B-1, cabinet L) B-18 expected while bypassing bistables (B-1, cabinet K)

BOP Bypass affected channel in CP-10, Channel D. Verify desired Trip Channel is not bypassed on another PPS Channel. Open key-locked portion of BCP in desired PPS Channel. Depress Bypass push button for desired Trip Channel. Verify Bypass push button remains in a depressed state.

ATC Bypass lights illuminate on BCP and ROM for the desired channel Verify Bypass light Illuminates on BCP and ROM for the desired Trip Channel. Steam Generator Pressure - Low Pressure Steam Generator P1 Steam Generator P2 TERMINATION Event can be terminated when Bistables placed in BYPASS or at discretion of Lead examiner.

E-NRC06-1 Page 8 of 21 OP Test 1, Scenario 1, Event 3 - VCT level transmitter 227 fails low Event

Description:

After the crew has bypassed Channel D Bistables and satisfied the reactivity manipulation, VCT level transmitter 227 fails low causing Charging Pump suction to shift from the VCT to the RWSP. The crew should implement OP-901-113 and secure Charging and Letdown to secure from inadvertent boration. The crew should enter TS 3.1.2.4 due to placing Charging Pump C/S to OFF (may enter 3.0.3 if they take all Pumps to OFF). Event Objectives:

1. Determine cause of VCT makeup malfunction and operate CVCS components in accordance with OP-901-113, VCT Makeup Malfunction.

2. Operate Charging Pumps as necessary to maintain Pressurizer Level above minimum level for operation in accordance with Attachment 1, Pressurizer Level Versus Tave Curve.

Event Critical Tasks:

1 None Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

ATC Recognizes VCT level instrument failed low: B-3 VCT level Lo-Lo (Cabinet G) A-3 VCT level Hi/Lo(Cabinet G) VCT level indication CP-2 CRS Directs entry into OP-901-113, Volume Control Tank Makeup control malfunction CRS/ATC If VCT level transmitter 227 fails low (charging pump suction aligned to RWSP): Simultaneously secure ALL Charging Pumps CP-2 Close LETDOWN STOP VALVE (CVC 101). CP-2 Operate Charging Pumps as necessary to maintain Pressurizer Level Above minimum level for operation in accordance with Attachment 1, Pressurizer Level Versus Tave Curve 4. CRS/BOP Match TAVG and TREF by adjusting Turbine Load. Place Main Turbine on HOLD BOP sets load reference and rate per CRS or BOP instructions and depresses GO pushbutton on DEH Control Panel on CP-1 CRS Initiate corrective action to repair level instrument. WHEN level instrument CVC-ILT-0227 is repaired, THEN restore Charging and Letdown in accordance with OP-002-005, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL E-NRC06-1 Page 9 of 21 Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

CRS Enter Tech Spec 3.1.2.4 for Charging Pump Operability TERMINATION This can be terminated once WWM has been contacted and actions have commenced to match Tave to Tref or at discretion of Lead Examiner E-NRC06-1 Page 10 of 21 OP Test 1, Scenario 1, Event 4 / 5 - MFW Pump B lube oil pipe leak, Reactor Cutback fails to occur Event

Description:

After Charging Pump Tech Specs have been addressed a lube oil pipe leak on MFW Pump B occurs, which causes the crew to commence power reduction. During the power reduction brief the oil leak worsens and trips MFW Pump B. Reactor Cutback will fail to actuate requiring manual Trip.

Event Objectives:

1. Carry out all operator actions, including necessary contingency actions in accordance with OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, in the event of a reactor trip. 2. Properly diagnose event in progress and transition to appropriate EOP recovery procedure.

Event Critical Tasks:

None Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

BOP Recognizes MFP B Trouble annunciator R-18 FWPT OIL PUMP TROUBLE (Cabinet F)

CRS Dispatch TB watch to investigate B MFP alarm TB watch will report large oil leak on MFP B oil pump unisolable and unable to keep up with leak BOP Recognizes MFP B low oil tank alarm S-20 FWPT OIL TANK HI/LO (Cabinet F)

CREW MFP B trips Cutback fails to actuate.

CRS/ATC Directs tripping Reactor ATC depresses both Reactor Trip Pushbuttons CRS Direct Entry in OP-902-000 Perform SPTAs TERM Crew diagnoses a Reactor Trip Event and transitions to OP-902-000 and Directs performance of Standard Post Tip Actions.

E-NRC06-1 Page 11 of 21 OP Test 1, Scenario 1, Event 6/7 - CEAs 3 and 82 stick out on Reactor Trip, Loss of OffSite Power occurs 1 minute after Reactor Trip Event

Description:

An automatic reactor power cutback fails to occur when MFW B trips and the crew trips the reactor enters OP-902-000, CEAs 3 and 82 stick out on the trip, which will require emergency boration A Loss of Offsite Power occurs 1 minute after the trip, and EDG B Output breaker fails to close and cannot be closed. The crew will implement SPTAs and will be directed to OP-902-003.

Event Objectives:

1. Carry out all operator actions, including necessary contingency actions in accordance with OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, in the event of a reactor trip.

2. Properly diagnose event in progress and transition to appropriate EOP recovery procedure.

Event Critical Tasks 1 Establish RCS Reactivity C ontrol The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The crew takes action to perform Emergency Boration due to two stuck out CEAs on reactor trip prior to exiting SPTAs. Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

E-NRC06-1 Page 12 of 21 Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

ATC/CRS VERIFY REACTIVITY CONTROL - Check Reactor Power dropping on Log Channel indicators and/or recorders on CP-2 and/CP Check Startup Rate on CP-2 and/or CP-7 Is negative - Emergency Borate from CP-4 by performing the following.

CRITICAL o Place Makeup Mode Selector Switch in MANUAL o Align borated water source by performing one of the following: Initiate Emergency Boration using Boric Acid Pump as follows: Open Emergency Boration Valve, BAM-133. Start one Boric Acid Pump. Close recirc valve for Boric Acid Pump started:

o Boric Acid Makeup Pump Recirc Valve A, BAM-126A OR o Boric Acid Makeup Pump Recirc Valve B, BAM-126B.

OR Initiate Emergency Boration using Gravity Feed as follows: Open Boric Acid Makeup Gravity Feed Valve A, BAM-113A And Open Boric Acid Makeup Gravity Feed Valve B, BAM-113B.

o Close VCT Disch Valve, CVC-183.

o Verify at least one Charging Pump operating and Charging Header flow

> 40 GPM. Note: Critical Task BOP/CRS Verify Maintenance Of Vital Auxiliaries Check the main turbine tripped by verifying all throttle and governor valves indicate green at Turbine Mimic on CP-1 Check the generator tripped by verifying green indication on both Generator Output Breakers and Exciter Field Breaker on CP-1 Check train A and B station loads are energized from offsite power by:

o Voltage available to A1, A2, A3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1 o Voltage available to B1, B2, B3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1 o A and B DC bus indicators on CP-1 o Vital AC Instrument Bus Indicators on CP-7 (4 total)

E-NRC06-1 Page 13 of 21 Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

BOP/CRS Verify Maintenance Of Vital Auxiliaries Check the main turbine tripped by verifying all throttle and governor valves indicate green at Turbine Mimic on CP-1 Check the generator tripped by verifying green indication on both Generator Output Breakers and Exciter Field Breaker on CP-1 Check train A and B station loads are energized from offsite power by:

o Voltage available to A1, A2, A3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1 o Voltage available to B1, B2, B3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1 o A and B DC bus indicators on CP-1 o Vital AC Instrument Bus Indicators on CP-7 (4 total) Recognizes EDG B Breaker did not close: Attempts to manually close EDG B Output Breaker. Calls WWM/PME to get assistance to EDG B Breaker.

ATC/CRS Verify RCS Inventory Control Check PZR level 7% to 60% and trending to 33% to 60% on CP-2 Check Subcooling Margin greater than or equal to 28°on CP-2 ATC/CRS Verify RCS Pressure Control Checks PZR pressure between 1750 psia and 2300 psia (CP-2, CP-7, PMC or QSPDS) and trending to between 2125 and 2275 psia OR If PZR pressure is less than 1684 psia, the operator verifies that SIAS and CIAS (CP-7) initiate or performs manual initiation (CP-7 or CP-8) NOTE: This was manually performed. If PZR pressure is less than 1621 psia, the operator verifies no more than two RCPs are operating o Starts lift oil pumps for RCPs to be secured at CP-2 o Secures RCP in Loop 1 and Loop 2 at CP-2 If PZR pressure is less than minimum RCP NPSH of App. 2A (curve located on CP-6) the operator secures all RCPS.

o Starts a lift oil pump for RCPs to be secured on CP-2 o Secures all RCPs at CP-2 NOTE: CRITICAL TASK BOLDED ATC/CRS Verify Core Heat Removal Check at least one RCP operating on CP-2, Operating loop delta-T less than 13°F, and E-NRC06-1 Page 14 of 21 Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior: RCS Subcooling (CP-2) greater than or equal to 28°F.

