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| {{#Wiki_filter:0CATEGORY1REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9708270015 DOC.DATE: | | {{#Wiki_filter:0 CATEGORY 1 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9708270015 DOC.DATE: 97/08/19 NOTARIZED: |
| 97/08/19NOTARIZED: | | NO DOCKET FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTH.NAPE AUTHOR AFFILIA.ION ST.HARTIN,J.T. |
| NODOCKETFACIL:50-244 RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester G05000244AUTH.NAPEAUTHORAFFILIA.ION ST.HARTIN,J.T.
| | Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.MECREDY,R,C. |
| Rochester Gas&ElectricCorp.MECREDY,R,C. | | Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION VISS ING, G. |
| Rochester Gas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION VISSING,G. | |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| LER97-002-00:on 970720,34.5 KVoffsite.powercircuit751waslost.Causedbyautoma;icactua"ionof"B"emergency DGduerounder;oitage onsafeguards buses16&17.0ffsir.e powerrestoredtosafeguards buses16&17.W/970819 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:ITR JENCILSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:License Expdateinaccordance with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).
| | LER 97-002-00:on 970720,34.5 KV offsite.power circuit 751 was lost.Caused by automa;ic actua" ion of"B" emergency DG due ro under;oitage on safeguards buses 16&17.0ffsir.e power restored to safeguards buses 16&17.W/970819 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:ITR J ENCI L SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). |
| c''''50002446INTERNAL: | | c''''5000244 6 INTERNAL: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-1 PD ILE CENTE NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN1 FILE 01 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME VISSING,G. |
| RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-1PDILECENTENRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN1FILE01COPIESLTTRENCL112211111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME VISSING,G. | | AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EIB COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 R D EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POORE,W.NRC PDR 1 1 1 1 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H NOAC QUEENER,DS NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 1 1 1 1 C U N NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS: |
| AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EIB COPIESLTTRENCL1111111111111111RDEXTERNAL: | | PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 24 ENCL 24 |
| LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOORE,W.NRCPDR111111LITCOBRYCE,JHNOACQUEENER,DS NUDOCSFULLTXT111111CUNNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
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| PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083FULLTEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
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| ANDo~("iv.igqgclap('rip+~/~i~<<l:"~~wv~hp'g~co'E)r~<
| | AND o~("i v.i gqg clap('r ip+~/~i~<<l: "~~wv~hp'g~co'E)r~<v(+of CQc<of 01;s August 19, 1997 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Guy S.Vissing Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C.20555 |
| v(+ofCQc<of01;sAugust19,1997U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskAttn:GuyS.VissingProjectDirectorate I-1Washington, D.C.20555 | |
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| ==Subject:== | | ==Subject:== |
| LER97-002,Lossof34.5KVOffsitePowerCircuit751,DuetoExternalCause,ResultsinAutomatic Startof"B"Emergency DieselGenerator R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244
| | LER 97-002, Loss of 34.5 KV Offsite Power Circuit 751, Due to External Cause, Results in Automatic Start of"B" Emergency Diesel Generator R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50-244 |
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| ==DearMr.Vissing:== | | ==Dear Mr.Vissing:== |
| Inaccordance with10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(iv),whichrequiresareportof,"Anyeventorcondition thatresultedinamanualorautomatic actuation ofanyengineered safetyfeature(ESF),including thereactorprotection system(RPS)",theattachedLicenseeEventReportLER97-002isherebysubmitted.
| | In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of,"Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 97-002 is hereby submitted. |
| Thiseventhasinnowayaffectedthepublic'shealthandsafety.Verytrulyyours,RobertC.Mecredyxc:Mr.GuyS.Vissing(MailStop14B2)PWRProjectDirectorate I-1Washington, D.C.20555U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission RegionI475Allendale RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaSeniorResidentInspector 97082700i5 9708i9PDRADQCK05000244SPDRlllllllllilllilllllllllllllillllllll
| | This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.Very truly yours, Robert C.Mecredy xc: Mr.Guy S.Vissing (Mail Stop 14B2)PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C.20555 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna Senior Resident Inspector 97082700i5 9708i9 PDR ADQCK 05000244 S PDR lllllllllilllilllllllllllllillllllll |
| ~l NRCFORM366(4.95)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIO LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)APPROVEDBYOMBNo.3150-0104 EXPIRES04/30/96ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSEToCOMPLYWITHTHISMANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.REPORTEDLESSONSLEARNEDAREINCORPORATED INTOTHELICENSING PROCESSANDFEDBACKToINDUSTRY. | | ~l NRC FORM 366 (4.95)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)APPROVED BY OMB No.3150-0104 EXPIRES 04/30/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE To COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK To INDUSTRY.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE To THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IT-6 F33).U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-000t, AND To THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT FACILITY NAME III R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant OOCKEf NUMBER I2)05000244 PAGE I3)1 OF 8 TITLE I4I Loss of 34.5 KV Offsite Power Circuit 751, Due to External Cause, Results in Automatic Start of"B" Emergency Diesel Generator EVENT DATE (5)LER NUMBER (61 REPORT DATE (7l OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (Bl DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY 07 20 YEAR 97 SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 97-002-00 MONTH 08 DAY 19 YEAR 97 FACILITY NAME FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBEII OPERATING MODE (9)POWER LEVEL (10)100 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PUR 20.2201(b) 20.2203(al(1) 20.2203(al(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(iil 20.2203(a) |
| FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATEToTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCHIT-6F33).U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC20555-000t, ANDToTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECTFACILITYNAMEIIIR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantOOCKEfNUMBERI2)05000244PAGEI3)1OF8TITLEI4ILossof34.5KVOffsitePowerCircuit751,DuetoExternalCause,ResultsinAutomatic Startof"B"Emergency DieselGenerator EVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(61REPORTDATE(7lOTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(BlDOCKETNUMBERMONTHDAY0720YEAR97SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER97-002-00MONTH08DAY19YEAR97FACILITYNAMEFACILITYNAMEDOCKETNUMBEIIOPERATING MODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)100THISREPORTISSUBMITTED PUR20.2201(b) 20.2203(al(1) 20.2203(al(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(iil 20.2203(a)
| | (2)(iii)SUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR E: (Check one or more)(11)20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a) |
| (2)(iii)SUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTS OF10CFRE:(Checkoneormore)(11)20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a) | | (3)(i)73.71 50.73(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(a)(3)(ii) |
| (3)(i)73.7150.73(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(a)(3)(ii) | | OTHER X 50.73(al(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1) |
| OTHERX50.73(al(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1)
| | Specity in Abstract below or in NRC Foim 366A 20.2203(a) |
| SpecityinAbstractbeloworinNRCFoim366A20.2203(a)
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| (2)(iv)50.36(c)(2) | | (2)(iv)50.36(c)(2) |
| LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)50.73(a)(2)(vii)
| | LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)50.73(a)(2)(vii) |
| NAMETELEPHONE NUMBER(IneiudeAresCodeiJohnT.St.Martin-Technical Assistant (716)771-3641COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENT FAILUREDESCRIBED INTH(SREPORT(13lCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER ToNPRDSCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE ToNPRDSEACBL5XOOONSUPPLEMENTAL REPORTEXPECTED(14)YES(Ityes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE).XNoEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE(15)MONTHDAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximatelY 15single.spacedtypewritten lines)(16)OnJuly20,1997,atapproximately 0043EDST,theplantwasinMode1atapproximately 100%steadystatepower.PowerfromCircuit751(34.5KVoffsitepowersource)waslost.Thisresultedindeenergization of4160Voltbus12Band"B"train480Voltsafeguards buses16and17.The"B"Emergency DieselGenerator (D/G)automatically startedandreenergized buses16and17asperdesign.Therewasnochangeinreactorpowerorturbineload.Immediate corrective actionwastoperformtheappropriate actionsofAbnormalProcedure AP-ELEC.1 (Lossof12AAnd/Or12BBuses)tostabilize theplantandtoverifythatthe"B"Emergency D/Ghadstartedandreenergized buses16and17.ThecauseofthelossofpowerfromCircuit751wasdetermined tobeaphase-to-phase faultcausedbyaraccoon.Thisfaultcausedtheinsulators onanoffsitepoleforCircuit75'ltofail.ThiseventisNUREG-1022 CauseCode(C).Corrective actiontopreventrecurrence isoutlinedinSectionV.B.NRCFORM366(4.95)
| | NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Ineiude Ares Codei John T.St.Martin-Technical Assistant (716)771-3641 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN TH(S REPORT (13l CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER To NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE To NPRDS EA CBL5 XOOO N SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (It yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).X No EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximatelY 15 single.spaced typewritten lines)(16)On July 20, 1997, at approximately 0043 EDST, the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 100%steady state power.Power from Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was lost.This resulted in deenergization of 4160 Volt bus 12B and"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17.The"B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G)automatically started and reenergized buses 16 and 17 as per design.There was no change in reactor power or turbine load.Immediate corrective action was to perform the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Buses)to stabilize the plant and to verify that the"B" Emergency D/G had started and reenergized buses 16 and 17.The cause of the loss of power from Circuit 751 was determined to be a phase-to-phase fault caused by a raccoon.This fault caused the insulators on an offsite pole for Circuit 75'l to fail.This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C).Corrective action to prevent recurrence is outlined in Section V.B.NRC FORM 366 (4.95) |
| NRCFORM366A(4-95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBERI6)YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER97-,002-00PAGEI3)2OF8TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A/I17)PRE-EVENT PLANTCONDITIONS OnJuly20,1997,atapproximateiy 0043EDST,theplantwasinMode1atapproximately 100%steadystatereactorpower.Therewerenosignificant activities inprogress.
