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| issue date = 04/22/2009 | | issue date = 04/22/2009 | ||
| title = Summary of Conference Call with Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc., to Discuss Responses to Severs Accident Migration Alternatives Request for Additional Information for Kewaunee Power Station | | title = Summary of Conference Call with Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc., to Discuss Responses to Severs Accident Migration Alternatives Request for Additional Information for Kewaunee Power Station | ||
| author name = Lopas S | | author name = Lopas S | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DLR/RPB1 | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DLR/RPB1 | ||
| addressee name = | | addressee name = | ||
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ENCLOSURE 2 NRC FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS FOR DOMINION ENERGY KEWAUNEE, INC. | ENCLOSURE 2 NRC FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS FOR DOMINION ENERGY KEWAUNEE, INC. | ||
REGARDING SEVERE ACCIDENT MITIGATION ALTERNATIVES April 15, 2009 The purpose of these follow-up questions is to clarify responses in the Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. (DEK) severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMA) analysis request for additional information (RAI) response document dated March 9, 2009, regarding Kewaunee Power Station (KPS). The DEK SAMA RAI response document is available at accession number ML090690458. NRC's SAMA RAIs, dated January 8, 2009, are available at ML083250719. For reference, the original RAI is included with the follow-up question. | REGARDING SEVERE ACCIDENT MITIGATION ALTERNATIVES April 15, 2009 The purpose of these follow-up questions is to clarify responses in the Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. (DEK) severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMA) analysis request for additional information (RAI) response document dated March 9, 2009, regarding Kewaunee Power Station (KPS). The DEK SAMA RAI response document is available at accession number ML090690458. NRC's SAMA RAIs, dated January 8, 2009, are available at ML083250719. For reference, the original RAI is included with the follow-up question. | ||
: 1. RAI 3.b: Section F.2.3.1 states than an assessment of the effects of plant procedure changes shows that the core damage frequency (CDF) would be reduced by a factor of 5 and that a more appropriate fire CDF would be 2.6E-5. Discuss in more detail the assessment of procedure changes and the impact of the changes on the CDF for each of the fire zones listed in Table F-22. | : 1. RAI 3.b: Section F.2.3.1 states than an assessment of the effects of plant procedure changes shows that the core damage frequency (CDF) would be reduced by a factor of 5 and that a more appropriate fire CDF would be 2.6E-5. Discuss in more detail the assessment of procedure changes and the impact of the changes on the CDF for each of the fire zones listed in Table F-22. | ||
Explain why the factor of 5 reduction was applied to the IPEEE fire CDF (1.8E-4) rather than the updated fire CDF (1.39E-4) since the latter was used for the assessment described in the RAI response. | Explain why the factor of 5 reduction was applied to the IPEEE fire CDF (1.8E-4) rather than the updated fire CDF (1.39E-4) since the latter was used for the assessment described in the RAI response. | ||
: 2. RAI 3.e.i: | : 2. RAI 3.e.i: | ||
For each major fire risk contributors at KPS, provide an evaluation demonstrating there are no viable SAMA candidates that would further reduce the fire risk. Address the impact of the weaknesses in the fire analysis (as identified in the IPEEE SER/technical evaluation report on this evaluation. | For each major fire risk contributors at KPS, provide an evaluation demonstrating there are no viable SAMA candidates that would further reduce the fire risk. Address the impact of the weaknesses in the fire analysis (as identified in the IPEEE SER/technical evaluation report on this evaluation. | ||
While the response to this RAI addresses the non-fire related events in the important fire cutsets, the potential for reducing fire risk by improvements in detection, mitigation, or the extent of fire damage (e.g., re-routing cable) is not discussed. Discuss these aspects of the identification of fire-related SAMAs. | While the response to this RAI addresses the non-fire related events in the important fire cutsets, the potential for reducing fire risk by improvements in detection, mitigation, or the extent of fire damage (e.g., re-routing cable) is not discussed. Discuss these aspects of the identification of fire-related SAMAs. | ||
: 3. RAI 5.b: For items 22, 23 and 35 (and others) in Table F-3, adding a refueling water storage tank (RWST) low level alarm and/or an automatic refilling system for the RWST could potentially reduce dependency on prior action or eliminate the need for the operator to refill the RWST. Provide an evaluation of these alternative SAMAs. | : 3. RAI 5.b: For items 22, 23 and 35 (and others) in Table F-3, adding a refueling water storage tank (RWST) low level alarm and/or an automatic refilling system for the RWST could potentially reduce dependency on prior action or eliminate the need for the operator to refill the RWST. Provide an evaluation of these alternative SAMAs. | ||