BOP/CRS Verify RCS Heat Removal Check at least one S/G is both 5-80% NR (CP-1 or CP-8) and Main Feedwater is available to restore level OR Verify EFW is available to restore level in at least one S/G within 50% -

70% NR [60% - 80% NR].

o EFAS-1 or EFAS-2 actuation occurred if < 27.4% NR (PPS ROM lights extinguished CP-7) o EFW pumps operating (CP-8) if EFAS-1 or 2 actuated ATC/BOP/CRS Verify RCS Tc (CP-2 or CP-7) is 530-550°F or If Tc is > 550°F verify level is being restored to at least one S/G (CP-1 or CP-8) and verify SBCS (CP-1) or ADVS (CP-8) are maintaining RCS temp 530-550°F. If Tc is < 530°F then verify feed flow (MFW-CP-1 or EFW-CP-8) is not excessive and verify SBCS or ADVs are restoring RCS Tc 530-550°F If Tc is < 382°F verify no more than 2 RCPs operating on CP-2 BOP/CRS Verify S/G pressure 885-1040 psia (CP-1 or CP-7) or If S/G press < 885 psia verify steam bypass valves and ADVs are closed. If S/G press less than or equal to 666 psia verify MSIS is initiated. if S/G press > 1040 psia verify SBCs or ADVs are restoring S/G press to

< 1040 psia BOP/CRS Verify FWCS in Reactor Trip Override (CP-1) Check Main Feed Reg Valves are closed, Startup Feed Reg Valves are 13-21% open, and Operating Feed Pumps are 3800 to 4000 rpm or Manually operate feedwater system to restore level in at least one S/G to 50-70% NR.

CRS/BOP Reset Moisture Separator Reheaters Check the Temp Control Valves closed (Reheat Control Panel CP-1) Direct TB watch to locally verify MSR TCV reset

E-NRC06-1 Page 15 of 21 Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

BOP/ATC Verify Containment Temperature And Pressure Control Verifying Containment Temperature (CP-18 or QSPDS) less than or equal to 120°F and Containment pressure is < 16.4 psia OR Verify at least 3 Containment Fan Coolers (CP-18) operating. If Containment press is greater or equal to 17.1 psia verify ALL available CFCs are operating in emergency mode.

o Verifies 4 CFCs operating in slow speed If Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.7 psia, verify o CSAS is initiated o ALL available CS pumps are delivering > 1750 gpm o ALL RCPs are secured NOTE: Due to size of LOCA, 17.7 psia may take some time to attain, so the operator may have to address this again later.

CRS Direct Diagnostic Action If ANY Safety Function Acceptance Criteria are not met OR ANY contingency action was taken perform Diagnostics Flowchart OP-902-009, Appendix 1 CRS Diagnoses into OP-902-003, Loss of Offsite power loss of forced circulation recovery.

CRS Confirm diagnosis Direct STA to perform safety function status check list Direct Chemistry to sample both SGs for activity.

TERMINATION The event may be terminated when directed to enter OP-902-003 or at discretion of Lead Examiner

E-NRC06-1 Page 16 of 21 OP Test 1, Scenario 1, Event 8 - EFW pump AB trips on overspeed Event

Description:

After the crew performs step 7 of OP-902-003, to Protect Main Condenser, the AB EFW Pump trips on overspeed and cannot be restored. The crew will transition to OP-902-008 due to a loss of all feedwater. Once safety function priorities are evaluated, EDG B Output breaker is restored and can be closed. Once closed, the B EFW Pump may be used to feed SGs. The scenario may be terminated when the crew has taken action to start EFW pump B. or at the discretion of the lead examiner.

Event Objectives:

1. Carry out all operator actions, including necessary contingency actions in accordance with OP-902-008, Functional Recovery.

Event Critical Tasks:

Establish a primary to secondary heat sink.

The task is identified by at least one member of the crew manipulating the controls to establish the desired plant condition. The crew should restore or maintain at least one steam generator available as a heat sink by starting EFW Pump B. Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

CRS Directs Entering OP-902-003 CRS Confirm Diagnosis Confirm diagnosis of a Loss of Offsite Power or a Loss of Forced Circulation by checking Safety Function Status Check Acceptance Criteria are satisfied.

CREW Announce the Event Announce a Loss of Offsite Power or a Loss of Forced Circulation is in progress using the plant page.

CRS Classify the Event Advise the Shift Manager to REFER TO EP-001-001, "Recognition & Classification of Emergency Condition" and implement the Emergency Plan.

CRS Implement Placekeeping REFER TO Section 6.0, "Placekeeper" and record the time of the reactor trip.

E-NRC06-1 Page 17 of 21 Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

BOP Verify Loads Sequence on Vital Bus (CP-1) IF offsite power has been lost, THEN verify the sequencer has timed out for at least one 4.16KV safety bus.

BOP Verify Proper CCW Operation (CP-8) Check a CCW pump is operating for each energized 4.16KV safety bus.

BOP Protect Main Condenser IF offsite power has been lost, THEN: Verify MSIVs are closed.

(CP-8) Verify following steam generator blowdown isolation valves are closed: BD-102 A, B (CP-8)

BD-103 A, B (CP-8)

CRS/BOP Recognizes EFW AB tripped loss of heat sink A-10 EFW AB unavailable (Cabinet M) Dispatches operator to investigate locally Calls WWM to dispatch repair team to EFW AB to Restore overspeed trip and/or expedite return to service of EFW Pump A. Operator reports Mechanical overspeed tripped linkage damaged and cannot be reset. CRS Directs entry to OP-902-008 for loss of Heat Sink Safety function CREW Announce the Event Announce that the Functional Recovery Procedure is in progress using the plant page.

CRS Classify the Event Advise the Shift Manager to REFER TO EP-001-001, "Recognition & Classification of Emergency Condition" and implement the Emergency Plan.

CRS Implement Placekeeping REFER TO the "Placekeeper" and record the time of the reactor trip.

ATC RCP Trip Strategy No RCP running following Loss off site power CREW Sample BOTH Steam Generators Direct Chemistry to sample BOTH steam generators for activity and boron.

E-NRC06-1 Page 18 of 21 Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

BOP Place Hydrogen Analyzers in Service Train A Place Train A H2 ANALYZER CNTMT ISOL VALVE keyswitch to "OPEN". (Key 216) Place H2 ANALYZER A POWER to "ON". Check H2 ANALYZER A PUMP indicates ON.

CRS Identify Success Paths Identify success paths to be used to satisfy each safety function using BOTH of the following:

Resource Assessment Trees Safety Function Tracking Sheet CRS Directs STA to perform Safety Function Status Checks REFER TO Section 6.0, "Safety Function Status Check", and perform Safety Function Status Checks.

CRS Maintain Success Paths Prioritize Safety Functions based on ALL of the following:

Instructions for those Safety Functions which do NOT meet any success path. Instructions for those Safety Functions for which success path one criteria is NOT met. Instructions for Safety Functions for which success path one criteria is met. NOTE: RCS and Core Heat Removal identified as number one Priority 2 Reactivity control 4 Maintenance of Aux DC 3 Maintenance of Aux AC 5 Rcs Inventory 6 RCS pressure control 1 RCS/Core Heat Removal 7 Containment Isolation 8 Containment temp and press control CRS Implement Success Paths Implement success paths based on prioritization from previous step. NOTE: Success path will be restoration of EDG B Output breaker Note: Once RCS and Core Heat Removal priority identified report from field that EDG B output Breaker problem has been restored and is ready

to close.

CRS Directs EDG B output Breaker closed E-NRC06-1 Page 19 of 21 Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

CRS/BOP EFW B pump started NOTE: CRITICAL TASK TERMINATION Scenario may be terminated when actions have been taken to manually start EFW pump B or at discretion of Lead Examiner.

NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR TURNOVER SHEET AND CHECKLIST (TYPICAL)

DATE 11/##/06

1. Prior to turnover, review Critical Parameters in allowable limits (Modes 1 and 2):

PRESSURIZER LEVEL 33-56% PRESSURIZER PRESSURE 2075-2275 psia STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL 60-70% STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE 860-1000 psia TAVG 544-582°F REACTOR POWER

<100% (Mode 2

< 5%) 2. Simulator Specific Information Reactor Power 74% EFPD 2 50 ESI 0.002 RCS Boron 942 ppm BAMT A 5850 ppmBAMT B 5725 ppm 3. Complete independent Control Board Walkdown.