| | NRC FORM 366A (4-95)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME I1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET 05000244 LER NUMBER I6)YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 97-,002-00 PAGE I3)2 OF 8 TEXT llf more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A/I17)PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS On July 20, 1997, at approximateiy 0043 EDST, the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 100%steady state reactor power.There were no significant activities in progress.The offsite power configuration to the plant was in the alternate"50%/50%" offsite power lineup: Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was supplying power to the"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12A (12A transformer), via circuit breaker 52/12AX, to 4160 Volt bus 12B, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers 16 and 17.Circuit 767 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was supplying power to the"A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12B (12B transformer), via circuit breaker 52/12BY, to 4160 Volt bus 12A, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers 14 and 18.See the attached sketch of the offsite power distribution system.II.DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A.DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES: |
| Theoffsitepowerconfiguration totheplantwasinthealternate "50%/50%"offsitepowerlineup:Circuit751(34.5KVoffsitepowersource)wassupplying powertothe"B"train480Voltsafeguards buses16and17through34.5KVto4160Volttransformer 12A(12Atransformer),
| | July 20, 1997, 0043 EDST: Event date and time.July 20, 1997, 0043 EDST: Discovery date and time.July 20, 1997, 0044 EDST: Control Room operators verify the"B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G)operation and that safeguards buses 16 and 17 are energized. |
| viacircuitbreaker52/12AX,to4160Voltbus12B,andthroughthesafeguards bus4160Voltto480Volttransformers 16and17.Circuit767(34.5KVoffsitepowersource)wassupplying powertothe"A"train480Voltsafeguards buses14and18through34.5KVto4160Volttransformer 12B(12Btransformer),
| | July 20, 1997, 0114 EDST: Safeguards buses 16 and 17 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the"B" Emergency D/G.July 20, 1997, 0124 EDST: The"B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby.July 20, 1997, 1228 EDST: Circuit 751 was declared operable.July 20, 1997, 1232 EDST: Offsite power configuration was restored to the alternate"50%/50%" lineup.NRC FORM 366A I4.95) |
| viacircuitbreaker52/12BY,to4160Voltbus12A,andthroughthesafeguards bus4160Voltto480Volttransformers 14and18.Seetheattachedsketchoftheoffsitepowerdistribution system.II.DESCRIPTION OFEVENTA.DATESANDAPPROXIMATE TIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES:
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| July20,1997,0043EDST:Eventdateandtime.July20,1997,0043EDST:Discovery dateandtime.July20,1997,0044EDST:ControlRoomoperators verifythe"B"Emergency DieselGenerator (D/G)operation andthatsafeguards buses16and17areenergized.
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| July20,1997,0114EDST:Safeguards buses16and17weretransferred toCircuit767fromthe"B"Emergency D/G.July20,1997,0124EDST:The"B"Emergency D/Gwasstoppedandrealigned forautostandby.July20,1997,1228EDST:Circuit751wasdeclaredoperable.
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| July20,1997,1232EDST:Offsitepowerconfiguration wasrestoredtothealternate "50%/50%"lineup.NRCFORM366AI4.95)
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| NRCFORM366AI4-95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION
| | NRC FORM 366A I4-95)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION |
| ~FACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBERIB)PAGEI3)YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER3OF897-002-00TEXTIlfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366AII17)EVENT:OnJuly20,1997,atapproximately 0043EDST,theplantwasinMode1atapproximately 100%steadystatefullpower.TheControlRoomoperators receivednumerousMainControlBoardannunciator alarms.AmongthesealarmswereL-20(12AXFMROR12ABUSTROUBLE), | | ~FACILITY NAME I1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET 05000244 LER NUMBER IB)PAGE I3)YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 3 OF 8 97-002-00 TEXT Ilf more spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366AI I17)EVENT: On July 20, 1997, at approximately 0043 EDST, the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 100%steady state full power.The Control Room operators received numerous Main Control Board annunciator alarms.Among these alarms were L-20 (12A XFMR OR 12A BUS TROUBLE), J-5 (¹11 OR¹12 TRANSFORMER OUT OF SYNCH), J-7 (480V MAIN OR TIE BREAKER TRIP), J-9 (SAFEGUARD BREAKER TRIP), and J-32 (EMERGENCY DIESEL GEN 1B PANEL).The Control Room operators determined that the following events had occurred: Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was deenergized"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 had lost their power supply from 4160 Volt bus 12B (buses 16 and 17 had been momentarily deenergized) |
| J-5(¹11OR¹12TRANSFORMER OUTOFSYNCH),J-7(480VMAINORTIEBREAKERTRIP),J-9(SAFEGUARD BREAKERTRIP),andJ-32(EMERGENCY DIESELGEN1BPANEL).TheControlRoomoperators determined thatthefollowing eventshadoccurred: | | The"B" Emergency D/G had automatically started and was tied to safeguards buses 16 and 17 The Control Room operators verified that reactor coolant system temperature and pressure were stable, and that there was no change in reactor power or turbine load.They performed the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Buses)to stabilize the plant.They verified that the"B" Emergency D/G was operating and that safeguards buses 16 and 17 were energized. |
| Circuit751(34.5KVoffsitepowersource)wasdeenergized "B"train480Voltsafeguards buses16and17hadlosttheirpowersupplyfrom4160Voltbus12B(buses16and17hadbeenmomentarily deenergized)
| | The Control Room operators observed that Circuit 751 and bus 128 displayed zero (0)voltage.The loss of power from Circuit 751 resulted in undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17, and the"B" Emergency D/G automatically started as per design and reenergized these buses.Energy Operations personnel also identified the loss of power from Circuit 751, and promptly notified Ginna Control Room operators of the loss of power from Circuit 751.The Control Room operators referred to Equipment Restoration procedure ER-ELEC.1 (Restoration of Offsite Power)to restore offsite power to 4160 Volt bus 12B and 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17.The Control Room operators closed 4160 Volt circuit breaker 52/12BX to energize bus 12B from Circuit 767, via the 12B transformer, at approximately 0053 EDST.At approximately 0114 EDST, safeguards buses 16 and 17 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the"B" Emergency D/G.(Circuit 767 had remained in operation, supplying"A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18, throughout the event.)At approximately 0124 EDST on July 20, the"B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby.Energy Operations subsequently contacted the Control Room operators and confirmed that the loss of power from Circuit 751 occurred when a raccoon climbed an offsite pole for Circuit 751 and caused a phase-to-phase fault.The fault caused insulators on the pole to fail.(The raccoon perished.) |
| The"B"Emergency D/Ghadautomatically startedandwastiedtosafeguards buses16and17TheControlRoomoperators verifiedthatreactorcoolantsystemtemperature andpressurewerestable,andthattherewasnochangeinreactorpowerorturbineload.Theyperformed theappropriate actionsofAbnormalProcedure AP-ELEC.1 (Lossof12AAnd/Or12BBuses)tostabilize theplant.Theyverifiedthatthe"B"Emergency D/Gwasoperating andthatsafeguards buses16and17wereenergized. | | NRC FORM 366A I4.95) |
| TheControlRoomoperators observedthatCircuit751andbus128displayed zero(0)voltage.ThelossofpowerfromCircuit751resultedinundervoltage onsafeguards buses16and17,andthe"B"Emergency D/Gautomatically startedasperdesignandreenergized thesebuses.EnergyOperations personnel alsoidentified thelossofpowerfromCircuit751,andpromptlynotifiedGinnaControlRoomoperators ofthelossofpowerfromCircuit751.TheControlRoomoperators referredtoEquipment Restoration procedure ER-ELEC.1 (Restoration ofOffsitePower)torestoreoffsitepowerto4160Voltbus12Band480Voltsafeguards buses16and17.TheControlRoomoperators closed4160Voltcircuitbreaker52/12BXtoenergizebus12BfromCircuit767,viathe12Btransformer, atapproximately 0053EDST.Atapproximately 0114EDST,safeguards buses16and17weretransferred toCircuit767fromthe"B"Emergency D/G.(Circuit767hadremainedinoperation, supplying "A"train480Voltsafeguards buses14and18,throughout theevent.)Atapproximately 0124EDSTonJuly20,the"B"Emergency D/Gwasstoppedandrealigned forautostandby.EnergyOperations subsequently contacted theControlRoomoperators andconfirmed thatthelossofpowerfromCircuit751occurredwhenaraccoonclimbedanoffsitepoleforCircuit751andcausedaphase-to-phase fault.Thefaultcausedinsulators onthepoletofail.(Theraccoonperished.)
