Revision as of 22:08, 10 July 2019

Text

PVNGS Insertion Instructions for Technical Specifications Bases Changed Pages, Revision 54
	ML110610762
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	01/26/2011
From:	Stephenson C; Arizona Public Service Co
To:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	Download: ML110610762 (73)
	v • d • e

Insertion Instructions f or Technical Sp ecifications Bases Revision 54 Technical Specificati o n Bases Revisi o n 54 inc o rp o rates LDC R s 09-B016, 09-B020, 09-B021,08-B013 and 10-B013.*LDCR 09-B016 relates to License Amendment le 1 (Administrative Relocation of MSIV and MFIV Stroke Times).*LDCR 09-B020 relates to License Amendment 1 2 (RWT Level Setpoint Change).*LDCR 09-B021 relates to License Amendment 1 3 (Organization Title Changes and Deletion of Redundant Safety Limit Reportin I).*LDCR 08-B013 relates to License Amendment 1 4 (Replacement of ASME Section Xl Code with OM Code).*LDCR 10-B013 clarifies the design basis for the;ondensate Storage Tank (CST).REMOVE PAGES INSERT PAGES C o ver page C o ver p_Lge List of Effective Pages List of Elfective Pages 1/2 through 7/8 1/2 thro L gh 7/8 B 2.1.1-5/Blank B 2.1.1-_/Blank B 2.1.2-3/B 2.1.2-4 B 2.1.2-:/B 2.1.2-4 B 2.1.2-5/Blank (No Rep acement Page)B 3.3.5-9/B 3.3.5-10 B 3.3.5-!/B 3.3.5-10 B 3.3.5-11/B 3.3.5-12 B 3.3.5-'1/B 3.3.5-12 B 3.3.5-17/B 3.3.5-18 B 3.3.5-'17/B 3.3.5-18 B 3.3.5-19/B 3.3.5-20 B 3.3.5-'19/B 3.3.5-20 B 3.4.7-3/B 3.4.7-4 B 3.4.7-:/B 3.4.7-4 B 3.4.8-1/B 3.4.8-2 B 3.4.8-/B 3.4.8-2 B 3.4.10-3/B 3.4.10-4 B 3.4.1G 3/B 3.4.10-4 B 3.4.11-5/B 3.4.11-6 B 3.4.1-5/B 3.4.11-6 B 3.4.13-9/B 3.4.13-10 B 3.4.1:-9/B 3.4.13-10 B 3.4.13-11/Blank B 3.4.12-11/Blank B 3.4.15-5/B 3.4.15-6 B 3.4.1_-5/B 3.4.15-6 B 3.4.15-7/Blank B 3.4.1-7/Blank Insertion Instructions for Technical SF,ecifications Bases Revision 54 B 3.5.3-9/B 3.5.3-10 B 3.5.3-!/B 3.5.3-10 B 3.5.5-1/B 3.5.5-2 B 3.5.5-'/B 3.5.5-2 B 3.5.5-3/B 3.5.5-4 B 3.5.5-,!/B 3.5.5-4 B 3.6.6-7/B 3.6.6-8 B 3.6.6-}/B 3.6.6-8 B 3.6.6-9/Blank B 3.6.6-,,./Blank B 3.7.1-5/B 3.7.1-6 B 3.7.1-_/B 3.7.1-6 B 3.7.2-7/B 3.7.2-8 B 3.7.2-}/B 3.7.2-8 B 3.7.2-9/Blank B 3.7.2-C ,/Blank B 3.7.3-5/Blank B 3.7.3-,,./Blank B 3.7.5-9/B 3.7.5-10 B 3.7.5-C./B 3.7.5-10 B 3.7.5-11/Blank B 3.7.5-1 1/Blank B 3.7.6-1/B 3.7.6-2 B 3.7.6-1/B 3.7.6-2 B 3.7.6-3/B 3.7.6-4 B 3.7.6-,_/B 3.7.6-4 B 3.8.3-5/B 3.8.3-6 B 3.8.3-,_/B 3.8.3-6 B 3.8.3-9/B 3.8.3-10 B 3.8.3-, c/B 3.8.3-10 B 3.9.4-1/B 3.9.4-2 B 3.9.4-"/B 3.9.4-2 B 3.9.5-1/B 3.9.5-2 B 3.9.5-'/B 3.9.5-2 PVNG S Palo Verde Nuclear Genera!ing Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Technic Specifica t ion B ases Revisio n 54 January 26, 2 0 11 o ,_,-C*e"_,e n so n o,.,:o,,.,.no0.__,e°.......C_rl J (ZOS77 8)!DN: cn=Stephenson

, Carl J(Z 05 77_)Reason: I attest to the accurao/an I integrity of Carl J(Z05778),h,,_......t Date: 2 011.0 1,2 1 10: 54:22 07'00' TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST O F EFFECTIVE P G E S Page Rev.Page Rev No.N o.No.N o.B 2 i.i-i 0 B 3.1 4-_0 B 2 I.i-2 0 B 3.1 4-L 0 B 2 I.i-3 37 B 3.1 4-0 B 2 I.i-4 21 B 3.1 5-0 B 2 i.i-5 54 B 3.1 5-i 52 B 2 1.2-i 0 B 3.1 5-52 B 2 1.2-2 31 B 3.1 5-52 B 2 1.2-3 0 B 3.1 5-52 B 2 1.2-4 54 B 3 1.5-E 52 B 3 0-I 49 B 3 1.5-7 52 B 3.0-2 0 B 3 1 5-8 52 B 3.0-3 0 B 3 1 5-_52 B 3 0-4 0 B 3 1 5-10 52 B 3 0-5 42 B 3 1 5-]i 52 B 3 0-6 48 B 3 1 5-]2 52 B 3 0-7 48 B 3 1 6-]0 B 3 0-8 42 B 3 1 6-_46 B 3 0-9 42 B 3 1 6-_42 B 3.0-i0 42 B 3.1 6-_42 B 3.0-11 42 B 3 1 6-[46 B 3 0-12 42 B 3 1 6-(46 B 3 0-13 42 B 3 1 7-]0 B 3 0-14 49 B 3 1 7-_0 B 3 0-15 50 B 3 1 7-_53 B 3 0-16 50 B 3 1 7-L 48 B 3 0-17 50 B 3 1 7-25 B 3 0-18 49 B 3 1 7-0 B 3 0-19 49 B 3 1 7-0 B 3 0-20 49 B 3 1.7-51 B 3 0-21 49 B 3 1.7-_0 B 3 0-22 49 B 3 1.8-I 52 B 3.1 i-i 28 B 3 1 8-_52 B 3.1 I-2 0 B 3 1 8-_52 B 3 1 I-3 43 B 3 1 8-4 52 B 3 1 i-4 43 B 3 1 8-[52 B 3 1 i-5 27 B 3 1 9-]0 B 3 1 i-6 31 B 3 1 9-_0 B 3 1 2-I 28 B 3 1 9-2 0 B 3 1 2-2 0 B 3.1 9-_0 B 3 1 2-3 43 B 3.1 9-[53 B 3 1 2-4 28 B 3.1 9-(1 B 3 1 2-5 0 B 3.1 i0-i 0 B 3 1 2-6 43 B 3.1 i0-2 53 B 3 1 2-7 12 B 3.1 i0-3 0 B 3 1 2-8 47 B 3.1 i0-4 37 B 3 1 2-9 0 B 3.1 i0-5 53 B 3 1 3-i 0 B 3.1 i0 6 0 B 3 1 3-2 0 B 3.1 ii 1 0 B 3 1 3-3 0 B 3.1 ii 2 53 B 3 1.3-4 0 B 3.1.ii 3 0 B 3 1.3-5 0 B 3.1.Ii 4 53 B 3 1.3-6 0 B 3.1.Ii 5 0 B 3 1.4-i 0 B 3.2.1-I 53 B 3 1.4-2 31 B 3.2.1-_I0 PALO VERDE UNITS i, 2, AND 3 1 Revision 54 January 26, 2011 TEC_IC_SP E CIFICATION B A SES LIST OF E F_CTI_PAGES Page Rev.Page Rev N o.N o.N o.N o.B 3.2.1-3 53 B 3.3.1-1 5 53 B 3.2.1-4 0 B 3.3.1-16 53 B 3.2.1-5 0 B 3.3.1-17 53 B 3.2.1-6 0 B 3.3.1-18 53 B 3.2.1-7 0 B 3.3.1-19 53 B 3.2.1-8 0 B 3.3.1-20 53 B 3.2.2-i 52 B 3.3.1-21 53 B 3.2.2-2 i0 B 3.3.1-22 53 B 3.2.2-3 0 B 3.3.1-23 53 B 3.2.2-4 52 B 3.3.1-24 53 B 3.2.2-5 1 B 3.3.1-25 53 B 3.2.2-6 0 B 3.3.1-26 53 B 3.2.2-7 0 B 3.3.1-27 53 B 3.2.3-i 52 B 3.3 1-28 53 B 3.2.3-2 i0 B 3.3 1-29 53 B 3.2.3-3 0 B 3.3 1-30 53 B 3.2.3-4 52 B 3.3 1-31 53 B 3.2.3-5 0 B 3.3 1-32 53 B 3.2.3-6 0 B 3.3 1-33 53 B 3.2.3-7 0 B 3.3 1-34 53 B 3.2.3-8 0 B 3.3 1-35 53 B 3.2.3-9 0 B 3.3 1-36 5 3 B 3.2.3-i0 0 B 3.3 1-37 53 B 3.2.4-i 52 B 3.3 1-38 53 B 3.2.4-2 i0 B 3.3 1-39 53 B 3.2.4-3 0 B 3.3 1-40 53 B 3.2.4-4 52 B 3.3 1-41 53 B 3.2.4-5 53 B 3.3 1-42 53 B 3.2.4-6 53 B 3.3 1-43 53 B 3.2.4-7 53 B 3.3 1-44 53 B 3.2.4-8 53 B 3.3 1-45 53 B 3.2.4-9 53 B 3.3 1-46 53 L B 3.2.4-i0 31 B 3.3 1-47 53 I B 3.2.5-i 52 B 3.3 1-48 53 B 3.2.5-2 i0 B 3.3 1-49 53 B 3.2.5-3 0 B 3.3 1-50 53 B 3.2.5-4 52 B 3.3 1-51 53 B 3.2.5-5 0 B 3.3.2-I 50 B 3.2.5-6 52 B 3.3.2-2 0 B 3.2.5-7 0 B 3.3.2-3 1 B 3.3.1-i 35 B 3.3.2-4 35 B 3 3.1-2 53 B 3.3.2-5 35 B 3 3.1-3 53 B 3.3.2-6 51 B 3 3.1-4 53 B 3.3.2-7 35 B 3 3.1-5 53 B 3.3.2-8 35 B 3 3.1-6 53 B 3.3.2-9 50 I B 3 3.1-7 53 B 3.3.2-i0 38 B 3 3.1-8 53 B 3.3.2-ii 4 2 B 3 3.1-9 53 B 3.3.2-12 42 B 3 3.1-I0 53 B 3.3.2-13 51 B 3 3.1-ii 53 B 3.3.2-14 51 B 3 3.1-12 53 B 3.3.2-15 35 B 3 3.1-13 53 B 3.3.2-16 35 B 3 3.1-14 53 B 3.3.2-17 35 PALO VERDE UNITS i, 2, AND 3 2 Revision 54 January 26, 2011[