LCO/Action Status:

Equip/Sys TS Entered Action ExitedEFW Pump A 3.7.1.2.d 24 hrs ago Restore to operable w/in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in HSB w/in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and HSD w/in next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . HPSI Pump A 3.5.2.b 2 hrs ago Restore to operable w/in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in HSB w/in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and Pzr pressure < 1750 psia and RCS temp < 500°F w/in next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Equip/Sys TRM#Entered Action Exited None E-NRC06-1 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR TURNOVER SHEET AND CHECKLIST (Cont'd)(TYPICAL) Surveillance Tests in progress:

None Equipment taken out of service:

EFW Pump A HPSI Pump A Equipment returned to service:

None Maintenance in progress:

EFW Pump A has been OOS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to replace the pump impeller. HPSI pump A has been OOS for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months due to bearing failure during a surveillance run.

Significant Events/Additional Items/Remarks/Equipment Out of Service:

Plant Safety Index is 8.6 Yellow. Protected Train is B. SubGroups 5 and 11 are selected for both RXC events. RCP 1A Middle Seal failed 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ago (steps 1 and 2 of OP-901-130 have been taken). Plans are for the oncoming shift to align HPSI Pump AB to replace A.

E-NRC06-1 A ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Waterford III Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: IC-30 100%, EOC Turnover: RCP 1A Middle Seal failed 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ago (RC09A). EFW Pump A is tagged out and is expected to be returned to service by the end of shift. HPSI Pump A is tagged out and is expected to be returned to service within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*

Event Description 1 RD02A82 R(RO) C(BOP/SRO) CEA 82 drops into the core. The crew should implement OP-901-102. To comply with TS 3.1.3.1 the crew implements OP-901-212 for a rapid power reduction within 15 minutes.

2 RC23B (0.01%) C(SRO) After the crew satisfies the reactivity manipulation, an RCS leak develops inside Containment. The crew should enter TS 3.4.5.2.

3 CV02A CV02C I(RO) Charging Pumps AB and A fail to auto start on lowering Pressurizer level. The RO should start pumps as directed by the SRO.

4 MS09A I(BOP/SRO) SG #1 Steam Flow instrument, FW-IFR-1011, fails low. The crew should enter OP-901-201 and manually control feedwater flow. The Ultrasonic Flowmeter goes bad due to the FW flow transient and the crew should enter TRM 3.3.5. Note: the crew has 1 minute 17 seconds to respond to this failure or the plant will trip on low SG level.

5 RC23B (0.1%) M(ALL) The leak grows to a SB LOCA over a 10 minute period. The crew should manually trip the reactor and manually initiate SIAS and CIAS.

6 SI02B SI16G I(BOP) HPSI Pump B fails to auto start and SI-227B fails to Open. The BOP should manually start HPSI Pump B and open SI-227B. The crew may commence a cooldown with the ADVs.

7 RP05B3 RP05C3 RP05D3 I(RO) CSAS fails to initiate when containment pressure reaches 17.7 psia. The RO should recognize this and manually initiate CSAS. Once the RO secures RCPs following CSAS, the scenario may be terminated. * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor E-NRC06-2 Page 1 of 19 Simulator Scenario Waterford 3 Nuclear Plant Simulator Scenario Number: E-NRC06-2 Author: Kirk B. Kirkpatrick Approval: Arvel J. Hall Revision Number:

0 Estimated Time: 60 Minutes Initial Conditions: 100%, EOC (IC-152)

Scenario

Description:

The plant is at 100% reactor power. AB electrical buses are aligned to the A side. RCP 1A Middle Seal failed 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ago. EFW Pump A has been OOS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to replace the pump impeller. HPSI pump A has been OOS for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months due to bearing failure during a surveillance run. After the crew takes the shift, CEA 82 drops into the core. The crew should implement OP-901-102. To comply with TS 3.1.3.1 the crew implements OP-901-212 for a rapid power reduction within 15 minutes. After the crew satisfies the reactivity manipulation, an RCS leak develops inside Containment. The crew should enter op-901-111 and TS 3.4.5.2. Charging Pumps AB and A fail to auto start on lowering Pressurizer level. The ATC should start pumps as directed by the CRS. SG #1 Steam Flow instrument, FW-IFR-1011, fails low. The crew should enter OP-901-201 and manually control feedwater flow. Note: the crew has 1 minute 17 seconds to respond to this failure or the plant will trip

on low SG level. The leak grows to a SB LOCA over a 10 minute period. The crew should manually trip the reactor and manually initiate SIAS and CIAS. HPSI Pump B fails to auto start and SI-227B fails to Open. The BOP should manually start HPSI Pump B and open SI-227B. The crew may commence a cooldown with the ADVs. CSAS fails to initiate when containment pressure reaches 17.7 psia. The crew should recognize this and manually initiate CSAS. Once the RO secures RCPs following CSAS, the scenario may be terminated.

E-NRC06-2 Page 2 of 19 Scenario Notes:

1. Reset Simulator to IC-152. 2. Download bat file: F:\Scenarios\Scenario062 from jump drive. 3. Verify Scenario Malfunctions, Remotes, and Overrides are loaded a. Remotes and Overrides are as follows: 1. FWR74, EFW Pump A breaker racked out 2. SIR29, HPSI Pump A breaker racked out b. Malfunctions 1. RC09A, RCP 1A middle seal failure (20%) (setup) 2. RD02A82, CEA 82 drops (Trigger 1) 3. RC23B, RCS leak (0.01%) (Trigger 2) 4. CV02A/CV02C, Chg Pmps A & AB fail to autostart (setup) 5. MS09A, SG1 Flow Inst. Fails low (1 min ramp) (Trigger 4) 6. SI02B, HPSI Pump B fails to auto start on SIAS (setup) 7. SI16G, SI-227B fails to open on SIAS (setup) 8. RP05B3/C3/D3, CSAS fails to auto actuate (setup) 4. Place in OFF and Danger Tag: a. EFW Pump A b. HPSI Pump A 5. Ensure Protected Train B sign is placed in SM office window. 6. Complete the simulator setup checklist.

E-NRC06-2 Page 3 of 19 EVENT 1 - CEA 82 Drops into the Core

1. Initiate Event Trigger 1. 2. If Work Week Manager or I&C is called, inform the caller that a team will be sent to the CEDMCS control cabinets.

EVENTS 2 and 3 - RCS Leak Inside Containment/Charging Pumps A & AB Fail to Auto Start

1. Initiate Event Trigger 2.

EVENT 4 - SG1 Steam Flow Instrument, FW-IFR-1011, Fails Low

1. Initiate Event Trigger 4. 2. If Work Week Manager or I&C is called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room.

Event 5 - Leak Grows to a SB LOCA

1. Modify RC23B to 0.1% with a 10 minute ramp.

Event 6 - HPSI Pump B Fails to Auto Start and SI-227B Fails to Auto Open

1. Event occurs automatically on SIAS.

Event 7 - CSAS Fails to Auto Actuate

1. Event occurs automatically when containment pressure reaches 17.7 psia.

E-NRC06-2 Page 4 of 19 Scenario Timeline: Event Malfunction Time (Min) Severity Ramp HH:MM:SSDelay Trigger 1 RD02A82 1 NA NA NA 1 CEA 82 Drops 2 RC23B 15 0.01% NA NA 2 RCS Leak Inside Containment 3 CV02A CV02C 20 NA NA NA NA Charging Pumps A & AB Fail to Auto Start 4 MS09A 30 0% 00:01:00 NA 4 SG1 Steam Flow Instrument, FW-IFR-1011, Fails Low 5 RC23B 40 0.1% 00:10: 00 NA 2 Modified SB LOCA 6 SI02B SI16G 45 NA NA NA NA HPSI Pump B Fails to Auto Start and SI-227B Fails to Auto Open 7 RP05B3 RP05C3 RP05D3 55 NA NA NA NA CSAS Fails to Auto Actuate

E-NRC06-2 Page 5 of 19 OP Test 1, Scenario 2, Event 1 - CEA 82 Drops into the Core Event

Description:

CEA 82 drops into the core. The crew should implement OP-901-102. To comply with TS 3.1.3.1 the crew implements OP-901-212 for a rapid power reduction within 15 minutes.

Event Objectives:

1. Stabilize plant conditions by adjusting Turbine load to match Tave-Tref following a dropped CEA. 2. Determine the cause and results of the dropped CEA. 3. Review and enter appropriate Tech Spec 3.1.3.1.c. 4. Reduce reactor power in accordance with COLR and OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction.

Event Critical Tasks:

1 None Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

ATC/BOP Recognize and report indications of Dropped CEA CEA 82 Amber Rod Bottom Light on CEA Rod Bottom Light Mimic on CP-2 CEA 82 Green Lower Electrical Limit Light illuminated on CEDMCS Control Panel on CP-2 CEAC CRT on CP-2 indicates CEA 82 inserted in core RCS Tc, Th, and Tave lowering on indicators and recorders on CP-2, CP-7 and PMC RCS Pressure slowly lowering on CP-2 and CP-7 indicators and recorders CEA Disabled, CEA Group Minor Deviation, CEA Group Major Deviation Annunciators on CP-2 COLSS Master annunciator on CP-36 (BOP) SG pressure lowering on CP-1 and CP-8 (BOP)

CRS Enters OP-901-102, CEA or CEDMCS Malfunction.