| | NRC FORM 366A (4.95)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME I1)DOCKET LER NUMBER IB)PAGE I3)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 4 OF 8 97-002-00 TEXT (If more space is reqtrired, tjse additional copies of NRC Form 366AI I17)Circuit 751 was reenergized and declared operable at approximately 1228 EDST on July 20.Circuit 751 was lined up to supply plant loads, and the offsite power configuration was restored to the alternate"50%/50%" offsite power lineup at approximately 1232 EDST.C.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: None D.OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: None E.METHOD OF DISCOVERY'his event was immediately apparent due to numerous Main Control Board alarms and other indications in the Control Room when power from Circuit 751 was lost.F.OPERATOR ACTION: Following the undervoltage condition on buses 16 and 17, the"B" Emergency D/G automatically started and reenergized these buses.The Control Room operators performed the appropriate actions to verify that the"B" Emergency D/G was operating and safeguards buses 16 and 17 were energized. |
| NRCFORM366AI4.95)
| | The Control Room operators manually restarted the"B" and"C" containment recirculation fans, which had tripped due to the loss of bus 16.The momentary loss of power to buses 16 and 17 caused the trip of the common sample pump for monitoring of the containment (CNMT)atmosphere by channels R-10A (iodine), R-11 (particulate) and R-12 (noble gas).The Control Room operator manually restarted the common sample pump at approximately 0100 EDST.The Control Room operators restored offsite power (from Circuit 767)to buses 16 and 17, stopped the"B" Emergency D/G, and realigned it for auto standby.The Shift Supervisor notified highet supervision and the NRC Resident Inspector of the loss of offsite Circuit 751.Subsequently, the Shift Supervisor notified the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii), non-emergency four hour notification, at approximately 0317 EDST on July 20, 1997.NAC FOAM 366A I4 95) |
| NRCFORM366A(4.95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAMEI1)DOCKETLERNUMBERIB)PAGEI3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER4OF897-002-00TEXT(Ifmorespaceisreqtrired, tjseadditional copiesofNRCForm366AII17)Circuit751wasreenergized anddeclaredoperableatapproximately 1228EDSTonJuly20.Circuit751waslineduptosupplyplantloads,andtheoffsitepowerconfiguration wasrestoredtothealternate "50%/50%"offsitepowerlineupatapproximately 1232EDST.C.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, ORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTED TOTHEEVENT:NoneD.OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:
| | NRC FORM 366A I4.95)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME I1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET 05000244 LER NUMBER I6)YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 97-002-00 PAGE (3)5 OF 8 TEXT ilf more spece is required, use addi tionel copies of NRC Form 368A/I17)G.SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES: |
| NoneE.METHODOFDISCOVERY'his eventwasimmediately apparentduetonumerousMainControlBoardalarmsandotherindications intheControlRoomwhenpowerfromCircuit751waslost.F.OPERATORACTION:Following theundervoltage condition onbuses16and17,the"B"Emergency D/Gautomatically startedandreenergized thesebuses.TheControlRoomoperators performed theappropriate actionstoverifythatthe"B"Emergency D/Gwasoperating andsafeguards buses16and17wereenergized.
| | AII safeguards equipment functioned properly.The"B" Emergency D/G automatically started due to the undervoltage condition on buses 16 and 17, displayed proper voltage and frequency, and reenergized safeguards buses 16 and 17 to supply emergency power.Running containment recirculation fans on bus 16 tripped as designed and were manually restarted as needed to restore normal cooling to the Containment. |
| TheControlRoomoperators manuallyrestarted the"B"and"C"containment recirculation fans,whichhadtrippedduetothelossofbus16.Themomentary lossofpowertobuses16and17causedthetripofthecommonsamplepumpformonitoring ofthecontainment (CNMT)atmosphere bychannelsR-10A(iodine),
| | Running service water pumps on bus 17 tripped as designed and the pump selected for autostart started when power was restored to bus 17.III.CAUSE OF EVENT A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE: The automatic actuation of the"B" Emergency D/G was due to undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17.I B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE: The (jndervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17 was due to the loss of power from Circuit 751.C.ROOT CAUSE: The underlying cause of the loss of power from Circuit 751 was a phase-to-phase fault on Circuit 751.This fault occurred when a raccoon climbed an offsite pole for Circuit 751.The fault caused the insulators to fail.The insulator failure affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped relays for Circuit 751, deenergizing Circuit 751.This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C),"External Cause".This loss of power and subsequent start of an Emergency D/G does not meet the NUMARC 93-01,"Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants", definition of a"Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".IV.ANALYSIS OF EVENT: This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of,"Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", in that the starting of the"B" Emergency D/G was an automatic actuation of an ESF system.NRC FORM 366A (4 95) |
| R-11(particulate) andR-12(noblegas).TheControlRoomoperatormanuallyrestarted thecommonsamplepumpatapproximately 0100EDST.TheControlRoomoperators restoredoffsitepower(fromCircuit767)tobuses16and17,stoppedthe"B"Emergency D/G,andrealigned itforautostandby.TheShiftSupervisor notifiedhighetsupervision andtheNRCResidentInspector ofthelossofoffsiteCircuit751.Subsequently, theShiftSupervisor notifiedtheNRCper10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii),non-emergency fourhournotification, atapproximately 0317EDSTonJuly20,1997.NACFOAM366AI495) | |
| NRCFORM366AI4.95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBERI6)YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER97-002-00PAGE(3)5OF8TEXTilfmorespeceisrequired, useadditionelcopiesofNRCForm368A/I17)G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES:
| |
| AIIsafeguards equipment functioned properly.