TEC_IC_SP E CIFICATIO N BASES LIST OF EF F ECTI_P A GES Page Rev.Page Rev No.No.N o.N o.B 3 3 2-18 35 B 3 3 5-_7 35 B 3 3 3-1 53 B 3 3 5-28 35 B 3 3 3-2 53 B 3 3 5-_9 35 B 3 3 3-3 53 B 3 3 5-20 35 B 3 3 3-4 53 B 3 3 6-]0 B 3 3 3-5 53 B 3 3 6-_0 B 3 3 3-6 53 B 3 3 6-2 0 B 3 3 3-7 53 B 3 3 6-4 0 B 3 3 3-8 53 B 3 3 6-[31 B 3 3 3-9 53 B 3 3 6-(0 B 3 3 3-i0 53 B 3 3 6-_27 B 3 3 3-ii 53 B 3 3 6-_27 B 3 3 3-12 53 B 3 3 6-_0 B 3 3 4-i 0 B 3 3 6-]0 0 B 3 3 4-2 0 B 3 3 6-]i 0 B 3 3 4-3 0 B 3 3 6-]2 0 B 3 3 4-4 0 B 3 3 6-]3 0 B 3 3 4-5 0 B 3 3 6-]4 0 B 3 3 4-6 31 B 3 3 6-]5 0 B 3 3 4-7 0 B 3 3 6-]6 0 B 3 3 4-8 0 B 3 3 6-]7 27 B 3 3 4-9 0 B 3 3 6-]8 0 B 3 3 4-I0 0 B 3 3 6-]9 0 B 3 3 4-ii 0 B 3 3 6-_0 0 B 3 3 4-12 0 B 3 3 6-_i 1 B 3 3 4-13 0 B 3 3 6-_2 46 B 3 3.4-14 0 B 3 3 7-]2 B 3.3.4-15 0 B 3 3 7-_2 B 3.3.5-i 0 B 3 3 7-_0 B 3.3.5-2 0 B 3 3 7-4 0 B 3.3.5-3 0 B 3.3 7-[0 B 3.3.5-4 35 B 3.3 7-(42 B 3.3.5-5 0 B 3.3 7-]0 B 3.3.5-6 0 B 3.3 7-_51 B 3.3.5-7 0 B 3.3 7-_51 B 3.3.5-8 31 B 3.3 8-]0 B 3.3.5-9 54 B 3.3 8-_44 B 3.3.5-i0 54 B 3.3 8-_0 B 3.3.5-ii 54 B 3.3 8-4 0 B 3.3.5-12 1 B 3.3 8-[0 B 3 3.5-13 0 B 3.3 8-(51 B 3 3.5-14 0 B 3.3 8-]0 B 3 3.5-15 35 B 3.3 8-£44 B 3 3.5-16 51 B 3.3 9-]48 B 3 3 5-17 35 B 3 3 9-_48 B 3 3 5-18 54 B 3 3 9-_21 B 3 3 5-19 54 B 3 3 9-4 i0 B 3 3 5-20 54 B 3 3 9-[51 B 3 3 5-21 35 B 3 3 9-(0 B 3 3 5-22 35 B 3 3 9-_0 B 3 3 5-23 52 B 3 3 i0-i 0 B 3 3 5-24 38 B 3 3 i0-2 0 B 3 3 5-25 42 B 3 3 i0-3 0 B 3 3 5-26 51 B 3 3 i0-4 0 PALO VERDE UNITS I, 2, AND 3 3 Revision 54 January 26, 2011 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF E FFECTIVE PAGES Page Rev.Page Rev N o.No.N o.N o.B 3 3.10-5 18 B 3.4.5-5 6 B 3 3.10-6 0 B 3.4 6-i 0 B 3 3.10-7 0 B 3.4 6-2 6 B 3 3.10-8 14 B 3.4 6-3 52 B 3 3.10-9 14 B 3.4 6-4 6 B 3 3.10-I0 51 B 3 4 6-5 52 B 3 3 i0-Ii 50 B 3 4 7-i 0 B 3 3 i0-12 50 B 3 4 7-2 6 B 3.3 i0-13 50 B 3 4 7-3 52 B 3.3 I0-14 50 B 3 4 7-4 54 B 3.3 i0-15 50 B 3 4 7-5 0 B 3.3 i0-16 50 B 3.4 7-6 0 B 3.3 i0-17 50 B 3.4 7-7 52 B 3.3 i0-18 50 B 3 4 8-i 0 B 3 3 i0-19 51 B 3 4.8-2 54 B 3 3 i0-20 50 B 3 4 8-3 6 B 3 3 i0-21 50 B 3 4 9-i 41 B 3 3 i0-22 32 B 3 4 9-2 31 B 3 3 Ii-i 0 B 3 4 9-3 41 B 3 3 ii-2 2 B 3 4 9-4 41 B 3 3 ii-3 2 B 3 4 9-5 0 B 3.3.11-4 42 B 3 4 9-6 0 B 3.3.11-5 42 B 3 4.10-i 53 B 3.3.11-6 51 B 3 4 i0-2 7 B 3.3.11-7 50 B 3 4 i0-3 0 B 3 3.12-i 15 B 3.4 i0-4 54 B 3 3.12-2 50 B 3.4 Ii-i 0 B 3 3 12-3 37 B 3.4 ii-2 53 B 3 3 12-4 37 B 3.4 ii-3 0 B 3 3 12-5 51 B 3.4 ii-4 52 B 3 3 12-6 6 B 3 4 Ii-5 54 B 3 4 i-i i0 B 3 4 ii-6 54 B 3 4 I-2 53 B 3 4 12-i 1 B 3 4 i-3 0 B 3 4 12-2 34 B 3 4 i-4 0 B 3 4 12-3 48 B 3 4.1-5 0 B 3 4 12-4 0 B 3 4.2-i 7 B 3 4 12-5 31 B 3 4.2-2 1 B 3 4 13-i 0 B 3 4.3-i 52 B 3.4 13-2 0 B 3.4.3-2 52 B 3.4 13-3 1 B 3.4 3-3 0 B 3.4 13-4 52 B 3.4 3-4 52 B 3.4 13-5 52 B 3.4 3-5 52 B 3 4.13-6 0 B 3.4 3-6 0 B 3 4.13-7 52 B 3 4 3-7 52 B 3 4 13-8 52 B 3 4 3-8 52 B 3 4 13-9 42 B 3 4 4-i 0 B 3 4 13-i0 54 B 3 4 4-2 50_B 3 4 13-ii 54 B 3 4 4-3 7 B 3 4 14-I 0 I B 3 4 4-4 0 B 3 4 14-2 34 B 3.4 5-i 0 B 3 4.14-3 34 B 3.4 5-2 38 B 3 4.14-4 38 B 3.4 5-3 38 B 3 4.14-5 38 B 3.4.5-4 0 B 3.4.14-6 38 PALO VERDE UNITS i, 2, AND 3 4 Revision 54 January 26, 2011 TEC ICSPECIFICATIO N BASES LIST OF EPFECTIGES Page Rev.Page Rev No.No.No.No.B 3.4 14-7 38 B 3.5 3-(2 B.3.4 14-8 38 B 3.5 3-]2 B 3.4 15-i 0 B 3.5 3-i 1 B 3.4 15-2 48 B 3.5 3-i 54 B 3.4 15-3 0 B 3.5 3-: 0 54 B 3.4 15-4 0 B 3.5 4-]15 B 3.4 15-5 54 B 3.5 4-_0 B 3 4 15-6 35 B 3.5 4-_42 B 3 4 15-7 54 B 3.5 5-]54 B 3 4 16-i 2 B 3.5 5-_54 B 3 4 16-2 I0 B 3.5 5-i 54 B 3 4 16-3 0 B 3 5 5-, 54 B 3 4 16-4 42 B 3 5.5-!51 B 3 4 16-5 0 B 3 5.5-i 51 B 3 4 16-6 0 B 3 5.5-" 51 B 3 4 17-I 0 B 3 5.5-E 51 B 3 4 17-2 27 B 3 5.5-_51 B 3 4 17-3 42 B 3 5 6-]0 B 3 4 17-4 42 B 3 5 6-_1 B 3 4 17-5 0 B 3 5 6-_0 B 3 4 17-6 0 B 3 5 6-4 24 B 3 4 18-i 38 B 3 5 6-[50 B 3 4 18-2 40 B 3 6 i-]0 B 3 4 18-3 38 B 3 6 i-_53 B 3 4 18-4 38 B 3 6 i-_0 B 3 4 18-5 38 B 3 6 1-4 29 B 3 4 18-6 38 B 3 6 i-[29 B 3 4 18-7 38 B 3 6 2-]45 B 3 4 18-8 38 B 3 6 2-_53 B 3 5 i-i 0 B 3 6.2-_0 B 3 5 i-2 53 B 3 6.2-4 0 B 3 5 i-3 7 B 3 6 2-[0 B 3 5 i-4 0 B 3 6 2-(0 B 3 5 i-5 0 B 3 6 2-_0 B 3 5 i-6 0 B 3 6 2-_0 B 3 5 i-7 1 B 3 6 3-]36 B 3 5 i-8 1 B 3 6 3-_43 B 3 5 i-9 0 B 3 6 3-_49 B 3 5 i-i0 53 B 3 6 3-4 43 B 3 5 2-i 0 B 3 6 3-[43 B 3 5 2-2 53 B 3 6 3-(43 B 3 5 2-3 53 B 3 6 3-]43 B 3 5 2-4 0 B 3 6 3-_43 B 3 5 2-5 0 B 3 6 3-_43 B 3 5 2-6 0 B 3 6 3-]0 43 B 3 5 2-7 1 B 3 6 3-]i 43 B 3 5 2-8 22 B 3 6 3-]2 43 B 3 5 2-9 1 B 3 6 3-]3 43 B 3 5 2-i0 53 B 3 6 3-]4 43 B 3 5 3-i 0 B 3 6 3-]5 43 B 3 5 3-2 48 B 3 6 3-]6 43 B 3 5 3-3 0 B 3 6 3-]7 27 B 3 5 3-4 0 B 3 6 3-]8 43 B 3 5 3-5 0 B 3 6 3-]9 43 PALO VERDE UNITS i, 2, AND 3 5 Revision 54 January 26, 2011 TECHNICAL SP E CIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIV E PAG E S Page Rev.Page Rev N o.N o.N o.No.B 3.6 4-I 53 B 3.7 6-3 54 B 3.6 4-2 38 B 3.7 6-4 54 B 3.6 4-3 1 B 3.7 7-i 0 B 3.6 5-i 0 B 3.7 7-2 1 B 3.6 5-2 1 B 3.7 7-3 1 B 3.6 5-3 48 B 3.7 7-4 1 B 3.6 5-4 0 B 3.7 7-5 1 B 3.6 6-i 0 B 3.7 8-i 1 B 3.6 6-2 0 B 3.7 8-2 1 B 3.6 6-3 53 B 3.7 8-3 1 B 3.6 6-4 7 B 3.7 8-4 1 B 3.6 6-5 1 B 3.7.9-I 0 B 3.6 6-6 0 B 3.7.9-2 44 B 3.6 6-7 54 B 3.7.9-3 44 B 3.6 6-8 4 8 B 3.7.10-i I0 B 3.6 6-9 54 B 3.7.10-2 1 B 3.7 I-i 50 B 3.7.10-3 1 B 3.7 i-2 50 B 3.7.10-4 1 B 3.7 i-3 34 B 3.7 ii-i 50 B 3.7 i-4 34 B 3.7 Ii-2 50 B 3.7 i-5 5 4 B 3.7 ii-3 51 B 3.7 i-6 54 B 3.7 ii-4 50 B 3.7.2-I 40 B 3.7 ii-5 50 B 3.7.2-2 42 B 3.7 ii-6 50 B 3.7 2-3 40 B 3.7 ii-7 50 B 3.7 2-4 40 B 3.7 ii-8 50 B 3.7 2-5 40 B 3.7 ii-9 50 B 3.7 2-6 40 B 3.7 12-i 1 B 3.7 2-7 40 B 3.7.12-2 21 B 3.7 2-8 54 B 3.7.12-3 52 B 3.7 2-9 54 B 3.7.12-4 i0 B 3.7 3-i 1 B 3.7.13-i 0 B 3.7 3-2 1 B 3.7.13-2 0 B 3.7 3-3 37 B 3.7.13-3 0 B 3.7 3-4 0 B 3.7.13-4 0 B 3.7 3-5 54 B 3.7.13-5 0 B 3.7 4-i 50 B 3.7.14-i 0 I J B 3.7 4-2 50 B 3.7.1 4-2 2 1 B 3.7 4-3 50 B 3.7.14-3 21 B 3.7 4-4 50 B 3.7.15-i 3 B 3.7 4-5 50 B 3.7.15-2 3 B 3.7 5-i 0 B 3.7.16-i 7 B 3.7 5-2 0 B 3.7.16-2 0 B 3.7 5-3 40 B 3.7.16-3 0 B 3.7 5-4 27 B 3.7.16-4 0 B 3.7 5-5 42 B 3.7.17-i 5 2 B 3.7 5-6 42 B 3.7.17-2 3 B 3.7 5-7 9 B 3.7.17-3 3 B 3.7.5-8 9 B 3.7.17-4 3 B 3.7.5-9 54 B 3.7.17-5 3 B 3.7.5-10 9 B 3.7.17-6 52 l B 3.7.5-ii 54 B 3.8.1-i 35 B 3.7.6-I 54 B 3.8.1-2 2 B 3.7.6-2 5 4 B 3.8.1-3 34 PALO VERDE UNITS i, 2, AND 3 6 Revisi o n 54 January 26, 2011 TEC ICSPECIFICATION BAS E S LIST OF EF CTIGES Page Rev.Page Rev No.No.N o.N o.B 3 8 i-4 34 B 3 8.3-4 0 B 3 8 i-5 20 B 3 8.3-[54 B 3 8 i-6 27 B 3 8.3-q 51 B 3 8 i-7 42 B 3 8.3-'41 B 3 8 i-8 50 B 3 8.3-_41 B 3 8 i-9 42 B 3 8.3-_41 B 3 8 i-I0 43 B 3 8.3-10 54 B 3 8 i-ii 50 B 3 8.4-1 0 B 3 8 1-12 48 B 3 8.4-_37 B 3 8 1-13 48 B 3 8.4-Z 0 B 3 8 1-14 48 B 3 8.4-4 2 B 3 8 1-15 48 B 3 8.4-[2 B 3 8 1-16 41 B 3 8.4-(2 B 3 8 1-17 41 B 3 8.4-]35 B 3 8 1-18 41 B 3 8.4-_35 B 3 8 1-19 41 B 3 8.4-_35 B 3 8 1-20 41 B 3 8.4-10 37 B 3 8 1-21 41 B 3 8.4-11 48 B 3 8 1-22 41 B 3 8.5-1 1 B 3 8 1-23 50 B 3 8 5-_1 B 3 8 1-24 50 B 3 8 5-_21 B 3 8 1-25 50 B 3 8 5-L 21 B 3 8 1-26 50 B 3 8 5-[2 B 3 8 1-27 50 B 3.8 5-(2 B 3 8 1-28 41 B 3.8 6-1 0 B 3 8 1-29 53 B 3.8 6-_0 B 3 8 1-30 50 B 3.8 6-_0 B 3 8.1-31 50 B 3.8 6-L 6 B 3 8.1-32 45 B 3.8 6-[37 B 3 8.1-33 48 B 3.8 6-(37 B 3 8.1-34 45 B 3 8 6-i 48 B 3 8 1-35 50 B 3 8 7-1 48 B 3 8 1-36 50 B 3 8 7-_48 B 3 8 1-37 45 B 3 8 7-_53 B 3 8 1-38 45 B 3 8 7-4 53 B 3 8 1-39 45 B 3 8 7-[53 B 3 8 1-40 48 B 3 8 8-]1 B 3 8 1-41 50 B 3 8 8-_1 B 3 8 1-42 45 B 3 8 8-_21 B 3 8 1-43 45 B 3 8 8--L 21 B 3 8 1-44 45 B 3 8 8-[1 B 3 8 1-45 45 B 3 8 9-]51 B.3 8 1-46 50 B 3 8 9-_0 B.3 8 1-47 45 B 3 8 9-_51 B.3 8 1-48 53 B 3 8 9--L 0 B 3 8 2-i 0 B 3 8 9-[0 B 3 8 2-2 0 B 3 8 9-(0 B 3 8 2-3 0 B 3 8 9-" 0 B 3 8 2-4 21 B 3 8 9-0 B 3 8 2-5 21 B 3 8 9-0 B 3 8 2-6 0 B 3 8 9-0 0 B 3 8 3-i 0 B 3 8 9-1 51 B 3 8 3-2 0 B 3 8 i0 1 0 B 3 8 3-3 50 B 3.8 i0 2 21 PALO VERDE UNITS i, 2, AND 3 7 Revision 54 January 26, 2011 T E CHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST O F EFFECTIVE PAG E S Page Rev.Page Rev N o.N o.N o.N o.B 3 8.10-3 48 B 3 8.10-4 0 B 3 9.1-1 34 Corrected B 3 9.1-2 0 B 3 9.1-3 0 B 3 9.1-4 0 B 3 9.2-1 48 B 3 9.2-2 15 B 3 9.2-3 15 B 3 9 2-4 15 B 3 9 3-1 18 B 3 93-2 19 B 3 9 3-3 27 B 3 9 3-4 19 B3 93-5 19 B.3 9.3-6 19 B 3 9.4-1 0 B 3 9.4-2 54 B 3.9 4-3 0 B 3.9 4-4 0 B 3.9 5-i 0 B 3 95-2 54 B 3 9 5-3 27 B3 95-4 16 B.3 9 5-5 16 B3 96-i 0 B3 9 6-2 0 B 3 9.6-3 0 B 3 9.7-1 0 B 3 9.7-2 0 B 3 9.7-3 0 I PALO VERDE UNITS i, 2, AND 3 8 Revision 54 January 26, 2011 Reactor Core SLs B 2.1,1 BASES REFERENCES 1.10 CFR 50, Appendix A , GDC 1[1988.2.UFSAR, Sections 6 and 15.PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 2.1.1-5 REVISION 54 This page intentionally blank RCS Pressure SL B 2.1.2 BASES APPLICABILITY SL 2.1.2 applies in MODES 1, 2 , 3, 4 , and 5 because this SL could be approached or exceeded ir these MODES due to overpressurization events.The SL is not applicable in MODE 6 because the reactor vessel head closure bolts are not fully tightened, making it unlikely that the RCS can be pressurized