ATC Verifies CEDMCS Mode Select Switch to OFF on CEDMCS Control Panel on CP-2. CRS Transitions to Section E1, CEA Misalignment Greater Than 7 Inches

E-NRC06-2 Page 6 of 19 Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

Crew Match TREF and TAVE CRS directs the BOP and ATC to coordinate to match Tave and Tref BOP lowers load reference and sets load rate per CRS or ATC instructions and depresses GO pushbutton on DEH Control Panel on CP-1 ATC instructs BOP to place turbine in Hold when Tave and Tref are matched CRS Informs the SM to notify Duty Plant Manager and Duty Engineering.

CRS/ATC Records time of CEA misalignment.

CRS Determines need to commence power reduction below 70% power by boration and implement OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction, to comply with Tech Spec 3.1.3.1 Determines need to start downpower within 15 minutes of CEA deviation Declares COLSS inoperable and enters OP-901-501, PMC or COLSS Inoperable Directs STA or board operators to start COLSS Off-Normal 15 minute logs ATC Initiates RCS boration within 15 minutes of CEA deviation Estimates ~ 660 gallons from BAMT A or ~ 1474 gallons from RWSP to reduce power to 70% Either direct borate or borate from the RWSP with one Charging Pump per CRS direction ATC Establishes Boron Equalization. Place all available Pressurizer Backup Heater C/Ss to ON on CP-2. Lower Potentiometer on Spray Valve Controller on CP-2 until Spray Valves indicate intermediate ATC/CRS Maintain ASI CRS provides direction on ASI Control - Preferred groups and CEA insertion limits per TS 3.1.3.6 ATC uses CEAs in Manual Group in accordance with CRS direction and OP-004-004, Control Element Drive CRS Notify Dispatcher of load reduction

E-NRC06-2 Page 7 of 19 Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

BOP Initiate Main Turbine load reduction to maintain RCS Tc 536°F - 549°F (or within a narrower band if directed by CRS). BOP lowers load reference and sets load rate per CRS or ATC instructions and depresses GO pushbutton on DEH Control Panel on CP-1 Termination Terminate after reactivity manipulation is satisfied.

E-NRC06-2 Page 8 of 19 OP Test 1, Scenario 2, Events 2 and 3 - RCS Leak Inside Containment/Charging Pumps A & AB Fail to Auto Start Event

Description:

After the crew satisfies the reactivity manipulation, an RCS leak develops inside Containment. The crew should implement OP- 901-111, RCS Leak, and evaluate T.S. 3.4.5.2. Charging Pumps AB and A fail to auto start on lowering Pressurizer level. The ATC should start pumps as directed by the SRO.

Event Objectives:

1. Determine approximate RCS leak rate. 2. Take Tech Spec action and make notifications according to Off-Normal Operating Procedure OP-901-111, Reactor Coolant System Leak.

Event Critical Tasks:

1 None Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

ATC/BOP Recognizes an RCS leak exists and checks that automatic actions occur as required Letdown flow on CP-4 lowers to maintain Pressurizer at setpoint Containment Water Leakage annunciators on CP-8 Containment PIG alarms and rising trend indication on RMS CRT at CP-6 Containment Pressure on CP-8 shows a slow rise over time Containment Leakage recorder on CP-1 shows rising trend CRS Discusses contingency with crew for inability to maintain Pressurizer Level with available Charging Pumps Trip Reactor Manually initiate SIAS/CIAS, Go to OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions ATC Determines approximate RCS leak rate by either of the following: calculating the difference between Charging flow (CP-4) and Letdown flow (CP-4) plus RCP Controlled Bleed Off flows (PMC) obtain value from PMC via Group Display LEAKRATE.

CRS Determines that plant is not stable (downpower in progress

); therefore, cannot obtain accurate leak rate data from PMC.

E-NRC06-2 Page 9 of 19 Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

CRS Refers to Tech Spec 3.4.5.2 and determines required actions Enters TS 3.4.5.2 Determines to shut the plant down instead of stopping at 70%

ATC Recognizes and reports that the backup charging pumps failed to auto start 1 st pump should start when Pzr level is 2.5% below program level 2 nd pump should start when Pzr level is 3.9% below program level both pumps should receive a start signal when Pzr level is 6.0% below program level CRS/ATC CRS directs the ATC to start backup charging pumps as necessary to

maintain Pzr level. ATC starts 1 or 2 charging pumps.

Termination Terminate after crew stabilizes Pressurizer level.

E-NRC06-2 Page 10 of 19 OP Test 1, Scenario 2, Event 4 - SG1 Steam Flow Instrument, FW-IFR-1011, Fails Low Event

Description:

SG 1 Steam Flow instrument, FW-IFR-1011, fails low. The crew should enter OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Control System Malfunction, and manually control feedwater flow. Note: the crew has 1 minute 17 seconds to respond to this failure or the plant will trip on low SG level.

Event Objectives:

1. Establish control of SG 1 level with manual control of the Master Controller.

Event Critical Tasks:

1 None Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

BOP Recognize and report indications of instrument failure: SG 1Steam Flow indication lowering (FW-IFR-1011) (CP-1) SG 1 actual level lowers (CP-1 or CP-8) Annunciator for SG 1 Level Hi/Lo (Cabinet F, U-14) (CP-1) Annunciator for SG 1 Steam/FW Flow Signal Dev (Cabinet F, T-17) (CP-1) SG 1 Master Controller shows deviation between Output and Process inputs (CP-1) Suggests taking manual control of either of the following to restore SG 1 level: o SG 1 Master Controller o SG 1 Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Controller (MFRV)

CRS/BOP CRS directs BOP to take manual control of SG 1 Master Controller or MFRV and raise output to restore SG 1 level CRS Enters OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Control Malfunction BOP BOP may return SG 1 Master Controller to Auto or manually control flow during the plant downpower.

Termination Terminate after crew stabilizes Steam Generator level.

E-NRC06-2 Page 11 of 19 OP Test 1, Scenario 2, Event 5, 6, and 7 - Leak Grows to a SB LOCA; HPSI Pump B Fails to Auto Start and SI-227B Fails to Auto Open; and CSAS Fails to Auto Actuate Event

Description:

The leak grows to a SB LOCA over a 10 minute period. The crew should manually trip the reactor, manually initiate SIAS and CIAS, and implement OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions. The crew should diagnose the event and transition to OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery. HPSI Pump B fails to auto start and SI-227B fails to Open. The BOP should manually start HPSI Pump B and open SI-227B. The crew may commence a cooldown with the ADVs. CSAS fails to initiate when containment pressure reaches 17.7 psia.

The BOP should recognize this and manually initiate CSAS.

Event Objectives:

1. Carry out all operator actions, including necessary contingency actions in accordance with OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions. 2. Properly diagnose event in progress and transition to OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery. 3. Initiate Safety Injection flow when RCS pressure is below SIAS setpoint. 4. Secure Reactor Coolant Pumps when less than minimum NPSH or upon loss of CCW cooling flow. 5. Initiate Containment Spray flow when Containment pressure is above CSAS setpoint.

Event Critical Tasks:

Manually establish the minimum design Safety Injection System flow. The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The crew starts HPSI Pump B and opens SI-227B prior to Reactor Vessel Plenum level dropping below 20%.

Trip any RCP not satisfying RCP operating limits. The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. All RCPs are stopped: within three (3) minutes on loss of CCW flow. within three (3) minutes on a loss of Subcooled Margin.

Maintain Containment Temperature and Pressure Control. The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The crew will initiate CSAS within three (3) minutes of Containment pressure exceeding 17.7 psia (CRS may direct initiation as pressure approaches 17.7 psia).

Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

ATC Recognize and report indications of inability to maintain Pressurizer Level with available Charging Pumps All 3 Charging Pumps running (CP-4) Pressurizer Level continuing to lower (CP-2)

E-NRC06-2 Page 12 of 19 Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

CRS/ATC At CRS direction, ATC performs the following: Trip Reactor (CP-2) Manually initiate SIAS/CIAS (CP-7) Go to OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions ATC/CRS Verify Reactivity Control Check reactor power dropping on CP-2 or CP-7 Check startup rate is negative on CP-2 or CP-7 Check less than 2 CEAS not fully inserted using o CEAC CRT on CP-2, or o CEDMCS LEL Lights illuminated on CP-2, or o CEA Rod Bottom Lights illuminated on CP-2 BOP/CRS Verify Maintenance Of Vital Auxiliaries Check the main turbine tripped by verifying all throttle and governor valves indicate green at Turbine Mimic on CP-1 Check the generator tripped by verifying green indication on both Generator Output Breakers and Exciter Field Breaker on CP-1 Check train A and B station loads are energized from offsite power by:

o Voltage available to A1, A2, A3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1 o Voltage available to B1, B2, B3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1 o A and B DC bus indicators on CP-1 o Vital AC Instrument Bus Indicators on CP-7 (4 total)

ATC/CRS Verify RCS Inventory Control Check PZR level 7% to 60% and trending to 33% to 60% on CP-2 Check Subcooling Margin greater than or equal to 28°on CP-2

E-NRC06-2 Page 13 of 19 Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

ATC/CRS Verify RCS Pressure Control Checks PZR pressure between 1750 psia and 2300 psia (CP-2, CP-7, PMC or QSPDS) and trending to between 2125 and 2275 psia OR If PZR pressure is less than 1684 psia, the operator verifies that SIAS and CIAS (CP-7) initiate or performs manual initiation (CP-7 or CP-8) NOTE: This was manually performed. If PZR pressure is less than 1621 psia, the operator verifies no more than two RCPs are operating o Starts lift oil pumps for RCPs to be secured at CP-2 o Secures RCP in Loop 1 and Loop 2 at CP-2 If PZR pressure is less than minimum RCP NPSH of App. 2A (curve located on CP-6) the operator secures all RCPS.

o Starts a lift oil pump for RCPs to be secured on CP-2 o Secures all RCPs at CP-2 NOTE: CRITICAL TASK BOLDED BOP Recognizes and reports that HPSI Pump B failed to auto start and SI-227B failed to auto open. Manually start HPSI Pump B Manually open SI-227B NOTE: CRITICAL TASK (may be performed now or after entering OP-902-002).

ATC/CRS Verify Core Heat Removal Check at least one RCP operating on CP-2, Operating loop delta-T less than 13°F, and RCS Subcooling (CP-2) greater than or equal to 28°F.

E-NRC06-2 Page 14 of 19 Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

BOP/CRS Verify RCS Heat Removal Check at least one S/G is both 5-80% NR (CP-1 or CP-8) and Main Feedwater is available to restore level OR Verify EFW is available to restore level in at least one S/G within 50% - 70% NR [60% - 80% NR].

o EFAS-1 or EFAS-2 actuation occurred if < 27.4% NR (PPS ROM lights extinguished CP-7) o EFW pumps operating (CP-8) if EFAS-1 or 2 actuated ATC/BOP/CRS Verify RCS Tc (CP-2 or CP-7) is 530-550°F or If Tc is > 550°F verify level is being restored to at least one S/G (CP-1 or CP-8) and verify SBCS (CP-1) or ADVS (CP-8) are maintaining RCS temp 530-550°F. If Tc is < 530°F then verify feed flow (MFW-CP-1 or EFW-CP-8) is not excessive and verify SBCS or ADVs are restoring RCS Tc 530-550°F If Tc is < 382°F verify no more than 2 RCPs operating on CP-2 BOP/CRS Verify S/G pressure 885-1040 psia (CP-1 or CP-7) or If S/G press < 885 psia verify steam bypass valves and ADVs are closed. If S/G press less than or equal to 666 psia verify MSIS is initiated. if S/G press > 1040 psia verify SBCs or ADVs are restoring S/G press to

< 1040 psia BOP/CRS Verify FWCS in Reactor Trip Override (CP-1) Check Main Feed Reg Valves are closed, Startup Feed Reg Valves are 13-21% open, and Operating Feed Pumps are 3800 to 4000 rpm or Manually operate feedwater system to restore level in at least one S/G to 50-70% NR.

BOP/CRS Reset Moisture Separator Reheaters Check the Temp Control Valves closed (Reheat Control Panel CP-1)

E-NRC06-2 Page 15 of 19 Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

ATC/CRS Verify Containment Isolation Check Containment pressure (CP-7 or CP-8) < 16.4 psia, Check that no Containment Area rad monitors (RMS CRT/CP-14/PMC) are in alarm or show an unexplained rise in activity, and Check that no steam plant rad monitors (RMS CRT/CP-14/PMC) alarm or show an unexplained rise in activity. If Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.1 psia verify CIAS, SIAS, and MSIS (CP-7) initiated or manually initiate each actuation (CP-7 or CP-8).

BOP/ATC/C Verify Containment Temperature And Pressure Control Verifying Containment Temperature (CP-18 or QSPDS) less than or equal to 120°F and Containment pressure is < 16.4 psia OR Verify at least 3 Containment Fan Coolers (CP-18) operating. If Containment press is greater or equal to 17.1 psia verify ALL available CFCs are operating in emergency mode.

o Verifies 4 CFCs operating in slow speed If Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.7 psia, verify o CSAS is initiated o ALL available CS pumps are delivering > 1750 gpm o ALL RCPs are secured NOTE: Due to size of LOCA, 17.7 psia may take some time to attain, so the operator may have to address this again later.

CRS Direct Diagnostic Action If ANY Safety Function Acceptance Criteria are not met OR ANY contingency action was taken perform Diagnostics Flowchart OP-902-009, Appendix 1 CRS Diagnoses into OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery, procedure.

CRS Confirm diagnosis Direct STA to perform safety function status check list Direct Chemistry to sample both SGs for activity.

Crew Announce the event using plant page CRS Direct SM to refer to Emergency Plan

E-NRC06-2 Page 16 of 19 Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

CRS Implement Placekeeper and records time of Reactor Trip ATC/BOP/CRS If PZR pressure < 1684 psia verify SIAS initiated, LPSI and HPSI pumps started, BOP takes action to manually start HPSI Pump B and open SI-227B NOTE: CRITICAL TASK Injection flow is acceptable per OP-902-009, Appendix 2-E available charging pumps (2) are running ATC/CRS If Pzr press < 1621 psia and SIAS is actuated verify no more than 2 RCPs operating. If PZR PRESS does not meet Appendix 2A (Curve located on CP-6) secure all RCPs. NOTE: CRITICAL TASK IF CONDITIONS REACHED BEFORE CSAS INITIATES ATC/CRS Verify RCP operating limits Verify CCW available to RCPs (CP-8 and CP-2) or secure affected RCPs if not restored within 3 minutes. Secure all RCPs if CSAS is initiated. NOTE: CRITICAL TASK IF NOT PERFORMED IN PREVIOUS STEP If Tc < 382°F, verify no more than 2 RCPs operating.

BOP/CRS Verify CCW operation by checking a CCW pump (CP-8) is operating for each energized 4 KV safety bus (CP-1)

ATC/BOP/CRS Isolate the LOCA by: Verifying letdown Containment isolations (CP-4) are closed. Verifying RCS sampling isolations (CP-8) are closed. Checking CCW AB rad monitor not in alarm (RMS CRT on CP-6) and no Abnormal rise in reading or stop all RCPs and close CCW Containment isolations.

ATC/BOP/CRS Verify LOCA not outside Containment by checking RAB rad monitors, sump levels (CP-8 and PMC), and waste tank levels (PMC). If a leak is indicated, locate and isolate the leak and verify CIAS actuated per Appendix 4D.

E-NRC06-2 Page 17 of 19 Time: Position: Applicant's Actions or Behavior:

BOP/CRS Place Hydrogen Analyzers A and B in service (CP-33) Open Hydrogen Analyzer Containment Isolation Valves Start Hydrogen Analyzer sample Pumps ATC/BOP/CRS IF Containment Pressure is > 17.1 psia (CP-7 or CP-8) or Containment area rad monitors are in hi alarm (RMS CRT CP-6 or CP-14), Verify CIAS is initiated (CP-7 or CP-8) Verify all available CFCs are in the EMERGENC Y MODE (CP-18)

BOP/CRS If Containment pressure is > 17.7 psia: Verify CSAS is initiated (CP-7 or CP-8) BOP will have to manually initiate CSAS due to initiation failure. NOTE: Critical Task Verify all operating CS pumps are delivering > 1750 gpm (CP-8).

ATC/CRS If not already performed, ATC will need to secure ALL RCPs NOTE: Critical Task Termination Terminate after crew initiates CSAS and secures ALL RCPs

E-NRC06-2 Page 18 of 19 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR TURNOVER SHEET AND CHECKLIST (TYPICAL)

DATE

1. Prior to turnover, review Critical Parameters in allowable limits (Modes 1 and 2):

PRESSURIZER LEVEL 33-56% PRESSURIZER PRESSURE 2075-2275 psia STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL 60-70% STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE 860-1000 psia TAVG 544-582°F REACTOR POWER

<100% (Mode 2

< 5%) 2. Simulator Specific Information Reactor Power 100% EFPD 450 ESI -0.005 RCS Boron 250 ppm BAMT A 5850 ppmBAMT B 5725 ppm 3. Complete independent Control Board Walkdown.