RAI 6.a: Table F-19 indicates that implementation of SAMA 19 (Use fire water as a backup source for diesel cooling) would result in an increase in CDF. Explain why this occurs. RAI 8a: (Provide an evaluation of) Automate the cross-tie of the existing condensate storage tank (CST) to other water sources rather than installing a new CST. | RAI 6.a: Table F-19 indicates that implementation of SAMA 19 (Use fire water as a backup source for diesel cooling) would result in an increase in CDF. Explain why this occurs. RAI 8a: (Provide an evaluation of) Automate the cross-tie of the existing condensate storage tank (CST) to other water sources rather than installing a new CST. | ||
The response to these RAIs include additional cost-benefit analysis of potential SAMAs including: adding an automatic RWST refill system, using fire water as backup source for diesel cooling, and automating the existing cross-tie of the CSTs. While the results of these analyses do not appear to indicate the SAMAs are cost beneficial in the baseline analysis, they would be cost beneficial using a 3% discount rate or considering uncertainties. Justify why these improvements should not be evaluated further as potentially cost-beneficial SAMAs. | The response to these RAIs include additional cost-benefit analysis of potential SAMAs including: adding an automatic RWST refill system, using fire water as backup source for diesel cooling, and automating the existing cross-tie of the CSTs. While the results of these analyses do not appear to indicate the SAMAs are cost beneficial in the baseline analysis, they would be cost beneficial using a 3% discount rate or considering uncertainties. Justify why these improvements should not be evaluated further as potentially cost-beneficial SAMAs. | ||
: 4. RAI 5.b: For items 22, 23 and 35 (and others) in Table F-3, adding a refueling water storage tank (RWST) low level alarm and/or an automatic refilling system for the RWST could potentially reduce dependency on prior action or eliminate the need for the operator to refill the RWST. Provide an evaluation of these alternative SAMAs. | : 4. RAI 5.b: For items 22, 23 and 35 (and others) in Table F-3, adding a refueling water storage tank (RWST) low level alarm and/or an automatic refilling system for the RWST could potentially reduce dependency on prior action or eliminate the need for the operator to refill the RWST. Provide an evaluation of these alternative SAMAs. | ||
Reconcile the estimated implementation cost for the RWST refill system ($850K) with that for the CST refill system ($1.4M) provided in response to RAI 8a. (As described, the modifications appear very similar.) | Reconcile the estimated implementation cost for the RWST refill system ($850K) with that for the CST refill system ($1.4M) provided in response to RAI 8a. (As described, the modifications appear very similar.) | ||
: 5. RAI 7.d: Section F.7.7 discusses the simultaneous implementation of SAMAs 81, 82, 83, 166, 167, 170 and 171. SAMA 160 is not included in the Section F.7.7 discussion but is included in the individual discussion in Sections F.6.17. Clarify which changes in the diesel generator room and switchgear room are included in the combined package. | : 5. RAI 7.d: Section F.7.7 discusses the simultaneous implementation of SAMAs 81, 82, 83, 166, 167, 170 and 171. SAMA 160 is not included in the Section F.7.7 discussion but is included in the individual discussion in Sections F.6.17. Clarify which changes in the diesel generator room and switchgear room are included in the combined package. | ||
Clarify which changes would be made in the diesel generator room, the switchgear room, and the screenhouse area if the combined set of changes described in Section F.7.7 and in the response to RAI 1.f.iii are implemented. Reconcile the statement in this response concerning SAMA 160 with that in the response to RAI 9. | Clarify which changes would be made in the diesel generator room, the switchgear room, and the screenhouse area if the combined set of changes described in Section F.7.7 and in the response to RAI 1.f.iii are implemented. Reconcile the statement in this response concerning SAMA 160 with that in the response to RAI 9. | ||
: 6. Explain why a "gagging device" that could be used to close a stuck-open steam generator safety valve on a faulted steam generator before core damage occurs would not be cost-beneficial given that most of the population dose at Kewaunee is due to steam generator tube rupture events with failure of secondary side isolation. (Such a device was found to be potentially cost beneficial in several recent SAMA evaluations, including Beaver Valley and Indian Point).}} | : 6. Explain why a "gagging device" that could be used to close a stuck-open steam generator safety valve on a faulted steam generator before core damage occurs would not be cost-beneficial given that most of the population dose at Kewaunee is due to steam generator tube rupture events with failure of secondary side isolation. (Such a device was found to be potentially cost beneficial in several recent SAMA evaluations, including Beaver Valley and Indian Point).}} |
Revision as of 01:12, 12 July 2019
ML091060365 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Kewaunee ![]() |
Issue date: | 04/22/2009 |
From: | Sarah Lopas License Renewal Projects Branch 1 |
To: | Dominion Energy Kewaunee |
Lopas, S, DLR/REBA - 415-1147 | |
References | |
TAC MD9409 | |
Download: ML091060365 (8) | |
Text
April 22, 2009 LICENSEE: Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.