.SAFETY LIMIT The following SL violation responses are applicable to the VIOLATIONS RCS pressure SLs.2.2.2.1 If the RCS pressure SL is violatec when the reactor is in MODE 1 or 2, the requirement is tc restore compliance and be in MODE 3 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .With RCS pressure greater than the value specified in SL 2.1.2 in MODE 1 or 2, the pressure must be reduced to below this value.A pressure greater that the value specified in SL 2.1.2 exceeds 110_of the RCS design pressure and may challenge system integrity.The allowed Completion Time of 1_our provides the operator time to complete the necessary actions to reduce RCS pressure by terminating the cause of the pressure increase, removing mass or energy from the FCS, or a combination of these actions, and to establish MCDE 3 conditions

.2.2.2.2 If the RCS pressure SL is exceedec in MODE 3, 4, or 5, RCS pressure must be restored to within the SL value within 5 minutes.Exceeding the RCS pressure SL in_ODE 3, 4, or 5 is potentially more severe than exceeding this SL in MODE I or 2, since the reactor vessel te n Derature may be lower and the vessel material, consequently less ductile.As such, pressure must be reduced to less man the SL within 5 minutes.This action does not equire reducing MODES, since this would require reducing temperature, which would (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1 , 2,3 B 2.1.2-3 REVISION 0 RCS Pressure SL B 2.1.2 BASES SAFETY LIMIT 2.2.2.2 (continued)

VIOLATIONS compound the problem by adding thermal gradient stresses to i the existing pressure stress.REFERENCES 1.10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 14, GDC 15, and GDC 28.2.ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section Ill, Article NB-7000.3.ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Article IWX-5000.4.10 CFR 100.I 5.UFSAR, Section 7.I PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 2.1.2-4 REVISION 54 ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3 , 5 BASES APPLICABLE 4.Main Steam Isolation Signal continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) high level condition or if a high containment pressure condition exists.This prevents an excessive rate of heat extraction and subsequent cooldown of the RCS during these events.5.Recirculation Actuation Signal At the end of the injection_hase of a LOCA, the Refueling Water Tank (RWT)will be nearly empty Continued cooling must be provided by the ECCS to remove decay heat.The source of water for the ECCS pumps is automatically switched to the containment recirculation sump.Switchover from RWT to containment sump must occur before the RWT empties to prevent damage to the ECCS pamps and a loss of core cooling capability

.For similar reasons , switchover must not occur before there is sufficient water in the containment sump to support pump suction.Furthermore, early switchover must not octur to ensure sufficient borated water is injected from the RWT to ensure the reactor remains shut down in the recirculation mode.An RWT Level-Low signal initiates the RAS.Once a RAS has occurred, timely operator action is required to close the RWT isolation valves (CH-531 and CH-530)to preclude air entrainment in the suction from the RWT during switchover to recirculation

.The volume remaining in the RWT after the RAS provides enough time for this operator actian and closure of the valves.6, 7.Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal AFAS consists of two steam generator (SG)specific signals (AFAS-1 and AFAS-2).AFAS-1 initiates auxiliary feed to SG#1, and AFAS-2 initiates auxiliary feed to SG#2.AFAS maintains a steam generator heat sink during a steam generator tube rupture event and an MSLB or FWLB event either inside or outside containment

.Low steam generator water l vel initiates auxiliary feed to the affected steam enerator, providing the generator is not identified (by the rupture detection circuitry) as faulted (a steam or FWLB).(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1 , 2 , 3 B 3.3.5-9 REVISION 54 ESFAS Instrumentati on B 3.3.5 BASES APPLICABLE 6, 7.Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

AFAS logic includes steam generator specific inputs from the SG Pressure Difference

-High (SG#1>SG#2 or SG#2>SG#i , bistable comparators) to determine if a fault in either generator has occurred.Not feeding a faulted generator prevents containment overpressurization during the analyzed events.The ESFAS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii)

.LCO The LCO requires all channel components necessary to provide an ESFAS actuation to be OPERABLE.The Bases for the LCOs on ESFAS Functions are: 1.Safety Injection Actuation Signal a.Containment Pressure-High This LCO requires four channels of Containment Pressure-High to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2 and 3.The Containment Pressure-High signal is shared among the SIAS (Function 1), CIAS (Function 3), and MSIS (Function 4).The Allowable Value for this trip is set high enough to allow for small pressure increases in containment expected during normal operation (i.e., plant heatup)and is not indicative of an abnormal condition.The setting is low enough to initiate the ESF Functions when an abnormal condition is indicated.This allows the ESF systems to perform as expected in the accident analyses to mitigate the consequences of the analyzed accidents.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2 , 3 B 3.3.5-10 REVISION 54 ESFAS Instrumentati on B 3.3.5 BASES LCO b.Pressurizer Pressure-Low (continued)

This LCO requires four channels of Pressurizer Pressure-Low to be OPERABL in MODES 1 , 2 and 3.The Allowable Value for this trip is set low enough to prevent actuating the ESF Functions (SIAS and CIAS)during normal plant operation and pressurizer pressure transients

.The setting is high enough that, with the s)ecified accidents, the ESF systems will actuate to perform as expected, mitigating the consequences of the accident.The Pressurizer Pressure-Low trip setpoint, which provides SIAS, CIAS, and RPS trip, may be manually decreased to a floor value of 100 psia to allow for a controlled cooldown and depressurization of the RCS_ithout causing a reactor trip, CIAS, or SIAS.The margin between actual pressurizer pressure and the trip setpoint must be maintained less than or equal to the specified value (400 psia)to ensure a reactor trip , CIAS, and SIAS will occur if required during RCS cooldown and depressurization

.When the RCS cold leg temperature is_485°F the setpoint must be_140 psia greater than the saturation pressure of the RCS cold leg.This is required to ensure a SIAS prior to reactor vessel upper head void formation in the event of RCS depressurization caused by a steam line break.From this reduced setting, the trip setpoint will increase automatically as pressurizer pressure increases, tracking actual RCS pressure until the trip setpoint is reached.When the trip setpoint has been lowered below the bypass permissive setpoint cf 400 psia, the Pressurizer Pressure-Low reactor trip , CIAS, and SIAS actuation may be manually bypassed in preparation for shutdown cocling.When RCS pressure rises above the by ass removal setpoint, the bypass is removed.(conti nued)PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.5-11 REVISION 54 ESFAS Instrumentati on B 3.3.5 BASES LCO Bypass Removal (continued)