LCO/Action Status:

Equip/Sys TS Entered Action ExitedEFW Pump A 3.7.1.2.d 24 hrs ago Restore to operable w/in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in HSB w/in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and HSD w/in next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . HPSI Pump A 3.5.2.b 2 hrs ago Restore to operable w/in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in HSB w/in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and Pzr pressure < 1750 psia and RCS temp < 500°F w/in next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Equip/Sys TRM#Entered Action Exited None E-NRC04-1 E-NRC06-2 Page 19 of 19 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR TURNOVER SHEET AND CHECKLIST (Cont'd)(TYPICAL) Surveillance Tests in progress:

None Equipment taken out of service:

EFW Pump A HPSI Pump A Equipment returned to service:

None Maintenance in progress:

EFW Pump A has been OOS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to replace the pump impeller. HPSI pump A has been OOS for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months due to bearing failure during a surveillance run.

Significant Events/Additional Items/Remarks/Equipment Out of Service:

Plant Safety Index is 8.6 Yellow. Protected Train is B. SubGroups 5 and 11 are selected for both RXC events. RCP 1A Middle Seal failed 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ago (steps 1 and 2 of OP-901-130 have been taken). Plans are for the oncoming shift to align HPSI Pump AB to replace A.

A ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Waterford III Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: IC-10 100%, BOC Turnover: RCP 1A Middle Seal failed 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ago (RC09A). EFW Pump A tagged out and is expected to be returned to service by the end of shift. HPSI Pump A is tagged out and is expected to be returned to service within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*

Event Description 1 NI01G I(ALL) After the crew takes the shift ENI Channel C Middle Detector fails low energizing Startup Channel 1. The crew should de-energize SU Channel 1. The crew should enter TS 3.3.1 & 3.3.3.6 and bypass affected trip bistables.

2 RC21A I(ALL) A loop 1 T hot instrument fails low affecting pressurizer level setpoint. This event requires implementation of OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Malfunction Off-Norma l procedure.

3 CC03A C(BOP/SRO) CCW Pump A bearing seizes and the pump trips. The BOP will start CCW Pump AB to replace A. Since the AB buses are aligned to the B side, this will require entry into TS 3.7.3 and cascading TS per OP-100-014. 4 RC08A C(RO/SRO) The pressure surge on the system causes RCP 1A Lower Seal to fail.

The crew should trip the reactor and secure RCP 1A to comply with OP-901-130.

5 RP01A RP01B RP01C I(RO) The manual reactor trip will fail and the RO will trip the reactor by alternate means.

6 FW07B I(BOP) EFW Pump B will fail to auto start, requiring the BOP to manually start the pump.

7 SG01A (20%) M(ALL) After the trip a SGTR occurs in SG #1. The crew will enter OP-902-007. Once the crew isolates SG #1, the scenario may be terminated. * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor E-NRC06-3Page 1 of 17Simulator ScenarioWaterford 3 Nuclear PlantSimulator Scenario Number: E-NRC06-3Author: Kirk B. KirkpatrickApproval: Arvel J. HallRevision Number:0Estimated Time:60 MinutesInitial Conditions:100%, BOC (IC-153)Scenario

Description:

The plant is at 100% reactor power. AB electrical buses are aligned to the B side. RCP 1A Middle Seal failed8 hours ago. EFW Pump A has been OOS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to replace the pump impeller. HPSI pump A has beenOOS for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months due to bearing failure during a surveillance run. Plans are for the oncoming shift to alignHPSI Pump AB to replace A.After the crew takes the shift ENI Channel C Middle Detector fails low energizing Startup Channel 1. The crewshould de-energize SU Channel 1. The crew should enter TS 3.3.1 & 3.3.3.6 and bypass affected tripbistables.After bistables placed in Bypass a loop 1 Thot instrument fails low affecting pressurizer level setpoint. Thisevent requires implementation of OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Malfunction Off-Normal procedure.After actions of OP-901-110 are implemented CCW Pump A bearing seizes and the pump trips. The BOP willstart CCW Pump AB to replace A. Since the AB buses are aligned to the B side, this will require entry into TS3.7.3 and cascading TS per OP-100-014.The pressure surge on the system causes RCP 1A Lower Seal to fail. The crew should trip the reactor andsecure RCP 1A to comply with OP-901-130. The manual reactor trip will fail and the RO will trip the reactor byalternate means.Exciter Field Breaker fails to auto open on the trip, requiring BOP to open manually.After the trip a SGTR occurs in SG #1. The crew will enter OP-902-007. Once the crew isolates SG #1, thescenario may be terminated.

E-NRC06-3Page 2 of 17Scenario Notes:1. Reset Simulator to IC-153.2. Download bat file: F:\Scenarios\Scenario063 from jump drive.3. Verify Scenario Malfunctions, Remotes, and Overrides are loadeda. Remotes and Overrides are as follows:1. FWR74, EFW Pump A breaker racked out2. SIR29, HPSI Pump A breaker racked outb. Malfunctions1. RC09A, RCP 1A middle seal failure (20%) (setup)2. NI01G, ENI Channel C Middle Detector Fails Low (Trigger 1)3. RC21A, RCS Hot leg 1 control channel TT 1223C fails Low(Trigger 2)4. CC03A, CCW Pmp A Bearing Seizure (Trigger 3)5. RC08A, RCP 1A Lower Seal Failure (Trigger 4)6. RP01A, B, C, RPS manual pushbutton Ch(setup)7. EG05, Main Generator Exciter Field Breaker fails to trip (setup)8. SG01A, SG#1 Tube Leak 5% (Trigger 7)4. Danger Tag and place in OFF:a. EFW Pump Ab. HPSI Pump A5. Ensure Protected Train B sign is placed in SM office window.6. Complete the simulator setup checklist.

E-NRC06-3Page 3 of 17EVENT 1 - ENI Channel C Middle Detector fails low1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 1.2. If Work Week Manager or I&C is called, inform the caller that a team will be Dispatched in 20 minutesEVENTS 2- loop 1 Thot instrument fails low affecting pressurizer level setpoint1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 2.2. If Work Week Manager or I&C is called, inform the caller that a team will be Dispatched in 20 minutesEVENT 3 - CCW Pump A bearing seizes and the pump trips1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 3.2. If Work Week Manager or I&C is called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and ateam will be sent to the Control Room.Event 4 - RCP 1A Lower Seal to fail requiring Reactor Trip1. On Lead Examiners cue initiate Event Trigger 4.Event 5 - Manual Reactor Trip Failure requiring Alternate means1.Event 6 - EFW Pump B fails to start1. If Work Week Manager or I&C is called, inform the caller that a team will be Dispatched in 20 minutesEvent 7 - SGTR on S/G# 1 following Reactor Trip1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 7.

E-NRC06-3Page 4 of 17Scenario Timeline:EventMalfunction Time(Min)Severity RampHH:MM:SSDelayTrigger1N101G10NANA1ENI Channel C Middle Detector Fails Low2RC21A50NANA2RCS Hot leg 1 control channel TT 1223C fails Low3CC03A15NANANA3CCW Pmp A Bearing Seizure4RC08A25100%00:01:00NA4RCP 1A Lower Seal Failure5RP01A,B,C 25NANANANARPS manual pushbutton Ch Fail6FW07B25NANANANAEFW Pmp B fail to auto start7SG01A305%00:02:00NANASG#1 Tube LeakRC09A40%NANANARCP 1A middle seal failure E-NRC06-3Page 5 of 17OP Test 1, Scenario 3, Event 1 - ENI Channel C Middle Detector fails lowEvent

Description:

After the crew takes the shift ENI Channel C Middle Detector fails low energizing Startup Channel 1. The crewshould de-energize SU Channel 1. The crew should enter TS 3.3.1 & 3.3.3.6 and bypass affected tripbistables.Event Objectives:1. Recognize failed instrument and verify RPS/CPC bistable functions as expected.2. Bypass affected bistable channel.Event Critical Tasks:1 NoneEvent Action Steps:Time: Position:Applicant's Actions or Behavior:ATCRecognize and report indications of failed channel- ENI Channel C Log Channel indicator failed low on CP ENI Channel C Linear Power Recorder on CP-7 reads low on CP CPC PIDs 011 and 171 read low on CPC Channel C on CP Startup Channel 1 is energized and indication on CP-2 and CP-4 arereading high- Alarms associated with CPCs, Startup Channel 1 and PPS on CP-2ATC/CRSVerify RPS/CPC bistables respond as expected- Reports trips/pretrips associated with bistables for Low DNBR and HighLPD if presentCRSReview and/or implement actions required by Technical Specification section3.3.1 (RPS), 3.3.3.5 (Remote Shutdown), and 3.3.3.6 (Accident Monitoring)- Enters TS 3.3.1 Action 2- Determines that following trip bistables in PPS Channel must be bypassedwithin 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months of time of failure:o Linear Power Hi,o DNBR Lo,o LPD Hio The CRS may decide to bypass PPS Channel A Log Pwr Hi toensure that on plant shutdown it is not missed, but it is notrequired in Mode 1- CRS reviews OP-903-013 and TS 3.3.3.5 and determines that minimumrequirements are met- CRS reviews OP-903-013 and TS 3.3.3.6 and determines that minimumrequirements are met E-NRC06-3Page 6 of 17CRSDirects BOP to bypass the following PPS Channel C trip bistables within 1hour of failure:- Linear Power Hi,- DNBR Lo,- LPD Hi- The CRS may decide to bypass PPS Channel C Log Pwr Hi to ensure thaton plant shutdown it is not missed, but it is not required in Mode 1BOPBypasses affected bistable in PPS Channel C as follows:- Obtains Key from Key locker on side of BOP Desk- Unlocks and opens front access door at CP-10 Channel C- Unlocks and opens the Bistable Control Panel door in PPS Channel C- Depresses the bistable bypass pushbuttons for the following trip bistablesin PPS Channel C and verifies associated bypass lights illuminate onCP-10:o Linear Power Hi,o DNBR Lo,o LPD Hio The BOP bypass PPS Channel C Log Pwr Hi per CRSinstructions, but it is not required in Mode 1TerminationBYPASS lights illuminated on BCP and ROM for the desired bistable channels E-NRC06-3Page 7 of 17OP Test 1, Scenario 3, Events 2 - Loop 1 Thot instrument fails low affecting pressurizer level setpointEvent