FACILITY: Kewaunee Power Station
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF CONFERENCE CALL WITH DOMINION ENERGY KEWAUNEE, INC., TO DISCUSS RESPONSES TO SEVERE ACCIDENT MITIGATION ALTERNATIVES REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR KEWAUNEE POWER STATION (TAC NO. MD9409)
On April 15, 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the staff) and representatives from its contractor (Information Systems Laboratory) conducted a conference call (teleconference) with Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. (DEK) staff and their contractor (Maracor) to obtain clarification regarding DEK's responses to the NRC's request for additional information (RAI) about the Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMA) analysis. The NRC SAMA RAI letter was dated January 8, 2009 (ML083250719), and DEK's response was dated March 9, 2009 (ML090690458).
NRC and its contractor representative discussed their follow-up questions concerning the SAMA RAI responses with DEK staff and their contractor. Clarifications were gained and DEK will supplement their March 9, 2009 SAMA submission with responses to the NRC follow-up questions. Enclosure 1 contains a list of teleconference participants. Enclosure 2 contains the NRC's follow-up questions. No staff decisions were made during the teleconference.
/RA/ Sarah Lopas, Project Manager Projects Branch 1 Division of License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-305
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/encls: See next page
ML091060365 OFFICE LA:DLR PM:DLR:RPB1 PM:DLR:RPB1 BC:DLR:RPB1 NAME SFigueroa SLopas SHernandez DPelton DATE 4/17/09 4/20/09 4/20/09 4/22/09 Letter to Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. from Sarah Lopas dated April 22, 2009
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF CONFERENCE CALL WITH DOMINION ENERGY KEWAUNEE, INC., TO DISCUSS RESPONSES TO SEVERE ACCIDENT MITIGATION ALTERNATIVES REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR KEWAUNEE POWER STATION (TAC NO. MD9409)
DISTRIBUTION:
PUBLIC B. Holian / S. Lee (RidsNrrDlr)
D. Pelton (RidsNrrDlrRpb1) B. Pham (RidsNrrDlrRerb) S. Hernandez S. Lopas P. Tam M. Kunowski S. Burton K. Barclay IV. Mitlyng
Kewaunee Power Station cc: Resident Inspectors Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission N490 Hwy 42 Kewaunee, WI 54216-9510 Mr. Chris L. Funderburk Director, Nuclear Licensing and Operations Support Dominion Resources Services, Inc. Innsbrook Technical Center - 2SE 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711 Mr. Thomas L. Breene Dominon Energy Kewaunee, Inc. Kewaunee Power Station N490 Highway 42 Kewaunee, WI 54216
Mr. Michael J. Wilson, Director Nuclear Safety & Licensing Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. Kewaunee Power Station N490 Highway 42 Kewaunee, WI 54216 Mr. William R. Matthews Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations Innsbrook Technical Center - 2SE 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711 Mr. Alan J. Price Vice President - Nuclear Engineering Innsbrook Technical Center - 2SE 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711 Mr. William D. Corbin Director - Nuclear Engineering Innsbrook Technical Center - 3NE 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711
Mr. Paul C. Aitken Supervisor - License Renewal Project Innsbrook Technical Center - 3NE 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711 Mr. David A. Sommers Supervisor - Nuclear Engineering Innsbrook Technical Center - 2SE 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711 Ms. Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq. Senior Counsel Dominion Resources Services, Inc. 120 Tredegar Street Riverside 2 Richmond, VA 23219
Mr. Stephen E. Scace Site Vice President Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. Kewaunee Power Station N490 Highway 42 Kewaunee, WI 54216 Mr. David R. Lewis Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP 2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037-1122 Mr. Ken Paplham E 4095 Sandy Bay Rd. Kewaunee, WI 54216
Mr. Richard Gallagher Senior Scientist, License Renewal Dominion Resources Services, Inc. Route 156, Rope Ferry Road Waterford, CT 06385
Kewaunee Power Station cc: Mr. Ronald Kazmierczak Regional Director Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources Northeast Region Headquarters 2984 Shawano Avenue P.O. Box 10448 Green Bay, WI 54307-0448
Ms. Kathleen Angel Federal Consistency and Coastal Hazards Coordinator Wisconsin Coastal Management Program P.O. Box 8944 Madison, WI 53708-8944
Mr. David A. Christian President and Chief Nuclear Officer Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. Innsbrook Technical Center 2SW 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711 Mr. Jeff Kitsembel, P.E. Public Service Commission of Wisconsin P.O. Box 7854 Madison, WI 53707-7854
ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS FOR CONFERENCE CALL WITH DOMINION ENERGY KEWAUNEE, INC., TO DISCUSS RESPONSES TO SEVERE ACCIDENT MITIGATION ALTERNATIVES REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR KEWAUNEE POWER STATION April 15, 2009 PARTICIPANTS AFFILIATIONSarah Lopas U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Robert Palla Bob Schmidt NRC Information Systems Laboratory Richard Gallagher Dominion Resources Services Paul Aitken Dominion Resources Services Amir Afzali Dominion Resources Services Ray Dremel Maracor
ENCLOSURE 2 NRC FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS FOR DOMINION ENERGY KEWAUNEE, INC.
