ML19354E040

Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Crescent Area Cooler Surveillance Requirements

ML19354E040
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	01/16/1990
From:	POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:
Shared Package
ML19354E035	List: ML19354E034 ML19354E039 ML19354E040
References
NUDOCS 9001250281
Download: ML19354E040 (6)

Text

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t i l- , ATTACHMENT I PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REGARDING- i CRESCENT AREA UNIT COOLERS IMPROVEMENT - .

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'i NewYork Power Authority JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT >

Docket No. 50-333 '

DPR 59 9001250281 90011s DR ADOCK 05000333 p

PDC

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3.11 (cont'd) 4.11 (cont'd)

B. Crescent AreaVentilation B. Crescent AreaVentilation Crescent area ventilation and cooling equipment shall be operable on a continuous basis whenever specification 3.5.A, 1. Unit coolers serving - ECCS components shall be 3.5.B, and 3.5.C are required to be satisfied. demonstrated operable once/3 months.

2. Each unit cooler's temperature control instrument shall be l

1. From and after the date that more than one unit cooler calibrated once/ operating cycle.

serving ECCS compartments in the same half of the

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crescent area are made or found to be inoperable, all  ;

, ECCS components in that half of the crescent area shall be considered to be inoperable for purposes of specification 3.5.A,3.5.B, and 3.5.C.

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2. If 3.11.B.1 cannot be met, the reactor shall be placed in a cold condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

C. Battery Room Ventilation C. Battery Room Ventilation ~

Battery - room ventilation equipment shall be doivuistrated Battery room ventilation shall be operable on a continuous basis operable once/ week.

whenever specification 3.9.E is required to be satisfied.

1. When it is determined that one battery room ventilation

1. From and after the date that one of the battery room system is inoperable, the remaming ventilation system ,

ventilation systems is made or found to be inoperable, its associated battery shall be considered to be inoperabie for shall be venfied operable and daily thereafter. ]

g .I' me t as M NW pee purposes of specification 3.9.E. '

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1 Amendment No. , ,1 ,1 ,1 -

! ATTACHMENT 11 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REGARDING CRESCENT AlWEURIT655G1EiBPROVEMENT (JPTS-89432)

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i New York Power Authority 1

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT j Docket No. 50-333 DPR-59

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. Attachment il SAFETY EVALUATION  ;

Page 1 of 3  ;

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE The proposed change to the James A. FitzPatrick Technical Specifications revises Surveillance -;

Requirement 4.11.B.2 on page 239. The phrase " Temperature indicator controllers" is replaced with *Each unit cooler's temperature control instrument." The change will require calibration, once per operating cycle, of the existing temperature Indicator controllers or the new temperature control switches. ,

ll. PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE s The Crescent Area Unit Coolers are air to-water heat exchangers which transfer haat from the air in the crescent area to the Service Water System. Ten unit coolers are divided into two trains.

Cooling water is normally supplied by the Service Water System. Emergency Service Water can be supplied to the coolers should Service Water become unavailable, in the existing arrangement, service water entering the coolers is regulated (throttled) by pneumatic Temperature Control Valves (TCVs) to achieve the desired crescent area air temperature. Temperature Indicator Controllers (TICS) regulate the pneumatic pressure to vary TCV position. Cooler fans run constantly pulling air across the coils. Increased area air temperatures cause the TCVs to open which, in turn, increases the amount of heat withdrawn from the air flowing through the coolers. When little or no air cooling is required, low cooling water flow (i.e., low flow velocities) causes silt to accumulate. This limits the heat transfer rate and reduces their hoat removal capacity.

The Authority plans to modify the coolers during and following the 1990 outage to reduce the potential for silt accumulation. The TCVs will be removed to allow continuous cooling water flow I through the coils. A new Temperature Control Switch (TCS) will be installed in the fan control l circuitry to tum the fans on and off. Existing TICS will be left in place and the high temperature alarm they generate will be retained.

When the modification is finished, the cooler operation will be controlled by the TCSs. The TICS will not control the coolers and will only be used to provide the alarm function.

l The control function previously performed by the TICS will be performed by the new TCSs. The surveillance Interval (once per operating cycle) was unchanged, since both the old TICS and TCSs perform equivalent functions. Periodic calibration of the TCSs will provide a comparable level of I confidence of the cooler's operability.

lil. IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE The change to the technical specifications is admin trative and is necessary to reflect accurately the physical condition of the plant after installation of this modification.

The technical specification change does not alter the conclusions of the plant's accident analyses as documented in the FSAR or the NRC staff's SER.

Attachment 11

/ SAFETY EVALUATION Page 2 of 3 The cooler modifications will improve the reliability of the crescent area coolers and restore the capability of the coolers to perform their intended function in the event of an accident. These modifications will not degrade the thermal capacity of the coolers or their ability to cool the crescent area in the event of an acciden'.

The applicable procedures and FSAR sectiora will be revised to reflect this change.

IV. EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONS:0ERATION Operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant !n accordance with this proposed amendment would not involve a significant hazards considerailon, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, since the proposed change would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The change to the specifications is purely administrative and will have no effect on either the probability or consequences of an accident.

The change to Surveillance Requirement 4.11.B.2 is required to reflect a planned plant modification. The modification will improve the reliability, performance and operability of the crescent area coolers.

Since the crescent area cooler's maximum thermal capacity is unchanged, there is no increase in consequences to any existing accident scenarios which require cooler operation and, therefore, the change does not increase the probability of any existing accident scenarios.

2. create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated. A purely administrative change to a periodic surveillance requirement will  !

not creato a new or different kind of accident. i The new temperature control method replaces a constant air flow through the coolers with a constant water flow. Any failure on the liquid side would, therefore, be due to a failure of the Service Water or Emergency Service Water systems and would be the same as if the coolers had a throttled water flow rate. The operation of the fans, on the air side of the coolers, in an 'as-needed" mode, as opposed to a constant air flow, does not alter the existing accident analyses. The system is either available (i.e.,

constantly on) or unavailable. This change, therefore, does not affect the plant's accident analyses as documented in the FSAR or the NRC staff's SER.

3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. A purely administrative change to a periodic surveillance requirement will not reduce the margin of safety. The margin of safety is not affected by the change from air flow control to water flow control. The maximum heat capacity of the coolers remains unchanged. Their ability to maintain the Crescent Area's temperature is also unchanged. Operation of i essential equipment in the Crescent Area is not affected by this change, nor is there any relaxation of controls or limitations.

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Attachment 11 i

SAFETY EVALUATION Page 3 of 3 i V. IMPLEMENTATION OF TNE PROPOSED CNANGE implementation of the proposed change will not impact the ALARA Program at the FitzPatrick plant, nor will the change impact the environment. ,

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VI. CCNCLUSION i

This change, as proposed, does not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in  !

10 CFR 50.59. That is,it:

a. will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or .

malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis [

report;

b. Will not increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a type different from any  ;

evaluated previously in the safety analysis report;

c. will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification; and j

d. Involves no significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92.

Vll. REFERENCES

1. NRC Inspection 50-333/88-392 Oct 6 Nov 251988 Routino inspection Plant  !

Activities Violation Deviation & Unresolved item, dated Decenher 20,1988. '

2. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Sections 9.9 and 12.3.

3. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Safety Evaluation Report (SER), dated November 20,1972 and Supplements.

4. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Crescent Area Unit Coolers improvements Conceptual Design Package Modification Number F189-049, July 18,1989.

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