Description:

After bistables placed in Bypass a loop 1 Thot instrument fails low affecting pressurizer level setpoint. Thisevent requires implementation of OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Malfunction Off-Normal procedure.Event Objectives:1. Determine faulty temperature channel(s) and take corrective actions to restore pressurizer level controlback to normal.2. Properly perform general subsequent operator actions in accordance with OP-901-110, Pressurizer LevelControl MalfunctionEvent Critical Tasks:1 NoneEvent Action Steps:Time:Position:Applicant's Actions or Behavior:ATCReport indications and alarms to CRS.- Pressurizer Level Hi/Lo annunciator on CP Pressurizer Level Hi-Hi annunciator on CP All Backup heaters ON at CP Setpoint Dropped suddenly on RC-ILR-0110 on CP Letdown Flow rising on CP Th Loop 1, RC-ITI-0110, instrument reading low on CP-2CRSDetermines need to enter and implement OP-901-110, Pressurizer LevelControl Malfunction.ATC/CRSPlace PZR Level Controller on CP-2 to MANUAL and adjust output slowly torestore Pressurizer Level (CP-2).- Takes manual control of RC-ILIC-0110 by momentarily depressing theMANUAL pushbutton- Lowers output of RC-ILIC-0110 to obtain a letdown flow that results instable or rising PZR Level on CP-2 indicators and recorders.CRSDiagnose into Subsection, E2, Pressurizer Level Setpoint MalfunctionATC/CRSVerify normal indications on all Safety Measurement Channel Hot Leg AndCold Leg Temperature Indicators on CP-7.- Determines that all Hot and Cold Leg Temperature Indicators on CP-7 arereading normally E-NRC06-3Page 8 of 17ATC/CRSDetermine affected channel(s) by checking RRS TAVG Recorders (RC-ITR-0111 AND RC-ITR-0121 ON CP-2).- Determines that both RRS Channels are affected.ATC/CRSCycle Charging Pumps (CP-4) as necessary to maintain Pressurizer Levelabove minimum level for operation per Attachment 1, PZR Level vs. Tavecurve.- Using pre-failure Tave indication and Attachment 1, determines minimumlevel for operation is 40-45%- CRS gives instructions to ATC to maintain PZR level above minimum levelor gives a band to maintain that ensures that minimum level is always metATC/CRSIf PZR Backup Heaters have energized, then place unnecessary BackupHeater banks to OFF on CP-2. (One bank may be left in ON)ATC/CRSCheck RRS Hot and Cold Leg Temperature meters on CP-2 for abnormalreadings.- Determines that Hot Leg instrument RC-ITI-0110 is failed lowBOP/CRSIf Hot Leg 1 indicates abnormally high or low, select Loop 2 for Tave LoopSelector in both RRS local cabinets (inside cabinet drawer on side of drawer).- CRS directs performance of this step- Locates RRS system cabinets behind main panels and places both TaveLoop Selector Switches to Loop 2.ATC/CRSVerify setpoint of Pressurizer Level Controller (RC-ILIC-0110 on CP-2) returnsto program setpoint per Attachment 1, PZR Level vs. Tave curve and performthe following:- Place PZR Level Controller in AUTO by momentarily depressing AUTOpushbutton and verify PZR level is controlling at setpoint- Place backup Charging Pumps in AUTO as necessary (CP-4)- Place desired Pressurizer Backup Heaters in AUTO; one bank may be leftin ON- Reset both Proportional Heater banks by momentarily placing each C/S onCP-2 to ONTerminationTermination point for event E-NRC06-3Page 9 of 17OP Test 1, Scenario 3, Event 3 - CCW Pump A bearing seizes and the pump tripsEvent

Description:

After actions of OP-901-110 are implemented CCW Pump A bearing seizes and the pump trips. The BOP willstart CCW Pump AB to replace A. Since the AB buses are aligned to the B side, this will require entry into TS3.7.3 and cascading TS per OP-100-014.Event Objectives:1. Restore and properly align CCW in accordance with off-normal operating procedure OP-901-510,Component Cooling Water System Malfunction.Event Critical Tasks:1 NoneEvent Action Steps:Time:Position:Applicant's Actions or Behavior:BOPRecognize and report CC Pump A trip.- CCW Pump A Trip/Trouble (CP-8)- Amber light on CC Pump A C/S (CP-8)- Lower CCW Flow and Pressure Indications on CP PMC alarm for CC Pump A OverloadCRSEnter OP-901-510, CCW Malfunction and implement Subsection E2, CCWPumps.BOP/CRSAlign CCW Pump AB Assignment Switch on CP-8 to position A.BOP/CRSVerify Suction and Discharge Cross Connect Valves from Train A are open onCP-8.- CC-126A/CC-114A, CCW Suct & Disch Header Tie Valves AB to A- CC-127A/CC-115A, CCW Suct & Disch Header Tie Valves AB to ABOP/CRSStart CCW Pump AB using C/S on CP-8.BOP/CRSEvaluate AB electrical bus alignment for Technical Specification impact.Enters:- T. S. 3.7.3- Cascading Tech Specs per OP-100-014- TRM 3.7.3TerminationTermination point for event E-NRC06-3Page 10 of 17OP Test 1, Scenario 3, Event 4, 5 and 6 - RCP 1A Lower Seal failure, Reactor Trip, Manual Trip FailureEFW Pump B fails to Auto StartEvent

Description:

The pressure surge on the system causes RCP 1A Lower Seal to fail. The crew should trip the reactor and secure RCP1A to comply with OP-901-130. The manual reactor trip will fail and the RO will trip the reactor by alternate means.Event Objectives:1. Carry out all operator actions, including necessary contingency actions in accordance with OP-902-000,Standard Post Trip Actions, in the event of a Reactor trip.2. Properly diagnose event in progress and transition to appropriate EOP recovery procedureEvent Critical Tasks:Establish Reactivity ControlThe task is identified by at least one memberof the crew. The crew will manually trip thereactor, by opening the 32 bus feeders, within1 minute of recognizing Manual Trip failedEvent Action Steps:Time: Position:Applicant's Actions or Behavior:ATC/CRSVerify Reactivity Control.- Check Reactor power dropping (CP-2 or CP-7)- Check startup rate is negative (CP-2 or CP-7).- Check less than 2 CEAs not fully inserted (CP-2)OpenBOTHthe following breakers for 5 seconds and close:* SST A32 FEEDER* SST B32 FEEDERNOTE: CRITICAL TASKBOP/CRSVerify Maintenance Of Vital Auxiliaries by:§ Checking the main turbine tripped by verifying all valves indicate green atTurbine Mimic on CP-1§ Check the generator tripped by verifying green indication on bothGenerator Output Breakers and Exciter Field Breaker on CP-1§ Check train A and B station loads are energized from offsite power by:§ Voltage available to A1, A2, A3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feederbreakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1§ Voltage available to B1, B2, B3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feederbreakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1§ A and B DC bus indicators on CP-1 read > 105 volts§ Vital AC Instrument Bus Indicators on CP-7 read ~ 120 voltsATC/CRSVerify RCS Inventory Controlby:§ Checking PZR level 7% to 60% and trending to 33% to 60% on CP-2§ Checks Subcooling Margin greater than or equal to 28 deg. on CP-2 E-NRC06-3Page 11 of 17Time: Position:Applicant's Actions or Behavior:ATC/CRSVerify RCS Pressure Control by:§ Checks PZR pressure between 1750 psia and 2300 psia (CP-2, CP-7,PMC or QSPDS) and trending to between 2025 and 2275 psiaATC/CRSVerify Core Heat Removal by:§ Checking at least one RCP operating on CP-2,§ Operating loop delta-T less than 13 deg. F (CP-2, CP-7, QSPDS) and§ RCS Subcooling (CP-2) greater than or equal to 28 deg. F.BOP/CRSCheck RCS Heat Removal by:§ Checking at least one S/G is both 15-80% NR (CP-1 or CP-8) and MainFeedwater is available to restore level or§ Verify EFW is available to restore level in at least one S/G.o EFAS-1 or EFAS-2 actuation occurred if < 27.4% NR (PPS ROMlights extinguished CP-7)o EFW pumps operating (CP-8) if EFAS-1 or 2 actuatedRecognizes EFW Pump B failed to auto start:*Manually starts EFW Pump BATC/CRSCheck RCS Tc (CP-2 or CP-7) is 535-555 deg. FBOP/CRSCheck S/G pressure 925-1050 psia (CP-1 or CP-7)BOP/CRSCheck FWCS in Reactor Trip Override (CP-1) by§ Checking Main Feed Reg Valves are closed,§ Startup Feed Reg Valves are 13-21% open, and§ Operating Feed Pumps are 3800 to 4000 rpmBOP/CRSReset Moisture Separator Reheaters and§ Check the Temp Control Valves closed (Reheat Control Panel CP-1)ATC/CRSVerify Containment Isolation by§ Checking Containment pressure (CP-7 or CP-8) < 16.4 psia,§ Check that no Containment. Area rad monitors are in alarm or showan unexplained rise in activity, and§ Check that no steam plant rad monitors alarm or show an unexplainedrise in activity.