| |
| The"B"Emergency D/Gautomatically startedduetotheundervoltage condition onbuses16and17,displayed propervoltageandfrequency, andreenergized safeguards buses16and17tosupplyemergency power.Runningcontainment recirculation fansonbus16trippedasdesignedandweremanuallyrestarted asneededtorestorenormalcoolingtotheContainment. | |
| Runningservicewaterpumpsonbus17trippedasdesignedandthepumpselectedforautostart startedwhenpowerwasrestoredtobus17.III.CAUSEOFEVENTA.IMMEDIATE CAUSE:Theautomatic actuation ofthe"B"Emergency D/Gwasduetoundervoltage onsafeguards buses16and17.IB.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:The(jndervoltage onsafeguards buses16and17wasduetothelossofpowerfromCircuit751.C.ROOTCAUSE:Theunderlying causeofthelossofpowerfromCircuit751wasaphase-to-phase faultonCircuit751.ThisfaultoccurredwhenaraccoonclimbedanoffsitepoleforCircuit751.Thefaultcausedtheinsulators tofail.Theinsulator failureaffectedcircuitsatoffsiteStation204andtrippedrelaysforCircuit751,deenergizing Circuit751.ThiseventisNUREG-1022 CauseCode(C),"External Cause".Thislossofpowerandsubsequent startofanEmergency D/GdoesnotmeettheNUMARC93-01,"Industry Guideline forMonitoring theEffectiveness ofMaintenance atNuclearPowerPlants",definition ofa"Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".
| |
| IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportable inaccordance with10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(iv),whichrequiresareportof,"Anyeventorcondition thatresultedinamanualorautomatic actuation ofanyengineered safetyfeature(ESF),including thereactorprotection system(RPS)",inthatthestartingofthe"B"Emergency D/Gwasanautomatic actuation ofanESFsystem.NRCFORM366A(495) | |
| ,~ | | ,~ |
| ONRCFORM366AI4-95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.s.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBERI6)YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER97-002-00PAGEI3)6OF8TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366AlI17)Anassessment wasperformed considering boththesafetyconsequences andimplications ofthiseventwiththefollowing resultsandconclusions:
| | O NRC FORM 366A I4-95)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.s.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME I1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET 05000244 LER NUMBER I6)YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 97-002-00 PAGE I3)6 OF 8 TEXT llf more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366Al I17)An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions: |
| Therewerenooperational orsafetyconsequences orimplications attributed tothelossofCircuit751andstartoftheEmergency D/Gbecause:oAllreactorcontrolandprotection systemsperformed asdesigned.
| | There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to the loss of Circuit 751 and start of the Emergency D/G because: o All reactor control and protection systems performed as designed.o The"B" Emergency D/G was available for operation and functioned as designed to reenergize"B" train safeguards buses 16 and 17.o While in this condition, the plant electrical power systems (offsite power sources and the Emergency D/Gs)remained within the requirements of the Ginna Station Improved Technical Specifications (ITS)Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)Required Action 3.8.1.A.o Circuit 767 remained in operation supplying power to the"A" train safeguards buses;subsequently, Circuit 767 was lined up to supply power to the"B" train safeguards buses also.o Radiation monitor channels R-10A, R-11, and R-12 were temporarily lost.The common sample pump was manually restarted within a few minutes.This response complied with the requirements of ITS LCO Required Action 3.3.5.B.1. |
| oThe"B"Emergency D/Gwasavailable foroperation andfunctioned asdesignedtoreenergize "B"trainsafeguards buses16and17.oWhileinthiscondition, theplantelectrical powersystems(offsitepowersourcesandtheEmergency D/Gs)remainedwithintherequirements oftheGinnaStationImprovedTechnical Specifications (ITS)LimitingCondition forOperation (LCO)RequiredAction3.8.1.A.oCircuit767remainedinoperation supplying powertothe"A"trainsafeguards buses;subsequently, Circuit767waslineduptosupplypowertothe"B"trainsafeguards busesalso.oRadiation monitorchannelsR-10A,R-11,andR-12weretemporarily lost.Thecommonsamplepumpwasmanuallyrestarted withinafewminutes.Thisresponsecompliedwiththerequirements ofITSLCORequiredAction3.3.5.B.1.
| | Based on the above, it can be concluded that the plant operated as designed, and that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.V.CORRECTIVE ACTION A..ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS o Offsite power was restored to safeguards buses 16 and 17 from Circuit 767, and the"B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby.o Circuit 751 was cleared for use by Energy Operations, protective relays for Circuit 751 (at Station 204)were reset by Energy Operations, and Circuit 751 was reenergized and restored to operable status.ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: |
| Basedontheabove,itcanbeconcluded thattheplantoperatedasdesigned, andthatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVE ACTIONA..ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENT NORMALSTATUSoOffsitepowerwasrestoredtosafeguards buses16and17fromCircuit767,andthe"B"Emergency D/Gwasstoppedandrealigned forautostandby.oCircuit751wasclearedforusebyEnergyOperations, protective relaysforCircuit751(atStation204)wereresetbyEnergyOperations, andCircuit751wasreenergized andrestoredtooperablestatus.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:
| | Since this was an isolated occurrence, no corrective action is planned.NRc FORM 366A I4.95) |
| Sincethiswasanisolatedoccurrence, nocorrective actionisplanned.NRcFORM366AI4.95)
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| NRCFORM366A<4-95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER97-002-00PAGE(3)TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm866A/(17)VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A.FAILEDCOMPONENTS:
| | NRC FORM 366A<4-95)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET 05000244 LER NUMBER (6)YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 97-002-00 PAGE (3)TEXT llf more spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC Form 866A/(17)VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A.FAILED COMPONENTS: |
| None8.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistorical searchwasconducted withthefollowing results:LERs91-002,92-007,94-012,95-006,and95-007weresimilareventswithsimilarrootcauses(startofanEmergency D/Gduetolossofoffsitepowerfromexternalcauses).However,noneoftheexternalcausesfortheseLERswasduetoananimal.C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:
| | None 8.PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS: A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: LERs 91-002, 92-007, 94-012, 95-006, and 95-007 were similar events with similar root causes (start of an Emergency D/G due to loss of offsite power from external causes).However, none of the external causes for these LERs was due to an animal.C.SPECIAL COMMENTS: None NRC FORM 366A<4-95) |
| NoneNRCFORM366A<4-95)
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| 0NRCFORM366A(4.95lLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantOOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER97-002-00PAGE(3)8OF8TEXTllfmorespeceisrequired, useedditionel copiesoflVRCForm366A1(17))I5>VI>>AS+PcIOCSIAOCWIllCII)I5A>I>AWINSSIIW IOAtttt)tt-121 Sf>IIIWill~IICIC)IC$2/15252I)II)IC$2/2)IItllf~I)~CCM2A35flWII~I)O)A,SCCIIN~IIOII)O>2$III)\CvMICISf>WWICWOfOWCC I)A)I,>N~INIINIltlICOI1A>St/I2CCSl/tt5$/1It>t~tSA/lSl/ItOf$2/tttl/5I)ifOr/Milt/ltl)OCAAOWOCAAtOOc/MIWll22AIAAOWCO/ttOS2/OISI)C/I~I255IC$2/MI)O/I2$2/Ml)O/)OIASSIC~IO~Wt$2/MIWI)St/OOSIWIS~IAWICIf55IC~2/O/II)A/I~ICSSICOWOIIWCOIlSIAICWftt>ICC~INWO><tIOOSClr>
| | 0 NRC FORM 366A (4.95l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant OOCKET 05000244 LER NUMBER (6)YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 97-002-00 PAGE (3)8 OF 8 TEXT llf more speceis required, use edditionel copies of lVRC Form 366A1 (17))I 5>V I>>AS+Pc IOC SIAOCW Ill C II)I 5 A>I>AWINSSIIW IOA tttt)tt-121 Sf>IIIW ill~I ICIC)IC$2/15252 I)I I)IC$2/2)I I t llf~I)~CC M 2 A3 5fl WII~I)O)A,SCC IIN~IIOI I)O>2$I I I)\Cv M I CI Sf>WW ICWOfOWCC I)A)I,>N~IN IINI l tlICO I 1A>St/I 2CC Sl/tt5$/1 It>t~tSA/l Sl/I tOf$2/tttl/5 I)if Or/Milt/lt l)O CAAOW OCAAtO Oc/MIWll 22A IAAOW CO/ttO S2/OIS I)C/I~I 255 IC$2/M I)O/I 2$2/Ml)O/)O I ASS IC~IO~Wt$2/MIWI)St/OOSIWIS~IAW IC I f55 IC~2/O/II)A/I~I CSS IC OWOIIWCO Il SIAICW ftt>ICC~IN WO><tIOOSClr> |
| A35IAICWSCWCCCWWOI>OCOI~~INACO>Atl>O)NIC>
| | A3 5 IAICW SCWCCC WWOI>OCO I~~IN ACO>Atl>O)NIC> |
| IIIIOIO~III~SIAOCWSCWCC>Off>WCON II~INWttA>WOSSCI~>SIAISWftOICt~~>INItlOISSCI~I$1/MI5/II~I~ICSl/OISI5/IICCCI~IOOICIOOSOOOWwfSWOACOIOOOfWO))CIStNCI~St/MlI/IIOI~IC52/MII/ICCCCIAIAO52/OUSI)/2)OI~ICPg)CCWIWIOO~~>OIMlfSl/OAWOCtCIC)IC$2/Of)It/1$CCCIO)WlSt/MIC/)ICtSlitICQ)CAW>AIIW~$2/O/ill/)1$
| | II I IO IO~I II~SIAOCW SCWCC>Off>WCON II~IN Wtt A>WOSSC I~>SIAISW ftOICt~~>IN I tlOISSC I~I$1/MI 5/I I~I~IC Sl/OISI 5/I IC CCI~I OOICI OOS OOOWwfSW OACO IOOO fWO))CIS tNC I~St/Ml I/I IO I~IC 52/MII/ICC CCI A I AO 52/OUS I)/2)O I~IC Pg)CCWIWIOO~~>OI M lf Sl/OAWOC tCIC)IC$2/Of)It/1$C CCIO)Wl St/MIC/)IC t Slit IC Q)CAW>AIIW~$2/O/ill/)1$I~WC NAC FOAM 366A (4.95)}} |
| I~WCNACFOAM366A(4.95)}} | |