REGARDING SEVERE ACCIDENT MITIGATION ALTERNATIVES April 15, 2009 The purpose of these follow-up questions is to clarify responses in the Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. (DEK) severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMA) analysis request for additional information (RAI) response document dated March 9, 2009, regarding Kewaunee Power Station (KPS). The DEK SAMA RAI response document is available at accession number ML090690458. NRC's SAMA RAIs, dated January 8, 2009, are available at ML083250719. For reference, the original RAI is included with the follow-up question.
- 1. RAI 3.b: Section F.2.3.1 states than an assessment of the effects of plant procedure changes shows that the core damage frequency (CDF) would be reduced by a factor of 5 and that a more appropriate fire CDF would be 2.6E-5. Discuss in more detail the assessment of procedure changes and the impact of the changes on the CDF for each of the fire zones listed in Table F-22.
Explain why the factor of 5 reduction was applied to the IPEEE fire CDF (1.8E-4) rather than the updated fire CDF (1.39E-4) since the latter was used for the assessment described in the RAI response.
- 2. RAI 3.e.i:
For each major fire risk contributors at KPS, provide an evaluation demonstrating there are no viable SAMA candidates that would further reduce the fire risk. Address the impact of the weaknesses in the fire analysis (as identified in the IPEEE SER/technical evaluation report on this evaluation.
While the response to this RAI addresses the non-fire related events in the important fire cutsets, the potential for reducing fire risk by improvements in detection, mitigation, or the extent of fire damage (e.g., re-routing cable) is not discussed. Discuss these aspects of the identification of fire-related SAMAs.
- 3. RAI 5.b: For items 22, 23 and 35 (and others) in Table F-3, adding a refueling water storage tank (RWST) low level alarm and/or an automatic refilling system for the RWST could potentially reduce dependency on prior action or eliminate the need for the operator to refill the RWST. Provide an evaluation of these alternative SAMAs.
RAI 6.a: Table F-19 indicates that implementation of SAMA 19 (Use fire water as a backup source for diesel cooling) would result in an increase in CDF. Explain why this occurs. RAI 8a: (Provide an evaluation of) Automate the cross-tie of the existing condensate storage tank (CST) to other water sources rather than installing a new CST.
The response to these RAIs include additional cost-benefit analysis of potential SAMAs including: adding an automatic RWST refill system, using fire water as backup source for diesel cooling, and automating the existing cross-tie of the CSTs. While the results of these analyses do not appear to indicate the SAMAs are cost beneficial in the baseline analysis, they would be cost beneficial using a 3% discount rate or considering uncertainties. Justify why these improvements should not be evaluated further as potentially cost-beneficial SAMAs.
- 4. RAI 5.b: For items 22, 23 and 35 (and others) in Table F-3, adding a refueling water storage tank (RWST) low level alarm and/or an automatic refilling system for the RWST could potentially reduce dependency on prior action or eliminate the need for the operator to refill the RWST. Provide an evaluation of these alternative SAMAs.
Reconcile the estimated implementation cost for the RWST refill system ($850K) with that for the CST refill system ($1.4M) provided in response to RAI 8a. (As described, the modifications appear very similar.)
- 5. RAI 7.d: Section F.7.7 discusses the simultaneous implementation of SAMAs 81, 82, 83, 166, 167, 170 and 171. SAMA 160 is not included in the Section F.7.7 discussion but is included in the individual discussion in Sections F.6.17. Clarify which changes in the diesel generator room and switchgear room are included in the combined package.
Clarify which changes would be made in the diesel generator room, the switchgear room, and the screenhouse area if the combined set of changes described in Section F.7.7 and in the response to RAI 1.f.iii are implemented. Reconcile the statement in this response concerning SAMA 160 with that in the response to RAI 9.
- 6. Explain why a "gagging device" that could be used to close a stuck-open steam generator safety valve on a faulted steam generator before core damage occurs would not be cost-beneficial given that most of the population dose at Kewaunee is due to steam generator tube rupture events with failure of secondary side isolation. (Such a device was found to be potentially cost beneficial in several recent SAMA evaluations, including Beaver Valley and Indian Point).