This LCO requires four channels of operating bypass removal for Pressurizer Pressure-Low to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2 and 3.Each of the four channels enables and disables the operating bypass capability for a single channel.Therefore, this LCO applies to the operating bypass removal feature only.If the bypass enable function is failed so as to prevent entering an operating bypass condition, operation I may continue.Because the trip setpoint has a floor value of 100 psia, a channel trip will result if pressure is decreased below this setpoint without bypassing.The operating bypass removal Allowable Value was chosen because MSLB events originating from below this setpoint add less positive reactivity than that which can be compensated for by required SDM.2.Containment Spray Actuation Signal a.Containment Pressure-High High This LCO requires four channels of Containment Pressure-High High to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3.The Allowable Value for this trip is set high enough to allow for small pressure increases in containment expected during normal operation (i.e.plant heatup)and is not indicative of an abnormal condition.The setting is low enough to initiate CSAS in time to prevent containment pressure from exceeding design.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.5-12 REVISION 1 ESFAS Instrumentati on B 3 , 3.5 BASES LCO conservative than the UFS_R Trip Setpoint.The (continued) general relationship amon_the PVNGS trip setpoint terms is as follows.The_alculated limiting setpoint (LSp)is determined within the plant specific setpoint analysi and is based on the Analytical Limit and Tota Loop Uncertainty

.The UFSAR Trip Setpoint is eq al to or more conservative than the LSp and is specified in the UFSAR.The DSp is the field installed setting and is equal to or more conservative than th_UFSAR Trip Setpoint.This relationship ensures that sufficient margin to the safety and/or analyti:al limit is maintained

.If the as-found instrument setting is found to be non-conservative with respect to the AV specified in the technical specificatims, or the as-left instrument setting cannot be returned to a setting within the ALT, or the instrument is not functioning as required;then the instrument channel shall be declared inoperable

.b.Containment Pressure-High This LCO requires four channels of Containment Pressure-High to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2 and 3.The Containment Pressure-High signal is shared among the SIAS (Function 1), CIAS (Function 3), and MSIS (F m ction 4).The Allowable Value for t_is trip is set high enough to allow for small pressure increases in containment expected duri ig normal operation (i.e., plant heatup)and s not indicative of an abnormal condition.The;etting is low enough to initiate the ESF Functions when an abnormal condition is indicated.T his allows the ESF systems to perform as expected in the accident analyses to mitigate the=onsequences of the analyzed accidents.c.Steam Generator Level-Hig_

This LCO requires four channels of Steam Generator Level-High to b OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2 and 3.The allowable value for t is trip is set high enough to ensure it does_ot interfere with (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.5-17 REVISION 35 ESFAS Instrumentati on B 3.3.5 BASES LCO c.Steam Generator Level-High (continued) normal plant operation.The setting is low enough to prevent moisture damage to secondary plant components in the case of a steam generator overfill event.5.Recirculation Actuation Signal a.Refueling Water Tank Level-Low This LCO requires four channels of RWT Level-Low to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3.The upper limit on the Allowable Value for this trip is set low enough to ensure RAS does not initiate before sufficient water is transferred to the containment sump.Premature recirculation could impair the reactivity control function of safety injection by limiting the amount of boron injection.Premature recirculation could also damage or disable the recirculation system if recirculation begins before the sump has enough water to prevent air entrainment in the suction.The lower limit on the RWT Level-Low trip Allowable Value is high enough to transfer suction to the containment sump prior to emptying the RWT.Once a RAS has occurred timely operator action is required to close the RWT isolation valves (CH-531 and CH-530)to preclude air entrainment in the suction from the RWT during switchover to recirculation

.The volume remaining in the RWT after the RAS provides enough time for I this operator action and closure of the valves.6, 7.Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal SG#1 and SG#2 (AFAS-1 and AFAS-2)AFAS-1 is initiated to SG#1 by either a low steam generator level coincident with no differential pressure trip present or by a low steam generator level coincident with a differential pressure between the two generators with the higher pressure in SG#1.AFAS-2 is similarly configured to feed SG#2.I (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.5-18 REVISION 54 ESFAS Instrumentati on B 3.3.5 BASES LCO 6, 7.Auxiliar 7 Feedwater Actuation_ignal SG#1 and SG#2 continued)(AFAS-1 and AFAS-2)The steam generator secondary lifferential pressure is used, as an input of the AFAS logic where it is used to determine if a generator is intact.The AFAS logic inhibits feeding a steam generator if the pressure in that steam generator is less tilan the pressure in the other steam generator by the S;eam Generator Pressure Difference (SGPD)-High setpoint.The SGPD setpoint is high enou, fh to allow for small pressure differences and norma instrumentation errors between the steam generator chLnnels during normal operati on.The fol lowing LCO description

_ppl i es to both AFAS signals.a.Steam Generator Level-Low This LCO requires four channels of Steam Generator Level-Low to be OPERABLE for each AFAS in MODES 1, 2, and 3.The Steam Generator Level-Low AFAS input is shared with the SteamGenerator Level-Low RPS function.The Steam Generator Level-Low AFAS and RPS use separate bistables.This allows the AFAS setpoint to be set lower than the RPS setpoint.The allowable value is high enough to ensure the steam generator is available as a heat sink.The setting is low enough to prevent inadvertent AFAS actuations during plant transients

.This setpoint provides allowarce that there will be sufficient inventory in the steam generator at the time of the RPS trip to provide a margin of at least 10 minutes before auxiliary feedwater is required to prevent degraded core cooling.b.SG Pressure Difference

-High (SG#1>SG#2)or (SG#2>SG#1)This LCO requires four c_annels of SG Pressure Difference

-High to be PERABLE for each AFAS in MODES 1, 2, and 3.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.5-19 REVISION 54 ESFAS Instrumentati on B 3.3.5 BASES LCO b.SG Pressure Difference-High (SG#1>SG#2)or (continued)(S'G#2>SG_1)The Allowable Value for this trip is high enough to allow for small pressure differences and normal instrumentation errors between the steam generator channels during normal operation without an actuation.The setting is low enough to detect and inhibit feeding of a faulted (MSLB or FWLB)steam generator in the event of an MSLB or FWLB, while permitting the feeding of the intact steam generator.APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2 and 3 there is sufficient energy in the primary and secondary systems to warrant automatic ESF System responses to:*Close the main steam isolation valves to preclude a positive reactivity addition;*Actuate auxiliary feedwater to preclude the loss of the steam generators as a heat sink (in the event the normal feedwater system is not available);

Actuate ESF systems to prevent or limit the release of fission product radioactivity to the environment by isolating containment and limiting the containment pressure from exceeding the containment design pressure during a design basis LOCA or MSLB;and*Actuate ESF systems to ensure sufficient borated water inventory to permit adequate core cooling and reactivity control during a design basis LOCA or MSLB accident.In MODES 4, 5 and 6 automatic actuation of these Functions is not required because adequate time is available to evaluate plant conditions and respond by manually operating the ESF components if required, as addressed by LCO 3.3.6.Several trips have operating bypasses, discussed in the preceding LCO section.The interlocks that allow these bypasses shall be OPERABLE whenever the RPS Function they support is OPERABLE.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.5-20 REVISION 54 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled B 3.4.7 BASES LCO in order to use the provisions of the Note allowing the (continued) pumps to be de-energized

.In this MODE, the SG(s)can be used as the backup for SDC heat re_oval.To ensure their availability, the RCS loop flow path is to be maintained with subcooled liquid.In MODE 5, it is sometimes necessary to stop all RCP or SDC forced circulation

.This is permitted to change operation from one SDC train to the other, perform surveillance or startup testing, perform the transition to and from the SDC, or to avoid operation below the RCP minimum net positive suction head limit.The time period is acceptable because natural circulation is acceptable for decay heat removal the reactor coolant temperature can be maintained subcooled, and boron stratification affecting reactivity control is not expected.Note 2 allows one SDC train to be inoperable for a period of up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months provided that the other SDC train is OPERABLE and in operation.This permits periodic surveillance tests to be performed on the inoperable train during the only time when such testing is safe and possible.Note 3 requires that secondary side water temperature in each SG is<IO0°F above each of t_e RCS cold leg temperatures before an RCP may be started with any RCS cold leg temperature less than or equal to the LTOP enable temperature specified in the PTLR Satisfying the above condition wi l preclude a low temperature overpressure event du to a thermal transient when the RCP is started.Note 4 restricts RCP operation to no more than 2 RCPs with RCS cold leg temperature

_200°F, and no more than 3 RCPs with RCS cold leg temperature

>2[O°F but s 500°F.Satisfying these conditions will naintain the analysis assumptions of the flow induced pressure correction factors due to RCP operation (Ref.3).(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1 , 2,3 B 3.4.7-3 REVISION 52 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled B 3.4.7 BASES LCO Note 5 provides for an orderly transition from MODE 5 to (continued)

MODE 4 during a planned heatup by permitting removal of SDC trains from operation when at least one RCP is in operation.This Note provides for the transition to MODE 4 where an RCP is permitted to be in operation and replaces the RCS circulation function provided by the SDC trains.An OPERABLE SDC train is composed of an OPERABLE SDC pump (CS or LPSI)capable of providing flow to the SDC heat exchanger for heat removal.SDC pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide flow, if required.A SG can perform as a heat sink when it is OPERABLE and has the minimum water level specified in SR 3.4.7.2.The RCS loops may not be considered filled until two conditions needed for operation of the steam generators are met.First, the RCS must be intact.This means that all removable portions of the primary pressure boundary (e.g., manways, safety valves)are securely fastened.Nozzle dams are removed.All manual drain and vent valves are closed, and any open system penetrations (e.g., letdown, reactor head vents)are capable of remote closure from the control room.An intact primary allows the system to be pressurized as needed to achieve the subcooling margin necessary to establish natural circulation cooling.When the RCS is not intact as described, a loss of SDC flow results in blowdown of coolant through boundary openings that also could prevent adequate natural circulation between the core and steam generators

.Secondly, the concentration of dissolved or otherwise entrained gases in the coolant must be limited or other controls established so that gases coming out of solution in the SG U-tubes will not adversely affect natural circulation

.With these conditions met, the SGs are a functional method of RCS heat removal upon loss of the operating SDC train.The ability to feed and steam SGs at all times is not required when RCS temperature is less than 210°F because significant loss of SG inventory through boiling will not occur during time anticipated to take corrective action.The required SG level provides sufficient time to either restore the SDC train or implement a method for feeding and steaming the SGs (using non-class components if necessary)

.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.4.7-4 REVISION 54 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4.8 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)B 3.4.8 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled BASES BACKGROUND In MODE 5 with the RCS loops not flled, the primary function of the reactor coolant is the removal of decay heat and transfer of this heat to the Slutdown Cooling (SDC)heat exchangers.

The Steam Generators (SGs)are not available as a heat sink when the loops are not filled.The secondary function of the reactor coolant is to act as a carrier for the soluble neutron poison, boric acid.In MODE 5 with loops not filled, only the SDC System can be used for coolant circulation

.The number of trains in operation can vary to suit the operational needs.The intent of this LCO is to provide forced flow from at least one SDC train for decay heat removal and transport and to require that two paths be available to provide redundancy for heat removal.APPLICABLE In MODE 5, RCS circulation is considered in determining SAFETY ANALYSES the time available for mitigation of the accidental boron dilution event.The SDC trains provide this circulation

.The flow provided by one SDC train is adequate for decay heat removal and for boron mixing.RCS loops-MODE 5 (loops not filled)have been identified in 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii) as important contributors to risk reduction.LCO The purpose of this LCO is to reqblre a minimum of two SDC trains be OPERABLE and one of these trains be in operation.An OPERABLE train is one that is apable of transferring heat from the reactor coolant at controlled rate.Heat cannot be removed via the SDC Sys em unless forced flow is used.A minimum of one running SIC pump meets the LCO requirement for one train in operation.

