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{{#Wiki_filter:AttachmentARevisetheTechnicalSpecificationpagesasfollows:Removepages3.3-6through3.3-8Insert3.3-6through3.3-8~80126P41~<Q01PP----ADO<K05ppop4PPD I~,iI~C1, b.cd.e.Onecontainmentspraypumpmaybeinoperableprovidedthepumpisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin3days.Duringdieselgeneratorloadandsafeguardsequencetesting,bothcontainment,spraypumpsmaybeinoperableforaperiodnottoexceedonehourprovidedtheRCStemperatureislessthan350'F.Anyvalveorpipinginasystem,requiredtofunctionduringaccidentconditions,maybeinoperableprovideditisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin72hours.Onepostaccidentcharcoalfilterunitand/oritsassociatedfancoolermaybeinoperableprovidedtheunitisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin7days.Thesprayadditivesystemmaybeinoperableforaperiodofnomorethan3daysprovidedthatbothcharcoalfilterunitsareoperable.3-3'ComonentCoolinSstem3.3.3.1Thereactorshallnotbetakenabovecoldshutdownunlessthefollowingconditionsaremet:a~b.cBothcomponentcoolingpumpsareoperable.Bothcomponentcoolingheatexchangersareoperable.Allvalves,interlocksandpipingassociatedwiththeabovecomponentswhicharerequired3.3-6AmendmentNo.,Prop'osed.
{{#Wiki_filter:Attachment ARevisetheTechnical Specification pagesasfollows:Removepages3.3-6through3.3-8Insert3.3-6through3.3-8~80126P41~<Q01PP----ADO<K05ppop4PPD I~,iI~C1, b.cd.e.Onecontainment spraypumpmaybeinoperable providedthepumpisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin3days.Duringdieselgenerator loadandsafeguard sequencetesting,bothcontainment, spraypumpsmaybeinoperable foraperiodnottoexceedonehourprovidedtheRCStemperature islessthan350'F.Anyvalveorpipinginasystem,requiredtofunctionduringaccidentconditions, maybeinoperable provideditisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin72hours.Onepostaccidentcharcoalfilterunitand/oritsassociated fancoolermaybeinoperable providedtheunitisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin7days.Thesprayadditivesystemmaybeinoperable foraperiodofnomorethan3daysprovidedthatbothcharcoalfilterunitsareoperable.
I1'T tofunctionduringaccidentconditionsareoperable.3.3.3.2Therequirementsof3.3.3.1maybemodifiedtoallowoneofthefollowingcomponentstobeinoperableatanyonetime.Ifthesystemisnotrestoredtomeettheconditionsof3.3.3.1withinthetimeperiodspecified,thereactorshallbeinhotshutdownwithinthenext6hours.Iftherequirementsof3.3.3.1arenotsatisfiedwithinanadditional48hours,thereactorshallbeinthecoldshutdownconditionwithinthefollowing30hours.Ifneithercomponentcoolingwaterloopisoperable,thereactorshallbemaintainedbelowareactorcoolantsystemtemperatureof350Finsteadofatcoldshutdownandcorrectiveactionshallbeinitiatedtorestoreacomponentcoolingwaterlooptooperablestatusassoonaspossible.a~b.Onecomponentcoolingpumpmaybeoutofserviceprovidedthepumpisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin24hours.Oneheatexchangerorotherpassivecomponentmaybeout,ofserviceprovidedthesystemmaystilloperateat100%capacityandrepairsarecompletedwithin24hours.3A37Amendment,No.Proposed E
3-3'ComonentCoolinSstem3.3.3.1Thereactorshallnotbetakenabovecoldshutdownunlessthefollowing conditions aremet:a~b.cBothcomponent coolingpumpsareoperable.
3.3.43.3.4.1ServiceWaterSstemThereactorshall=notbetakenabovecoldshutdownunlessthefollowingconditionsaremet:3.3.4.23.3.53.3.5.13.3.5.2a.Atleasttwoservicewaterpumps,oneonbus17andoneonbus18,andoneloopheaderareoperable.b.Allvalves,interlocks,andpipingassociatedwiththeoperationoftwopumpsareoperable.Anytimethat.theconditionsof3.3.4.1abovecannotbemet,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdownwithin6hoursand,incoldshutdownwithinanadditional30hours.ControlRoomEmerencAirTreatmentSstemTheRCStemperatureshallnotbeatorabove350'Funlessthecontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystemisoperable.Therequirementsof3.3.5.1maybemodifiedtoallowthecontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystemtobeinoperableforaperiod.of48hours.Ifthesystemisnotmadeoperablewithinthose48hours,the.reactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandtheRCStemperaturelessthan350'Finanadditional12hours.BasisThenormalprocedureforstartingthereactoris,firsttoheat3.3-8AmendmentNo.Proposed