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Audible Count Rate Function Was Restored to Operable Status ML17264B1441997-12-17017 December 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 971117,NF Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel N-44 Was Not Placed in Tripped Condition.Caused by Technical Inadequacies in Procedures.Implemented EWR 4862 to Resolve Design deficiency.W/971217 Ltr ML17264B1291997-12-0303 December 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971103,NIS Audible Count Rate Function Was Inoperable.Caused by Misinterpretation of Event Sequence Due to Not Verifying Boron Concentration.B Verification Occurred Every 12 H Per ITS LCO Action 3.9.2.C.3.W/971203 Ltr ML17264B1271997-12-0101 December 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 971031,undetected Unblocking of SI Actuation Signal Occurred at Low Pressure Condition,Due to Faulty Bistable Which Resulted in Inadvertent SI Actuation Signal.Sias,Ci & CVI Signals Were Reset ML17264B1211997-11-24024 November 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 971024,radiation Monitor Alarm Were Noted Due to Higher than Normal Radioactive Gas Concentration Resulted in Cvi.New R-12 Alarm Setpoint Was Maintained for Duration of Refueling Outage ML17264B0461997-09-29029 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970730,bistable Instrument Trip Setpoint Could Have Exceeded Allowable Value.Caused by Insufficient Existing Margin Between Trip Setpoint & Allowable Value. Held Switches in Tripped configuration.W/970929 Ltr ML17264B0111997-08-27027 August 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970730,high Steam Flow Bistable Instrument Setpoint Plus Instrument Uncertainty Could Exceed Allowable Value in ITS Was Identified.Caused by Entry Into ITS LCO 3.0.3.Switches Placed in Tripped configuration.W/970827 Ltr ML17264A9941997-08-19019 August 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970720,34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751 Was Lost.Caused by Automatic Actuation of B Emergency DG Due to Undervoltage on Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.Offsite Power Restored to Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.W/970819 Ltr ML17264A9911997-08-11011 August 1997 LER 96-009-02:on 960723,determined That Leak Rate Outside Containment Was Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Isolated Leak & Cut Out & Replaced Leaking Pipe ML17264A8271997-03-0303 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970131,discovered Service Water Temp Was Less than Specified Value.Caused by non-representative Method of Monitoring.Increased Water Temp in Screenhouse Bay to Greater than 35 Degrees F.W/970303 Ltr ML17264A8071997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-015-00:on 961223,discovered Thermally Induced Overpressure Transient Could Occur.Caused by Thermal Expansion of Fluid During Design Basis Accident Condition. Installed Relief Valve on Affected line.W/970122 Ltr ML17264A7471996-11-27027 November 1996 LER 96-013-00:on 961029,circuit Breakers Closed While in Mode 3 & Resulted in Condition Prohibited by TS Due to Personnel Error.Circuit Breakers for MOV-878B & MOV-878D Were re-opened.W/961127 Ltr ML17264A6051996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-012-00:on 960820,feedwater Transient Occurred,Due to Closure of Feedwater Regulating Valve,Causing Lo Lo Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip.Sgs Were Restored & Missing Screw in 1/P-476 Was replaced.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A6061996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-009-01:on 960723,leakage Outside Containment Occurred,Due to Weld Defect,Resulting in Leak Rate Greater than Program Limits.Source of Leakage Isolated from RWST by Freeze Seal,Allowing Exit from ITS LCO 3.0.3.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A5911996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-011-00:on 960807,improper Configuration of Circuit Breaker Occurred,Due to Undetected Internal Interference, Resulting in Automatic Start of Both Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.Running AFW Pumps Were secured.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5921996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-010-00:on 960806,latching of Main Turbine While in Mode 4 Occurred,Due to Defective Procedure,Resulting in Automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.Caused by Defective Maint Procedure.Procedure revised.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5891996-08-22022 August 1996 LER 96-009-00:on 960723,determined Leak on Piping Sys Outside Containment Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Pipe & Socket Welds Were Cut Out & Replaced. W/960822 Ltr ML17264A5781996-08-0606 August 1996 LER 96-008-00:on 960707,main Feedwater Pump Breakers Opened. Caused by Change in Seal Water Differential Pressure Occurred During Sys Realignment.Afw Flow Controlled as Desired to Maintain S/G level.W/960806 Ltr ML17264A5561996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 960612,CR Operators Identified Control Rods Misaligned & Not Moving in Proper Sequence.Caused by Faulty Firing Circuit Card in Rod Control Sys.Faulty Firing Circuit Card in 1BD Power Cabinet replaced.W/960712 Ltr ML17264A5421996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960521,discovered Containment Penetration Not in Required Status.Caused by Personnel Error.Installed Flange Inside Containment Penetration 2.W/960620 Ltr ML17264A5411996-06-17017 June 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960516,PORC Determined Deficient Procedures Do Not Meet SRs for Testing safety-related Logic Circuits. Caused by Inadequancies in Individual Testing Procedures. Procedures Re Improved TSs revised.W/960617 Ltr ML17264A5051996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-01:on 960308,identified That Both Pressurizer PORVs Inoperable Concurrently Due to Disconnection of Flex Hose to Both PORV Actuators to Install air-sets for Benchset & Limit Switch Activities.Hpes Completed ML17264A4481996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960308,both Pressurizer Relief Valves Inoperable.Hpes Evaluation Is Being Conducted to Determined Cause of Event.C/As:Both PORVs restored.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4471996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960307,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump.C/As: Thermography performed.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4101996-03-18018 March 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 950504,inservice Test Not Performed During Refueling Outage.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Surveillance Frequency.Valve Test Performed & Disassembled. W/960318 Ltr ML17264A2971995-12-14014 December 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950817,surveillance Was Not Performed Due to Improper Application of TS Requirements Resulting in TS Violation.Testing of MOV-515 Was Performed on 951115.W/ 951214 Ltr ML17264A1711995-09-25025 September 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 950825,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump That Resulted in Manual Rt.Returned S/G Levels to Normal Operating levels.W/950925 Ltr 1999-09-22
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999 LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999 LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr ML17265A3671998-07-14014 July 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 971019,CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Actuating Function Was Not Operable.Caused by Mispositioned Switch.Revised Procedure CPI-MON-R37.W/980714 Ltr ML17265A1921998-03-11011 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980209,discovered That Boraflex Degradation in SPF Was Greater than Was Assumed.Caused by Dissolution of Boron on Boraflex Matrix,Per 10CFR50.21.Removed Spent Fuel Assemblies from Selected Degraded Storage Rack Cells ML17265A1641998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-007-01:on 971117,reactor Engineer Recognized That Neutron Flux Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel Was Not in Tripped Condition as Required.Caused by Technical Inadequacies.Channel Defeat Will Be Identified ML17265A1601998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-006-01:on 971103,verification of B Concentration Was Not Performed Due to Misinterpretation of Event Sequence. Audible Count Rate Function Was Restored to Operable Status ML17264B1441997-12-17017 December 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 971117,NF Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel N-44 Was Not Placed in Tripped Condition.Caused by Technical Inadequacies in Procedures.Implemented EWR 4862 to Resolve Design deficiency.W/971217 Ltr ML17264B1291997-12-0303 December 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971103,NIS Audible Count Rate Function Was Inoperable.Caused by Misinterpretation of Event Sequence Due to Not Verifying Boron Concentration.B Verification Occurred Every 12 H Per ITS LCO Action 3.9.2.C.3.W/971203 Ltr ML17264B1271997-12-0101 December 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 971031,undetected Unblocking of SI Actuation Signal Occurred at Low Pressure Condition,Due to Faulty Bistable Which Resulted in Inadvertent SI Actuation Signal.Sias,Ci & CVI Signals Were Reset ML17264B1211997-11-24024 November 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 971024,radiation Monitor Alarm Were Noted Due to Higher than Normal Radioactive Gas Concentration Resulted in Cvi.New R-12 Alarm Setpoint Was Maintained for Duration of Refueling Outage ML17264B0461997-09-29029 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970730,bistable Instrument Trip Setpoint Could Have Exceeded Allowable Value.Caused by Insufficient Existing Margin Between Trip Setpoint & Allowable Value. Held Switches in Tripped configuration.W/970929 Ltr ML17264B0111997-08-27027 August 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970730,high Steam Flow Bistable Instrument Setpoint Plus Instrument Uncertainty Could Exceed Allowable Value in ITS Was Identified.Caused by Entry Into ITS LCO 3.0.3.Switches Placed in Tripped configuration.W/970827 Ltr ML17264A9941997-08-19019 August 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970720,34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751 Was Lost.Caused by Automatic Actuation of B Emergency DG Due to Undervoltage on Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.Offsite Power Restored to Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.W/970819 Ltr ML17264A9911997-08-11011 August 1997 LER 96-009-02:on 960723,determined That Leak Rate Outside Containment Was Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Isolated Leak & Cut Out & Replaced Leaking Pipe ML17264A8271997-03-0303 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970131,discovered Service Water Temp Was Less than Specified Value.Caused by non-representative Method of Monitoring.Increased Water Temp in Screenhouse Bay to Greater than 35 Degrees F.W/970303 Ltr ML17264A8071997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-015-00:on 961223,discovered Thermally Induced Overpressure Transient Could Occur.Caused by Thermal Expansion of Fluid During Design Basis Accident Condition. Installed Relief Valve on Affected line.W/970122 Ltr ML17264A7471996-11-27027 November 1996 LER 96-013-00:on 961029,circuit Breakers Closed While in Mode 3 & Resulted in Condition Prohibited by TS Due to Personnel Error.Circuit Breakers for MOV-878B & MOV-878D Were re-opened.W/961127 Ltr ML17264A6051996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-012-00:on 960820,feedwater Transient Occurred,Due to Closure of Feedwater Regulating Valve,Causing Lo Lo Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip.Sgs Were Restored & Missing Screw in 1/P-476 Was replaced.