An additional SDC train is required to be OPERABLE o meet the single failure criterion.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.4.8-1 REVISION 0 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4.8 BASES LCO Note 1 permits all SDC pumps to be de-energized

_1 hour per (continued) 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period.The circumstances for stopping both SDC pumps are to be limited to situations when the outage time is short and the core outlet temperature is maintained

>IO°F below saturation temperature

.The 10 degrees F is considered the actual value of the necessary difference between RCS core outlet temperature and the saturation temperature associated with RCS pressure to be maintained during the time the pumps would be de-energized

.The instrument error associated with determining this difference is less than 10 degrees F.(There are no special restrictions for instrumentation use.)Therefore, the indicated value of the difference between RCS core outlet temperature and the saturation temperature associated with RCS pressure must be greater than or equal to 20 degrees F in order to use the provisions of the Note allowing the pumps to be de-energized

.The Note prohibits boron dilution or draining operations when SDC forced flow is stopped.Note 2 allows one SDC train to be inoperable for a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months provided that the other train is OPERABLE and in operation.This permits periodic surveillance tests to be performed on the inoperable train during the only time when these tests are safe and possible.An OPERABLE SDC train is composed of an OPERABLE SDC pump (CS or LPSl)capable of providing flow to the SDC heat exchanger for heat removal.SDC pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide flow, I if required.APPLICABILITY In MODE 5 with loops not filled, this LCO requires core heat removal and coolant circulation by the SDC System.Operation in other MODES is covered by: LCO 3.4.4,"RCS Loops-MODES 1 and 2";LCO 3.4.5,"RCS Loops-MODE 3";LCO 3.4.6,"RCS Loops-MODE 4";LCO 3.4.7,"RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled";LCO 3.9.4,"Shutdown Cooling (SDC)and Coolant Circulation

-High Water Level" (MODE 6);and LCO 3.9.5,"Shutdown Cooling (SDC)and Coolant Circulation

-Low Water Level" (MODE 6).(conti nued)PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.4.8-2 REVISION 54 Pressurizer Safety Valves-MODES 1, 2, and 3 B 3,4.10 BASES APPLICABILITY The requirements for overpressure)rotection in other MODES (continued) are covered by LCO 3.4.11,"Pressurizer Safety Valves-MODE 4," and LCO 3.4.13,"LTOP SysLem." The Note allows entry into MODES 3 and 4 with the lift settings outside the LCO limits.[his permits testing and examination of the safety valves aL high pressure and temperature near their normal operating range, but only after the valves have had a preliminary cold setting.The cold setting gives assurance that Lhe valves are OPERABLE near their design condition.Only one valve at a time will be removed from service for testing.The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months exception is based on 18 hour2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months outage time for each of the four valves.The 18 hour2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months period is derived from operating experience that hot testing can be performed withiq this timeframe.ACTIONS A.I With one pressurizer safety valve inoperable, restoration must take place within 15 minutes.The Completion Time of 15 minutes reflects the importance of maintaining the RCS overpressure protection system.An inoperable safety valve coincident with an RCS overpressure event could challenge the integrity of the RCPB.B.1 and B.2 If the Required Action cannot be_et within the required Completion Time or if two or more pressurizer safety valves are inoperable, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the requirement does not apply.To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .The 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowed is reasonable

, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power without challenging plant systems.Similarly, the 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowed is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MOEE 4 without challenging plant systems.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.4.10-3 REVISION 0 Pressurizer Safety Valves-MODES 1, 2, and 3 B 3.4.10 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

The change from MODE 1, 2, or 3 to MODE 4 reduces the RCS energy (core power and pressure), lowers the potential for large pressurizer insurges, and thereby removes the need for overpressure protection by four pressurizer safety valves.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.10.1 REQUIREMENTS SRs are specified in the Inservice Testing Program.Pressurizer safety valves are to be tested in accordance I with the requirements of the ASME OM Code (Ref.3), which provides the activities and the Frequency necessary to satisfy the SRs.No additional requirements are specified.The pressurizer safety valve setpoint is+3%, 1%for OPERABILITY; however, the valves are reset to+/-1%during the Surveillance to allow for drift (Ref.2).The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.I REFERENCES 1.ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section Ill.2.PVNGS Operating License Amendment Nos.75, 61, and 47 for Units 1, 2, and 3 , respectively, and associated NRC Safety Evaluation dated May 16, 1994.3.ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.4.10-4 REVISION 54 PressL ri zer Safety Val ves-MODE 4 B 3.4.11 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.11.1 REQUIREMENTS SRs are specified in the Inservice Testing Program.Pressurizer safety valves are to be tested in accordance with the requirements of the ASME OM Code (Ref.2), which provides the activities and the Frequency necessary to satisfy the SRs.No additional requirements are specified.The pressurizer safety valve setpcint is+3%,-1%for OPERABILITY however the valves_re reset to+/-1%during the Surveillance to allow for dri.t (Ref.3).The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating te_)erature and pressure.SR 3.4.11.2 SR 3.4.11.2 requires that the reqL red Shutdown Cooling System suction line relief valve OPERABLE by verifying its open pathway condition either a.Once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for a vave that is unlocked, not sealed, or otherwise not secllred open in the vent pathway, or b.Once every 31 days for a val_e that is locked, sealed or otherwise secured open in the vent pathway.The SR has been modified by a Not_that requires performance only if a Shutdown Cooling System suction line relief valve is being used for overpressure pr(_tection

.The Frequencies consider operating experience witlt mispositioning of unlocked and locked pathway vent'alves.SR 3.4.11.3 SRs are specified in the Inservic_Testing Program.Shutdown Cooling System suction l-ne relief valves are to be tested in accordance with the reqLHrements of the ASME OM Code (Ref.2), which provides the activities and the Frequency necessary to satisfy the SRs.The Shutdown Cooling System suction line relie valve setpoint is 467 psig.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.4.11-5 REVISION 54 Pressurizer Safety Valves-MODE 4 B 3.4.11 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1.ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section Ill.2.ASME Code for Operations and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.3.PVNGS Operating License Amendment Nos.75, 61, and 47 for Units 1, 2, and 3 respectively, and associated NRC Safety Evaluation dated May 16, 1994.PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.4.11-6 REVISION 54 LTOP System BASES B 3.4,13 ACTIONS B.1 (continued)(continued)

Cooling System suction line relief valve failures without exposure to a lengthy period with only one Shutdown Cooling System suction line relief valve CPERABLE to protect against overpressure events.C.1 If two required Shutdown Cooling System suction line relief valves are inoperable, or if a Required Action and the associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met, the RCS must be depressurized and a vent established within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .The vent must be sized at least 16 square inches to ensure the flow capacity is greater than that required for the worst case mass input transient reasonable during the applicable MODES.This action protects the RCPB from a low temperature overpressure event and a possible brittle failure of the reactor vessel.For personnel safety considerations, the RCS cold leg temperature must be reduced to less than 200°F prior to venting.The Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months to depressurize and vent the RCS is based on the time required to place the plant in this condition and the relatively low probability of an overpressure event during this tire period due to increased operator awareness of administrative control requirements

.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.13.1 and 3.4.13.2 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.13.1 and SR 3.4.13.2 require verifying that the RCS vent is open_16 square inches or that the Shutdown Cooling System suction line relief valves be aligned to provide overpressure protection for the RCS is proven OPERABLE by verifying its open pathway condition either: Shutdown Coolin 9 System suction/line relief valves a.Once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for a valve that is unlocked, not sealed, or otherwise not secLred open in the vent pathway, or b.Once every 31 days for a val\e that is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured open in the vent pathway.RCS Vent a.Once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for avert pathway that is unlocked, not sealed, or oth(rwise not secured open (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.4.13-9 REVISION 42 LTOP System B 3.4.13 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.13.1 and 3.4.13.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS b.Once every 31 days for a vent pathway that is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured open.For an RCS vent to meet the specified flow capacity, it requires removing all pressurizer safety valves, or similarly establishing a vent by opening the pressurizer manway (Ref.11).The vent path(s)must be above the level of reactor coolant, so as not to drain the RCS when open.The passive vent arrangement must only be open (vent pathway exists)to be OPERABLE.These Surveillances need only be performed if the vent or the Shutdown Cooling System suction line relief valves are being used to satisfy the requirements of this LCO.The Frequencies consider operating experience with mispositioning of unlocked and locked pathway vent valves, and passive pathway obstructions

.SR 3.4.13.3 SRs are specified in the Inservice Testing Program.I Shutdown Cooling System suction line relief valves are to be tested in accordance with the requirements of the ASME OM Code (Ref.10), which provides the activities and the Frequency necessary to satisfy the SRs.The Shutdown Cooling System suction line relief valve set point is 467 psig.REFERENCES 1 10 CFR 50, Appendix G.2 Generic Letter 88-11.3 UFSAR, Section 15.4 10 CFR 50.46.I 5 10 CFR 5 0 , Appendix K.6 Generic Letter 90-06.7 UFSAR, Section 5.2.(continued)

I PALO VERDE UNITS 1 , 2 , 3 B 3.4.13-10 REVISION 54 LTOP System BASES B 3.4.13 REFERENCES 8.Pressure Transient Analyses (continued) a, V-PSAC-O09 (3876 MWt w/Original Steam Generators

[historical reference])

b.MN725-00118 (Unit 2, 4070_Wt w/Replacement Steam Generators) c.MN725-00562 (Units 31, 407 MWt w/Replacement Steam Generators) 9.Mass Input Pressure Transient in Water Solid RCS a, V-PSAC-010 (3876 MWt w/Orilinal Steam Generators

[historical reference])

b.MN725-00117 (Unit 2, 4070 MWt w/Replacement Steam Generators) c.MN725-01495 (Units 31,407(MWt w/Replacement Steam Generators) 10.ASME Code for Operation and_aintenance of Nuclear i Power Plants, I 11.13-C00-93-016

, Sensitivity Study on Pressurizer Vent Paths vs.Days Post Shutdown PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.4.13-11 REVISION 54 This page intentionally blank RCS PIV Leakage B 3.4.15 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.15.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS For the two PIVs in series , the l_kage requirement applies to each valve individually and not to the combined leakage across both valves.If the PIVs a not individually leakage tested, one valve may have failed completely and not be detected if the other valve in_eries meets the leakage requirement

.In this situation, t_e protection provided by redundant valves would be lost.Testing is to be performed every 9 months, but may be extended up to 18 months, a typica refueling cycle, if the plant does not go into MODE 5 for least 7 days.The 18 month Frequency is consistent th 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(Ref.8), is within frequency all by the American I Society of Mechanical Engineers)OM Code (Ref.7), I and is based on the need to perfor the Surveillance under conditions that apply during a pla outage and the potential for an unplanned transie if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.In addition , testing must be perfo once after the valve has been opened by flow or exercis to ensure tight reseating.PIVs disturbed in the)erformance of this Surveillance should also be unless documentation shows that an infinite testing loo cannot practically be avoided.Testing must be performe within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after the valve has been reseated.Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is a reasonable and practical time limi for performing this test after opening or reseating a val The SDC PIVs excepted in two of th three FREQUENCIES are UV-651, UV-652, UV-653, and UV-due to position indication of the valves in the room.Although not explicitly required SR 3.4.15.1, performance of leakage testing to verify l is below the specified limit must be performed prior to_turning a valve to service following maintenance, re r or replacement work on the valve in order to demonstrate)erability

.The leakage limit is to be met at RCS pressure associated with MODES 1 and 2.s permits leakage testing at high differential pressures wi stable conditions not possible in the MODES with lower ressures.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.4.15-5 REVISION 54 RCS PIV Leakage B 3.4.15 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.15.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Entry into MODES 3 and 4 is allowed to establish the necessary differential pressures and stable conditions to allow for performance of this Surveillance

.The Note that allows this provision is complimentary to the Frequency of prior to entry into MODE 2 whenever the unit has been in MODE 5 for 7 days or more, if leakage testing has not been performed in the previous 9 months.In addition, this Surveillance is not required to be performed on the SDC System when the SDC System is aligned to the RCS in the shutdown cooling mode of operation.PIVs contained in the SDC shutdown cooling flow path must be leakage rate tested after SDC is secured and stable unit conditions and the necessary differential pressures are established