AttachmentBAmendment,No.24totheTechnicalSpecificationchangedtheRCSconditionsabovewhichthecontainmentspraypumpswererequiredtobeoperablefromcriticaltocoldshutdown.ThisrequirementwillnolongerallowthecurrentPlantpracticeofperformingtheemergencydieselgeneratorloadandsafeguardssequencetesting(GinnaProcedureRSSP2.2)whenRCStemperatureisatapproximately300'F.Thistestisperformedwithonespraypumpalignedforrecirculationandtheotherinpull-stop.Therefore,neitherpumpwouldbeabletorespondtoanautomaticactuationsignalalthoughthepumpinpull-stopcouldbemanuallyactuatedimmediatelyandtheotherpumpcouldberealignedwithinarelativelybriefperiodoftime.Thecontainmentspraysystem,inconjunctionwiththecontain-ment.fancoolers,isdesignedtoremovesufficientheatfromthecontainmentatmospherefollowinganaccidenttomaintainthecontainment.pressurebelowitsdesignlimit(60psig).Thecontainmentspraysystemisalsocapableofreducingtheiodineandparticulatefissionproductinventoriesinthecontainmentatmosph'eresuchthatoffsitedosesresultingfromaLOCAarewithintheguidelinevaluesof10CFR100.TheproposedchangetotheTechnicalSpecificationswouldallowbothspraypumpstobeinoperableforaperiodnot.toexceed1hourprovidedRCStemperatureislessthan350'F.Thedesignbasiseventsforacontainmentpressuretransient.aretheLOCAat100percentpowerormainsteamlinebreak(MSLB)occurringatzeropercentreactorthermalpower.RestrictingRCStemperaturetolessthan350'Flimitstheamount.ofenergyavailablefortransfertothecontainmentatmosphereshouldaprimarysystempiperuptureorMSLBoccur.Forexample,acomparisonofreactorcoolantspecific"enthalpiesyields559.8BTU/ibmat560Fand2200psiaversus322.5BTU/ibmat350Fand600psia.InadditionenergyfromthefuelthatwouldbetransferredtotheRCSduringblowdownfollowingapiperuptureat100percentpower,wouldnotbeavailableattheisothermal350'Fcondition.Therefore,thepeakcontainmentpressureshouldremainwellbelowthedesignlimitof60psig.ThepotentialforoffsitedoseconsequencesforLOCAoccurringat350Fwithoutcontainmentspraypumpsimmediatelyoperable,tobeequaltoorgreaterthanthoseconsequencesresultingfromaLOCAat100%powerwithcontainmentsprayavailable,islimited.The350'Fisothermalconditionofthefuelreducesthepotentialforcladdingdamageandreleaseoffissionproducts.Thelowercontainmentpressurereducesthedrivingforceforleakageofanyfissionproductsreleasedintothecontainment,atmospheretotheoutsideenvironment..Finally,althoughthespraypumpsaretechnicallyconsideredinoperablebecausetheycannotbeautomati-callyactuated,theycanbemanuallyactuatedorrealignedwithinabriefperiodoftime.
Bothcomponent coolingheatexchangers areoperable.
Thisproposedamendmenthasbeenreviewedagainstthethreefactorsof10CFR50.92.Ithasbeendeterminedthattheamendmentdoesnotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationforthefollowingreasons.Thischangewillnotresultinasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangeinvolvestheinsertionofatestexceptionintotheoperabilityrequirementsforthecontainmentspraypumps.ThischangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalmodificationofthePlantorequipment.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceoftheaccidentsaddressedintheUFSARcannotbeaffected.ThecontainmentspraysystemisdesignedtoremoveheatfromthecontainmentatmospherefollowingapostulatedLOCA,mainsteamlinebreak(MSLB)oranyeventwherelargeamountsofenergytransferredtocontainmentcouldcauseoverpressurization.Theproposedtestexceptionminimizesthetimethatbothspraypumpswouldbetechnicallyinoperable,andplacesalimitonRCSconditionssuchthattheenergyavailablefortransfertothecontainmentatmosphereisalsolimited.Thetimeallowedtoconductthetest(1hr)isshort.LicensedOperatorswillbeoverseeingthetestingandwillbealerttothecontainmentsprayconfiguration.Theprobabilityofanaccidentoccuring,duringthistimeperiod,islessthan1.2x10oftheannualfrequencyofoccuranceofthedesignbasisevent.Therefore,theconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated(LOCA,MSLB)arenotsignificantlyincreasedintermsofthepotentialforcontainmentdesignpressuretobeexceeded.Theoffsitedoseconsequencesduetotheunavailabilityofcontainmentspraywouldnotbeincreased.Thepotentialforfuelfailureandreleaseoffissionproductsfromthecladdingissignificantlyreducedduetothelowtemperature(350'F)initialconditionofthefuelatthetimeofthepostulatedLOCA.Thelowercontainmentpressurereducesthepotentialforcontainmentleakage.Alsomanualrealignmentofaspraypumpwouldoccurinsufficienttimetoprovidesignificantfissionproductremovalcapability.2.Thesechangeswillnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.AsindicatedabovetheproposedchangetotheTechnicalSpecificationsdoesnotinvolveaphysicalmodificationtothePlantthatcouldresultinthecreationofanaccidentnotpreviouslyanalyzed.3.Thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninthemarginsofsafety.