E-NRC06-3Page 12 of 17Time: Position:Applicant's Actions or Behavior:BOP/ATC/CRSVerify Containment Temperature And Pressure Control And ContainmentCombustible Gas Control by§ Verifying Containment Temperature (CP-18 or QSPDS) less than orequal to 120 deg. F§ Verify Containment pressure is < 16.4 psia (CP-7 or CP-8)CRSDetermines whether all Safety Function Acceptance Criteria were met and nocontingencies were taken:§ If answer is Yes CRS goes to OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery§ If answer is NO then CRS performs diagnostics flowchart OP-902-009,Appendix 1TerminationCrew diagnoses a Reactor Trip Event and transitions to OP-902-001 E-NRC06-3Page 13 of 17OP Test 1, Scenario 3, Event 7 - Steam Generator Tube RuptureEvent

Description:

After the trip a SGTR occurs in SG #1. The crew will enter OP-902-007. Once the crew isolates SG #1, thescenario may be terminated.Event Objectives:During implementation of OP-902- 006, a Steam Generator Tube Rupture occurs in S/G 1. The Crew shoulddiagnose to OP-902-007. The scenario may be terminated after the crew takes action to isolate S/G 1 andcommence depressurization of the RCSEvent Critical Tasks:1. Prevent Opening of the SG Safety ValvesThe task is identified by at least one member of thecrew. The Crew takes action to reduce T-Hot to< 520 degrees F prior to isolating SG 12. Isolate the Most Affected SGThe task is identified by at least one member of thecrew. The Crew takes action to isolate SG 1 priorto commencing the controlled cooldown to 350°FEvent Action Steps:Time: Position:Applicant's Actions or Behavior:ATC/BOPRecognizes SGTR* Pressurizer level changing* Pressurizer pressure dropping rapidly* Activity in steam plantCRSDirects Entry into OP-902-007CRSConfirm diagnosis§ CRS directs STA to perform safety function status check list§ CRS notifies Chemistry to sample both S/Gs for activityCREWAnnounce the event using plant pageCRSDirects SM to Refer to Emergency PlanCRSImplements Placekeeper and records time of Reactor TripATC/CRSIf PZR pressure < 1684 psia verify SIAS initiated,§ SIAS lights off on PPS ROM on CP-7§ SIAS Initiation Alarms on CP-2 E-NRC06-3Page 14 of 17Time: Position:Applicant's Actions or Behavior:ATC/BOP/CRSIf SIAS initiated,§ LPSI and HPSI pumps started,§ Injection flow is acceptable per OP-902-009, Appendix 2§ available charging pumps (2) are runningATC/CRSIf PZR press < 1621 psia and SIAS is actuated verify no more than 2 RCPs(CP-2) operating.If PZR PRESS does not meet Appendix 2A secure all RCPs.ATC/BOP/CRSVerify RCP operating limits§ Verify CCW available to RCPs (CP-2/CP-8) or secure affected RCPs if notrestored within 3 minutes.§ if Tc < 500 deg. F, verify no more than 2 RCPs operating.BOP/CRSVerify proper CCW operation§ Verify a CCW Pump (CP-8) is running for Train A and BBOPPerform Rapid Cooldown of RCS to less than 520°F Th§ Places Permissive switch for one Steam Bypass Valve on CP-1 toMANUAL§ Places Controller for respective Steam Bypass Valve to Manual on CP-1and raises output to initiate an RCS cooldownNOTE: CRITICAL TASKATC/CRSDepressurize the RCS using Main(CP-2) or Aux. Spray (CP-4) to meet all ofthe following:§ RCS pressure less than 950 psia§ RCS pressure within Appendix 2-A§ If HPSI Throttle Criteria are met control Charging and Letdown flow andthrottle HPSI flowATC/BOPReset MSIS initiation setpoints§ Depress all 4 SG Pressure setpoint Reset pushbutton on PPS ROMs onCP-7 when SG Pressure Lo Pretrip alarms actuate on CP-2§ Verify SG Press Lo Trip Setpoints Lower on all 4 indicators on CP-8 andclear SG pressure Lo Pretrips annunciators by depressing CLEARpushbutton at CP-2 E-NRC06-3Page 15 of 17Time: Position:Applicant's Actions or Behavior:BOP/CRSDetermine most affected SG§ High Rad Monitor readings (RMS CRT on CP-6)§ SG level (CP-8) rise in SG 1 when not feeding§ SG Activity SamplesBOP/CRSWhen RCS T-hot is less than 520 degrees F isolate the most affected SG 1 by:§ Place ADV 1 controller setpoint to 980 psig and verify the controller isin AUTO on CP-8§ Verify MSIV 1 is CLOSED on CP-8§ Verify MFIV 1 Closed on CP-8§ If EFAS 1 is not initiated close EFW-228A and EFW-229A on CP-8§ place the EFW FCV controllers in manual and close EFW-224A andEFW-223A on CP-8 by verifying output of controller is 0%§ Close MS-401A on CP-8§ Close the main steam line drains MS-120A and MS-119A on CP-8§ Direct an NAO to check Main Steam Safety Valves closed on SG 1NOTE: CRITICAL TASKTermination E-NRC06-3Page 16 of 17NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR TURNOVER SHEET AND CHECKLIST(TYPICAL)DATE 11/15/061.Prior to turnover, review Critical Parameters in allowable limits (Modes 1 and 2):PRESSURIZER LEVEL33-56%PRESSURIZER PRESSURE2075-2275 psiaSTEAM GENERATOR LEVEL60-70%STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE 860-1000 psiaTAVG544-582°FREACTOR POWER <100% (Mode 2 < 5%)2.Simulator Specific InformationReactor Power100%EFPD50ESI-0.01RCS Boron1442 ppmBAMT A5850 ppmBAMT B5725 ppm3. Complete independent Control Board Walkdown.LCO/Action Status:Equip/Sys TS Entered Action ExitedEFW Pump A3.7.1.2.d24 hrs ago Restore to operable w/in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or bein HSB w/in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and HSD w/in next6 hours.HPSI Pump A3.5.2.b 2 hrs ago Restore to operable w/in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or bein HSB w/in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and Pzr pressure< 1750 psia and RCS temp < 500°Fw/in next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .Equip/Sys TRM#EnteredActionExitedNoneE-NRC04-1 E-NRC06-3Page 17 of 17NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR TURNOVER SHEET AND CHECKLIST (Cont'd)(TYPICAL)Surveillance Tests in progress:NoneEquipment taken out of service:EFW Pump AHPSI Pump AEquipment returned to service:NoneMaintenance in progress:EFW Pump A has been OOS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to replace the pump impeller. HPSI pump A has been OOS for 2hours due to bearing failure during a surveillance run.Significant Events/Additional Items/Remarks/Equipment Out of Service:Plant Safety Index is 8.6 Yellow. Protected Train is B. SubGroups 5 and 11 are selected for both RXC events. RCP 1AMiddle Seal failed 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ago (steps 1 and 2 of OP-901-130 have been taken). Plans are for the oncoming shift toalign HPSI Pump AB to replace A.

ML070530083

Contents

Text

5.2. Critical

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Navigation menu

ML070530083

Text

5.2. Critical

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Description:

Navigation menu

Search