.SR 3.4.15.2 Verifying that the SDC open permissive interlocks are I OPERABLE, when tested as described in Reference 10, ensures that RCS pressure will not pressurize the SDC system beyond 125%of its design pressure of 485 psig.The interlock setpoint that prevents the valves from being opened is set so the actual RCS pressure must be<410 psia to open the valves.This setpoint ensures the SDC design pressure will not be exceeded and the SDC relief valves (Reference 9)will not lift.The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under conditions that apply during a plant outage.The 18 month Frequency is also acceptable based on consideration of the design reliability (and confirming operating experience) of the equipment.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.4.15-6 REVISION 35 RCS PIV Leakage B3.4.15 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1 10 CFR 50.2.2 10 CFR 50.55a(c).3 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Section V , GDC 55.4 WASH-1400 NUREG-75/014), A_)endix V, October 1975.5 NUREG-0677 May 1980.6 UFSAR, Section 3.9.6.2 7 ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.8 10 CFR 50.55a(g).9 T.S.LCO 3.4.13 (LTOP)10.UFSAR Section 7.6.2.2.1, (4.0).PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.4.15-7 REVISION 54 This page intentionally blank ECCS-Operating B 3.5.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.3.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Periodic surveillance testing of ESCS pumps to detect gross degradation caused by impeller strJctural damage or other hydraulic component problems is reTuired by the ASME OM Code.This type of testing may be accomplished by measuring the pump developed head at only on?point of the pump characteristic curve.This verifies both that the measured performance is within an acceptabl?

tolerance of the original pump baseline performance and that the performance at the test flow is greater than o equal to the performance assumed in the unit safety analysi SRs are specified in the Inservice Testing Program, whi h encompasses the ASME OM Code (Ref.7).The frequency of t_is SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.5.3.4, SR 3.5.3.5, and SR 5.3.6 These SRs demonstrate that each auLomatic ECCS valve actuates to the required position Dn an actual or simulated SIAS and on an RAS, that each ECCS pump starts on receipt of an actual or simulated SIAS, and tqat the LPSI pumps stop on receipt of an actual or simulated_AS.This Surveillance is not required for valves that are IDcked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls.The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform these Surveillances under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for unplanned transients if the Surveillances were performed with the reactor at power.The 18 month Frequency is also acceptable based on consideration Df the design reliability (and confirming operating experience) of the equipment.The actuation logic is tested as part of the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)testing, and equipment performance is monitored as part of the Inservice Testing Program.The following valve actuations must be verified at least once per 18 months: on an actual or simulated re(irculation actuation signal, the containment sump isolation valves open, and the HPSI, LPSI and CS mirimum bypass recirculation flow line isolation valves arc combined SI mini flow valve close.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.5.3-9 REVISION 54 ECCS Operating B 3.5.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.3.7 REQU I REMENTS (continued)

Realignment of valves in the flow path on an SIAS is necessary for proper ECCS performance

.The safety injection valves have stops to position them properly so that flow is restricted to a ruptured cold leg, ensuring that the other cold legs receive at least the required minimum flow.The 18 month Frequency is based on current industry practice.These valves are also monitored in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (Ref.5).SR 3.5.3.8 Periodic inspection of the containment sump ensures that it is unrestricted and stays in proper operating condition.The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during an outage, on the need to have access to the location, and on the potential for unplanned transients i f the Survei I Iance were performed with the reactor at power.This Frequency is sufficient to detect abnormal degradation and is confirmed by operating experience

.REFERENCES 1.10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 35.2.10 CFR 50.46.3.UFSAR, Chapter 6.4.NRC Memorandum to V.Stello, Jr., from R.L.Baer,"Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.5.10 CFR 50.65.6.Combustion Engineering Owners Group Joint Applications Report for Low Pressure Safety Injection System AOT Extension, CE NPSD-995, dated May 1995, as submitted to NRC in APS letter no.1 0 2-03392 , dated June 13, 1995, with updates described in letter no.102-04250 dated February 26, 1999.Also see TS amendment no.124 dated February 1, 2000.I 7.ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.I PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.5.3-10 REVISION 54 RWT B 3,5.5 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)B 3.5.5 Refueling Water Tank (RWT)BASES BACKGROUND The RWT supports the ECCS and the]ontainment Spray System by providing a source of borated w_ter for Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)pump operation.The RWT supplies two ECCS trains b/separate , redundant supply headers.Each header also supplies one train of the Containment Spray System.A motor operated isolation valve is provided in each header to alloN the operator to isolate the usable volume of the RWT from the ECCS after the ESF pump suction has been transferred to the containment sump following depletion of the RWT during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).A separate header is used to supply the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)from the RWT.Use of a single RWT to supply both trains of the ECCS is acceptable since the RWT is a passive component, and passive failures are not assumed to occur soincidently with the Design Basis Event during the injestion phase of an accident.Not all the water storeJ in the RWT is available for injection following a LOCA;the location of the ECCS suction piping in the RWT will result in some portion of the stored volume being unavailable.

The High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI), Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI), and containment spray pumps are provided with recirculation lines that ensure each pump can maintain minimum flow requirements when operating at shutoff head conditions.

These lines discharge back to the RWT.The RWT vents to the Fuel Building Ventilation System.When the suction for the HPSI and containment spray pumps is transferred to the containment sun), this flow path must be isolated to prevent a release of tle containment sump contents to the RWT.If not isolated, this flow path could result in a release of contaminants to the atmosphere and the eventual loss of suction head for the ESF pumps.This LCO ensures that: a.The RWT contains sufficient L_orated water to support the ECCS and Containment SpryLy System during the injection phase;(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.5.5-1 REVISION 54 RWT B3.5.5 I BASES BACKGROUND b.Sufficient water volume exists in the containment sump (continued) to support continued operation of the ESF pumps at the time of transfer to the recirculation mode of cooling;and c.The reactor remains subcritical following a LOCA.Insufficient water inventory in the RWT could result in (1)insufficient cooling capacity of the ECCS and Containment Spray System, or (2)insufficient water level to support continued ESF pump operation when the transfer to the recirculation mode occurs.Improper boron concentrations could result in a reduction of SDM or excessive boric acid precipitation in the core following a LOCA, as well as excessive caustic stress corrosion of mechanical components and systems inside containment

.The RWT also provides a source of borated water to the charging system for makeup to the RCS to compensate for contraction of the RCS coolant during plant cooldown while maintaining adequate shutdown margin.Although this charging system boration function is not required to be in a Technical Specification LCO per 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) criteria, the RWT volume requirements of Figure 3.5.5-1 include this function in order to provide the plant operators with a single requirement for RWT volume.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.5.5-2 REVISION 54 RWT B 3.5.5 BASES BACKGROUND The table below provides the required RWT level at selected (continued)

RCS average temperature values, corresponding to Figure 3.5.5-1.The RWT volume is the tctal volume of water in the RWT above the vortex breaker.This volume includes the volumes required to be transferred, as discussed below, an allowance for instrument uncertainty, and the volume that will remain in the RWT after the s_itch over to the recirculation mode.RWT Required Level at RCS Temperatures RCS Temperature

(°F)RWT Required Level RWT Volume*average Indicated (Gallons)(%)Pre-RWT TS After-RWT TS Pre-RWT TS After-RWT Setpoint Setpoint Setpoint TS Setpoint Change Change Change Change 210 79.9 81.2 601,000 611,000 250 80.1 81.4 603 , 000 613,000 300 80.4 81.8 605,000 615,000 350 80.8 82.1 608,000 618,000 400 81.2 82.5 611,000 621,000 450 81.6 83.0 614,000 624,000 500 82.1 83.5 618,000 628,000 565 83.0 84.3 624,000 634,000 600 83.0 84.3 624,000 634,000*The volumes include instrument uncertainty and have been rounded up or down to the nearest 1,000 gallons.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.5.5-3 REVISION 54 RWT B3.5.5 BASES APPLICABLE During accident conditions, the RWT provides a source of SAFETY ANALYSES borated water to the HPSl, LPSl and containment spray pumps.As such, it provides containment cooling and depressurization, core cooling, and replacement inventory and is a source of negative reactivity for reactor shutdown (Ref.1).The design basis transients and applicable safety analyses concerning each of these systems are discussed in the Applicable Safety Analyses section of Bases B 3.5.3,"ECCS-Operating," and B 3.6.6,"Containment Spray." These analyses are used to assess changes to the RWT in order to evaluate their effects in relation to the acceptance limits.The level limit of Figure 3.5.5-1 for the ESF function is based on the largest of the following four factors: I a.A volume of borated water must be transferred to containment via the ESF pumps prior to reaching a low level switchover to the containment sump for recirculation

.This ESF Reserve Volume ensures that the ESF pump suction will not be aligned to the containment sump until the point at which 75%of the minimum design flow of one HPSl pump is capable of meeting or exceeding the decay heat boil-off rate.b.A volume of borated water must be transferred to the RCS and containment for flooding of sump strainers to prevent vortexing and to ensure adequate net positive suction head to support continued ESF pump operation after the switchover to recirculati o n occurs.I c.A volume of borated water must be avail a ble for Containment Spray System operation as credited in the containment pressure and temperature analyses.I d.A volume of borated water is needed during ECCS functions to ensure shut down margin (SDM)is maintained

.The volume required is similar to that needed for the charging system function of compensating for contraction of the RCS coolant during plant cooldown.The volume required will vary depending upon the event and is bounded by the volume (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.5.5-4 REVISION 54 l Containment Spray System B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Verifying that the containment sp ay header piping is full of water to the 113 ft level minimizes the time required to fill the header.This ensures that spray flow will be admitted to the containment atmosphere within the time frame assumed in the containment analysis.The analyses shows that the header may be filled with unborated water which helps to reduce boron plate out due to evaporation

.The 31 day Frequency is based on the static nature of the fill header and the low probability of a significant degradation of water level in the piping occurring between surveillances

.The value of 113 ft is an indicated value which accounts for instrument unc_rtainty.SR 3.6.6.3 Verifying that each containment s ray pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head ensures that spray pump performance has not degraded during the cycle.Flow and differential pressure are normal tests of centrifugal pump performance required by the ASME OM Code (Ref.6).Since the I containment spray pumps cannot be tested with flow through the spray headers, they are tested on recirculation flow (either full flow or miniflow as conditions permit).This test is indicative of overall performance

.Such inservice inspections confirm component OPER&BILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance

.The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.(conti nued)PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.6.6-7 REVISION 54 Containment Spray System B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.4 and SR 3.6.6.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS These SRs verify that each automatic containment spray valve actuates to its correct position and that each containment spray pump starts upon receipt of an actual or simulated safety injection actuation signal, recirculation actuation signal and containment spray actuation signal as applicable

.This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls.The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform these Surveillances under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillances were performed with the reactor at power.Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillances when performed at the 18 month Frequency.Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint

.The surveillance of containment sump isolation valves is also required by SR 3.5.3.5.A single surveillance may be used to satisfy both requirements

.SR 3.6.6.6 Unobstructed flow headers and nozzles are determined by either flow testing or visual inspection

.With the containment spray inlet valves closed and the spray header drained of any solution, low pressure air or smoke can be blown through test connections

.Performance of this SR demonstrates that each spray nozzle is unobstructed and provides assurance that spray coverage of the containment during an accident is not degraded.Due to the passive design of the nozzle, a test at 10 year intervals is considered adequate to detect obstruction of the spray nozzles.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.6.6-8 REVISION 48 Containment Spray System B 3.6.6 BASES REFERENCES 1.10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 3E GDC 39, GDC 40, GDC 41, GDC 42, and GDC 43.2.UFSAR, Section 6.2.3.UFSAR, Section 6.5.4.UFSAR, Section 7.3.5.UFSAR, Section 3.1.34 6.ASME Code for Operation and aintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.7.10 CFR 50.44.8.Regulatory Guide 1.7, Revisi n O.PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.6.6-9 REVISION 54 This page intentionally blank MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued)

When more than eight required MSSVs per steam generator are inoperable, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.To achieve this status the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies the OPERABILITY cf the MSSVs by the verification of each MSSV lift setpoints in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.The ASME OM Code (Ref.4), requires the following tests for PSSVs: a.Visual examination; b.Seat tightness determination c.Setpoint pressure determinat on (lift setting);d.Compliance with owner's seat tightness criteria;and e.Verification of the balancin(device integrity on bal anced valves.The ASME OM Code requires that al valves be tested every 5 years, and a minimum of 20%of th valves tested every 24 months.The ASME OM Code specifie the activities and frequencies necessary to satisfy the requirements