Allvalves,interlocks andpipingassociated withtheabovecomponents whicharerequired3.3-6Amendment No.,Prop'osed
Therearenosignificantreductionsinthemarginsofsafety.ThecontainmentspraysystemisdesignedtoprovideheatremovalandremovaloffissionproductsfromthecontainmentatmospherefollowingaLOCA.Duetothereasonsdiscussedabove,thecontainmentpressureandradiologicalconsequencesofaLOCAoccurringatanRCSconditionoflessthan350Fandnospraysystempumpsavailablewouldbemuchlessthanthedesignbasisaccidentcondition.Thereforethemarginsofsafetytocontainmentfailureanddoselimitsof10CFR100wouldnotbereduced.  
.
I1'T tofunctionduringaccidentconditions areoperable.
3.3.3.2Therequirements of3.3.3.1maybemodifiedtoallowoneofthefollowing components tobeinoperable atanyonetime.Ifthesystemisnotrestoredtomeettheconditions of3.3.3.1withinthetimeperiodspecified, thereactorshallbeinhotshutdownwithinthenext6hours.Iftherequirements of3.3.3.1arenotsatisfied withinanadditional 48hours,thereactorshallbeinthecoldshutdowncondition withinthefollowing 30hours.Ifneithercomponent coolingwaterloopisoperable, thereactorshallbemaintained belowareactorcoolantsystemtemperature of350Finsteadofatcoldshutdownandcorrective actionshallbeinitiated torestoreacomponent coolingwaterlooptooperablestatusassoonaspossible.
a~b.Onecomponent coolingpumpmaybeoutofserviceprovidedthepumpisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin24hours.Oneheatexchanger orotherpassivecomponent maybeout,ofserviceprovidedthesystemmaystilloperateat100%capacityandrepairsarecompleted within24hours.3A37Amendment, No.Proposed E
3.3.43.3.4.1ServiceWaterSstemThereactorshall=not betakenabovecoldshutdownunlessthefollowing conditions aremet:3.3.4.23.3.53.3.5.13.3.5.2a.Atleasttwoservicewaterpumps,oneonbus17andoneonbus18,andoneloopheaderareoperable.
b.Allvalves,interlocks, andpipingassociated withtheoperation oftwopumpsareoperable.
Anytimethat.theconditions of3.3.4.1abovecannotbemet,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdownwithin6hoursand,incoldshutdownwithinanadditional 30hours.ControlRoomEmerencAirTreatment SstemTheRCStemperature shallnotbeatorabove350'Funlessthecontrolroomemergency airtreatment systemisoperable.
Therequirements of3.3.5.1maybemodifiedtoallowthecontrolroomemergency airtreatment systemtobeinoperable foraperiod.of48hours.Ifthesystemisnotmadeoperablewithinthose48hours,the.reactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandtheRCStemperature lessthan350'Finanadditional 12hours.BasisThenormalprocedure forstartingthereactoris,firsttoheat3.3-8Amendment No.Proposed Attachment BAmendment, No.24totheTechnical Specification changedtheRCSconditions abovewhichthecontainment spraypumpswererequiredtobeoperablefromcriticaltocoldshutdown.
Thisrequirement willnolongerallowthecurrentPlantpracticeofperforming theemergency dieselgenerator loadandsafeguards sequencetesting(GinnaProcedure RSSP2.2)whenRCStemperature isatapproximately 300'F.Thistestisperformed withonespraypumpalignedforrecirculation andtheotherinpull-stop.
Therefore, neitherpumpwouldbeabletorespondtoanautomatic actuation signalalthoughthepumpinpull-stop couldbemanuallyactuatedimmediately andtheotherpumpcouldberealigned withinarelatively briefperiodoftime.Thecontainment spraysystem,inconjunction withthecontain-ment.fancoolers,isdesignedtoremovesufficient heatfromthecontainment atmosphere following anaccidenttomaintainthecontainment.
pressurebelowitsdesignlimit(60psig).Thecontainment spraysystemisalsocapableofreducingtheiodineandparticulate fissionproductinventories inthecontainment atmosph'ere suchthatoffsitedosesresulting fromaLOCAarewithintheguideline valuesof10CFR100.