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A6061996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-009-01:on 960723,leakage Outside Containment Occurred,Due to Weld Defect,Resulting in Leak Rate Greater than Program Limits.Source of Leakage Isolated from RWST by Freeze Seal,Allowing Exit from ITS LCO 3.0.3.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A5911996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-011-00:on 960807,improper Configuration of Circuit Breaker Occurred,Due to Undetected Internal Interference, Resulting in Automatic Start of Both Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.Running AFW Pumps Were secured.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5921996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-010-00:on 960806,latching of Main Turbine While in Mode 4 Occurred,Due to Defective Procedure,Resulting in Automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.Caused by Defective Maint Procedure.Procedure revised.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5891996-08-22022 August 1996 LER 96-009-00:on 960723,determined Leak on Piping Sys Outside Containment Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Pipe & Socket Welds Were Cut Out & Replaced. W/960822 Ltr ML17264A5781996-08-0606 August 1996 LER 96-008-00:on 960707,main Feedwater Pump Breakers Opened. Caused by Change in Seal Water Differential Pressure Occurred During Sys Realignment.Afw Flow Controlled as Desired to Maintain S/G level.W/960806 Ltr ML17264A5561996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 960612,CR Operators Identified Control Rods Misaligned & Not Moving in Proper Sequence.Caused by Faulty Firing Circuit Card in Rod Control Sys.Faulty Firing Circuit Card in 1BD Power Cabinet replaced.W/960712 Ltr ML17264A5421996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960521,discovered Containment Penetration Not in Required Status.Caused by Personnel Error.Installed Flange Inside Containment Penetration 2.W/960620 Ltr ML17264A5411996-06-17017 June 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960516,PORC Determined Deficient Procedures Do Not Meet SRs for Testing safety-related Logic Circuits. Caused by Inadequancies in Individual Testing Procedures. Procedures Re Improved TSs revised.W/960617 Ltr ML17264A5051996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-01:on 960308,identified That Both Pressurizer PORVs Inoperable Concurrently Due to Disconnection of Flex Hose to Both PORV Actuators to Install air-sets for Benchset & Limit Switch Activities.Hpes Completed ML17264A4481996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960308,both Pressurizer Relief Valves Inoperable.Hpes Evaluation Is Being Conducted to Determined Cause of Event.C/As:Both PORVs restored.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4471996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960307,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump.C/As: Thermography performed.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4101996-03-18018 March 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 950504,inservice Test Not Performed During Refueling Outage.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Surveillance Frequency.Valve Test Performed & Disassembled. W/960318 Ltr ML17264A2971995-12-14014 December 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950817,surveillance Was Not Performed Due to Improper Application of TS Requirements Resulting in TS Violation.Testing of MOV-515 Was Performed on 951115.W/ 951214 Ltr ML17264A1711995-09-25025 September 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 950825,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump That Resulted in Manual Rt.Returned S/G Levels to Normal Operating levels.W/950925 Ltr 1999-09-22
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17265A7601999-10-0505 October 1999 Part 21 Rept Re W2 Switch Supplied by W Drawn from Stock, Did Not Operate Properly After Being Installed on 990409. Switch Returned to W on 990514 for Evaluation & Root Cause Analysis ML17265A7621999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 991008 Ltr ML17265A7531999-09-23023 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Corrective Action & Closeout of 10CFR21 Rept of Noncompliance Re Unacceptable Part for 30-4 Connector. Unacceptable Parts Removed from Stock & Scrapped ML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr ML17265A7471999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990909 Ltr ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A7341999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990806 Ltr ML17265A7291999-07-29029 July 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re safety-related DB-25 Breaker Mechanism Procured from W Did Not Pas Degradatin Checks When Drawn from Stock to Be Installed Into BUS15/03A.Holes Did Not line-up & Tripper Pan Bent ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999 LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored ML17265A7131999-07-22022 July 1999 Special Rept:On 990407,radiation Monitor RM-14A Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Failed Communication Link from TSC to Plant Process Computer Sys.Communication Link Was re-established & RM-14A Was Declaed Operable on 990521 ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr ML17265A7211999-07-19019 July 1999 ISI Rept for Third Interval (1990-1999) Third Period, Second Outage (1999) at Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr ML17265A7661999-06-30030 June 1999 1999 Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments Conducted Without Prior NRC Approval for Jan 1998 Through June 1999, Per 10CFR50.59.With 991020 Ltr ML17265A7011999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990712 Ltr ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999 LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr ML17265A6761999-06-16016 June 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defects & noncompliances,10CFR21(d)(3)(ii), Which Requires Written Notification to NRC on Identification of Defect or Failure to Comply. Relays Were Returned to Eaton for Evaluation & Root Cause Analysis ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr ML17265A6681999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990608 Ltr ML17265A6651999-05-27027 May 1999 Interim Rept Re W2 Control Switch,Procured from W,Did Not Operate Satisfactorily When Drawn from Stock to Be Installed in Main Control Board for 1C2 Safety Injection Pump. Estimated That Evaluation Will Be Completed by 991001 ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr ML17265A6591999-05-17017 May 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Relay Deficiency Detected During pre-installation Testing.Caused by Incorrectly Wired Relay Coil.Relays Were Returned to Eaton Corp for Investigation. Relays Were Repaired & Retested ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A6381999-05-0707 May 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Replacement Turbocharger Exhaust Turbine Side Drain Port Not Functioning as Design Intended.Caused by Manufacturing Deficiency.Turbocharger Was Reaasembled & Reinstalled on B EDG ML17265A6391999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990510 Ltr ML17265A6361999-04-23023 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Power Supply That Did Not Work Properly When Drawn from Stock & Installed in -25 Vdc Slot.Power Supply Will Be Sent to Vendor to Perform Failure Mode Assessment.Evaluation Will Be Completed by 991001 ML17265A6301999-04-18018 April 1999 Rev 1 to Cycle 28 COLR for Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A6251999-04-15015 April 1999 Special Rept:On 990309,halon Systems Were Removed from Svc & Fire Door F502 Was Blocked Open.Caused by Mods Being Made to CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys.Continuous Fire Watch Was Established with Backup Fire Suppression Equipment ML17265A6551999-04-0909 April 1999 Initial Part 21 Rept Re Mfg Deficiency in Replacement Turbocharger for B EDG Supplied by Coltec Industries. Deficiency Consisted of Missing Drain Port in Intermediate Casing.Required Oil Drain Port Machined Open ML17265A6291999-03-31031 March 1999 Rev 0 to Cycle 28 COLR for Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A6241999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Ginna Station.With 990409 Ltr ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp ML17265A5661999-03-0101 March 1999 Rev 26 to QA Program for Station Operation. ML17265A5961999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990310 Ltr ML17265A5371999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990205 Ltr ML17265A5951998-12-31031 December 1998 Rg&E 1998 Annual Rept. ML17265A5001998-12-21021 December 1998 Rev 26 to QA Program for Station Operation. ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery ML17265A4761998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981210 Ltr ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR ML17265A4531998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981110 Ltr ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr ML17265A4291998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981009 Ltr 1999-09-30
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0 CATEGORY 1 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9708270015 DOC.DATE: 97/08/19 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTH.NAPE AUTHOR AFFILIA.ION ST.HARTIN,J.T.
Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.MECREDY,R,C.
Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION VISS ING, G.
SUBJECT:
LER 97-002-00:on 970720,34.5 KV offsite.power circuit 751 was lost.Caused by automa;ic actua" ion of"B" emergency DG due ro under;oitage on safeguards buses 16&17.0ffsir.e power restored to safeguards buses 16&17.W/970819 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:ITR J ENCI L SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).
c'5000244 6 INTERNAL: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-1 PD ILE CENTE NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN1 FILE 01 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME VISSING,G.
AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EIB COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 R D EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POORE,W.NRC PDR 1 1 1 1 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H NOAC QUEENER,DS NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 1 1 1 1 C U N NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 24 ENCL 24
AND o~("i v.i gqg clap('r ip+~/~i~<<l: "~~wv~hp'g~co'E)r~<v(+of CQc<of 01;s August 19, 1997 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Guy S.Vissing Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C.20555
Subject:
LER 97-002, Loss of 34.5 KV Offsite Power Circuit 751, Due to External Cause, Results in Automatic Start of"B" Emergency Diesel Generator R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50-244
Dear Mr.Vissing:
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of,"Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 97-002 is hereby submitted.
This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.Very truly yours, Robert C.Mecredy xc: Mr.Guy S.Vissing (Mail Stop 14B2)PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C.20555 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna Senior Resident Inspector 97082700i5 9708i9 PDR ADQCK 05000244 S PDR lllllllllilllilllllllllllllillllllll
~l NRC FORM 366 (4.95)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)APPROVED BY OMB No.3150-0104 EXPIRES 04/30/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE To COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK To INDUSTRY.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE To THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IT-6 F33).U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-000t, AND To THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT FACILITY NAME III R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant OOCKEf NUMBER I2)05000244 PAGE I3)1 OF 8 TITLE I4I Loss of 34.5 KV Offsite Power Circuit 751, Due to External Cause, Results in Automatic Start of"B" Emergency Diesel Generator EVENT DATE (5)LER NUMBER (61 REPORT DATE (7l OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (Bl DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY 07 20 YEAR 97 SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 97-002-00 MONTH 08 DAY 19 YEAR 97 FACILITY NAME FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBEII OPERATING MODE (9)POWER LEVEL (10)100 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PUR 20.2201(b) 20.2203(al(1) 20.2203(al(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(iil 20.2203(a)
(2)(iii)SUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR E: (Check one or more)(11)20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)
(3)(i)73.71 50.73(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
OTHER X 50.73(al(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1)
Specity in Abstract below or in NRC Foim 366A 20.2203(a)
(2)(iv)50.36(c)(2)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)50.73(a)(2)(vii)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Ineiude Ares Codei John T.St.Martin-Technical Assistant (716)771-3641 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN TH(S REPORT (13l CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER To NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE To NPRDS EA CBL5 XOOO N SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (It yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).X No EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximatelY 15 single.spaced typewritten lines)(16)On July 20, 1997, at approximately 0043 EDST, the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 100%steady state power.Power from Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was lost.This resulted in deenergization of 4160 Volt bus 12B and"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17.The"B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G)automatically started and reenergized buses 16 and 17 as per design.There was no change in reactor power or turbine load.Immediate corrective action was to perform the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Buses)to stabilize the plant and to verify that the"B" Emergency D/G had started and reenergized buses 16 and 17.The cause of the loss of power from Circuit 751 was determined to be a phase-to-phase fault caused by a raccoon.This fault caused the insulators on an offsite pole for Circuit 75'l to fail.This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C).Corrective action to prevent recurrence is outlined in Section V.B.NRC FORM 366 (4.95)
NRC FORM 366A (4-95)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME I1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET 05000244 LER NUMBER I6)YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 97-,002-00 PAGE I3)2 OF 8 TEXT llf more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A/I17)PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS On July 20, 1997, at approximateiy 0043 EDST, the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 100%steady state reactor power.There were no significant activities in progress.The offsite power configuration to the plant was in the alternate"50%/50%" offsite power lineup: Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was supplying power to the"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12A (12A transformer), via circuit breaker 52/12AX, to 4160 Volt bus 12B, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers 16 and 17.Circuit 767 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was supplying power to the"A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12B (12B transformer), via circuit breaker 52/12BY, to 4160 Volt bus 12A, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers 14 and 18.See the attached sketch of the offsite power distribution system.II.DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A.DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES:
July 20, 1997, 0043 EDST: Event date and time.July 20, 1997, 0043 EDST: Discovery date and time.July 20, 1997, 0044 EDST: Control Room operators verify the"B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G)operation and that safeguards buses 16 and 17 are energized.
July 20, 1997, 0114 EDST: Safeguards buses 16 and 17 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the"B" Emergency D/G.July 20, 1997, 0124 EDST: The"B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby.July 20, 1997, 1228 EDST: Circuit 751 was declared operable.July 20, 1997, 1232 EDST: Offsite power configuration was restored to the alternate"50%/50%" lineup.NRC FORM 366A I4.95)
NRC FORM 366A I4-95)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
~FACILITY NAME I1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET 05000244 LER NUMBER IB)PAGE I3)YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 3 OF 8 97-002-00 TEXT Ilf more spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366AI I17)EVENT: On July 20, 1997, at approximately 0043 EDST, the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 100%steady state full power.The Control Room operators received numerous Main Control Board annunciator alarms.Among these alarms were L-20 (12A XFMR OR 12A BUS TROUBLE), J-5 (¹11 OR¹12 TRANSFORMER OUT OF SYNCH), J-7 (480V MAIN OR TIE BREAKER TRIP), J-9 (SAFEGUARD BREAKER TRIP), and J-32 (EMERGENCY DIESEL GEN 1B PANEL).The Control Room operators determined that the following events had occurred: Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was deenergized"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 had lost their power supply from 4160 Volt bus 12B (buses 16 and 17 had been momentarily deenergized)
The"B" Emergency D/G had automatically started and was tied to safeguards buses 16 and 17 The Control Room operators verified that reactor coolant system temperature and pressure were stable, and that there was no change in reactor power or turbine load.They performed the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Buses)to stabilize the plant.They verified that the"B" Emergency D/G was operating and that safeguards buses 16 and 17 were energized.