.Table 3.7.1-2 allows a+/-3%setpoint tolerance for OPERABILITY; however, the valves re reset to+/-1%during the Surveillance to allow for dri t.PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.7.1-5 REVISION 54 MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR.This is to allow testing of the MSSVs at hot conditions

.The MSSVs may be either bench tested or tested in situ at hot conditions using an assist device to simulate lift pressure.If the MSSVs are not tested at hot conditions, the lift setting pressure shall be corrected to ambient conditions of the valve at operating temperature and pressure.REFERENCES 1.UFSAR, Section 5.2.2.ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section Ill, Article NC-7 0 00, Class 2 Components

.3.UFSAR, Section 15.2.4.ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear I Power Plants.I PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.7.1-6 REVISION 54 MSIVs B 3.7.2 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS E.1 (continued)(continued) or more MSIVs inoperable while in_IODE 1 requires entry into LCO 3.0.3.F.1 With one MSIV inoperable in MODE 1, time is allowed to restore the component to OPERABLE status.Some repairs can be made to the MSIV with the unit qot.The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable, considering the probability of an accident occurring during th time period that would require closure of the MSIVs.Condition F is entered when one MS V is inoperable in MODE 1, including when both actuator trains for one MSIV are operable.When only one actuator train is inoperable on one MSIV, Condition A applies.The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time is consistent with that normally al I owed for containment i sol ation valves that i sol ate a closed system penetrating containment

.These valves differ from other containment isolation valves in that the closed system provides an additional means for containment isolation.G.I I If the MSIV cannot be restored to OPERABLE within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.To achieve this status , the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and Condition H would be entered.The I Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2, and close the MSIVs in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.H.1 and H.2 Condition H is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSIV.Since the MSIVs are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, the inoperable MSIVs may either be restored to OPERABLE status or closed.When closed, the MSIVs are already in the position required by the assumptions in the safety analysis.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.7.2-7 REVISION 40 MSIVs B 3.7.2 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS H.1 and H.2 (continued)(continued)

The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time is consistent with that allowed in Condition F.Inoperable MSIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the specified Completion Time but are closed must be verified on a periodic basis to be closed.This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid.The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, MSIV status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls, to ensure these valves are in the closed position.I.l and 1.2 If the MSIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status , or closed, within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from MODE 2 conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the closure time of each MSIV is within the limit given in Reference 5 with each actuator train on an actual or simulated actuation signal and is within that assumed in the accident and containment analyses.This SR also verifies the valve closure time is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.This SR I is normally performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage.The MSIVs should not be full stroke tested at power.The Frequency for this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.This Frequency demonstrates the valve closure time at least once per refueling cycle.(continued)

I PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.7.2-8 REVISION 54 MSIVs B 3.7.2 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This test is conducted in MODE 3 , Nith the unit at operating temperature and pressure, as discussed in the Reference 6 exercising requirements

.This SR is modified I by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 l prior to performing the SR.This a llows a delay of testing until MODE 3, in order to establisl conditions consistent with those under which the acceptance criterion was generated.REFERENCES 1.UFSAR, Section 10.3.2.CESSAR, Section 6.2.3.UFSAR, Section 15.1.5.4.10 CFR 100.11.5.UFSAR, Section 5.1.5 6.ASME Code for Operation and_aintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.PALO VERDE UNITS 1 , 2,3 B 3.7.2-9 REVISION 54 This page intentionally blank MFIVs B 3.7.3 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that closure time of each MFIV is within the limit given in Reference 2 on an actual or simulated actuation signal and is within that assumed in the accident and containment analyses.This SR also verifies the valve closure time is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.This SR is normally perfDrmed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage.The MFIVs should not be full stroke tested a power.The Frequency is in accordance wit the Inservice Testing Program.The Frequency for valve losure time is based on the refueling cycle.Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the specified Frequency.REFERENCES 1.UFSAR, Section 10.4.7.2.UFSAR, Section 5.1.5.PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.7.3-5 REVISION 54 This page intentional ly blank AFW System B 3.7.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS normal tests of pump performance required by the ASME OM Code (Ref.2).Because it is undesirable to introduce cold AFW into the steam generators whi e they are operating, this testing may be performed on recir, ulation flow.This test confirms one point on the pump design curve and can be indicative of overall performance.

Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance

.Performance of inservice testing, discussed in the ASME OM Code, (Ref.2), at 3 month intervals satisfies this requirement

.This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR should be deferred until suitable test conditions are established

.Normal operating pressure is established in the steam generators when RCS temperature reaches 532°F, this corresponds to a Psat of 900 psia.Fhis deferral is required because there is an insufficient steam pressure to perform the test.SR 3.7.5.3 This SR ensures that AFW can be delivered to the appropriate steam generator, in the event of any accident or transient that generates an AFAS signal, by demonstrating that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls.This SR is not required for the non-essential train since there are no automatic valves which receive an AFAS.The 18 morth Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage ard the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.The 18 month Frequency is acceptable, based on the design reliability ard operating experience of the equipment.This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR should be deferred until suitable test ccnditions have been established

.Normal operating pressure is established in the steam generators when RCS temFerature reaches 532°F, this corresponds to a Psat of 900 psia.This deferral is required because there is an insufficient steam pressure to perform the test.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.7.5-9 REVISION 54 AFW System B 3.7.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Also, this SR is modified by a Note that states the SR is not required in MODE 4.In MODE 4, the required AFW train is already aligned and operating.SR 3.7.5.4 This SR ensures that the essential AFW pumps will start in the event of any accident or transient that generates an AFAS signal by demonstrating that each essential AFW pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.The 18 month Frequency is acceptable, based on the design reliability and operating experience of the equipment.The non-essential AFW pump does not automatically activate and is not subject to this SR.This SR is modified by two Notes.Note 1 indicates that the SR be deferred until suitable test conditions are established

.Normal operating pressure is established in the steam generators when RCS temperature reaches 532°F, this corresponds to a Psat of 900 psi a.This deferral is required because there is insufficient steam pressure to perform the test.Note 2 states that the SR is not required in MODE 4.In MODE 4, the required pump is already operating and the autostart function is not required.SR 3.7.5.5 This SR ensures that the AFW System is properly aligned by verifying the flow path from each essential AFW pump to each steam generator prior to entering MODE 2 operation, after 30 days in MODE 5 or 6.OPERABILITY of essential AFW flow paths must be verified before sufficient core heat is generated that would require the operation of the AFW System during a subsequent shutdown.The Frequency is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, and administrative controls to ensure that flow paths remain OPERABLE.(continued)

I I PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.7.5-10 REVISION 9 AFW System B 3.7.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS To further ensure AFW System aligrnent, the OPERABILITY of the essential AFW flow paths is verified following extended outages to determine that no misal gnment of valves has occurred.This SR ensures that th flow path from the CST to the steam generators is properl aligned by requiring a verification of minimum flow capac ty of 650 gpm at pressures corresponding to 1270 psia at the entrance to the steam generators

.(This SR is not required for the non-essential AFW pump since it is normally used for startup and shutdown.)REFERENCES 1.UFSAR, Section 10.4.9.2.ASME Code for Operation and_aintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.7.5-11 REVISION 54 This page intentionally blank CST B 3.7.6 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST)BASES BACKGROUND The CST provides a safety grade source of water to the steam generators for removing decay and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS).The CST is the primary source of water for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)System (LCO 3.7.5 ,"Auxiliary Feedwater (&FW)System").The steam produced is released to the atmosphere by the Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)or the atmos)heric dump valves.When the main steam isolation valves are open, the preferred means of heat removal is to discharge steam to the condenser by the nonsafety grade path of the steam bypass control valves.The condensed steam is returned to the CST by the condensate pump draw-off.This has the advantage of conserving condensate while minimizing releases to the environment

.Because the CST is a principal component in removing residual heat from the RCS, it is designed to withstand earthquakes and other natural phenomena.The CST is designed to Seismic Category I requirements to ensure availability of the feedwater supply.Feedwater is also available from the Reactor Makeup dater Tank (RMWT).A description of the CST is found in the UFSAR, Section 9.2.6 (Ref.I).APPLICABLE The CST has sufficient volume to_aintain the plant for SAFETY ANALYSES 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months at MODE 3 followed by a symmetrical cooldown (two steam generators available) to shutdown cooling (SDC)entry conditions at the design cooldown rate in the event of main condenser unavailability

.The CST inventory is demonstrated to be sufficient by satisfying the requirements of long-term cooling event which includes both LOCA Long-Term Cooling and Reactor Systems Branch Technical Position 5-1 (RSB 5-1)"Design Requirements of the Residual Heat Removal System" (Ref.4), scenario, described in UFSAR Appendix 5C, atural Circulation Cooldown Analysis", is based on a natural circulation cooldown with both steam generators (SGs)available, using (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1 , 2 , 3 B 3.7.6-1 REVISION 54 CST B3.7.6 BASES APPLICABLE safety-grade equipment, assuming a loss of offsite power, a SAFETY ANALYSES limiting single failure, and with minimal operator actions (continued) outside the control room, as approved by the NRC.The RSB 5-1 guidance requires 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months at hot standby prior to initiating cooldown and is analytically found to be the bounding event for CST sizing.Transients and accidents other than the RSB 5-1 scenario and Long Term LOCA are evaluated deterministically in the UFSAR Chapter 15 analyses to demonstrate the ability to achieve hot standby conditions (Refs 2 and 3).Cooldown scenarios to SDC entry conditions outside the"events" described here are outside the current Design Basis.The Licensing Basis for these scenarios is that there are no significant decay heat removal vulnerabilities when all available plant equipment and the EOPs are evaluated through the facility's probabilistic risk assessment, as documented in the APS resolution of"Unresolved Safety Issue" (USl)A-45,"Shutdown Decay Heat Removal Requirements" and response to GL 88-20,"Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities

.The CST satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii)

.I LCO The CST must contain sufficient cooling water to remove decay heat for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months following a reactor trip from 102%RTP, and then cool down the RCS to SDC entry conditions, assuming a coincident loss of offsite power and the most adverse single failure as required by RSB 5-1.I The CST level required is a usable volume of_300,000 gallons, which is based on holding the unit in MODE 3 for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , followed by a cooldown to SDC entry conditions at I 75°F per hour.This basis is analytically bounded by the level required by the NRC Standard Review Plan Branch Technical Position, Reactor Systems Branch 5-1 (Ref.4).OPERABILITY of the CST is determined by maintaining the tank level at or above the minimum required level.(continued)

I PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.7.6-2 REVISION 54 CST B 3.7.6 BASES APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, and in MODE 4, when steam generator is being relied upon for heat removal the CST is required to be OPERABLE.In MODES 5 and 6, the CST is not r ,quired because the AFW System is not required.ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If the CST level is not within the limit, the OPERABILITY of the backup water supply (RMWT)must be verified within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .OPERABILITY of the RMWT must include initial alignment and verification of the OPERABILITY of flow paths from the RMWT to the AFW pumps , and availability of 26 ft.(300,000 gal.)of water in the RMWT.The CST level must be returned to OPERABLE status within 7 days, as the RMWT may be performing this function in addition to its normal functions.The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to verify the OPERABI ITY of the RMWT.The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable based on an OPERABLE RMWT being available , and the low prob bility of an event requiring the use of the water frcm the CST occurring during this period.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2 , 3 B 3.7.6-3 REVISION 54 CST B3.7.6 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

If the CST cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 4, without reliance on steam generator for heat removal, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.6.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the CST contains the required volume of cooling water.(This level_29.5 ft (3 0 0,000 gallons)).The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Frequency is based on operating experience, and the need for operator awareness of unit evolutions that may affect the CST inventory between checks.The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to abnormal CST level deviations

.REFERENCES 1.UFSAR, Section 9.2.6.2.UFSAR, Chapter 6.3.UFSAR, Chapter 15.4.NRC Standard Review Plan Branch Technical Position I (BTP)RSB 5-1.PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.7.6-4 REVISION 54 I Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued)