TheproposedchangetotheTechnical Specifications wouldallowbothspraypumpstobeinoperable foraperiodnot.toexceed1hourprovidedRCStemperature islessthan350'F.Thedesignbasiseventsforacontainment pressuretransient.
aretheLOCAat100percentpowerormainsteamlinebreak(MSLB)occurring atzeropercentreactorthermalpower.Restricting RCStemperature tolessthan350'Flimitstheamount.ofenergyavailable fortransfertothecontainment atmosphere shouldaprimarysystempiperuptureorMSLBoccur.Forexample,acomparison ofreactorcoolantspecific"enthalpies yields559.8BTU/ibmat560Fand2200psiaversus322.5BTU/ibmat350Fand600psia.Inadditionenergyfromthefuelthatwouldbetransferred totheRCSduringblowdownfollowing apiperuptureat100percentpower,wouldnotbeavailable attheisothermal 350'Fcondition.
Therefore, thepeakcontainment pressureshouldremainwellbelowthedesignlimitof60psig.Thepotential foroffsitedoseconsequences forLOCAoccurring at350Fwithoutcontainment spraypumpsimmediately
: operable, tobeequaltoorgreaterthanthoseconsequences resulting fromaLOCAat100%powerwithcontainment sprayavailable, islimited.The350'Fisothermal condition ofthefuelreducesthepotential forcladdingdamageandreleaseoffissionproducts.
Thelowercontainment pressurereducesthedrivingforceforleakageofanyfissionproductsreleasedintothecontainment, atmosphere totheoutsideenvironment..
Finally,althoughthespraypumpsaretechnically considered inoperable becausetheycannotbeautomati-callyactuated, theycanbemanuallyactuatedorrealigned withinabriefperiodoftime.
Thisproposedamendment hasbeenreviewedagainstthethreefactorsof10CFR50.92.
Ithasbeendetermined thattheamendment doesnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration forthefollowing reasons.Thischangewillnotresultinasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.
Theproposedchangeinvolvestheinsertion ofatestexception intotheoperability requirements forthecontainment spraypumps.Thischangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalmodification ofthePlantorequipment.
Theprobability ofoccurrence oftheaccidents addressed intheUFSARcannotbeaffected.
Thecontainment spraysystemisdesignedtoremoveheatfromthecontainment atmosphere following apostulated LOCA,mainsteamlinebreak(MSLB)oranyeventwherelargeamountsofenergytransferred tocontainment couldcauseoverpressurization.
Theproposedtestexception minimizes thetimethatbothspraypumpswouldbetechnically inoperable, andplacesalimitonRCSconditions suchthattheenergyavailable fortransfertothecontainment atmosphere isalsolimited.Thetimeallowedtoconductthetest(1hr)isshort.LicensedOperators willbeoverseeing thetestingandwillbealerttothecontainment sprayconfiguration.
Theprobability ofanaccidentoccuring, duringthistimeperiod,islessthan1.2x10oftheannualfrequency ofoccurance ofthedesignbasisevent.Therefore, theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated (LOCA,MSLB)arenotsignificantly increased intermsofthepotential forcontainment designpressuretobeexceeded.
Theoffsitedoseconsequences duetotheunavailability ofcontainment spraywouldnotbeincreased.
Thepotential forfuelfailureandreleaseoffissionproductsfromthecladdingissignificantly reducedduetothelowtemperature (350'F)initialcondition ofthefuelatthetimeofthepostulated LOCA.Thelowercontainment pressurereducesthepotential forcontainment leakage.Alsomanualrealignment ofaspraypumpwouldoccurinsufficient timetoprovidesignificant fissionproductremovalcapability.
2.Thesechangeswillnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentpreviously evaluated.
Asindicated abovetheproposedchangetotheTechnical Specifications doesnotinvolveaphysicalmodification tothePlantthatcouldresultinthecreationofanaccidentnotpreviously analyzed.
3.Thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificant reduction inthemarginsofsafety.
Therearenosignificant reductions inthemarginsofsafety.Thecontainment spraysystemisdesignedtoprovideheatremovalandremovaloffissionproductsfromthecontainment atmosphere following aLOCA.Duetothereasonsdiscussed above,thecontainment pressureandradiological consequences ofaLOCAoccurring atanRCScondition oflessthan350Fandnospraysystempumpsavailable wouldbemuchlessthanthedesignbasisaccidentcondition.
Therefore themarginsofsafetytocontainment failureanddoselimitsof10CFR100wouldnotbereduced.  


LISTOFCHANGESTOTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSLocationofChanep.3.3-6,Section3.3.2.2bAddedphrase"Duringdieselgeneratorloadandsafeguardsequencetesting,bothcontainmentspraypumpsmaybeinoperableforaperiodnottoexceedonehourprovidedtheRCStemperatureislessthan350Fp.3.3-7,3.3-8Nochangestothesepages.Pagesretypedonly.}}
LISTOFCHANGESTOTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LocationofChanep.3.3-6,Section3.3.2.2bAddedphrase"Duringdieselgenerator loadandsafeguard sequencetesting,bothcontainment spraypumpsmaybeinoperable foraperiodnottoexceedonehourprovidedtheRCStemperature islessthan350Fp.3.3-7,3.3-8Nochangestothesepages.Pagesretypedonly.}}

Revision as of 13:23, 29 June 2018

Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Test Exception to Containment Spray Pump Operability Requirements
ML17261A778
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/20/1988
From:
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17261A775 List:
References
NUDOCS 8801260416
Download: ML17261A778 (12)


Text

Attachment ARevisetheTechnical Specification pagesasfollows:Removepages3.3-6through3.3-8Insert3.3-6through3.3-8~80126P41~<Q01PP----ADO<K05ppop4PPD I~,iI~C1, b.cd.e.Onecontainment spraypumpmaybeinoperable providedthepumpisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin3days.Duringdieselgenerator loadandsafeguard sequencetesting,bothcontainment, spraypumpsmaybeinoperable foraperiodnottoexceedonehourprovidedtheRCStemperature islessthan350'F.Anyvalveorpipinginasystem,requiredtofunctionduringaccidentconditions, maybeinoperable provideditisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin72hours.Onepostaccidentcharcoalfilterunitand/oritsassociated fancoolermaybeinoperable providedtheunitisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin7days.Thesprayadditivesystemmaybeinoperable foraperiodofnomorethan3daysprovidedthatbothcharcoalfilterunitsareoperable.

3-3'ComonentCoolinSstem3.3.3.1Thereactorshallnotbetakenabovecoldshutdownunlessthefollowing conditions aremet:a~b.cBothcomponent coolingpumpsareoperable.

Bothcomponent coolingheatexchangers areoperable.