The Control Room operators observed that Circuit 751 and bus 128 displayed zero (0)voltage.The loss of power from Circuit 751 resulted in undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17, and the"B" Emergency D/G automatically started as per design and reenergized these buses.Energy Operations personnel also identified the loss of power from Circuit 751, and promptly notified Ginna Control Room operators of the loss of power from Circuit 751.The Control Room operators referred to Equipment Restoration procedure ER-ELEC.1 (Restoration of Offsite Power)to restore offsite power to 4160 Volt bus 12B and 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17.The Control Room operators closed 4160 Volt circuit breaker 52/12BX to energize bus 12B from Circuit 767, via the 12B transformer, at approximately 0053 EDST.At approximately 0114 EDST, safeguards buses 16 and 17 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the"B" Emergency D/G.(Circuit 767 had remained in operation, supplying"A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18, throughout the event.)At approximately 0124 EDST on July 20, the"B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby.Energy Operations subsequently contacted the Control Room operators and confirmed that the loss of power from Circuit 751 occurred when a raccoon climbed an offsite pole for Circuit 751 and caused a phase-to-phase fault.The fault caused insulators on the pole to fail.(The raccoon perished.)
NRC FORM 366A I4.95)
NRC FORM 366A (4.95)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME I1)DOCKET LER NUMBER IB)PAGE I3)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 4 OF 8 97-002-00 TEXT (If more space is reqtrired, tjse additional copies of NRC Form 366AI I17)Circuit 751 was reenergized and declared operable at approximately 1228 EDST on July 20.Circuit 751 was lined up to supply plant loads, and the offsite power configuration was restored to the alternate"50%/50%" offsite power lineup at approximately 1232 EDST.C.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: None D.OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: None E.METHOD OF DISCOVERY'his event was immediately apparent due to numerous Main Control Board alarms and other indications in the Control Room when power from Circuit 751 was lost.F.OPERATOR ACTION: Following the undervoltage condition on buses 16 and 17, the"B" Emergency D/G automatically started and reenergized these buses.The Control Room operators performed the appropriate actions to verify that the"B" Emergency D/G was operating and safeguards buses 16 and 17 were energized.
The Control Room operators manually restarted the"B" and"C" containment recirculation fans, which had tripped due to the loss of bus 16.The momentary loss of power to buses 16 and 17 caused the trip of the common sample pump for monitoring of the containment (CNMT)atmosphere by channels R-10A (iodine), R-11 (particulate) and R-12 (noble gas).The Control Room operator manually restarted the common sample pump at approximately 0100 EDST.The Control Room operators restored offsite power (from Circuit 767)to buses 16 and 17, stopped the"B" Emergency D/G, and realigned it for auto standby.The Shift Supervisor notified highet supervision and the NRC Resident Inspector of the loss of offsite Circuit 751.Subsequently, the Shift Supervisor notified the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii), non-emergency four hour notification, at approximately 0317 EDST on July 20, 1997.NAC FOAM 366A I4 95)
NRC FORM 366A I4.95)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME I1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET 05000244 LER NUMBER I6)YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 97-002-00 PAGE (3)5 OF 8 TEXT ilf more spece is required, use addi tionel copies of NRC Form 368A/I17)G.SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:
AII safeguards equipment functioned properly.The"B" Emergency D/G automatically started due to the undervoltage condition on buses 16 and 17, displayed proper voltage and frequency, and reenergized safeguards buses 16 and 17 to supply emergency power.Running containment recirculation fans on bus 16 tripped as designed and were manually restarted as needed to restore normal cooling to the Containment.
Running service water pumps on bus 17 tripped as designed and the pump selected for autostart started when power was restored to bus 17.III.CAUSE OF EVENT A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE: The automatic actuation of the"B" Emergency D/G was due to undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17.I B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE: The (jndervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17 was due to the loss of power from Circuit 751.C.ROOT CAUSE: The underlying cause of the loss of power from Circuit 751 was a phase-to-phase fault on Circuit 751.This fault occurred when a raccoon climbed an offsite pole for Circuit 751.The fault caused the insulators to fail.The insulator failure affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped relays for Circuit 751, deenergizing Circuit 751.This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C),"External Cause".This loss of power and subsequent start of an Emergency D/G does not meet the NUMARC 93-01,"Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants", definition of a"Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".IV.ANALYSIS OF EVENT: This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of,"Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", in that the starting of the"B" Emergency D/G was an automatic actuation of an ESF system.NRC FORM 366A (4 95)
,~
O NRC FORM 366A I4-95)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.s.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME I1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET 05000244 LER NUMBER I6)YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 97-002-00 PAGE I3)6 OF 8 TEXT llf more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366Al I17)An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:
There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to the loss of Circuit 751 and start of the Emergency D/G because: o All reactor control and protection systems performed as designed.o The"B" Emergency D/G was available for operation and functioned as designed to reenergize"B" train safeguards buses 16 and 17.o While in this condition, the plant electrical power systems (offsite power sources and the Emergency D/Gs)remained within the requirements of the Ginna Station Improved Technical Specifications (ITS)Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)Required Action 3.8.1.A.o Circuit 767 remained in operation supplying power to the"A" train safeguards buses;subsequently, Circuit 767 was lined up to supply power to the"B" train safeguards buses also.o Radiation monitor channels R-10A, R-11, and R-12 were temporarily lost.The common sample pump was manually restarted within a few minutes.This response complied with the requirements of ITS LCO Required Action 3.3.5.B.1.
Based on the above, it can be concluded that the plant operated as designed, and that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.V.CORRECTIVE ACTION A..ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS o Offsite power was restored to safeguards buses 16 and 17 from Circuit 767, and the"B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby.o Circuit 751 was cleared for use by Energy Operations, protective relays for Circuit 751 (at Station 204)were reset by Energy Operations, and Circuit 751 was reenergized and restored to operable status.ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
Since this was an isolated occurrence, no corrective action is planned.NRc FORM 366A I4.95)
NRC FORM 366A<4-95)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET 05000244 LER NUMBER (6)YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 97-002-00 PAGE (3)TEXT llf more spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC Form 866A/(17)VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A.FAILED COMPONENTS:
None 8.PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS: A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: LERs91-002, 92-007,94-012, 95-006, and 95-007 were similar events with similar root causes (start of an Emergency D/G due to loss of offsite power from external causes).However, none of the external causes for these LERs was due to an animal.C.SPECIAL COMMENTS: None NRC FORM 366A<4-95)
0 NRC FORM 366A (4.95l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant OOCKET 05000244 LER NUMBER (6)YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 97-002-00 PAGE (3)8 OF 8 TEXT llf more speceis required, use edditionel copies of lVRC Form 366A1 (17))I 5>V I>>AS+Pc IOC SIAOCW Ill C II)I 5 A>I>AWINSSIIW IOA tttt)tt-121 Sf>IIIW ill~I ICIC)IC$2/15252 I)I I)IC$2/2)I I t llf~I)~CC M 2 A3 5fl WII~I)O)A,SCC IIN~IIOI I)O>2$I I I)\Cv M I CI Sf>WW ICWOfOWCC I)A)I,>N~IN IINI l tlICO I 1A>St/I 2CC Sl/tt5$/1 It>t~tSA/l Sl/I tOf$2/tttl/5 I)if Or/Milt/lt l)O CAAOW OCAAtO Oc/MIWll 22A IAAOW CO/ttO S2/OIS I)C/I~I 255 IC$2/M I)O/I 2$2/Ml)O/)O I ASS IC~IO~Wt$2/MIWI)St/OOSIWIS~IAW IC I f55 IC~2/O/II)A/I~I CSS IC OWOIIWCO Il SIAICW ftt>ICC~IN WO><tIOOSClr>
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