With the new fuel oil properties defined in the Bases for SR 3.8.3.3 not within the required limits, a period of 30 days is allowed for restoring the stored fuel oil properties

.This period provides sufficient time to test the stored fuel oil to determine that the new fuel oil, when mixed with previously stored fuel oil, remains acceptable, or restore the stored fuel oil properties

.This restoration may involve feed and bleed procedures, filtering, or combinations of these procedures

.Even if a DG start and load was required during this time interval and the fuel oil properties were outside limits, there is a high likelihood that the DG would still be capable of performing its intended function.E.1 Each DG is OPERABLE with one air receiver capable of delivering an operating pressure of_230 psig indicated.Although there are two independent and redundant starting air receivers per DG , only one starting air receiver is required for DG OPERABILITY

.Each receiver is sized to accomplish 5 DG starts from its ncrmal operating pressure of 250 psig, and each will start the DG in_10 seconds with a minimum pressure of 185 psig indicated.If the required starting air receiver is<230 psigiand_185 psig indicated, the starting air syste_s degraded and a period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is considered sufficient to complete restoration to the required pressure prior to declaring the DG inoperable

.This 48-hour period is acceptable based on the minimum starting air capacity (_]85 psig indicated), the fact that the DG start must be accomplished on the first attempt (there are no sequential starts in emergency mode), and the low probability of an event during this brief period.Calculation 13-JC-DG-203 (Ref.8)supports the I proposed values for receiver pressures.F.1 With a Required Action and associeted Completion Time not met, or one or more DGs with diesel fuel oil, lube oil, or starting air subsystem inoperable for reasons other than addressed by Conditions A through E, the associated DG may be incapable of performing its intended function and must be immediately declared inoperable

.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.8.3-5 REVISION 54 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES ACTIONS F.1 (continued)

A Note modifies condition F.Periodic starting of the Emergency Diesel Generator(s) requires isolation on one of the two normally aligned air start receivers.During the subsequent Diesel Generator start, the air pressure in the one remaining air receiver may momentarily drop below the I minimum required pressure of 185 psig indicated.This would normally require declaring the now running Diesel Generator inoperable, due to low pressure in the air start system.This is not required, as the Diesel Generator would now be running following the successful start.Should the start not be successful, the DG would be declared inoperable per the requirements of LCO 3.8.1.As such, this Condition is modified by a Note stating that should the required starting air receiver pressure momentarily drop to<185 psig I indicated while starting the Diesel Generator on one air receiver only, then entry into Condition F is not required.It is expected that this condition would be fairly short duration (approximately 8 minutes), as the air start compressors should quickly restore the air receiver pressure after the diesel start.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR provides verification that there is an adequate inventory of fuel oil in the storage tanks to support each DG's operation for 7 days at full load.The 7 day period is sufficient time to place the unit in a safe shutdown condition and to bring in replenishment fuel from an offsite location.The 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and unit operators would be aware of any large uses of fuel oil during this period.SR 3.8.3.2 This Surveillance ensures that sufficient lube oil inventory is available to support at least 7 days of full load operation for each DG.The 2.5 inches visible in the I sightglass requirement is based on the DG manufacturer consumption values for the run time of the DG.Implicit in this SR is the requirement to verify the capability to (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.8.3-6 REVISION 51 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.3.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This Surveillance ensures that, without the aid of the refill compressor, sufficient air start capacity for each DG is available.The system design requirements provide for a minimum of five engine start cycles without recharging

.A start cycle is defined by the DG vendor, but usually is measured in terms of time (seconds or cranking)or engine cranking speed.The pressure specified in this SR is intended to reflect the lowest vaIJe at which the DG can be considered OPERABLE.The 31 day Frequency takes into account the capacity, capability, redundancy

, and diversity of the AC sources and other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to below normal air start pressure.SR 3.8.3.5 Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation

.There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive.Removal of water from the fuel oil storage tanks once every 92 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival.This is the most effective means of controllin_

microbiological fouling.In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation.Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water , rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and from breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria.Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regardin_the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system.The Surveillance Frequencies are established by Regulatory Guide 1 137 (Ref.10).This SR is for preventive maintenance

.The resence of water does not necessarily represent failure of this SR provided the accumulated water is removed durin_the performance of this Surveillance

.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.8.3-9 REVISION 41 Diesel Fuel Oil , Lube Oil , and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES REFERENCES 1.FSAR, Section 9.5.4.2.2.Regulatory Guide 1.137.3.ANSl N195-1976, Appendix B.4.FSAR, Chapter 6.5.FSAR, Chapter 15.6.ASTM Standards:

D4057-81;D975-O7b;D976-91;D4737-90;D1796-83;D2276-89 , Method A.7.ASTM Standards, D975, Table 1.I 8."Emergency Diesel Generator and Diesel Fuel Oil Systems Instrumentation Uncertainty Calculation", 13-JC-DG-203, Parts 23 and 51 PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2 , 3 B 3.8.3-10 REVISION 54 SDC and Coolant Circulation

-High Water Level B 3.9,4 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.4 Shutdown Cooling (SDC)and Coolant Circulat on-High Water Level BASES BACKGROUND The purposes of the SDC System in_ODE 6 are to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), as required by GDC 34 , to p°ovide mixing of borated coolant, to provide sufficient coo ant circulation to minimize the effects of a boron di ution accident, and to prevent boron stratification (Ref.1).Heat is removed from the RCS by circulating reactor coo ant through the SDC heat exchanger(s), where the heat is trmsferred to the Essential Cooling Water System via the SDC h_at exchanger(s)

.The coolant is then returned to the RC5 via the RCS cold leg(s).Operation of the SDC System for normal cooldown or decay heat removal is manually accomplished from the control room.The heat removal rate is adjusted Dy controlling the flow of reactor coolant through the SDC he_t exchanger(s) and bypassing the heat exchanger(s)

._ixing of the reactor coolant is maintained by this continuous circulation of reactor coolant through the SDC System.APPLICABLE If the reactor coolant temperature is not maintained below SAFETY ANALYSES 200°F, boiling of the reactor cool a nt could result.This could lead to inadequate cooling of the reactor fuel due to a resulting loss of coolant in the reactor vessel.Additionally, boiling of the reactor coolant could lead to a reduction in boron concentration in the coolant due to the boron plating out on components near the areas of the boiling activity, and because of the possible addition of water to the reactor vessel with a lower boron concentration than is required to keep the reactor subcritical

.The loss of reactor coolant and the reduction of boron concentration in the reactor coolant would eventually challenge the integrity of the fuel cladding, which is a fission product barrier.One train of the SDC System is required to be operational in MODE 6, with the water level 2 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, to prevent this challenge.The LCO does permit de-energizing of the SDC pump for short durations under the condition that the boron concentration is not diluted.This conditional de-energizing of the SDC pump does not result in a challenge to the fission product barrier.SDC and Coolant Circulation

-High Water Level sat sfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.9.4-1 REVISION 0 SDC and Coolant Circulation

-High Water Level B 3.9.4 BASES LCO Only one SDC loop is required for decay heat removal in MODE 6, with water level_23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange.Only one SDC loop is required because the volume of water above the reactor vessel flange provides backup decay heat removal capability

.At least one SDC loop must be in operation to provide: a.Removal of decay heat b.Mixing of borated coolant to minimize the possibility of a criticality and c.Indication of reactor coolant temperature

.An OPERABLE SDC train is composed of an OPERABLE SDC pump (LPSl or CS)capable of providing flow to the SDC heat exchanger for heat removal.SDC pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide flow, I if required.The LCO is modified by a Note that allows the required operating SDC loop to be removed from service for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months in each 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period, provided no operations are permitted that would cause a reduction of the RCS boron concentration

.Boron concentration reduction is prohibited because uniform concentration distribution cannot be ensured without forced circulation

.This permits operations such as core mapping or alterations in the vicinity of the reactor vessel hot leg nozzles, surveillance testing of ECCS pumps, and RCS to SDC isolation valve testing.During this 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months period, decay heat is removed by natural convection to the large mass of water in the refueling cavity.APPLICABILITY One SDC loop must be in operation in MODE 6, with the water level_23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, to provide decay heat removal.The 23 ft level was selected because it corresponds to the 23 ft requirement established for fuel movement in LCO 3.9.6,"Refueling Water Level Fuel Assemblies

." I (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.9.4-2 REVISION 54 SDC and Coolant Circulation Low Water Level B 3.9.5 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.5 Shutdown Cooling (SDC)and Coolant Circulation Low Water Level BASES BACKGROUND The purposes of the SDC System in_ODE 6 are to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), as required by GDC 34, to provide mixing of borated coolant, to provide sufficient coolant circulation to minimize the effects of a boron dilution accident, and to prevent boron stratification (Ref.1).Heat is removed from the RCS by circulating reactor coolant through the SDC heat exchanger(s)

, where the heat is transferred to the Essential Cooling Water System via the SDC heat exchanger(s)

.The coolant is then returned to the RCS via the RCS cold leg(s).Operation of the SDC System for normal cooldown or decay heat removal is manually accomplished from the control room.The heat removal rate is adjusted by controlling the flow of reactor coolant through the SDC heat exchanger(s) and bypassing the heat exchanger(s)

.Mixing of the reactor coolant is maintained by this contlnuous circulation of reactor coolant through the SDC System.APPLICABLE If the reactor coolant tempe ratur_is not maintained below SAFETY ANALYSES 200°F, boiling of the reactor coolant could result.This could lead to inadequate cooling cf the reactor fuel due to the resulting loss of coolant in the reactor vessel.Additionally, boiling of the reactor coolant could lead to a reduction in boron concentration in the coolant due to the boron plating out on components n_ar the areas of the boiling activity, and because of he possible addition of water to the reactor vessel with lower boron concentration than is required to keep the reac or subcritical

.The loss of reactor coolant and the reduction of boron concentration in the reactor coolant would eventually challenge the integrity of the fuel cladding, which is a fission product barrier.Two trains of the SDC System are required to be OPERABLE, and one train is required to be in operation in MODE 6 , with the water level<23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange , to prevent this challenge.SDC and Coolant Circulation

-Low Water Level satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii)

.(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3,9.5-1 REVISION 0 SDC and Coolant Circulation

-Low Water Level B 3.9.5 BASES LCO In MODE 6, with the water level<23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, both SDC loops must be OPERABLE.Additionally, one loop of the SDC System must be in operation in order to provide: a.Removal of decay heat;b.Mixing of borated coolant to minimize the possibility of a criticality; and c.Indication of reactor coolant temperature

.An OPERABLE SDC train is composed of an OPERABLE SDC pump (LPSl or CS)capable of providing flow to the SDC heat exchanger for heat removal.SDC pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide flow , if required.Both SDC pumps may be aligned to the Refueling Water Tank (RWT)to support filling the refueling cavity or for performance of required testing.The LCO is modified by a Note that allows a required operating SDC loop to be removed from service for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months in each 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period, provided no operations are permitted that would cause a reduction of the RCS boron concentration

.Boron concentration reduction is prohibited because uniform concentration distribution cannot be ensured without forced circulation

.This permits operations such as core mapping or alterations in the vicinity of the reactor vessel hot leg nozzles, surveillance testing of ECCS pumps, and RCS to SDC isolation valve testing.During this 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months period, decay heat is removed by natural convection to the large mass of water in the refueling cavity.This LCO is modified by a Note that allows one SDC loop to be inoperable for a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months provided the other loop is OPERABLE and in operation.Prior to declaring the loop inoperable, consideration should be given to the existing plant configuration

.This consideration should include that the core time to boil is not short, there is no draining operation to further reduce RCS water level and that the capacity exists to inject borated water into the reactor vessel.This permits surveillance tests to be performed on the non-operating loop during a time when these tests are safe and possible.(conti nued)PALO VERDE UNITS 1 , 2,3 B 3.9.5-2 REVISION 54 I

@@ Line 3: / Line 3: @@
 | issue date = 01/26/2011
 | title = PVNGS Insertion Instructions for Technical Specifications Bases Changed Pages, Revision 54
-| author name = Stephenson C J
+| author name = Stephenson C
 | author affiliation = Arizona Public Service Co
 | addressee name =

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