Allvalves,interlocks andpipingassociated withtheabovecomponents whicharerequired3.3-6Amendment No.,Prop'osed

.

I1'T tofunctionduringaccidentconditions areoperable.

3.3.3.2Therequirements of3.3.3.1maybemodifiedtoallowoneofthefollowing components tobeinoperable atanyonetime.Ifthesystemisnotrestoredtomeettheconditions of3.3.3.1withinthetimeperiodspecified, thereactorshallbeinhotshutdownwithinthenext6hours.Iftherequirements of3.3.3.1arenotsatisfied withinanadditional 48hours,thereactorshallbeinthecoldshutdowncondition withinthefollowing 30hours.Ifneithercomponent coolingwaterloopisoperable, thereactorshallbemaintained belowareactorcoolantsystemtemperature of350Finsteadofatcoldshutdownandcorrective actionshallbeinitiated torestoreacomponent coolingwaterlooptooperablestatusassoonaspossible.

a~b.Onecomponent coolingpumpmaybeoutofserviceprovidedthepumpisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin24hours.Oneheatexchanger orotherpassivecomponent maybeout,ofserviceprovidedthesystemmaystilloperateat100%capacityandrepairsarecompleted within24hours.3A37Amendment, No.Proposed E

3.3.43.3.4.1ServiceWaterSstemThereactorshall=not betakenabovecoldshutdownunlessthefollowing conditions aremet:3.3.4.23.3.53.3.5.13.3.5.2a.Atleasttwoservicewaterpumps,oneonbus17andoneonbus18,andoneloopheaderareoperable.

b.Allvalves,interlocks, andpipingassociated withtheoperation oftwopumpsareoperable.

Anytimethat.theconditions of3.3.4.1abovecannotbemet,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdownwithin6hoursand,incoldshutdownwithinanadditional 30hours.ControlRoomEmerencAirTreatment SstemTheRCStemperature shallnotbeatorabove350'Funlessthecontrolroomemergency airtreatment systemisoperable.

Therequirements of3.3.5.1maybemodifiedtoallowthecontrolroomemergency airtreatment systemtobeinoperable foraperiod.of48hours.Ifthesystemisnotmadeoperablewithinthose48hours,the.reactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandtheRCStemperature lessthan350'Finanadditional 12hours.BasisThenormalprocedure forstartingthereactoris,firsttoheat3.3-8Amendment No.Proposed Attachment BAmendment, No.24totheTechnical Specification changedtheRCSconditions abovewhichthecontainment spraypumpswererequiredtobeoperablefromcriticaltocoldshutdown.

Thisrequirement willnolongerallowthecurrentPlantpracticeofperforming theemergency dieselgenerator loadandsafeguards sequencetesting(GinnaProcedure RSSP2.2)whenRCStemperature isatapproximately 300'F.Thistestisperformed withonespraypumpalignedforrecirculation andtheotherinpull-stop.

Therefore, neitherpumpwouldbeabletorespondtoanautomatic actuation signalalthoughthepumpinpull-stop couldbemanuallyactuatedimmediately andtheotherpumpcouldberealigned withinarelatively briefperiodoftime.Thecontainment spraysystem,inconjunction withthecontain-ment.fancoolers,isdesignedtoremovesufficient heatfromthecontainment atmosphere following anaccidenttomaintainthecontainment.

pressurebelowitsdesignlimit(60psig).Thecontainment spraysystemisalsocapableofreducingtheiodineandparticulate fissionproductinventories inthecontainment atmosph'ere suchthatoffsitedosesresulting fromaLOCAarewithintheguideline valuesof10CFR100.

TheproposedchangetotheTechnical Specifications wouldallowbothspraypumpstobeinoperable foraperiodnot.toexceed1hourprovidedRCStemperature islessthan350'F.Thedesignbasiseventsforacontainment pressuretransient.

aretheLOCAat100percentpowerormainsteamlinebreak(MSLB)occurring atzeropercentreactorthermalpower.Restricting RCStemperature tolessthan350'Flimitstheamount.ofenergyavailable fortransfertothecontainment atmosphere shouldaprimarysystempiperuptureorMSLBoccur.Forexample,acomparison ofreactorcoolantspecific"enthalpies yields559.8BTU/ibmat560Fand2200psiaversus322.5BTU/ibmat350Fand600psia.Inadditionenergyfromthefuelthatwouldbetransferred totheRCSduringblowdownfollowing apiperuptureat100percentpower,wouldnotbeavailable attheisothermal 350'Fcondition.

Therefore, thepeakcontainment pressureshouldremainwellbelowthedesignlimitof60psig.Thepotential foroffsitedoseconsequences forLOCAoccurring at350Fwithoutcontainment spraypumpsimmediately

operable, tobeequaltoorgreaterthanthoseconsequences resulting fromaLOCAat100%powerwithcontainment sprayavailable, islimited.The350'Fisothermal condition ofthefuelreducesthepotential forcladdingdamageandreleaseoffissionproducts.

Thelowercontainment pressurereducesthedrivingforceforleakageofanyfissionproductsreleasedintothecontainment, atmosphere totheoutsideenvironment..

Finally,althoughthespraypumpsaretechnically considered inoperable becausetheycannotbeautomati-callyactuated, theycanbemanuallyactuatedorrealigned withinabriefperiodoftime.

Thisproposedamendment hasbeenreviewedagainstthethreefactorsof10CFR50.92.

Ithasbeendetermined thattheamendment doesnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration forthefollowing reasons.Thischangewillnotresultinasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Theproposedchangeinvolvestheinsertion ofatestexception intotheoperability requirements forthecontainment spraypumps.Thischangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalmodification ofthePlantorequipment.

Theprobability ofoccurrence oftheaccidents addressed intheUFSARcannotbeaffected.

Thecontainment spraysystemisdesignedtoremoveheatfromthecontainment atmosphere following apostulated LOCA,mainsteamlinebreak(MSLB)oranyeventwherelargeamountsofenergytransferred tocontainment couldcauseoverpressurization.

Theproposedtestexception minimizes thetimethatbothspraypumpswouldbetechnically inoperable, andplacesalimitonRCSconditions suchthattheenergyavailable fortransfertothecontainment atmosphere isalsolimited.Thetimeallowedtoconductthetest(1hr)isshort.LicensedOperators willbeoverseeing thetestingandwillbealerttothecontainment sprayconfiguration.

Theprobability ofanaccidentoccuring, duringthistimeperiod,islessthan1.2x10oftheannualfrequency ofoccurance ofthedesignbasisevent.Therefore, theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated (LOCA,MSLB)arenotsignificantly increased intermsofthepotential forcontainment designpressuretobeexceeded.

Theoffsitedoseconsequences duetotheunavailability ofcontainment spraywouldnotbeincreased.

Thepotential forfuelfailureandreleaseoffissionproductsfromthecladdingissignificantly reducedduetothelowtemperature (350'F)initialcondition ofthefuelatthetimeofthepostulated LOCA.Thelowercontainment pressurereducesthepotential forcontainment leakage.Alsomanualrealignment ofaspraypumpwouldoccurinsufficient timetoprovidesignificant fissionproductremovalcapability.

2.Thesechangeswillnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Asindicated abovetheproposedchangetotheTechnical Specifications doesnotinvolveaphysicalmodification tothePlantthatcouldresultinthecreationofanaccidentnotpreviously analyzed.

3.Thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificant reduction inthemarginsofsafety.

Therearenosignificant reductions inthemarginsofsafety.Thecontainment spraysystemisdesignedtoprovideheatremovalandremovaloffissionproductsfromthecontainment atmosphere following aLOCA.Duetothereasonsdiscussed above,thecontainment pressureandradiological consequences ofaLOCAoccurring atanRCScondition oflessthan350Fandnospraysystempumpsavailable wouldbemuchlessthanthedesignbasisaccidentcondition.

Therefore themarginsofsafetytocontainment failureanddoselimitsof10CFR100wouldnotbereduced.

LISTOFCHANGESTOTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LocationofChanep.3.3-6,Section3.3.2.2bAddedphrase"Duringdieselgenerator loadandsafeguard sequencetesting,bothcontainment spraypumpsmaybeinoperable foraperiodnottoexceedonehourprovidedtheRCStemperature islessthan350Fp.3.3-7,3.3-8Nochangestothesepages.Pagesretypedonly.